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# SENIOR LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AT THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL

by Elliott Jaques, S. Clement, C. Rigby and T. Owen Jacobs

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This report was the first in a series resulting from research inspired by Dr. Elliott Jaques and in which he was directly involved. His move to the United States in the late seventies opened the door to collaboration with the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences at a time when the Army was deeply concerned about succession in its General Officer Corps. At that time, leadership was still viewed by key Army doctrinal proponents from a leader-centric perspective. Leader attributes and behavior were the central concern; relatively little attention was paid to role complexity, organizational processes and organizational structure. U. S. military leadership doctrine reflected this leader-centric perspective strongly, thus failing to differentiate face-to-face leadership from organizational and systems leadership. In the U. S. and elsewhere, the scientific study of organizations as living systems had already achieved substantial maturity, but an understanding of the transitive interface between individual leadership and organizational behavior had yet to see the light of day in military doctrine. More pointedly, there was little codified understanding of the responsibility that strategic military leaders have for shaping organizational culture, climate and operational processes, so as to achieve organizational excellence, or of their global roles – in some cases nearly equal in importance to those of ambassadors. Clearly, many very senior military leaders did understand these roles, as our research showed. However, the base of doctrine on which leader development practices were based at that time was blind to the larger reality.

Perhaps even more significant, officer personnel management practices–analogous to human resources management in the private sector–were based on industrial-age concepts which some scientists believed inappropriate for the evolving information-age global society. While weeding out the less capable, these practices also discouraged many young officers of high potential, leading to early termination of their military service and rendering the military organization itself less capable of truly transformative thought.

It was into this context that Dr. Jaques brought his rich understanding of the interplay between the organization, with its structures, processes and global reach, and leaders at various levels, with their attributes, developmental perspectives, and global roles. With his insights, a program of research was approved by topmost levels of the Army Staff to test applicability of Stratified Systems Theory within the military organization, and to make subsequent recommendations for improving leader development. Its specific objectives were:

- to examine the structure of the operational (TO&E) Army to question whether it is fundamentally sound against the criterion of Requisite Organization structure,
- to assess the extent to which the military personnel management system had placed requisitely complex general officers and civilians in the topmost roles, and
- to provide the basis for changes in the doctrinal leadership base and in leader developmental practices.

The authors of this report together interviewed a total of 68 top-level executives: 4-star general officers, 3-star general officers, and top-level civilian members of the Senior Executive Service. The report contains initial findings and projects subsequent efforts/utilization of results. Broad initial findings include:

- The mental frames of reference–what the generals thought about and how they did it–strongly supported SST predictions. Four-star generals were concerned about national and international politics, economics, and social structures–the role of the military in society and in the global context. They were less concerned about "internal" matters. Officers who were 2-star and lower were more concerned about "running" their organizations.
- The structure of role complexity in the field (TO&E) Army was quite similar to that found in previous SST research in large divisional organizations in the private sector.
- If there is a single, "most important" theme in our preliminary findings, it is that "cognitive power" is extraordinarily important. Our generals commented often about the complexity and uncertainty at the strategic level.
- Most predictions from SST as applied in the private sector appear to have been supported in this research. We concluded that SST would be a powerful tool for improving leader development and organizational functioning.

More detailed findings from detailed analysis of these interviews are contained in other reports in this series.

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This report deals with the changing nature and increasing complexity at the various GO/SES levels. A general theory of organizational structure is proposed which would facilitate leader development and provide information and decision systems support for executives. A program of action is posited based on findings from interview data which lays out major systematic leadership requirements for a hierarchy of levels of work. Higher level work (structured within a joint, combined, and unified command) is characterized as requiring an (Continued)

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20. (Continued)

international perspective and collegiality. Professional development and competency requirements at the top-most levels are consistent with a time horizon of 20 years or more.

Research Report 1420

# Senior Leadership Performance Requirements at the Executive Level

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## Foreword

Technology changes over the past two decades promise near-quantum change in the nature of the future mid- to high-intensity battlefield. Because leadership is perhaps the most critical factor in generating combat power, systematic research to anticipate future battlefield leadership needs is appropriate as a part of the Army's total readiness posture. And because the growth of generations of leaders with different capabilities requires very long lead times, it is appropriate that this research itself have a substantial future orientation.

This report is part of a larger effort which is intended to influence the development of officers from mid-career onward. Its immediate application is to increase understanding of the conceptual frames of reference used by Army executives to deal with issues critical at their level, and to provide immediate improvement in organizational and information systems support provided executives. Its long-term application is to provide a set of developmental goals for sequential and progressive growth of leader potential throughout the major part of a career.



Edgar M. Johnson
Technical Director

SENIOR LEADERSHIP

PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AT THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Introduction

The report which this summary will preface describes interview findings from research on executive (general officer and SES) position requirements. It is an initial effort in a series of efforts designed to increase the scope of Army leadership doctrine and Army leader development.

The need for a broader scope was recognized in 1982 within the Department of Command, USACGSC, during the writing of the current FM 22-100. This need was subsequently codified in TRADOC PAM 525-28, US Army Operational Concept for Leadership, which was published in March 1983. In this operational concept, several requirements for leadership doctrine and leader development were established. Explicit among them were the following.

1. A linkage between leadership and operational publications is required. Leadership is for a purpose, and the Army's primary purpose is fighting. The linkage thus should primarily be between "how to lead" and "how to fight", with provision for linkages with other "how to's" as required. The requirement thus was posed for a family of leadership doctrinal manuals. A mid-level manual is now under development at the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), based in part on concepts provided by the Army Research Institute (ARI). The effort now being reported was designed to support concept development for the executive level.

2. Leader development should focus not only on schools, but also on experience in units and on self-initiated development.

3. Leader development must be integrated, sequential, and progressive. The most critical tasks of leaders at the various organizational levels are unique to those levels. Each level of leadership thus represents unique skill requirements. Leader development must therefore aim to develop those skills progressively, in the correct sequence to produce mature and capable leaders as they are needed. The development must consider all sources of development as an integrated whole, i.e., any given source of development cannot be considered in insolation from the others. The sequence of development was later identified as direct leadership (up to and including battalion), organizational (battalion through division), and systems (echelons above division). FM 22-100 addresses direct leadership; the mid-level draft addresses organizational leadership; and the executive work now in progress will address systems leadership.

Discussions during the fall of 1983 led to the conclusion that work at the executive level would require a steering group of general officers. Agreement was reached that such a body would be formed, and that it would consist of CG CAC (Chair), DCSPER DA, CG III Corps, and ASA MRA. At its initial meeting, the decision was made to invite the DCSOPS DA also to be a member. The current title of this group is the Senior Leadership Coordinating Committee (SLCC).

In November 1983, ASA (MRA) and DCSPER DA briefed the Army Policy Council on an action plan to initiate work at the executive level. At this briefing, and at later meetings of the SLCC, decisions were reached to proceed with establishing the information base necessary to provide a doctrinal foundation for leadership at echelons above division, and for continuing education/development of general officers. As a secondary purpose, it was also recognized that articulation of skill and performance requirements at the executive level would constitute a powerful aid to the systematic shaping of leader development at considerably more junior levels, in that these requirements would constitute developmental targets for leaders at all levels.

General Officer/SES Interviews

The development of an understanding of the critical tasks of executives and how they approach their work was a necessary first step toward the development of either a doctrinal foundation or a purposeful program of continuing education and development. It was accepted that this understanding could come only from interviews of incumbent executives, and approval was given to initiate these interviews in late November 1983. The positions examined were those of lieutenant generals and generals, on the one hand, and members of the Senior Executive Service, both appointed and career, on the other hand. The research had several purposes.

- To develop an understanding of the nature of executive level work, and the associated frames of reference, critical knowledges, skills, and other abilities required by this work.

- To obtain from incumbents an assessment of the effectiveness of the developmental processes by which they had come to the positions they occupied, and suggestions for changes in that process.

- To determine from incumbents whether they have or had continuing developmental needs, either for transition within grades or for transition across grades.

- To test a general theory of organization structure which, if found to be useful, would be a powerful tool in the design of systems both to facilitate leader development and to provide information and decision support for executives.

The executive summary is in two parts.

- A summary of the main findings from the research, organized in terms of the major topics raised, and

. A program of action stemming from analysis of the findings, and organized in terms of a concept which lays out the major systematic leadership requirements for leadership at the executive level.

## Major Findings

### The Nature of Work at the Executive Level

#### a. Joint, Combined, and Unified Command

Eight of 13 four-star positions were either primarily or mainly joint in nature. Many of the key three-star positions similarly had requirements for understanding and skill in operating in the joint arena. However, many of the general officers interviewed did not feel that their assignments and schooling prior to attaining three-star rank adequately prepared them for the joint responsibilities of their positions or for the shift to the qualitatively different requirements of a more diffused type of command role.

#### b. International Perspective

All four star positions and most of the three star positions examined required an international perspective -- frame of reference. Especially at four star level, incumbents are required to interact effectively with representatives of other nations outside the military establishment. Understanding of culture differences and how to deal with them are essential to effectiveness. However, preparation again was felt to be generally inadequate, especially for the shift to three star level.

#### c. National Political Work

There is an increasing requirement for three and four star generals to interact with national political leaders, particularly to represent Army interests. This requirement runs counter to the traditional requirement to avoid the political arena, and our representation to the congress, in particular, is on occasion less effective than it might be.

#### d. Major Resourcing and Logistics

There was a view that logistics systems considerations were not sufficiently widely understood by the senior leadership, and hence were not being integrated with operational considerations as effectively as they need to be considering our forward deployed force structure and world-wide commitments. The problem is exacerbated by current force modernization efforts. Logistics is becoming an increasingly specialized area, which is difficult to integrate in and of itself. This complexity makes integration with other areas even more difficult. This view was expressed by CINCs more often than by any others.

#### e. Diffusion of Command

There is a significant shift in complexity and the nature of command between two star and three star commands. It was described as a shift from full control of a subordinate organization to command tempered by persuasion of subordinate commanders from other services or nations and therefore not

completely subordinated by chain of command. This requirement is even more marked at four star level. There is a special premium in work at this level on negotiation, persuasion, and consensus building. The view was expressed that there should be opportunity to learn in advance about this shift in the nature of command prior to making this transition.

f. Collegiality

Some collegial functioning was found among four star incumbents. This is a way of working issues through persuasive development of consensus so as to decrease the uncertainty of the complex four star world and create shared frames of reference across commands. Collegial functioning was regarded as extremely helpful for improving understanding of how best to handle the responsibilities at this level. The view was, however, that far more collegiality is required in order to ensure adequate sharing of common vision.

g. General Officer Strategic/Policy Work

A strong concern was expressed about the manner in which the Army addresses strategic/policy work. On virtually all large staffs, work -- even work of the utmost significance -- is delegated down to the Action Officer level, either with or without guidance, for initial drafts. It is then difficult for officers at senior levels to break out of the frame of reference initially established by the Action Officer, with the result that many policy sensitive documents are not sufficiently encompassing.

h. SES Work

Comparison of civilian and military positions showed that SES work was, in the main, equivalent to that of two star general officers. At this level, SES members provide an essential continuity and capability for specialized work. However, the views of the general officers experienced in dealing with SES were that continuity should be balanced against the requirement for mobility in order to prevent stagnation and build broader perspectives.

i. SES Scientific and Technical Work

Approximately 88 SES members, mostly those in scientific and technical work, are either directly or indirectly subordinated to and rated by colonels. This is inconsistent with their two star equivalency level.

j. SES Participation in Policy Making

Many SES expressed a strong desire to be more fully involved in the policy making process. General Officers consistently underestimated the importance of this involvement to the SES members.

k. SES and Military Knowledge

SES, in order to perform their duties satisfactorily, require at least some operational military knowledge. However, there are no systematic provisions for them to acquire this knowledge.

Leadership at Senior Levels

a. Leadership and Envisionment

A primary task of the senior leader is to set long-term vision. At three star levels, the requirement is for creating the 12 to 15 year concept within which the programmatic efforts of subordinate two star commands can function. This 12 to 15 year outlook was widely found among three star incumbents. Among those three and four star incumbents who discussed it, the need was also expressed for an even longer outlook, 20 to 25 years, to serve as a working vision for the Army as a whole, and to unify the 12 to 15 year outlooks. However, this need was not stated uniformly by all those interviewed.

b. Culture and Values

Monitoring and maintaining the Army's culture and values was reported to be a crucial part of four star work. Particular emphasis was placed on sustaining a culture and climate of trust and confidence, as a prime task of senior leadership.

c. SES Leadership

Very few of the SES members and none of the general officers spoke spontaneously of the SES in terms of leadership roles. The consensus was that generals were required to be good with people, whereas SES were more called upon to be good with technology.

Competency Requirements

a. Four star competencies

These topmost leaders were required to operate at a level of cognitive complexity consistent with a time horizon of 20 years or more, equivalent to that required of the topmost leaders in industry and other fields. Competency requirements, in turn, were:

- Ability to operate comfortably within an international arena with representatives of other nations of equal stature.

- Sophisticated understanding of strategy in relation to national objectives, which was thought by many four star generals to require an in-depth understanding and appreciation of the history of military art.

- Capability to envision combat anywhere in the world using multi-service/multi-national forces.

- A profound understanding of both how-to-fight and how-to-train. A strong four star comment was that a high level of trainer skill improves capacity for logical grasp of battlefield complexity. A small number of three and four star generals commented that we do not provide realistic means for combat skills training at division and above, and that simulations or other experiences are needed to provide growth of these skills.

. Ancillary knowledge in many fields -- of how Congress operates; the government budgeting process; international relations as they affect military alliances; the social, political, and economic circumstances in allied nations and in nations where conflict may occur; and, optimally, knowledge of research and statistics, of engineering and technology, and of the social sciences. In addition, a greater general knowledge of logistics was said to be required.

. A wide range of other skills, including: negotiating skills, consensus building skills, skills of collegial interaction (to cross turf boundaries and break out of stovepipes), skills in teaching culture and values, and a general category of conceptual skills which includes problem solving, communications, and the management of information and planning systems.

b. Three Star Competencies

Competencies at the three star level are much the same as those required at the four star level, except that they are not required at as high a level and they may be more technically focused.

c. Other General Officer Attributes

A high energy level to field the variety of demanding requirements at three and four star levels.

The ability to manifest affection for soldiers, while at the same time being able to face decisions affecting soldiers' lives in combat.

d. Pool of General Officer Talent

On the assumption that there are approximately four four star positions and fifteen three star positions to be filled each year, and on the further assumption that there ought to be a pool of at least two to three times as many reasonably qualified candidates as there are vacancies from among whom to select for promotion, the following are the approximate numbers of general officers of higher level potential needed at each level:

| | 1 Star Level | 2 Star Level | 3 Star Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four Star Potential | 20 | 15 | 10 |
| Three Star Potential | 50 | 40 | - |

e. SES Competencies

SES members, both managerial and technical, should have a level of cognitive capability equivalent to operating with a 5 to 10 year time horizon, corresponding to two star general officer work. This time horizon places them in a position to work the POM and PPBES systems. The knowledges and skills required by SES members vary considerably because of the wide diversity of specialized requirements in their positions. However, the values,

interests, and temperament requirements for SES work are similar to those for general officer work, especially to the extent SES are required to provide leadership to others as do general officers.

Professional Development

a. Coaching, and mentoring.

These were defined respectively as support for the development of subordinates by immediate superiors, and by other superiors. Both were recognized as essential for long-term development of leaders, and both were felt to occur insufficiently often. Especially by four star general officers, the view was expressed that higher levels of mentoring and coaching skills are needed, and should be developed.

b. Development from Two Star to Three Star to Four Star

Progression from 2-star to 4-star level was extremely rapid in many cases. The transition from 2-star to 3-star was thought particularly difficult, and one that would profit from either a self-directed sabbatical or the opportunity to explore the frame of reference required in 3-star positions with mentors or predecessors in those positions. Such transition aiding was thought less necessary in the move from 3-star to 4-star level. In general, more training emphasis is needed at the senior levels than exists at present, because of the vastly greater complexity at the top, particularly in war-fighting skills at corps and echelons above corps.

c. Development Prior to Selection as General Officer

In addition to the development that occurs during formal schooling and in units, two other sources of individual development were:

. Instructor assignments in the Army Schools System, to develop skills thought to underlie coaching and mentoring skills, which, in turn, are essential for effective command.

. Individually selected "full stretch" assignments, which allow officers up to Colonel to exercise their full potential in work which might be considerably above their rank levels, and thus would develop potential which might otherwise be underutilized because of the slow rate of promotion in peacetime. (This concept was compared with the extensive utilization of high potential officers in what was essentially strategic planning before World War II.)

d. SES Career Development

Career development of SES must be considered separately from career development of senior officers, because of differences between the civilian and military personnel management systems. The military personnel management system is person centered and progression of both grades and assignments is intended to develop skills for future use as well as to use skills currently in being. By contrast, the civilian system is job centered.

- Civilians do not have an assignments system, but rather progress by individual competition for vacant positions, though these may be positions in a career ladder.

- Civilians are not dismissed because of failure to progress in grade.

- Civilian mobility is not at present a general requirement.

Needs were expressed to modify civilian personnel management by requiring mobility, at least for those who aspire to SES status; providing more systematic development through progressive assignments; and separating the civilian streams into two sub-streams, managerial and specialist-technical with the potential for genuine 3-star equivalency in at least some positions.

SES members were felt to need sabbaticals, short courses, and assessment center experience, as was the case for general officers. In addition, there was strong need for increased training in military operations, to include the opportunity for some joint attendance with officers at military courses.

