Working with Values
Software of the Mind

Warren Kinston

SIGMA

Systematizing **I**magination to support **G**oals **M**anagement & **A**ction

Working with Values: Software of the Mind

A Systematic and Practical Account
of Purpose, Value and Obligation
in Organizations and Society.

Warren Kinston

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Who is wise? He who learns from everyone.

The Talmud.

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Preface

I wrote this book primarily to give myself and my close colleagues the essential knowledge required for our consultations which often dealt with values, objectives and obligations. It therefore assumes a basic appreciation of the way people function, organizations are managed and society works; and the material has been presented in a compressed, summarized form not unlike a text-book.

Publication is now timely because I have reached the conclusion that my distinctions and formulations are sufficiently correct to be useful, even though some may require further refinement. Despite this, I am sure to have made errors of fact, produced some unsatisfactory accounts and offered some faulty or partial analyses. Undoubtedly, my own cultural biases have crept in despite attempts to be dispassionate.

Although I have tried to present a comprehensive account, I am aware of unanswered questions and puzzling relationships that I have had to leave unexplored. Representing human experience, inner and outer, is a new phase of the scientific enterprise. We have much to learn. Properties in this creative and subjective realm are not quite like those in the physical realm. As you would expect, trans-disciplinary inquiry and knowledge follow different rules from conventional disciplinary endeavours.

Practical testing and critical reflection over a lengthy period have given me confidence that something universal and significant has been discovered. I feel quite certain that the overall patterns of hierarchies, groupings and channels are valid because I and others have found them in a variety of other unrelated areas of human functioning.

In helping me along my path, I am grateful to the work of innumerable scholars and thinkers over the centuries and social scientists in recent times. There are so many whose ideas have become so much part of me that it has been impossible to refer to them all specifically in the text or notes.

I recognise the impetus given by colleagues at Brunel University where this book was first conceived. I am indebted to Elliott Jaques who invited me there, to Jimmy Algie who provided the nucleus notion and freely shared his wealth of ideas, and to Ralph Rowbottom who not only impressed the need for rigour in analysing social concepts but also good-naturedly tolerated my first fumbling definitions and helped me refine and apply them. Gillian Stamp, Tim Packwood and others generously read and commented on early drafts of various chapters. Over the subsequent years many have helped me in my work. It is impossible to name them all, but I am especially grateful to Anne Bosanquet, Ian Johnston, David Wilshire and Nick Bosanquet. Clients too, through individual discussions and in workshops, offered many stimulating suggestions.

Two people must be singled out for special appreciation. Stephen Sinnott provided continual encouragement over several years, not only by overcoming my doubts that the task was feasible and that I could complete it, but also by making insightful suggestions on several occasions when I became stuck. Verity Goitein provided unfailing support and enthusiasm from start to finish. She willingly read and re-read, criticized and re-criticized drafts of every chapter; and her consultancy projects served as an invaluable testing-ground for many of the ideas. Naturally, unevenness, mistakes and poor writing remain my own responsibility.

Warren Kinston, 1995

Chapter 1

Getting Started

WHY BOTHER?

To be a person in society, which means to exist at all, you must set purposes and hold values. To achieve anything, you must put a great deal of effort into deciding your purposes and pay close attention to values. To influence other people within an organization, in government or in society generally, you must reflect deeply on values and work with values explicitly.

To be a social scientist or engage in social science of any sort — and I include vocational disciplines like management, medicine. law and journalism in my broad definition — you must not only deal in values but directly confront the essential nature of values and its offshoot, ethics.

Yet there is no accepted theoretical framework of purpose or value. There are no widely agreed definitions to which you can turn.

So each organization and sometimes each manager, each discipline and sometimes each social scientist, develops a unique lexicon of terms for the different notions and shades of meaning required when working with purposes and values.

Does it matter? From one point of view, it does not. People may not know what a value is, but they do know what makes sense to them.

Even if it does matter, we all dislike people interfering with our understanding of things by foisting defined terms on us. So if a common language is really needed, the trick must be to find universal definitions which are intuitively right for most people. The theoretical framework offered in this book is the fruition of many years devoted to just this task.

From a purely practical perspective, the lack of a common language is harmful. It creates confusion in organizations and government, it impedes research and analysis, it interferes with fruitful inter-disciplinary work, and it keeps the general public mystified. The proposed terminology makes any work with values and purposes much easier, partly because of the way that communication is aided and misunderstanding reduced.

But the book is not just about communication, it is about freedom and power. The framework was produced for one purpose only: to help people achieve things. This is its chief merit and justification. All inspiration, all human energies, all social forces, all action can be traced to the effective use of purposes and values. Working with values in a proper and precise way liberates human and social potential and permits extraordinary achievements. This is the secret treasure revealed by the framework, and available to anyone who truly seeks it.

The framework emerged from and was used to guide numerous consultancy projects, often large scale and long term. Success in transforming organizations and producing social change would have been impossible without the ideas. Use of the ideas made the experience for clients utterly unlike that generated by pragmatic management consultants, discipline-based investigators or non-theoretical action researchers.

Whether your concern is with raising standards, designing strategies, evaluating policies, changing an organization's culture, introducing managers to new ideas, establishing identity, using religious notions, making an ethical choice, developing a community, making reforms, strengthening governance, remedying social injustice, furthering a social movement, leading a team, campaigning for a cause, increasing participation, or a myriad of other things in relation to action, ethics, organization or government: this book offers a helpful and practical understanding of what you are about, explains likely pitfalls and mistakes to be avoided, and clarifies how the social context should be handled.

You will not find here a recipe telling you what to do in seven easy steps, but you will be given some essential tools to help you create your own future.

Assessing the Ideas. Discovering and organizing the axioms of purpose and value is not what social sciences or even management disciplines are there for. Each must pursue its own special area of interest and leave wider issues to others. But who? Everyone, every organization, every discipline expects to take such basic intellectual infra-structure for granted as it goes about

its real business of developing, using, maintaining, or studying purposes and values.

Unfortunately, you cannot take even reading, writing or arithmetic for granted until each has been created and tested in practice — and this requires a dedicated effort.

To develop (or rather discover) the necessary ideas, it was essential to use everyday life as a laboratory. I had to learn from many academic disciplines while refusing to identify with any particular one. At all times I pursued the ideas wherever they went, guided generally by a systems philosophy, and more specifically by project demands.[1]

I assessed my emerging ideas by their effectiveness and acceptability to people in positions of responsibility. As a coherent and elegant framework slowly emerged, many of its formal features were being clarified and confirmed by concurrent investigations in related topics like decision-making and personal growth.[2]

It would be unhelpful and tedious to follow the usual academic practice of integrating these ideas within the existing literature because there are too many relevant literatures. In any case, each reader must assess the ideas and test them against what they know and what their discipline teaches. The ideas need to be incorporated and subtly modified within you — but without losing their helpful essence. The point is that this new account of purpose is a true inter-disciplinary or rather trans-disciplinary product. It must of necessity exist as an entity in its own right, standing on its own merits and within your own mind, but outside existing disciplines. The social science corpus is complemented and interpreted, but not challenged or replaced.[3]

An end to the refinement and elaboration of the framework has continually receded. The time has come to call a temporary halt. The general outline and most parts of the framework have already proved their worth in many consultations and projects. Clients — managers, politicians, social scientists — spontaneously and surprisingly uncomplainingly learn and use its language. The acceptance and appeal of these ideas over many years now suggests that the time is right to offer the framework in its entirety to a wider audience. It needs and deserves further application, testing, refinement and elaboration.

ARTIFICIAL INTUITION

Each of us is aware. We each use our mind. We may also work at using it. Using the mind is not wholly dissimilar to using a computer. Both are multi-function

tools requiring creative control. Ease of use of a computer, say for word-processing, depends on the software provided — although this is no guarantee of the quality of the resulting prose. Analogously, the mind depends, say in managing, on implicit or explicit theories — although, again, these give no guarantee of the quality of any decision. If software does not suit the computer's operating system, it will not load and cannot be used. In the same way, if a theory does not suit the operation of the mind, people soon reject or ignore it. Few social, psychological or management theories have been developed with an intense, continuing and over-riding urge to suit the natural workings of the mind. This one has. That is why I call it 'software of the mind'.

Some theories suit certain minds and not others, just as some software runs on some computers and not others. However, the mind is like a universal computer. It therefore invites the creation of theories that are both universal and yet positively support diversity. Most theories avoid that challenge. This theoretical framework sought it out.

Being software of the mind, the framework is really a form of 'artificial intuition'.[4] Because the framework embodies and supports intuitive processes, its ideas appear natural and unforced when applied in everyday life. When parts of the framework are explained to people, they seem obvious, even axiomatic. Clients in consultations and students in lectures frequently tell me that what I am saying is 'just common sense' or 'terribly neat and simple'. Sometimes they are genuinely puzzled about why they had not seen it themselves. So the framework could be considered to be part of a science of common sense — if that was not a contradiction in terms.

The framework has only reached its present degree of simplicity, coverage and clarity by being altered in response to people's views. I am in debt to the intuitions and arguments of hundreds of managers and professionals seeking to handle everyday work situations better, and to thousands reacting to the ideas and examples in seminars and lectures. Naturally, a debt must also be acknowledged to the analyses and intuitions of great thinkers, East and West; and to the cores of truth in the otherwise conflicting and evolving explanations and theories within the management disciplines and social sciences.

Something designed to suit the mind could equally be termed 'software *for* the mind'. All achievement and community depends on the mind, that is to say on conscious and intuitive efforts rather than mechanical habits. If ideas are going to be used in those efforts, they must both feel right (personally and spontaneously) and be right (practically and logically) or they will be

disruptive. This framework has the potential to focus and clarify what is already natural. It can be easily simplified and explained to children. It should be taught to managers, professionals and politicians.

Because the framework reflects the undisturbed operation of the mind, it feels most real at the moment when it is used. So understanding the framework through reading is an entirely different experience from understanding the framework through using it.

The point is that we do not operate in our daily dealings as if truth lies in a textbook or requires a laboratory. The gulf between the truth we live by and scientifically formulated truth needs to be recognized. Truth is something we experience and come upon in ordinary living. The book can never be such an event, but the framework ought to be. It exists to be lived. It exists because it is lived.

It follows that it is best to read the book with imagination and put what you read in the context of immediate difficult problems or issues requiring your personal action or judgement. This means reflecting on your situation with the new ideas in mind. As an intuitive understanding of the situation fuses with an intuitive understanding of the constraining assumptions of the framework, a sense of a constructive way forward should emerge. Alternatively, you may turn to the book only when faced with a challenge which cannot be handled or a situation which seems to be going wrong — especially if you suspect that your understanding of purpose may be at fault. The need to get something right when others are holding you responsible is a powerful incentive to use and assimilate new ideas.

A SPECIAL-ORDINARY LANGUAGE

At this point I would like you to look at Master-Figure 0 (at the end of the chapter) and compare it to the Table of Contents from Chapter 3 to Chapter 13. You will see that the book is laid out in an orderly fashion with each section assigned a formula, a label, and an epithet.

In the primary hierarchy (with its pattern of circles and lines), you can see seven levels or types of purpose. The upper five levels of purpose are also types of value. Everything else derives from or is related to these seven conceptual entities.[5]

The Master-Figure emphasizes that the language of the framework is primarily a language of formulae. The Table of Contents emphasizes that a controlled yet natural language of concepts is possible and necessary — but it accommodates to the stress of this demand through the use of epithets.

Following application of the ideas in many settings and after numerous labelling and re-labelling efforts, it has become clear to me that the only truly unambiguous and universally suitable (and therefore scientifically correct) name is a formula or symbol. For example, the most precise way to refer to a value which has the properties of the sixth level is as an 'L-6 purpose', not as a 'value system' or any other synonym — belief, new idea, ideal, principle, doctrine, ideology, framework, theory, paradigm, school of thought, philosophy — which might appear to be more suitable in a particular situation, organization or discipline.

But the use of formulae can seem mysterious. To write an account of the framework using formulae alone would produce not just awkward sentences, but an utterly impenetrable book. Yet formulae are always used in project work as an adjunct and managers take to them as they become familiar with the ideas. Most people dislike formulae when reading, so I have kept them to a minimum.[6]

However the reality is that *the precision of a formal language was absolutely essential to the discovery and development of a consistent and coherent universal framework.* To avoid formulae altogether would have been wrong because it would have excluded more curious readers from working directly with the underlying code. In the future, formulae may help with inter-organizational, cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural communication.[7]

There was, however, another essential and complementary principle of the research approach. Every entity or process demanded or implied by the theoretical framework had to correspond to everyday reality. This meant that labelling using ordinary language had to be possible. In short, no purely abstract concept or invented jargon was allowed. Everything had to be common currency and make immediate sense. In other words, *natural language was a tool of equal significance in the research process.* This tool helped ensure that the theory could be intuitively perceived as correct.

These two tools, formulae and natural language, emerge from distinguishing and valuing objective and subjective truth. The result has been to produce a completely formal language which is almost indistinguishable from real language in everyday use. The reader can expect to find ordinary meaningful terms underpinned by precise definitions and relationships which enhance their sense.

Natural language labels evolved during the research process. For example, L-3 purposes and values were called 'political aims' for a long time: in part following a colleague's suggestion, in part to capture their con-

troversial quality, and in part because I was consulting with town hall councillors who liked the term. Later I changed the L-3 label to 'internal priority'. The change was based on pragmatic grounds because I found that managers reacted nervously to the word 'political', on methodological grounds when I began using quantitative and systematic priority-setting techniques in consultations, and on theoretical grounds after I discovered that any type of value could at certain times and in certain situations be political (cf. Master-Matrix 30).

Although it is essential to recognize that L-3 values are always and characteristically wholly internal to an endeavour or organization, 'internal priority' may be shortened in conversation to 'priority'. To improve readability, I will use such abbreviations or even synonyms (e.g. 'emphasis' or 'criteria' for an L-3 value) where the meaning is unambiguous.

Managers also use 'policy' as a synonym for 'internal priority', but 'policy' really needs to be reserved for a specific use. It is common to find 'policy' used rather indiscriminately by managers and academics in reference to a diverse range of purposive entities including priorities, ideals, social values, and desired outcomes. It may not matter at the time, but this practice is harmful in the long term. The reason is that all these terms are not just words but powerful tools. Using them inappropriately blunts them, and their full power cannot then be harnessed. As language becomes confused and debased, people find themselves becoming muddled, irritated, argumentative, anxious and unable to think.

Playing around with labels can lead to an unconscious disconnection of the word from the underlying realities. For example: a social value (shared by different projects or services) is utterly distinct from a principal object (which defines a particular project or service). However, once the term 'need' is habitually used in place of 'social value', then departmental managers in bidding for resources argue in all sincerity that there is a 'need' for their 'service'. In this way, the two concepts are collapsed and it becomes difficult to focus on the 'real needs' (i.e. social values) which may well demand innovative, modified or reduced services from that department.

Deliberately distorting or misapplying concepts is an old political trick in the repertoire of every pragmatic businessman, ambitious politician and academic wheeler-dealer. However, such personally advantageous tricks eventually stop the concept functioning as an effective tool in the wider community. Formulae are the surest prevention. But, just as celibacy is the surest method of birth control, second best may suit people better. The second best is to use the given labels and treat them as univocal concepts.

Of course, in practice, the person familiar with the framework and at ease in a consultation or in a position of responsibility knows when a looseness of language or its local modification is acceptable and helpful. Rigorous precision and sensitive adaptation are bedfellows in the real world, not opposites. A colleague, completing a project for a city government, consulted me to see if the list of recommendations which concluded his excellent report could be made more incisive. In discussion, we saw that he had intuitively produced all the elements of a programme for growth and development (G-4^2). So he restructured the list of recommendations using as headings: Current Needs (which stated the social values); The Main Objective (which explained the principal objects of a new endeavour); The Next Steps (which organized his proposed priorities); and Key Outcomes (which listed strategic objectives). Use of my concepts re-structured and strengthened his conclusions, but strict use of my terminology was not appropriate.

LEARNING AND USING THE FRAMEWORK

The framework, being software of the mind, has properties like the mind. So anyone can intuitively identify with the framework to order and reflect on their assumptions and experiences of values, objectives and ethics.

However, each of us has blind-spots which interfere with this intuitive learning process. Readers will find, as I found, that they catch on to some parts of the framework easily and find others mysterious or even objectionable. Because everyone has different blind-spots, the way to handle them is through group discussion and team learning.

By hammering out the ideas in dialogue, each person will benefit. Indeed, only by explaining the ideas to others in your own words with your own concrete examples can you really be sure that you have understood them. When others challenge and criticize what you have said, you must handle those challenges and criticisms constructively. In this way, you will be repeating the inquiry exercises which produced and refined the framework.

Understanding the framework is about engaging with it. To understand it, you must use it and get used to it. Unless you use it, you cannot get used to it. And then you will never really understand it.

Once you have understood the framework, it will assist you automatically. Its fluidity will complement the fluidity of your own intuitive processes. When the time comes to deal with a situation, you will simply use

the relevant ideas. You will neither cumbrously and artificially apply the ideas, nor forget their implications just at the moment when they are most needed. The concepts will emerge as naturally as words do when you speak. If you try to use the book solely for reference at the crucial moment, it will be as helpful as a dictionary in the middle of a debate.

Although the framework is a general theory, it is not a theory of the conventional sort which proposes to explain realities in the past or the present. The framework has been designed to design the future. So it comes into its own *before* anything has been decided. The challenge met by the theory is creative design not the explanation of facts.

Creativity, like the mind, is a reflexive and fluid process: and so is the framework. The framework is paradoxically both unnervingly precise — one colleague compared it to caging butterflies — and yet utterly protean in its application.

The framework contains itself. It is a value system and an ethical teaching and conforms to the principles and properties that govern such entities. The framework can even be said to define its own creation, because it describes the creation of social reality of which the framework is a part.

The framework was unconsciously and consciously used in producing the theory. It will also be used implicitly as you read about it. Many aspects of values and objectives taken for granted in early chapters are not defined precisely and explained until the final chapters. Intentional processes — decision, idealization, imposition, implementation and so on — can be taken for granted because we live in, with, through, and by them.

The essential fluidity in the everyday use and application of the framework can be disconcerting. To get a handle on abstract ideas, readers naturally think of an example only to find that this example shows rapid shifts in its properties as either its *function* or *frame of reference* alters. Taking function first: the same value as formulated, e.g. 'providing care for children', or 'building houses' or 'honesty', can at one moment or in one situation function as a belief or value system, at the next moment or in another situation as a need or social value, at the next moment or in another situation as an urgent priority for action, and so on.

Shifting the frame of reference can give the (false) impression that the theoretical structure itself is fluid. A reader may note, for example, that a government's strategy leads to the objects of a new organization being defined: and then argue that this means 'objects' are hierarchically below 'strategy'. It

does seem so in social terms, but only because the frame of reference of the organization is within that of the government. Keep in mind that the framework is a conceptual hierarchy, and that it only maintains its structure within a particular frame of reference. In this case, the strategy is in the frame or reference of the government (and is encompassed by the objects of government), whereas the organization's objects are in the frame of reference of the organization (and will encompass its strategy).

In order to grasp and apply the framework, it is essential to be clear about the frame of reference in use. Generally the frame in use is an organization, a government or a nation. But I also regularly offer examples using other frames, like a project, a department, a neighbourhood, or a person. This is to make it clear that the ideas apply anywhere that an enduring social boundary can be drawn, and whenever purposes (i.e. values or objectives) are defined.

IT REALLY IS LIKE SOFTWARE

In software terms, this publication is Version 1 (V. 1.0). Beta-versions, as pre-release software is called, have been around since the ideas began gelling in about 1983. These early versions took the form of discussion documents, seminar handouts, aide memoire tables, conference presentations, published papers, drafts of sections and whole chapters of the book. So there has been fairly lengthy and extensive testing to check out the ideas and how to communicate them.

Software is never perfect or complete. The same is true of this framework. Software programs become ever more complicated: users demand more once they have mastered the first version and seen its deficiencies. Similar elaboration is both possible and desirable in regard to this framework.

The framework can (and should) be developed in several directions. First, it can be simplified. Microsoft, for example, sold both a cut-down and a complex application for word-processing to suit different market segments. If this book is welcomed and its value recognized, then shortened and dedicated versions can be developed for managers and others. I encourage teachers and trainers to customize the book for their own purposes to suit their courses and students.

Second, the framework can be written and explained in a form particularly suited for certain domains (like banking, or health care, or public relations). Third, the framework can be elaborated and its usefulness explored further by making new internal connections, and by showing relationships with other similarly constructed frameworks.

Like all complex software, the framework has potentials of which even the author is not fully aware. In trying to produce an account that was neither too long nor too complicated, I have played down many of the formal analogies and implications which must, by definition, have real world significance. I have been concerned to say enough to make it possible for any reader to get into the framework so as to find new correspondences and linkages and to pursue additional practical applications.

Fixing Bugs. The book contains mistakes. Some are just like software bugs. Such bugs, errors in the framework, must be distinguished from other types of mistake such as errors of fact, errors of presentation, and errors of illustration.

I am acutely embarrassed in advance by errors of fact, which have crept in because of the breadth of the book and the varying depth of understanding I have in different areas. I am naturally embarrassed by errors of expression or presentation. Whenever these sorts of error come to light, they have been or will be corrected.

Errors in the examples are a lesser concern. I would like to compare such errors with those in a word-processing manual in which the capitalization feature is demonstrated on an ungrammatical sentence. It is off-putting, but not crucial. I trust that no examples are so erroneous that the underlying ideas are distorted, but perhaps this is to be over-optimistic.

Many beta-testers criticized various examples as over-simplified or biased. Other readers protested about some which touched on their assumptions and values. Sensitivity was especially high in regard to political, national and religious matters. You may find yourself reacting in the same way. Please keep in mind that the examples are only there to illustrate a general idea. They cannot prove anything, and their precise correctness is rarely relevant. They do not necessarily indicate my own views.

Bugs in the software are either my oversights or my personal blind-spots. Naturally these must be distinguished from blind-spots of the reader. Few readers will find anything that is entirely new and so you will come to the book with ideas shaped by your disciplinary training, your past experience, and your social environment. You will find genuine errors, but be cautious before automatically throwing out my propositions just because they do not accord with your existing notions. When you want to reject something, please suggest an alternative. It may be better. The aim is to build, not destroy. But remember: it all has to hang together. A change in any one part of the framework may demand changes, subtle or major, in many other parts.

Real bugs are what make a computer system crash. In the framework, they correspond to errors of justification, errors of formulation, errors in identifying or specifying a property, errors in relations &c. Having put some concepts through twenty or more alterations, I would be foolish to imagine that all are 100% correct now. I am confident that the basic shape of the framework is correct — that the software really works — but I am continually seeking to understand it, to improve the formulations, and to assign properties more precisely. The only way to deal with these errors is to fix them. If the book is well-received and I get sufficient constructive feedback and suggestions for improvement, revisions can be anticipated: a second edition (V. 2.0) and upwards.

HOW TO TACKLE THE BOOK

There are many different ways to read this book: as a whole, in sections, or via topics.

Everyone should read (and maybe even re-read) this chapter. Some may also wish to read Ch. 2, which provides a simple introduction to my research and consultation approach, and indicates how conventional disciplines link to the book. My personal reflections in Ch. 14 can be read now or at any time. Once oriented by these chapters, you can use the book to suit yourself.

Some people, those who like reading manuals or are capable of encyclopaedic coverage of a subject, may simply plough through the book from cover to cover. But each small section could have been a book in itself, and the style is necessarily compressed with new ideas and essential propositions coming one after the other thick and fast.

The present ordering is essentially the order of discovery. I like it because it puts ethical issues at the heart of the book, and so emphasizes the realization of ethical as well as instrumental or managerial values. An alternative ordering of chapters could be: the basics (Ch.s 3 and 4), using values (Ch.s 10 and 13), making choices (Ch. 6), developing social identity (Ch.s 7 to 9), and organizing progress in groups and society (Ch.s 5, 11 and 12).

Another way to work through the whole book is to skim through by reading all the *Introducing....* summaries and explanations at the start of each chapter and main sections, and the *Reviewing....* summaries and transitions at the end of each chapter and section. These are all shown in italics and marked with an arrow (➻) in the Table of Contents.

Anyone intuitively at home with the subject may find that they can glean all they need from the Master-Matrices (Master-Tables/Figures). These are placed at

the end of the chapter or section where they are explained, and are also collected together at the end of the book. The matrices provide an ultra-brief summary and aide memoire of the entire framework. Their primary purpose is to help the reader keep the whole picture in view either while reading about part of the framework, or while applying it, or while improving it.

Although I have written the book as an evolving argument and kept repetition to a minimum, I have also tried to write each chapter, and even each chapter section, so that it can stand alone. As a result, readers may turn immediately to whatever is of interest to them. For example: readers who are specifically interested in the making of ethical choices may read Ch. 6 alone without difficulty. It is perfectly possible to work through different parts of the book in an order that suits you.

The reader can be even more selective by using the Table of Contents, Glossary, Master-Matrices and Index. The Glossary is particularly useful in that it provides a reference to the framework position for over 750 terms (via formulae) and indicates relevant Master-Matrices.

Key concepts (e.g. policy) have their own specific place in the framework (i.e. their own formula: G-2^2 for policy), and have chapter sections devoted to them which are usually only a few pages long. Such core concepts are always found in the Table of Contents. If you read the section on policy, you may then wish to turn to the pages which describe the category to which policy belongs — in this case 'direction'. While doing this you might turn to Master-Table 31 to compare and contrast policies with the other five types of direction.

You may discover that you are not really interested in developing or teaching about policy at all, but rather wish to consider approaches. If so, you can then turn to read about them. If devising a policy is what interests you after all, you may wish to discover more about its constituent levels of purpose: internal priorities and strategic objectives — either by turning to the relevant Master-Matrices or parts of Ch. 3 and Ch. 5. Or you may wish to understand the work of governing boards in relation to policies (in Ch. 12), or investigate the dynamics of policy-making further (in Ch. 13). And so on.

If you are interested in an umbrella conception, like standards, which has many different and often muddled meanings, then it is best to start with the Glossary. There you will see the various specific conceptions for which 'standard' is a common synonym. You can explore these initially in the Glossary, turning to the Master-Matrices and text whenever you feel inclined to dig deeper.

Transition. You now know enough about the book to get started anywhere.

The framework leaves you free to determine particular purposes and preferred values to suit you, your situation and your society. But this does not mean it is value-free. The framework is itself built with values and, like any framework, provides the potential for undesirable constraint. So introducing it is ethically problematic. To provide some reassurance, or at least explanation, I will say something about the ethical dimension of my research and consultancy work in Ch. 2. ✿

**Master-
Figure 0**

The full framework. In this framework, every cell represents an easily recognizable entity in the social world, and can be precisely labelled and defined using ordinary languages. Each entity relates intuitively and logically with every other entity. Entities with similar formulae show formal similarities. The formulae can be interpreted using the Table of Contents

ETHICAL
RULES

L"-7
L"-6
L"-5
L"-4
L"-3
L"-2
L"-1

G"-2   G"-3   G"-4   G"-5 G"-6 G"-7

etc   etc

ETHICAL
APPROACHES

TERTIARY
HIERARCHY

TERTIARY STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY
Ethical Rule Derivatives enabling Ethical Authority in Society.

L'-7
L'-6
L'-5
L'-4
L'-3
L'-2
L'-1

m-

Value Systems enabling Responsible
Choice in Specific Situations.

SECONDARY
HIERARCHY

PURPOSES
(& VALUES)

L-7
L-6
L-5
L-4
L-3
L-2
L-1

G-2   G-3   G-4   G-5   G-6   G-7

Associated
Hierarchies

PRIMARY
HIERARCHY*

PRIMARY STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY
Purpose and Value Derivatives enabling the Realization of Values in Society.

* The pattern of processes shown within the primary hierarchy can be found within the other hierarchies.

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NOTES

1. The usual criticism of systems science is that its models are over-formalized and excessively abstract, or that they state the obvious in an over-complicated and unhelpful way. The present product is both formal and yet pragmatic. The pattern revealed is only obvious once properly appreciated, and then it is extremely useful. The prime epistemological consideration in judging a systems-based theory is whether the model adequately represents the crucial features of the reality being modelled. In pursuing this goal, comprehensiveness consistency and coherence are typically regarded as highly important theoretical requirements, while actual *implementation* in real world projects is an important methodological requirement. Churchman, Ackoff and other leading systems researchers have emphasized in their writings and lectures that the crucial element omitted in most system science research is the human element, and the major research failure is lack of implementation. By contrast, this research was developed around the human element and has been thoroughly tested through repeated large-scale and long-term organizational and social change projects. See Ch. 2 for further details of the research approach and the projects. Earlier versions of Ch. 3 and Ch. 4 and parts of Ch. 6 and Ch. 12 have appeared in the systems science literature.

2. Virtually identical frameworks (in formal terms) have emerged as practical guides in related domains of human functioning including communication, creativity, change and knowing. A framework of experience and identity development is noted in Ch. 3 and developed in outline in Ch. 7 because it is difficult to appreciate and use values properly without understanding its links to human identity. Frameworks for inquiry and decision-making are touched on when examining methods for ethical choice (Ch. 6). Of course, you would expect to find links between domains of human functioning, but the parallelism is probably not accounted for by my imposition of the ideas on reality. Different parts of the formal pattern in Master-Fig. 0 were discovered independently in different domains at different times and with different colleagues.

3. I have published and lectured in a variety of disciplines, and in those situations referred to the literature of that discipline in accord with academic conventions. My approach here has to be different. I have kept references to a *minimum*, and incorporated them within Notes at the end of each chapter. References are usually provided either to inform the reader of a source, to elaborate a point, or to indicate my debt to another writer or researcher. The Notes do *not* acknowledge all major contributions to a topic; nor do they offer a comprehensive bibliography. To ease reading, I frequently use a single note to group references to different points within a paragraph.

4. *Artificial intuition* was a term suggested by Prof. Jimmy

Algie, one of the contributors and supporters of my work, to describe his computer applications. With colleagues at Work Sciences (London, UK), he independently developed simple and effective computer-based software applications -- for establishing priorities, developing policies, budget planning and control, and workload planning and control — which are built on principles defined by the general theory. This program has sold widely and won the Standard Award for British Business Software. (Further information and software is available from: Work Sciences, 26 Southwood Lawn Rd., London N6, UK.)

5. Findings of others working with the systems science disciplines provides some confirmation for the most basic formal feature of the framework: its seven level structure. For example: the lower five levels seem to have been established by Klir, G. *Architecture of Systems Problem Solving*. New York: Plenum, 1985; Beer, S. *The Brain of the Firm 2nd Ed.* New York: Wiley, 1981; and Jaques, E., Gibson, R.O. & Isaacs, D.J. *Levels of Abstraction in Logic and Human Action*. London: Heinemann, 1978. My two higher levels reflect the use of thought or theory and the creative imagination. The idea that self-consciousness is a meta-system above actuality is now recognized in systems thinking e.g. van Gigch, J.P. *System Design Modeling and Metamodeling*. New York: Plenum, 1991. Empirical research into parts of the framework has commenced in the US and Europe: e.g. Snow, R.M. & Bloom, A.J. Ethical decision-making styles in the work place: Underlying dimensions and their implications. *Systems Research*, 9: 35-45, 1992; Bloom, A.J. & Snow, R.M. Ethical decision making styles in the workplace: Relations to the Keirsey Temperament Sorter. *Systems Research*, 11: 59-63, 1994.

6. The formulae become more mysterious as they get more complex. Consider $G''\text{-}4^2{}_3$. This is the formula referring to the third level in the second of the four-level groupings within the tertiary hierarchy. The G means we are dealing with a grouping of elements; the " means that we are in a tertiary hierarchy; the 4 means we are dealing with a tetrad or grouping of four adjacent levels; the superscript 2 means than it is the second of four tetrads counting upwards; the subscript 3 means that the entity being identified is the third level up in that tetrad. Each of these features has characteristic qualities which apply across frameworks. In the special-ordinary language of the present framework of purpose and value, the formula refers to 'customary or non-legal rights or duties which enable an individual's (i.e. a person's or an organization's) minimum standards to be affirmed dogmatically '.

7. It should not be surprising to recognize that I could not possibly have created this framework without computer aid. I used an Apple Macintosh computer and Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to lay out the complex matrices in a way that assisted in the elaboration of ideas and in the exposure of inconsistencies and incoherences.

Chapter 2

Investigating Ethically

To investigate purpose and value is to investigate social life. To guide the use of purposes and values is to shape people's activities. To work with purposes and values is to participate in organizations and communities. To set purposes and values is to accept responsibility for creating the future. The present account will examine all these things and human identity too. An ethical perspective is essential here, because any interference with who people are, how they think, what they do, why they do it, and the way they organize themselves and their society is a sensitive and controversial matter.

The theoretical framework has been developed and tested through treating organizations and society as research laboratories. This chapter will explain the ethics of such an investigative process, and compare my type of consultancy intervention, called ethical design, with other types. I will indicate what is involved in developing a universal axiom-based framework, emphasizing the need to learn from people and to seek a holistic vision. To put the theoretical work in a practical context, I will also say a little about the particular consultancy project which led to my discovery of the framework. Finally, I will indicate how management, social science, philosophy, law, and religion link to the book, and offer reading suggestions for practitioners and academics identified with these disciplines.

ETHICAL DESIGN

There is one fundamental question for us: where are we all going? Kant unpacked this into: what can we know? what can we hope for? and what should we do? The last is the ethical question. My framework has emerged from 20 years of working with people who were wondering what to do. In my time, I have spent thousands of hours with individuals, attended hundreds of meetings with families and groups, discussed for days on end with managers, argued in heated sessions with professionals, and challenged convinced politicians.

Telling them was assuredly not the answer. Each person knew their situation far better than I did, and was in any case already surrounded by advisers,

welcome and unwelcome. What I could do was focus on helping them personally in a dedicated and disinterested way. Within that context, I found myself offering fundamental insights and principles, while always checking that these felt right to the client. I pushed my client to help me inquire into the nature of these fundamentals.

My client and I had to convince each other and think through divergent points of view. At times, we experienced blank incomprehension of each other. At other times, we engaged in ferocious criticism. Always, we stood up to those fashionable ideas and pseudo-theories which regularly sweep through organizations leaving a trail of confusion and havoc. In this process, I discovered, somewhat unexpectedly, that the best solutions were, broadly speaking, ethical. I found, less surprisingly, that no problem lacked an ethical dimension and that no act was indifferent to ethical judgement. Locke, one of the fathers of modern science suggested that ethics was 'the proper science and business of mankind in general'.[1] Perhaps this is why the strategy of collaborative inquiry works.

Ethical solutions were not about episodic grand choices but about ingraining values into every action, every thought, every decision, every relationship. People generally welcomed ethical clarification, and were slightly surprised by how much they could personally benefit by doing the right thing, and be personally harmed by unthinking avoidance of the issues. (Much later I read Spinoza's unequivocal assertion that 'the effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue.'[2]) Managers and politicians may get nervous when words like values and ethics are mentioned, but they are aware that achievement depends on knowing where you are going and why, that personal integrity matters, and that fulfilment of duty is one yardstick by which they must measure themselves.

It became obvious to me that organizational and social life not only required individuals to be strong and determined, but also to know precisely what their responsibilities and values were. Time and again, I found that people did not know what to expect of themselves or of others. Confusion about intentions

and responsibilities meant people were muddled and overwhelmed. 'Fix it' was then the only watchword; and 'tell us what to do' the only request. Such people seemed to be flapping around in an alligator-filled swamp. Empirical studies mainly measured the splashes and blood in the water; while management gurus taught them how to flap so rapidly that the alligators could be kept at bay. I tried to help my clients reach the high dry land of reflective awareness. From there, managing life or business or family or politics felt very different: not always easy or trouble-free, but a feasible enjoyable and ethical endeavour.

The Freudian revolution, which spearheaded modern man's inner search, has forever removed self-ignorance as a choice. Like it or not, we now have the task of creating ourselves and our societies with awareness of what we are doing. This is ethics in practice, and the framework is dedicated to people engaged in this great task. I have come to refer to my work as *ethical design*. My research method is *ethical design research*; my consultancy offers an *ethical design approach*; all my frameworks are *ethical design products*.

Intervention in the laboratory of real life is only justified if ethical criteria are met. During interventions, parts of the framework were never offered in the indicative as one possibility among many, but rather in a conditional imperative mode: 'You are already operating with an implicit framework. Make it explicit and compare it to this one. Only change your present framework if this one is clearer, more true to life, more consistent and more coherent — and so more useful and more beneficial for you.' This was the challenge my clients paid for, and it is the challenge to which the reader of the book is invited to respond.

Over the years, I have used ethical design to develop a number of helpful theoretical frameworks for different domains of social life. I had to choose one to elaborate fully in detail. This particular framework of

purpose was chosen because it provides an explicit and systematic understanding of key assumptions underlying the development and use of *any* theoretical framework in social life.

The Logic of Intervention

There are three distinct ways to intervene constructively in a social situation. These modes are diagrammatically represented as three hierarchical levels in Fig. 2.1.

The social situation requiring intervention is typically referred to as a problem or a mess (i.e. a system of inter-linked problems). An intervention may be targeted directly at that level (Level A in Fig. 2.1). For example: invoicing may be a mess and the manager may come in on weekends to check and code invoices. Alternatively an outside firm may be called in to do the coding. Many management consultancy firms work in this way: for instance, putting one of their staff inside the accounts department, or developing a marketing strategy for top management.