ACTION PROGRAM

This section contains a proposed program of action arising from the findings described above. Many of these actions arose as suggestions from the general officers and SES members interviewed. They have been incorporated within the broad systems strategy shown in Figure 1, and thus constitute the beginnings of a comprehensive program in which the linkages among the various individual actions are apparent by virtue of where they are found within the total strategy.

The framework in Figure 1 shows systems development requirements at senior levels in terms of:

. A broad sequence of interactive effects which cascade from mission through organizational structure, forces structure, information/planning/control systems, personnel systems, and executive (systems) leadership.

. The consolidated impact of these systems components on organization and unit performance.

. The interlinking of systems leadership with organizational and direct leadership at the level of the small fighting unit.

. The integrating function of the senior leadership of the Army to create a dynamic force fully capable of defending the nation.

The interview results support the initial thinking which led to the initiation of this research, and provide a substantial basis for doing the necessary follow-on work. There do appear to be doctrinal voids. The senior leaders address issues which are not systematically treated in doctrinal instruments, and which should be. There also appear to be major areas in which our senior leaders could use better and more timely aid. One such area is transition aiding, specific and tailored "work ahead" packages for transitioning within grade, and perhaps more extensive "packages" to aid the difficult transition from two- to three-star assignments. Finally, there is an extensive need for tools that will help prepare for joint and combined responsibilities, particularly at three- and four-star level.

In Table E-1, these three broad areas have been addressed in a notional plan for consideration by the senior leadership. If implemented, it would form a six year program of work to create improved developmental opportunities for senior officers. Expanded, it would focus early development to a point at least as early as staff college.

On the first page of the table, (xiv), three doctrinal areas are outlined. They are a general doctrinal instrument at the executive level (tasks 2-3); research and doctrinal instrument, probably eventually a field manual, on organizational structure (also a matter of executive responsibility); and a doctrinal statement on human resources development. This latter, to the extent that it would clearly reflect executive policy on the development and use of human resources within the Army, is clearly a concern for the senior leadership.

Page xv contains tasks for improving transition aiding, which would move toward an automated capability for remote delivery of executive assistance in the early 1990's. It would also include the capability for remote developmental assessments in mid-career, to enable integration of formal, assignments, and individual initiative sources of professional development. The mid-career developmental assessment would, in concept, be followed by a late career developmental assessment to begin the officer's period of most intensive utilization and value to the Army.

Finally, page xvi contains tasks focused on development of methods for assessing operational effectiveness of large TDA headquarters, initially focusing on corps combat operations and later expanding both to higher echelons and to other types of headquarters. The thrust is centered on the logic that a method of effectiveness assessment is essential in order for commanders to establish feedback mechanisms for themselves, to determine if their actions to improve effectiveness are in fact working. And the focus on corps as the first headquarters would capitalize on excellent simulations now available while at the same time emphasizing the importance of early growth of the skills necessary to operate in a joint environment.

TABLE E-1

ACTIONS IN GO/SES PLAN

| | TASK | USER | ACTION | TIMELINE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | 22-999 Chapter 5 | CAC | EDRG | |
| 2. | FM 22-999 (Organizational Leadership) | ARMY | CAC | |
| 3. | Executive Level Concept | ? | EDRG | |
| 4. | FM 22-xxx (100-1-xx) | ARMY | ? | |
| 5. | ARSTAFF Structure Pilot Studies | DCSPER/ DCSOPS | EDRG | |
| 6. | TOE Structure Experiments | DCSOPS | EDRG | |
| 7. | Organization Structure Doctrinal Concepts | DCSPER/ DCSOPS | EDRG | |
| 8. | FM XX-1-xx (Structure) | ARMY | DCSOPS | |
| 9. | Human Resources Development Doctrinal Concepts | TRADOC | EDRG | |
| 10. | FM XX-1-xx (Human Resources Development Doctrine) | ARMY | TRADOC | |



| | TASK | USER | ACTION / TIMELINE |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 86 87 88 89 90 91 |
| 11. "State of the Art" Executive Assessment and Development | DCSPER | EDRG | x |
| 12. GO/SES Position Requirements | DCSPER | HAY | ——————————x |
| 13. Concepts for Executive Capability Profiles | GOMO/SESO | EDRG | x——x |
| 14. Capability Assessment System | DCSPER | GOMO/ SESO | x————————x |
| 15. Executive Management System | DCSPER | GOMO/ SESO | x————————x |
| 16. Transition Aiding Pilot Test | DCSPER | GOMO/ EDRG | x————————x |
| 17. Transition Aiding System (Manual/ Automated) | ARMY | GOMO/ EDRG | x————————————————————x |
| 18. Developmental Assessment (Mid-Career) | TRADOC | CAC | x————x————x————x |
| 19. Developmental Assessment (Late Career) | DCSPER | EDRG | x————x————x————————x |

| | TASK | USER | ACTION / TIMELINE |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 86 87 88 89 90 91 |
| 20. Concept Plan for STANPER (EAD) | TRADOC/ DCST | EDRG | x |
| 21. Task Identification for STANPER (EAD) | TRADOC/ DCST | EDRG | x——x |
| 22. Measurement Technology for STANPER (EAD) | TRADOC/ DCST | EDRG | x——x |

# SYSTEMS LEADERSHIP



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# SENIOR LEADERSHIP

## PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AT THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL

### INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the findings of interviews of 68 Army executives, military and civilian. Military positions were those of lieutenant generals and generals; civilian positions were members of the Senior Executive Service, both career and appointed. In all cases but one, an interview team conducted an in-depth interview which the executive permitted to be tape-recorded. The tape recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, and then were subjected to an extensive content analysis, from which the findings in this report have been drawn. The research had several purposes.

- To develop an understanding of the nature of work at three star, four star and SES levels, and the associated frames of reference, critical knowledges, skills, and other abilities required by these levels of work.

- To obtain from incumbents an assessment of the effectiveness of the developmental processes by which they had come to the positions they occupied, and suggestions for changes in that process as a basis for formulating improved methods of developing these senior leaders.

- To test a general theory of organizational structure (Stratified Systems Theory — SST) which, if found to be useful, would powerfully enable further work to be done both to facilitate executive development and to provide information and decision systems support for executives.

Stratified systems theory (SST) provided the framework for the interview guide (Appendix B), and for the analysis. SST was developed as an outgrowth of a wide range of research projects in civilian and military organizations, both in the USA and elsewhere, spanning a time frame of more than 35 years. It specifies both the organizational structure and separation of roles and functions found to characterize the most effective organizations. It thus provides a template with major implications for a systematic understanding of work and leadership at the level of 3- and 4-star general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service.

This template is based on two general findings from previous work. The first was that the level of work of any position in a hierarchical organization can be objectively measured in terms of its time-span. This time-span is the maximum allowed completion time of the longest tasks, assignments, projects or programs which the superior assigns the subordinate in the position being assessed. The second general finding was that there is an optimum organizational structure, consisting of a specific number of organizational levels, regardless of the nature of the work to be done. This structural template, and the associated time-spans, if applied to the Army, would yield a pattern of organizational levels similar to that shown below.

| Time Span | Command Level | Rank | Stratum | Civilian Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20 Yr | Army (MACOM) | General | VII | Appointees |
| 10 Yr | Corps/DCS | LTG | VI | Apptees/Sup SES |
| 5 Yr | Division | MG | V | SES |
| 2 Yr | Brigade | BG/COL | IV | GS-15,14 |
| 1 Yr | Battalion | LTC/MAJ | III | GS-13,12,11 |
| 3 Mo | Company | CPT/LT | II | GS-10,9,8,7 |
| 1 Da | Enlisteds | E-7/E-1 | I | GS-6,5,4,3,2,1 |

Within this general template, the present work is concerned with the topmost two strata, which constitute the executive level. SST provided a basis for expectations concerning the nature and level of work, and specific leadership requirements at this level.

The remainder of this report is organized into four major sections. The first will present the major findings on the nature of work at the executive level. The second will deal with explicit leadership requirements at the senior level, and the third will deal with other competencies. Finally the fourth will deal with the required capability pool from which selections are made for three and four star ranks.

REQUISITE WORK: 4-STAR, 3-STAR AND SES

The work at 3-Star and 4-Star levels differs qualitatively from work at lower levels. These differences should be taken into account both in laying a foundation for senior executive development and in establishing transition aiding programs.

Joint, Combined and Unified Command

The first, and perhaps the most significant, difference is the encompassing importance at 3- and 4-Star level of joint, combined and unified combat command. While it is possible to be fairly well insulated against the reality of jointness at lower levels of command, such insulation is difficult at 3-star levels, and impossible at 4-star levels. However, there are shortcomings in the preparation of general officers for the task of working with the other Services and with forces of other nations, either as subordinate to CINCs who might be from other Services, or at 4-Star level for the role of CINC in command of a wide range of forces.

There is substantial evidence that jointness has not been a sufficiently strong focus in the development of officers, either in the schoolhouse or in the units, despite the fact that 8 out of the 13 4-Star positions are wholly or mainly joint. There is room for further development of the theme of jointness and of unified command before officers reach the 3-Star level.

International Perspective

Studies of large private sector organizations show that Str. VI and Str. VII corporate executive work (3 Star and 4-Star levels in Army terms) is always international in scope. This same feature characterizes the work at these levels in the Army. The perspective is that of what might be termed $W^3E$ (whole wide world environment). Anything which might be occurring anywhere in any facet of social life (political, economic, social, technological and intellectual -- the PESTI world) might be of significance for one's work, or for the effective functioning of subordinate commands.

Work of this nature requires a degree of political, economic and social knowledge, skill, and sophistication, which is not necessarily a part of the preparation of general officers required to serve at these levels.

Further, keeping sufficiently well informed in the $W^3E$ PESTI world is a formidable task. There is a great volume of random data which needs scanning, in addition to the relevant information which must be recognized and kept. One important way of imposing reasonable order on this mass of information is networking, i.e., sustaining an active network of colleagues, specialists and others, in the military, industry, politics, universities, research institutions, and elsewhere, with whom information can be exchanged, and who can help the general officer to have an up-to-date and discriminating understanding of what is going on in the world relevant to his own needs.

The general officers in the present set of interviews did in fact both understand the importance of and maintain such a network. The 4-star networks were generally larger than those maintained at 3-star level, and those were generally larger than those maintained by members of the SES. Especially at 4-star levels, the networks also included both national and international political figures with whom senior officers interacted, to include heads of state, ambassadors, senators and congressmen, governors, NATO officials, international negotiators, and ranking State Department officials. To be effective in the performance of their duties, senior generals of necessity must have learned to be at ease in discussions and negotiations with such public figures in the performance of duty, and during state occasions.

National Political Work

The required international perspective at 3-Star and 4-Star levels, goes along with the corresponding national political work which faces these senior leaders in negotiations with Congress, with national and state political leaders, with the press and with television, and with other leaders of political and social opinion who influence attitudes towards the military.

This political work calls for a sense of how these political leaders think, the kinds of arguments which are likely to influence them, and the pressures to which they are themselves subjected by their constituents or by their perceptions of public attitudes and tasks.

This kind of understanding of the outlook, values, and priorities of political leaders and leaders of public opinion, requires that senior generals have a deep understanding of America and American society, including movements and shifts in its overall culture and values, and variations in the culture and values of its key groups. As will be discussed below, this understanding of American culture and values is crucial also for effective leadership at 3-Star and 4-Star levels.

The interview findings suggest, however, that the training and development opportunities are not as well designed as they might be to prepare general officers for this political work. The political appointees are relied upon for substantial support. But the most strongly expressed view was that senior officers should also be better equipped, by either or both of modifications in assignments policies and officer training programs.

National Strategy and Political Work Summarized

Taken together, the international and national political requirements of the 3-Star and 4-Star level general officer positions underpin the requirement for an understanding of national strategy. While it was generally agreed that all senior officers should understand how national strategy impinges upon their work, the need for such understanding was sharper for those general officers whose work did in fact impact on the development of national strategy or who worked with those who developed it.

It appears that the development of the national strategic and political expertise and sophistication required at senior levels now is mainly dependent upon the opportunities an officer gets in the earlier stages of his career to experience positions which expose him to these issues. In the absence of such experience, generals on promotion to 3-Star and 4-Star level may require intensive transition aiding to help them to pick up the necessary understanding of jointness, relevant national and international social, political and economic issues, and national strategic issues. More extensive earlier preparation would be an advantage.

Major Resourcing and Logistics

A central focus of the national political work at senior levels is that of getting the resources for the major weapons systems and equipment, and the attendant logistical support. In addition to the ordinary problems of preparation of sound proposals and arguments, and of negotiation with political leaders, one particular problem which was highlighted in the interviews was that of balancing new equipment requirements against logistical requirements.

The point was made that senior officers had been better prepared for considering weapons systems and equipment than for thinking about logistical requirements. Logistics tended to be held in too low regard among officers, to an extent that posed a threat to readiness.

This viewpoint raises questions about the emphasis given to logistics in the training of officers, especially with regard to sensitizing them to the balancing of long-term and short-term resource requirements, and to understanding how such things as port and transport facilities for getting resources from CONUS to a combat theatre put absolute limits on the ability to fight.

Diffusion of Command

The experience of Str. V work, both 2-Star and SES, is that of unified command. Commanders and managers at those levels were described as being able to control what they commanded. The work was localizable in the sense of working within a context set either by a corps commander or by a Deputy Chief of Staff, or other 3-Star superior. The transition from Str. IV to Str. V, while a move to greater responsibility, thus held no unexpected surprises.

By contrast, promotion to Str. VI, 3-Star level, was full of surprises. It felt different. It was a move into a different world. A corps commander, for example, was unlikely any longer to have full control over his entire command. Host nation or assigned allied troops, while nominally under his command, nevertheless retained allegiances and lines of authority to their own national commanders.

This quality of diffuseness of command, which is felt even more strongly at the 4-Star level, puts new demands on senior officers. It puts a special premium on being able to get things done by negotiation and persuasion, and on getting concurrence and consensus. It would be useful if general officers could be aided in making this difficult transition by prior opportunity to develop the skills needed to deal with this substantial shift in the nature of their command authority.

Collegiality

Coincident with the change in the nature of authority with the move to 3-Star and 4-Star levels is a related shift in the approach to decision making - a shift to a collegial mode of functioning from one considerably more directive at the lower levels. Work in other large scale organizations suggests that collegial functioning is requisite at these senior executive levels. It is required by the situation and by the nature of the work. Such terms as "the college" or "the club" are frequently used to describe the way executives function together at this level.

The need for collegial relationships derives mainly from the gross complexity of senior level work, caused in turn by the complexity of information in the $W^3E$ PESTI world in which senior executives are called upon to function. Collegiality also, however, is forced by the need for shared vision at

the top, as a basis for concerted action on difficult issues that require great energy, in contrast to the stovepiping and turf battles which often occur at lower levels. The Army by and large has not articulated the need for collegial function at these top levels. Nor have its general officers been trained to function in this manner.

It accordingly may be useful describe some of the main features of collegial work. By collegial is meant a mode of operation in which the command structure is reinforced by consensual support from the most senior commanders acting as a corporate group.

Consensus does not necessarily mean enthusiastic support from everyone. It does mean that no immediate decision would be made that was strongly opposed by a member of the collegial group. Strong opposition by any such member would require further working through, discussion, and modification, if necessary, in order to achieve workable solutions, unless there was an emergency.

The collegial mode of working has been found to be a natural requirement for effective work at these topmost 20-to-25-year-plus levels. In addition, there is strong evidence that the opportunity to participate in explicitly established collegial corporate functions sharply increases the degree of mutually supportive collaboration among leaders.

The use of joint staff mechanisms is thus not some special arrangement which applies only to the top command of the Services. It applies generally in very large-scale institutions. Collegial working within each service and within each unified and specified command could enhance effectiveness of operations, and help to establish a network of collaboration right across the top. The prior existence in peacetime of a top level network of collegial groups used to working in this way, would be a substantial contribution to readiness. It builds up a store of trust which facilitates immediate response to command in emergency.

A collegial consensus mode of operations used to achieve a continual working agreement on a balanced 20/25 year, 10/15 year, 5/8 year, 2/3 year, and current year plan, would provide a strong umbrella integrating and protecting the work of each of the MACOMs. It could possibly improve the effectiveness of use of resources, facilitate decisions on the most appropriate disposition of resources between immediate needs of forces readiness and sustainment and the more distant requirements of forces modernization and development. It might save considerable sums of money.

Applied in the Army setting, collegial functioning would call for close collaborative working among the 4-Star general officers, and among appropriate groupings of 4-Star and 3-Star general officers as called for by particular categories of issues.

How Strategic/Policy Work is Accomplished

The view is strongly held by a few key senior generals and political appointees that 4-Star and 3-Star generals do not have sufficient opportunity to do their own concept development work on the policy issues, without first delegating it to action officer level for initial working up. Examples of phrases heard are, "Generals tend to work the fringes rather than the real problems," and "The Army is run by its Iron Majors!"

It is, of course, not universally the case that generals do not do their own concept development work for strategic policy development. Many do keep their own grip on the situation, and use their staffers for help. But they must buck the system in order to do so, and that is not always easy. For example, if a 3-Star general wants the direct help of a major or lieutenant colonel deep inside his staff, the officers in between may feel bypassed and pushed aside, with a substantial amount of resulting discomfort.

This problem has also been encountered in correlated research on Army organizations. It appears to be connected with a way of doing business which has come to grip the military, and the civil service as well, which can perhaps best be described as an "upside down blandification process." This process stems from a tendency at general officer level to get work done by a process of delegation to Staff or Action Officers at lieutenant colonel and major levels. Anything from strategic policy issues to operational missions will come in at 4-Star or 3-Star level. They will be screened by Directors or Chiefs of Staff, or by XOs, who will delegate some issues directly downwards, and pick out the more substantial issues for the general to scrutinize. He, in turn, may or may not append a brief guidance note, after which it also will be passed down the system for a junior staffer, such as an assistant G3, or an action officer to work up.

When the action officers, usually under the guidance of a colonel, have done their work, a response (a draft order, a policy statement, a reply, a memorandum, or whatever is called for) will be prepared. In the course of doing so, three things are described as occurring. First, it is necessary to "second guess" the general's views about the nature of a satisfactory solution. Second, alternative proposals are prepared wherever possible, so as to ensure that at least one draft solution might be acceptable. And third, solutions or considerations judged likely to be unacceptable at higher levels tend to be scrubbed out, a process which ensures that good news travels upwards but blocks bad news, thereby depriving the senior leadership of the information necessary for effective decisions at least a part of the time.

Because of the need to cover all possibilities, much unnecessary work is done, not only by the action officers working the issue, but also by action officers in other departments who respond to requests for information, analysis of possible consequences, or observations on fit with related developments elsewhere. Cumulative waves of work can thus be generated in all directions.

When the first draft has been completed, it is taken for granted that the briefing process begins. The coordinating colonel reviews the work, works it back and forth with the majors and lieutenant colonels until satisfied, and then arranges for it to be briefed to a major general. The process is repeated at lieutenant general and, for major issues, at general level. At each stage, the rough edges and controversial bits are removed, and so the brief may become increasingly bland.

The major problem, however, is that the mind-set of the staffer has been indelibly stamped upon the action. It is difficult for the higher level generals to modify the action's basic frame of reference (not only the orientation and content, but also the subsequent missions) without rejecting the whole. In the event that is done, the two alternatives are to start the process over or personally spend the time to take the brief apart and put it back together again as a brand new document.

Moreover, the general who is being briefed will more often than not be hearing the material for the first time. There is pressure for him to make up his mind on the spot about the proposals, with all eyes upon him, and almost magically, to decide what to do.

In short, senior officers are ensnared in a work system which leaves them "captives of the expert briefer," and which puts the enduring stamp of whoever does the first draft on the outcome. Large amounts of unnecessary work are generated, and priorities are difficult to keep in perspective, not only for the reasons described but also because this bottom-up process may be initiated unintentionally by even the most casual of questions if raised by a general.

This process has been set out in such detail because it affects the quality of work and outputs which senior officers are in a position to produce. A very competent action officer may turn out directed work of very credible quality, but only under the rarest circumstances would this work have the level of creativity of which a general officer would consistently be capable. When senior officers take major strategic policy issues under their own wing, as many of them sometimes have the chance to do, and then do the work themselves (as for example, a 3-Star working with a 2-Star subordinate, directly assisted perhaps by one or two staffers at major, lieutenant colonel or colonel level), the output tends to have much more powerful impact than the outputs from the bottom-up process can possibly have. Further, it seems to take no more general officer time, and clearly requires vastly less staff time.

Contrariwise, whenever a problem is delegated to a level of organization below the level of complexity of the problem itself (e.g. a problem complex enough to call for direct general officer attention assigned to the major/ lieutenant colonel level for initial work up) then

the process generates considerable amounts of wasted effort and work at lower levels;

it keeps a deluge of briefing documents and detailed 'eaches' pouring out upon senior officers, making Herculean efforts necessary to cope with the detail while retaining sufficient time and focus to work the bigger issue;

the initial work-up will be too long and either too diffuse, or too simplistic;

it will miss chances for genuine simplification and cost reduction;

it will seriously underestimate total costs and required times of completion.

These symptoms are familiar enough.

The current experience of general officers and the current method of work in all major headquarters, however, are in the direction of the method of work described. This approach could be reversed if it were desired to do so. Improved quality of work might then be achieved by fewer people, and substantial numbers of officers released for more meaningful combat-related duties.

SES Work: Specilization and Continuity

The civilian service constitutes one-third of the Army's active strength. It is essential for readiness. Civilians perform duties which cannot easily be assigned to soldiers, for two reasons. First, their work covers a wide range of specialized activities which require specialized education, training, and development which are not compatible with requirements for preparation and pursuit of a professional military career. Second, the kind of work done by civilians demands greater continuity than can be provided by soldiers, given current military tours of duty.

The continuity provided by SESs is recognized as being of great importance. An SES can continue through the tours of three or four general officers, helping to orient each in turn, and ensuring that there is no interruption in critical long-term projects. Though few SES members have a formal role in Army policy development, this continuity does indirectly give some SESs the opportunity to have a major impact at the policy level. However, it was held also that SESs can and do remain too long in one position. Position requirements should determine tour of duty. For example, an SES tour of duty of 6 to 8 years was suggested as optimum for those SES positions providing continuity. It would encompass several general officer changes, and at the same time be within the 5 to 10 year time-span for Str. V.

SES work covers a much wider range of specialized positions than does GO work. This work tends to be in the 5 to 8 year time-span range, coinciding with the time-spans found at 2-Star level under peacetime garrison conditions. The development programs for SES must thus be considered in terms of opportunities for growing in a specialty towards work at Str. V level, with an understanding of military requirements associated with that specialty.

The SES specialties are more or less exhaustively categorized in terms of the various civilian specialist communities. Examples are:

- accounting and finance
- statistics
- scientific and engineering
- construction engineering

Scientific and Technical Work

Systems development for modern warfare requires the closest military and scientific/technical collaboration. The scientific and technical work ensures that the Armed forces are supplied with the weapons systems required to meet and defeat threat forces from technologically advanced adversaries. A prime role of the civilian service, and especially the SES, is to sustain those scientific and technical developmental efforts.

By far, the largest group of SESs is employed in research and development work in AMC. These scientists and technicians occupy both managerial and non-managerial research positions in laboratories. They are the ones for whom an alternative scientific and technical personnel management system is under consideration, in order to provide levels of remuneration and other conditions which are competitive with industry.

However, establishing an alternative personnel system for this special circumstance -- fragmenting a service in order to deal with a problem caused by rigidities and shortcomings in the administration of the service -- was thought to be a bad principle. What is required is to improve the existing ineffective procedures.

SES Status

At least three steps need to be taken to improve the current situation. The first has to do with the issue that a substantial number of SES managerial positions (approximately 88 as of July 1985) are directly or indirectly subordinated to colonels. The reasons for this are difficult to find. It is the equivalent of subordinating a Brigadier or Major General to a Colonel. SES subordination can be tolerated to some extent if the Colonel is an experienced officer in a pre-retirement post, with a level of capability equivalent to a Lieutenant General, but whose career precluded selection as a general officer because it followed specialist non-combat work. However, it is not ideal even under those circumstances, and special instances do not give a basis for a solution in principle. It is essential that SES posts be recognized clearly as 2-Star equivalent, and structured organizationally to be subordinate to 3-Star general officers.

The second step has to do with remuneration. If the present salary cap could be broken for a special civilian personnel management system, then presumably it can be broken for the existing civilian service, including SES. Such a step ought to be considered forthwith. The time-span method used to measure level of work in the present research provides for a direct comparison of payment levels in the civil service with equivalent levels of work in

industry measured in the same way. (Data on current levels of compensation for 5-year time-span level of work in industry can, for example, readily be provided). To continue to sustain a seriously depressed SES payment structure is to encourage the filling of top level roles either with individuals of the required capability who for one reason or another are prepared to make substantial financial sacrifices, or, increasingly, with individuals who while capable, nevertheless may not have the full capabilities which are called for by the work to be done.

The third step has to do with mechanisms for achieving parity between managerial and non-managerial specialist SES positions. Parity determination should be based on equivalence in level of work, regardless of numbers of subordinates controlled or programs managed. It could be achieved through use of the time-span measure referenced in the previous paragraph. Given such a mechanism, it would not be necessary to have separate career ladders for managers and specialists. Individuals could alternate between managerial and specialist roles, much as soldiers alternate between command and staff roles, rather than needing to adhere rigidly to a single path. This would provide developmental opportunity that is desirable for most, without precluding opportunity for concentration on one or the other in special cases.

SES Participation in Policy Making

The issues of subordination and remuneration apply not only to the scientific and technical SES work, but also to other specialist areas of the SES. However, for these additional areas, there are further issues which need consideration. One is the extent to which SES members take part in policy making in the departments to which they belong. Among those interviewed, the degree of participation varied from full involvement to practical exclusion. It appears to be determined in part by differences in custom and practice in different departments, and in part by the personalities of those concerned. There are no standard practices which set out the requisite amount or type of participation.

What becomes clear from the discussions, however, is that the failure to include SES members in the top management policy making groups in departments or directorates commanded at 3-Star level, on the same basis as 2-Star GO directors would be included, adds to whatever feelings of alienation may already exist among SES staff. A strong desire to take part, and to be included, is expressed, and connected with the desire to be a part of the Army.

To be included as part of the policy making group is an important issue of status and recognition. There are many others, such as the fact that SESs, in contrast to general officers, do not have the outward accoutrements of status such as flags. Nor do they share general officer messes and dining facilities. Such differences all tend to magnify felt exclusion, and the sense of being something less than first class Army citizens.

SES and Military Knowledge

All SES work calls for some understanding of combat; some calls for nearly the same understanding as would be required of general officers in TO&E positions. In the direction of less knowledge would be work in construction engineering, law, and finance and accounting. In the direction of substantial knowledge would be weapon system research, research in DCSOPS, work in CAA, and behavioral sciences research.

SES members get what knowledge they have about military matters through independent reading and study. There is sufficient military content to SES work to warrant consideration of systematic opportunities for SES members to acquire the necessary military knowledge and experience through education and training both with military officers and separately.

GO/SES Equivalent Levels

One of the implications of these findings is that it is not realistic to think of leadership, work, and personnel systems to encompass 3-and 4-star general officers and members of the SES in the same framework, as was envisioned at the start of this study. The evidence from the interviews, in terms both of protocol status and of time-span measurement of the level of work, shows the majority of those SES members interviewed to be in the equivalent of 2-star positions. There are two or three which correspond to the three-star level, and a few others which correspond to the one-star level. However, since those interviewed were selected as the most senior group of SES, it is likely that many and perhaps most SES positions are at the one-star equivalent level.

By contrast with the SES roles, the level of work in the political appointee roles consistently is the equivalent of 3- and 4-star level. The current structure of roles at these levels is illustrated in the following chart.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20 Yr | Str VII | 4-Star | Political Appointee Roles |
| 10 Yr | Str VI | 3-Star | |
| 5 Yr | Str V | 2-Star | SES |
| 2 Yr | Str IV | 1-Star/COL | SES |

It would be useful for SES motivation if there were some, half a dozen or more, SES roles which were clearly designated as Str VI deputies to 4-Star commanders, to provide a substantial recognized career top. Examples could be Deputy to the CSA, Deputy VCSA, Deputy CG FORSCOM, Deputy CG TRADOC, and Deputy CG AMC.

In addition it would be useful to consider the possibility of extending the number of SES roles holding established authority as Deputy CG to 3-Star commanding generals. The Navy has recently begun such an extension of recognition to SES work by establishing such Deputy CG roles as subordinates of 3-Star commanders in Naval Operations.

A General Structure for GS and SES

If the SES is requisitely equivalent to Str. V 2-Star general officer rank, a question may also be raised about the organizational structure equivalents of the GS positions. Like nearly all other large-scale organizations, a system of pay grades (GS 1 to 15) has been provided for compensation and career development purposes, but a requisite structure of managerial levels has not been separately established. (The military also has its pay grade system in the form of ranks, but fortunately it also has a system of seven command levels.)

It is essential to have an accurate and clearly articulated work organization structure upon which to build an effective managerial and personnel system. A preliminary analysis suggests an organizational work structure for the Civil Service along the lines shown below.

Str. VII - Political Appointees
Str. VI - Political Appointees + a few super SES
Str. V - SES
Str. IV - GS/GM 15/14
Str. III - GS 13/12/11/10
Str. II - GS 9/8/7
Str. I - GS 6/5/4/3/2/1

While this analysis is tentative and should be confirmed by one more systematically done, it deals with some of the structural problems discussed earlier. It elevates all SES positions at least to 2-Star equivalence and provides for some "super SES". Such an arrangement is essential to give adequate status for the career service to do the work it must do, and to give organizational breating space for the 15 GS grades to be formed into the requisite number of work levels. Further, provision for the Str. VI Super SES achieves the effect now proposed to be accomplished by splitting the current single system into two, one of which would be a Scientific and Technical Personnel Management System.

The implications of this organizational structure for managerial arrangements would be that the manager-subordinate relationship would be limited to the following role relationships:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Star GOs | as managers | of | SES | |
| SES | " | " | " | GS 15/14 |
| GS 15/14 | " | " | " | GS 13/12/11 |
| GS 13/12/11 | " | " | " | GS 10/9/8/7 |
| GS 10/9/8/7 | " | " | " | GS 6/5/4/3/2/1 |

In short, the analysis, which is based upon the organizational template and supported by preliminary data, provides for 5 levels of organizational structure (6 levels if a Str. VI Super SES role is allowed for) and the 15 GS pay grades plus the SES pay grade (divided into 6 pay steps). There is evidence from industrial organization studies that getting organization structure into this requisite form can open the way for gains in productive effectiveness of 30% and more.[1]

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[1]See, in particular, the accumulative results of work in the Australian Mining Corporation, CRA, which is acting as a test bed for the US Army on application of the SST template in organization development.

## LEADERSHIP AT SENIOR LEVELS

One hypothesis with which this research began was that current leadership theory is far too limited to deal with the nature of leadership at senior levels. FM 22-100, Military Leadership, describes leadership in face-to-face groups and is therefore appropriate for small unit, company, and battalion interpersonal leadership. However, different and more encompassing manuals are required for mid-level leadership -- division, brigade, and battalion levels -- and for senior leadership at 3-Star and 4-Star levels. Parallel manuals are also required for civilian leadership development.

The interviews have strongly confirmed the assumption that there are distinct changes in the nature of leadership at successively higher levels of command. Commanders at all levels must be able to exercise direct face-to-face leadership with their immediate subordinates. But while direct leadership suffices at CO and BN levels, it is not enough at mid and senior levels. These leaders must be able to do more.

Previous research has established[1] that mid-level leadership - at Division and Brigade levels - calls for creating a command climate through policy and oversight of operating procedures which will

. provide the most appropriate setting for direct face-to-face leadership at small unit level, strengthening leaders and reinforcing soldiers' will to fight, and

. be consistent with Army-wide culture and values as articulated at senior levels.

The main instrument for climate creation is the Division Commander's control of policy and his oversight of operating procedures at lower levels. Policies have a profound impact on climate. Restrictive policies foster "red tape", produce a climate encouraging "do-as-you-are-told" and risk avoidance, and thereby reduce initiative and innovativeness. By contrast, "open" policies generate a climate of freedom to experiment, encouraging initiative and innovation[2]. In the interviews, the importance of "open" policies and a climate that encourages experimentation during peacetime training was particularly emphasized at the 4-star level. However, there was at the same time a lack of optimism that the total system could ever be changed. (One hypothesis not tested is that general officers voicing these thoughts implicitly recognized system change of this nature as a very major undertaking that could never be accomplished during one single 4-star tenure, and, because of the way the system works, therefore probably not "do-able" at all.)

At the same time, there was also recognition, among those at 4-star level, that the senior leadership of the Army is responsible for setting the values by which the Army should abide, and for supporting and maintaining an

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[1]See draft FM 22-999 prepared by Dr. T. O. Jacobs of ARI.
[2]As shown in the power-down leader experiments at Fort Hood,

Army culture that will foster enhanced combat readiness. This is uniquely the task of the topmost levels, as is oversight of policy formation so as to ensure that values and culture are supported by policy. Indeed, it is through showing how to link policy and operations to the desired values and culture that the senior leadership makes the intangible real, and ensures the continuity of real battle readiness over time.

## A Citizen Army

Army culture and values were of central concern, especially at the 4-star level, because of the unique nature of the group to be led and the institution itself. Soldiers are not ordinary employees as would be the case for leadership of, for example, a large corporation. They are citizens who have entered under oath to defend their country, in an institution which has been entrusted with profound responsibility, and to which has been assigned a part of the nation's legal system in the UCMJ processes to establish and legitimate command.

Army leaders are in a position of trust. They have had entrusted to them groups of followers about whom the nation, and the nation's families, are concerned as individuals. That is why culture and values that foster trust and confidence are crucial top level leadership responsibilities. That theme was raised repeatedly in the interviews of general officers, and informs the analysis which follows.

## Leadership and Envisionment

One of the foundation stones on which leadership lies is the vision of the leader. Vision at the top, in this sense of the word, is the capacity to form a concept of where the Army needs to go over time, and how it is to get there. It is specific both in content and in time. Content consists of goals -- the direction in which the leader is seeking to move. For the senior leadership of the Army, that direction will be set in its most general terms by national strategy coming from the topmost political bodies. There will then follow a series of goals cascading from level to level, goals at one level nested within the goals at the next higher level.

Envisionment also has a time dimension. A general statement of the time-scale is given by the organizational template and its time-span boundaries. It calls for the senior leadership to be setting the long-term vision for the Army as a whole and for its MACOMs in explicit ways, for example, laying out a working concept for the Army of 2005-2010, and for how in broad terms it is intended to get there.