The level above the problematic situation (Level B in Fig. 2.1) is where a practical understanding forms. This understanding is a model of the situation in Level A developed so as to indicate what to do. In the above example, the understanding might suggest that the backlog of invoice coding was due to the absence of a proper system for handling invoices. The understanding does not say what to do, but it does constrain and channel whatever is done. Managers improve each other's capability to understand situations through discussion, and by reading and writing down-to-earth accounts of their work. Most management consultants intervene at this level. They review and analyse the mess, draw conclusions, and make recommendations for action. (Weaker firms simply impose the latest fashion, called 'best practice', without taking the trouble to penetrate deeply into the nature of the mess.)

Figure 2.1: What is a framework? The hierarchy below illustrates how assumptions constrain any understanding, and how these assumptions are distant from the problematic situation. The terms on the right are systems science equivalents.

Level C	Implicit Assumptions	Framework of Universal Axioms
Level B	Practical Understanding	The Model
Level A	Problematic Situation	The Mess

Note that intervening at the level of understanding is design-oriented in the sense that it indicates or constrains what people should be doing in the future. The real issue is whether the design recommendations are ethical, that is to say good and right in principle. To appreciate this, it is necessary to clarify the underlying values and assumptions being used.

Any practical understanding or model is built using various assumptions, which are usually taken for granted and left implicit. These assumptions exist in the top-most level (Level C in Fig. 2.1). They are applicable across situations — that is to say, they are non-specific and potentially universal. Assumptions often come to be held through habit, imitation or experience, rather than through rigorous analysis and validation. However, if the assumptions are not geared to the nature of the situation and also to the nature of people, then they will cause harm. In short, many assumptions are unethical in their application.

If the assumptions in use are simply incorrect, people find that their efforts in practice do not turn out as successfully as they hoped or expected. When organizations get restructured every year, it is likely that top managers (or their consultants) do not know what they are doing. If people lose confidence in their implicit assumptions, they get confused. The alternative approach is to copy what others do: again a common tactic of consultants, managers and politicians. This pragmatic approach may mean that all firms in a sector, say banking, fail simultaneously.

It is possible to intervene at the highest level by introducing new ethically-based assumptions. My consultancy interventions take place at this level. Others intervene here too: politicians, pressure groups, academics, and management gurus often exhort people with worthy ideas. But such moralizing is not situation-based, cannot be classed as design, and is often experienced as intrusive rather than helpful.

Any serious intervention in assumptions needs to use a comprehensive and coherent framework designed to suit the type of situation being handled. I have found that only *ideas unambiguously located within frameworks* can seem (and be) superior to existing habitual or experience-based beliefs.

If a framework is rigorously developed with a constant focus on issues of responsibility, with an effort to accord with human nature and social existence, and with a concern to be intrinsically right and good, then it deserves to be called an 'ethical framework' whatever domain it may be ordering. It can then be introduced in good faith and explained in an appealing manner.

DESIGNING A UNIVERSAL FRAMEWORK

Research Assumptions. Note that an understanding of a situation, i.e. a practical understanding, leads to blue-prints for action, but an understanding of principles, i.e. a theoretical understanding or framework of universals, does not. This is the practical person's disappointment with theory. But the fact that frameworks never say directly what should be done should be seen as a virtue, not as a limitation. Frameworks only constrain and channel the development of understanding. They rule out some models as unworkable or harmful and only in the broadest sense indicate what might be done. So they allow freedom and demand responsibility.

Some people who eternally defend and seek freedom — often artists, therapists, academics — object to the constraints implied by any universal framework. They have a horror of categorization. It is true that reality cannot be captured in categories. But the point is that *in social life* there is *always* a constraining framework. If there were not, communication and social interaction would become impossible. So the real issues are: are you aware of your underlying assumptions and categories? and, how useful and ethical are your frameworks in practice?

If a framework is well-designed, then blue-prints can be developed in which control is not oppressive, spontaneity is preserved, injustices are limited, and organic development is facilitated. The world will go on whether or not our efforts are well-designed, but it will not go on happily if human nature is violated. We are all blueprint makers — managers design their endeavours, politicians design their manifestos, and all of us design important aspects of our own lives — so we can benefit from a framework that accords with human nature. (As to what constitutes human nature, that is a matter for each person to decide. Mistakes can be made and advice can be occasionally sought, but we cannot abdicate our everyday responsibilities to experts or academics.)

Whereas managers or politicians and their consultant advisers can be expected to sort out messes and develop a conventional understanding of them, they cannot be expected to develop frameworks of universals. This is thinkers' work. Practical people have a right to expect thinkers to construct such an infrastructure, to develop the necessary language and to validate the ideas.

A core assumption of the present approach is that while there is no model for a perfect society or organization, there are frameworks that can helpfully and non-oppressively orient our striving for this ideal.

Any utopian model threatens to justify totalitarian control so as to impose its way of thinking. To escape this trap, we could say that utopia is a society in which the possibility of design and evolutionary progress exists. This is probably the only utopia we can realistically expect. It exists everywhere as a potentiality, and always has existed in this form.

One consequence of ethical design through collaboration and intervention is that any account inevitably confuses description with prescription. Often what is, is what ought to be — so the same statement may be both descriptive and prescriptive. Observing what existed and what did not exist, and what worked and what failed to work was essential to the research approach. So the exposition is descriptive to some degree. How could a framework for something as basic as social life not reflect reality and still be useful? However, because the framework aims to be a guide to ethical living, it must of necessity be prescriptive.[3]

Testing the Framework. Intervening by introducing a set of new ideas is a complex matter. It is only possible if the ideas seem axiomatic, have intuitive appeal, are personally supportive, and rapidly demonstrate benefits. To the dismay of ivory-tower dwellers, compelling evidence, scholarly erudition and intrinsic logic are far less significant. The reason is simple: intervening in a person's assumptive world and installing a new way of thinking means tampering with their identity. Such activity will not be generally welcomed and absorbed if the frameworks do not seem to be wholesome and to affirm existing identity. A psychotherapeutic-style sensitivity to people is obviously needed as part of the research method.

This is not the place to engage in a detailed account of systemic inquiry methods for ethical design. However, it is necessary for the reader to recognize that conventional empirical and hypothesis-testing inquiry, the commonest conceptions of science, cannot possibly **produce** useful frameworks of universals. Scientists using these approaches do not attempt such a task. Most of the distinctive principles used in my research are mentioned in the opening chapter and this one. (For a summary, see Box 2.1).

A Holistic Vision

To enter the domain of purpose, values and ethics is to find oneself in a circular antechamber from which a number of doors lead. Each door is labelled with a discipline. Once you pass through a door-way, the door slams irrevocably shut behind you. There is no turning back: your career, your mode of thinking, your friends, your life are all altered forever. The social guardians of

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Some Distinctive and Unconventional Research Principles
☞ Start with complexity.
☞ Use experiential reality as a reference.
☞ Expect parallel hierarchies of concepts.
☞ Define elements precisely.
☞ Refine ordinary language and reject neologisms.
☞ Work by progressive approximation.
☞ Scan all relevant disciplines.
☞ Accept the validity of all sides in long-standing theoretical debates.
☞ Distinguish the actual from the potential.
☞ Understand, then universalize, then apply.
☞ Strive for completeness, consistency and coherence.
☞ Relate frameworks where possible.
☞ Check ideas apply equally well at personal, organizational and societal levels.
☞ Only apply theories in consultation by invitation, and then solve real problems collaboratively.
☞ Help people and trust people.
☞ Give truth priority over method.
☞ End with simplicity.
Box 2.1

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knowledge demand compartmentalization. Beyond the door-way, the rooms are inter-connected, but the guardians permit short visits only.

To summarize what lies behind all the different doors is beyond anyone's expertise. To take account of the conflicting and complex viewpoints, ideas and findings about purposes and values in a proper and fair way, were it possible, would render this book hopelessly obscure.

The intense specialisation within management and social science disciplines has produced depth at the expense of breadth. But a holistic vision is essential to achieve anything substantial. Ignoring a single relevant factor can bring the whole edifice of an endeavour tumbling down. To avoid compartmentalization, inter-disciplinary work is proceeding apace. However the academic culture is unchanged, so the result is new and worthy but even more specialized and restricted disciplines or domain-limited efforts. Consider some examples: development economics, business ethics, medical geography, socio-legal studies, media studies, political psychology, educational assessment.

All too often the research establishment mocks efforts to produce a global vision. So the search for universality is not just neglected by academics, it is avoided as being equivalent to career death. As a result,

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perspectives and jargon proliferate in contradictory and confusing ways, and any sense of the needs of humanity is lost.

The last word can be handed over to an academic who can be taken as speaking for any of the social sciences anywhere in the world: "What is wrong ... today is that we are over-specialised, fragmented, alienated from the society in which the majority of people live and lacking any vision of our own or humanity's future."[4]

By contrast, the framework of purpose is the product of a holistic vision. It extends via action to clarify the design and working of organizations and government, and via experience to clarify the nature of personal identity and moral institutions. All its definitions are offered as universally valid, cross-culturally applicable, integrated within a meaningful system, potentially embedded in existing society, and pointing towards an ultimate goal for humanity.

A holistic vision must handle complexity without being over-complicated. It must be simple if it is to be grasped, and yet avoid being simplistic. Nowhere is complex over-complication and simplistic over-simplification more evident than in the field of ethics.

Over-simplifying Ethics. Ethics, we can say, is about the *obligation* or *duty* to do what is right and good. It relates to what one is *bound* to do (*obligation* etym. L. obligare = to bind up, to pledge), or to what *ought* to be done (*duty* etym. M.E. dew = to owe). The obligation and duty is both inner, that is to say a motivational force; and outer, that is to say a social demand. In other words, ethics is both personal and societal. For the person in the street, ethics is, in short, about what must be done, what values to hold, and what rules to obey. The ethical ideal is a virtuous person in a just society.

Some have said that mistaking the part for the whole is the essence of heresy. If so, most writers on ethics are heretics. Blandly, they consign to the dustbin whole areas of relevance and centuries of philosophical reflection. Everything before Kant was a mistake says one. Everything after Kant is empty comes the riposte. For some, ethics is essentially a matter of union with God. For others religion is irrelevant and God a metaphysical nonsense. Morals and ethics are words derived from Latin and Greek terms referring to custom, character and behaviour — but most ethicists seem united in regarding such things as outside their scope.[5]

The moral education of children, asserted Kohlberg, an eminent psychologist, should take as its subject matter the settling of conflicts of interest among people to whom equal respect is due.[6] But this excludes so much. Surely moral education is also about developing honesty, truthfulness and integrity? And where do rules about gambling, euthanasia, the use of drugs, or sexual fidelity fit into this schema?

These over-simplifications are due to the protean quality and immense size of the ethical domain. We always manage complexity by analysis — which entails breaking the whole up into its parts. However, if the sight of the whole is lost, artificially isolated parts may grow unchecked and deformed, potentially and quite unnecessarily subverting the enterprise. A balanced and effective understanding of any part of ethics requires an image of the whole. Generating this image is my aim: not resolving particular ethical issues. Providing a base for discourse is my task: not participating passionately in that discourse.[7]

Of course, the combination of over-complication and over-simplification is not restricted to ethics. It applies to decision-making, organizational design, social participation, and virtually all areas of social science study.

The favourite simplifying tactic of social scientists is to dichotomize, often into opposites. This is the norm when defining purpose and value. (See the introductory sections to Ch.s 3 and 4 respectively). The next step is to combine two dichotomies into a four-celled two-by-two table (see Fig. 2.2). Using this trick, the illusion of understanding is dramatically increased.

People experience a sense of relief that there is some order in social reality. If well-designed, as in Fig. 2.2(b), 2x2 tables may have some use.[8] However, their weakness is that they use ideas to order realities. Imposition on reality and the massaging of reality are ever-present tendencies. The present framework, in sharp contrast, is based on using realities to order ideas.

Learning from People

People came first. Out of the experience of living, came the awareness of social existence. And from reflections on social existence came religion, philosophy, law, social science and management studies, approximately in that order. To go back to people's experiences and to view purposes and values as a product of experience allows us to learn from all these domains.

Pluralism. Social scientists often start by assuming or testing popular beliefs. Even philosophers nowadays try to harmonize their conclusions with what they presume to be everyday thinking by ordinary people. However, such work usually assumes that there is only one common-sense way of thinking and acting. The

Figure 2.2: Dichotomizing: The typical simplification. (a) Cartesian coordinates based on continuous variables and the 2 x 2 table for discrete entities which is derived from it. (b) Distinctive theories of society with key social scientists. Note that the approach to society taken in this book does not easily fit into the table.

(a)

	X'	X
Y	$P(X',Y)$	$Q(X,Y)$
Y'	$R(X',Y')$	$S(X,Y')$

(b)

	Subjective	Objective
Radical Change	Radical Humanist *e.g. Illich*	Radical Structuralist *e.g. Marx*
Regulation	Interpretive *e.g. Goffman*	Functionalist *e.g. Parsons*

assumption of unity is the ultimate over-simplification. Such a mistake is easy to make, partly because we tend to think that people are like ourselves and those with whom we mix, and partly because of an inherent psychological urge to unification. Philosophers, in particular, seem to be prone to pour scathing criticism and unmodified contempt on views with which they disagree.

Reading widely in many disciplines has forced me to accept that there are multiple valid modes of thought and action — only some of which accord with my own personal inclinations. These multiple theoretical approaches cannot be unified into an encompassing 'super-better' theory, but they can be grouped, ordered, and made humanly manageable by clarifying their essential relationships. The result, which might be called a meta-theory or meta-paradigm, generates an overview and enables an expansion of awareness.

By confidentially cooperating with people making difficult decisions in disparate settings — and encouraging them to be explicit when doing it their way — I have directly observed the dramatic differences which result when they use different implicit theories. I found that it was often their theoretical approach which made the decision, not themselves. In other words, someone else with the same theory would come to a very similar conclusion. My view is that people not ideas should be in the driving seat. People must experience themselves as responsible for their actions, and this means they must be aware of and personally responsible for the ideas and assumptions they hold.

My work required me to assist and empower people who carried formal responsibility and wished to act with awareness. When the situation is difficult, managers, professionals, politicians and others inquire and reflect on their activities even though their main con-

cern is not generating knowledge. Helping them reflect is not itself a scientific activity, but it has an advantage over more controlled forms of investigation in that it minimizes the distortion of human nature to suit scientific methods or theoretical preconceptions.

During one phase of consultancy, for example, I explored exactly what was meant and implied when a decision or proposal is described as good (or bad) or right (or wrong). The resulting multiplicity of views and ways of handling controversy were systematically analysed and refined over some years to produce a set of very different approaches to ethical choice (see Ch. 6).

Precise Formulation. The concepts, structures and relationships of purpose and value were tested and validated in an iterative process to make them fit the realities precisely. Ideas were developed so as to be applicable, and application in problematic situations was pursued to test and modify the formulations. I have generally worked with successful people capable of reflecting on their own functioning. Such people do not accept fuzzy jargon or artificial ideas, and are far too sensible to adapt to disciplinary prejudices. They are aware of the evolution of their own attitudes and beliefs, and expect new ideas to be broadly congruent with what experience has taught them.

Of course, even the brightest person looking for help might accept plausible but mistaken ideas. And if the ideas are buzzwords, it becomes positively dangerous to appear behind the times by questioning or rejecting them. Much academic and commercial consultancy seems to build on this human weakness, by deliberately promoting buzzwords while avoiding precise formulations (cf. Box 2.2).

But precision in thinking is needed to construct an effective language for management. Errors multiply

themselves as any grand synthesis proceeds. The present framework would have collapsed at an early stage if valid universals had not been discovered. As the ideas in any one section (and its master-matrix) were hammered out, problems elsewhere were resolved or inconsistencies emerged. So other sections and master-matrices were re-worked and improved. Now, the whole framework is a tightly-linked and reasonably

coherent and consistent structure — though still open to improvement and elaboration.

Socrates drove everyone mad with his impossible demands for precise definition of things like virtue, knowledge and justice. How could I possibly succeed where he failed? The answer lies in the different methods being applied. In the philosophic method, asking questions and maintaining a dialogue are as important as reaching an answer — or even more important. By contrast in the present inquiry, answers were the object of the exercise and their correctness the source of my livelihood. To keep projects going, workable definitions just had to be produced in a way that was socially acceptable, approximately right, and evidently useful to clients.

Something sensible could always be created by defining social entities in terms of their core purpose and relationships. In other words, the way out of the maze was to move from asking (say) 'What is a faction?' to 'What is a faction for?' and to examine how factions relate to and differ from other forms of social group like communities, associations or work groups. I then used these ideas with the client to help them understand their situation. As formulations were used and re-used, they were modified, focused and refined until they were simple, obvious and unexceptionable.

A client's conceptions and values were never unduly disrupted or opposed. Clients soon realized that the issue was really one of gaining clarity in their own mind. They recognized that a challenging dialogue with a supportive outsider could be helpful. Common sense told them that things go awry when they and those working to them are confused about what essential words mean or when buzzwords or other key ideas do not fit realities. In all projects, people begin using the language and working with the ideas of my frameworks, perhaps a little stiffly at first, but soon in an easy and natural way.

Confucius was also deeply concerned with the *rectification of names*, and gave a similar reason for his concern to the one I give my clients. 'If names are not rectified, then language will not be in accord with truth. If language is not in accord with truth, then things cannot be accomplished. If things cannot be accomplished, then ceremonies and music will not flourish [i.e. disrespect and bad feelings will disrupt social relationships]. If ceremonies and music do not flourish, then punishment will not be just. If punishments are not just, then the people will not know how to move hand or foot [i.e. will be inhibited]. Therefore the superior man will give only names that can be described in speech and say only what can be carried out in practice.[9]

CONCEPT OR BUZZWORD?
The Example of 'Strategy'

There is little agreement amongst either businessmen or academics about what strategy is. A recent popular article on strategy recognizes it as a buzzword and yet mirrors the confusion it reports. The writer drifts between what a strategy should be in principle, what should guide strategy, and what business strategies should be in practice. The final suggestion is that the secret of success is to let strategy mean whatever you want it to mean (*The Economist*, 20th March 1993, p.106). In short, good-bye to concepts.

The messages about strategy that flow from my approach are quite different. Here are three:

☛ Strategy has different connotations based on the approach to work and decision-making taken by the manager (cf. Master-Table 8). This accords with the general principle that all domains allow for a range of different approaches (cf. L-6: Ch.4).

☛ Before you try to set a strategy, get a grasp of what a strategy is in principle (cf. Glossary). Make sure you know how strategy links to other forms of purpose and value. Use the word 'strategy', like any other tool, with respect. So avoid using it to refer bluntly to purposes in general.

☛ No one can tell you what your strategy should be. And do not expect a strategy (or any other tool including the ideas in this book) to carry the burden of your success. Business, like any other aspect of social life, is more complicated than that.

When strategy was the popular buzzword some years ago, it was not wise to suggest that it is perfectly possible to succeed without strategies — and easy to fail with them. But many effective managers, then and now, are pragmatic opportunists for whom objectives are a matter of immediate convenience and concepts a form of brain-ache.

Academics who promote the use of strategy are typically rationalists or systems thinkers who believe in ideas and insist on the importance of knowing where you are going. Managers who find such an approach appealing should feel at home with the definitions and explanations of strategy and related terms provided here (cf. Ch. 3 L-2; Ch. 13).

Box 2.2

THE ORIGINATING PROJECT

My various theoretical frameworks have emerged principally from a 25 year consultancy programme aiming to improve organization and management of the United Kingdom's National Health Service (NHS). The NHS, the largest employer in Western Europe, is as complex as any organization in the world. Its one million employees include health professionals in numerous disciplines, managers of many types, and a wide variety of occupational groups ranging from doctors to accountants to gardeners. Its control involves politicians, civil servants and the public. Taking an action-research perspective, I have directed a variety of major organization development projects over the past 15 years, some lasting many years. Over two hundred conferences and seminars have been mounted. New ideas and theories in many areas of management have been pursued with thousands of staff in all tiers of the NHS. The ideas have been fed back to senior managers, and have been followed up over the many changes of public policy, governments, and people at the top of the NHS.[10]

The particular stimulus to work on purpose and value came from requests in 1981-2 to improve the working of two District Health Authorities (DHAs). The DHA is a form of governing body or board within the NHS. It was then responsible for comprehensive provision of health services in a defined territory with a population of about 250,000. This responsibility was both legal — it could be sued, and financial — it was allocated an annual budget with which to provide services. The project needed to establish the appropriate work of the DHA, its chairman and members, and to clarify their roles and relations to the top officers and to higher level governance provided by a Regional Health Authority and the Secretary of State. The research contract was not just a theoretical exercise. It required us to assist Authority members and top officers to put our proposals into practice.

This project forced us to develop the notion of levels of purpose and then it became evident that we could design a model of the Authority based on this framework. After testing the ideas further in seminars and projects with other governors, the model was published and disseminated nationally. Both lay governors and top managers found the framework easy to assimilate, and told us that the model felt right and natural. Above all, when put into practice, the ideas actually worked.[11]

The framework of purpose was subsequently applied and validated in local government. Local government in the UK is responsible for various welfare, education, housing and other services for large communities.

Elections are contested by the major political parties and so the governance process is highly politicized. Here the challenge was to improve council and committee structures and the policy-making process generally, while keeping in mind the councillors' political and democratic role. Again the framework proved to accord with a deep social reality and to be a useful guide for devising and implementing reforms.[12]

Subsequently, the framework was clarified and further elaborated to assist work with values and objectives by executives, and to facilitate social change in projects involving multiple organizations. In this work, links with related frameworks of decision and responsibility were developed. The ideas have also been tested and refined in work with commercial firms, voluntary bodies and churches, carried out in part by colleagues.

An Unavoidable Discovery

What is 'Policy'? Clarifying the nature of purpose was simply unavoidable in the Health Authority project because members and officers repeatedly used purposive terms. Some like priorities, options and plans seemed straightforward. However the most frequent term, policy, was puzzling. We had no precise sense of what policy referred to. Time and again in our field and seminar discussions, participants claimed that policies were not being set, or were inappropriately set, or were too vague, or were too specific, or were not understandable. In confidential discussions, members of Health Authorities expressed puzzlement as to what sort of policy decisions they could realistically make. Top officers also revealed confusion as to their specific contribution to board policy-making, and wondered what distinguished this from purely executive policy-making.

We asked managers and governors to explain what they meant by policy. They replied with synonyms like direction or priority and seemed unsure as to the precise function of policy. Examination of documents which were labelled 'policies', for example, usually revealed a mixture of strongly held values, vague aspirations, specific activities, targets (often grossly unrealistic), directions for change, general procedures, responsibilities, methods, rules, and self-evident or tautological statements. The best one could say of many of these documents was that they met the requirement to have something official in writing.

Two conclusions were drawn: first, an unequivocal and unambiguous definition of policy was required if those on governing bodies were ever to be clear about their responsibilities; second, such a definition required clarity about purposes in general.

Sorting Purposes. To understand purposes, we reflected on their use and misuse in other settings. Several observations immediately impressed themselves on us. People were not clear about what purposes were about — especially purposes which were also values. Perhaps as a consequence, we found an extraordinarily varied number of synonyms for purpose in everyday use. Poor or absent specifications of purposes and inconsistency between purposes were frequent causes of confusion for managers in large organizations.

Over time we came to see that the notion of different types of purpose was important to resolve problems with the setting of purposes. Again, two findings pointed unmistakably to this conclusion. First, distinctly different forms of system breakdown could be linked with absence or confusion of different types of purpose. Second, attempts at evaluation were regularly bedevilled by conflicts between managers, politicians and different breeds of academics, because each viewed different types of purposes as most relevant.

Eventually we realized that there was a good reason why purposes were labelled in so many ways. In organizations, indeed in any deliberate activity, a number of categorically discrete articulations of purpose are absolutely essential. To use them effectively, each requires a distinct name. The situation had become confused because investigators in different fields of human endeavour had, innocently, evolved different names for similar notions or used the same name for differing notions.

For example, the objectives studied by policy analysts related to changes in services, while the objectives stressed by role analysts concerned the nature of enduring functions within the organization. Sociologists noted implicit communal or group values which resulted in the direction taken by services, while managers applied values overtly to make decisions. Entrepreneurs with their lawyers formulated aims to justify setting up enterprises, whilst planners identified aims which determined their operation in the immediate future. Supervisors usually set goals to ensure that things were done on time, while general managers often set goals to which everyone had to work in their own way. And so on. Rectification of names was evidently necessary.

In the event, the enormous number of explicit and implicit objectives derived from a limited number of formally distinct and definable categories (or types) of purpose. The variety of surface labels and classifications of objectives could be retained, reinterpreted and refined using the new deep classification.

I was predisposed to believe that my categories

would form an interconnected structure with an intrinsic coherence. If such an underlying structure of purpose could be clearly articulated, I knew it would be a useful tool for organizational development. However, its extension to encompass ethical choice and social change was not recognized at that stage.

In studies of social services, a colleague, Jimmy Algie, had previously suggested that there might be five distinct categories of purpose forming a conceptual hierarchy.[13] This insight as to hierarchy was sound and, although the labels have been altered, the definitions modified, and two further levels added, Algie's underlying notions remain. However, the present study emphasises that the hierarchy is not merely conceptual but is linked to existing social practices. It seems that the hierarchy, as I have extended and completed it, is not just another typology, but a framework which touches social reality itself. It is therefore of profound importance for the ethical design of activities, organizations and society.

DISCIPLINARY LINKS

It may be helpful for readers within particular disciplines or interests to have advance notice of my connections with these, and some indication of the parts of the book that might be particularly relevant to them. The areas to be considered here are: management disciplines, social sciences, philosophy, religion and law.

Management Disciplines. Much of my research and consultancy has been concerned with improving management within organizations. Management is all about pursuing purposes, ensuring cooperation, establishing values, and thriving in a wider social context, so management disciplines were a natural starting point. I am indebted to the many management theorists and writers who gave me a base from which to work.

Technical work apart, management has not yet become theory-based. Even a prestigious University like Harvard teaches management in much the same way that morality used to be taught in the middle ages — using case studies and simulations. Empirical research has produced little theory, and much management writing is an unashamed mixture of description and ad hoc precepts. Such theory as exists is simplistic or out of touch with the reality to be managed. Where management theory is precise and mathematical, it is near-impossible to understand and implementation is conspicuously absent.

The absence of theory encourages managers to write popular books about their own experiences, and fosters the phenomenon of the management guru. The result is

a mix of tips and hints buried in a web of illusion. Much writing encourages imitation rather than reflective awareness. The language used aspires to be allusive rather than precise, despite the harmful effects (cf. Box 2.2 and Ex. 3.14 in Ch. 3).

At all times, this book speaks very directly to the needs of managers who wish to be aware of what is going on — in themselves, in their work, in their organization, in their professional associations, in their society. Some parts are particularly relevant to practising managers. Ch. 3 which deals with the five purposes needed for action is geared to organizations; and Ch. 10 is about systematically using purposes and values (and their derivatives) in management. Ch. 13 is essential reading for those who believe in value-driven management and like using objectives to get results. To understand governing boards and governance duties, the section in Ch. 12 on executive organization (G-5) is essential. The most useful sections in regard to ethics are: Ch. 6 on ethical decision-making; Ch. 8 on the various of ethical codes; and the section on minimum standards in Ch. 9.

Social Science. Even though the scientific ethos typically excludes itself from any responsibility to provide a direction for activities or a guide to conduct, social scientists realize that purpose and value are central to their disciplines. I have drawn freely across the spectrum of social sciences without pretending expertise in any area (except perhaps systems and psychoanalysis which hardly count as social sciences).

Social scientists have clarified that the drive for improvement, cross-cultural comparisons and reflective awareness are features of modern developed societies which are alien, even inimical, to traditional or primitive societies. Less developed societies are distinguished by their lack of concern with the origins of their ethical assumptions. They abjure change and take the validity of their standards for granted. Only in modern times could the urge to set up organizations, to respect differences in individual view, and to design social life be realized on a sufficient scale to make the discovery and testing of the present framework possible.

Sociologists and anthropologists established by the middle of this century that all human societies have standards of right and wrong and good and bad, and that people in all societies are sensitive to judgements in these terms. Ethical concepts and rules have been shown to be inextricably part of the culture and structure of the society within which they are found. The finding of enormous diversity on the one hand and some real measure of uniformity on the other is of immense significance. It validates the approach that led to this book.[14]

I worked throughout on the twin assumptions (a) that our common humanity means that there must be an underlying, invisible and uniform framework for purpose and ethics within which all people and all societies make choices, devise rules and create institutions; and (b) that these choices, rules and institutions would vary depending on every conceivable social influence: economic, historical, political, demographic, geographical, religious, and so on.

Needless to say, all social scientists should find all chapters of some interest. However, readers concerned with society as a whole rather than its organizations or public sector administration may wish to focus on: Ch. 5 dealing with the variety of natural social groups; the second part of Ch. 7 dealing with society's natural moral institutions; Ch. 9 examining ethical authorities; Ch. 11 classifying the myriad of organizations in society; and Ch. 12 considering the expression of autonomy, sovereignty and membership of society, including a new approach to popular movements and regulatory authorities. The social aspects of being intentional, as presented in Ch. 13, would also be relevant.

Readers concerned with psychological or personal aspects of social life might prefer to focus on: the exploration of value (Ch. 4), natural social groups (Ch. 5), making ethical choices (Ch. 6), developing identity (the first part of Ch. 7), as well as modes of being intentional (Ch. 13).

Philosophy. A great deal of thought but little orthodox philosophy has gone into the formulations of the framework. I take heart from Bertrand Russell who suggested, somewhat pessimistically, that only bad philosophy had any influence in society. To reject the value of good philosophy would be unthinkable, but for a non-philosopher to extract that value is not always easy. Even amongst philosophers, there does seem to be general agreement that application of their ideas is limited. One formal assessment by philosophers of their own courses in business ethics concluded that the great philosophical theories were not useful as teaching devices.[15]

From my perspective, the unquestionable value of the past three thousand years of disciplined philosophical analysis comes from its clarification of the basic features of ethics, and its articulation of a variety of distinct approaches and perennial dualities.

From ancient times until the present, ethics has been studied primarily by philosophical analysis rather than by intervening in actual situations and noting the effects. Indeed ethics is often used synonymously with philosophical study: the object of that study being morals or morality.[16]

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My impression is that the great philosophers have advocated, explicitly or implicitly, adoption of a single approach to ethics, and have focused on how, by following that approach, people should conduct themselves. Many philosophers still see their work as producing knowledge to help people become good or happy, or to do what is right either in general or in specific situations.

Such moralizing is largely avoided by the modern fashion for logical positivism. Its offspring, analytic philosophy, worries over the meaning and objectivity of propositions and concepts used in discourse. From the comfort of their armchairs, philosophers argue with one another about the way in which a particular word is used, and about comparisons and contrasts with other notions commonly associated in thought with it. Superficially, this resembles my concern for the rectification of names.

So philosophers may well look askance at the many definitions and propositions presented in this book. But the framework is primarily about achievement, not about discourse. So its essential elements are formulae representing social realities, not words that people happen to use. Chuang Tzu compared words to nets for catching fish. Once you have understood the reality (caught the fish), then the words (net) used to capture it can be changed or forgotten. Ethical design involves honing ordinary words *to sharpen up just those distinctions that really matter in practice*. The idea that usefulness might be a superordinate guide to truth is generally alien to the philosophic mind (even allowing for the pragmatic tradition).

All philosophers should be interested in the new way that certain perennial dualities in human life are accounted for and theoretically handled (see Ch.s 6, 7 and 13). Moral philosophers will find the analysis of values (Ch. 4), and the different approaches to making an ethical choice (Ch. 6) relevant to their work. Philosophers who enjoy getting their teeth into a grand systemic synthesis may find Chs. 9 and 13 of interest.

Religion. It has been suggested that modern ethical philosophy was brought down to reality and saved by medical ethics. But who led the way in medical ethics? Not philosophers, and not even doctors. Medical ethics was established as a field of concern largely through the work of moral theologians.[17] This should not surprise anyone. Religion has always seen itself as having a central role in guiding social behaviour along the right channels.

A separation of religion from values and ethics is just not possible. Moral theology is the critical work within a religion applying its knowledge of God to ordinary behaviour. Moral theology apart, traditional creeds provide a framework within which most people work and think without much consideration of its influence.

Without pretending to escape this influence, my concern has been the religious impulse in the mind and in society universally. As the research progressed, this impulse towards the spiritual was revealed in a variety of contexts. The analyses to be presented suggest that a complete divorce of values and ethics from spirituality is impossible. If this understanding is correct, the present growth of ethical reflection in society is likely to be associated with a re-invigoration of transpersonal and transcendental awareness.

Spirituality is hard for secular man to take seriously, so such proposals sound far-fetched. Religion seems to take for granted just what science and much Western culture questions. For example, a central concern of religion is salvation i.e. how the soul, the divine spark within man, is to be united with the Eternal. Science says nothing about this, and even wonders if notions like soul and salvation are sensible or meaningful. However, achieving salvation, redemption, release from suffering, and union of the soul with God are definitions of the ultimate end and good for man recognized and affirmed by all religions.

In my analyses. I distinguish sharply between transpersonal experiences and spiritual forms which are remarkably uniform the world over, and the church organizations, religious dogmas, rituals and value systems which show considerable variation. Spirituality and transpersonal existence seem to be empirical phenomena built into the very structure of human consciousness.[18] I take them for granted as universals while regarding religions and churches as the property of particular tribes and times.

In my work, I have found that most people have the capacity to see issues from a spiritual perspective and feel refreshed by taking this view. However, few were practised in activating this potential themselves. Still fewer found their official religious doctrine an effective guide to handling the complexity of modern society and organizational life. What they urgently required was a new symbolic understanding of the human spirit which could resonate with the ethos of autonomy and scientific precision characteristic of the modern age.

If you are of a religious disposition, or a New Age devotee, or a researcher of religion within a social science, or a theological scholar, then you will be particularly interested in the sixth and seventh levels in all the hierarchies. Comparison with lower levels will be helpful in appreciating and reconciling yourself to mundane temporal perspectives. Use the Table of Contents to guide your reading.

Law. *Question:* When the Chicago Mercantile Exchange wanted its members to learn about ethics following an FBI indictment of 47 of its brokers and traders for de-frauding customers, where did they turn? *Answer:* Professors at the Chicago-Kent College of law. *Question:* When the British Psychoanalytic Society needed help in constructing its code of ethics, who did they call in? *Answer:* Their solicitors. Presumably philosophers and theologians were thought to lack certain knowledge or communicative skills, or viewed as out of touch with everyday life; or possibly it is just that they charged too little to be taken seriously.

Nobody wants to get entangled with the law. But still, the law is the ultimate social recourse if any of us wishes to assert that something done to us is bad or unfair, or should we wish to defend an action as good and right in the face of accusations to the contrary. The courts of justice are a means whereby what is officially ethical can be publicly argued and decided. Correspondingly the law and jurists have a great deal to say about values in social life. Academic jurists might be expected to offer a theory of values and society, but instead they restrict themselves to the theory of law. The study of the theory of law is known as jurisprudence.

My knowledge of jurisprudence is rudimentary yet I have become fascinated by the law. Legal positivism, the currently dominant trend of thinking in jurisprudence, tends to separate law and morals absolutely. However, from my perspective, law seems to be ethical at core.[19]

The governance system which enables legality is given a special status and compared with other natural moral institutions in Ch.7. Laws are viewed as a special form of regulation and compared with other ethical rules in Ch. 8. Different aspects of justice are discussed in Ch.9, where 'the law' is defined. Law is also considered briefly in Ch. 12 in relation to sovereignty.

THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE COMMUNITY

I need to state just one more of my assumptions before proceeding: purposes, values and obligations demand a balanced recognition of 'the individual in the community'.

The Enlightenment's emphases on freedom of thought, scepticism and the value of the individual, for all their benefits, seem to have led to a devaluation of the social order which all individuals need. This movement has fostered an intolerance of the very notion of certain eternal and unshakeable beliefs on which all ethics absolutely depends. Religious and communalist emphases on the value of the community, mutuality and cooperation, for all their virtue, seem to have gone hand in hand with attempts to limit autonomy, deny diversity and suppress personal initiative and imagination.

Each perspective makes a vital contribution, but in the USA and on the international scene it sometimes seems that a war between the two outlooks is brewing.

Because individuals are the purposeful entities which constitute communities, we must start with them. But because individuals depend on communities for their continuing existence, we must never neglect the social dimension in our explorations.

But what is an individual? It has become acceptable, if a little odd, to use the term to refer to any social entity that is self-contained, self-identified, purposeful and has a legal existence. Such an individual makes decisions, commits resources, and can be held responsible.

There are at least four important categories of individual in this wider sense. First there are people like you and me, operating deliberately or unselfconsciously in a variety of social roles. Then there are organizations like firms, public bodies and voluntary associations pursuing their own business. Then there are governments concerned with the security and wellbeing of society. Finally, there are the churches which represent a moral community.[20]

It is essential to recognize that organizations, governments and churches are individuals capable of inconceivably more good and harm than persons. In modern society, people do most of their good and harm by virtue of their positions within such powerful and complex individuals. So a practical framework for purposes, values and obligation cannot be restricted to purely personal matters or personal volition: which is the present convention in psychology, philosophy and ethics courses. Nor can it be restricted to purely social phenomena, as is common in most social sciences.