The discussions strongly supported the assumption that senior leaders must provide the long term vision within which the Army functions. The 20-25 year time perspective for Army development given by the CSA and his 4-Star generals would include concepts for its future how-to-fight doctrine, force development, and weapon systems development. Army 21, with its 25 year outreach is a critical example of such envisionment.

In the case of 4-Star general officers commanding TO&E Forces, two levels of vision must be set out. The first is the immediate and active projection of the Force for the succeeding two years -- the contemplated changes and their associated plans for implementation with minimum disturbance of readiness. The second is to provide soldiers with an understanding of the 20-25 year forward look of the Army, and of how the MACOM goals mesh with the broader goals and national strategy. The second, long term, envisionment is essential to give the necessary depth of meaning to the immediate vision, and to give confirmation to the sense of taking part in a national endeavor.

By the same token, it is the mark of effective 3-star leadership to set the 12-15 year vision for a command -- giving the conceptions lying behind the programs and projects which are being delegated to 2-star and SES levels. This outreach encompasses the 10 year scope of the EPA and the long-term forces plan, which deal with developments targeted in the time frame of 1997-2000. This time-frame lies beyond the range where accurate trend extrapolative forecasting is feasible (7 to 8 years is the maximum for that purpose). The leader therefore must rely upon a conceptual understanding of what is needed, but, once again, spelled out in specific terms. And in the case of TO&E Corps Commanders, the 1 1/2 to 2 year immediate readiness goals need to be set out against the background of the 12-15 year direction of corps development, which, in turn, is set by the Commander within the 20-25 year working orientation for the Army which comes from 4-star level. It is precisely by being able to provide an adequate 12 to 15 year conceptual framework that the 3-Star general officer gives meaning and purpose to the work of his subordinates; this is an essential part of the foundation on which subordinate leader development and unit effectiveness rests.

Work and leadership at SES and 2-Star general officer level are different again in quality. The maximum time frame at this level is in the 5-7 year range. That time-frame allows for predicting and forecasting, and plans that can be concretized in terms of the POM and PPBS. Hence, the work at this level has a quality of reality and concreteness that is inevitably missing from the higher level roles. It is a quality which makes possible the feeling of unity of command which suffuses Str. V, in contrast to the sense of diffusion of command at higher levels.

A number of the interviewed officers pointed out that, while the above time-spans were true for peacetime under Pentagon and garrison conditions, they did not hold for TO&E units in state of readiness, or for combat. Under these latter conditions, the time-scale of operations was reduced to no more than 1 1/2 to 2 years at 3-Star level in readiness, and down to perhaps weeks at this level in combat. But even under these conditions of time compression, there was an awareness of the required background understanding of national purpose which gives meaning to the intense shorter term efforts. This was described by some as a philosophy. Evidence of the need to have and understand such a philosophy also appears in autobiographical writings of retired 4- and 5-star general officers as the basis for their application of what now is labeled "operational art", i.e., the understanding of how to design military operations to implement strategic national purpose. In this sense, even the intense time compression of combat is not free from the requirement of strategic envisionment.

A conflict was expressed by a number of general officers between the long time-span which should operate at their level and their actual two to three year tours of duty. It was difficult to attend adequately to the longer term requirements in view of the relatively short time available to make a mark "on my watch." It would seem useful to find ways of placing greater weight on the value of programs which general officers might initiate but not complete on their own tours, together with greater reward and recognition given for success in doing so.

The felt need to do whatever could be done during one's own tour of duty, if one were to get due credit, was an important source of turbulence and excessive change. These issues of the time frame within which work is done, as contrasted with that in which it should be done, will be addressed subsequently in connection with organization structure and with officer development.

Senior Leadership, Culture, and Values

Results thus far presented have confirmed the initial hypothesis not only that senior leadership would have its own special qualities at each different command level, but also that the senior leadership would have much of its Army-wide and corps-wide impact by virtue of its impact upon culture and values. This crucially important point was articulated particularly strongly by the 4-star general officers, who repeatedly commented on the indirect nature of their impact on the total Army. They not only understood that this was necessarily the case for long term effect, but also understood the linkages through which the indirect effects were obtained. They widely shared the view recently expressed by CSA that the molding of Army culture and values is a crucial part of 4-star work, particularly with regard to the absolute importance of creating a culture of trust and confidence upward and downward.

Culture is best defined as the Army's way of doing things. The bottom-up briefing process described earlier, for example, is a significant component of Army culture. So is the play-it-safe process, held to be essential at company and battalion level if officers were to be confident of avoiding the risk of a less-than-perfect OER. And so, on the positive side, is the strongly embedded culture of duty, honor, country. While the pragmatics of concern for career were found to be widespread, these pragmatics were strongly overshadowed by evident willingness to sacrifice at any time for country and for duty. However, there were conflicts between these different values.

Army culture must be reasonably in line with culture of the nation. When it sometimes is not, conflict occurs, which will in the long run be to the detriment of the Army in recruitment, in retaining outstanding officers, and even in securing congressional support. By the same token, the values which are a part of culture and in part are generated by culture, must also be maintained in harmony with national values.

Culture and values have a powerful effect on small unit action and on soldier behavior. This effect is not direct. It operates through several intervening links. Culture and operating values (i.e. the values on which actual behavior is based as opposed to those which are stated but not expressed in practice) provide the setting for policy and climate at mid-level. Policy and climate in turn influence the procedures, processes and standards promulgated by battalion and company commanders. At the bottom end of this cascading flow are small unit and individual actions, and the cohesion which sustains small units on the battlefield. When the various linking pieces are consistent, leadership is experienced as consistent by the soldier, and small unit leaders have the confidence to learn and do what is right. Inconsistencies create confusion, loss of confidence in leadership, and inconsistent actions, especially by company grade leaders.

## A Culture of Trust and Understanding

Small unit combat effectiveness, the ultimate goal of leadership at all levels, requires that subordinates be g ven an understanding of the context within which the leader is acting as well as a clear and precise understanding of the context within which he expects them to operate. It is this shared understanding of contexts which enables subordinates to act responsibly in the absence of orders, as, for example, will be required under the assumptions of the distributed AirLand battlefield.

But the capacity to share understanding of contexts depends on the existence of appropriate culture and values. Culture and values appropriate for the distributed battlefield will, for example, call for and accept reasonable risk by virtue of decisions required of small unit leaders in peacetime training, in contrast to a play-it-safe culture which would much more narrowly limit the range of decisions small unit leaders can make. The opportunity cost of "play-it-safe" is that small unit leaders do not learn how to make risky decisions within the context of their seniors' concepts, and thereby fail to acquire a skill essential to success in mid-to high-intensity combat.

In addition, trust is undermined in two different ways. First, because trust is built through successfully dealing with risk, a "play-it-safe" peacetime environment limits the extent to which trust can be built. Second, for some small percentage of leaders who will not be able to deal with the challenge, their lack of peacetime challenge will have prevented demonstration of their development need. The need is for peacetime culture and values that will allow risk within reasonable limits, depending upon and reinforcing individual responsibility, thereby building confidence, technical and tactical competence, decision skills and trust.

## Leadership and the Modification of Culture

There are four major sets of levers available to senior leaders for modifying culture. These levers are systems which influence culture through the operating values they impose. These systems include:

Personnel Systems - promotion, evaluation, individual development, compensation, organizational structure

Operational Systems - force integration, objectives setting, planning, task allocation, information

Materiel Acquisition Systems - requirements definition, development/design, acquisition, distribution, maintenance

Training System - combat doctrine development, training within the schoolhouse, training within units, external training, special training.

The tendency is to rely on training as the sole solution to all cultural issues. It is important to note that there are other powerful levers. If these other levers are not recognized and used, changes in these systems produce unanticipated cultural changes which may not always be desirable. It is also essential that training should be in line with the Army culture required to fight and win on the "come as you are" battlefield, both to transmit and reinforce that culture.

This conception of leadership requirements changing in quality at successively higher levels of command is not new. Senior leaders have always had to work with culture and values as part of their overall responsibilities. What may be new is the systematic articulation of these leadership requirements at higher levels, as against previous concepts of leadership in terms of face-to-face relationships alone. This articulation is urgently needed today, because of the increasing complexity which faces leaders at all levels as a function of rapi changes in technology, increases in quantity of information, and much greater enemy capability in creating deception. Increased complexity has made it imperative that leaders at every level have available an explicit and accurate understanding of their responsibilities, both to develop the skills needed to perform at higher levels if required, and to perform effectively in their current assignments.

SES Leadership

There was little discussion in the interviews about SES leadership. Very few of the SES members interviewed had a strong sense of leadership responsibilities in the positions they occupied, and even those who were in managerial positions placed more emphasis on management problems than on leadership problems. They were more concerned about the lack of clear leadership they were receiving from their military supervisors. This lack was thought to result from lack of understanding of SES work. When their military supervisors did have the necessary understanding, especially when coupled with interest in the contribution to the Army made by SES members, the leadership was thought to be very effective.

Some few SES members who were managers of substantial departments of military and civilian members did see themselves in an active leadership role, although sometimes it was easier to exercise that leadership in relation to civilians than it was in relation to officers. The elements of this

leadership are in line with the policy and climate setting called for at mid-level. SES members do not appear to get involved with culture and value development, other than the very few whose positions were more or less the equivalent of 3-Star.

The time-scale of SES leadership envisionment is in the 5 to 8 year range. That time-scale allows SES leaders to set out their programs and provide a clear context for their subordinate organizations in terms of the POM and PPBES, each of which really has a 7-year frame.

It could contribute to the effectiveness of civilian work if there were greater awareness among SES members of the importance of leadership. If SES positions were requisitely established at the 2-Star equivalent level, recognizing that there are more than 450,000 civilians, then it may be seen that leadership development equivalent to that of Division Commanders is essential for SES members.

Unit Visiting

Finally, there was one issue of leadership on which there were differences of opinion; namely, the issue of unit visiting. The views ranged from the value of surprise visits "to see what things were really like" to the value of planned visits notified well in advance "to see the very best account the unit could give of itself;" or from the value of "correcting mistakes of junior officers and NCOs," to the value of "getting a sense of the unit's standards, but not interferring with what the officers or NCOs were doing." A distillation of the various observations leads to a picture of unit visiting along the following lines.

Whether or not to take a unit by surprise is probably a matter of individual taste, and may vary from time to time with circumstances. But there are two central features of any visit: first, to be seen; second, to get a direct sense of the operating effectiveness, culture and climate, and morale of the visited unit.

The importance of being seen was strongly emphasized. Top level leaders should be personally recognizable. Whether or not this personal identification needs to be reinforced by creating and projecting a unique image was left as a moot point. What was commonly agreed, however, was that the qualities presented should be a genuine reflection of the personality of the leader.

There was also general agreement on the second point. Senior officers considered that they could get a good sense of the state of a unit by visits of either type, surprise or planned. They were aware of the commonly held view that they usually were shown what the unit wanted them to see, so as to give a favorable impression. But this rarely prevented seeing through to the essentials. The art was to have plenty of opportunity to talk to troops, NCOs, junior officers, and officers at mid-level, and to see the unit at work, whether in training, on exercises, in maintenance activities, or in special drills. But this, in turn, required the senior leaders to manage

their time so that they would always have enough for this critical activity. Where time was totally programmed on formal activities, the opportunity existed to miss some of the real essentials.

Given the opportunity to sense at lower and mid-levels, it was thought possible to determine the extent that policy and climate are in line with the culture and values which the senior leaders are attempting to sustain. The ability to read the signs, of course, requires that the leader be clear about the culture and values he considers important, and the standards of effective performance he is setting. Inaccurate assessments of units spring more from unclarity of visiting officers about their standards, than from failing to see what is going on.

On the question of what to do about what is observed, the central point is that the visiting officer should work through the findings in a coaching and mentoring relationship with his immediate subordinate, and perhaps in conference with all subordinates-once-removed. The issue is not to correct a particular NCO; but rather to take what NCOs (and others) do or say as exemplars to illustrate the general conclusions arrived at and subsequently fed back to the subordinate commander.

The feed-back side of visits is just as important as the assessment and informing function. What are the difficulties standing in the way of reaching given performance standards? Are the desired policies and climate viewed as on the mark? Or do they support operating values in conflict with stated values such that the latter are considered to be pious and unrealistic and to be rejected in practice. This kind of analysis and feed-back is essential for total Army leadership to work effectively as a system.

## INDIVIDUAL COMPETENCY REQUIREMENTS

The foregoing material gives some indication of the competencies which are required in 4-star and 3-star general officers, and in SES members. We shall consider the 4-star requirements first, use these requirements as background for the requirements at 3-star level, and then treat the SES competency requirements separately. We shall then consider the pool of talent needed at lower levels to ensure a steady flow of replacements at senior officer levels, and also the question of how potential senior officer talent can be recognized and identified at earlier stages in a career, but without creating a "crown prince" elite group.

### The Nature of Individual Capability

The concept for considering individual capability is based upon the following formula:

$$\text{LoC} = f(\text{PE} \cdot \text{CP} \cdot \text{O})$$

LoC = a person's level of capability in the sense of the level of work of a particular kind he/she would be able to achieve; a person's LoC thus varies with different kinds of work.

PE = Psychological equipment required for a particular kind of work, including:

| | |
|---|---|
| Knowledge (K) | Values/interests (V) |
| Skill (S) | Temperament (T) |

KS and VT are modifiable to a certain extent, making it possible by appropriate education, training, and counseling programs to prepare a person for a particular position or type of work.

CP = Cognitive power of a person, being the size of world he/she is able to construct, or the amount and complexity of information he/she is able to process.

CP is measurable in time horizon; it is constitutionally based, is relatively unmodifiable, and matures throughout life at predictable rates. A person's cognitive power sets the maximum level of work of any kind that he/she would be capable of even with maximum opportunities for the development of the necessary equipment (KS&VT).

O = the developmental opportunity that a person has had, which includes the opportunity for the necessary experience to gain both knowledge and skill.

There is evidence that cognitive power matures as illustrated in the array of time-horizon progression curves shown in Figure 2 of Appendix A. Two particularly significant points need to be noted. The first is that individuals who are genuinely capable of operating at 4-star level by age 52-54, will be in Mode VIII. That is, they have maturation potential of the kind possessed by individuals who may get to 5-star equivalent levels of cognitive capability and time horizon in what is ordinarily termed old age. That is a very outstanding level of talent.

The second point is that the ordinary career promotion pattern for 4-star (and 3-star) general officers is as shown in Figure 3 of Appendix A. They progress along with all other officers in on up-or-out basis, until they reach a Senior Service College, probably between 38 to 41 years of age. Then they receive very rapid promotions, usually reaching 4-star level 10 to 12 years after leaving SSC. An implication of the time-horizon maturation curves is that during the period until they reach 4-star level, their cognitive capability has been maturing well above their level of promotion. There consequently is a kind of manpower POMCUS of officers of high level potential between the ages of 20 and 50, which may or may not be either used or developed. These issues will be pursued further in the next section on senior officer development.

In addition to the fact that about half the 4-star general officers should be Mode VIII (eventual 5-star potential) in order to ensure that the Army has sufficient capability at Stratum VII for effective command of the Total Army, enough talent must be available at this level to provide for the

contingency of a "come-as-you-are" war. In such a war, the 5-star quality of leadership will be required immediately, without the time lag which has made large-scale military build-up possible in the past.

A derivative advantage of having Mode VIII (potential 5-star) talent at the top has to do with a particularly important quality which tends to occur in people at this level. This quality is that of strong human compassion, and concern with individuals, special groups and societies. Having enough Mode VIII 4-stars at the top, is the best assurance of having an Army with a culture of simultaneous toughness and human concern.

This criterion of the level of cognitive power required to function effectively at 4-star level should be a basic factor to be taken into account in the selection of general officers for these posts. It sets an outstandingly high standard for an Army led by a top level team of individuals each of whom has a level of cognitive competence equivalent to the outstanding leaders of international corporations.

The need for such a standard is evident in the responsibilities borne by those at the top. The US Army is by far the largest, and in many ways the most complex, command hierarchy in the western world. It must sustain itself in a fine tuned state of readiness to act under emergency conditions, without room for error, and with little opportunity for second chances. That is why it requires not only individuals of the highest levels of capability, but also a larger group of such individuals than even the largest corporation would need. To sustain a group of general officers of such stature is a daunting task, particularly since they are rarely available for more than three to four years after achieving 4-star status. In turn, this limited availability means that three or four new 4-stars are required each year. No corporation has such an extraordinary demand to face.

Yet another way of seeing the very high levels of cognitive power required is to consider the levels of the individuals with whom 4-star general officers must interact: leaders of government; heads of major states; CEOs of great corporations; equivalent leaders of other major Armies; and leaders of other institutions of world status. To deal eyeball to eyeball with individuals of this calibre requires nothing less than equivalent calibre, and a bit more if possible.

## Some Political Consequences at 4-Star Level

It is recognized that to prescribe military leadership of the calibre described raises deep questions of political control of the military in democratic nations, especially in peacetime. In time of war, only the very highest levels of leadership are tolerable, but a close and intensely focused grip is still kept by the political leadership on the military activity.

In peactime, contradictions emerge. On the one hand, there is the absolute need to sustain an Army of excellence. There can be no equivocation on that score. But at the same time, effective and true political control must be maintained, and there is a recurrent fear that there are dangers in having military leaders of too great competence. It was not our task, however, in

this analysis to tackle issues of political control. They are, indeed, under continual debate around the question of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of its Chairman. The issue will be left there, and present findings will be pursued in terms of requirements for developing and sustaining a senior leadership capable of commanding the great Army the nation has legislated for. As part of this analysis, the essential value systems for senior leadership, the V of the KS and VT of the formula for level of capability, will be considered.