The present framework engages directly with these artificial individuals which are so important in our lives, especially organizations which are the most prolific and most amenable to personal control. Those responsible for designing, operating and regulating organizations need to appreciate what they are about.

Transition. *The introduction is over at last. The need for a framework has been identified. The design process has been explained. The ethical underpinnings of the inquiry have been emphasized. The originating project has been described. Links to existing disciplines have been noted. Now we can start.* ✤

NOTES

1. Locke's quote can be found in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

2. Spinoza, B. The *Ethics of Spinoza*. (Ed. by D.D. Runes) Secaucus, NJ: Citadel, 1957, p.94.

3. This descriptive-prescriptive duality relates to the is/ought dilemma, which is the focus of much philosophical debate (e.g. Hudson, W.D. *The Is/Ought Question: A Collection of Papers on the Central Problem in Moral Philosophy*. Macmillan: London,1969). The dilemma is irrelevant in the present pragmatic context in which all social facts embody an ought in their nature. For example, to say that someone is a father or a friend or a manager directly implies that the person has a certain responsibility and ought to behave in a certain way. In the same way, if a person's intention to buy a car means anything, we take it for granted that the person has the accompanying right and responsibility. Such points have been made by Churchman and others repeatedly (e.g. Churchman, C.W. *The Design of Inquiring Systems*. New York: Basic Books, 1971; Milne, A.J.M. *Human Rights and Human Diversity*. London: Macmillan, 1986). Systems science views dualities as characteristic of systems, and the handling and resolution of dualities is one of the themes of the book (see especially Ch.s 6, 7, 13). However the descriptive—prescriptive duality, which probably belongs somewhere within the framework of inquiry, is not explored.

4. Hart, K. Quoted in *The Times Higher Educational Supplement*, p.V, 28th December 1990. In the same vein, a review of an American Economic Association conference noted that it 'addressed scarcely a word to the world's mounting economic ills', with one speaker being 'publicly admonished for his impropriety' in using the word 'conscience' amongst academics for whom only isolated self-interest has any meaning. (Edward Fulbrook in *The Times Higher Educational Supplement*, March 25, 1994.)

5. Examples of the various views noted are as follows: H.A. Pritchard discounts pre-Kantian ethics (*Moral Obligation*. London: Oxford University Press, 1949) while B. Williams discounts post-Kantian ethics (*Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). P. Geach presses the religious view (*The Virtues*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) while J.L. Mackie ridicules it (*Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).

6. Kohlberg's studies assessing moral stages in child development have had considerable influence in education and psychology. See: Colby, A. & Kohlberg, L. *Measurement and Moral Judgement: Theoretical Foundations and Research Validation*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

7. Ethical studies typically use limited frameworks which are taken for granted by their authors. Investigators examine the nature of a problematic issue, or the importance and relevance of particular ethical rules, or the various values inherent in possible choices. For example, over 200 articles devoted to medical ethics appear monthly and virtually all address specific problems of what is to be valued or permissible in medical practice and why (Thomasma, D.C. & Pellegrino, E.D. Philosophy of medicine as the source for medical ethics. *Metamedicine*, 2: 5-11, 1981). To examine ethical issues in a community (even via academic journals) is akin to being a manager in a firm. It means becoming a passionate participant and working to become an expert in the area. My aim is rather to clarify what ethics is about. This means determining the framework of general ideas and fundamental assumptions on which all value debate, ethical choice and ethical judgement might (or must) be based whatever the issue, domain or cultural setting.

8. The 2x2 table in Fig. 2.2 has been extracted from: Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis*. London: Heinemann, 1979. Holland demonstrates its application to the treatment of mental illness (Holland, R. Sanity, necessary complexities and mental health promotion. *Changes*, 10: 136-145).

9. Confucius. *The Analects*. 13.3. Extracted from: *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Transl. Wing-tsit Chan) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p.40.

10. For some of the more significant publications see: Rowbottom, R.W. et al. *Hospital Organization*. London: Heinemann, 1973; Jaques, E. (ed.) *Health Services*. London: Heinemann, 1978; Kinston, W. *The District Health Authority*. London: Brunel University, 1986; Kinston, W. *Stronger Nursing Organisation*. London: Brunel University, 1987; Kinston, W. & Rowbottom, R.W. *Making General Management Work in the National Health Service*. London: Brunel University, 1989; Ovretveit, J. *Health Service Quality*. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1992.

11. The governance model was first published for the NHS (Kinston, W. 1986, op. cit. [10]). The underlying framework of levels was published in the systems literature at the same time (Kinston, W. Purposes and the translation of values into action. *Systems Research*, 3: 147-160, 1986). A more general and elaborate account of the model was published in the academic literature following further study and testing (Kinston, W. Designing the four compartments of organizations: constituting, governing, top officer and executant bodies. *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis*, 18: 3-24, 1991). A slightly reworked abbreviated and generalized version of the model is to be found in Ch. 12, where the emphasis is on executive-led organizations and a comparison with two other types of autonomous endeavour: popular movements and regulatory authorities.

12. An educational booklet was developed and used by the Local Government Training Board: Kinston, W. *Stronger Political Management in Local Government: A Guide*. London: Brunel University, 1988. National and local conferences were provided. (See: Kinston, W. & Wilshire, D. *Discussion Documents for Councillors and Top Officers*. Political Management Programme, Brunel University, 1986-1989.) I also worked with David Wilshire MP on legislation for the reform of local government in 1992, including guidance to the Local Government Commission. (See: Wilshire, D & Kinston, W. A Local Revolution. *The Magazine of the Houses of Parliament*. June 20 1988, p.6; and Wilshire, D. *Re-Designing Local Government. Parts 1-5*. London, 1992.)

13. Algie, J. *Social Values, Objectives and Action*. London: Kogan Page, 1975.

14. See, for example: Westermarck, E. (1906) *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. 2 vols. (2nd Ed.)* London: Macmillan, 1912-1917; and *Ethical Relativity*. London:

International Library of Psychology, Kegan Paul, 1932. Also: Hobhouse, L.T. (1906) *Morals in Evolution (7th Ed.)*. London: Chapman Hall. 1951; Ginsberg, M. *On the Diversity of Morals*. London: Mercury, 1962; Edel, A. & Edel, E. *Anthropology and Ethics. (Rev. Ed.)* Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968.

15. Criticism of the practical value of philosophy is made in: DiMarco. J.P. & Fox, R.M. (eds.) *New Directions in Ethics: The Challenge of Applied Ethics*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986, p.16. Ch. 9 in this collection (Bowie, N. Business ethics) contains the formal assessment of philosophical theories in business ethics courses.

16. Ethics is equivalent to moral philosophy for many academics. Yet moral philosophy was not restricted to ethics in former times, and covered many matters now regarded as within the domain of psychology and other social sciences. For most people nowadays, ethics is not a form of study but a way to live. In such a context, the terms 'ethical' and 'moral' are sometimes used synonymously and sometimes not. Except in a few places where the sense is unambiguous, I have chosen 'ethical' and 'ethics' as the general terms, and have used 'moral' and 'morality' in a restricted way.

17. The importance of medical ethics to philosophy was suggested in: S. Toulmin. How medicine saved the life of ethics. Ch. 16 in: DiMarco & Fox op.cit. [15]. The work of moral theologians in medical ethics can be seen in, for example: Kelly, G. *Medico-Moral Problems*. St. Louis: Catholic Hospital Association, 1958; Fletcher, J. *Moral Problems in Medicine*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; McFadden, C. *Medical Ethics. (6th Ed.)* Philadelphia: F.A. Davis, 1967; Ramsey, P. *The Patient as Person*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

18. This proposition is examined and explained more fully in Ch. 7 with references to the psychology and religious studies literature.

19. I was not invited to assist in any legal projects, but I found myself reading classic texts, especially those published in the 1920's: Goitein, H. (1924). *Primitive Ordeal and Modern Law*. London: Rothman, 1980; Gray, J.C. *The Nature and Sources of the Law*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1916; and Cardozo, B.N. *Nature of the Judicial Process*. Yale: Yale University Press, 1921. From reading modern texts, I have the impression that jurisprudence has become more restricted and mundane. Analytical jurisprudence, the preference of English empiricist jurists, works out arguments about what is right or good in the context of particular cases. Sociological jurisprudence, the preference of American scholars, studies the social factors affecting such judgements and the social consequences of legal decisions. Occasionally, modern jurisprudence takes the plunge and becomes overtly ethical by grappling with universals like: what should the law mean by fault? what should ultimately determine court procedures? e.g. Amselek, P. & MacCormick, N. (eds.) *Controversies about Law's Ontology*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991.

20 The currently wide definition of an individual is not new. In times past, legal individuals have also included: supernatural beings and dead people – so people would make archangels or Christ their heirs; animals — in the middle ages they were summoned, arrested, imprisoned, defended, sentenced and executed; and things — temples, ships and weapons were assigned rights and duties in ancient Greece, and proceedings against them were not infrequent. (Gray op.cit [19].)

Chapter 3

Unravelling Purpose

Deliberate action is a good place to start understanding values. Values and ethics can seem so impenetrable and mysterious on their own. By contrast, deliberate action is straightforward and fundamental. Working with values means thinking about what is important when doing something, and being ethical is about recognizing obligations in action. Of course it is not the mechanics of action that are of interest, but the purposes driving the action.

Purposes not only say what is going to be done, they explain why it is being done. Purposes need to be made explicit for both practical and ethical reasons.

Sometimes a purpose is pursued in order to realize an ethical urge directly. But even if the ethics of the matter feels subsidiary, the action, and particularly its purpose, can always be challenged. When this occurs, we attach the utmost significance to where responsibility lies for deciding the purpose. So, although purposes may be left implicit in everyday life, we must make them explicit in organizations and public affairs.

CONFRONTING CONFUSION

Anthropologists, cyberneticians, psychobiologists, psychologists, philosophers, theologians and others have studied the underlying nature and origin of purposes and goal-oriented activity. However, despite their efforts, no coherent and usable understanding of purpose is generally accepted. In the absence of agreed definitions and theory, numerous synonyms for purpose have emerged, each with its own imprecise uncertain nuance. Such a state of affairs is confusing.

But not so confusing as abstruse philosophical debates about whether purpose has any reality. Such argument evaporates in the face of the practical knowledge that human activity collapses utterly if purpose is absent. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the running of organizations. Here, purposive terms have proliferated — end, goal, object, intention, aim, policy, vision, strategy, direction, plan, mandate, objective, target, task. What each of these terms means is often made clear by the context. But why are there so many terms? If many are needed, what might each

mean? What *should* each mean? The meaning really does matter in those cases where the context is ambiguous or the responsibility onerous. In such situations, terms tend to be used in a defensive way that impedes achievement and distorts or diffuses responsibility.

This is the place to explain that the term purpose will be used to refer to a *statement which specifies a future state of affairs in order to help bring it about*. An explicit purpose should be distinguished from a person's inner experiences. A person's *stated* purpose may or may not be supported by an *inner* experience, like desire or interest. These inner states are best regarded as forms of motivation. So motivation is an inner experiential drive. It is conceptually distinct from purpose which is about an end state in the outer world.

In practice, however, motivation and purpose are invariably linked. Motivations are activated, developed and harnessed through some conception of an end state. Without a clear purpose, personal energies lie dormant or operate chaotically. Without motivation, purposes are empty words.

The relation between a person's own purposes and those of any organization or society with which he is involved has preoccupied sociologists, social planners, economists, policy analysts, political thinkers, and organization theorists.

The inter-dependency of purposes, people, organizations and society is marked. People have purposes and motivations, whereas organizations have purposes and people. Societies have purposes, people and organizations. Societies need organizations to achieve things, and organizations need people to set and pursue their purposes. To exist, people need a society. People in complex societies need organizations as vehicles to channel their energies and to pursue particular purposes of their own.

Within organizations, the key to sensible managing, planning and evaluation is explicit articulation of purposes — so practical people like management consultants, systems analysts and programme evaluators say. In designing institutional and organizational arrangements to channel and constrain activity, purposes are

again held to be primary. Organizational structure should, it is characteristically argued, follow from a clear statement of purposes to be fulfilled.[1]

It is a paradoxical situation: the idea of purpose is self-evident to all and the importance of specifying purposes is preached on every side — and yet turning this to practical benefit has been elusive.

Research and everyday observation show that people act unthinkingly, professionals make decisions which contradict their stated values, managers allocate resources in ways which do not accord with agreed priorities, politicians sanction activities which inhibit their strategies, organizations pursue strategies which do not recognise realities, and boards become embroiled in paralysing controversies and disputes. Periodically this perpetual shambles becomes public: either through major scandals like the savings and loan debacle in the US, or the Concorde overspend in the UK; or following the collapse of companies or whole industries previously thought successful, like the motor cycle industry in the UK or consumer electronics in the US. Achievement in many companies occurs despite chaos.

Confusion is capitalised on by gurus of pragmatic management who advocate thriving on chaos[2] — and causing it too. 'Don't plan, do!' the man-of-action exhorts. But this option does not exist for shareholders, or for non-executive members of governing boards, or for consumers, or for governments, all of whom try to point organizations in certain directions. Determining overall values and purposes within which executives must operate cannot be avoided in any enterprise. Setting purposes well is paramount in an organization which desires to succeed outstandingly or in a society which aspires to social progress — or indeed for any person who wishes to have a measure of control over his or her life.

Just because inner functioning and outer reality are complex and sometimes chaotic, the individual's response needs to be reflective and ordered. If it is not, cooperation with other individuals is difficult or impossible. Whenever cooperation is desired, purposes play a crucial part and serve as a useful tool.

Finding a Way Through

The first task must be to sharpen up the general definition of purpose to help ensure that specifications of purposes are adequate and that responsibility for them is assigned appropriately. But, at this first hurdle, the academic literature stumbles. Such definitions as exist are too limited, and issues of responsibility are usually ignored.

Tautologies are sometimes proffered: "An objective may be defined as any aim or goal".[3] Good, but what is an aim or goal? The most sophisticated philosophical approach suggests three types or levels of purpose: goals which are actions, goals which direct action, and goals which enable self-determination.[4] The more popular social science approach calls for a two-level classification into either goals vs objectives, or objectives vs goals, or purposes vs goals, or purposes vs objectives.[5] One of the two is then said to be: general, abstract, non-achievable, vague, enduring, widely applicable, high level, ambiguous, and non-quantified. This description is used to distinguish it from the other opposite type of purpose which is said to be: specific, low level, part of given situations or activities, quantifiable, the results of action, concrete and time-limited. Purposes of the former type are assumed to set the context for purposes of the latter type.

The idea that there are two (or at most three) levels of purpose as described above is a simple and immediately appealing one. Unfortunately, it does not fit reality very well. For example, the upper level goal which set the overall context of the American space effort in the 1960's was anything but abstract or vague. What could be more specific and time-limited than 'to put a man on the moon and return him safely by the end of the decade'? Another problem found in practice is that each level mixes together obviously distinct sub-types of purpose. Turning to the American space effort again, one can identify other overall or contextual goals such as 'to boost national pride'.

Lower level tangible objectives are also not homogeneous. A variety of specific answers of increasing generality can always be given when the purpose of any activity is examined. A builder, say, is simultaneously aiming to lay a number of bricks that afternoon, and aiming to build a wall that week, and aiming to complete a house extension over the coming months. Another distinction within the lower level is between goals as a set of specific targets and an equally specific goal defined by ordering or prioritising these targets.

The aim of my investigations in the early 1980s (as described in Ch. 2) was to find a way out of this confusion by providing useful and precise definitions of the basic notions of purpose required for organized activity of any sort. I wanted to clarify these definitions by relating them to each other and to aspects of organizational structure and management practice. The set of levels of purpose which emerged had, to my surprise, explanatory power far beyond these confines.

The levels of purpose form the framework which organizes the whole argument of the book. There are five levels concerned directly with deliberate action,

and these will be described in this chapter. As my attention turned to handling purposes within society, it became evident that two further levels of value-based purpose were needed to complete the framework. They are described in Chapter 4 in detail.

After introducing and over-viewing the lower five levels of purpose, each level is described in detail with examples. The chapter closes with more examples of how purposes are mishandled in organizations.

INTRODUCING PURPOSES

The basic proposition is that organized social activity requires the articulation of exactly five discrete and specific notions of purpose, and that these types of purpose are hierarchically related. In other words, each type of purpose implies and depends on the types at higher and lower levels in the system. This contextual arrangement is both conceptual and practical. In organizations, for example, it aligns with distinctive social structures which carry responsibility for setting the different types of purpose — and the relationship between these bodies is also hierarchical (see Table 3.7).

The *function* of the hierarchy is the articulation and promotion of social values and their progressive translation into actions in the world. Presumably the hierarchy of purpose evolved to reflect in some fundamental way the relationship between man's inner world of aspirations and preferences and his outer world of action upon people and things. The hierarchical theory emphasises discontinuity in the varieties of purpose. It shows how in society and in large organizations the balance of concern between what is desirable and what is feasible necessarily changes as one moves from aspiration towards implementation.

Something must be said at this stage about values and about action. For the moment, a value can be taken to refer to a sense of importance which can be articulated. So a value acts as a basic criterion for choice as to what is desirable or worthy. Values are produced by the act of valuing something: a person or object (e.g. a mother, a car), an idea (e.g. risk, clarity), or an event or activity (e.g. celebrating, smoking). Once created, values are the prime motivating forces within individuals and societies. It might be argued that values, strictly speaking, are not themselves purposes. But values can be articulated in purposive terms and values certainly originate purposes. So the study of purposes leads one inexorably to values and, as we shall see, the study of values leads one equally inexorably to ethics.

Action may be defined as any directed alteration of the social or physical world which involves the exercise of power and judgement as to feasibility. Actions, though not themselves purposes, are the embodiment of purpose, and the final common pathway for the realization of values. The key element of action is the decision point when commitment is made. Whether or not the process is explicit, purpose is expressed in the act of deciding. Values are realized through decisions, and so decision may be defined as the application of value to action. Any framework for purpose is therefore a schema for decision-making. Ethics must ultimately involve decision or action if it is to have any concrete reality, so ethics must be rooted in purpose; and the framework of purpose, if valid, ought to provide an insight into ethical choice somehow.

Types of Purpose. The names of the five action-related levels of purpose in logically descending order are: *social value* (L-5), *principal object* (L-4), *internal priority* (L-3), *strategic objective* (L-2), and *tactical objective* (L-1). Social values give the most open and abstract direction for action while tactical objectives refer most specifically to tangible actions. Although there are numerous synonyms for purpose, some of which seem to be level-specific, I will be using my terms throughout unless the meaning is self evident (see Table 3.1). General labels like goal, purpose, end and objective will be used when the issue of level is not relevant or when the type of purpose is clear from the context.

It will become rapidly evident that social values, principal objects and internal priorities are described equally accurately as statements of value or as statements of purpose. So the framework demands consideration of values, and places value choice as the driving and steering force in any activity.

Distinctions between the various levels (types) of purpose have important ramifications in the personal, organizational and social sphere. Developing, using and evaluating purposes at each level is characteristically different. Each type has distinctive psychological correlates and generates characteristic forms of responsibility. Finally, each relates differentially to the tangible world of action, time and resources.

In introducing the ideas, the focus will be mainly on activities and organizations — rather than on personal life, public institutions, social judgements, or societal development — because the need for clarity about purpose is most easily understood in that context. (In Ch.s 4 and 5, a wider perspective is taken; and much more will be said about using purposes and values in Ch.s 10, 12 and 13.)

Translating Values into Action

The framework will be introduced by running through the five levels to demonstrate the fundamental

Table 3.1: Common synonyms for purpose. The synonyms below are some of those used by managers and found in the literature. The general terms are regularly used at all levels. The items in italics are given specific definitions elsewhere in the framework.

General terms	Purpose, objective, goal, aim, end, *policy*.
L-5: Social value	Value, social goal, basic value, banner goal, core value, *ideal, need*.
L-4: Principal object	Overall aim, primary task, function, service, brief, terms of reference, mandate, *mission*.
L-3: Internal priority	Criteria, important objective, political aim, emphasis, focus, reason.
L-2: Strategic objective	Option, outcome, achievement, deliverable, choice, *plan, direction, vision*.
L-1: Tactical objective	Activity, task objective, operational objective, immediate result, tactic.

proposition that the hierarchy is about the orderly translation of values into action. The main properties of the levels in relation to action and organization are summarized in Master-Table 1. See Table 3.1 for common synonyms. See Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for illustrative examples.

L-5: Social values are freely shared purposes which specify needs within a particular community. These values leave open the possibilities for action to meet the needs. Social values express an actual or potential value consensus of the particular community within which any activity or organization is to be found. Responsibility for developing social values belongs to this context, usually called: wider society. Social values can be stated in a form like: "We all need and want ..X..". X might be 'to improve communication between people' or 'adequate housing' or 'treatment for illness' or 'reliability'. Such values are not specific to any particular project, cannot be used to distinguish an organization, and do not indicate what action is required. Nevertheless enterprises would not be allowed to exist within a community, and activities would not be socially supported, if they did not in some way meet social needs. Social values imply action, but are too general to guide practical engagement with reality. Purposes must be set which delimit the possibilities for action.

L-4: Principal objects are purposes which are activities defining the identity of an endeavour. The purpose indicates what is to be achieved overall and implies a range of related activities valued because of their contribution to the endeavour. So principal objects define a value consensus within any organization or project. Responsibility for setting principal objects belongs to the person, group of people or social body which owns the endeavour or constitutes the enterprise. The typical format here is: "This entity is set up to....X...". In relation to the social value of improving communication, X might be (say) running a drama

workshop, providing speech therapy, or publishing a newspaper. Once principal objects are determined, it is rapidly discovered that there are not enough resources — money, attention, skill, time, people — to do all that is implied by it. Difficult choices must be made, but this requires purposes to be set at a lower level where the principal objects can be taken for granted.

Consensus and Conflict. Before describing the remaining types of purposes, it is worth noting that social values and principal objects form the levels of consensus, beyond and within an organization (or organized activity) respectively. So they need to be relatively stable over time. Changes here disrupt people and interfere severely with achievement. By contrast, the remaining lower levels contain purposes which must be easily modified, even replaced, as circumstances and values alter and as progress occurs.

Wherever there is change there will be choice, and where there is choice there is a potential conflict and tension which must be resolved. The conflict around internal priorities (L-3) centres on which of different valid values should be most emphasized. Around strategic objectives (L-2), conflict centres on what actions best meet those given values. Around tactical objectives (L-1), conflict centres on which actions should be chosen out of many possibilities. Priorities steer and control changes in outcomes and actions, while strategic and tactical objectives provide for implementation of the changes.

L-3: Internal priorities are purposes which specify degrees of emphasis amongst valid values or actions for immediate use. They clarify relative preferences within activities expected or permitted by the principal objects, or among relevant social values. In doing so, priorities resolve conflicting views and steer or govern choices and outcomes within a particular endeavour. Bodies responsible for weighing up the application of values in making a choice, judgement or

assessment are known as boards. In formally constituted organizations, boards may be known as governing bodies, committees, councils, or authorities. The typical format here is: "X is more important than Y, Z,... now". X, Y, Z,... may be social values (e.g. 'in our publishing business, entertainment is more important than education') or options for action (e.g. 'a marketing drive is more important than designing another service'). Priorities are inherently quantitative because they imply a degree of emphasis. For this reason, they can and should be linked to resource allocation, a feature that sharpens their controversial aspect. Internal priorities orient action within the principal objects, but in themselves identify no outcome. For this, purposes are needed at a yet lower level closer to tangible realities.

L-2: Strategic objectives are purposes which specify a desired feasible outcome which maximizes impact. They specify a worthwhile direction for progressing the main activities defined by the principal objects. The objective must resolve conflicts between given value assertions and the demands of action in the situation. A strategy is formed by elaborating strategic sub-objectives. Setting strategic objectives and associated strategies is the responsibility of top officers. The typical format here is: "The situation (or need or problem or opportunity) as we see it is ..A.., and over the coming time period (t), we need to ..X; and this means doing ..Y, Z,.." Realisation of any strategy (X via Y, Z,..) involves a fine adaptation to the minutiae of circumstances as they evolve. Such adaptations are pure means and their purposes are to be found at the lowest and most tangible level of the hierarchy.

L-1: Tactical objectives are purposes which specify precisely, often quantitatively, a tangible result to be produced to a time deadline as a step to a desired outcome. Tactical objectives must resolve conflicts between alternative courses of action, each of which might well eventually produce the desired outcome. Executants (employed staff in firms) are responsible for

setting these purposes. The standard format is: "X is to be done by T, so as to achieve Y", where X is the concrete result, Y is a strategic objective or part of the strategy, and T is a time which is days, weeks, months or years ahead. Tactical objectives specify definite, concrete and unambiguous tasks or targets, and are the immediate generators of any action. Specification of a series of linked tactical objectives and sub-objectives ensures progress of a strategy.

There seems to be no logical room for a further and still lower level of purpose. Action itself may be analysed further into its component elements, and eventually described as the result of moving particular limbs and neurophysiological processes. However, the notion of purpose in any meaningful psychosocial sense is lost.

About the Hierarchy. The hierarchy as outlined provides a coherent and consistent language for the clarification of objectives. The synonyms in Table 3.1 have been culled from fieldwork and the literature, and are not defended. Some are more appropriate than others. In some cases, the synonymous terms will be used and defined elsewhere in the framework with a related but distinctive meaning. Table 3.2 shows how a similar purpose is subtly but unmistakably altered as it is used within different levels.

The hierarchy applies to personal action and to action by part of an organization, as well as to organizations as a whole, and to governments. Table 3.3 illustrates its use with two hypothetical examples: providing refuse collection services in the UK and choosing a family holiday.

Before moving on, two caveats are called for — and these apply to hierarchical structures throughout the book. First, although exposition of the hierarchy necessarily proceeds systematically, it is not imagined that the real world ever does or always should operate in such an orderly fashion. Second, although the numbers attached to the levels have significance, this does not

Table 3.2: Effect of context. It makes no sense to ask: what sort of purpose (or value) is 'efficiency' or 'caring for children'. The frame of reference and the function being served need to be known to determine the level of purpose. The frame and function are usually evident in the wording of the purpose. The Table illustrates how the search for efficiency leads to slightly different statements at each level.

L-5: Social value	Our society needs efficiency in its enterprises.
L-4: Principal object	A working party is being set up to improve efficiency.
L-3: Internal priority	Efficiency is not as important as safety in our current programme.
L-2: Strategic objective	The outcome of this initiative must be an efficiency gain of 10%.
L-1: Tactical objective	A 10% efficiency gain by March will release space for phase 4 of the plan.

Table 3.3: The progressive specification of purp· ses. In most cases, there are many relevant purposes in each level. Often purposes at the various levels are develc ed around a unitary principal object or a single social value as shown below. In family life, it would be unusual fc ill these steps to be orderly formulated. However the control of any large scale enterprise generally improves if a systematic and explicit approach is adopted.

Type of Purpose	Public Service Example	Family Life Example
L-5: Social value	We all need and want a clean and hygienic environment.	We all need and want relaxation and variety.
L-4: Principal object	Local Government will ensure that domestic refuse is collected.	We will take a holiday this year
L-3: Internal priority	Refuse collection will be contracted out to private firms despite the views of Council staff.	We will go to the beach as the children prefer — not go skiing as father prefers, or visit ruins as mother prefers.
L-2: Strategic objective	Over 2-3 years we will contract out services ensuring no redundancies and providing retraining for those wanting it.	We will go to the Mediterranean in May for 2 weeks, staying on an island with ruins, and spending up to £2000.
L-1: Tactical objective	Tender documents will be obtained for Phase 1 by March 31st.	The flight will be booked with a travel agent by the end of January.

mean that any level is intrinsically better or more valuable than any other level. All levels correspond with necessary things in the social world, so each is important. In this type of hierarchy, each level is implied by and implies the other levels. So considering a purpose at just one level in everyday life does not deny the existence of the others. Purposes at the other levels are hidden (or enfolded) within the identified purpose. If the need arose, those purposes could be easily elicited (cf. Tables 3.2 and 3.3).

Properties. We can now move on to discuss the qualities of purposes at each level in more detail. A similar schema will be followed for each, starting with social values. First, the essential *nature* of the level will be established by elaborating the definition together with common synonyms for the level and some illustrative examples. Some of the *uses* or functions of the type of purpose will then be noted. An extended example is included to illustrate the severe dysfunction that results from the complete *omission* of a type of purpose. The way *motivation* manifests at each level is also briefly explained.

The *responsibility* for setting each type of purpose within organizations is noted here, but only in passing. (A fuller account of what this responsibility should mean in enterprises is provided in Ch. 12 (G-5); and an account of what this responsibility should mean for each person is provided in Ch. 10 (G-1).) The approach to

evaluation of each type of purpose will also be summarised. Evaluation in this context is necessarily prospective. It judges the appropriateness or desirability of the purpose. (Retrospective assessment of effectiveness and efficiency usually takes the appropriateness and quality of purposes for granted.) Finally, criticism of each form of purpose based in its *limitation* in producing tangible achievement leads on to the next lower level. (In Ch. 4, the hierarchy is presented from tactical objectives upwards, and the limitation is then noticed in terms of the incorporation of value.)

L-5: SOCIAL VALUES

Nature. Social values express needs to be met within a specific community. The fulfilment of these needs crosses many discrete areas of activity. So social values can be applied very widely. For example, the same social value may be equally held by people, organisations and state institutions. Examples include such grand abstractions as 'to allow diversity of choice' and 'to develop human potential' — these are sometimes called fundamental values. Other social values seem more specific e.g. 'to care for the sick' and 'to maintain the safety of the streets' — these tend to be called basic values or simply values. Because such purposes express a consensus which binds a social group, they have been called core values and focal values. Because they are essential, they are often thought of as social needs.

Organizations sometimes refer to their social values as their fundamental objectives. For example, a university might claim to exist in order 'to create a more informed society'. Organizations must choose such purposes because they humanly justify and socially legitimate their existence. However, organizations cannot own this sort of purpose. A precisely identical social value may be pursued and valued by many varied organizations. In the university's case, an advertising agency and a computer firm might claim exactly the same fundamental objective. In other words, no activity, project, institution or organization can be distinguished adequately simply by a social value.

Social values can never be achieved as such, but are rather to be felt and expressed at all stages of the process of achievement. For this reason, firms have taken to referring to social values as their philosophy — which they distinguish sharply from their principal objects or corporate priorities or strategies.

> Elswick Business Philosophy: In essence, the philosophy of Elswick involves (1) putting the customer in the forefront of their thinking, (2) providing high quality products at reasonable prices, (3) being ethical, (4) treating staff well, (5) maintaining an open inquiring attitude, (6) developing the organization by helping staff develop, (7) being aware of the social environment, and (8) doing better than others. Note that from this philosophy it is impossible to recognize what business Elswick is in. Elswick recognized the banner quality of these values by describing each purpose in simple memorable phrases. (1) was 'The customer provides our livelihood.' and (5) was 'There is no substitute for the facts'. Although widely held, these social values are not universally appreciated. Many people, for example, do not place great value on factual inquiry. The goals also bear a temporal stamp: several would have been irrelevant fifty years ago, and more modern social values like concern for the physical environment are not mentioned.   Ex. 3.1⁶

Social values are always freely sharable and, usually, but not necessarily, widely shared. The active sharing of social values generates a sense of community. Communities are modified by those people, usually few at first, who recognize new needs. The wider the social value is shared, the more socially pervasive it becomes, and the greater its influence over activities and organizations. The more valued and accepted an organization wishes to be, the more it must tune its social values to those characteristic of society as a whole.

Uses. Social values determine the shape of what is personally and socially possible. They exist as a potential and can never be fully grasped, possessed or realized. Social values may seem to be very distant from implementation. However such purposes are the most tangible justification for activities and one of the

great integrating forces in society. Reluctance to specify social values and to pursue action in their terms tends to fragment, de-emotionalise, and depersonalise achievement.

All human perception and action is impregnated with and modified by social values. They infuse lower levels, and make work intrinsically meaningful and socially justifiable. Social values generate much of the goodwill and cooperation required by any social endeavour or institution. The very survival and growth of organizations is underpinned by them. As well as providing a value context for an organization's principal objects, social values ease links between organizations and provide a common basis for negotiation and cooperation.

People use social values to harmonise their work-life with their social life and private life. For example, a person who values art might seek work as an art auctioneer or as a teacher of art history. In her spare time, she might visit art exhibitions, read books on the subject, or paint.

Established social values support decisions at lower levels without argument. For example, efficiency and economy are social values which may be directly applied in businesses to justify decisions in a myriad of situations.

Social values are inherently motivating and vitalising, and so they serve as a rallying cry for joint effort and spark developments and innovations. They are to be found supporting missions and approaches, powering ideals, crusades and campaigns. They are also used to create a vision, define a culture and drive growth.

A deliberate focus on social values is usually needed if a major re-orienting of community effort is desired. For example, doing something about pollution of the environment by industry requires no less than a sea-change in attitudes. Concerted and effective action will only emerge when protection and preservation of the environment becomes established as a need for each and all in a community. Formal and informal social pressure will then force commercial firms and public agencies to take the value seriously.

Omission. If social values are not alive and widely subscribed to, morale withers and apathy and futility develop. All practical efforts become undermined, and cynicism develops.

> Neglect of Patients: After an incident of maltreatment in a mental hospital had been reported in the press, I was invited in to devise a better management structure. However, it soon became clear that the publicized abuse was part of a much wider neglect. The facilities were poorly decorated and overcrowded. Medical staff were few and rarely in evidence. Occupational therapists and other professionals had not been recruited even though

money had been allocated. A variety of corrupt practices such as dishonest signing on and theft were known to occur and were tolerated. Clearly, a better management structure was not the immediate need, because a good nurse manager would avoid the place. The major problem seemed to be a general sense that no-one cared about the staff or the patients, and that this was going to continue. An explicit and public statement by the Authority and its top officers with high media coverage saying that 'we really care about the mentally ill' was required. This would, of course, need to be backed up by further action. In the event negative public attitudes meant that the social value was neither affirmed nor pursued for some years.

Ex. 3.2

Motivation. Inner (psychological) need is the motivational correlate of social value.[7] For example, the inner need for safety drives pursuit of social values like 'safe streets', 'safe houses', 'safe cars', and 'safe working environments'. Not surprisingly, need or social need is frequently used as a synonym for social value. Inner need like social need is interpersonal in character, and people experience their inner needs as common to all.

Needs, like those listed above, are all goods. Experience of an inner need, like recognition of a good, is associated with the sense that failure to meet that inner need, or supply that good, will lead to harm. So inner needs — for food, for education, for health, for possession, for housing, for nurture, for kindness, for work, for mutuality — serve as the essential personal basis for participation in any community, activity or organisation. The freedom to pursue what is self-evidently good for each and all is equivalent to the freedom to realize social values. So inner need governs the open-ended development of identity.

Needs like social values do not lead to a practical and direct engagement with reality. They have an experiential quality and are recognized by intuition. One reason why so many business philosophies are so trite is that they have been produced by imitation rather than by reflection. A sustained intuitive exploration is required to recognize the deep relation of social values to the needs of any firm and its successful operation.

It is possible to refuse to recognize and respond to an inner need. But inner needs, again like social values, are essential to engage experientially and emotionally with reality. So people (or firms) that ignore inner needs and fail to recognize necessary social values become cut off from their inner self and cannot fully integrate into an activity or community. At the extreme, their survival is put at risk. The discovery of inner needs and corresponding social values occurs in an evolutionary process which is recognized as self-development and social progress.

Responsibility. Unlike lower level purposes, social values are realized through participation in action as much as in any eventual outcome. So each individual is responsible for recognizing and pursuing social values at all times. The pattern of human goals chosen ultimately determines the type and quality of any person or organization or society, rather than what it will actually do. It affects the degree of commitment to action, but does not indicate what the practical consequences will actually be.

Social values are typically specified in the founding documents of enterprises as part of the rationale for their creation. They appear in mission statements, significant speeches, press releases and other morale-boosting exercises within the organization and without. Sometimes they are called banner goals as a reminder that these purposes may be written on banners, placards, or posters and held aloft to epitomize the desires of popular movements and social crusades. People can endorse such goals without having to sign up to anything.

Social values, in all the various examples, are set neither by those who use or benefit from them nor by those who propose them. Nor are they formally set by any social body. Instead, they emerge within society over time and become eventually taken for granted as they are accepted and endorsed by people, groups and institutions. In other words, responsibility for social values is diffused in any society. A new social value only comes to be understood and pursued after it has been urged and affirmed by many sources in a wide variety of settings.

Evaluation. Social values, once accepted, are held to be self-evidently valuable to those involved. They are simply good. Disagreement with them seems deeply mistaken, unreasonable or even perverse. Paradoxically, all social values are equally good, and each appears to be most important from its own perspective. To compare the goal of health and the goal of learning is pointless because both need to be pursued. Health will not be realized if we lack knowledge, and knowledge will not be developed and used if we are ill.

For any organization, the first evaluative question is whether an explicit set of relevant social values has been defined, and the second is how well these fit into the context of wider society. The relevant wider society with which accommodation must be reached is somewhat different for each individual. So social values proclaimed by different social groups or organizations do vary. However, as long as an action orientation is maintained, any social value that might be socially useful may be proclaimed without any sense of contradiction. Thus

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a firm may, without cynicism, proclaim that its goal is both 'to increase efficiency' and 'to provide employment', irrespective of whether it cuts jobs to reduce costs, or allows over-manning to avoid strikes.

Limitation. Although social values generate and imbue all activity, they do not determine action and they are not distinctively recognisable in action. In fact, it is impossible to get anywhere with social values alone because they leave all options for action open. They can seem vacuous and platitudinous truisms — nothing more than hot air. Such criticisms can be overcome by pursuing a more limited but practical engagement with reality. This requirement is met by determining and organizing a bounded activity. This means moving down the hierarchy to articulate a different sort of purpose.

L-4: PRINCIPAL OBJECTS

Nature. Principal objects refer to purposes which are the identity-defining of an endeavour. They specify, demarcate and give value to a range of specific activities. As a result, principal objects enable the social identification of enterprises and organizations, and provide them with a degree of autonomy and individuality. If a whole organization is being defined, the principal objects tend to be referred to as general aims or overall goals. Where the activity is within an organization, the principal objects tend to be called the function, service or role. The principal objects of a working group or project or post are often labelled as the brief, mandate, terms of reference or primary task.

Principal objects define the boundary of an enterprise or activity, and hence clarify its distinctiveness from the social or organizational environment. They explicitly define or directly imply the what, how and who of pursuing social values. So principal objects which set up new organizations are of public significance.

In all cases, the principal objects consist of a set of stable objectives which define, categorize or type an on-going desired activity. They clarify the rationale underpinning everything which goes on within the organization, department, working group, or project. Activity which is outside the limits set by principal objects is described as *ultra vires* and, however well motivated, is prohibited.

Because principal objects define a type of activity, any task can be usefully conceptualized as having a principal object. If the task is complex, it calls for internal prioritization, and requires strategies and tactical objectives for its fulfilment.

Uses. The statement of principal objects, i.e. 'the business we are in', is the *raison d'être* of a particular organization. It serves as the terms of reference for more specific lower level purposes, and provides the foremost justification for these within the organization. Implications for action that emerge from the principal objects typically define the organization in a fundamental way. For example, the principal objects might specify (or clearly imply) the desired degree of impact on society, general personnel requirements, some technical approach to be used, or a type of programme to be pursued. The principal objects also provide some broad indication of the resources required for achievement. The 'man on the moon' endeavour mentioned earlier is an example where such specifications were evident.

A principal object is the first practical and organized step towards realisation of a social value. So it must be sufficiently valued within the wider social context. Only if this is so will people's support and commitment be captured, and some of the financial resources of the community be obtained. By bringing related social values and principal objects together, a powerfully motivating mission can be defined.

Pursuit of the principal objects needs to be built upon a distinctive competence. So their determination and assertion form one of the bases for leadership. Principal objects need to be specified to identify roles, to organize operations, to steer developments, to focus crusades, to guide campaigns, and to launch initiatives. Without them, people find progress impossible.

Unambiguous principal objects are needed to professionalise an occupation and develop a discipline. For example, public health and occupational therapy are two disciplines which have been often passed over in the NHS, partly due to confusion about their precise contribution.

Occupational Therapy: Occupational therapists in the NHS have complained about shortages of skilled staff, diffuse boundaries with other professions, lack of professional leadership, and management from without the profession. In consultancy with some of its leaders, we asked for a statement of what distinguished occupational therapy work i.e. what are its principal objects? Several unsatisfactory answers were proposed including: maximising a patient's independence — but this is a social value shared widely within and without the health service; sensitivity to the patient as a whole — but such holistic care is a value system, again shared by others in a variety of professions; assessing patients' needs or rehabilitating patients — but these are ways of working shared by many professions. Eventually we clarified that occupational therapists have distinctive knowledge about what activities will help a patient overcome their particular mental and/or physical disability in their environment. Their distinctive practice is to organise a multiplicity of

social and work-related activities for people with disabilities to ameliorate these or prevent deterioration. If occupational therapists themselves do not know and value their own distinguishing purposes and competencies, others are unlikely to.   Ex. 3.3

Omission. If projects lack clear principal objects, or if such statements as do exist are out of date, then they achieve little and slowly wither. Departments or other subdivisions of an organization, whose survival is assured despite lack of clarity about their functions, become a debilitating drain on the whole. When an entire organization lacks principal objects, it has increasing difficulty in developing any distinctive competence. It then meanders vaguely in the social stream, inappropriately following different paths of development until it loses its way and is taken over or crowded out by more determined competitors. In a grant-aided institution, the consequence may be progressive fragmentation, inability to recruit staff and loss of morale.

The Confused Research Institute: An Inter-disciplinary Research Institute in a University was set up and led by a powerful Director for many years. He not only brought in most of the finance but impressed on the Institute his own distinctive conception of what it was there for. Members of the Institute largely accepted his interests and methods or left. When the Director retired, the University, which had no defined commitment to the Institute as a separate structure, designated an acting Director. The various small groups of researchers felt leaderless, but they resisted pressures to close down the Institute. Although the desire to work within an interdisciplinary structure remained, the researchers now lacked a unified sense of exactly what the Institute should be doing — what was within its remit and what without — and no higher body felt able or willing to take on this responsibility. As a result, lines of research began to diverge, and a variety of new links with outside agencies were set up. The subgroups worked hard to devise their own principal objects which broadly harmonized, but did not generate synergy. However, no-one could draw on the total strength of the Institute. The sense of a collective purpose weakened and negotiations with the environment became largely reactive. Inevitably the University decided to close down the Institute as a distinct entity despite objections from the members and their continuing receipt of funds. Members, with their funds, were expected to move to other departments or to leave the University.   Ex. 3.4

Motivation. Participants in any endeavour must commit time and energy, and a principal object is an important instigator of their motivation. Many activities may be conceived to meet a particular social value, but the ones eventually pursued by a person are those which accord with their own interests. Interest is therefore the type of motivation that corresponds to principal objects. Participation needs to be voluntary if interest is to energize someone effectively. In short,

personal interest in the principal objects ensures voluntary participation above and beyond any contractual obligation.

To pursue principal objects, you need to make a positive commitment to all activities implied by them. From a personal perspective, many necessary activities are not particularly desired or enjoyed. Just think of the bureaucratic or menial demands in your own work. But interest in the principal objects and commitment to them carries us through the boredom or active dislike of such drudgery. In the same way, an organization's objects help different departments cooperate. For example advertising and editorial staff must recognize each other's contribution to the final production of a magazine, however irritated they may get with each other's proposals in the process.

Interest is a personal and private form of motivation. So commonality cannot be as readily assumed as in the case of needs. Interests are rooted in ideas. A genuine commonality of interests allows people to associate, share ideas, and then define and pursue a principal object jointly. Each person feels sustained by the idea of the object.

Responsibility. Because principal objects give an identity to organizations, they may be, and often must be, embodied in publicly available documents — legislation, a constitution or charter, memorandum of association or similar. The documents are requisitely agreed and sanctioned where possible by a constituting body defined by the principal objects. For a firm, responsibility officially lies with the company shareholders. For voluntary bodies, it lies with the formally or informally constituted association of members. For public agencies, the legislature is responsible on behalf of the public. Shareholders, members and legislatures feel under different obligations and so it follows that the detailed objects of a school, say, will vary according to its type of constituting body.

When the only way to incorporate was to obtain a Royal Charter, organizations were able to undertake any activity at all. This absence of principal objects prejudiced the interests of members and creditors, and subsequently laws were passed which prohibited incorporated organizations from operating without specifying their activities. To enable specifications to last, constituting objects are deliberately drawn broadly. If they are too broad, however, their remit becomes diffused.

The NHS: The 1946 NHS Act stated that the aim of the NHS was to promote 'the establishment of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people.....and the pre-

vention, diagnosis and treatment of illness'. This was enough to set the NHS up but not enough to clarify important aspects of its ongoing operation. From its sense of the essence of the NHS, the Royal Commission investigating the NHS in the late 1970s offered more specific principal objects statements including: to provide a broad range of services to a high standard; to provide equality of access to these; services to be free at the time of use; and so on. Each of these subsidiary principal objects statements stands on its own as a defining characteristic of the NHS, indicating what staff in the NHS should expect to be doing and broadly what level of resource is required. A different set of purposes would have created a different organization. The Secretariat of the Royal Commission also identified a 'fundamental overall objective' for the NHS: 'to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of the individual and the enhancement of his capacity to use his abilities to the greatest possible extent'. This is recognizable as a social value, because it is equally applicable to education services, good neighbour groups, family life and much else besides the NHS.

Ex. 3.5[8]

Objects exist to be owned. If people do not own their endeavours, then they will not be properly committed. Each person can, in principle, accept the responsibility to set up something for himself and make it successful. In business this is to be a sole trader or entrepreneur. Within large organizations, it is desirable to stimulate in everyone some of the initiative and responsibility that each entrepreneur spontaneously accepts. One way this is fostered is through developing mission statements which everyone finds relevant and worthwhile.

Evaluation. Principal objects may be evaluated in terms of how realistic they are. There is a charitable association with an annual budget of £1,500 whose object is 'to relieve world poverty': hardly a likely outcome. The distinctive feature of a principal object is that it bounds activity. So evaluation focuses on the quality of that boundary. In the case of the above charity, most would say that the boundary is drawn too widely.

More commonly, the boundary is viewed as being too constraining. As a result, people moan about being shunted amongst numerous agencies, or between departments within a firm. Why, people complain, can't one agency or department deal with all of a person's needs? The answer is that it is impossible in the nature of things. People's needs form a unique interlinked whole, whereas enterprises set up to meet needs are discrete, partial and limited. Unbounded principal objects are phoney. One building society recently advertised itself with twelve photos of the same man. Under each photo was a different label: your estate agent, your mortgage arranger, your surveyor, your legal advisor, your financial advisor, your insurance

advisor, your pension advisor and so on. One can barely imagine how low the level of expertise and quality of advice must be in each specialist area.

Given well-defined realistic principal objects, it is possible to ask the next question: 'will people be interested enough in these aims to identify with them and commit their energies?' A principal object in which no one is interested is not viable. People evaluate principal objects in terms of their interests and also their social values. The principal objects provide for a consensus on value amongst committed individuals and, as long as they provide the resources, the enterprise will persist regardless of achievement. For example, there are long-standing non-violent anarchist political parties which regularly contest elections but whose membership has never been more than a few hundred. People may mock, but if the objects and consequent activities do not contravene social values and laws, what outsiders think is irrelevant.

Limitation. Establishing principal objects is important to frame action, but clearly not enough on its own to determine results. From the outset, it becomes clear that there are very many, indeed too many, possible and desirable ways to forward the principal objects. And there is never enough money, people or time to do everything. It becomes necessary, therefore, to apportion attention and other resources amongst equally valid possibilities for action.

L-3: INTERNAL PRIORITIES

Nature. Internal priorities are purposes which specify emphases among valid competing values or actions applicable to choice in a situation. These emphases are not theoretical or wishful, but apply to a particular endeavour and are for immediate use in an actual situation. Conflicts of view are always to be found about which of many valid actions or which of many relevant social values are most relevant, pertinent, useful or necessary. Priorities, sometimes called policies, are the primary orienting statements guiding operations and implementation. Some internal priorities may persist long-term, but others shift, sometimes very rapidly, in line with changing fashions or circumstances. Because such goals primarily indicate differences of value, they lend themselves to polarisation and easily generate heated controversy. For this reason, they have been called political aims.[9] Being no more than statements of preference, priorities can be sharply focused and expressed in simple language. Internal priorities resolve issues of conflicting value, but any resolution is liable to generate further political issues.

Political Issues in Local Government: Internal priorities in local government commonly deal with (a) matters of public concern, like environmental protection; (b) changes in custom and practice in the service organization, like better budgetary control; (c) matters of political ideology, like greater or lesser use of private sector firms; (d) changes in style of delivery of service, like decentralisation of welfare offices; (e) controversial issues which suddenly blow up and receive high media coverage, like re-zoning part of a park for commercial development.

Ex. 3.6

Internal priorities represent the most concrete form of value and so they link directly to resource allocation. Note that priorities may resemble social values in content, but differ in being internal to a defined endeavour or organization, in needing to be applied to an immediate particular situation, and in requiring quantification in resource terms.

Priorities may be set either systematically or in response to a pressing demand. On a systematic basis, allocation of any total resource should accord with priorities (which must add up to 100% as in Table 3.4). Put another way, priorities reflect the distribution of intensity or amount of preference, and resource use is a precisely specifiable and concrete way in which value can be expressed and demonstrated. Resource is often viewed as synonymous with money, but things like goodwill, attention, space, and time are just as important, if not more so, in forwarding particular values. Even if prioritisation of such things has not occurred explicitly or systematically, it is possible to work backwards and deduce priorities from actual expenditure or actual use of time.[10]

Internal priorities are sited at a crucial nexus: the lowest level of purpose which expresses pure value and the highest level of purpose which produces change in ongoing operations. Agreement on principal objects may be assumed and built on to develop morale, but disagreement and contention are to be expected when considering internal priorities. Internal priorities therefore appear as focal points for debates and, in their nature, generate opposition. Alternative choices are routinely generated by the breadth of scope of the principal objects. They also emerge periodically during implementation. As action proceeds, situations develop where different people want a decision to go one way rather than another. Such choices (sometimes called issues or dilemmas) are primarily a matter of value and cannot be decided on the basis of evidence, information or professional expertise. Inevitably, someone or some group loses out to some degree.

Uses. All internal priorities take the form of concrete and immediately applicable preferences. In prac-

tice, they appear in many different guises depending on how they are used. They control directives, adapt roles, steer operations, determine the impact of initiatives and developments, focus campaigns, and bring the values of popular movements into businesses.

Internal priorities may allocate finance, may rather silently reaffirm a legitimate expectation, may introduce a risky innovation, may express a subtle judgement of what is best, or may contentiously signal a wholesale re-focusing of operations.

Priorities may be expressed as a systematically developed set covering all the different options for action e.g. a number of services affected by a budget cut may be prioritized and each service told to handle a proportion of the cut related to its priority. Sometimes the emphasis may be on what the resource is being allocated to, rather than on the amount of resource to be allocated. For example, a staff development programme might be highly controversial even if changes in resources allocated are trivial.

Priorities may also be expressed by determining different values to be promoted (rather than different activities or options). In this case, the focus is on identifying criteria or reasons to be applied when choosing. Criteria for new developments in a firm might include: enhancement of safety, cost, acceptability to staff, marketability, and known effectiveness. Eventually all criteria reduce to two superordinate criteria: feasibility and desirability. The act of selecting criteria is clearly controversial, and prioritization of the criteria even more so. For example, in the above list, directors might feel unwilling to give enhancement of safety a high priority if the company is facing a severe business downturn.

Internal priorities may be hidden in the need to come down firmly or one side or the other of a controversial issue. Should a disciplinary appeal be allowed or not? Should a firm encourage its managers to stay local or to move about? Should the City Council build its new offices on commercial or residential land? Should a University expect its academics to concentrate on under-graduate teaching or to take on a wider educational role in society? In all these cases, the rejected side, still requires some consideration and resource. So issues here are never as black-or-white as they are so often presented.

In publicly funded services, open debate to expose the values inherent in issues is accepted as important. By contrast, in firms, in professional or academic organizations, and in voluntary associations, power and politics are dirty words. The cultures in these bodies too often allow avoidance of matters which really need to be faced and gripped.

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Omission. If internal priorities are not set when they need to be, there are interminable overt or covert struggles to determine where effort and resources should go. In such circumstances any decision, resolutely pursued, may be better than none. Alternatively, the controversial choices are suppressed and a strategy is released as if it were self-evidently reasonable or determined by data or technology.

Research and Development: The Chief Executive of a large chemical firm brought in management consultants to help develop an R & D strategy. Chief scientists in each division were invited to discuss their desired developments with the management consultants. When the consultant's proposals were presented, there was an uproar. The consultants had conveniently ignored sensitive political issues. The general approach to research and the firm's strategic alliances with other international firms, notions which permeated the proposals, had not been discussed, clarified and resolved with the scientific chiefs. Also chiefs resented that the resource constraints were only made clear afterwards. As a result, some extensively discussed developments could not go ahead. Many research staff felt disappointed, even betrayed. Ex. 3.7

A common form of fudging is to use ranking rather than rating. For example, the statement that 'safety is our highest priority' may sound far better than it really is, as Table 3.4 illustrates. Each of the hypothetical raters in the Table shows an identical ranking, with safety as the highest priority, but only Rater #1 really means it. Rater #2, sees cost as being almost as important as client safety; and Rater #3 judges that staff acceptability as well as cost must be given a great deal of attention in any decision.

Motivation. Because all choices are equally valid in terms of the principal objects, internal priorities become a matter of brute assertion. Priorities do not exclude any relevant value, but they do seek to produce a hierarchy of pre-eminence amongst them. Given the validity of all relevant values (and the irrelevance of evidence or expertise), asserting a priority is a matter

of desire. Desire is the emotional form of motivation associated with political choice.

That political choices are emotionally driven and sometimes profoundly irrational is a commonplace. But, so long as desire is guided by higher level motivations like obligations, needs and interests, and carried through by lower level motivations like intention and awareness, harm is unlikely. Danger occurs when the hierarchy of inner motivation is not appreciated, or when principles of the hierarchy of purpose are flouted. Then people may let desire dominate and distort social life.

Responsibility. Political or priority decisions need to be handled authoritatively. Such responsibility is requisitely taken on by a relatively small body with power over executives who do what is required. This body is usually known as a board. Boards are used in a variety of situations where values must be weighed up, and where a single person's view is judged to be too liable to introduce a value bias e.g. in making disciplinary or other adjudications, or at formal reviews or examinations on which much depends. Boards in organizations are known as governing bodies, councils, committees, or authorities. Projects can get a similar input from an advisory or steering group. Setting up arrangements for governance is part of the constituting body's responsibilities. Boards operate with a voting system, implicit or explicit. Though political issues requisitely call for decision or approval by the board, their recognition and articulation is an appropriate task for the top executive.

The controversial aspects of political purposes usually result in the formation of temporary or long-lived factions or cliques who feel responsible for particular sides of the policy debate. Permanent factionalisation is the norm in governing bodies elected by the general public. Factionalism may be sterile or it may be constructive. A common tendency is to suppress dissenting viewpoints whenever possible so as to avoid the potential for acrimonious conflict and schism.

Table 3.4: Rating versus ranking. The Table provides a hypothetical illustration of the fact that similarly ranked criteria may have entirely different implications for action according to the quantified priority accorded to them.

Criteria used in Decision-making	Rank Order	Priority Rating #1	Priority Rating #2	Priority Rating #3
Safety	1	97%	45%	35%
Cost	2	2%	44%	33%
Acceptability to Staff	3	1%	1%	32%
Total Priority		100%	100%	100%

However, bringing debate into the open is almost always preferable to papering over deep divisions of opinion.

Should feelings run high enough, a faction may desire to forward its own values more systematically. This means departing and setting up a competing or specialised firm, agency or association with its own distinctive constitution setting out the new principal objects and relevant social values. Left-wing political parties, psychotherapy institutions, and churches seem particularly prone to such splits.

Clear recognition of the rights of boards to determine internal priorities is both sensible and feasible. Prolonged stalemates which benefit nobody might then be prevented.

> Stalemate: The Executive Director of a Housing Foundation, whose principal object was to provide housing for the unemployed, wanted to proceed by setting up co-operative work arrangements (his strategic objective). The trustees, however, believed that an individual's work plans should not be restricted (their internal priority). This issue of whether on-site cooperative ventures should or should not be made mandatory was essentially a matter of values—either approach could be successfully implemented and no information or evidence could decide the matter. The difference of opinion between Board and executive director was not resolved. A stalemate resulted because the director had a long-term contract, while the trustees refused to release funds to him. The Foundation was not able to accomplish very much at all. Ex. 3.8[11]

Boards, whether governing a business or a non-profit organization, are notorious for poor adherence to their required role.[12] In the absence of board leadership, the executive or professionals will take major decisions without concern for controversial and emotive issues likely to affect the longer term future of the enterprise. In a firm, this might manifest as a neglect of one or more important stakeholders, or as a lack of a unifying vision. In government, it leads to inefficient, ineffective, over-manned and apathetic bureaucracies. In health services, it has often resulted in an acceptance of professional ideologies to the detriment of the general population.[13]

Evaluation. Internal priorities balance the claims of competing valid values. Each value has its own supporters or constituency on which the activity or organization depends. So the choice of priorities must be broadly acceptable to the relevant constituencies. Stakeholders of a commercial firm, for example, include shareholders, consumers, suppliers, creditors, staff, and others. Each will evaluate priorities in terms of how they are affected and neglect the interests of the organization as a whole. By contrast, groups within the organization should be expected to evaluate choices in terms of the well-being of the organization as well as in terms of their own interests.

When evaluating the use of priorities, a useful comparison to make is between 'planned priorities' defined in anticipation and aimed to alter activities, and 'implied priorities' calculated after activities have been performed. Discrepancy is the norm as the inertia of habitual preferences and practices and situational characteristics like pressure of demand take their toll. For many years, so-called high priority services in the NHS — like those for the elderly and the mentally ill — got the smallest share of available funds and suffered the biggest cuts whenever savings were required.[14]

Limitation. Internal priorities do not require deep appreciation of real world complexities. Richard Nixon, when US President, epitomised the formulation of an internal priority when asked his position on a particular crisis of the Italian lira. His reported statement, 'I don't give an expletive deleted for the Italian lira', expressed unambiguously the degree of value he assigned to the crisis.

However, coming down on one side or another of an issue like Nixon did, or even allocating money, difficult though such things may be, in itself makes no impact and defines no outcome. The question still remains as to 'what *can* be done'.[15] Such a consideration means moving down to the upper of the two levels of implementation and bowing to expertise and experience in dealing with external realities.

L-2: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Nature. Strategic objectives are purposes which set a direction for the enterprise in the current situation, by promising the delivery of a particular outcome. They are about 'doing the right thing' within a broad time frame. This means ensuring maximum impact with the available resources. Specification of the objective must be more tangible than a type of activity or type of outcome. An objective like greater reliability is too vague and indistinguishable from a priority. At this level, a statement of what aspects of reliability need attention and clear indications of the nature and degree of improvement are required.

To achieve this, the current situation must be appraised and the essential nature of needs or problems and possible responses to them must be decided. Such an assessment should be carried out in the light of articulated internal priorities, the given principal objects and accepted social values. The objective is sometimes termed a policy, or an option for action, or 'what is to

be achieved', or (in business jargon) a deliverable. If the strategic objective is long-term and comprehensive it may be referred to (loosely) as a plan, forecast or vision because it pictures a future state of affairs. If it is a way out of a difficult or confused situation, it is often termed a strategy.

Strategic objectives, implicitly or explicitly, interpret the world inside and outside of the organization by asserting what is realistic. They tell those involved about 'the way things are', 'where we are going' and 'what result we are looking for'.

> Quality Improvements: Following their privatization, public sector organizations are expected to improve their quality of service. But quality is an extremely general term, as general as quantity. A vast number of things can and should be done. In trying to get progress, it is essential to specify which particular qualities are to be improved (i.e. what is meant by quality and what the present deficiencies are), and then to define specific improvements that are to be brought about. Some improvements, say in repair rates, could be expected within 12 to 18 months. Others, say in attitudes to customers, could not be expected in less than 18 to 24 months.   Ex. 3.9

In other words, before purposes can specify precise tasks to be performed in the light of all the practicalities, there is a need for a definite image of the eventual outcome. Associated with this, there is a need for some guidance as to the nature of the total situation, and the expected rate of progress. Endeavours may be short-term with an outcome measured in weeks or months. However, the time frame of significant strategies within large organizations is usually not less than one year, and many extend over a number of years. In governments or very large organizations, strategies with a time-scale of 20 years or more may be meaningful. Strategic objectives operate within a broadly conceived time-scale, their pursuit being identified and evaluated in terms of a general rate of progress — not by pre-specified deadlines or performance targets.

Uses. To this point, all purposes have been purely ends-based. The means have been another type of end one level lower. However, at this level (and the next) it becomes possible and necessary to speak of means without moving down a level.

Strategic objectives are used to realize developments and generate unambiguous achievement. They ensure that initiatives and developments are adapted to the realities; and are to be found guiding plans, focussing directives and driving operational programmes.

In many situations, it is not at all clear how a strategic objective is to be achieved. Such challenging objectives need to be elaborated using a variety of subordinate objectives which together constitute the

strategy (or sometimes the strategic plan). The strategy is a means of intervening powerfully in a complex situation. Strategic (sub-)objectives are a set of outcomes, not a series of actions. Their pursuit is justified by the promise that together they will bring about the realisation of the main strategic objective. Because the real world does not automatically bend itself to an individual's desires, the strategy may well involve deviations from existing ways of doing things. It is essential to recognize that a successful outcome is defined by the main strategic objective, not by achieving one or more sub-objectives within the strategy. Many elements of a strategy might well be achieved without producing the desired outcome. This is evident from a hypothetical example laid out in Table 3.5.

In large organizations, people have a great deal of autonomy. Without strategic objectives, they feel in the dark about how they should direct their initiative. If internal priorities are not transformed into strategic objectives, staff are likely either to ignore the internal priorities, to engage in mindless opportunism, or to use priorities for their own personal or factional advantage.

Strategic objectives share with internal priorities a concern to affect the organization as a whole without necessarily being comprehensive in scope. As indicated earlier, political choices on their own appear weak and unconvincing and typically call for the articulation of associated strategic objectives and strategies. Together the result is a policy.

> Changing Health Services Policies: Over the past forty years, the emphases in European health services have been (in chronological order): to provide access for patients to physicians, to build hospitals and develop hospital care, to provide services for neglected groups, to improve management, to control medical manpower, to contain costs, and to develop care in the community. These are all internal priorities and highly political. Although they were similar from country to country, the strategic objectives for pursuing these varied greatly. For example, the priority to develop hospitals and hospital care was pursued in the U.K. via national ownership; in France, by developing private for-profit hospitals; and in the Netherlands by developing non-profit voluntary hospitals.   Ex. 3.10[16]

Omission. Lack of strategic objectives and an associated strategy results in the organization making a weak disorganized impact. In the commercial world, rival firms penetrate the firm's markets. In public services, government priorities do not get implemented and finance allocated to particular areas of need are diverted.

Money is frequently allocated by Government agencies or charitable foundations on the assumption that it can be spent to produce desirable results simply and

Table 3.5: Distinguishing strategic objectives and strategies. Many local government authorities may conclude that 'we must improve our social services for the increasing numbers of elderly' — the internal priority. But each would probably require a different main strategic objective and a range of different strategic sub-objectives as illustrated here.

Main Strategic Objective	Detailed Strategy
Council #1: A wider range of domiciliary care services should be provided flexibly to assist those with multiple severe disabilities. To be introduced over 9-12 months.	We will do this by improving our liaison with health services, creating a new unqualified post of home carer, and by computerizing care plans for central monitoring.
Council #2: Day care services in the North sector are poor. Numbers of places must be increased by at least 20-30%, and more up-to-date methods of management introduced over 2-3 years.	We will do this by refurbishment, changing our policy for eligibility, introducing a more highly graded manager, and by offering specialized training for existing staff.
Council #3: Our housing provision is inadequate due to an influx of elderly newcomers. We will get 20 new units of sheltered housing over the next 5 years.	We will do this by involving local Housing Associations, obtaining a profile of future needs, releasing land for development, and contracting with voluntary bodies.

directly. This is probably the exception rather than the rule.

Inter-organizational initiatives, commercial or governmental, frequently come to grief because of the inability of the separate organizations to agree on a common strategy. Mergers of companies, for example, frequently fail to deliver the desired synergies. Each organization is happy to accept the funds or to carry out tasks — building new facilities, employing new staff, marketing a product — but each wishes to retain its own perceptions (assumptions, definitions) of the situation. Resolving such matters would generate conflict and potentially put the joint venture in jeopardy, but avoidance is liable to mean certain and total failure.

Greer and Rozas[17] have described in painful detail the failure of a U.S. Foundation's multi-million dollar attempt to assist integrated provision of services for the underprivileged. After the money was spent the clients would not come and the professionals would not agree on how those who did should be handled. Money was poured in (appropriately) to support a political initiative, but money by itself does not make things happen.

The two common problems of too much or too little strategy may not be initially recognized. Absence of explicit strategic objectives may not seem to matter if activity can be driven by action plans filled with time deadlines. The result is chaotic compulsive activity which implicitly embodies assumptions about the situation and progress. The direction that evolves is described, retrospectively, as the strategy.

Abstract or 'shelf' planning is the reverse situation in which there is a voluminous explicit strategy which is utterly disconnected from action. A genuine strategy must include examination of assumptions as to compliance by those involved, and must specify ways of dealing with the world's characteristic refusal to fit in with head office initiatives.

Motivation. Purpose at this level is finally about producing an actual significant outcome. The type of motivation that drives achievement is intention. Intention is an inner state which develops once a clear focus for concrete achievement is defined. Intention leads to the formation of inner plans.[18] It might be described as an impersonal or pre-personal motivation, because a person's intention can be activated in respect of matters which he does not particularly care about. Intention is activated by work to be done now, whether for money, as a favour, or out of obedience. In such situations, personal identity (as expressed by desire, interest and higher motivations) serves as a context. Intention is a property of human existence: a strong sense of intention provides for vitality and is the basis for thriving on life.

Intention depends on the creation of an image of an end state of affairs. This image needs to be kept in mind until the world has been transformed to correspond to it. The importance of imagery is now recognized in management education. Top executives are exhorted to develop a vision of the future and to produce a vision statement for staff.[19]

Without sustained intention, a feasible strategy will not be realized. Sustaining intention means refusing to be deterred by setbacks or obstacles for as long as it takes to complete the task. People vary greatly in their capacity to sustain intention.[20] At the one extreme, some people with severe learning difficulties cannot sustain an intention for more than a few minutes; and at the other extreme, there are individuals who can sustain an intention for many years, even decades until a complex initiative comes to fruition.

Many initiatives in large organisations fail not because of lack of commitment but because of the absence of any real intention to produce change. Top executives too often speak of culture change and of dedication to quality (or whatever the latest fashion is) without any vision of the end state and no genuine intention to produce results. A vision of any consequence requires strategies which may take several years to produce results. Instead there is a quick fix, a few meetings, an exorbitant fee for management consultant input, and soon it is all forgotten; or subsumed by the next management fad.

Responsibility. Strategic objectives engage with the complexities of the social world on behalf of the enterprise as a whole. They demand mobilization of resources and call for decisive intervention in the flow of social processes. Everything of potential relevance must be taken into account. This is a tall order, and the assignation of responsibility needs to recognize this. The etymology of strategy is the Greek *strategia* which means 'office or command of a general' (OED). Strategies in large organizations (or fully developed subsidiaries) are set by a chief executive who is a general manager. The chief executive should ensure that conflicts about whether choices are feasible and effective are resolved, and that obstacles are somehow circumvented.

Evaluation. Strategic objectives must be defined so that it is unambiguously evident in due course whether or not they have been achieved. Evaluation of strategic objectives before the event is therefore a matter of great concern. Well selected objectives mean that the enterprise can succeed brilliantly — poorly selected objectives mean that it must muddle along or possibly fail. Evaluation should take place while developing strategies, because retrospective assessment of the strategic objective itself is far less significant than an anticipatory assessment.

Numerous quantitative tools and theoretical principles analysing and inter-relating markets, products, operations and so on have been devised to aid strategic thinking.[21] It is in the nature of such tools that they can-

not be situation-specific. Strategic objectives, though based on facts and principles, can never be determined by them. Things like needs and problems or appropriate responses to these are not incontestable givens. Strategic objectives that appear to flow logically from data-based analyses must be treated with caution because the underlying data are selected and collected using assumptions or desired definitions as to the nature of things; assumptions underlie necessary analyses; and the integration of data and data analyses into a coherent whole picture is itself a matter of interpretation. The intrinsic requirement that strategic objectives must define reality (rather than the other way around) is often forgotten in a desperate attempt to reduce uncertainty.

> Closing the Pits: The strategic objective of UK's National Coal Board, to close uneconomic pits, led to a year-long strike by miners in 1984-5. The facts and figures put forward by the NCB appeared convincing and most debate either asserted or contradicted these facts. However, a large number of assumptions — about the operation of pits, about the coal industry, and about the energy needs of the country — were buried in the facts and figures. Different assumptions associated with differently arranged facts would have led to a different strategic objective.   Ex. 3.11[22]

Qualitative approaches like SWOT analysis, which focus attention on the strengths and weaknesses of a business and the opportunities and threats it faces, are also useful but are again limited in their coverage. The real world includes things like the economic environment, political trends, alterations in markets, technological developments, shifts in government policies, attitudes of stakeholders, the mood of the work-force, and reactions by competing organizations. Often it is not clear whether such matters are relevant to the matter in hand, and, even if clearly significant, the extent and nature of any effect is uncertain. Situations can be analysed, risks can be systematically hedged and data will always be important, but a sensitive judgement of the situation cannot be removed as the final arbiter of the quality of a strategic objective.

Limitation. The strategic objective, even with its strategy, still floats above immediate specific action. It does not determine precisely how obstacles, foreseen and unforeseen, are to be overcome, how daily changes in the situation are to be handled, how available resources are to be used, or how activities are to be adapted to meet regulations. Nor does it say exactly when anything is to be done. The strategy therefore needs to be implemented using scheduled tasks or operational plans. This brings us to the final and lowest level in the purpose hierarchy.

L-1: TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

Nature. Tactical objectives are the purposes of specific practical tasks or necessary actions on the way to producing the desired outcome. Because they are steps towards a pre-defined achievement, they are tactics: i.e. pure means. Tactical objectives are inherent in any action taken, so they are sometimes referred to simply as activities. The end result, evident from the objective, ought to be capable of being directly linked to the strategic objective or sub-objectives within the strategy.

The concern in setting tactical objectives moves from doing the right thing, to doing the thing exactly right; from what to do to how to do it. Time is no longer just a guide for objective-setting and action, but the primary framework. Tasks are always set, implicitly or explicitly, with sharp deadlines, end-points or time-targets. So a tactical objective may be defined as a purpose which specifies a precise result to be produced in a defined **period** of time. The deadlines may be as short as one day or less, and are probably not meaningful above ten years. In organisations, tactical objectives with shorter time-scales tend to be called task objectives, while those with longer time-scales may be called operational objectives.

Concrete detailing and quantification of tactical objectives, including sub-objectives and related programmatic specifications, may be taken as far as relevant or desired. Hence these objectives are referred to as the nuts and bolts of the scheme. Focusing here is getting down to brass tacks. Work is now said to be at the sharp end.

Tactical objectives often need to be specified in considerable detail. A linked set of tactical objectives forms an action plan or operational plan. Such programmes of action may include specific sub-objectives, which themselves may be further broken down into sub-sub-objectives and so on as far as necessary for precise control of the action process.

Uses. Tactical objectives are, above all, adaptive. For example a strategic objective to provide a more welcoming reception area for clients must be implemented with tactical objectives adapted precisely to the circumstances. The manager involved must set objectives which take account of the personalities of existing receptionists, the rotting floor-boards in the hall, the impending vacation of the works officer, the overspent budget for furnishings, and so on.

Because tactical objectives refer to specific and easily identifiable end-points in given concrete situations, they lend themselves to detailed planning and quanti-

fication. So tactical objectives are invariably used for progressing, monitoring and evaluating work.[23] They are always evident as the means, whether for an urgent directive, a current project, or a long-running operational programme.

The danger here lies in mistakenly identifying tactical objectives with what actually has to be achieved. Because a strategy is so much more than any particular set of tactical objectives, it is possible to meet an action plan in all particulars and yet fail to implement a strategic objective. The classic joke of attempting management by numbers shows a Soviet steel factory producing one giant nail because achievement was assessed by tonnage; and then in the next year producing millions of tiny pins when achievement was assessed by numbers of items.

Many very short-term objectives are never written down or explicitly set. However an enterprise of any complexity requires certain tasks to be specified in detail and assigned appropriately. Tactical objectives are to be found in protocols, task lists, action plans, rotas, schedules and similar documents.

Work should be personal rather than mechanical. If it is, then meeting tactical objectives involves the use of judgement and leads to each individual doing the same task in a slightly different way. Two major requirements of any work programme stand out: first, there should be rapid and effective resolution of conflicts between equally acceptable ways of achieving the same end result; and, second, necessary tactical objectives should not be omitted or duplicated.

Omission. If tactical objectives are not properly set, then work simply does not get done or it gets done incorrectly, inefficiently or inappropriately. This is what has earned bureaucracy its bad name.

> Bureaucracy: A civil service administrator was sent a memo asking for a report on the handling of public complaints 'as soon as convenient'. When asked for the report the following week, he explained that he was waiting for some staffing details. The committee which needed the report was to meet that day, so the review had to be postponed a fortnight. Worried by the apparent slur on his performance, the administrator produced a 50 page document. But this was unusable by the Committee which required a 2 page account of progress and problems in introducing training for the new systems. Again the item was held over for a fortnight to await his revision. This time the report was accepted.   Ex. 3.12

Conflicting specifications usually stem from incoherent role definitions, absence of assigned responsibility, or duplication of responsibility. Schemes like management-by-objectives attempt to minimize such

problems, but structural deficiencies in organizations may be so severe as to resist such remedies. When purpose is ignored and everything is action-oriented, chaos grows and meetings grow larger and larger, and longer and longer as everyone attempts to check and influence every action that others wish to take.

Motivation. The type of motivation required by tactical objectives is illustrated by considering an example. What motivates us to go to the King St. Branch, when our local supplier is shut with a notice on the door saying 'All enquiries to the King St. Branch'? The driving intention to obtain supplies remains, but if we wish to fulfil it, then we have no option but to set a new tactical objective driven by our awareness of external reality. So awareness, sensory in nature, seems to be a motivating force which is in the service of intention.