4-Star Competencies: Cognitive Power

The first thing to note about the 4-star positions is that they require individuals of world stature. The analogy is that of athletes who compete in the Olympics as opposed to the national championships.

A more precise way of putting this requirement is that at least half of the 4-star general officers should be capable of 5-star equivalent levels of work by the time they reach their developmental peak, and the other half should be capable of work at the top of 4-star equivalent range by that time. This statement is not intended to imply that the normal careers of 4-star general officers should be extended beyond present limits. Rather, the point is that individuals at this high level of capability will not yet have reached their developmental peaks at the time they are required to do work at the 4-star level. In order to have the level of ability required to do 4-star work before the development peak is reached, individuals must be chosen who will in fact mature further with time, some of whom will mature substantially more. (A second point is that the presence of general officers of this level of capability will provide a war reserve of 5-star potential against the contingency of mid-or high-intensity war.)

4-Star Competencies: Psychological Equipment

Added to the extraordinarily high level of cognitive power required for 4-star positions are other equally high requirements for psychological equipment related to the very special requirements of the positions: leadership of a citizen Army, combat strategic work, political work, and understanding of weaponary and modern technology. We shall consider these requirements under the headings of knowledge (K), skills (S), values and interests (V), and temperament (T).

The knowledge (K) requirements at 4-star level are formidable. There is first of all the required knowledge of combat strategy and tactics, not only of how to fight, but of how to fight under widely varying conditions anywhere in the world. Historical interests and knowledge, both military and general, were often cited as required background to the necessary understanding of grand scale military strategy and tactics, and many of the general officers interviewed were in fact keen students of history.

Knowledge of how-to-fight doctrine is necessary in all 4-star positions, regardless of how specialized some of these positions may be in other respects. The peacetime equivalent of how-to-fight doctrine is how-to-train, and all 4-star general officers must have expert knowledge in that field.

An additional area of knowledge cited as necessary at 4-star level was logistics, and those who held it to be necessary were also those who thought that general officers do not know enough about the discipline. The cost was said to be more difficulty than was necessary in balancing short-term and long-term materiel and equipment requirements.

Ancillary knowledge is required in many other fields, such as of how the Congress operates, and of the governmental military budgeting process; of international relations as these affect military alliances; of the social, political and economic circumstances in allied nations, and in nations where conflict may occur; and optimally, knowledge of research and statistics, of engineering and technology, and of the social sciences.

The most highly specialized role at 4-star level is that of the Commanding General, AMC, with its requirement for a high level of technological and logistical knowledge and sophistication.

The Skill (S) requirements are equally varied, beginning with skills in combat command and in training. With respect to combat command skills, the Army is now at the point where the last of its officers with combat experience as battalion commanders are coming through to top level, and where its 4-star general officers will henceforth not have had that experience. This places some degree of urgency on the need to develop and make widely available sufficiently realistic training experience opportunities to fill the gap. (The need is not only for realism, but also for sufficient duration of training experience, i.e., one rotation at NTC will not provide sufficient duration for all the required learning, and there are extremely few other equally effective learning opportunities at battalion and higher. There is also an experience gap in the pipeline, between those officers who have had no battalion combat command and those who have had at least one rotation at NTC. This gap also needs filling.)

An important and all-pervasive requirement is skill in the use of persuasion and negotiation. As has been described above, command itself has become diffused at the topmost levels and must be supplemented by persuasion in order to reach the necessary level of effectiveness. Persuasive skills are required, furthermore, in many other situations: in negotiations with Congressional Committees; in managing interdependencies with and between allied leaders; in international networking; in coping with local political leaders; and in collegial relationship with other general officers.

If the analysis of the importance of collegial modes of functioning is correct, then collegial skills will need to be developed. There is not much opportunity for developing these skills at present, because of the tendency towards stovepiping and turf ownership as the primary mode of functioning at all grades up to and including 3-star level. It is only as a 4-star that general officers clearly step beyond turf ownership, and the remaining time of service at that point is really not enough for such collegial skills to be acquired and then used for mentoring subordinates. The system consequently has a tendency to perpetuate itself.

The requirement for skill in establishing and reinforcing desired culture and values has been described in the section on leadership, and again is a skill that needs development. A connected skill, and one in which general officers have more experience, is that of organizational engineering and forces structuring.

Finally, there is a family of skills concerned with problem solving, communications, and information and planning systems. These skills are connected with the problems of handling complexity at 4-star levels. There is a need for skill in the use of heuristics (e.g., analogues) and complex model building to tackle problems which are generated by the $W^3E$ PESTI world. These skills are required in order to be able to see the meaningful patterns in what would otherwise be seen as confusing and random, much as templating permits intelligence analysts to identify enemy units on the basis of superficially unrelated pieces of intelligence information. These skills are also used for a multiplicity of other purposes:

for getting out clearer alternative plans within the 20-25 year working orientation, in which 12-15 year programs, 7-year PPBS developments, 3-year projects, and 1-year tasks nest purposefully within the higher order objectives;

for communicating frames of reference and context to subordinates and colleagues, and to the media;

for setting essential elements of Information (EEI) requirements, so as to be sure to get the right kinds of information.

Values and Interests (V) take on a particular importance at 4-star level. It is imperative that all senior officers should share the basic enduring values of the nation with respect to the military and its national purpose. These prime values are set out in FM 100-1, the foreword to which states: "We seek from the soldiers, NCOs, and officers of our units, and from our civilians, an instant capability to go to war in defense of our national interests. The consistant obligation of the Army's senior leadership is to be prepared to lead our Army wisely."

A second set of values, also expressed in different ways in the interviews, are those described in "The Profession of Arms" in FM 100-1: loyalty to the institution and to the unit; personal responsibility; and selfless service; along with committment, competence, candor and courage.

A third set of key values which must be held by senior officers are those concerned with serving the soldiers. "You have to make them believe you care about them. And to do that, you really have to care about them, or they'll see through you." This concern for soldiers, and for their families, was strongly expressed as a critical issue, a value which had to be embedded in culture and reflected in the day to day behavior of NCOs and first-line officers.

The fourth set of values is concerned with civilians and is not widely recognized. It is a concern for the effective and productive governance of the civilian service, and the application of continual pressure to achieve steady improvements in productive effectiveness and in the morale of civilians.

These values are held by general officers not just to be buzz words, but values which must show consistently in the behavior of senior leaders if they are to sustain that essential culture of trust and confidence on which the will to fight depends. FM 100-1 states succinctly: "The Army's task is a complex one. It serves the nation, but in doing so, it must serve the soldier as well. It is a value-centered institution ..."

Finally, with respect to Temperament (T), there are certain characteristics which can be picked out from the plethora of qualities which fall under the general heading of temperament and emotional make-up, which have been found in the interviews and confirmed in other studies as essential for top level leadership.

A first group of temperamental qualities is concerned with energy. It was generally recognized that senior leaders must be proactive, and must have substantial stores of energy on which to draw. These qualities are almost universally mentioned in describing key characteristics of outstanding leaders in industry and other fields as well as in the military. High energy levels and proactivity go along with the ability of these leaders to handle their aggression by turning it to constructive use, rather than to frustrated hostility.

A second group of qualities centers around the ability to handle affection. In its most positive form, it is found in expressions like, "You've got to love those soldiers, and they've got to love you - and that applies to everyone from squad leaders to the top." It is stated that leaders who are experienced as cold leaders are never quite trusted. It is not that they are necessarily mistrusted, but rather that bonds of affectionate trust are difficult to feel and to establish. To win the affection of followers is an essential component of winning their enthusiastic motivation; it requires continually manifested reciprocal affection.

Relative to affection and aggression is the ability to handle conscience and guilt. In no other top leadership role is there the same need for leaders to be able to cope with guilt as in the military. To cope with quilt means to be able to experience the pain -- sometimes very strong pain -- of past or anticipated future loss of life of those commanded, but without being rendered less capable of effective combat command by those feelings.

Combat faces military leaders with conscience and guilt in sacrifice of life. If they are capable of the necessary affection, they will suffer deeply from the point of appropriate conscience. They must be able to cope with such pain in and through their own temperamental make-up, including their ability to deal with conflict. They must also be able to rely upon the

shared values and affection they have been able to build up in their units to sustain everyone including themselves in the exigencies and emotional conflicts of combat.

Finally, senior leaders must themselves be free from irrational feelings of suspicion and mistrust. Such feelings run directly counter to the requirement that senior leaders should be able to generate feelings of trust and confidence. Suspicion breeds hostility towards colleagues. It also leads to a tendency to manipulate others, interacting with the underlying belief that others are manipulative as well. Such feelings are inconsistent with the high level of cooperation and mutual openness between senior officers which is essential for collegial functioning and cohesion at the top.

In summary, these components of psychological equipment (PE = KS & VT) are presented not as an idealized picture of a 4-star general officer paragon, but rather as a description of core qualities which should be present at 4-star level. The possible variations in personality make-up around these core qualities are infinite. But the core qualities themselves represent the minimum requirements for effective senior officer leadership. And they can all be assessed.

## 3-Star Competencies: Cognitive Power

The time-horizon maturation curves indicate that, to be capable of promotion to 3-star Stratum VI levels by the ages of 51 to 56, individuals must be of high Mode VI, or Mode VII capability. Middle or low Mode VI is not likely to be sufficient; such individuals are unlikely to be ready for 3-star levels of work until their early sixties, and that is too late for the Army. High Mode VI or Mode VII level of cognitive power will be such as to enable 3-star general officers to function comfortably in the 12-15 year time-span called for by the roles, and to encompass the 7-year programs, 3-year projects, and 1-year tasks which they must carry through in pursuit of their longer-term objectives.

In addition, in order to provide a pool of talent for promotion to 4-star rank, there must be at least 10 3-star general officers who are in high Mode VII or in Mode VIII. This figure of 10 is based on the fact that about four 4-star positions become vacant each year, and there must be a sufficiently large pool from which to select them. By the same token there must be something of the order of 40 or more 2-star general officers with potential cognitive power to move to 3-star level in order to provide an adequate pool from which to replenish the 15 or so 3-star vacancies which occur each year.

## 3-Star Competencies: Psychological Equipment

The psychological equipment (PE = KS and VT) required at 3-star level is not all that different from that required at 4-star level. The required values and temperament are identical. The knowledge and skills differ to some extent in two respects: they may be more specialized, and they are not required at as high a level.

With respect to knowledge, 3-star positions are much more varied than are 4-star positions. The corps command roles do have common knowledge requirements. Examples are how-to-fight doctrine; translating strategic issues into operational art; and knowing how to translate culture and values into contexts within which divisional policies may be set and appropriate climate established. Along with knowledge goes a set of skills in: operational art; persuasive command and leadership of host nation and allied divisions; and persuasive working relationships with local political dignitaries and community leaders (social, religious, trade union).

The more highly specialized 3-star positions demand special knowledge and skills which are too diverse to be treated here, and will be illustrated only. There are for example, the special requirements of: financial control and administration; personnel work and research; operational research; logistics; weapons technology and engineering; and scientific research. Each of these areas calls for its own special education and training background, including in some cases academic qualification at graduate level.

Pool of Talent at General Officer Levels

On the assumption, stated above, that there are approximately four 4-star positions and fifteen 3-star positions to be filled each year, and on the assumption further that there ought to be a pool of at least two to three times as many reasonably qualified candidates as there are vacancies from among whom to select for promotion, the following are the approximate numbers of GOs of higher level potential needed at each GO level, allowing also for some wastage:

| | 1-Star Level | 2-Star Level | 3-Star Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4-Star Potential | 20 | 15 | 10 |
| 3-Star Potential | 50 | 40 | - |

These figures can be an important checklist for evaluating whether the Army has a sufficient supply of high level talent coming through the system. A method now exists for assessing potential. It might well be used to obtain an annual review of the distribution of cognitive capability and of potential capability at critical levels, such as at C&GS, in Senior Service Colleges, among newly promoted brigadier generals, and at 2-star and 3-star levels. These assessment issues will be discussed below under Development Requirements.

SES Competencies: Cognitive Power

SES members should optimally be in high Mode V or low Mode VI. They would then be in a maturation pattern which would bring them to the necessary level of cognitive capability for promotion to the Stratum V 2-Star equivalent SES level of work between 42 and 55 years of age. They might thereupon mature to the middle or top of Stratum V by retirement age.

This Stratum V level of cognitive capability coincides with time horizons in the 5-10 year band. This level is the equivalent of 2-star Division Command, the Army's highest level of unified command. SES members should therefore have the capability to manage a substantial directorate or department; including managing the planning and execution of POM and PPBES 5-7 year programs.

The same time span levels of work would apply in the case of SES members who are scientific and technical experts engaged in research and development work, perhaps with some few assistants or research teams to assist them, but without departmental managerial duties. These scientists are the ones who can carry the longer term research and development projects, major projects planned for completion in the 5 to 8 year term. There are program manager roles at these levels for whom the same cognitive capabilities would be required.

Some few SES members -- scientists, program managers, department managers -- might be engaged in conceptual developments which run over the 10-year boundary. These would be levels of work which call for cognitive functioning equivalent to that of the 3-star general officer. These members would be the ones who would warrant recognition as Super SES, and who would be expected to have the cognitive capability to work in the $W^3E$ PESTI world as described above under 4-Star competencies.

SES Competencies: Psychological Equipment (PE = KS and VT)

Because SES roles are so highly specialized, it is not possible to spell out the knowledge (K) required in the different roles. Legal, financial, research and technical, operational research and systems analysis, behavioral research, concepts analysis, engineering, logistics, information and communications science, all require their own specialized knowledge and qualifications.

There are, however, some generic knowledge requirements. All SES should have a full and rounded knowledge of the Army and how it functions, including key relationships with the Congress. They should equally possess a working knowledge of strategy, operational art, and tactics, so as to understand how their own work relates to combat and to the will to fight.

Since SES work impacts on policies and the climate produced by policies, and since in many cases the SES member may be setting such policies and the consequential climates, they must know about policy setting and its relation to climate. They must further know about culture and values, and about how culture can be modified, because in their role of providing continuity across changes in leadership at 3-star and 4-star level, they must be able to sustain the longer term programs of culture change which have to be handed over from one senior officer to the next.

Most if not all SES members must know about preparing and implementing budgets, because their 5 to 8 year outreach encompasses the POMs and PPBES financed programs. These developments require precise budgeting and budgetary control. Some SES members have, in addition, the duty of preparing budgets for such programs for presentation to Congress and for overseeing expenditure against such budgets when funded.

The skills (S) required at SES level, for those who are department managers or who have large subordinate research groups, include those of managing subordinates. A special managerial requirement is the skill needed to manage military as well as civilian subordinates, and to earn credibility in managing them, to include being the rating officer for the military subordinate.

There are additional skills required in working for superiors who are military officers, who may be anywhere from 0-6 to 0-9 in rank. The skill needed to be an effective subordinate to a manager working at a lower level (0-6 to 0-7) cannot be described in general terms because it is non-requisite, a reflection of poor organization structure, and individuals must deal with these situations on a case-by-case basis. An equally non-requisite situ-

ation for which the necessary skills cannot be adequately formulated is that which occasionally arises in which an SES is organizationally subordinate to another SES.

Additional skill requirements fall into the specialist fields listed above in the discussion of required knowledge, and which would have to be specified in detail for each one. But there is one skill which does apply to all these specialties, and that is the social skill of being a constructive member of the particular specialist community to which the SES member belongs. SES leadership is important in these communities, and it is crucial that each SES member should be able to play a full part.

The Values and Interests (V) and Temperament (T) necessary for SES work are not much different from those described for 4-star work, except for those temperamental qualities directly related to combat which do not figure so strongly for the SES. One value which does need to be clearly emphasized is a concern for the effective and productive governance of the civilian service, and the application of continual and unending pressure to achieve steady improvements in productive effectiveness and in the morale of civilians. This is a value that is alive in all good executive systems.

## GO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Programs for the professional development of officers with a view to ensuring the necessary stream of potential 3-star and 4-star general officers will be considered under four main headings: the development process from 2-star to 3-star to 4-star levels; development at 1-star level; early development from Ø-1 to Ø-6; and personal and executive assessment and appraisal in connection with development.

### Coaching, Mentoring, Counseling and Sponsoring

In order to describe some aspects of the the officer development process, the concepts of coaching, mentoring, counselling and sponsoring will be used.

Coaching is the process of on-going on-the-job training carried out regularly by an immediate superior with each immediate subordinate. It is a part of regular performance appraisal and involves not only performance feedback but also constructive modeling and skill development.

Mentoring is the process of teaching of officers by other officers who are usually more senior than the immediate superior. It is the kind of periodic teaching which superiors-once-removed should regularly undertake as part of the development of their subordinates-once-removed.

Counseling is specialist advice given to an officer by a career counselor or other specialist engaged in career development, assessment, or psychological work.

Sponsoring is the process whereby higher level officers with a special interest in more junior officers, not necessarily under their command, provide advice and see that the officer sponsored is considered for appropriate assignments. This is not currently used in the Army, but is common in some industries, and is included here for completeness.

From 2-Star to 3-Star to 4-Star

One of the main features of development for officers at 2-star level and above is what might be termed transition training. The transitions may be either horizontal (change from one type of post to another at the same command level) or vertical (promotion from one command level to the next).