Excessive focus on producing results in the absence of a strategic vision and higher values is dehumanizing. Work of this sort is mind-numbing labour. It is akin to slavery and is insufficient to sustain human uniqueness. Machines can perform better if a reflex to sensory awareness is all that is required. A workaholic may find a task-centred life sustaining, but healthy people do not. So large organizations can only produce results by an intensive task-centred approach for short periods before hostility and tension increase and staff start leaving.

Responsibility. Tactical objectives must be set by people whose focus and responsibility is on doing things or getting things done. When the things to be done are decided by others, the responsibility is that of an agent. In organizations, tactical objectives are set and pursued by top officers, managers and workers within the executive structure. The general term I use to cover all such employed staff is: executants.

Executant roles are typically, but not invariably, built on some form of managerial hierarchy designed to ensure control and performance of the necessary work. The need to assign responsibilities so that time-targeted objectives are progressively met without duplication or omission led Jaques to identify a structure of 'levels of work' based on differing time-spans of tasks.[24]

Evaluation. Tactical objectives lend themselves to evaluation both prospectively and retrospectively. Prospectively, the rationale for the tactical objective should be self-evident. It lies in a superficial demand for the results or activities referred to. The feasibility of tactical objectives should also be self-evident, although it must be recognized that more complex tasks will not be feasible for less capable individuals. Many associated aspects of the task may be analysed and quantified in advance — like specific resource allocations, specific times, specific places, specific methods, specific personnel. Such quantification makes it easier to determine retrospectively whether or not performance has been adequate.

Termination. The virtue and limitation of tactical objectives are that they are purely means-oriented. Their meaning comes from the way the results which they generate contribute to a pre-defined strategic objective. If the tactical objective is pursued effectively, then results will follow. These tactical activities and results have an additional intrinsic value in that they express higher values as well, especially those defined as priorities. In addition, activities have many unforeseen consequences. So the pursuit of tactical objectives may reveal or realize values which were not previously noted or desired. In any case, the translation of values into action is now complete and no further still lower levels are logically or practically required.

REVIEWING PURPOSES AND THEIR MISHANDLING

In exploring purpose and action, I have focused mainly on organizations, partly because of their importance in modern society, and partly because the frequency with which managers make serious and avoidable errors is so disturbing. Some brief comment on organizations and their dysfunction may help firm up an appreciation of the significance of the five levels of purpose.

Organizations. Organization is the way that things get done in society, and organizations are creatures of purpose whose role is to do things. Organizations are defined by principal objects and meet social values. If our concern is the pursuit and realisation of values and the practical creation of a better society, then organizations are the vehicle for this endeavour.

The framework can be applied to any type of organisation, not just to giant bureaucracies like the NHS where it was first developed. It can be used, for example, to give a slant on the particular strengths and weaknesses of different sorts of organization, as illustrated in Table 3.6.[25]

Although the framework has been presented primarily in relation to whole organizations, it may be applied within an organization to any coherent decision-making section. So although Acme Universal Ltd may be the primary legal entity with formal principal objects, its divisions and subdivisions have their own principal objects, and so do supporting departments like accounting or computing, and so do specific posts.

Table 3.6: Types of organization. Three different kinds of organisation are compared crudely in terms of the way that purposes of each type are likely to be pursued. The analysis reveals different structural strengths and weaknesses. The quality of the purposes actually set and the way matters are handled may overcome the weaknesses or may fail to take advantage of the strengths. (Level 1 purposes are embedded in actions and are not relevant here.)

Level of Purpose	Entrepreneur-controlled Enterprises	Professional Practices	Adhocracies
	e.g. rapidly growing small businesses	*e.g. group architecture or medical practice*	*e.g. academic institute or design consultancy*
L-5: Social values	*Strong* Highly personal, but do not need to be widely recognised in society.	*Strong* Held personally as a professional, and very widely endorsed in society.	*Strong* Essential cohesive force of the group, and generally supported in society.
L-4: Principal objects	*Strong* Personally decided, and easily altered.	*Strong* Based in a formal discipline, so well-understood by members.	*Weak* Tends to be overridden by projects in hand and self-development needs.
L-3: Internal priorities	*Strong* Controversy is rapidly dealt with, and those who object are removed.	*Weak* Controversial issues are generally avoided.	*Weak* Lengthy debates and irresolution are common
L-2: Strategic objectives	*Strong* Strategies can be bold, ambitious and long-term.	*Weak* Painstaking negotiations are required to gain agreement.	*Weak* Disjointed strategies subordinated to environmental demands.

The multiplicity of these endeavours and the variety of lower level purposes within each is what makes decision-making in large organizations so complicated and liable to go wrong.[26]

Purposes may be the source of intra-organizational dysfunction in many other ways. They may be absent, unrealistically devised, poorly formulated, poorly communicated, poorly understood, confused with rules or methods, and so on. Such problems have been long recognized, and little needs to be added here. It is worth mentioning however that although task objectives and principal objects have long been assigned significance in management textbooks, only in recent decades has it become fashionable to emphasize strategic objectives and social values.[27] And the textbooks are ahead of the field. Most managers, even successful ones, confuse the forms of purpose and do not fully appreciate the human energies and collective forces which are released when each is used effectively.

Multiple Omissions. Thus far, the examples showed just one level of purpose being omitted. Sometimes several levels of purpose are by-passed. In voluntary associations, we have noticed a tendency for

groups to move directly from the reassuring and comforting work of affirming social values and principal objects to deciding on immediately satisfying activities (tactical objectives). The social values and principal objects enhance morale and feelings of group cohesion, and the tasks reinforce this with a sense of achievement and group effectiveness. However sooner or later, the undiscussed, unresolved and contentious political issues push through. And the lack of any strategy vitiates any substantial progress. Because controversy and conflict are disliked, specific structural and procedural arrangements are not instituted to handle necessary debate and ensure that necessary decisions are taken. Textbooks presenting the dichotomized goal/objective model of purpose are in danger of propagating this pathology.

Baptist Church Objectives: A standard textbook, which argues that only two sorts of purpose are needed, uses the programs and objectives of a Baptist Church as one of their examples. The programs, as presented, are typical statements of principal objects: e.g. 'To proclaim the Gospel to all people' and 'To promote worship'. However it feels incongruous to follow the authors' suggestion and move from such broad goals to tactical

objectives like: 'To establish a church evangelism committee by April 15' and 'To involve all institutionalized (elderly and otherwise) members in regular church worship by June 1st'. Unless this is an unusually united or apathetic church, there will be differences of opinion on how 'all people' should be interpreted, disagreements on the different ways to persuade members to worship, and conflicting views on which institutions can realistically be approached.   Ex. 3.13[28]

Confusing Levels. Another common problem arises from confusion between levels. Social values may be presented as strategic objectives or misused as a principal objects; tactical objectives may be treated as if they were internal priorities or be made to stand in for strategic objectives; strategic objectives may be described as alterations to the principal objects or substituted for political choices; and so on.

We have been particularly struck by the tendency for public sector policy documents, which ostensibly develop priorities and strategies, to be packed either with social values or tactical objectives. For example, in response to the need for a preventive care policy, one health authority stated that its policy was to prevent the preventable (a social value); and another stated that its policy was to appoint two new health education officers by the end of the year (a tactical objective). The policy for mental illness for one Health Region covering 4 million people would have made a fine chapter in a textbook, with its exposition of social values and principal objects, but it was utterly useless for managers facing hard choices. Businesses are not much better, but they usually keep their confusion private.

> Mentor Graphics' Muddles: The President of this Corporation graphically described 'the power of vision to weaken a company'. What in fact weakened the company was the President's lack of any understanding as to what constituted a vision, what sorts of purposes were needed, and what each sort could and could not do. The vision moved from 'beat Daisy', their main competitor (a temporary priority), to 'our six boxes' i.e. their main businesses (informal principal objects) to 'the 10X imperative' (an impossible strategic objective), to 'change the way the world designs' (a poorly formulated visionary aim based on an ultimate value: see Ch. 4), and finally to 'build something people will buy' (an established social value). Never at any stage in his account did the President refer to a vision in the sense of one or a few encompassing feasible and desirable strategic objectives which addressed the main issues and would maximize the impact of the firm in its situation.   Ex. 3.14[29]

Muddling levels, as Mentor Graphics found (Ex. 3.14), can lead to a failure to develop consensus and stimulate motivation. This hinders personal fulfilment and may even jeopardize the survival of the organization. Muddling levels can also lead to a failure to con-

front and resolve controversial issues. Muddles obscure real agreements and disagreements, produce fudges, prevent reasoned discussion, and generate inappropriate and ineffective action. Muddling purposes means, at best, muddling along.

The multiple permutations and combinations of logical and practical errors are the very reason why our understanding of purpose has been so poor. Disentangling them is fascinating.

Readers are encouraged to test out their feelings for the ideas by applying the schema to an initiative or organization they know well. In time, the reader will not only judge that it is unwise but also find that it is impossible to specify a purpose of any sort without being aware of its deeper nature and function.

TRANSITION

Purpose is one of the fundamental particles of social existence. Like the proton, it has an inner structure of definable particles which do not exist on their own in nature. Repeatedly, we found that muddling up the types of purposes or using less than five types when pursuing an activity was damaging or even disastrous. Practical things like determining resource allocation or assigning responsibilities would then go wildly astray, and people would become confused and conflicted.

The framework is an ends-means hierarchy in that purposes within each level answer the question 'why?' to purposes in the level below, and 'how?' to purposes in the level above.

Ends-means hierarchies can be defined within each level. Centuries ago Aquinas suggested a conceptual hierarchy of social values, and more recently others have done likewise. The usefulness of hierarchies of sub-objectives within principal object, internal priority, strategic objective and tactical objective levels has been referred to, and is well-established in the academic literature. However, all such hierarchies are of less social and practical importance than that defined by the present framework.[30]

It is the transition *across* from one level to the next which emerges as by far the most significant and potentially controversial in social terms. As if to confirm and validate the level boundaries, society has spontaneously generated distinctive entities for controlling large scale activities. At each level, a societal structure is given the authority and responsibility to determine the purposes to be used. These have been identified in organizations as follows: social values (L-5) — wider society; principal objects (L-4) — constituting body; internal priorities (L-3) — governing body; strategic objectives

Table 3.7: Organizations and society. The diagram shows the use of purposes to deal with organizational identity and to handle relationships with the social environment. Note that at the upper levels society impacts on the organization, and at the lower levels the organization impacts on society. Note that change generated by the lower levels is within the continuity established at the higher levels.

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS	TYPE OF PURPOSE	RESPONSIBLE BODY	ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY
Purposes providing orientation.	Social values —	Wider society	Purposes establishing identity.
	Principal objects —	Constituting body	
	Internal priorities —	Governing body	
Purposes generating impact.	Strategic objectives —	Top officers	Purposes supporting identity.
	Tactical objectives —	Executants	

(L-2) — top officer body; and tactical objectives (L-1) — executant body. The powers of each of these sources of authority become more focused and immediate, but also more limited in scope, as the hierarchy is descended. Getting them all to work together depends on recognizing the framework on which they are based. Table 3.7 summarizes what has been analysed so far.

Much much more can be said about the use of the hierarchy, about how each purpose contributes to the formation of other purpose-based tools, about the influence that purposes set at one level exert on pur-

poses set at other levels, about the use of emotion and logic in devising purposes, about the relation between people and their social environment, and about the way that value conflict is resolved and ethical judgement clarified. But, before such things can be addressed, the hierarchy must be completed.

Five levels suffice when the focus is on *pursuing values through* action, but not when our concern moves to *developing values for* action. Examination of the value context for action revealed two more and final levels in the framework. These are described in the next chapter.   ✱

Master-Table 1

The hierarchy of purposes used to translate values into action.

The Table summarizes properties of levels in the hierarchy which relate most directly to activity

Note that the 'typical format' is illustrative only. See text and Master-Tables 2 and 3 for further details and explanations

L	Type of Purpose	Definition	Typical Format	Experience and Activity	Value/Action Relation	Link to Resources	Temporal Perspective
5	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	'We all need and want ..X..' [X = the social value.]	Intuition of many varied possible and worthwhile activities.	*Value consensus* crossing endeavours social bodies and institutions.	Provides the social potential for obtaining resources.	Present and undefined future.
4	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	'..A.. is set up to ..X..' [A = organized entity: eg project, group, person; X = the principal object.]	Idea (i.e. type or category) of specific worthwhile activities.	*Value consensus* within a defined endeavour.	Indicates general level and type of resource base required.	Present and defined or undefined future.
3	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use.	'..X.. is more important than ...Y,Z... now' [The preference for X over Y,Z .. is the internal priority.]	Emotion surrounding likely activities (basis of politics).	*Value/value conflict* within an endeavour in general or in a particular situation.	Provides the rationale for allocating resource	Present and immediate future.
2	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	'..X.. must be achieved over the next ..t..' [X = strategic objective; t = approx. time period.]	Image of the outcome of activities (basis of strategies).	*Value/action conflict* within an endeavour in a particular situation.	Leads to mobilization and deployment of resource.	Rate of progress in a defined future
1	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome.	'..X.. is to be done by ..T so as to achieve ..Y..' [X is tactical; Y is strategic; T is the time-deadline.]	Awareness of activity details (basis of tasks).	*Action/action conflict* within an endeavour in a particular situation.	Leads to resource being **produced** and consumed.	Precisely defined future.

NOTES

1. For example, see: Chandler, A.D. *Strategy and Structure.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962; Lawrence, P.R. & Lorsch, J.W. *Studies in Organisation Design.* Homewood, Ill.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1967; Galbraith, J. *Designing Complex Organisations.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973.

2. A bible for many managers is: Peters, T.J. *Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution.* New York: Knopf, 1987.

3. Argenti claims that this definition is 'by far the most common in use'. In: Kempner, T. (ed.) *A Handbook of Management.* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976, p.273.

4. Arendt, H. *The Human Condition.* Chicago: University of London Press, 1958; Grisez, G. & Shaw, R. *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom.* London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.

5. For example, see: Blum, H.L. *Planning for Health.* New York: Human Sciences Press, 1974; Rein, M. *Social Science and Public Policy.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976; Anthony, R.N. & Herzlinger, R.E. *Management Control in Non-profit Organizations (Revised edition).* Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, 1980; Checkland, P. *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice.* New York: John Wiley, 1981.

6. Taken from: Webley, S. *Company Philosophies and Codes of Business Ethics.* London: Institute for Business Ethics, 1988.

7. The use of need as a purely psychological drive was popularized by Abraham Maslow (*Toward a Psychology of Being.* 2nd Ed. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1968). Other have criticized his conceptualization and emphasized the close link to social values e.g. Thomson, G. *Needs.* London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1987.

8. Great Britain, Parliament, *The National Health Service Act, 1946.* London: HMSO, 1946; Royal Commission on the National Health Service. *Report.* London: HMSO Cmnd. 7615, 1979, Ch.2; Secretariat of the Royal Commission on the NHS, *The Objectives of the NHS.* King's Fund Project Paper RC10, London, 1980.

9. Jimmy Algie suggested the label 'political aim' in his *Social Values, Objectives and Action* (London: Kogan Page, 1975). Also see: Easton, D. The analysis of political systems. In: Macrides R.C. & Brown, B.E. (eds.) *Comparative Politics.* Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1961, p. 81-94.

10. See, for example: Algie, J., Mallan, G. & Foster, W. Financial cutback decisions by priority scaling. *Journal of Management Studies.* 20: 233-260, 1983; Algie, J. & Foster, W. *The Priority Decision System.* London: Work Sciences, 1985.

11. Quoted in: Unterman, I. & Davis, R.H. The strategy gap in not-for-profits. *Harvard Business Review,* Reprint #82312.

12. Herron, R. *The Role of the Trustee.* Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1969; Brown, C. *Putting the Corporate Board to Work.* New York: Macmillan Publ. Co., 1976; Nachmias D. & Greer, A. *Self Governance in the Interpenetrated Society.* Special Issue of *Policy Sciences,* 14 (2), Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publ., 1982.

13. Segovia, J. & Gomez, O.J. Implicit versus explicit goals: medical care in Argentina. In: Ingman, S. R. & Thomas A.E. (eds.) *Topias and Utopias in Health.* The Hague: Mouton, 1975; Ugalde, A. Physicians' control of the health sector: professional values and economic interests. *Social Science and Medicine.* 14A: 435-444, 1980.

14. Glennerster, H., Korman, N. & Marslen-Wilson, F. *Planning for Priority Groups.* Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983.

15. Edwards III, G.C. & Sharkansky, I. *The Policy Predicament.* San Francisco: Freeman, 1978.

16. Blanpain, J., Delesie, L. & Nys, H. *National Health Insurance and Health Resources: The European Experience.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.

17. Greer, A. & Rozas, A. *Building on Existing Resources: Community Care and the Problem of Integration.* University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee: Urban Research Center, 1984.

18. Miller, E.J., Galanter, E. & Pribram, K. *Plans and the Structure of Behaviour.* New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1960.

19. See, for example: Hickman, C.R. & Silva, M.A. *Creating Excellence: Managing Corporate Culture, Strategy and Change in the New Age.* London: Unwin, 1985. See Ex. 3.14 (p. 45) for how this goes wrong in practice.

20. Elliot Jaques usefully distinguished different time-spans of tasks i.e. in effect the duration for which intention must be sustained for successful task completion. He found that the capability of managers could be defined by the maximum time-span of tasks for which they could be held fully accountable. Jaques, E. *A General Theory of Bureaucracy.* London: Heinemann, 1976.

21. See, for example: Buzzell, R.D. & Gale, B.T. *The PIMS Principles: Linking Strategy to Performance.* New York: Free Press, 1987. Texts like these speak more to social scientists than practitioners. The weakness of their quantitative-based strategic principles for the manager on the spot is evident from examples: profitability and market share are strongly related; vertical integration is profitable for some businesses but not others; the relative quality of services or products is the most important factor affecting profitability and growth.

22. Economic History Dept. *The Aberystwyth Report on Coal.* Aberystwyth: Univ. Coll. of Wales, 1985.

23. This has been developed and systematized in the management-by-objectives school of thought. See, for example: Humble, J. *Management by Objectives in Action.* London: McGraw Hill, 1970.

24. Jaques, E., 1976 op. cit. [20]. A very similar hierarchy has been developed based on type of output or response to need i.e. principal objects: Rowbottom, R. & Billis, D. *Organisational Design: The Work-Levels Approach.* London: Gower, 1987; Kinston, W. & Rowbottom, R. Levels of work: New applications to management in large organizations. *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis,* 16: 19-34, 1989; Kinston, W. & Rowbottom, R. A new model of managing based on levels of work. *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis,* 17: 89-113, 1990.

25. This is one of a variety of categorizations of organizations. See, for example: Handy, C. *Gods of Management.* London: Souvenir Press, 1978; Mintzberg, H. *The Structuring of Organisations.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979.

26. Apart from the sheer complexity of integrating the objectives of numerous endeavours, there is the problem of

implicit values. The subsidiary strategic and tactical objectives are relatively overt and may be unproblematic, but the nested priorities tend to operate implicitly and reflect vested interests and distinctive social values held by different groups and individuals within the organization. These values are one source of the internal politicking which sociologists emphasize when documenting the irrationality of organizations. See, for example: Crozier, M. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. London: Tavistock, 1964; Perrow, C. *Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View*. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1970.

27. The case for policy and strategy was finally accepted by the mid-70's. See: Mintzberg, H. Patterns in strategy formation. *Management Science*, 24, 934-948, 1978; Ansoff, H.I. *Corporate Strategy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965; Andrews, K.R. *The Concept of Corporate Strategy*. Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1971; Srivasta, S. and Associates, *The Executive Mind*. London: Jossey-Bass, 1983. The case for values was established by the mid-80's. See: Peters, T.J. & Waterman Jr., R.H. *In Search of Excellence*. New York: Harper Row, 1982; Francis, D. & Woodcock, M. *Clarifying Organisational Values*. London: Gower, 1989.

28 Anthony, R.N. & Herzlinger, R.E. 1980 op. cit. [5] p.230-1.

29 Langeler, G.H. The vision trap. *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1992, p.46-54.

30 For Aquinas' ideas, see: McInerney, R. *Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982; for a modern hierarchy of social values, see: Blum, H.L. op. cit. [5]. For examples of hierarchies within a level, see: Simon, H.A. On the concept of organisational goals. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 9: 1-22, 1965; Warfield, J.N. Intent structures. *IEEE Transactions on Systems Man & Cybernetics*, SMC-3: 133-140, 1973.

Chapter 4

Exploring Value

Purpose is an essential concept for understanding and determining both personal and social action. In the last chapter, it became apparent that certain statements of purpose are statements of value. The focus in this chapter is on values themselves: what they are and how they differ from level to level.

In examining values and talking to people about what they mean by values, we uncovered yet more confusion and muddle. As with purpose, value is used in widely varying ways both in everyday life and in the academic literature. For many people the notion of 'developing values' sounded meaningless or esoteric. When it is explained that a value is what is important to you, that social groups are built round what their members think is important, that what anyone thinks is important changes over time, that each of us can and must decide for ourselves what is important, then developing values suddenly makes sense. It is something we all do all the time.

INTRODUCING VALUES

The idea of essentially different types of value in a hierarchy is not commonly appreciated. The usual distinctions are dichotomous. Value is divided into: moral values (like honesty) versus non-moral values (like driving a car); or values as ends (like truth) versus values as means (like fair prices); or primary self-evident common values (like education) versus secondary contentious sectional values (like rote learning); or abstract values (like theories) versus concrete values (like property); or spiritual religious values (like hope) versus temporal secular values (like shopping). Unfortunately, as we found in the conventional two-fold division of purpose, the merit of simplicity of such analyses does not compensate for their frequent inadequacy in practice.

In Chapter 3, I identified five distinct types of purpose and showed that they are hierarchically related. The function of the hierarchy, when descending, could be seen to be the progressive translation of values into action — until a level precisely defining necessary tasks is reached. A way to appreciate types of value is to recreate the hierarchy from the bottom up. As one level succeeds another ascending the hierarchy, we can observe how different forms of purpose have the quality of values, and how the value element becomes progressively more purified. In other words, the dominance and particularity of purposes at one level can be overcome by a higher more value-imbued conception of purpose — until a level of pure value is reached which all can share in all situations.

So we will now recapitulate the hierarchy from the perspective of value starting with pure means. *Tactical objectives* (L-1) specify finite tangible results to be produced to a time deadline. These purposes, inherent in any action at all, are devoid of intrinsic value and make little or no sense unless they are clearly steps towards a desired achievement. Precisely what is to be achieved is contained in the specification of a strategic objective. *Strategic objectives* (L-2) specify desired feasible outcomes which maximize impact. But any given outcome is never desired by all people affected by it. So any strategy needs to take into account a variety of values. Ensuring that progress is governed by preferred values is achieved by specifying internal priorities. *Internal priorities* (L-3) specify relative preferences or degrees of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use. Ideally, they quantify the degree of emphases to be given to each possibility. However, not everything is of interest to whomever owns and sustains the endeavour as a whole. So boundaries to possible choices need to be set by specifying principal objects. The *principal objects* (L-4) specify those activities which define the identity of the endeavour. In doing so, they demarcate activities and can create organized bodies. However, no activity or organization will survive for long unless it is supported by the surrounding community. Wider social endorsement can be obtained by specifying and using social values. *Social values* (L-5) specify actualizable freely shared community-based values which meet needs and keep open possibilities for action. These values justify social institutions, organizations and activities of all sorts without being tied to any particular one.

The Need for Higher Levels

The framework of five levels just listed is an ends-means hierarchy in that purposes within each level answer the question 'why?' to purposes within the level below, and 'how?' to purposes within the level above. This raises the interesting question of what happens at the top and the bottom. Is the hierarchy endless? The answer is: No. We noted in the last chapter, that we cannot sensibly ask 'how?' of a tactical objective. But asking 'why?' of social values leads to a quite different result.

It is apparent that social values — the values which overtly drive activities without defining or limiting them — may themselves be developed, debated and promoted independently of action. That is to say, we can intelligently ask the question 'why?' of social values. For example, why is it that we all need and seek such specific and practical values as schools for our children? or efficiency in our public services? or unpolluted air? Such questions must be answered by appealing to something purposive, but yet more general abstract and explanatory than the social values themselves. This purpose or value would be logically found in a level above L-5.

Of course, practically-minded people do not usually question social values. Nevertheless, in discussion, they can and do justify their values by offering a rationale. Let us take, for instance, the social value of education for children. Pushing someone to justify education might lead them to say that it is needed to get a good job, or that going to school is the basis for learning to be a good citizen, or that education allows the child to develop itself. Any one of these (or other) notions could be elaborated further into a full-blooded defence of education.

What this man-in-the-street is offering is a theory about why education is a social need worth holding. And what is this theory if not a value? I will be calling explanatory ideas or theories a *value system*. Such values may look much like social values, but in fact they are debatable ideas which offer understanding and explanation — not self-evident needs promoting general action.

A more philosophically-minded person might well have given a different sort of answer. While believing that education is important because of its link to social ideals like employment, citizenship, and self-development, the second person might go further. This quasi-philosopher could also claim that education for children is good because it is the road to their experience of Truth and Freedom—things which are, and have always been, of inestimable value. I will be calling such values *ultimate values*.

Social values and all lower level purposes are eventually justified in terms of value systems and ultimate values. These two highest values are purposes in so far as they identify a future state of affairs and so contribute to bringing it about. However, the endpoint they specify is theoretical and abstract. The result is two levels of pure value above the five-level hierarchy of purpose making it in all a seven-level structure.

This two-level value context is what makes values and activity meaningful. In other words, values here endow life with a sense of rightness and goodness, and govern all social relations. And yet, such values do not need to be specified, and may not even be consciously considered when taking action. In firms, these higher values tend to be defined when issues of principle, ideals, culture and vision emerge.

Summarizing the Pure Values

The finding that two further higher levels of purpose can be elicited beyond the social value level is confirmed by a review of the literature on values. *Value systems* (L-6) and *ultimate values* (L-7) have similar properties to the lower five levels of purpose, and a comparable but slightly modified and re-ordered account is provided in the next two sections. A summary of the two higher levels of pure value, including synonyms, is provided below. These two levels are placed in the context of the others in Master-Table 2.

L-6: Value systems are interlinked or complex valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain. Although they are frequently used to justify enduring values and activities, they can be entirely hypothetical and divorced from existing society and current activities. Common synonyms include: belief, principle, assumption, ideal, theory, ideology, paradigm, intellectual framework, school of thought, doctrine. Value systems are the basis for socialization and social division, creating intense loyalty amongst adherents and negativity in others. The typical format for their expression is: "We all believe and want ..X.." or "We believe X and so we want ..Y.Z.." — where X is the value system and Y and Z are directly implied social values or endeavours. For example, X might be efficiency, and Y and Z might be routinization and automation of jobs. Being so partial and diverse, value systems do not provide absolute justification, so a higher level is required.

L-7: Ultimate values are universally accepted and eternally pursued states of being. They can only be fully appreciated by people as individuals who, when activated by them, feel uplifted and inspired. Although utterly abstract immutable and experiential, their

articulation is culture-bound. The typical format for their expression is: "The human race has always striven for..X.." — where X is the ultimate value. Typical ultimate values are peace, compassion and truth. If we say that people have always sought efficiency in the use of limited resources, then efficiency is being elevated to an ultimate value. Common synonyms include: universal values, being values, meta-values, absolute values and inspirational values. Ultimate values are the source of the sense of good and evil, and are used to describe deities. Ultimate values can be defined in terms of each other and are the final social justification for hypothetical ideas, actual values and activities, so no higher level of purpose either exists or is needed.

Each of the higher levels will now be described in detail. On this basis, I will clarify the nature and properties of values. The upper five levels of purpose, which are all values, will then be re-examined from this new perspective.

L-6: VALUE SYSTEMS

Nature. A value implies that something is important: the something here is an idea. Value systems are complex valued ideas used to order understanding within their particular domain, and so justify social values and endeavours. Such ideas are sometimes called ideals. A value system, as the name suggests, implies that even single ideas are always complex and analysable as an inter-linked or inter-related set. The idea of customer-responsiveness, for example, includes ideas of promptness, helpfulness, service, courtesy and so on. Value systems are to be found (or can be elicited or pieced together) in all societies and enduring social groups, in all academic disciplines, in all industries, and indeed in all domains of human interest and activity.

Ideas are always present even if the people involved are unaware of their nature and force. It is impossible in practice, to approach any domain of activity if we do not assimilate and use certain ideas associated with it. If nothing is available, then we turn away or ignore the domain as meaningless or irrelevant, until those intellectually more adventurous souls blaze a trail of thinking for others to follow.

A variety of labels for value systems have come into use. Single or loosely connected ideas are often called principles, beliefs, assumptions or ideals. Ideas lends themselves to being systematized. Ideologies are systematized value systems. Some now use this term beyond its political sense to include purposive thinking and values inherent within any social sphere of action.[1] The term philosophy may be used in a similar way (e.g. the philosophy of the Steiner system of education).

School of thought is a general phrase capturing these more rationally organized value systems. Formally structured systems of ideas are also known as theories, paradigms, or doctrines. So mathematics, behaviourism and Christianity are all built around value systems. Because a value system is believed in by its adherents, it may be referred to as a belief system. Cultures and cults embody value systems and much else, but sometimes these terms are used to refer solely to the value system.

Scientific Empiricism: The empirical value system places primary significance on data and regards the freely given widespread agreement of others to the factuality of that data as crucial. So the amassing and organizing of ever more facts is good in itself. Other valued ideas in the system include: quantification; precise measurement using a universal standard unit; objectivity and verifiability; reduction of complexity; simple experiments; well-structured problems; what exists now rather than in the past or future. The value system particularly rejects ideas and reasoning (even though data itself is an idea), the incorporation of subjectivity through values or intuition, and direct approaches to complexity. Although all scientists have a respect for facts, some find empiricism congenial, while others find it abhorrent. There is no formal or official statement of precisely what the empirical value system is.
Ex. 4.1

Value systems are theoretical. Comprehensive and organized value systems define a complete and coherent approach to understanding 'how' and 'what' to value within their domain. Value systems validate achievement and are experienced as the principal source of value within any domain, more important even than social values.

Value systems are accepted or rejected as a whole. In certain times, places or arenas, a single or overwhelmingly dominant value system is found. More frequently in today's complicated world, there are a multiplicity of value systems, all apparently equally valid. Where pluralism prevails and a number of value systems co-exist within a domain, then each value system necessarily appears to be distinctive and largely incompatible with the others.

Value System Clashes: a) Within the mental health field, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists adhere to fundamentally different models of mental illness. In practice, they often have difficulty collaborating in the way that would benefit the patient. b) In politics, a variety of ideologies are well recognized e.g. fascist, conservative, liberal, socialist, communist. These represent competing views on societal government, and give rise to parties whose representatives fight each other in elections, in the legislature, and sometimes in civil war. c) In scientific inquiry, often claimed to be non-ideological by its practitioners, many distinct competing approaches have been identified (such as empiricist, rationalist, hypothesis-testing, and

systemicist) with each scientist being primarily socialized into just one and hostile towards some or all of the others. d) Religions embody value systems and provoke intense inter-group conflict despite their promotion of ultimate values like peace love and harmony.   Ex. 4.2[2]

Value systems, such as those in Ex. 4.2, structure what is to be desired and what aspects of reality are to be transformed. They therefore include assumptions that define reality broadly. By indicating what is important and what can be ignored, value systems affect perception, creating blind spots and areas of intense lucidity. Although value systems need not be formulated for action, their significance cannot be ignored. Lying beyond social values, value systems are an extraordinarily powerful controlling influence.

Motivation. The deep court of appeal in each person is the integrity of their identity. A person's identity is built up through identifications, and value systems are incorporated through identification. Because value systems become part of a person's identity, they are revealed in spontaneous personal expressions during activity. Once a value system is internalised, it becomes a source of obligation and a deep compulsion. The individual is obliged to adhere to the value system and (as it feels) the value system obliges the person to develop and apply certain values. So inner authority or obligation is the characteristic type of motivation that corresponds to this level of purpose. This motivation is social in nature, in that it stems from the internalization of external systems of authority. The inner sense of obligation controls and justifies action. Its compulsory quality makes it the mainspring of ethical living.

Adherents repetitively proclaim their support for their value system as a way of reaffirming themselves, and generating their inner commitment to action of a particular sort. Too often, they go further and deny the value and validity of alternative ways of thinking and acting — even to the point of desiring and pursuing the annihilation of alternatives and their adherents (cf. Ex. 4.2). Value systems are therefore identity sustaining for an individual person and powerfully integrative for groups of like-minded people. Simultaneously, they are intensely divisive between adherents of different systems.

Uses. Value systems are essential for developing new social values and opening up new domains of thought and action. They are a source of attraction and foster intense adherence and belief. There is a general unease with this. Before a value system becomes an idea, theory or paradigm that is universally taken for granted, it puzzles people and seems too extreme, too simplistic, too one-sided to the outsider — however

notable the spokesman, however persuasive the arguments, and however numerous the adherents.

Value systems should be seen as an aid to clarifying and modifying existing values, as an orientation to a new area, and as a spur to commitment and confidence. In these latter roles, they are essential, being both informative and sensitising.

For example, academic debates in the 1960s between the 'muddling through' incremental pragmatists and the grand planning rationalists usefully exposed assumptions in public policy-making. In the process, the implications of different ways of deciding issues were clarified.[3] Similarly the debates generated by the publication of Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses,* not only exposed differences in the value assumptions of Western and Islamic cultures, but also provided the possibility for communication and rapprochement.[4]

Value systems have many other functions. They are essential for inner convictions and developing new approaches to social problems. They are the basis of individuality for people, social groups and enterprises of all sorts. They give coherence to social movements and provide a rationale for causes and crusades.

Articulation. Value systems do not require to be articulated for action to occur. Nevertheless value systems can be perceived underlying purposes which are deliberately set and pursued. Value systems do need to be articulated in situations of challenge or major change. Single ideas are easy to affirm, but a set is needed to properly appreciate, use and defend any idea.

A person may be responsible for whether or not he enters or remains in a domain or identifies with one or other of the value systems on offer. But no person can be made responsible for ideas in the value system held by all in a social group. In any case, most people take their value systems for granted, and the idea that alternative systems might be valid seems improbable to them.

Where the value system is implicit, valued ideas can be deduced from natural behaviours and unguarded or quasi-official pronouncements by the people involved. If social groups are to understand each other, then such elucidation is needed. Exploration of value systems is generally left to those with a scientific or philosophical bent, or with a natural orientation to conceptualizing value concerns. They may be called theoreticians. If the emphasis is on producing or overseeing action, then ideological thinkers might be a preferable label (given that the notion of ideology is not to be restricted to politics and economics). In religions, theologians analyse and develop their value system. The better academics develop theories all the time without thinking of

them as value systems or even as social products. But their theories can have major social consequences — finance for more investigation, publications, conferences, employment of research staff, promotion. The ideas might even be used by industry or governments.

> Popperism: Karl Popper articulated a particular approach to how knowledge developed and science worked. He vigorously propounded his ideas and was not averse to scientists taking them as a manifesto for deciding what was proper science and what was merely masquerading as such. The flow of research funds and the development of careers are determined by such decisions. Popper's ideas are therefore a value system and not socially neutral. Other useful inquiring systems have lacked such an effective proponent in recent times and have suffered because of this. Ex. 4.3

Omission. When domains lack valued ideas and theories, society suffers. Recognition of existing communal needs alone is generally insufficient for progress. Some understanding is essential to determine associated or new needs, and to know what to do about needs. Without any understanding, a sense of uncertainty and helplessness develops. So the old saying is true: there is nothing as practical as a good theory. Specification and reflection on ideas that define us and our activities is regarded as an exercise for intellectuals rather than ordinary people. Yet the beliefs that people live by are important for them and everyone else. If there is no reflective awareness, there can be no deep personal or social change.

Cooperation is weak and ineffective in organizations which lack shared beliefs. If in addition the significance of value systems is neglected, conflicts between different groups escalate and cannot be handled sensibly. In banking, for example, retail bankers and merchant or investment bankers use quite different values to handle quite different types of activity. Calling both groups bankers is possible, but attempting to merge them within a single division is liable to fail. Similarly, the value system of information specialists differs markedly from that of operational managers. Misunderstanding and criticism between these groups is rife with the result that many information technology projects overspend, seriously under-perform, or fail utterly.

Occasionally a person may enter a new domain without the necessary socialization. Then their activity is likely to be socially chaotic, incoherent and unacceptable until a tolerated value system has been internalized and adopted. The socialization process is unavoidable if the person wishes to remain in the domain.

> **Doctors and Managers:** Involving doctors in the management of the hospitals of the National Health Service

has been a long and difficult struggle. Doctors distrust managers because their value system is so alien. Managers focus on money, service profile, new technology, markets or catchments, competition, political priorities, staff satisfaction, public relations &c. Doctors focus on their own independence of action, accuracy of diagnosis, needs of individual patients, new techniques, expertise, trust, confidentiality, income, publications &c. When a doctor becomes a manager, he slowly becomes re-socialized. His colleagues feel this and the doctor may then lose their confidence. Public health doctors were expected at one time to bridge the divide between medicine and management, but their value system differs again. It includes community health, needs for services, research, facts and epidemiological method. Their lack of focus on health care delivery or organizational boundaries leads the profession to become estranged from both clinical doctors and health care managers. Ex. 4.4

Evaluation. Value systems, like social values, do not seem to lend themselves to being evaluated. For adherents, they are good: more than good — ideal; more than ideal — true. For the adherent the valued ideas define reality. For non-believers or outsiders, either the ideas seem irrelevant, devoid of content and confusing; or they are understandable but excessive, misconceived and mischievous. At worst, the value system is judged to be delusional and dangerous.

Nevertheless, a degree of detached academic evaluation is possible. This may be carried out from within the value system or from without. The task here is to articulate the valued ideas as precisely as possible, to examine their clarity consistency and coherence, to consider their congruence with reality and impact in practice, and to compare and contrast the value system as a whole with others in the same domain.

Limitation. Value systems are limited to a particular domain and fail to define a good to which all can give assent. Yet such ends are felt to exist. Being inherently partial and diverse, any value system seems to need justification. In practice, appeal is typically made to certain final ends which transcend all value systems and seem unchallengeable: ultimate values.

Value systems have an essential quality that ultimate values lack. They have to show at least some recognition of physical and social realities in order to guide people's thinking and regulate social life. In other words, they usefully deal with the utter abstraction of ultimate values. Now it is time to consider these highest abstract values.

L-7: ULTIMATE VALUES

Nature. Ultimate values are universally accepted and eternally pursued states of being. Examples include truth, beauty, compassion, goodness, order, strength,

gratitude, humour, harmony, peace, uniqueness, liberty, justice, happiness, patience, virtue, love. Such values are readily recognizable as the source of all value, and as requiring no higher justification. In recent times, ultimate values have been repeatedly rediscovered and there is now a bewildering number of synonyms including: meta-value, being value, ultimate goal, universal value, inspirational value, absolute value, existential value, spiritual value and transcendent value.[5]

Ultimate values are purposive in the sense that they represent in abstract form what needs to be realized in any worthwhile human life or human society. They express the essential basic longings of humanity, irrespective of the stage of cultural development reached, or the forms of social organization adopted. Correspondingly, their negative form represents states of being, like ugliness, chaos and injustice, which have been rejected at all times by mankind.

Ultimate values enable self-transcendence and cultural transcendence because, being experiential, they express commonality with all humanity. They cannot be tied to any particular culture, historical time, social institution, dogma, or endeavour. For example, no group or philosophy has the copyright on truth or the final say about what constitutes justice. So ultimate values merge with the essence of what reality is and what humanity can be. They are frequently conceived in spiritual terms, either as a definition of God or as God's attributes.

Motivation. The unbounded creative imagination is the inner link to ultimate values; and the characteristic form of motivation is inspiration. Meditation on a matter with the ultimate value firmly fixed in mind generates inspiration, and this inspiration powers whatever conclusion is reached. Inspiration operates on actions as well to produce deeds which are described as good, inspired or enlightened.

Inspiration is transpersonal and provides an energy which infuses lower social, individual and pre-personal forms of motivation. Together with obligation, inspiration ensures that inner energies are effectively and appropriately harnessed.

Uses. Ultimate values, when genuinely experienced, stabilize, vitalize and nourish people irrespective of their specific beliefs, cultural background or personality. Ultimate values lead to a stronger expression, clarification, amplification and validation of particular value systems and beliefs of all sorts. They bolster convictions, justify ideals, stimulate visionary designs, and power social movements.

Ultimate values are, it seems, the final justification for all values and activities. Beauty might be called on to bolster support for literature, parks, and architecture; truth and freedom to underpin efforts to promote scientific endeavour and psychotherapy; harmony and wholeness to provide the rationale for well-managed effective organizations and racial integration. However, there is never a one-to-one connection.

The abstract notion of liberty, for example, seems to underpin many specific freedoms in a social setting: including freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of passage, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of information, and freedom of worship. Which of these could become a social value in practice would vary with the value system of a society and its circumstances. The complete openness of the ultimate value provides for the development of new and undreamed freedoms as societies evolve.

The same ultimate value may justify totally opposing value systems without discrimination. For example, harmony and wholeness might be used to justify both totalitarianism and liberalism. It follows that ultimate values, like value systems, cannot possibly provide any pointers for practical action. Indeed, the history of mankind reveals that ultimate values have been used to justify horrific behaviours: e.g. harmony has been invoked to allow racial discrimination, order to justify violent punishment, and truth to permit torture.

Articulation. Genuine contact with ultimate values is an inner state which seems to be invariably experienced as uplifting. So contact with ultimate values evokes veneration. Evil individuals correspondingly glory in negative versions like destruction, hate or disorder. The awareness and use of ultimate values, for good or evil, may be fostered in either solitary or group settings.

The manner of articulation and veneration varies between cultures and over time. For example, harmony seems especially meaningful for the Navaho Indians; while, from Aristotle onwards, happiness has been said to be the main goal of Western man. Love was the ultimate value for Jesus. However, when love re-emerged as the ultimate value in the Western youth movements of the 1960's, it was not specifically Christian.

The importance of ultimate values means that there is societal work to be done in articulating them. Artists of all types strive to evoke contact with ultimate values. And religious leaders do so too. Some psychotherapists see ultimate values as the healing force in therapy. Those who regularly make contact with ultimate values in a way that has popular appeal become spiritual leaders.

Omission. Everyone seeks goodness (or happiness

or harmony &c), whether they know it or not. Ordinary people follow Aristotle in taking this for granted. As with value systems, denial or ignorance is possible, but not omission. Nonetheless modern thinkers repeatedly dismiss ultimate values as unreal, as childish fantasy, as self-evidently mistaken, and as metaphysical nonsense.[6] Too ambiguous, too abstract, too vague are the criticisms. My consultations with ministers of the church revealed some who repudiated ultimate values on these grounds. The degree of rejection can be intense e.g. one Christian moral theologian wrote: "To say follow love is not an ethics at all, but a refusal to take ethical problems seriously".

Evaluation. Evaluation is not required because ultimate values are perfect. They may be simply proclaimed and affirmed without concern for justification. In the words of Mother Juliana of Norwich: "All shall be well, and all shall be well and all manner of thing shall be well."

Distinctions between different ultimate values sometimes seem blurred. Any ultimate value may be held to include others, and sometimes one is directly defined in terms of another. "Truth is beauty, beauty truth" intuited Keats in a typical tautological affirmation.[7] This suggests that the ultimate values are all different facets of one unified final value, absolute good, which corresponds to an ineffable sense of abstract goodness.

Closure. The hierarchy has now come to an end. Intuitively, it does not make sense to ask why of an ultimate value. It is surely meaningless to seek for a value justification beyond absolute good. If ultimate values are essentially a unity where form and content virtually coalesce, then no higher level of articulation is logically possible. The hierarchy is therefore complete, logically as well as intuitively.

God. Ultimate value, absolute goodness and associated inner experiences are usually seen as characterizing pure Being and their origin is commonly attributed to God. Such a God is Lord of (spatio-temporal) Creation and has properties like perfection, omniscience, and omnipotence. Values always polarize, so this conception of God generates a corresponding Satanic being which is evil because it epitomizes a drive for all that is bad. A higher transcendent God is recognized in the great religions in whom all opposites like good/bad or being/non-being fuse. And yet beyond that God is a nameless Godhead which cannot be conceived or described at all. These higher Conceptions might be regarded as forming the environment or context of the hierarchy of purpose and permitting its existence.

REVIEWING VALUES

Value is not so mysterious now that we have moved decisively into its realm. Valuing should not be strange to us because it is a distinguishing human capacity. Nevertheless, it was not until the 19th century that the study of value (axiology) came to be universally recognized as one of the great philosophical subjects.[8] Now, research into value is carried out in many other disciplines as well, including psychology, anthropology, religious studies, management, sociology, economics and politics. But cross-fertilization between these disciplines is inhibited by the lack of a shared framework defining value.[9]

To design social arrangements ethically, certain things must be recognized as important, then these values must be introduced to people, and then they must act upon them. I call this process *the realization of value* in society. It implies working to develop values as well as introducing and establishing them. Developing values is a world apart from using already developed values for action. The time has now come to turn our attention to what is meant by a value, and to use the levels of purpose analysis to begin to gain a deeper understanding of values apart from their use in designing activities and organization.

We commenced from the basic self-evident notion that a value is an assignment of importance. In pursuing the different forms of purpose, several other inherent properties of any value have emerged. In brief, these inherent properties are: (a) Values indicate a preference for something by someone i.e. values exist in a *relation*. (b) To value something implies devaluing or rejecting something else i.e. values produce conflict through *polarization*. (c) Values direct endeavours and choices i.e. values are *purposes*. (d) Values are the link between our inner experience and outer reality i.e. values personalize things, and generate and confirm *identity*. (e) Values also generate and confirm commonality i.e. values always imply a *social group*. (f) Values orient and regulate people and activities in social situations i.e. values create *order*. (g) Finally, values are the driving force in people and society i.e. values motivate and release human *energy* in their service — at times unto death.

The types of value revealed by the study of purpose and action can now be reviewed. We have seen that ultimate values and value systems are the source or potential for having and recognizing value. The other types of purpose which have the properties of values are: social values, principal objects, and internal priorities. In other words, each level from L-7 through to L-3 may be regarded as a distinct type of value. Taken together they form a *five-level hierarchy of values*.

Strategic objectives (L-2) and tactical objectives (L-1) cannot be regarded as values because the necessary properties are lacking. They do not specify a polarized preference; they do not need to be decided by a group; and they are identity independent. Not surprisingly, simple strategies and tasks are already within the compass of computers and robots.

Comparing Levels of Value

Debates about how a value should be defined have frequently led people to fix the label of value to certain levels, and to minimize the usefulness or significance of other levels.[10] So, in reviewing the five levels of value, the definitions of each level will be restated together with the *typical criticisms* which too often generate misunderstanding and unnecessary disputes. These criticisms are not valid from within the level, but appear to be valid from the viewpoint of another level. However, if one recognizes that each level implies the others, then supporting one type of value and rejecting another makes no sense at all.

As the hierarchy is descended, values are transformed and elaborated in an ever-expanding diversity. To simplify describing how values proliferate other values and purposes, I will give just two examples at each level. It should be evident from the examples that each type of value does indeed imply the types at the levels above and below it. This is the feature that makes the framework a hierarchy rather than a list.

We all tend to become more aware of values when we are enmeshed in a value conflict, arguing for our ideas and debating what is most important or best to do. Coming to terms with value conflict is an urgent social necessity. In dealing with conflict, one simple distinction must be recognized: Can all relevant positive values within a level be accepted in principle? Or: does social reality makes it necessary to exclude or reject certain otherwise desirable values?

When all values at a particular level can and should be accepted, choosing is termed *inclusive* and conflict should reduce. So value-choice at these levels tends to bring people and groups together and their effect is *integrative*. When rejection is part of valuing at a particular level, then choosing is termed *exclusive*, and conflict between people tends to heighten. Value-choice at these levels has a *divisive* effect.

My inquiry revealed that the levels alternate between being inclusive-integrative and exclusive-divisive in nature. Some argue that exclusive-divisive choosing is inherently evil.[11] Perhaps they hope to avoid disagreement or wish to minimize the importance of diversity.

But all the levels of value are self-evidently necessary in social life, so none should be stigmatized as evil.

Values generate conflict because the process of valuing polarizes. The object of positive valuation is good; and the object of rejection (or negative valuation) is bad. As part of this exploration of values, we will focus on the way *good* and *bad* change their meaning and quality according to the levels of value.

Ultimate values (L-7) specify universally accepted values and eternally pursued states of being. An example might be truth or justice. Ultimate values are *typically criticized* as being too vague, too ambiguous and too abstract. Proving the impossibility of catching them in a simple definition was Socrates' favourite game.

Ultimate value is *inclusive* because the various values either imply each other or are different aspects of the same thing. This seems to be so even if articulations vary and even if their equivalence is not recognized or realized. This is not to argue that a person or group should not fix its attention on liberty rather than harmony, or on compassion rather than truth. It does imply that if the value of liberty as developed at lower levels leads to serious disharmony in practice, then remonstration in terms of the ultimate value of harmony is valid. Of course, choosing an ultimate value is meaningless unless that value is deeply experienced. Such experiences are profoundly *integrating* internally and in relation to others.

An ultimate value identifies *absolute goodness*. Ultimate values like peace or compassion represent perfection. However, absolute good and perfection exist nowhere but in the imagination. This leads to the conception of a highest ideal which is synonymous with God. Ultimate value is therefore an utterly abstract and imaginative form of goodness. The polarity of values means that it must be possible to conceive of *absolute badness* which expresses utterly abstract imaginative representations of evil. Religions recognize evil, specifically in the form of negative ultimate values like chaos or hatred, and generally as sin or impurity. Facing God is the devil or demons. The polarity is most evident in the culture of the ancient Aryans who believed in two opposing forces of Truth or Order and The Lie or Disorder, a notion which was spiritually developed in Zoroastrianism (see Ex. 4.6).

Ultimate values are a condition through and by which we exist, not something we learn or create. So goodness becomes the aspect under which we pursue whatever we pursue — even if we are mistaken in the event. Ultimate values generate the puzzle that all seek the good, yet all must clarify their minds in order to seek it. Perverted souls who dedicate themselves to evil are in

the same boat. Fortunately, to dedicate oneself to lies, hate or destruction is to make survival impossible: lies deceive the liar, hatred isolates the hater, destruction destroys the destroyer. It seems that Zoroaster may have got it right: goodness will survive. Of course, man may not.

Value systems (L-6) specify interlinked valued ideas which order understanding within a particular domain. Truth, for example, might take the form of 'equal rights' or 'socialism' in the political domain or the form of 'facts' or 'empiricism' in the domain of inquiry. Such value systems are *typically criticized* for being too extreme, too simplistic, too one-sided, too confusing, too theoretical, too blind to the facts, to invested with irrational emotions, and altogether too controlling.

Value systems are *exclusive,* because choice of one automatically rejects others in the same domain. The individual, however well-intentioned and broad-minded, cannot ride two horses. Value systems are *divisive* and create believers and non-believers. Societies usually need to sustain several conflicting value systems in domains like inquiry and politics. However, in respect of the operation of society itself or in the spiritual domain, a dominant value system may help to avoid endemic internal conflict. Unfortunately, it may also lead to xenophobia and the uncontrollable persecution of minorities. Internationally, a multiplicity of cultural value systems needs to be accepted — the alternative being total war.

Each value system is preferred by adherents to other value systems, which are seen to be bad, wrong, incomprehensible, meaningless, or unreal. Value systems (like Marxism and empiricism) are theoretical constructs which are imposed on people more or less overtly and unashamedly. Reality alone cannot invalidate a value system because the value system exists to alter reality and determine people's perceptions of reality. So value systems identify *theoretical goodness and badness.* This theoretical quality means that actual social consequences of adhering to the ideas are held to be irrelevant. Although a religious doctrine, for example, is commonly judged in terms of its adherents' behaviour, its quality can only be properly evaluated by study of the doctrine itself. Because value systems are so divorced from social reality, they should never be used to drive political and strategic choices directly. If they are, the result is disaster.[12]

Value systems create obligations which can never be directly or completely realized in practice. Each value system is incomplete and depends on others if social living is to be comprehensive and developing. For example, intuitionist inquiry is based in subjectivity and inner feelings. However, in practice, intuitionists freely use information which is a product of empirical inquiry and based on objectivity and general agreement. Conversely, empirical scientists freely use intuition in determining what or when to investigate. Similarly, however market-oriented and individualist a culture and its economy may be, defence of the realm is always a social monopoly, centrally planned and collectively financed. As a final example: however complete a religious value system may be in respect of ethics or morals, it will be patently insufficient as a guide for many things from developing clothing fashions to resolving intergovernmental trade disputes.

Social values (L-5) are freely shared need-based values which serve a particular community and leave open possibilities for action. Empiricists might espouse, for instance, the value of disseminating information widely, and socialists might espouse, say, the value of helping others. Such social values are *typically criticized* for being platitudinous and vacuous truisms: like 'motherhood and apple pie'. When a social value is new and different — access to government information or segregation of cigarette smokers — then it is viewed equally dismissively as ridiculous, impractical and unwanted. Social values (unlike value systems) lead directly to activities for their own sake, but being conceptual (like value systems) they persist irrespective of their successful achievement.

Because social values embody needs of individual people and the wider group, the rejection or complete absence of any one would cause serious harm. So many social values must be held regardless of any apparent conflicts between them. In other words, choice is *inclusive.* Social values are also *integrative.* They not only aid the willing involvement of the individual and the group, so preserving both, but also develop the individual internally and provide links between disparate people and different groups.

Lists of social values which define a complete person have been frequently compiled.[13] A recent list includes life (health, safety, procreation &c), play (sport, work &c), aesthetic experience (music, art, cinema &c), speculative knowledge (learning, gossip, &c), sociability (friendship, family life &c), and religion. Another similar list distinguishes substantive goods like life and knowledge from reflexive goods like integrity and authenticity. Firms and charities benefit from producing their own lists (see Ex. 3.1). None of the goals or goods in such lists can be reduced to any other. Each value when focused upon seems most important.

Available information and helping others are two

examples of conceptual goods which can be directly pursued and realized in a recognizable way. They feel and are immediately relevant and, when affirmed, are expected to remain so for an indefinite future. Social values are *potential goods* because the possibilities for actualizing them are not closed off or constrained by their specification. *Potential bads* which are self-evident and capable of realization in a wide variety of ways also exist: illness, poverty, fraud, ignorance, bitterness, laziness, secrecy and neglect. The common bads in organizations include inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and inappropriateness.

Social values are situated in a unique position in the hierarchy: the lowest level of conceptual value, and the highest level where self-conscious choice and control are possible. It follows that philosophers' lists seem trite in our everyday world. People need to engage in an intuitive inner search to identify those social values that they feel they need. The value must make practical sense to them, and they must then find ways of getting others to agree. Only in harness with others can such values be properly realized. Those in charge of organizations or leading society must also realize that social values do not come from outside. They cannot be assumed from the value system or decided by an external expert: they must be developed by each individual and made acceptable within the community.

Principal objects (L-4) value the essential enduring activities which define the identity of an endeavour. They can be institutionalized and the resulting enterprise or organization is of value to those associated with it. Holding the social value of disseminating information might lead someone to become a journalist or to set up a polling organization. Holding the social value of helping others might lead someone to become a teacher or to sponsor a legal advice centre. Principal objects are always recognized as values by those involved (cf. the principal objects statement for the NHS in Ex. 3.5). The boundaries defined by the objects inevitably prevent the enterprise from meeting the full range of needs of people or society, and regularly render certain socially desirable initiatives *ultra vires*. So principal objects are *typically criticized* on the grounds that they are too constrained or too limited.

Principal objects are *exclusive*. The competitive exclusion principle (from evolutionary biology) suggests that no two individuals can operate with identical objects. If they do, one eventually eliminates the other. Businessmen recognize this phenomenon and the cleverer ones seek out and monopolize a unique niche in their market. Principal objects are linked to competencies, and excessive diversity tends to create incompatibilities rather than synergies. For example: a

publishing business is unlikely to make a success of fast-food outlets; and a heavy engineering firm does not sensibly diversify into fashion design.

When a firm selects a range of principal objects, it is necessary to guard against conflicts of interest which can interfere with success. In the 1980's, it became common for accountancy firms to earn money from firms both through providing management consultancy and also through auditing their accounts. After a few scandals where audits had not revealed serious financial problems, people started wondering if the firm's wish to please directors and gain consultancy business might be overriding their duty to protect shareholders.[14]

Principal objects are also *divisive* in the sense that they create insiders and outsiders. Insiders identify with or at least support the principal objects and are conscious of the choice that they make to participate.[15] Outsiders, unless they are targeted to benefit, are at best tolerant of the principal objects, and may be envious of insiders.

Principal objects specify goods which can be identifiably generated or achieved. So principal objects define an *achievable good*. Because the value is deliberately specified to be bounded or limited, it prevents efforts from being diffused. Unlike a social value which opens up possibilities, principal objects close them down. If the social value of exposing injustice is relevant, a fictional film may achieve something, and so may an academic book, and so may a newspaper exposé. In all cases something good can be achieved, but this achievement is limited by the nature of film-making, academic writing, or newspaper publishing. Correspondingly, principal objects may also define an *achievable bad*. Criminal organizations illustrate the systematic pursuit of achievable bads. Their operations are typically based on activities like drug-dealing, smuggling, prostitution, extortion and gambling.

Internal priorities (L-3) specify a degree of emphasis amongst valid values or actions for immediate use. Continuing our two main examples: the journalist might personally prefer to cover society scandals rather than sporting events; and the legal advice centre might find itself forced by demand to focus on problems of racial discrimination rather than on employment or housing. Values here are *typically criticized* for being too relative, too situationally based, or too pragmatic. But an internal priority is by nature a transient value which must be adapted and changed according to the situational pressures.

Internal priorities are *inclusive* because all relevant values are held by those involved, and all possibilities should be prioritized so as to receive at least some quantum of preference. Appraisal of a problematic

situation in terms of values alone usually creates proponents and opponents in respect of any decision because someone will fail to benefit in some way. This may lead to priorities being inappropriately treated as if they were exclusive. Exclusivity leads to excessive denigration of valid choices and eventually to bitter and sometimes unhealable antagonisms which impede rather than aid the principal objects. Strategic objectives are exclusive/divisive because their choice involves defining one outcome and rejecting others. So the common difference of opinion regarding the necessary strategic objectives mistakenly leads people to view internal priorities as divisive. An internal priority, so long as it is based on constructive debate, adequate procedures and thoughtful choice, is *integrative*. (Naturally the resulting strategic choices need to recognize the different strands of opinion in some way.)

An internal priority is a *quantifiable good* because it identifies a specific and limited amount of resource assigned in a particular decision. The quantification may be expressed as an allocation of finite available time, space or money. To the opponent of a particular internal priority, the relative distribution of resource is viewed as a *quantified bad*. For example, large sums of money spent on marketing will be seen as bad by those who think that some or all of that money should be spent on product development. Costs which divert resources from the principal objects epitomize quantifiable bads. Staff and paperwork to meet government regulations are felt as bads by firms. Similarly, charities tend to see money going to necessary management costs as bad.

Evil and the Supreme Good

Misconceiving Evil. Plato taught that the business of life was the knowledge of good and evil. But what is evil? Theistic and pantheistic religions which emphasize that God and the whole of His creation are good have difficulty in accepting, explaining or defining evil. Leibniz's famous answer that this must be 'the best of all possible worlds' seems to imply that the world is full of necessary evils, a notion scathingly satirized by Voltaire in his *Candide*.

Evil is frequently described as a form of imperfection, a failure of wholeness, an exclusiveness or particularity, whilst goodness is seen conversely as perfection, wholeness, inclusiveness and transcendence. Augustine, for example, concluded that evil was lack of conformity to the creative will. Because we are all imperfect, such accounts lead to an emphasis on the discrepancy between God and man, and then, in parts of the Christian tradition, to the identification of evil with original sin.

However, it is a truism to say that each of us and mankind in general is imperfect. Remedying imperfection and relieving suffering is what the notion of social progress as a value-driven process is all about. Labelling ourselves with the term 'evil' does not help. Often this labelling is saved for more primitive forms of consciousness.[16] Many, for example, would be inclined to think that human sacrifice was evil. However in communities where such rites were customary, they were carried out with much religious solemnity and were essential for social cohesion. We can reasonably assume that future observers will look back at our present society and identify some of its ethical or moral practices as evil.

Such labelling probably harms and certainly confuses. Evil must surely be defined as something worse than temporary ignorance, inevitable imperfection or current afflictions. Evil must be something which was evil in the past, is evil now, and will be evil in the future. The Bible opens with a myth in which man becomes mortal through the act of eating of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. There really should not be a puzzle about what evil is, because it is the knowledge which defines our existence. So I propose that we define evil as negative ultimate value, and locate it in the seventh level of purpose.

Distinguishing Evil. Evil as an ultimate value represents *a paradoxical drive to deny values and their significance altogether*. Evil includes the purposes that flow from this drive, and the consequences of that perverted drive. Evil may involve asserting that what is good is bad and what is bad is good, or it may mean eradicating any difference between good and bad, or it may be the deliberate generation of a bad without any compensating good. Man has a disposition, or at least the potential, to function in this way.

> Nazism: The Nazi's were evil, but not because they did horrific things. They did horrific things because their value system was driven by evil. This evil involved deliberately aiming to eliminate all notions of fairness from political life, creating the notion in people's minds that all things were **permitted** and nothing forbidden, regarding violence and domination as proper instruments of government, substituting revenge for justice, replacing impartiality by loyalty to the party, destroying the weak, and valuing people by origins not character. Almost all those involved, including the mass of the German people, did not believe that such things were good prior to or following the Nazi period. The people colluded in the denial of their own ultimate values: this was evil and it released evil.   Ex. 4.5[17]

Negative ultimate values are a forceful negation of being. So it is not surprising that evil seems to thrive on dominating and dehumanizing others. Evil is character-

istically associated with uncontrolled ambition and greed.[18] Greed for power is particularly dangerous. Power offers the prospect of self-glorification and of enslaving or destroying others. Power generates strife and violence, and violence or the threat of violence appears to be intrinsic to evil. Coercive power is an accompaniment of evil, because without it people tend to recoil from persistently acting against ultimate values. Violence interferes with this process by generating an excitement that prevents sensitivity, reflective thought or consideration for others.

It follows that ensuring that power is exercised fairly and beneficially lies at the heart of the ethical design of any organization or society.

Distinguishing Bad. Bad (in different guises) exists and must be tolerated at the four levels of value from L-6 down to L-3. The sad fact is that the pursuit of ultimate values invariably generates bads and causes harm. Accepting bads and balancing goods and bads is not itself evil — it is essential to social life. The amount and extent of harm that is acceptably balanced by the amount of good generated varies across time, between different social groups, and according to the situation.[19] The difference between evil (as an ultimate value) and lower level bads is that evil cannot be counterbalanced by lower level goods and is genuinely intolerable.

We can illustrate the difference between what is evil and what is bad by distinguishing, for instance, between lying as an ultimate value, and lying as part of a value system, or as a social value, principal object or internal priority. The white lie is the trivial result of a situation in which avoidance of unnecessary embarrassment is given priority over plain speaking. Longer term policies to lie are also evident amongst religionaries. Many thinkers resorted to deceit and dissimulation to cope with the religious persecution and intellectual intolerance of the 16th and 17th centuries.[20] Lying, or disinformation, is a principal object of espionage services in most countries. To lie could even become a necessary social value for people living and working in the civil service of a repressive tyrannical state where informers are everywhere and frankness leads to torture and punishment. In cultures like the Palau, which are surely not evil, lying is part of the value system.[21] At none of these levels is lying wholly good. Still, as long as a lie is not being justified by the ultimate value of falsehood, evil is contained. If, however, lying is held as an ultimate value, then one is unleashing an evil force that not only perverts all attempts at truth, but also corrupts all endeavours by sowing discord, distrust and dysharmony.

Recognizing the Supreme Good. There does not seem to be a word for the specific form of ultimate value which asserts values and the heightening of awareness of the difference between good and bad. I suggest that we call it the 'supreme good'. Supreme good and evil are not just opposing ultimate values, they are essential and irreconcilable cosmic forces which cannot coexist.

> Zoroastrianism: The opposition of good and evil is the basis of all Zoroastrian mythology, theology and philosophy. Ahura Mazda (Ohrmazd), the Wise Lord, created the spiritual and material world and is the Supreme Good. The Forces of Evil are led by Angra Mainyu (Ahriman). The various Gods and Demons are both human capacities and cosmic forces. The children of Ahura are: Good Thought (Vohu Manah), Best Righteousness (Asha Vahishta), Holy Devotion (Spenta Armaiti), Desirable Dominion (Khsathra Vairya) and Immortality (Ameretat). The opposing demons are principally Fury (Aeshma) and Deceit (Azhi Dahaka), but also Jealousy, Anarchy, Lethargy, Wrongmindedness, Vile Thoughts, Presumption and Corruption. Zoroastrians do not have a problem of evil: evil is an independent fact. Although God cannot control evil, one day good will be victorious. Evil, unlike good, does not materialize but only exists as a force which parasitizes man. Certain animals which are ugly, deadly or cruel were provided by Ahura to ensure people can recognize evil. Purity laws and the avoidance of pollution bring the cosmic conflict between good and evil into the daily lives and homes of the believers. Man aids Ahura and is expected to 'overcome doubts and unrighteous desires with reason, overcome greed with contentment, anger with serenity, envy with benevolence, want with vigilance, strife with peace, falsehood with truth'. Zoroastrianism is a religion of happiness, personal responsibility and good works.
>
> Ex. 4.6[22]

Each level of value is its own unique form of good. So the supreme good implies seeking to realize values at each level in a way that befits their nature. It would seem that to call social things like (say) contraception or unemployment evil rather than bad is not wise. To stigmatize as evil politicians who must make difficult decisions between alternative bads is unfair. It could be said that inappropriate or unbalanced criticism of the good at any level, a common enough behaviour by scientists, philosophers and theologians, denies the supreme good or at least weakens its realization.

People have tried to argue for unity around a single good. However, unity is only possible in relation to ultimate values which are so abstract and experiential that they are not useful for controlling or organizing others. Elsewhere — value systems, social values, principal objects, internal priorities — we find an inherent multiplicity. There can be no such thing *in practice* as a single good for each or all of us. As we shall see in the next chapter, a society finds itself endorsing or developing particular conceptions of the good. But this is not

the same as asserting either that these are the only conceptions or that they are unequivocally good for all. Those who over-emphatically promote a single path may not be evil, but they are not recognizing the supreme good either.

TRANSITION

Values and their development are of paramount significance for improving society, for running organizations, and for personal life. Paradoxically, values, despite being about the good, appear to foster evil. Looking around, we see that values lead people to attack alternative values and the value of others who hold these. We can agree with Hegel that "the essentially tragic fact is not so much the war of good with evil as it is the war of good with good". Because value conflicts are part of social existence, equating all of them to a battle between good and evil denies the nature of value, and so (by definition) liberates evil.

Value conflicts occur in the process of interaction between social groups of various sorts, and in the assertion of self in the context of group living. The next chapter explores the levels of value further by examining the properties and paradoxes of group life and individual identity.   ❖

Master-Table 2	**The complete hierarchy of purpose.** Additional properties are specified in Master-Tables 1, 3, 4 and 31. See text for further explanation The columns headed 'Transition downwards' and 'Transition upwards' describe the logic for the evolution of the hierarchy through the limitations of each level in terms of producing results (the 'how') and in justifying choice (the 'why'). Read the columns top down and bottom up respectively.						

	Type of Purpose	Definition	Transition Downwards (The 'How?')	Transition Upwards (The 'Why?')	Nature of Choice	Motivation (Motivation Type) Core Experience	Some Typical Critisms
7	Ultimate value	A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.			Inclusive-integrative	Inspiration (Transpersonal) Imagination	Too vague; too ambiguous; too abstract.
6	Value system	Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain	Need to order social life and guide thinking.	Need for an absolute justification.	Exclusive-divisive	Obligation (Social) Identification	Too confusing; too simplistic; too extreme; too controlling
5	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Need for ideas to be accepted by people.	Need for an explanatory rationale.	Inclusive-integrative	Need (Relational) Intuition	Too impractical; too platitudinous; too vacuous; too obvious.
4	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	Need to pursue specific activities competently.	Need for community endorsement.	Exclusive-divisive	Interest (Individual) Idea	Too constrained; too limited.
3	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use	Need to cope within available resources.	Need to limit possible choices.	Inclusive-integrative	Desire (Emotional) Emotion	Too situational; too pragmatic; too flexible; too inflexible.
2	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	Need to produce actual impact in the situation.	Need for action to be governed by preferences.	Exclusive-divisive	Intention (Vital) Image	Too imprecise; too subjective;
1	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome.	Need to adapt to circumstances in fine detail.	Need for a sense of what is to be achieved.	Inclusive-integrative	Awareness (Sensory) Sensation	Too demanding; too specific; too mechanical.

NOTES

1. Value systems are described in the literature under the various synonyms suggested in the text. The importance of ideas as values and the interpretation of reality in such terms has been emphasized in the hermeneutic tradition. See, for example: Ricoeur, P. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*. Ed. & transl. J.B. Thompson, London: Cambridge University Press, 1984. The significance of value systems has been evident in sociological studies, especially the critical tradition. It is now starting to be recognized in psychology e.g. Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. & Radley, A. *Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking*. New York: Sage, 1988. Social scientists, following the lead of physical scientists, do not usually think of scientific theories as value systems. This may lead them to claim that science is non-ideological e.g. Althusser, L. *Essays on Ideology*. London: Verso, 1984. My view is that science is ideological in the sense of having a recognizable value system. Its disciplines and theories are also value systems because they fit the definition of value systems and have their properties.

2. a) The challenge to the medical model of mental illness came from: Szasz, T. *The Myth of Mental Illness*. New York: Secker & Warburg, 1962. b) Political ideologies are regularly described in the social science literature. See: Larrain, J. *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson, 1979; McLellan, D. *Ideology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986; Williams, H. *Concepts of Ideology*. New York: Wheatsheaf, 1988. Larrain, J. *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson, 1979. c) See: Mitroff, I.I. *The Subjective Side of Science*. New York: Elsevier, 1974; Kinston, W. A total framework for inquiry. *Systems Research*, 5: 9-25, 1988.

3. The two main protagonists were C. Lindblom (e.g. The science of "muddling through". *Public Administration Review*, 19: 79-88, 1959) and Dror, Y. (e.g. Muddling through — science or inertia. *Public Administration Review*, 24: 154, 1964).

4. In the U.K., where many Islamic communities have become culturally isolated, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) mounted seminars and published Discussion Papers to enable these debates. e.g. *Law, Blasphemy and the Multi-faith Society*. CRE and the Inter-Faith Network; *Free Speech*. CRE and Policy Studies Institute; *Britain: A Plural Society*. CRE and The Runnymede Trust. (All published in London by the CRE, 1990.)

5. Anshen, R.N. (ed.) *Moral Principles of Action: Man's Ethical Imperative*. Vol. 6 in the Science of Culture Series. New York: Harper, 1953; Findlay, J.N. *Values and Intentions. A Study in Value Theory and Philosophy of Mind*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961; Maslow, A. *Toward a Psychology of Being. (2nd Ed.)* Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1968.

6. For philosophical dismissals, see: Zink, S. *The Concepts of Ethics*. London: Macmillan, 1962; and Mackie, J.L. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. The theologist's quotation is from: Grisez, G. & Shaw, R. *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibility of Freedom*. London: Notre Dame University Press, 1974, p. 104.

7. Keats, J. Ode to a Grecian Urn. In: Bullett G. (ed.) *John Keat's Poems*. London: Dent, 1964.

8. See, for example: Urban, W.M. *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*. New York, 1909. Findlay, J.N. *Axiological Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970.

9. Bringing values under the wing of science is a vexed issue. Attempts have been made e.g. Perry, R.B. *Realms of Value*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1954; Handy, R. *Value Theory and the Behavioral Sciences*. Springfield, Il.: Charles C. Thomas, 1969. A rather general hierarchy of forms of value has been noted by some e.g. Albert, E.M. The classification of values: A method and illustration. *American Anthropologist*, 58: 221-248, 1956; Kluckhohn, C. et al. Values and value-orientations in the theory of action: An exploration in definition and classification. In: Parson, T. & Shils, E. (eds.) *Toward a General Theory of Action*. p. 388-433. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1952. The present framework is offered as a new scientific approach.

10. Philosophers like J. Finnis home in on social values cf. *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Empiricists like J. Dewey prefer internal priorities cf. *The Theory of Valuation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Ideologues like Althusser affirm value systems cf. op. cit. [1]. Theologians like Buber concentrate on ultimate values cf. *Between Man and Man*. (transl. R. Smith) London: Kegal Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947. Few seem to emphasize principal objects as values.

11. See, for example: Grisez, G. & Shaw, R. op. cit. [6].

12. For an amusing account of an attempt to use a value system to run a business, see: Chippindale, P. & Horrie, C. *Disaster! The Rise and Fall of the News on Sunday: Anatomy of a Business Failure*. London: Sphere Books, 1988.

13. The first list comes from: Finnis, J. *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. The second list comes from: Grisez, G. *Christian Moral Principles*. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983.

14. Editorial. Blowing the whistle on accountancy. *The Economist*, 22 December 1990, p. 16.

15. Two classic texts emphasizing the importance of the decision to participate in an organization are: Simon, H.A. *Administrative Behaviour*. New York: Macmillan 1957; Hirschman, A.O. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

16. This point is made convincingly by Ken Wilber in: *Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1983.

17. For example, see: Rauschning, H. *Revolution of Nihilismus*. London: Arno Press, 1990; Kogon, E. *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. New York: Berkeley Medallion, 1958.

18. Many theologians, philosophers and psychologists have noted this feature of evil. See, for example: Fromm, E. *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.

19. This has led to an ethics oriented to situations: e.g. Fletcher, J. *Situation Ethics*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.

20. Zagorin, P. *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution and Conformity in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

21. See: Mead, M. (ed.) *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change* New York: Mentor, 1955, Ch. 2 p. 126-150.

22. Zaehner, R.C. *The Teachings of the Magi*. London, 1966. Quotation taken from p. 25.

Chapter 5

Handling Natural Social Groups

We now turn to three properties of values — identity, social group, and energy — which have been barely touched upon as yet. The notion of developing values, that is to say, of determining what is important or good for us, suggests a focus on both personal identity and social life. When we do something, the social group is a contextual factor. But in regard to who we are, the social group is a dominant factor. We can barely imagine ourselves apart from the identity of a variety of social groups with which, like it or not, we are deeply involved.