The criticism was frequently made that general officers were often thrown in at the deep end, sometimes ill-prepared for new assignments. To overcome this criticism, training for such transitions calls for preparatory steps once it is known that the shift is to occur. The first step in such preparation should be for the immediate superior to coach the subordinate on his new responsibilities, explaining the nature of the higher level of work in the case of a promotion, or explaining the new requirements (or getting appropriate assistance in doing so) in the case of a lateral transfer.

In addition to coaching, the transition points should provide the opportunity for an intensification of mentoring by whichever officer or officers may have been acting as mentor, again to give the transition-ing officer as much insight as possible into the new situation which he is approaching.

The necessity for effective coaching and mentoring at these transition stages can be more fully appreciated if the rate of career progression of 3-star and 4-star GOs is considered. After a slow and steady career progression, along with all other officers, to Senior Service College around the age of 40 years (and about 20 years service), there then follows an accelerated progression: BG by 42 to 45 years of age; MG by 44 to 49 years of age; LTG by 50 to 53 years of age; and GEN by 51 to 55 years of age. The full transition from selection as BG to 4-star promotion frequently takes less than 10 years and occasionally is as low as 7 years. That is an accelerated progression.

The point about this accelerated progression is that it raises questions about the opportunities provided to senior officers to mature adequately in vertical transitioning. The very rapid progression at these senior levels needs to be offset by as much preparation for lateral and vertical transitions as possible.

One other possible step to aid these transitional moves, and to enrich individual senior officer development at the points of change when the whole mental set is in favor of learning and maturation, is to provide the opportunity for the transitioning officer to leave his post early - days, weeks, or perhaps a month - and to spend that time in taking stock of where he has come from, and of where he is going to. The hiatus would provide time for study of the military, social, economic, and political circumstances of the new situa-

tion as well as for consolidation of lessons learned from the old one. A deputy should be able to fill the vacant role, as would be necessary when a commander is on any extended absence, or becomes a casualty in combat.

A particularly important and difficult transition is that from 2-star to 3-star level, on promotion. The change in outlook is held to be extremely difficult to encompass. It is the change described as that from unified command to diffuse command. It is a move into a different world -- the $W^3E$ PESTI world -- and it is said that general officers could benefit from preparation for the move.

This particular transition from 2-star to 3-star level produces a concentration of general officer developmental requirements: first, coaching of 2-star general officers by their 3-star seniors on the nature of the experience; second, mentoring by other relevant 3-star or 4-star generals on the nature and significance of the transition, and on the nature of life in the new situation.

Along with coaching and mentoring, and the opportunity to leave the current position slightly in advance of reporting in to the new position, two other developmental opportunities, sabbaticals and special courses, are frequently mentioned. General officers do not see the need for substantial education or training courses at 3-star and 4-star levels. The opportunity for short "sabbaticals" and appropriate short courses could be useful, however. By a sabbatical is meant the opportunity for anything from a few days to a few weeks of personal study away from the job. It would be time to be spent in reflecting about the work, in relevant reading, in writing or in discussion with others, in the course of which a deeper consideration could be given to fundamental issues than would be possible in the day-to-day work situation. It might include, for example, study in relation to promotion to a 3-star position.

The emphasis on short courses is in contrast to being away for any long period of time. By short courses is meant courses of 1 day to several days or a week's duration, for up-dating, for getting hold of some new idea or procedure, or for keeping abreast of some particular field. Such courses are generally held to have been useful to senior general officers.

There is one point in general officer development where it was thought that a slightly longer course might be useful. That is the course for BGs, referred to as the "BG Charm School." The current 2-week course is thought to be useful, but a slightly more extended course ought to be considered. The particular features which are of value are the opportunities for direct face-to-face contact with the Army's senior leadership and with civilian leaders, and this part of the course content needs to be increased.

Development Processes Prior to General Officer Selection

The development of a senior general officer cadre requires, in addition to schoolhouse learning and unit leadership experience, at least two things: teaching experience; and planned assignments in which individuals can have the opportunity to exercise their capabilities at full stretch. The latter

requires the identification of a wide pool of potential high level talent, not of a crown prince elite, but a pool encompassingly wide in the sense of including everyone who shows any signs of such potential. (Such a pool exists now in the pool of C&GSC regular course graduates. The current proposal might involve little more than making selection for that course more precisely reflective of the officer's potential.)

Teaching experience is a uniquely valuable experience for building leadership skills for many reasons. It gives practice in clear articulation of ideas, and in communicating those ideas; it gives the opportunity to review one's own knowledge and experience; and it gives feed-back on the reception of Army doctrine by officers in the learning situation. It thus prepares officers for perhaps the most demanding aspects of their command responsibilities, coaching and developing their more junior subordinates, and aiding them to develop the more complex frames of reference needed to progress.

For teaching experience to pay off, instructors should be at a higher rank than their students, and should be at least one step ahead of them in experience. It is dysfunctional for captains to teach equally experienced captains, or majors to teach majors. The one cannot "add value" to the other in the process. Effective teaching demands that the instructor have a qualitatively wider frame of reference than the students. It is under these circumstances that the officer-teacher gains valuable leadership experience, faced by potential command subordinates expecting to take part in a two-way working relationship in which the leader must explain and share a frame of reference as he would have to do to prepare them for leadership on the distributed battlefield. Successful completion of an instructional assignment at an Army Service School, Staff College, or Senior Service College should be prerequisite to selection for command at or above battalion.

Full-stretch assignments are a critical part of the testing and development of high-level potential talent. Such assignments are especially important in the military because of the slow rate of promotion in peacetime. If officers of high potential are given the opportunity for levels of work no higher than would ordinarily be called for by the rank they hold, two serious consequences follow: first, they may become intensely frustrated by the "cap" they feel in what they are allowed to do; second, the Army is prevented from knowing what it must know, namely, how much more an officer is capable of beyond that which he is now called upon to do. The potential of a "come-as-you-are" war requires that potential be much more precisely known now than has been necessary in previous eras.

There are many types of assignment in which officers up to lieutenant colonel can be given the opportunity to work at levels well above the rank they hold. For example, Pentagon action officer positions provide opportunity to work on strategic policy issues; duty on corps and division staffs, particularly those requiring planning, usefully enlarge frames of reference; developmental roles and study groups in Service Schools and Senior Service Colleges offer the opportunity for development of initiative and integrative skills. The main requirement, however, is that there should be an officer

appraisal system which can ensure that no potential high level officers are overlooked. It may be useful, therefore, to re-examine the current OER appraisal system.

Appraisal of Officer Performance and Capability

The general view was expressed in the interviews that the present OER system is the best the Army has ever had. But at the same time, the view was held that there were still shortcomings which need to be overcome. The Army is no better off than other large organizations in this regard. Performance appraisal systems, and procedures for assessing individual capability and future potential remain areas of personnel management which are in an unsatisfactory state. An alternative systems will be proposed, as one part of a potential future officer development system.

One difficulty with the current OER system which was often cited was that nearly all officers were given ratings of 1 on all 14 of the professional criteria for performance appraisal, because only those who had perfect scores year after year were likely to be considered for promotion. To be given a rating of less than 1 on any of these criteria was effectively to be dammed to no further progress. In addition, when only overall ratings of performance are called for, it is impossible to know which of a number of equally possible and substantially different meanings of performance is intended, e.g., full attainment of relatively easy targeted objectives vs. high quality of performance while failing to achieve difficult objectives.

On the question of assessment of potential for promotion, similar problems arise. The OER requires an immediate Commander to compare his own subordinates with each other and with others, on their potential for promotion. But he not the best judge of the promotion potential of his own immediate subordinates. He is far too likely to have not yet completely filled out the frame of reference required at his own level, and lacks that of the next higher level. On the other hand, he is well qualified to assess the promotion potential of his subordinates once-removed for he should be able to judge who would have the potential to work for him.

This problem is not resolved by having a senior rater place the officer in a population of 100. Not all officers who have been successful at lieutenant colonel level can be in the top 1% of the population; yet it is emotionally difficult to give a lower comparative rating to any members of such a high level group because that also may preclude further promotion. (The SES ratings by military supervisors are similarly inflated, perhaps because of a feeling that the same thing is true within the SES system, though it in fact is not.)

Some of these difficulties arise from the failure to separate current performance appraisal from assessment of potential. Performance appraisal should be a matter between a superior and each of his immediate subordinates as part of the superior's coaching of the subordinate in which he tries to reinforce his strengths and frankly reviews his weaknesses in order to help him to overcome them. Assessment of potential should be a quite separate process in which those higher up in the system consider which officers are

coming along below who might be capable of working for them. This is a matter of succession planning. Effective and constructive performance appraisal is seriously inhibited by making it part of the process of assessment of potential.

In the light of these difficulties, and they are common to all performance appraisal systems which attempt also to assess individual capability, an alternative procedure will be described and set out in detail in Appendix A. This procedure is based on the important assumption that it is essential to separate the appraisal of an officer's personal performance from the assessment of that officer's potential capability, in contrast to the current OER procedures which group these two processes together:

a) current personal performance appraisal should be an on-going part of a superior's coaching of immediate subordinates:

b) assessment of potential capability should be carried out as part of succession planning by superior-once-removed advised by immediate superiors.

Performance appraisal should be a continual process carried on throughout the year, and reviewed at the end of the year, in which every officer coaches each of his subordinates. This coaching calls for the superior to watch for instances of good performance and of weaknesses in performance, to commend the good and to help overcome the weaknesses. Such coaching was described in many of the discussions as a crucial part of leadership at all levels in combat. It should be equally so in peacetime. Further, it is disruptive to the essential spontaneity of such coaching to require written reports of the talks. Written records cannot capture the quality of these superior-subordinate interactions and may indeed reduce their actual quality.

If this coaching process is carried out regularly throughout the year, an annual review of performance can readily be carried out at the end of the year, and recorded simply in the from of a statement that the regular coaching has occurred. Unless a subordinate's performance is the subject of an adverse report, in which case the prescribed adverse reporting procedure must be used, there is no need for a description of performance. This principle would be a substantial shift from must current practice. The reason for it is as follows.

Performance appraisal is a delicate matter between a superior and a subordinate. It is concerned with the superior's duty to help each subordinate to develop his/her best competencies. It is best left at that. For it is no part of the immediate superior's responsibility to assess subordinates from the point of view of progression and promotions. That should be the duty of the superior-once-removed.

To put the matter another way, the commonly held view that every manager should be finding and training his successor is incorrect. Managers tend to find successors in their own image, and that may be precisely what the manager-once-removed does not want. It is that manager-once-removed who can best judge whether a subordinate-once-removed has the capability for promotion to the next level. That judgment requisitely cannot be made by the

immediate manager of that subordinate. This approach leads to the following procedure for assessing the current level of capability of individuals and their future potential.

Assessment of capability of officers is a judgment which ought to be made by the commander-once-removed (i.e., Corps Cmdrs judge BDE Cmdrs; Div Cmdrs judge BN Cmdrs; BDE Cmdrs judge CO Cmdrs). It is a central feature of the responsibilities of officers that they should know their subordinates-once-removed well enough to judge their capability for promotions, assisted by advice from their immediate subordinates. That is how any large-scale organizaiton should keep track of its pool of talent, in order to provide adequate professional development to ensure adequate leadership succession.

The superior-once-removed would be required to make and to record two assessments, in the form of answers to these two questions:

a) Current potential: if the officer being assessed had had the necessary training and experience, at what grade to you judge he would be capable of working at the present time (whether his existing grade, or a lower or a higher grade)?

b) Potential for next higher grade: if the officer being assessed were to have the necessary training and experience, do you judge he would ever be capable of promotion to the grade above that you stated in reply to the previous question, and, if so, within how many years?

Having made his judgments, the assessing officer (the superior-once-removed) would be required to provide brief descriptive notes of two kinds:

a) a description of any outstanding qualities of the assessed officer, which have contributed to the assessment of his potential capability;

b) a statement of most useful next steps for the optimum development of the officer, including best types of next assignment, and any training or development opportunities for increasing knowledge or skill, or widening experience, or for emotional maturation.

This assessment of potential constitutes important material to be taken into account by the immediate superior in his on-going coaching of his subordinates.

Given the above two judgments of potential, accompanied by the brief descriptive notes outlined, it becomes possible to accumulate a series of judgments by a succession of superiors-once-removed which will produce a trend line showing the growth of the rated officer, and which can make a significant contribution to the deliberations of promotion boards.

It should be noted that the focus of assessment is the individual in his/her own right, an absolute judgment of where that person's potential lies currently and for the next step up. It does not ask for a judgment of where that individual should be placed as compared with an unidentified group of

others. Such a method of comparative judgments is unsound. What needs to be judged is what level of work and types of work an individual can do, not who compares with whom.

Finally, the individual judgments can be put together to provide a picture of the distribution of current and future potential capability for each rank, a prime datum for the macro-assessment of the numbers of individuals in the pipeline with the potential for taking their place in due course at higher levels.

The detailed procedures and forms for these procedures are in Appendix A. Also included are the forms which can be prepared for promotion boards, setting out the accumulated judgments of potential in such a way is to give a trend of assessment which indicates even more precisely what the future potential might be.

Assessment Center Procedures

It has been argued that coaching and performance appraisal by immediate commanders and assessment of potential by commanders-once-removed are essential components of any satisfactory officer development program. Strong reinforcement for these components could be given by assessment center processes of two kinds. The first is personal assessment for the individual officer, and the second is executive assessment as an aid to selection.

Personal assessment is a procedure carried out with individual officers in which they are given the opportunity to sit back and look at themselves, with the assistance of trained counselors, and to take stock of where they have come from and where they judge they might be able to go. These possible future directions would consider both potential level of promotion and potential capacities or specialties. The main aim would be to assist individuals to sharpen their development goals, and to frame realistic education and training programs to achieve those goals.

Such information is for the officers themselves and not for the Army, although aggregations of individual data might be prepared which could protect the identity of individuals while at the same time adding to the Army's data base on the size of its talent pool for given levels and types of functions.

Useful stages at which to provide assessment centers would be at the 10-year and 20-year career points. The 10-year stage would allow officers to consider their competencies for field grade levels; the 20-year stage, perhaps at Senior Service College, would allow them to consider themselves against the requirements of General Officer command.

The assessment ought to be carried out in two main sections. The first would comprise psychological equipment - knowledge (K), skills (S), values and interests (V), and temperament (T); the second would be cognitive power (CP). There is extensive experience in the assessment of KS and VT. Knowledge can be examined by interview and a range of tests, skill by field tests

and simulations, values and interests by interview and standard inventories, and temperament by tests such as the Myers-Briggs, or the Birkman inventories.

Where there has always been more difficulty is in the assessment of cognitive power. Intelligence tests are not of sufficient help. They do not adequately differentiate capability by Stratum, perhaps because other factors interact with intelligence to produce capability to pattern complexity. The particular significance of cognitive power as measured in time horizon is that it does differentiate capability by Stratum. It is an index of current capability which also establishes the level in the future at which a person could be capable of working given the necessary education, training and experience.

In addition to time horizon, a method of direct assessment of cognitive power has been developed out of Stratified Systems Theory, and has been under test by the Army Research Institute for some years. The method, called Career Path Appreciation (CPA), has been tested for 10 years in British industry, 5 years in the British Army, 3 years in the US Army, and 3 years under cross cultural conditions in South Africa, Nambia, and the Solomon Islands. Test samples include women and minority groups. The evidence is strongly accumulating that the CPA gives an accurate assessment both of an individual's current level of potential, regardless of previous education, opportunity and experience, or minority group background; and of that person's future potential. Both are in terms of time horizon and organizational stratum, which are directly relatable to Army command level. Test use of the Career Path Appreciation in the Army so far has shown consistently that the experience has led to very practical discussion of career development plans and thus that it might be a useful tool for aiding professional development.

The combination of the above procedures for assessing psychological equipment (PE) and cognitive power could give the Army a powerful set of tools for assisting its officers at the 10 and 20 year career stages to review their careers and to think realistically about their futures. They are likely to want to share these assessments with their coaches and mentors.

In addition, however, there is here a powerful battery of assessment tools which could be used as supporting information to promotion boards though not for selection decisions themselves. The Army has been reluctant to employ systematic selection testing procedures. In the light of these recent developments, however, and in the light of the absolute need to ensure the best possible selection for promotion to general officer levels, a further consideration of the Army's policies might be appropriate. However, the introduction of such assessment tools should not be undertaken without at the same time undertaking to introduce the commander-once-removed appraisal of potential described above, in order to ensure that their accumulated wisdom continues to be the central factor in the issue of professional development and advancement.

SES Career Development

In order to understand the special requirements of SES development programs, it is important to be clear about the similarities and the differences in career development conditions in the military and in the civilian services. These conditions are set out in the following table.