The term 'social group' is restricted here to collectives which are natural in that they emerge more or less spontaneously around values which all in the group implicitly or explicitly freely recognize and share. So I am excluding groups formed haphazardly (e.g. people in a ticket queue), or defined statistically (e.g. males aged 30-40 years), or based on categories or classes (e.g. all unskilled labourers, all widows) In this context, organizations are individuals constructed for a task, and their work groups (teams and hierarchies) are special cases.

The notion of common values invites a link between social groups and the hierarchy of values. The aim of this chapter is to make that link by describing the distinctive forms of social group generated by each level of value. I will also examine the way that values are used by these social groups to release and channel personal energy. This exploration will offer a perspective on the development of personal identity.

INTRODUCING NATURAL SOCIAL GROUPS

The Assumption of Social Existence. I would like to be able to take it as self-evident that the growth of the self depends on developing values. I would also like to take for granted that there is an interacting relationship between the identities of social groups and their members. However, this would be to pretend that such matters are not the subject of intense speculation and debate. Even the idea that values need to be developed so that a group knows what it stands for, and so

that people know who they are, is not commonly accepted.

Social scientists share a focus on social life, but differ sharply on the relation of social groups to the self. Most psychoanalysts follow Freud in minimizing the significance of the social group in their theorizing about the self. At the other extreme are sociologists who regard the notion of the individual and individual morality as a mistake: the social group is all. Social psychologists and socially-oriented psychotherapists occupy a middle ground. Varied pictures are offered by cultural theorists attempting to reconcile the individual and the group. Mead viewed the social group as a cooperative and generalized 'other' which naturally gave rise to the self. Marx viewed the social group as inherently conflicted and demanding a struggle for genuine existence from each person. Writers in the modernist and post-modernist tradition emphasize the fragmenting effect of society on self-hood.

We do not need to enter these complex academic debates on the self and its social context. Yet some brief orientation to identity and social groups is needed before we plunge in. Elsewhere, I have concluded that there is a need for a variety of approaches to the self-conscious development of identity, and we will need to explore them in due course.[1] One of these approaches to identity is central to the framework and directly relevant to the creation of social groups. I call it: social being or social existence. To introduce the notion of social being, I will summarize the basic assumptions which most people find acceptable and useful in thinking about social life.

(A) *People exist in social groups which they create and maintain.* Social life is all around us. To ignore this does not make any sense. We must assume that group formation is more than an interesting characteristic of people. Social life seems to be an absolute requirement for human development and is partially genetically programmed according to socio-biologists.[2] Many human potentialities, including language, are undeveloped in the absence of a social upbringing. It is obvious, too, that people put a great deal of effort into maintaining social life.

(B) *Both the person and the group, separately and in their own way, come to regard certain things as important and good — these are their values.* Values are all around us. People do develop common conceptions of what is good and do share with others aspirations to realize these. If people really had no values in common, then they would live utterly solitary lives. This way of life would not be propagated by offspring or fellows: so it would self-extinguish. It is assumed. then, that man has evolved as a social being who participates in groups through a capacity to develop, use and maintain values.

(C) *The recognition and assertion of values is an essential aspect of identity.* From the perspective of social existence and evolution, anyone's identity — who one is, what one thinks, what one does — is built on persistent and sustainable values. The creation of one's self as a social being is an active process that requires the deliberate choice and use of values available within a variety of social groups. In short, man has an identity as a social being.

(D) *The growth of personal identity interacts inextricably with the identity and evolution of social groups.* Each person is involved in a variety of social groups. To a greater or lesser degree, personal identity is moulded and shaped by the values dominant in those social groups; and to a greater or lesser degree, the identity of the social groups is shaped by each person's identity-based values. This fourth proposition will be developed and explored further in this chapter.

Summarizing the Groups

Each person is unique and yet people are like each other. Values are a typical expression of this paradoxical combination of identity and commonality. Put another way, values both distinguish people and unite people. Identity is, to use Freud's term, a primal word.[1] Primal words convey two opposite meanings: 'cleave', for example, is primal because it means both 'to separate' and 'to attach'. Identity is primal because it means both distinctiveness and sameness. At each level of value, values held in common create a characteristic basis of sameness that permits formation of a distinct type of social group. These common values and social groups affect and express personal uniqueness.

Both individuals and social groups seek to promote the good (as they see it), and seek to prevent harm and reduce the bad (as they see it). The social group seeks to promote those goods which all in the group share, that is to say the common good. The social group also seeks to prevent or reduce the harms which all in the group share, that is to say the common bad.

If social groups are based on common values, then each type of value would be expected to constitute or correspond to a particular form of natural social group. This is indeed the case. The five types of natural social group are labelled as follows: *humanity* or *unions* (L-7), *tribes* (L-6), *communities* (L-5), *associations* (L-4) and *factions* (L-3).

Through examining the natural social groups and their constituting type of value, we can appreciate their relationship to a person's identity. It will become evident that values at every level lead to the person's identity being strengthened by the social group, the social group's identity being strengthened by the person, and the values themselves being strengthened by both.

Before examining the hierarchy of natural social groups in detail, a sketch of each type is provided below. The full picture is summarized in Master-Table 3.

L-7: Humanity and unions form around ultimate values. Existence as a human being generates the potential for experiencing, holding and sharing an ultimate value. Ultimate values break down boundaries between people and make harmonious unions possible. They liberate spiritual forces and permit reconciliation of differences.

L-6: Tribes form around value systems in order to preserve social distinctiveness. The tribe and its value system are perpetuated by socialization. Coexistence is required despite the negative attitudes which arise between groups. Tribes generate intense solidarity amongst members and demand and get their willing loyalty.

L-5: Communities form around social values in order to meet social and personal needs. The community depends on mutuality and fellowship. Communities tend to share many social values, so they can cooperate and feel positive towards each other. The force released by communities is belonging: an emotional sense of attachment to the community and its values despite any undesirable features.

L-4: Associations form within tribes and communities around principal objects in order to promote an interest formally. Members create the association through their commitment to its objects. Associations with similar objects compete for members and resources; but they may form alliances to pursue common goals. Associations release and channel enthusiasm.

L-3: Factions form within associations around internal priorities in order to ensure a particular view prevails. Members create such groups by taking sides in particular situations demanding choice. Factions define each other by their opposing viewpoints. Whenever

opposition is unnecessary or undesirable for the association, members coalesce or a coalition is formed. Factions release passion which can degenerate into fanaticism.

Properties. The bulk of this chapter is taken up by an exploration of the *nature* of the characteristic form of social group at each level of value, together with examples. As is evident from the above summaries, all types of social group share certain properties. These properties, with the key term italicized, are listed here in the order they will be considered in the descriptions to follow.

First, the essential *function* of the type of social group will be identified. When people in groups are energized by values, extraordinary social forces are released. Social forces depend on non-physical human energies which accompany and power the various motivations already identified. These human energies are released and channelled by activation of the values in the group context.

The various modes of *group formation* will be examined, and then the type of situation which is *antithetical* to group existence will be described. Under the heading, *group relations*, we will examine the nature of cohesion within the social group. We will note how such groups interact with each other both when they deliberately link up and when they develop separately in parallel. Social groups based on value imply or aspire to equality, but some form of *leadership* is needed, and *status* issues are invariably a concern: again, the expression of both varies according to level. Turning to the individual, the method of *entry* to, participation, and *exit* from the group will be described at each level. Then the relation of the type of social group and values to *identity formation* will be clarified. Finally the *limitation* inherent in social groups at that level provides a logic for moving down a level to a new type of social group.

Caveat. The subject of social life and its organization is so vast that the very limited aim of the present analysis needs to be kept in mind. The aim here is to heighten awareness of the different sorts of value, to demonstrate that these distinctions amongst values are not merely conceptual but parallel important forms of social organization, and finally to link values and social groups to identity development. With this aim, let us commence the account starting once again from the source of all value, ultimate values.

HUMANITY, UNIONS AND ULTIMATE VALUES (L-7)

Nature. Ultimate values reflect and sustain a social group that involves all *humanity*. Humanity includes not only all people in all cultures, but also all people across all time. The notion of the oneness of humanity expresses a sense of a deep and fundamental commonality between people. This commonality must be at root biological, but it is recognized in practice as experiential. The social manifestation of commonality stems from ultimate values which are able to unite us all precisely because they are experiential states. Because ultimate values define each of us as part of a single social group and are used to define God, they invite the view that all are equal in the sight of God.

There is nothing abstruse about recognizing the unity of humanity as a genuine social group. When a father says to his son that 'one day we will fly to the stars', he is recognizing their joint participation in the human race. John Donne expressed the same idea in a poem: "no man is an island, entire of itself......any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind."[4] The joke that 'I love mankind, it's people I can't stand' has a kernel of truth. It seems that the further one grows spiritually, the more people one loves, and the fewer people one likes. This is because liking is based on superficial features like charm and similarities of habits and interests, whereas loving depends on respect and acceptance of an essence beneath these.

Being part of humanity is not an organizational or intellectual matter, it is defined in terms of an experience of relatedness which is permeated by ultimate values. In other words, membership of humanity is experiential, rather than a matter of social certification. Awareness of this membership powerfully affects the operation of social groups at lower levels. Ultimate values define sought after states of being. When ultimate values and a deep sense of common humanity are operative in a particular group or relationship (at lower levels), the group may be termed a union. Commonality within a union is sometimes described as a 'sense of genuine relatedness'. So union heightens the unique identity of each and precludes primitive psychological fusion between people or with the group. Such fusion, often mistaken for union, fragments and destroys identity.

Function. The recognition of our common humanity within any social group has an important function. It facilitates union within that group and between that group and others. Union involves a sensitive attunement between people so that all interact in a way that expresses and activates ultimate values. Attuning allows interaction to be peaceful, truthful, harmonious, just, and loving. These ultimate values are completely shared values and such sharing creates a bond so deep that it invokes a sense of oneness: hence the term union. The notion of humanity and the possibility of union aids us in relating better, not only to

people of alien cultures in distant places, but also to our intimates and neighbours.

Humanity as a whole is not, at present, characterized by union. However the recognition of the possibility of union within other smaller social groups is a worthy goal pointing in the right direction. Just as social values contain the potential for worthwhile activity, so ultimate values carry the potential for worthwhile group life. Much of this section will focus on groups in which ultimate values are activated, and which can therefore be described as unions. Buber has described "that rightness which... is expressed as revelation... and...cannot be realized in the individual, but only in human community".[5] To this must be added the rider — 'only in the state of union'.

The effect of union is to release and channel spirituality. This force may not be recognized as such. It may be identified as a realization of a particular ultimate value like trust, peace or love, or be felt as an experience like lightness, illumination or release, or appear as charisma attached to some member, often a leader figure. The experience of union is felt to be given from outside the group, although it is dependent upon the efforts of members of the group to recognize and be guided by ultimate values. Union leads to an evident unification of the group. Spirituality within a union strengthens and enriches people. In particular, it supports whatever other values the members may hold or purposes they may be pursuing.

AA: Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is an association which operates through a group process that generates union and uses spirituality. Its twelve steps are: "1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol — that our lives had become unmanageable. 2. We came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity. 3. We made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him. 4. We made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves. 5. We admitted to God, to ourselves and to other human beings the exact nature of our wrongs. 6. We were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character. 7. We humbly asked Him to remove our short-comings. 8. We made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all. 9. We made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure them or others. 10. We continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it. 11. We sought through prayer and mediation to improve our conscious contact with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out. 12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these Steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics and to practise these principles in all our affairs." Atheists cope with the dreaded word 'God' by referring to 'group power' instead.   Ex. 5.1

Group Formation. A social group may enter a state of union in a variety of ways. Recognition of a common humanity may emerge relatively readily in times of crisis. Total strangers, when involved in a catastrophe, will bond together spontaneously; and the capacity for tragedy and war to bring out the best in people is well-recognized. The popular response to relieve a distant outbreak of famine is another expression of participation beyond nationality or community. However, the union generated in these ways tends to dissipate rapidly.

For many, union breaks through only in moments of apparently altruistic sacrifice. Only apparently altruistic, because altruism implies an other — from L. *alter* = other — and the other is one with the self in this mode. A person explaining an apparently altruistic act will say 'I could not have done otherwise', or 'I could not have lived with myself if I had done otherwise'. People who have spontaneously and heroically risked their life for another have referred to an inexpressible and puzzling sense of connection.

The post-war use of groups for personal development — therapy groups, sensitivity groups, T-groups, therapeutic communities, support groups, community-building seminars and the like — has led to a realization that union is a necessary preliminary. As a psychoanalyst, I found that union was a prerequisite for analysands to relive and rework childhood traumas. I called this state 'primary relatedness'.[6] The implication of these findings is that any work of deep personal significance, or work involving the use of the self, requires union to overcome the defensiveness, idealization and inappropriate competitiveness which hamper effectiveness.

Marriages and families are the natural entities which society expects to foster union over the long term. All societies place great value on the integrity of the family, and religions invariably invest marriage with a deep spiritual significance. Husband and wife at first, and progressively the children too, are expected to foster feelings of mutual respect and understanding. The work needed to ensure that a union actually develops and that exploitation, manipulation, distance and hardness do not drive out love is not given enough attention in modern society. The present gap between the rhetoric of union and the reality of much family life seems to reflect an inability for people to be fully open and honest with themselves and with each other.

Larger communities fostering union have existed amongst monastic orders and religious groups led by radical charismatic leaders. Spiritually-driven utopian communes were common in the USA in the 19th century, but are relatively unusual at present. These were never easy alternatives to modern society, and few of

them survived longer than a generation. In the case of modern anarchist communes, where the main urge is escape from the burden of social living, degeneration and collapse is rapid. Union only survives in communities when the search for spirituality is a positive driving force for the members.

> Oneida Community: The Oneida Community was founded in 1848 by John Noyes from his bible class after he lost his license to preach. It consisted of 200 people who were organized around the early Christian principle that 'the believers possessed one heart, and one soul and had all things in common'. Equality and communalism characterized all arrangements: the family was replaced by a complex system of free love in which men and women approached each other through third parties; children were raised communally; almost all property, work and leisure was communal; government was provided by numerous committees on which all had a chance to serve. Mutual criticism was used for social control, to foster union, and to ensure the development of virtue. The members felt that their community was a shining example of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, and viewed the outside world as spiritually contaminating. The community eventually dissolved in 1881 and became a business manufacturing silverware.   Ex. 5.2[7]

Antithesis. The antithesis of union is anti-social or anti-human behaviour driven by negative ultimate values. Such behaviour is often associated with psychological states of fusion in which personal identity is lost. Then violence and coercion, disrespect and denigration attack identity and block union directly.

Genocidal policies reflect a direct attack on humanity. These policies incite hate and dehumanize the victims in order to overcome any reluctance to deprive or kill them. Killing is called extermination to generate a resemblance to the slaughter of pests. Victims are given numbers rather than names or simply herded without discrimination. In wartime, the humanity of the enemy is not so much denied as viewed as an obstacle to victory by the political and military authorities. The dehumanization of the enemy may be overcome, as in the Christmas in the trenches episode at the onset of World War 1 when, to the dismay of the authorities, British and German soldiers fraternized. Alternatively, dehumanization may degenerate into mindless massacres of civilians, as in the My Lai episode in the Vietnam war.

More insidious, but equally significant in modern life, is the absence of union generated by a lack of effective contact with positive ultimate values. People seek union in social settings of all sorts: in their family, in their workplace, in their church, in their sporting club, in their neighbourhood, in their charitable efforts. But, too often, union is not found.

The modern denigration of spirituality, the scientific devaluation of values, the academic flight from wrestling with the idea of God, the professionalization of everything, the dead hand of convention, all these combine to block contact with ultimate values and their affirmation in relatedness. But without a certain level of communion, isolation fragmentation and insensitivity is inevitable. From here it is a short step to the release of antagonism and loss of respect, in short to social breakdown.[8]

Violence within families, mindless vandalism, a drug-abusing underclass, squalid living, depersonalized sexuality, such phenomena when widespread are symptomatic of the loss of a sense of humanity in a modern society. Unity may be vaunted in repressive societies based on a leadership cult, informers, secret police, torture and detention without trial, but humanity and union are absent there as well.

Group Relations. The development of a sense of deep commonality depends on a process of communion. This communion is a communicative mode, verbal and non-verbal, which provides cohesion for the group and enables containment of tensions and disagreements amongst its members. Freedom and harmony are the observed and felt state of affairs wherever union genuinely exists. (Even if, to the outsider, the group atmosphere and arrangements appear to be austere, strict and controlling.) Differences between members of the group are recognized, but these do not become a reason for disconnection or rejection.

A union is self-contained in that there is no need for the group to identify with anything outside of itself. However, the nature of union and the method by which it is achieved generate an urge to include others. Boundaries are not just overcome with other people or groups, but also with animals, plants, and even things. All these may come to be felt to be part of a unified interconnected whole. "Blessedness" said Spinoza "is the knowledge which the mind has of its union with the whole of nature". This phenomenon, seen purposively, is given a variety of names like Destiny, the Hand of God, Dharma or Tao.

Because ultimate values and humanity are inclusive, the artificial creation of enemies is inhibited. Union requires a process of reconciliation amongst groups of different sorts. This implies positive efforts at contact and communication no matter how difficult or painful the relationship. For example, without condoning their brutal invasion of Tibet, the Dalai Lama in exile publicly forgives the Chinese. By contrast, bickering and suspicion rather than understanding and trust seem to be the rule within and amongst most states and their political leaders.

In our world of nations, union can be fostered by activities and events which transcend the individual and the state. The creations of science, music, sport, art and architecture, being products of inspiration and imagination, can sometimes break through the barriers of culture and language and provide us with the certainty of a deep identity of all.

Leadership and Status. In a union, status differences are minimized and leadership is diffused throughout the group. Equality is deeply felt but it exists alongside a sensitivity to differences and an awareness of the uniqueness of each person. Leadership is based in charisma. Charismatic leadership is inspired by a transcendental force that compels recognition. It is assumed to be an expression of grace given by God. Charisma is free-floating in a union, whereas in lower level groups it tends to fix on someone able to affirm and uphold ultimate values.

So leadership in a union need not be prominent or permanently attached to one member. Communion fosters a consciousness that each person needs to choose responsibly for the sake of the group and each other, and yet each needs to submit to the way the group is developing. This mentality leads to choices being made in a realistic and highly effective fashion: something which is obvious to those who have experienced union, but which is puzzling to others.

Governing the Society of Friends: The Quakers hold that the Bible is secondary in authority to the Spirit of God which is available to all and known directly. They use unprogrammed and mainly silent worship in which anyone, man or woman, may speak to the congregation or offer a prayer on its behalf. The congregations govern their society using meetings for church affairs. At each meeting every Friend may attend and should do so if possible. It is believed that the Light in each person will lead into union and the right choice if faithfully followed. The meetings begin and conclude with worship, and worship may be introduced during them. Discussion proceeds but no vote is taken. At the conclusion of an item, the clerk records the judgement of the meeting and this must be accepted, perhaps with agreed modifications, before further business is taken.   Ex. 5.3

Entry and Exit. Membership of humanity is open to all. Being human suffices and, by definition, there can be no bar to entry. Exit is not possible — not even through death. What is possible is a failure to realize the significance of humanity as a transpersonal group. People forget or deny their own essence. Realizing the significance of a transpersonal identity is the first step to developing the capacity for union with others.

To enter into and maintain union via communion requires activation of one's 'true self'. The process of entering union involves acceptance of vulnerability, recognition of imperfection, direct communication, experiential openness, and mutual respect and acceptance — as well as commitment to the aims of the group (cf. Ex.s 5.1 to 5.3). This is only possible by attuning to one's deep experience or listening to one's soul. Recognizing and activating being is part of spiritual growth. It has been described by all the major religions. Yet the path is repeatedly rediscovered anew — especially by psychologists in modern times.[9] Somehow pure being seems metaphysical and mysterious, even mystical, although its properties are straightforward and the process of reaching it has been documented so often and so well.

Once being has been solidly recognized by a person and found in a group, exit from that state or that group is rarely sought. If union is lost by accident or for practical reasons, re-creation of the state of union is attempted again or elsewhere with others. Union is unambiguously good, despite all the trials, tribulations and conflicts that need handling while sustaining the group.

Identity Formation. Ultimate values call for union of oneself with others around and with all humanity. Such union is never fusion. Union depends on the operation of an unambiguous and distinct sense of self, and is not a regressive or primitive loss of self, or projection of the self. The self that exists here is not an ego, isolated by trappings of status or childhood distortions or fantasies of self-sufficiency, but a self which is pure being and which recognizes a transpersonal and transcendent reality.

Being and communion is impossible for those dominated by postures that generate a false self and a collusive form of relatedness. It is utterly blocked by antisocial behaviour. Most people are blocked by their own rigid and inappropriate self-assertiveness — colloquially referred to as their ego — and by the excessive use of institutions and authorities to buttress their views and decisions. The way to enlightenment, as every sage knows, is to abandon the ego. This occurs by recognizing the superficiality and transitoriness of memories, desires, prejudices and expectations. It is often described as emptying the self, or as dying to be reborn. Once this is done, the spiritual self is released and union becomes possible.

Being creates union, and union affirms being. The conception of human nature that exists in any culture or era limits what any particular individual can be. Conversely, the conception that can be realized by any particular individual may succeed in redefining what human nature can be for others. This process is evident

in the evolution of awareness or consciousness over the past 2,000,000 years.[10] For instance, the recognition that the fertility of the fields and the seasonal cycle did not depend on human sacrifice was an extraordinary development in awareness. The Greek originators of our civilization lacked any concept of will, so the development of individuality in the West during the Renaissance was a redefinition of being.[11] The enlightenment of Siddartha Gautama as the Buddha was yet another. Conscious recognition of what man can be clearly requires an extraordinary degree of imagination and inspiration. People like Socrates, Jesus and Siddartha obviously were extraordinary. By being themselves, they defined what humanity could be.

Membership of humanity implies that the responsibility for changing the world lies with each person recognizing the truth of the spirit and following it. At present, people appear to be becoming aware of the interconnectedness of mankind, and of man and nature, and the need for peace and harmony in these relations. This is an important step towards union. Till relatively recently, it seemed esoteric to emphasize mankind's interconnectedness. Not to recognize this today takes some effort given global communications, the worldwide inter-relations of commodities and finance, and the actual and potential destructiveness of our technologies.

This modern awareness of interconnectedness is not equivalent to its precursor, the harmony of man and nature known in primitive cultures. The loss of that harmony was a necessary step in the individuation of human awareness which allowed scientific creativity and the technological control of many natural phenomena. Primitive man could not intervene in nature to cause much harm; but modern man can. So our personal responsibility for union is of far greater significance.

Because we are each part of humanity, it follows that "no one can be perfectly free till all are free; no one can be perfectly moral till all are moral; no one can be perfectly happy till all are happy".[12]

Limitation. Humanity and union are necessary for all, but they are not sufficient. Union recognizes but does not regulate the myriad of individual differences generated by social life; and union, alone, cannot deal effectively with evil intent or anti-social behaviour. Differences need to be fostered. People seem to need to develop, affirm and celebrate their uniqueness. And each particular social domain can only thrive if distinctive values are identified for it, and then used to attract, guide and bind people.

In short, union is but a context for social life. The family is the obvious example of this. Although children need to grow spontaneously and uniquely in the beneficial atmosphere that union creates, they also require guidance of a very specific sort about what to value. This guidance will inevitably differ from family to family as well as from community to community and nation to nation.

The expression of union and the realization of ultimate values depends on the creation of different types of social group which emerge from values at lower levels. We turn now to the pre-eminent and most problematic type of social group.

TRIBES AND VALUE SYSTEMS (L-6)

Nature. Value systems reflect and sustain social groups which, for lack of a better term, I will call *tribes*.

Tribes are created by socialization and generate a social classification or categorization of people which is felt to be of the utmost importance. A tribe in the classical sense is typically endogamous, that is to say marriages must occur within it. So tribes based on race or culture come first to mind. From the present perspective, marriage and reproduction within a tribe is not so much about passing on genes, it is more a mechanism for ensuring transmission of the value system. A nation is a numerous tribe based on a language, tradition and culture. Any group that shares a history or territory may develop a culture, a way of doing things including a value system. It then takes on tribal characteristics. Students of prehistory suggest that the earliest tribes were extended families or clans. In modern societies, social classes based on rigid socio-economic barriers, may become tribal.

Tribes in the extended sense are not restricted to family, ethnic or cultural groups. Tribes are here defined as groups which possess a long-standing recognizable value system. For example, they may form from those holding distinctive religious beliefs, or be generated by sharply defined professional and other occupational roles, or emerge as those working within a school of thought in an academic discipline. In other words, it does make sense to speak of the tribe of economists or journalists or behaviourists or Marxists.

Tribes and Sects: The Jews of the diaspora are united by their Judaic value system even though this means including people with a wide range of very different cultural beliefs and practices. The same is true of Muslims and Christians. Despite their common origin in the Old Testament revelation of Abraham. Jews Muslims and Christians are in practice utterly separate. Within religions there are sects with their own distinctive value systems: the early

Roman Catholic Church generated Carthusians who emphasized manual labour and renunciation of the world, Franciscans who were committed to teaching and serving the poor, and Dominicans who were dedicated to the intellectual presentation and defence of the faith. So value systems can exist within value systems and sub-tribes may sustain a distinctive identity so long as it is within that of the encompassing tribe.   Ex. 5.4

Tribes, in the extended sense, have become numerous in modern societies because religious exclusivity has diminished, ethnic migrations have flourished, social activities and roles have diversified and specialized, and schools of thought have proliferated.

Primitive societies show relatively little differentiation of skill and interest. Social groups within these societies recruit through birth, and membership (which is based on age, sex, kinship and neighbourhood) is usually compulsory. Withdrawal or change of group or society as a whole is not possible, so social identity is extremely restricted. By contrast, people in modern societies are dedicated members of a few tribes: usually one associated with their culture, another associated with their work or socio-economic status, possibly another associated with their religious or political beliefs. They can, with effort, alter their memberships. The rule of endogamy is not strictly upheld, but it still applies in modern society. Such endogamy is partly opportunistic, partly demanded by social convention, and partly a personal preference for a partner similar to oneself.

Function. The function of the tribe is to provide for and preserve social distinctiveness. Within a particular domain, each member of a tribe holds a similar set of ideas to fellow members. These ideas are felt to be utterly distinct from the set of valued ideas held by members of other tribes. Tribes celebrate and affirm their own value systems, which they see as the best way, or even the only way, to realize certain ultimate values. Scientists, for example, might accept that journalists, artists and theologians seek and communicate truth and knowledge, but the gulfs separating life within these four tribes is immense.

Tribal membership activates and channels loyalty. Loyalty is the crucial force that enables a person to uphold the virtues of the group and to defend it vigorously against criticism and attack. It is a powerful force for tribal continuity and contributes to its persistence through hard times. Hard times include those periods when members are ashamed of the views or behaviour of the tribe as a whole or of members acting on its behalf. Loyalty is particularly poignant when a person who is selflessly serving the group is rejected or even persecuted by other members or group officials. This

sometimes happens with espionage or undercover agents.

Loyalty in a nation-state is often called patriotism. Exaggerated and bellicose loyalty has come to be known as chauvinism after Nicolas Chauvin of Rochefort, a veteran soldier of the First Republic and Empire in France. Loyalty reaches its extreme where, as in the military, loyalty is itself specifically part of the value system. Some churches take the same view.

Church & Dissent: In 1989, the Vatican, disturbed by dissent, attempted to impose a loyalty oath on Catholic priests and theologians. In 1990, it published a document approved by the Pope which asserts clearly that theologians do not have any right of public dissent from the official Church teaching, even when such teaching does not pretend to infallibility. The document argues that 'standards of conduct appropriate to civil society or the workings of a democracy cannot be purely and simply applied to the Church'. In taking this line, the Church is no different from any other organization determined to maintain its cohesion. The following phrase in the document is identical to the military demand for unquestioning obedience: 'Appealing to the obligation to follow one's own conscience cannot legitimate dissent.' The Vatican cannot be accused of equivocating, or letting a long-standing element of its value system be modified.   Ex. 5.5[13]

As noted earlier, individuals usually have multiple loyalties. These can lead to inner conflict. The theologians affected in Ex. 5.5 suffer precisely because loyalty to their society's value system requires them to assert their right to freedom of thought and inquiry, while loyalty to their church demands some sacrifice of their independence of thought. A much commoner loyalty conflict in modern society results from the division between loyalty to the family and loyalty to the firm. The in-law problem is a loyalty conflict between the family of origin and the family of procreation. During wartime, there may be conflicts between the loyalty owed to one's nation of birth and one's nation of residence.

If a tribe's importance is excessively exalted, for good or bad reasons, without concern for wider society, loyalty conflicts become externalized as tribal warfare. For example, the UK print workers were a well-integrated tribe organized into trade unions which often seemed to show little concern for the demands of newspaper production. Their stance culminated in the 1980's in complete exclusion from one newspaper group and pitched battles with police.

To avoid such things and capitalize on the power of loyalty, national leaders desire to make the main tribal memberships coterminous. A territory with a single established religion and a unitary culture is relatively easy to govern. For this reason, conquests have been

regularly followed by efforts to destroy the local culture and religion.

> Tribes and Conquest: 1. 'On the same day, Joshua captured Makkedah and put both king and people to the sword, destroying both them and every living thing in the city. He left no survivor..... Then Joshua and all the Israelites marched....to Libnah and attacked it......and they put its people and every living thing in it to the sword; they left no survivor there...... From Libnah....to Lachish.... they took it on the second day and put every living thing to the sword....'. Moses was more practical, and he advised: kill the men and mature women, but breed from the virgins.[14] 2. Zoroastrianism was the state religion of various Iranian empires until the Arabs conquered Iran and imposed Islam in the 7th century. Zoroastrians declined more rapidly after the 9th century due to successive conquests of Iran by Muslim Turks and Mongols. In the 10th century a group fled to India and became known as the Parsis. By the 13th century, only a persecuted minority survived in Iran around two desert cities of Yazd and Kerman and Islam was the overwhelmingly dominant religion. 3. In 1949, China invaded Buddhist Tibet. It is estimated that 1.2 million Tibetans were killed. 7.5 million Chinese were moved in so making the remaining 6 million Tibetans a minority in their own country. Virtually all the 6000 Buddhist temples were destroyed and the spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, was forced into exile in 1959.   Ex. 5.6

Any established minority in a community is a natural scapegoat because of the inherent negativism between value systems. The persecution of minorities serves as a ready outlet for hostility and a relief from frustrations generated by the difficulties of social life.

Within the tribe, altruism is a manifestation of loyalty. In other words, self-sacrifice occurs for the value system or for symbols or individual representatives of the value system. Altruistic acts for another tribe are regarded with grave suspicion, and considered to be expressions of disloyalty and betrayal. 'The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality — one kind of behaviour for in-group relations, another for out-group'.[15]

Group Formation. As we have seen, tribes form in response to social, linguistic, religious, occupational, theoretical or other enduring distinctions. The incompatibility of beliefs, interests, activities, customs or modes of communicating leads to those of a like mind congregating and distancing themselves actually or psychologically from others. This congregation, combined with the desire to perpetuate the value system, produces the tribe.

Value systems which emerge over time in relation to activities or communal interaction cannot be designed. The tribe and its value system, and hence the definition

of a social identity for a person, evolves over a considerable period — usually more than one generation. Emotional, historical and geographical factors all influence the result. Other things being equal, the longer the history, the more secure the tribe and the more intense the tribalism.

Social and environmental changes may lead to tribal modification or weakness and extinction. Genetic extermination, the mainstay of early man, has been replaced by cultural evolution and social selection. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of religions. To illustrate the diversity needed for evolution: over 10,000 new primal religions are said to have developed in Africa in response to the impact of Christianity.[16] To illustrate relatively sudden major change: cult worship of the Mother Goddess which dominated Brahmanism in ancient India was rapidly displaced by Jainism and Buddhism whose founders emerged around 550BC.

Value systems which are pure theories or scientific paradigms are capable of deliberate design. However, the tribe itself remains beyond design because it requires the development of personal belief and must adapt to the social context. So scientific disciplines and theories also show evolutionary patterns and are affected by psychosocial pressures.

Loyalty generated by tribes encourages people to define and preserve the value system through socializing others into the tribe. Socialization efforts are intensified by groups that demand a great deal of their followers. This may take the form of indoctrination at work, use of schooling to drive home a message, exhortations in speeches and writings, and privileges for those who demonstrate their devotion to the tribe's ideals.

Antithesis. A tribe experiences itself as beset by two types of seemingly antithetical behaviour. The first is disbelief. Those who tolerate or even respect the tribe's value system, but are not members of the tribe potentially weaken both the tribe's external influence and its hold on its own members. Tribes vary in their efforts to convert or exclude such people, but non-believers generally play a useful role by being cast as inferior, ignorant, unenlightened or harmful.

The most undermining and dangerous force for any tribe comes from betrayal. Adherents who reject the tribe's value system in part or whole become susceptible to the ideas of alternative tribes, and may act on their behalf against their original tribe. Tribes are intolerant of lapsed members because of the trust, hope and effort invested in them. Free-thinkers, traitors and apostates are also reviled because they set a bad example.

One thinks of betrayal in relation to nation-states. However, the term can equally include a person who marries out of their community or class; a feminist who becomes a full-time wife and mother; a doctor who defends the validity of alternative medicine; an academic who rejects the foundation assumptions of his discipline; or a priest who rejects a key element of dogma. Such people tend to be punished, persecuted or rejected by their tribe. If the tribe is well-organized, ways exist for such members to be formally expelled. For instance, a person may be exiled from a country, excommunicated from a religion, or de-registered from a profession.

When the tribe is oriented around a well-defined school of thought, as in the case of psychoanalysis, Marxism, or Roman Catholicism, betrayal takes the form of revisionism, deviationism or heresy. Such tribes may tolerate differences and dispute within the value system, but direct criticism can only be allowed in the most marginal way. Tribes handle internal differences by forming sub-tribes (see Ex. 5.4). If differences between the sub-tribes are too great, then painful schism results.

Group Relations. The socialization process provides all adherents of the value system with much in common. For a tribe and its value system to persist, it is necessary to ensure that socialization is periodically reinforced and that new recruits are sought and systematically socialized. Value systems are assimilated via identification, so a full and thorough conversion is required. Often it has the element of an ordeal in the sense that an old self must die and a new self be reborn.

Membership of the tribe generates a solidarity or brotherhood which enables the group to sustain itself against outsiders. A sense of unity is essential. Group unity and identity is revealed in the way that all members defend the value system, affirm its central features, and proclaim its inherent goodness — typically using almost identical phrases and arguments.

The group looks after its members by looking after itself. Sometimes this involves keeping the numbers restricted while increasing the amount of resources put at the disposal of the tribe: professions usually try to take this approach. In other situations, it implies expanding the tribe and its sphere of influence to enable others to benefit. So accountants colonize universities, psychotherapists get involved in cancer care, and media people infiltrate political party machines.

Making Universities Businesslike: The tribe of academics has been united by a value system captured by the metaphor of the ivory tower. In the ivory tower, reputation is pursued through scholarship (even if only a tiny esoteric research community appreciates it), adaptation of ideas for public consumption is shunned (even if it would benefit the community), the general public is treated as ignorant (even if academics would benefit from listening), a boundary between work and social action is maintained (even if social needs are evident), academic freedom is supported (even if lines of research are fruitless over many years), and research which is not rigorous is opposed (even if it is useful or lucrative). The introduction of a business approach to Universities can be seen as an attempt to alter this value system. However academics have generally opposed changes aimed at making Universities more business-like.   Ex. 5.7

A diverse variety of tribes is often to be found within any single domain. They naturally come into conflict over values adopted in that domain and the allocation of resources. In a health service, for example, doctors, nurses, paramedics and managers cooperate reasonably well in the handling of patients, but fight bitterly over money for developments. Doctors as individuals may be altruistic guarantors of the patient's interests, but as a profession they are a powerful tribe affirming the pre-eminence of their values and pursuing their own advantage.[17]

Although variety is usually desirable from a practical or humanistic standpoint, adherents of any value system have an urge to reject and denigrate, if not utterly annihilate, different value systems. Negativity between tribes seems unavoidable. Within churches and utopian communes which explicitly foster union and where tolerance and acceptance might be expected, epithets for outsiders range from ignorant at best, through contaminating, to pernicious and evil. The most that can be realistically expected of tribes is that they should be expected to co-exist in a state of quiet non-pejorative negativity. Coexistence refers to the right for all tribes and their members to be allowed to function. Negativity refers to the sense of social distance and division between tribes. Tribes may grow towards each other over time, especially if sharing a common goal or faced with a common enemy, but inter-tribal unity is impossible. Inter-faith initiatives, for example, usually expect too much. Professionals, ideologues and religionaries find the limited aim of peaceful coexistence spoiled by deep drives of each tribe to assert pre-eminence. If coexistence is deeply hostile, social life is invariably harmed in some way.

Leadership and Status. All within a tribe are equal and yet tribes invariably generate an informal but widely recognized hierarchy. Over time, these status differentials may become sharp, rigid and immensely complex as in the Hindu caste system. In tribes based in occupations or political ideologies, the hierarchy develops in relation to the degree of dedication to the

value system, the significance of the contribution of the adherents, and their power in society. For example, the hierarchy within adherents of a political ideology depends on the degree of commitment, ideological purity and political ability; the hierarchy in academia reflects the quality of the academic contribution and service to the discipline.