Similarities and Differences between the Military (GO) and Civilian (SES) Cultures

| | Mil/GO | Civ/SES |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Institution | A total institution<br>A part society with a Courts-Martial system | A quasi-tenured employment system. |
| Rites of Passage | Well established rites, especially in Schoolhouse, or moving up in rank. | No rites of passage |
| Nature of Position | Holds a Rank.<br>Competes for Rank<br>Assigned to a Position. | At GS level holds a position<br>o applies and competes for positions.<br>SES holds rank and position.<br>o tends to hold onto position rather than compete.<br>o equivocality about whether SES 1-6 are pay grades or sub-ranks.<br>o gives sense of a floating top. |
| Status | Set by rank and assignment.<br>o Cannot stay beyond tour of duty. | Status set by job - which they can stay in.<br>o No tour of duty |
| Manager/ Commander | Ordinarly at higher rank. | Often managed by officers at same or lower equivalent rank |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Belonging | Natural planned periods of 'unemployment' in Schoolhouse or Sabbatical.<br><br>o Retain rank, and an assignment.<br><br>o Part of the Army. | If leave job, e.g., to attend an extended educational program, the feeling is that of being lost from sight for the duration<br><br>o Employed by the Army. |
| Entry | Enter at bottom and work up. | May come in at any level, though most come in at or near the bottom.<br><br>o Can leave and return. |
| Progression - Policy | o Up or out.<br>o Not an assured life-time career. | An assured life-time career given good performance. SES can be removed or downgraded for 1 year's bad performance must be for 2 bad years or 3 substandard years. |
| Career Management of the Individual | Central career management process, via assignments. | Self management of own career, supported by mentoring and central career referral process. |
| Career Pattern | Get knowledge and skill build-up through system of assignment sequences. | Systematic process of referrals in relation to career paths. |
| Inter-Service Movement | Constrained to own service. | Part of a Federal Service, with interchange ad lib. |
| Career Milestones | A succession of milestones to be achieved in upward progress, e.g., C&GSC, Bn CMD, SSC, which must be met to stay competitive. | No identifiable essential milestones which must be met to stay in the service. |
| Ratings | Can be black-balled by one bad OER. | Progress occurs through application or competition for job rather than through assignment based on prior performance. |
| Promotion | Based upon known criteria in OER, same for all ranks. | Based upon job specific criteria, and relevant personal qualifications; with some general criteria for SES. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Assessment | Assessment or personal use is acceptable - but not for selection. i.e. you do not apply for promotion, hence no selection assessment. | Assessment acceptable both for personal use and for selection; i.e. if you apply for a job, you expect to go through a selection procedure. |
| Top Career Level | 4-Star (Str. VII) and calls for 5-Star potential | 2-Star equivalent (Str. V) with some few 3-Star equivalent: 2-Star or 3-Star potential are sufficient. |
| Command and Specialist Promotion Lines | GO positions command substantial subordinate organizations (with few exceptions). | Provisions required for many specialist non-managerial SES positions, as well as for managerial positions. |
| Relation to Political Appointees | Interact laterally | o Subordinate to Military<br>o Interact laterally with some political appointees.<br>o Some SES may also be political appointees. |
| Remuneration | Fixed renumeration by rank - plus, military benefits which vary with circumstances. | Salary plus awards. |

The first feature of these differences between the military and civilian cultures is that there is no required systematic pattern of development for career progression for the civilian. (The ACTEDS -- Army Civilian Training Education and Development System -- program is designed to remedy this problem.) However, it is still the individual's responsibility to take the steps prescribed for career advancement. An additional procedure might be considered, an SES assignment system.

An SES assignment procedure (the Resource Utilization Board -- RUB) developed in NAVMAT, is now on trial for SES in the Scientific and Technical field in the Army. The objective of the Boards is to review regularly (at least annually) the careers of all SES in a particular category (say Scientists and Technicians), or in a particular MACOM or Directorate (say AMC), and to determine whether there are any who would benefit the Army and themselves by a move in position to gain broader experience, to avoid the sedentary effects of being too long in one position, or to enliven creativity and innovativeness by bringing changes in personnel to different agencies.

The optimum time for such movement was viewed as between 6 and 9 years. This period would provide for the essential continuity now contributed by SES, and at the same time would give the mobility necessary to grow more encompassing frames of reference. .

The constitution of the review boards (RUBs) could vary with the organization. In cases where all the SES members of a particular community were concentrated in one command, the Navy experience has suggested that an appropriate Board would have the Commander as chairman with, perhaps, three senior officers, three of the senior SES, and an executive secretary of senior rank. In cases where the SES members of a particular community were dispersed across various commands, the Board would have one of the leaders of that community, either political appointee or SES, and appropriate military and SES members. Decisions of the Board should constitute a strong recommendation to the individual -- a marker for further progress and reward -- rather than a mandatory instruction.

Such a procedure would require an extension at least down to GS-11 level in order to work effectively, as in the ACTEDS LOGAMP program. Extended to the GS system, the procedure could bring some order into career development, the offer of a transfer from one job to another being equivalent to an offer of an opportunity to acquire the necessary experience for career advancement. Failure to acquire breadth and experience through mobility would be a handicap to progress. This extension of the RUB process to GS levels is being tried out by the Navy.

If similar procedures were adopted by the Army, the RUBs would require substantial guidance and assistance in the form of a centralized information source wherein the necessary data on individuals and the differing career progressions could be brought together. Such a data base would include for individuals their past assignments in relation to projected required assignments in any given career progression, and for positions a readily available list of possible candidates judged both suitable and ready to assume those positions. It thus would have many of the central referral and individual-tracking functions now in existence, but would have them in consolidated form. It would also encompass both the general managerial and non-managerial specialist equivalents. Such a function might in due course, if experience warranted such a move, even replace the Board process.

The question of organization structure discussed earlier in this report is important for career development programs. It has been the experience in formulating programs for ACTEDS that the divisions into GS grades are too many and too fine for development planning. It was found necessary to group the GS grades into categories which closely resemble the categories emerging from the present organizational analysis. These coarser groupings provide for an ordering of GS grades into a requisite set of organization work strata. With respect to education and training, they provide for a small number of programs, one program to fit each of the six strata, rather than a program for each of 15 GS grades, plus the SES and SES super grades. These programs would be designed to facilitate development through a Stratum, and preparation for promotion to the next higher Stratum.

| | |
|---|---|
| Str. VI | SES Super Grade |
| Str. V | SES |
| Str. IV | GS 15,14 |
| Str. III | GS 13,12,11 |
| Str. II | GS 10,9,8,7 |
| Str. I | GS 6,5,4,3,2,1 |

This organizational structure also would provide the necessary foundation for providing more training with the military. In order to arrange such training it is necessary to be able to determine the equivalencies between civilian grades and military rank/command levels. For purposes of common training, it is suggested that the civilian grades of those attending should be equated with military grades slightly lower than is actually correct. The logic of this suggestion flows from the fact that officers are selected for staff colleges and senior service schools at specific times in their career progressions, with less regard for their immediately following assignments than would be the case for civilians. It thus would be reasonable for civilians to be somewhat more senior at the time of such schooling than their military counterparts, i.e., it would be anticipated that the content of these courses would be more immediately required in current or next position.

If this analysis is correct, civilians attending the BG Orientation Course or Capstone Course should be newly appointed SES. Less obvious is where GS-15 civilians should fit. The structure suggests that they, if SES candidates, should also attend the Capstone Course, but that would probably not be acceptable. Pragmatically, then, those GS-15 and 14 civilians with centralized career planning attention (including SES candidates) should be regarded as equivalent to officers attending Senior Service Schools, e.g., USAWC, who are on the boundary between Strata IV and III. GS-13, 12, and 11 would then be equivalent to officers attending the various staff colleges, Stratum III.

The strong wish for shared civilian/military training expressed by many of the interviewees would suggest the need to explore further the possibilities and the consequences of more intermixing of civilians in military training courses. This would not necessarily entail whole one-year courses, for example, but might involve significant overlaps between parallel courses. Such mixing would enable the civilians to develop a better knowledge of military operations, and to begin including a group of officers with whom they have worked in their personal networks. The current common courses, such as, for example, the finance course at Syracuse, were said to achieve such an effect.

As discussed earlier, two sets of recognized equivalent roles, rather than separated career streams, are needed for an adequate development system. They are the managerial and the non-managerial specialist roles, both extending the full range from Stratum II to Stratum VI. Training and education in the managerial roles would focus on leadership, management, and human resources issues, with secondary reference to technical processes. By contrast, training and education for the non-managerial specialist roles could concentrate almost exclusively on opportunities for learning more advanced techniques and practices, and for keeping up with technical developments. Individuals could then seek their fullest development by moving from one developmental path to the other as appropriate, much as their military counterparts move between line and staff positions. Given the opportunity for exceptional cases, the general rule then would be that all higher level managers should have had some experience in the specialist roles, and that all specialists must have had at least some managerial experience.

There are several other issues which would apply in the same way to civilians as to military officers as described above. Among these issues are the following.

Performance appraisal and assessment of potential capability are as essential a component of civilian development as they are of officer development. Precisely the same procedures that were described above are suggested for the civilian group. The current civilian performance appraisal process could be simplified by the proposed process. And, in addition, as stated earlier, the appraising officer for SES should be the relevant 3-star general officer. For GS members, it should be the manager at the next Stratum, and not necessarily the next grade. This change is crucial.

For assessment of capability, the same procedures would apply. Here again, it will be apparent why a sound structure of organization strata is essential. It is the true manager-once-removed who ought to be making these assessments, and not the person in the role at the next grade.

Civilians should also be included in assessment center processes. The nearest civilian equivalents to officer at the 10-year and 20-year career points, would be roughly GS-11 and GS-14. The possibility of an assessment center process at these levels would be useful, regardless of length of service.

With respect to attendance at courses, the SES requirement, like that for GOs, is for short courses and short sabbaticals. The opportunity to teach on appropriate civilian courses should also be considered. Attendance at courses should be determined by RUBs or by SCIVMO, in terms of a longer-term career development for individuals, rather than a spot-shot one-off event.

Finally, the question of compensation ought to be reconsidered in terms of the requirements of SES development. The present bonus system is more geared to overcoming the top level pay cap than it is to personal development. It tends to restrict the desire to take time off for training and upgrading, for the fear of being away and getting overlooked. Provision needs to be made for adequate compensation levels without adjustments made by

bonuses. Time-span measurement can supply a direct, simple, and accurate yardstick for setting appropriate differential levels by comparison with industrial and commercial differentials.

APPENDIX A

# APPRAISAL OF OFFICER PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL

## INTRODUCTION

It is essential to separate the process of appraisal of the current personal performance of an officer from the process of assessment of that officer's potential capability, in contrast to the OER procedures which group these two processes together:

(a) current personal performance appraisal should be an on-going part of a superior's coaching of immediate subordinates;

(b) assessment of potential capability should be carried out as part of succession planning by superior-once-removed advised by immediate superiors.

Different procedures for these two types of assessment are described. These procedures are based upon the following conception of the nature of individual capability - both current potential, and future potential.

The concept for considering individual capability is based upon the formula:

$$LoC \int PE \cdot CP \cdot O$$

LOC = a person's level of capability in the sense of the level of work of a particular kind he/she would be able to achieve; a person's LoC thus varies with different kinds of work.

PE = Psychological equipment for a particular kind of work, including:

| | |
|---|---|
| Knowledge (K) | Values/interest (V) |
| Skill (S) | Temperament (T) |

KS and VT are modifiable to a certain extent, making it possible by appropriate education, training, and counselling development programs to prepare a person for a particular position or type of work.

CP = Cognitive power of a person, being the size of world he/she is able to construct, or the amount and complexity of information he/she is able to process. CP is measurable in time horizon; it is constitutionally based, is relatively unmodifiable, and matures throughout life at predictable rates. A person's cognitive power sets the maximum level of work of any kind that he/she would be capable of even with maximum opportunities for the development of the necessary psychological equipment (KS&VT).

O = the employment opportunity that a person has had, which thus includes the opportunity for the necessary experience to gain both knowledge and skill.

There is evidence that cognitive power matures as illustrated in the array of time-horizon progression curves shown in figure A-1.

BACKGROUND

There is a widely held view that the present OER system is the best the Army has had; but also that it has serious shortcomings which need to be remedied. One of the difficulties, for example, with the OER forms is that all officers tend to get ratings of 1 on all 14 of the professional criteria for performance appraisal, since to give a rating of less than 1 on any one of these criteria is to damn that officer to no further progress.

In addition, when overall ratings of performance are called for, it is impossible to know which of a number of equally possible and substantially different meanings of performance is intended. Thus, for example, in the question of whether or not an officer "met requirements" the term "requirements" can be interpreted in a number of entirely different ways by the raters, as for example:

(a) did the officer achieve his targeted output (without reference to whether or not the conditions were easy)?

(b) did the officer give the required quality of performance even though he rarely achieved targeted output because of difficult circumstances?

On the question of assessment of potential for promotion, similar problems arise. The OER requires an immediate Commander to compare his own subordinates with each other and with others, for their potential for promotion to his own level. But he should be concerned not with promotion of his immediate subordinates to his own level (he is too often not a good judge of who best can do his own level of work), but rather with the potential of his subordinates once-removed for promotion to his immediate subordinate command level (for he should be able to judge who would have the potential to work for him).


SLOPE (% PER ANNUM)
50 Yrs
40 Yrs
30 Yrs
20 Yrs
17 Yrs
14 Yrs
10 Yrs
8½ Yrs
7 Yrs
6 Yrs
4 Yrs
3 Yrs
2 Yrs
20 Mths
16 Mths
1 Yr
9 Mths
6 Mths
3 Mths
1 Mth
1 Wk
1 Day
CL-VII
CL-VI
CL-V
CL-IV
CL-III
CL-II
CL-I
ARMY
CORPS
DIVISION
BRIGADE
BATTALION
COY
CEN
LTG.
MG.
BG.
COL.
LTC.
MAJOR
CAPT.
LIEUT.
MacARTHUR:
BRADLEY:
EISENHOWER:
PATTON:
MARSHALL:
MODE VIII
MODE VII
MODE VI
MODE IV
MODE III
MODE II
MODE I
AGE
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35
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45
50
55
60

Figure A-1.

This problem is not resolved by having an intermediate rater for there are various positions which he could occupy; nor by having a senior rater place the officer in a population of 100, since all officers who have been successful at O-5 level will be in the top 1% of the population and it is emotionally difficult to give a low comparative rating to any members of such a high level group.

Finally, some of these difficulties arise from the failure to separate current performance appraisal from assessment of potential. Performance appraisal should be a matter between a superior and each of his immediate subordinates as part of the superior's coaching of the subordinate in which he tries to reinforce his strengths and frankly reviews his weaknesses in order to help him to overcome them. Assessment of potential should be a quite separate process in which those higher up in the system consider which officers are coming along below who might be capable of working for them: it is a mattter of succession planning and provision. Effective and constructive performance appraisal is seriously inhibited by making it part of the process of assessment of potential.

Six Different Meanings of Performance

It is important to note that current personal performance appraisal as an essential component of coaching is constantly bedevilled and confounded by the fact that the term "performance" is applied to at least six significantly different conditions, all equally important in their own right:

a) Simple output; e.g., the fact that an officer or his unit trained all its men in a new procedure in 18 days;

b) degree of success; e.g., the extent to which an officer or his Unit's output achieved a targeted requirement;

c) productivity; e.g., the fact that an officer and his Unit carried out a targeted requirement with 10% less than the budgeted resources in manpower, supplies and equipment;

d) performance trends; any of the above criteria over a given period of time (say, annually);

e) absolute performance rating; e.g., a rating by objective assessors of where the actual record of a Unit or an officer falls on a scale of better than --- worse than, as compared with other Units or officers doing the same kind of work - regionally, or nationally, or as compared with other threat or friendly forces (e.g., an NTC rating);

f) current personal performance of an officer (CPPA); e.g., how an officer's performance is judged by his immediate superior commander, in a coaching situation, of how well that officer is doing, taking into account plans and achievements, the judged ease or difficulty of unexpected conditions that were encountered, and the training experience, and level of capability of the officer.

Each of these six conditions refers to quite different matters, each of which is important. They all need to be taken into account for different purposes. There is one particular difference between them, however, which needs to be noted; namely, the extent to which they are amenable to objective measurement or must remain matters for subjective judgment.

Output, degree of success, productivity, and performance trends, as defined above, can all be subjected to objective counting or measurement. Absolute performance rating may be objectively measured if Units can be compared with each other in a direct competitive situation, otherwise subjective ratings have to be used.

By contrast, current personal performance appraisal (CPPA) is and must always be quintessentially a matter of subjective judgment - that all important judgment by an immediate superior of just how well he thinks a subordinate is doing, honestly conveyed to the subordinate in a setting of helpful confidentiality and trust. No large scale institution can in the long run be any better than the competence of its commanders and managers in judging the quality of performance of their subordinates. It is these standards of judgment which collectively inform the functioning of the whole system and establish its standards of effectiveness.

## CURRENT PERSONAL PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FOR OFFICERS

It is essential that every officer should coach and educate his immediate subordinates. It is a crucial part of effective leadership in combat as in peacetime. Coaching is an on-going process, the officer taking regular opportunity to critique a subordinate's work to let him know where he stands and help him with his development. At least once a year he should sit down with each subordinate and review the quality of his performance and development during that period against targets set at the beginning of the period. Such discussions may be referred to as current personal performance appraisal (CPPA).

In this setting the superior must be free to discuss directly with the subordinates his view of the subordinate's weaknesses as well as his strengths. It is a delicate situation, for it is founded upon the quality of the superior's own judgment. The goal of the exercise is that the review ought to be helpful to the subordinate; the discussion must there fore be free and frank.

Such freedom and frankness cannot obtain, however, if the review is locked into an official report which can make or break the subordinate's career. The process of current personal performance appraisal must therefore be conducted separately from the process of official periodic assessment of potential capability as part of an officer's official record.

How then is current personal performance appraisal to be carried out? This question can be answered sensibly only when the objective of CPPA has been clearly established. That objective is readily apparent once the CPPA process has been separated from that of the assessment of potential carried out by the superior-once-removed.

Personal performance appraisal is a delicate aspect of the relationship between superior and subordinate. As an integral part of the coaching process, it must be a continual feature of the work situation. It assumes that the superior and the subordinate have established sound plans and targets at the beginning of each year. These plans and targets should have been worked through to the point where they are acceptable as demanding but reasonable, so that trust and confidence can obtain over what is to be done.

From time to time, as occasion arises, that superior will grasp opportunities to assist the subordinate to learn more about the jobs, pointing out weaknesses and helping to overcome them, and supporting and reinforcing strong points. Such discussions must be purely between the superior and subordinate. Outside intrusion, or official reporting to others, will weaken the necessary mutual trust, and interfere with the process of subjective judgements which are difficult enough to make and to discuss without interference.

The central focus of such performance appraisal is for the superior to judge whether the subordinate is using his capability to the full, functioning with loyalty and integrity, using spontaneity and initiative, and behaving responsibly. These conditions constitute ordinary good performance. Anything more would constitute performance beyond the normal line of duty or a level of capability significantly above that required in the job.

With respect to personal performance, therefore, there are really only four gradings:

- ordinary good performance, as described above;
- marginally sub-standard performance, which the superior should help to remedy;
- seriously sub-standard performance, which would indicate that the superior is coming to the conclusion that the subordinate is not up to the job -- and if it goes on would lead to an adverse report and eventual initiation of removal from that position.
- performance that gives evidence of a higher level of capability than is required in the role.

These judgements must be keyed into a separate validation of the subordinate's level or work. Two subordinates may be giving continuous and reliable ordinary good performance -- but the work of one can be more valuable than the work of the other because of differences in level of capability. In these circumstances of differentials in the value of individuals' work, equity demands that the superior should exercise differentials in recognition and reward -- in such things as access to the time of the superior, deputizing opportunities, public status and recognition, access to information, and other assets, since recognition by differentials in pay within ranks is not possible.

Once a year, preferably at the time when plans and targets are being established for the coming year, the superior should review, with the subordinate the achievements of the previous year, and pull together the personal performance assessments into a broader picture of progress. Whereas the agreed plans and targets may be set out in writing, the performance review is not.

After the annual performance review has been completed, a brief statement to the effect that it had taken place, signed by the superior and subordinate, might be recorded. And on those occasions where an official adverse report has been made, whatever is the official procedure must be followed. But that is all the documentation.

The reason that none of the personal performance appraisal process, even the annual review, is set out in writing, is that the aim of the process is that of

coaching and personal development and not an official document and report to someone else. Written documentation interferes with the personal interaction between superior and subordinate around the superior's communication of this subjective judgement, and tends to thwart the process by casting it into legalistic verbal cement.

## ASSESSMENT OF OFFICER POTENTIAL

The objective and the function of assessment of officer potential, can be seen most clearly by comparison with the process of personal performance appraisal.

As described above, current personal performance appraisal of his immediate subordinates is a requisite responsibility of every officer as part of his on-going coaching role in their personal development. He and he alone, by virtue of his position and his duty can exercise the necessary judgement. The focus of the discussion is the development of the individual, and not an official report to the Service.

By contrast, assessment of potential is a part of the official process whereby the Service assesses its on-coming leadership capability and chooses officers for promotion. Such assessment is a matter for officers at levels above that of the immediate superior of the officer assessed.

### Procedure

Assessment of potential must be carried out at least by an officer's superior-once-removed; for that is the first level of accountability for determining succession to the in-between level. Assessment of potential must be organized therefore as a process separate in time and place from performance review and appraisal.

In its simplest form superior A convenes a meeting with each of his subordinates (B) in order to assess the potential of each subordinate-once-removed C, aided by B who is the intermediate superior (the immediate superior of C); for example, a Division Commander assessing each of his Battalion Commanders, with the aid of the relevant Brigade Commander.

In order to carry out this assessment, the superior-once-removed must personally know his subordinates-once-removed by having observed them regularly at work. During an assessment procedure he will discuss with each intermediate commander B each of B's subordinates C. It is at this point that the intermediate commander can bring in his judgements of the performance of his subordinates (Cs) to assist the superior-once-removed in his own decision about their potential.

The superior-once-removed would be required to make and to record two assessments, in the form of answers to these two questions:

- Current potential: if the officer being assessed had had the necessary training and experience, at what grade do you judge he would be capable of working at the present time (whether his existing grade, or a lower or a higher grade)?

- Potential for next higher grade: if the officer being assessed were to have the necessary training and experience, do you judge he would ever be capable of promotion to the grade above that you stated in reply to the previous question, and, if so, within how many years?

There is substantial experience to show that superiors-once-removed are capable of making such judgements if they are competent in their own posts; and they should requisitely have the duty of doing so.

Having made his judgements, the assessing officer (the superior-once-removed) would be required to provide brief descriptive notes of two kinds:

- a description of any outstanding qualities of the assessed officer, which have contributed to the assessment of his potential capability;

- a statement of most useful next steps for the optimum development of the officer, including both: best types of next assignment; and any training or development opportunities for increasing knowledge or skill, or widening experience, or for emotional maturation.

This assessment of potential also constitutes important material to be taken into account by the immediate superior in his on-going mentoring discussions with his subordinates.

Accumulation of Assessment for Promotion Boards

Given the above two judgements of potential, accompanied by the brief description notes outlined, it becomes possible to accumulate a series of judgements by a succession of superiors-once-removed which can make a significant contribution to the deliberations of promotion boards.

It becomes possible, moreover, to record the judgements of potential by plotting the data on a graph, as illustrated, to produce a vivid picture of the evolution of an officer's judged potential. The graph is highly discriminating with respect to age - a factor which is ordinarily not sufficiently taken into account in comparing individuals with respect to potential.

Three illustrative charts are given, constructed by transforming data from industry into their Army equivalents. The dots show the successive judgements of superiors-once-removed about current potential; and the crosses show judgements about future potential. The thick stepwise lines show the grade of the individual's current position.

The illustrations which have been chosen, show three individuals all working at the equivalent of O-5, one aged 36, and two aged 39. The sloping curves have been drawn from experience in non-military institutions of many kinds in many different countries, which has shown that individuals who eventually succeed in reaching levels of work consistent with their potential, show regular and predictable paths of development in assessed potential from very early in their careers. Moreover, these paths are the ones actually followed by individuals who have been fortunate enough to have had career opportunities to work consistently at their full potential in jobs that felt just right for them.

It will be seen from examination of these three illustrative cases, that the cumulative assessments of one individual (Chart A) judge him potentially to be headed for an O-6 level of work, by say age 47-50; a second individual (Chart B) is judged to be capable currently of an O-6 level of work and to be headed for O-7 level by about age 42 to 45, and eventually to an O-8 level by about age 50; and the third and youngest (Chart C) is judged to be currently capable of an O-7 level of work (even though he is only working at O-5), and to be headed for O-8 at about 42-45, and O-9 by say 50 (he is one of the potential leavers unless promoted pretty quickly!).

Cumulative judgements of this kind, if expanded by a form allowing for brief descriptive comments by superior-once-removed, give selection panels the kind of data they require. Separation of this process from the conditional review and appraisal of performance by immediate superiors, can leave the delicate mentoring process intact, while providing in a practical way for assessment of potential.

Macro-Assessment of the Army's Officer Potential

The foregoing type of judgment of individual officer potential can be put together in collective form, to give an approximate picture of the distribution of potential officer capability in each rank; e.g., the number of potential Ø-7, Ø-8, Ø-9, and Ø-1Ø officers among the current colonels; or the number of potential Ø-4, Ø-5, Ø-6 and Ø-7 officers among the Ø-3s. Looking four ranks forward from a given rank is both feasible and useful.

These macro-assessments could be reinforced by the introduction of personal assessment center procedures, from which individual data could be merged anonymously into collective form, as illustrated in chart x.


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
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
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AGE
AGE

MENTORING AND PERFORMANCE JUDGMENT REPORT

Date: _____

Name of Officer: _____ Rank: _____

Unit: _____

Name of Immediate Commander _____ Rank _____

(Reporting Officer) Unit _____

1. I have mentored _____ regularly throughout the year, and have drawn his/her attention to strengths and weaknesses in his/her performance, and discussed how improvements might be achieved.

2. I have told _____ that his/her over-all performance has been: **

   (a) Up to US Army standards.

   (b) Above US Army standards.

   (c) Marginally below US Army standards.

   (d) Below US Army standards.

3. I have taken the following actions :

   (a) if up to US Army standards - have commended the officer;

   (b) if above US Army standards - referred to my own Commander for re-assessment of effective level of work;

   (c) if marginally below US Army standards - have provided special mentoring and tutoring;

   (d) if below US Army standards -

   recommend: - removal from this role
   - transfer
   - early retirement
   - termination
   - other action

4. I have read the above statement.

_____ _____

Signature of Officer reviewed Date

** See Definitions overleaf.

DEFINITIONS OF COMMANDER'S DECISIONS ON SUBORDINATE'S PERFORMANCE FOR PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

| | |
|---|---|
| Performance up to US Army Standards | Performance with enthusiasm, initiative and the development of new ideas and has generally fulfilled the Commander's expectations. |
| Performance above US Army standards | Performance that gives evidence of a higher effective level of work than has so far been recognised. |
| Performance marginally below US Army standards | Performance that has in some respects fallen short of the Commander's expectations. |
| Performance below US Army standards | Performance at a level which, if continued, would be unacceptable or which suggests that the subordinate's effective level of work has been over-rated. |

## ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF WORK

1. Date: _____

2. Assessor (Cmdr.-once-removed): _____ Role: _____

3. Immediate Cmdr: _____ Role _____

A. Current Role and Stratum

1. Is the officer able to function effectively in his/her current role? Yes ☐ No ☐

2. Could he/she function effectively in other roles at the same Command Level? Yes ☐ No ☐
   if yes, specify:

3. If not currently effective, summarise the main shortcomings (see notes at end):

4. If a development program were available, could he/she become able to function effectively at current Command Level? Yes ☐ No ☐

   - If yes, how soon? 3 months 6 months 1 year
     (circle one)

   - In what roles

   - Specify development program on Page 3.

B. Next Higher Command Level: Currently

1. Could the officer work effectively now at the next higher Command Level? Yes ☐ No ☐

2. If yes, in what roles?

3. Recommendation to your own Commander.

C. Next Higher Command Level: In Due Course

1. Will the officer be able to work effectively in due course at the next higher Command Level? Yes ☐ No ☐

2. If yes, by when? Within 3 years Longer
(circle one)

In what roles?

3. Indicate what specific characteristics will need development: (see notes at end)

4. Specify development program on Page 3.

D. Development Program

Indicate the main features of a development program for this officer to bring him/her up to full effectiveness at current Command Level, or to progress to next Command Level (see notes at end).

1. Education to improve knowledge (recommend appropriate education and training courses):

2. Broadening of Experience (recommend optimum career progression patterns):

3. Skill Training (recommend on-the-job training priorities):

4. Behavior and character. (Recommend whether or not personal tutoring with another officer is warranted):

5. Personal outlook (recommend personal mentoring and tutoring):

# N O T E S

## CHARACTERISTICS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

## IN ASSESSING EFFECTIVE WORK LEVEL

1. Knowledge: the explicit facts and procedures an officer has accumulated through education and experience: shortcomings in knowledge may be rectified by further teaching.

   For example:

2. Experience: the accumulation of insight and judgment as a result of what an officer has done: shortcomings in experience may be rectified by giving opportunities for work in unfamiliar situations.

   For example:

3. Skill: the special abilities a person may possess in relation to various types of work; shortcomings may be rectified by on-the-job training in improvement of particular skills.

   For example:

   | | |
   |---|---|
   | Skill in speaking or writing | Skills in interpreting environment |
   | Leadership skills | Research skills |
   | Social skills | Persuasive skill |
   | Planning skill | Communications skill |
   | Mentoring, tutoring & counselling skills | Mathematical & Statistical skills |

4. Behavior and Character: an officer's emotional make-up and quality of behavior, and values: shortcomings in temperament may be rectified to some extent by appropriate mentoring and tutoring.

   For example:

   | | |
   |---|---|
   | Initiative and energy | Sense of duty |
   | Emotional balance | Sociability |
   | Co-operativeness | Fairness |
   | Maturity | Integrity |
   | Self-awareness | Honesty |
   | Resourcefulness | Reliability |
   | Courage | Loyalty |

APPENDIX B

# INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR GO/SES RESEARCH

**A.** Principal duties and functions. (Your personal responsibilities -- the heart of your job.)

1. ASK THIS QUESTION FIRST ONLY FOR THOSE FOR WHOM WE DO NOT ALREADY KNOW THE ANSWER.

   Could you please describe your organization and how it fits into the overall operation of the Army -- where you get your requirements and what your organization does for the Army?

2. What are your personal objectives for your tenure as _____ and how do you plan to accomplish them?

3. What are the critical tasks that you alone can do?

4. What are the main obstacles you will need to overcome?

5. What are the important considerations you keep in mind in deciding how to deal with obstacles?



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B. Your work and its time scale.

1. What are your long term goals and what are their time horizons — including those of sufficient duration that you yourself may not complete them?

2. How will you know if you have been successful in your job?

3. If you are successful, what will it do for the Army today? Ten years from now?

4. What is the appropriate tour of duty for someone in your job?

- Examples of a successful outcome and one not so successful.

  1. Could you please illustrate by telling us about an event in which your actions led to an outcome that was unusually successful?

     a. When was this?
     b. Who else was involved?
     c. What actually happened? (Please describe what happened in detail.)
     d. What did you do that made a difference?
     e. What made the outcome unusually successful? (Why do you judge that it was so?)

  2. Could you please illustrate by telling us about an event that did not have a particularly successful outcome?

     a. When was this?
     b. Who else was involved?
     c. What actually happened? (Please describe the event in detail.)
     d. What did you do, and what could you have done that would have made a difference?
     e. What made the outcome one that was not particularly successful? (Why did you judge that it was not?)

D. Your organization.

1. How do you resource your organization -- with people, information, and other assets -- not just the PPBS?

2. What kinds of indicators do you use to decide if your organization is in good health?

3. Is your current organization optimum for your current responsibilities? How would you change it if you could?

4. What is the best unit you have ever known? What made it good?

5. What is the worst unit you have ever known? What made it bad?

E. The key people with whom you work.

1. On Figure A, please tell us who the key people are with whom you work, how you influence them, and how they influence you.

2. Are these relationships optimum? How would you change them if you could?

3. How do you interface with your contemporaries in other services?

F. Your view of the important attributes of the professional officer and how they should be developed.

1. What abilities, special skills, or competencies will your successor need in this job?

2. Are we systematically growing your replacements the right way, considering assignment histories and schooling?

3. We are very interested in the processes of mentoring, coaching, and teaching.

   a. What do you now do in this area for others? Are you now mentoring /coaching/teaching someone? Who and for what purpose?

   b. How much do you try to influence their future assignments?

   c. If you would, could you please tell us who you regard as your own mentor/coach/teacher?

   d. Do you have and rely on advisors outside your organization? Outside the Army?

4. What was the best developmental experience or training you have had during the past five years? Ever?

5. What are the most important changes that need to be made in the development of officers? Where is the greatest change needed?

G. How the SES system functions.

1. If you have Senior Executive Service subordinates (or have had —please say which), please answer the following.

   a. How do the SES tie in with their uniformed counterparts?

   b. Are they well utilied?

   c. What are the obstacles to their proper utilization?

   d. Are they sufficiently well prepared?

2. What do you feel needs to be done to make the SES more effective?

H. How national objectives impact on your role, and it on them.

1. What are the most important issues facing the Army and the nation? How can we best deal with them? How does your role uniquely bear on them?

2. What are your views about unified command and joint inter-service operations? (Have you had any experience with these?)

I. FOR SES ONLY --

1. What has been your experience as an SES member in interacting with your military counterparts? Were you sufficiently well prepared?

2. What has your experience been of the working relationships between your own civilian and military subordinates?

3. What are the obstacles to effective interaction?

4. What are the interfaces, and are these the correct ones?

5. How effective is the civilian personnel management system in producing qualified SES? What might be done to improve it?

6. What opportunities do civilians in your organization have to be involved in the management of the organization? To make decisions? To impact on policy?

7. What do you feel could be done to make the the SES system more effective?

8. How do see the role of the SES in providing continuity beyond the tour of duty of the military (or the stay of political appointees)?

9. What types of GO/SES position could be interchangeable?

GO Global Organization Design Society

**GO SOCIETY PURPOSE AND VALUES STATEMENT**

To support the organizing of work in a responsible, fair and healthy manner in which people are led in a way that enables them to exercise their capabilities.

The Society believes this requires applying a systems framework* emerging from reflective inquiry in which levels of work and capability are the initial paradigm and growth in human awareness is the essential process.

The benefits are organizational effectiveness, fulfilled people and organizations designed for value-creation, sustainability and social well-being.

*Note: inspired by the work of Wilfred Brown and Elliott Jaques*

---

The *Global Organization Design Society* was founded in 2004 to establish and operate a worldwide association of business users, consultants, and academics interested in science-based management to improve organizational effectiveness.

The GO Society fulfills its purpose by:

- Promoting among existing users increased awareness, understanding and skilled knowledge in applying concepts of Levels of Work Complexity, Levels of Human Capability, Accountability, and other concepts included in Requisite Organization and/or Stratified Systems Theory.
- Promoting among potential users of the methods, appreciation of the variety of uses and benefits of science-based management, and access to resources. The GO Society supports the learning and development of current and future practitioners by holding world conferences and professional development workshops, publishing books and a journal, and maintaining a resource-rich web site with related articles, monographs, books, videos, blogs, discussion groups, and surveys.


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