The tribe desires, above all, for its value system to survive. It therefore organizes to defend its own distinctiveness and means of perpetuation. Membership-centred associations may be set up which are open only to the tribe and dedicated to its defence and promotion. The leadership needed by tribes and tribal bodies is quite unlike dynamic merit-based leadership needed in organizations. Tribal leaders are required for symbolic purposes and to perform ritual functions which signify the truth and power of the value system. They represent and endorse the value system internally to adherents and externally. So leadership is embodied in official or quasi-official positions e.g. presidents and councils of professional associations, general secretaries of trade unions, founding fathers of new disciplines or theories, heads of state or of world churches. Whoever is in these positions is treated deferentially, irrespective of their personal qualities.

Although those in leadership positions may play a role in handling social pressures and tribal changes, leadership here is intensely conservative in respect of the value system. There is little or no room for pragmatism or compromise by the leader, because such things are about what to do — not about what to be. The tribe exists to affirm a distinctive identity and value and the leadership symbolizes that existence and identity. Members of the tribe must be able to recognize themselves unambiguously in whoever is in the leadership position. Ideally that person should be recognized as being one-of-us and reflecting the best-in-us.

Entry and Exit. In the case of race and religion, people qualify for a particular tribe through their birth, and are socialized during their upbringing. University undergraduates are educated into accepting certain schools of thought and rejecting others. If their career is in academe or based in its teachings, they become voluntary converts. People often accept indoctrination voluntarily: for example, when joining a professional group or adopting a particular political ideology. They then obtain the needed socialization through self-disciplined effort, participation, and responding to exhortations. Acceptance by the group is granted via formal or informal qualifications. Religious membership and citizenship may be changed in later life through a voluntary conversion.

Entry to a tribe is charged with emotional significance because it means subordinating oneself to the values and needs of that tribe. In all cases, lengthy periods of initiation and adaptation in childhood or adulthood are required before full membership of the tribe is granted. Where a tribe has formally constituted itself, an investiture into full membership may take place when the individual is deemed ready. Because language unconsciously, implicitly and uncontrollably expresses values, the learning of a language (or a lexicon of specialized terms — jargon to outsiders) is encouraged if not enforced during the entry process. Such verbal and non-verbal language differences help to demarcate tribes. The resulting barriers to communication foster negativity.

The person whose innate or deliberate identity development leads to growth away from the value system of the tribe cannot stay within it. A process of mutual rejection commences, until either the tribe or member takes the final step to sever connection. Exit is generally viewed as positively undesirable by the tribe, and it may be impossible in the view of outsiders: Hitler, for example, persecuted Jews who had abandoned the faith.

> **Families and Family Therapy:** A family is a tribe in this context, but a most unusual one because it is impossible to de-select either our parents or our children. Membership of the family is more permanent than membership of nations, religions, professions or ideologies. When society was less individualistic, wider tribal values were a sufficient guide for family life. Now, each family requires the development of its own value system in which fairness and reciprocity as well as the meeting of emotional needs are worked out. The frequency of marital break up suggests that many fail in this task. (Perhaps too much is being expected.) Marital partners have to socialize each other and the children in order to create the necessary loyalty to the family unit, but such socialization involves loyalties to value systems in the families of origin. Family therapists have found that disturbance often results when there are unadmitted or unconscious loyalty conflicts. A family member may be treated as a traitor when all that is happening is a socially appropriate search for autonomy.
> Ex. 5.8[18]

Exit from a tribe is an emotionally difficult matter. Joining another tribe is equally difficult because it means undergoing a conversion to that tribe's values, often in the face of suspicion about loyalty. As a reaction, converts are known to become over-zealous and develop a 'holier than thou' attitude. Membership of two competing tribes is viewed with the deepest suspicion: a scientist who becomes a philosopher may never be fully accepted as a proper scientist or as a proper philosopher.

Identity Formation. Value systems demand an identification with the values and with the relevant tribe. So the tribe now defines the individual. Identification occurs in the socialization process, and roots the sense of obligation and loyalty to the tribe. The tribe's values and needs become indistinguishable from the individual's, and are held by the tribe to be more significant than any values or needs that the individual may have which are unrelated to the tribal identity and well-being. So death in the service of the tribe and its value system is regarded with favour. (Socio-biologists explain that parental sacrifice for a family, the earliest tribe, protected the germ line and so must have been selected for during evolution.[2])

Limitation. Socialization gives a sense of attachment which is too theoretical for everyday use. The tribe's value system makes no specific provision for differences between people or for the needs of particular situations. So it feels too demanding and too controlling of the individual at times. People need to be part of a social group which is more practical and flexible. They need a group which allows for some personal recognition, some regular physical and emotional contact, and which allows each person to have some influence over the group's identity. This takes us to what most people immediately think of when imagining a social group: a community.

COMMUNITIES AND SOCIAL VALUES (L-5)

Nature. Social values reflect and sustain actual organic *communities*. By calling the community actual and organic, I am attempting to avoid confusion with the metaphorical extension of the term to natural social groups at other levels — as in 'community of mankind' (L-7) or the worldwide 'community of feminists' (L-6). The community built around social values is a social group where people meet and interact continuously or periodically on a regular and public basis in respect of an undefined range of activities. Such a community is expected to meet the full range of needs of its individual members so far as this is possible. It seeks to accept personality differences and individual quirks and preferences. Any community is perceived to be a coherent and evolving entity with needs of its own.

The *primary* form of community, the focus in this section, is *territorially* defined. The size of the territory and number of people determines the quality and extent of the interaction. Community, as most people understand it, is realized in a shared household or in a neighbourhood or small town where personal recognition is possible and where mutual informal assistance

is natural and desirable. Such communities have been idealized: Rousseau, for example, felt that only in a community simple enough to be intelligible and small enough to allow effective participation could man be free, happy and on good terms with others.[19]

It is essential to recognize that there are discrete levels of territorial community and that each of us is potentially a member of seven progressively encompassing communities requiring government in quite distinct ways.[20] The household is the smallest territorial community which requires to be governed. A neighbourhood or small village within which children play and people walk about is the next territory, and here parish or village councils are found. (Most utopian community experiments and primitive societies are not organized beyond this level.) At the next level is the town or rural district in which most community services are available. This is the arena of local government. Above this is the region or province based on geography or history, and requiring laws to maintain its distinct subcultural characteristics. Finally there is the nation-state which is usually culturally defined by such things as a common language, common religion, common ethnic origin. It enforces unity by social arrangements like a common monetary system, common defence and free passage. Multi-national regional groupings, like the Organization of African Unity or the European Community, form the sixth territorial level of potential community; and finally, at the seventh level is the world community of nations where government is reflected in a body like the United Nations.

Although larger communities are impersonal and extremely complex, individuals still have the potential to exercise an influence over their values and operation. The advantage of large communities lies in their capacity to provide for a great variety of social values, and so cater for an enormous range of individual differences. The claustrophobia and sense of intrusion in neighbourhoods or villages is avoided by the possibility of finding soul-mates whilst retaining anonymity.

The *secondary* or *non-territorial* form of community is one which emerges when any set of people interact physically and personally over time for any reason at all. This may occur at work, or in a club, or in tribal activities. People in such situations interact physically and emotionally in parallel to whatever their main purpose is. They need to get to know and deal with each other as individuals in order to pursue their primary purpose. In doing so, a form of community is created.

Community in a Firm: A firm is not a territorial community, but people within it must get on with each other. If the firm wishes its employees to consider themselves as part of a community, it must imitate territorial communities by

deliberately catering to the social values and social needs of staff. For example, it might fund a staff association, offer its facilities for out-of-hours functions, allow for personalization of the office decor, set up and subsidize a high quality cafeteria, provide medical care, support further education, enter staff teams in competitive sports, encourage charitable giving, provide relaxation rooms for people to meet, only move people around the firm after consultation, and institute policies which minimize staff turnover. The specification, introduction and organization of such initiatives should not be driven by line-managers but should depend on the staff association and voluntary participation by staff.   Ex. 5.9

Anthropological studies show that networks of social relations catering for the same needs — economic, legal, political, kinship, religious — are to be found in all societies however disparate their value systems. The tribal value systems affect these community activities, but whereas the value system is an abstraction floating above external reality, values governing activities must suit actual local needs and circumstances. In other words, the system or network of social values which defines a community must be distinguished from the value system.

Function. Intrinsic to any community is the notion that personal needs (like privacy) should be a group concern and that communal needs (like clean streets) should be a personal concern. The community should provide a robust context for regular daily social life, one within which all that is necessary for living is available. Its function is, simply, to meet social needs. The first and overriding requirement seems to be ensuring social order and maintaining the community as an entity. The more interconnected the members of a community feel, the more effective is the informal social control which can be exerted during daily interaction by members on each other.

Such things like the provision of food and water, work and leisure activities, housing and travel, buying and selling, education and welfare, and resolution of disputes are essential in territorial communities. Beyond that, the richness of any community is expressed by the variety and depth of the activities which it regularly supports.

To achieve its ends, any community demands a degree of adaptation and compromise amongst people in the light of the realities of the situation. This give-and-take is most difficult in regard to areas where value systems are battling for dominance. Adherents of the various groups then have great difficulty in co-operating.

By focusing on shared social values, differences in value systems can be overcome without needing to meet the more stringent demands of union. For example, the community in Jerusalem between the wars consisted of Jews, Muslims, Christians, the Druze and others. Despite their markedly different value systems, they were able to share social values like worship, social order, friendship, tolerance and work. A community formed in this way develops common understandings, habitual patterns of interaction, physical routines, and customary resolution of difficulties. People become attached to these ways of doing things as well as to the people and to the place.

A community is home: it permits togetherness, abolishes loneliness, and releases and channels belonging. The camaraderie and security of belonging, though less intense than the fire of loyalty, still engenders a comforting warmth. Belonging is felt directly as an inner personal force, a drive which defines a physical and a psychological attachment to the community. Belonging leads to members doing things voluntarily for the community or for particular people within it: voluntarily rather than obligatorily as loyalty might require (Ex. 5.5); and voluntarily but not necessarily enthusiastically as personal interest might allow (Ex. 5.11). Involvement in a community depends both on what a person is willing to give and what he is content to receive. Belonging is associated with a feeling that the community is an extension of the person and that the person is an essential element of the community.

Group Formation. A community forms if people are required by circumstances to interact over time. Sometimes a new community is set up because a group of people wish to share a social life together. Many non-utopian communes develop from friendships and resemble extended families. Larger whole communities may be deliberately established. They may simply be an over-spill from an overpopulated area; or they may be based on a utopian value system, like the Oneida community (Ex. 5.2) or Findhorn (currently thriving in Scotland[21]); or they may realize a principal object, like the early penal colonies in America and Australia or a future colony on the moon.

Whatever the reason for a new community, its evolution will depend heavily on the qualities, values and participation of the people within it. The more distinctive their value system and the more idiosyncratic their social values, the more isolated from surrounding communities the new community is likely to become.

Antithesis. Isolation and alienation are the antithesis of community. A community, being an enduring network of social interactions based on social values, demands sharing of goals and communal activities. If those living in a neighbourhood or housing estate do not

get to know each other, fail to recognize that they have common needs, and act intolerantly on the basis of tribal differences, then the quality of social life deteriorates and the potential for anti-social activities escalates. Anomie develops as the social values within each person fail to resonate with the social values evident in their environment.

Group Relations. Everyone is born into a community. Some stay in that same community for their whole life, others move to new communities. Only very rarely does a person become hermitic. People must relate to others in their communities, and take them as they happen to find them. This calls for mutuality and dialogue.

On the one hand, differences, in particular tribal distinctions, must be tolerated; and on the other, the views of any single person must not be allowed to determine the shape of the community. Individual differences must be recognized and built on to ensure that all members are valued. Personal strengths must be harnessed, and everyone must be allowed some say and enabled to play some part in community development. Dialogue is essential to discover what the shared social values actually are, what the needs and capabilities of members are, and what challenges and needs the community is facing and should meet.

The greater the degree of cooperative interaction among people, the stronger the cohesion of the community, the more intense the feeling of belonging, the more social values are reinforced and realized, and the stronger the community identity.

There are two obvious extremes in the balance between dominance by individual or community needs. At one extreme are anarchist communities in which there is a minimum of sharing and cooperation due to the notion that a group should interfere minimally with the freedom of the individual. The result is transient membership, weakly defined boundaries, and a short life-span for the group. At the other extreme are utopian experiments which value social control over personal identity. Communes based on the ideas of people like Owen and Fourier ensure control by strictly valuing communal equality, cooperation and fairness; while social control in a convent of cloistered nuns may be equally strict but so hierarchical that no two are equal.[22] Most of us live in communities lying somewhere between these extremes.

Cohesion and warmth within communities are experienced and expressed as fellowship. Social values, being inclusive and integrative, serve as a suitable basis for fellowship and provide the main opportunity to overcome internal differences in value systems. Social values can also generate cooperation and positive feeling between communities which have different value systems.

Altruism comes into its own in communities because it is tacitly regarded as a reciprocal matter. In a community, people allow themselves to be changed, and hope to change others and the community as a whole. Altruism is therefore tightly linked to an expectation that the sort of community that is worth living in is one in which each treats the other without allowing immediate self-interest to intrude excessively. If, in the event, altruism is not repaid, it ceases — unless it meets masochistic needs for self-sacrifice. Altruism for distant people in communities unknown is weak and unreliable, because reciprocity is impossible. Hardin argues that biological selection operated to favour tribal groups characterized by reciprocal altruism and inter-tribal aggression.[16]

Altruism is impractical on a large scale because scale generates impersonality. It is difficult to know whether something beneficial in one community will be beneficial in another. Much supposedly altruistic foreign aid — food, money, equipment, medicines, building — seems to have disrupted cultural life and imposed alien values (as well as propping up regimes that persecute their own people).

Leadership and Status. People in a community have to deal with each other directly, and so tribal status differentials may be reduced. Because the rationale for community lies in meeting needs and because all in the community share these needs, a sense that equality is desirable may be strong. However, any community at any point in time manifests social inequalities. These inequalities may be informal and unenforced, but they are widely recognized and sometimes difficult to escape.

Different people or groups in the community experience certain needs more intensely than others (e.g. needs for emotional support, for health care, or for education) and these people tend to suffer or feel inferior. Certain communal needs may be more prominent because of circumstances (say, the need for computerization) or tradition (say, the need for religion), and this raises the status of those involved. Communities deliberately elevate or depress status by allocating money or prestige, and people can take advantage of this. For instance, enhancing the prestige of soldiers in wartime helps ensure a steady flow of recruits. Similarly, a shortage of computer experts leads to higher salaries which encourage people to enter this occupation. Differences in inherent and learned capabilities (e.g. in intelligence, in self-expression, in

social skills, in making money) emerge at different ages and alter over the life-span under the influence of illness, opportunity and circumstance. These are further sources of social differences.

For all these reasons, inequalities are endemic and continuously fluctuating in a community. Communities permit a degree of individual distinctiveness, allow multiple statuses and foster integration. The result is social fluidity and mobility. Unfortunately for some people and for the community as a whole, tribal allegiances and mentalities may inhibit use of the potential for personal benefit that a community can offer.

Leadership in a community is provided by public figures. These emerge in two ways: formal-political and informal-relational. Communities need government and the politicians are formal leaders. In a free society, members of the community are nominated and elected to govern by all in a secret ballot. Political parties form around a value system, but voters are rarely members of the party, so at election time, politicians of opposing parties appeal to identical social values like economic well-being, national security, control of crime, and better welfare services. In the event, the realization of most promises is rather rare. Nevertheless, the public seems to be satisfied with hearing their social values proclaimed and affirmed.

Informal leadership emerges from the processes of interaction and fellowship. On the one hand, all members are typical of the community. So the views of the community may be obtained by opinion polls, invited phone-ins on the radio, or letters to newspaper editors. On the other hand, it soon becomes apparent that certain individuals are particularly able to appreciate and articulate the social values of the community, and desirous to do so. These are usually people with the time, capability and material resources to be concerned for the well-being of the wider community. They may be businessmen, professionals, church leaders, journalists or intellectuals. Such community leaders may achieve considerable influence without any formal responsibility so long as they recognize, like politicians, that they can go no further than the community as a whole is prepared to accept.

Entry and Exit. Within a free society, joining and leaving communities is an informal matter. Subject to particular problems of space or resources and the local ethos, communities readily allow their members to move between them. Migration becomes problematic if there are differences in value systems, and if large numbers of migrants are involved. Although newcomers are expected to adapt to the existing social values (because it is presumed that these were an

inducement to come), they are also expected to introduce their own social values. In organizations, this is described as bringing in new blood.

Exit from a community is not traumatic, but even so it may be an emotional wrench. So people staying a short time in a community may avoid getting too involved with it. This is the danger posed by excessive mobility in a society. If a person's social values change relative to their current community, then leaving is positively desired, and exit is a relief.

Identity Formation. Social values are felt as personal needs, and the community's values are experienced as community needs. Calls for political self-determination by a community are not just about asserting community identity, but also about the freedom for personal development. Those who assert the need for each and all to discover meaning in their life and to be open to experience are usually arguing for the significance of social values. The implication here is that potentials within the self have to be developed within an available community sympathetic to those needs. Each of us needs to recognize that we are physically located within communities and must find ourselves in relationships available there. In other words, identity is relational in character.

The growth of identity depends on a sense of personal freedom. Personal freedom is expressed within community life and depends upon the handling of relationships. If the potentialities and freedom of others are not to be infringed, such relationships need to be characterized by mutuality. The control of others is particularly unsatisfactory, even when strong leadership is valued. Control interferes with the inclusiveness of social values, and with the openness to different ways of interpreting and realizing them.[23]

The person and the community shape each other because the social values of one are the social values of the other. The development of both relate to the same needs: the individual needs health, the community thrives if its members are healthy; the individual needs to be educated, the community develops if its members are knowledgeable; the individual needs to trust and be trusted, the community thrives on mutual trust.

People who see their community neglecting the needs of some or all within it can and should push for change. Changes in social values and community identity always start with a radical minority in favour.

Social values are open-ended and require ever new modes of realization. The regular reinforcing of social values in community life strengthens personal identity, and feeds back into a diversity of communal activities

whereby these values are lived. Such participation creates a more wholehearted involvement and further strengthens the community as a whole.

In focusing on one's needs and determining social values, the use of intuition is essential. There is no other way in which a sense of ourselves, a sense of others, and a sense of any relationship or community feeling can be obtained.

Limitation. Communities are too diffuse to allow focused endeavour. Mutuality and fellowship are sustaining, but do not provide a way for individuals to use their particular interests and aptitudes to the full. Neither belonging (nor loyalty nor spirituality) are sufficiently dynamic and organized to promote a particular endeavour. Like-minded people within a tribe or community need to band together in a different way if something good is to be achieved for the group and for themselves.

ASSOCIATIONS AND PRINCIPAL OBJECTS (L-4)

Nature. Principal objects reflect and sustain *associations*. An association is a social group which people voluntarily and deliberately join to affirm and promote an interest in a formal way. The association has a valued and achievable goal, the principal object, which is the activity required to forward that interest. Associations may construct and staff a more or less complex enterprise based on that goal. Association is the means whereby the abstraction of ultimate values can be converted by a person into something which can have an impact. So freedom to associate for social, political or commercial purposes is fundamental in free societies.

Democracy in America: "They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons and schools." De Tocqueville also observed that "in aristocratic societies (like England) men do not need to combine in order to act", and claimed that "Americans are much more addicted to the use of general ideas than the English and entertain a much greater relish for them."
Ex. 5.10[24]

Cooperatives, partnerships, sports clubs, professional bodies, churches, charities — all these are associations which depend on communities for their existence. Although they seem to flower spontaneously, they must be deliberately set up by people using their

initiative. Such associations stem in part from the community's background support and encouragement of endeavours, but mainly from the existence of common interests amongst the people involved. It follows that whatever is in the interest of the association is felt to be in the interest of the members.

Some Associations: A motorway is planned: one person has an interest to oppose it and sets up an association with all those of like mind. An inventor gets an idea for a new sort of car which will be a one-seater, and forms an association of those who are prepared to invest in the idea. When a disaster occurs, a few victims form an association for those involved in it with the object of providing emotional support and legal assistance which all will find relevant. People working on a new theory in mathematics form an association to exchange ideas and produce a newsletter. Some drama enthusiasts in a neighbourhood form an association to present amateur theatricals. All these groups are built around principal objects and are motivated by interests. Ex. 5.11

Function. The examples in Ex. 5.11 make it clear that an association is a grouping of individuals formed in order to promote the achievement of something specific. Each person in the association must deeply value the endeavour defined by the principal objects, feel it is good to work for it, and put their resources (time, money, effort &c) into it.

Associations may consist of members who do no direct work at all but solely contribute money. Most large businesses are constituted by shareholders in this way. In many other associations, members prefer to offer their own unpaid work as a resource. For example, neighbourhood associations generate wholly voluntary endeavours like Christmas parties, summer fetes, and jumble sales. Voluntary associations with more ambitious aims like organizing regular concerts, providing sports facilities or producing amateur theatricals may need to employ a few staff to do things for the members. Associations which represent the interests of doctors in the nation, or promote spiritual values, or relieve the plight of the worst off in society are promoting a far bigger enterprise. Such enterprises invariably need an extensive paid executive body to carry much of the responsibility for pursuing the principal objects.

Staff in a firm may think of themselves as a community (cf. Ex. 5.9), but they more often feel like an association of people with a common interest. Mission statements, for example, are typically aimed at staff on this basis. It is natural that people work best for organizations whose rationale fits their interests.

Principal objects release people's active enthusiasm and natural ardour. Zeal is the old-fashioned word for

it. Associations are necessary to channel zeal and human energies of all sorts in the service of some practical achievement. Without principal objects, energies become diffused and ineffective. Without an association, the full variety of possibilities for realizing the principal objects cannot be properly appreciated. Enthusiasm enables persistence, perseverance and initiative.

Group Formation. A person should be able to set up an association easily as long as two criteria are met: the value being asserted must be one in which others are interested, and it must accord with the social values of the wider community. Tribes and communities proliferate associations, because only by associating and pursuing a delimited set of principal objects can anything be achieved. Associations themselves proliferate subsidiary associations either within their control or at arms length.

Associations are important as a way that different and potentially antagonistic tribes and their organizations can pursue common ends in parallel or jointly. For example, an inner city development trust might be constituted by different churches, businesses, trade unions and voluntary agencies.

Antithesis. The strength of the association is determined by the significance of the principal objects to the participants. When the association is dominated by apathy and disinterest, its core value, the principal objects, cannot flourish. A person may join a particular association with the hope of making business contacts, earning money, gaining prestige, or making friends: but these cannot substitute for the main interest as defined by the objects. The more important such ancillary reasons are to members, the less effective the association will be.

Shareholders comprise the legal association of any incorporated firm. However, their principal concern is with profit-taking and they have little interest in the business. As a result, shareholders (unlike proprietors in the past) have little constructive influence. Firms thrive only because (or if) the board and top management are deeply identified with the principal objects. Not surprisingly, this anomalous situation leads to problems including urges to replace the shareholders through a buy-out.

Group Relations. It will be recalled that principal objects were defined as the raison d'être of a business. They are also the raison d'être of an association. The identity of any association is determined partly by its principal objects and partly by the preferences of those signed up to it. The people in the association form a

dedicated band or partnership who support each other in relation to the pursuit of the principal objects. The association thrives in direct proportion to the degree of commitment of the members to it.

Each association should have its own distinctive objects and social niche within a community. This minimizes destructive competition. Merging between very similar associations is possible and sometimes desirable if it enhances effectiveness. In the UK, the Writers's Guild and the Society of Authors periodically consider and reject a merger because of subtle differences. Nevertheless they work together.

Inter-association relations to enable such joint work are called alliances. But the basic relation between associations is one of competitiveness because each seeks resources for its particular endeavour from a common pool. This resource may be money, clients/customers, sponsorship, new members, public attention, political favour, or press coverage.

Competition for resources between associations does not imply or require negativity, so hostility is less justifiable. But principal objects are exclusive and divisive, so full positivity is not possible either. When public interest groups feel 'column inch envy' for each other and avoid sharing skills and resources, they harm their own cause. Proper market-place competition amongst charities for donations can activate different types of donor. Unseemly or unfair competition amongst charities generates distrust and suspicion in all donors.

Strong alliances and networks regularly develop as temporary or permanent phenomena to handle the common needs and joint work of different associations in the same domain. Networking can also help mitigate unnecessary and inappropriate hostility. Associations may link to form a new association to pursue a common aim, or provide common services. For example, two businesses may set up a third business with joint ownership; or a variety of charities might form an association to coordinate lobbying or campaigns.

Indeed strategic alliances can be highly beneficial for all parties. For example, they may lead to the market or community niche being systematically expanded. Very large enterprises, like the tunnel under the English channel or space exploration, may be financially and technically impossible without the use of alliances.

Alliances within a particular domain may be buttressed by the formation of an association of associations with objects defined to strengthen their identity. Over 170 different Christian church organizations — but notably not the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches — formed the World

Council of Churches in 1948 to work for the unity and renewal of the church, and to be an instrument for the churches to talk, pray and work together in a spirit of tolerance. Similarly, businesses, trade unions and voluntary agencies each have umbrella organizations in most countries (and sometimes internationally) representing their common interests and perspective.

Leadership and Status. Status differences exist in associations largely according to the enthusiasm, commitment and circumstances of members. Inequality here is overt, logical and assignable. It attempts to match particular rights and duties of categories of association membership with characteristics and preferences of people. The membership structure needs to be designed to suit the precise nature of the association but may include categories like: life, full, associate, preferential, employee, honorary, affiliate, absentee, retired, overseas, week-day, working, student.

Leadership of the association is provided by its governance structure. Even the smallest voluntary association needs a governing body in the form of a small executive committee made up of two or three elected posts like Chairman or President, and Honorary Secretary or Honorary Treasurer. Where an enterprise is dominated by its association (rather than by the executive), the governing body tends to have a complex structure of committees, sub-committees, working parties, panels, special interest groups and so on in order to involve as many members as possible, and to cater for all the sub-interests and factions.

In an association created by other associations, membership of the governing body is usually arranged by nomination or appointment. Where the association requires a complex executive bureaucracy, it may be appropriate to put top executives and non-members with relevant expertise on the governing body. The risk here is that such people may lose sight of the values of the association. Whatever the form of association, the chief function of the leadership is to decide priorities and handle internal factionalization.

Entry and Exit. To participate in the association and have a degree of control over the enterprise as a whole, a person must enrol or register in some fashion. The chief concern of the association when a new member applies to join is whether a genuine interest exists and whether a proper commitment is likely. To test commitment, barriers to membership are frequently set up. The barrier might be a playing-in test for a tennis club, a substantial entry fee for a prestigious country club, committing a murder for the Mafia, an academic qualification for a learned society, a demonstration or presentation for a special interest club,

attendance at events or meetings on several occasions, or simply purchase of a share. If there is concern to ensure the applicant's interest is genuine, recommendation by other members and an interview may be required.

Because entering and leaving an association is based on a person voluntarily giving or withdrawing commitment, it is generally non-stressful. If the person's interests have changed, then departing is natural. If interests have not changed but the association has altered its focus, then another association which is more closely aligned to the person's interests can be joined. However, if the association has also become the person's community and is tribal in nature, then departure may be problematic. Retirement from work, for example, may mean an opportunity to change interests. But if work was identity-defining, as is common amongst professionals, then membership of the relevant professional organizations may well be maintained, and the person keeps reading journals and pursuing activities which maintain contact with fellow members.

Identity Formation. The locus of control has now shifted decisively to the person. People define or relate to the identity of their associations in the light of their own identity. Everyone must determine which associations will get their full commitment. Associations therefore are tools to support and develop personal identity. In other words, the channelling of energies is, at last, in the hands of the person. When commitment is long-lasting, the identity of the person locks into the identity of the enterprise and irritating or boring or disliked elements — paperwork, annual dinners — are tolerated.

We are all the principal shareholder or proprietor in our own life. We must invest in ourselves and be committed to our well-being. A rich life is one in which a person deliberately develops a wide range of interests and commits himself wholeheartedly to these. The limit is defined by the ideas and interests a person is capable of holding, and the resources at his or her disposal. Such things change as circumstances change and as a person matures.

A range of interests is desirable for another reason. When people band together and harness themselves to a common enterprise, the enterprise starts to take precedence over their needs. Because no particular enterprise can ever satisfy all their needs, people need to join or become involved with several associations for their own protection.

Limitation. Partnership in a joint endeavour is gratifying. But people also feel the need to ensure that, in any particular decision, the association espouses the

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values that they prefer. Associations themselves need to decide what is best in situations where the available facts are debatable, irrelevant or absent. To determine and implement such internal priorities, the formation of a different sort of social group is required.

FACTIONS AND INTERNAL PRIORITIES (L-3)

Nature. Internal priorities reflect and sustain temporary sub-groups or *factions* within an ongoing association. Such sub-groups are sometimes called cliques, coteries, cabals — or simply sides. When values are completely polarized, an issue only has two sides: the good and the bad. So the most intense form of factionalization involves just two sides. However, an issue may have as many sides and as many factions as there are relevant valid values or choices.

Taking sides in a particular choice situation is the most concrete expression of value and self-definition. In common parlance, it is 'being for it or against it', or 'standing up to be counted' or 'putting your money where your mouth is'.

Sides and factions are explicitly created by the way people feel in particular situations. So this social group is fully subordinate in its identity to the immediate perceptions of the people constituting it.

Common foci for temporary factionalization include support for a particular person as a leader of the association, or support for a particular allocation of a resource. Factions seek to sway important decisions where the correct choice is obscure. Transient factions do not usually contain sub-factions because these would dissipate their energy. The same is not true if factions are long-term or permanent.

Common foci for permanent factionalization include legitimate sub-interests within the association (e.g. doctors in training, hospital specialists, general practitioners and public health doctors within a medical association), community allegiances (e.g. competing towns sharing a local government council), and tribal loyalties (e.g. academic disciplines within a research institute).

Function. Internal priorities are by nature transient and heavily dependent on situational factors, timing and the actual people involved. Internal priorities therefore correspond to the simplest social group: a collective of transient membership forming around a temporary preference. The function of a faction is to define sharply the best orientation or emphasis which the immediate issue demands. The faction seeks to ensure that its

particular view prevails. The members' desires, convictions and personal power are the resources that must be won over during the formation of factions.

Because internal priorities are a matter of brute assertion of value, the association needs factions to create the strongest possible debate. Only in this way can it discover which value should dominate. Freedom to have opinions and to express these feelingly are essential to this process. Priorities, it should be recalled, are integrative and inclusive. All sides are equally valid and the process and final result should clearly recognize this.

A particularly testing time is during constitutional change when the uncertain status of the principal objects temporarily removes the prime force binding opposing factions. Then the traditionalists, who wish to minimize change, and the radicals, who wish to push change through, disagree for long periods on every tiny detail. As a result, the work of the association may grind to a halt.

Factions foster contact with inner conviction and channel the release of passion. By passion, I mean raw emotional energy. Without passion, associations and their enterprises can achieve little. Passion is needed to overcome the obstacles to change presented by inertia, apathy and the sheer difficulty of it all. But passion is potentially disruptive and divisive and the faction must contain it. Passion in a permanent faction may be particularly intense if the faction is based around a community or tribe. The situation is even worse if community and tribe coincide. In a country, such cases can lead to disintegration because territorial ethnic groups become driven by urges for full autonomy — as recently witnessed in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

In firms, factions are often oriented around domains of expertise (general management, finance, information technology, public relations &c). If these departments become geographically isolated, coordination and cooperation frequently suffer.

Factions and Government. The situation is confused in the case of government where political parties are commonly described as factions. Within parliament, representatives of the different parties do indeed form factions. Such factions are relatively permanent, voting en bloc on most issues. However, voting may occur occasionally with members of the other side. This is not about leaving the party, but about a different factional split on that particular matter. Factionalization is inevitable even if one party sweeps to power. When party-based opposition is weak, factionalization is stimulated within the leading party so that the needed debate around value conflicts may take place.

The political parties, themselves, are not factions but associations. The difference is not trivial and is the source of criticism of elected representatives by party activists. The purpose of the party is to win office and to introduce changes in accord with party ideology. The purpose of the elected government is far more complex. Above all, it must act as custodian of the common good in society. In other words, party activists need to recognize that government is more than just a party in power. Political systems may provide checks in the system to buttress this awareness. For example, the US Presidency and Congress are not necessarily controlled by the same political party.

For a long time, UK local government was minimally politicized. In the 1970's and 1980's, factions constituted themselves as 'groups' aligned with the national political parties. Many saw the introduction of groups as a bad thing, preferring the councillor to use common sense and be aware of local feelings. However, from the present perspective, it seems an inevitable development. Local government is an enterprise which aims to represent and serve a territorially-defined community (L-5), and there is a vacuum for associations (L-4) to compete for control of this government on behalf of the community. Political parties naturally fill this vacuum.

Factions within a party tend to persist if they are about cultural or territorial matters; and they are transient if they are about personalities or a current controversy. However, if the faction is ideological, then party schism is possible. Faction members may feel impelled to set up a distinct political party. The UK's Social Democratic Party was formed in this way in the mid-1970s, when an ideologically centrist faction defected from the increasingly leftist Labour Party.

Group Formation. The two or more sides of an issue are the foci around which members of the association coalesce and rally in support or opposition. Transient factions supporting a particular internal priority must be able to come into being rapidly, and subsequently be able to dissolve equally rapidly. These give the truest sense of a pure faction, and make it evident that this form of social group is little more than a vehicle for the expression of the individual's feelings and assessments for the issue of the moment. Such a faction has little life of its own. Persistent factions required by value-based subdivisions in the association have greater influence on their members on a wide range of matters.

Antithesis. Factions fail when their members refuse to recognize that political aims or priorities are means to an end all share — the furthering of the asso-

ciation. Factions have no independent ends and should regard the integrity of the association as paramount. So fanaticism based on adherence to certain values is inappropriate and destructive.

Fanaticism is revealed by the existence of a permanent faction which refuses to accept association decisions or parasitically attempts to take over the association. Then every debate becomes skewed around the same issue, and valid views and interests are denigrated. Chronic internecine warfare and personal antagonism begin to fester within the association, and artificial compromises which uneasily paper over the divisions are created. The fact is that it is not possible to have a fully independent faction following its own rules and policies at variance with those of the association. This state of affairs can usually be traced to value system conflicts i.e. arguments over ideas or doctrines. It is appropriate for value systems to generate associations dedicated to their propagation; and so the proper course is for the faction to constitute itself as a new association and promote its members' preferences directly.

Splits in Psychoanalytic Societies: Psychoanalytic factions are often based on particular theories (i.e. value systems). The early deviant theorists like Adler and Jung left with their factions to form their own associations. Followers of more recent deviant schools of thought, like that of Melanie Klein, have tried to remain with classical Freudians in the same organizations. In many cases, as in Argentina, this proved impossible. Each theoretical group developed itself within its own independent society under the auspices of the International Psychoanalytic Association. In the UK, three factions (called 'groups') emerged: Freudian, Kleinian and a third 'middle' group of 'independents' influenced by the ideas of Winnicott and Balint. The attempt to contain three somewhat fanatical factions has been draining. It has led to the group issue dominating the political life of the society. Decisions have to be scrutinized for any favouritism towards one of the groups. Issues which require factionalization across groups are poorly debated because everything must be subordinated to the need to support the group. Fresh theoretical work is difficult because this might undermine the status of the existing groups. Negativity and snide remarks often spoil the atmosphere.   Ex. 5.12

Internal priorities assume that people are committed to the association within which the faction is defined. The interests of everyone are served by accepting whatever final decision is reached. This means that partisanship should not be personalized. Indeed friendship between members of different factions should be fostered as the norm. Any overt conflict should be recognized as a conflict of ideas or values or perceptions, not a conflict between particular people.

Unfortunately, tribal negativities often emerge when internal priorities are being decided. This reflects

poorly on the value system and reduces the likelihood of discovering the best outcome. It is unambiguously destructive. Little seems to have changed over the past two centuries since Adam Smith observed the atrocious conduct of factions: the weaker groups made to suffer and regarded as heretical; and those expressing balanced views treated with contempt, derision and detestation by furious zealots of both parties.[25] So it is worth insisting that abuse, denigration and other expressions of hostility are totally out of place. All are members of the same association, and adherence to the principal objects and the need for strenuous value debate should unite the opposing factions.

Group Relations. If an association is united on the values underlying a particular choice, then an internal priority is set but no factions form. A faction only forms when people who are of a like mind on a particular issue spontaneously come together because they recognize that others are doing likewise on the other side of the issue. In other words, factions define and create each other through an opposition of values.

Despite appearances, factions are integrative, not divisive. They contain opposing but equally valid values. The necessary relation between factions is one of dialectical opposition. One view may be the deadly enemy of the opposing view metaphorically speaking, but the groups are not deadly enemies. Each faction should be viewed as a valued and integral part of a whole.

Because opposition is dialectical and exists to forward agreed principal objects, coalition must be possible. If partisanship goes so far that coalition becomes impossible, then the association is damaged and full-fledged schism is not far away.

Factionalization within Local Government Associations: Local governments in the UK have formed themselves into associations like the Association of District Councils. The remit of these bodies is to speak up for their sort of local government. Out of habit, ignorance or lack of self-control, they have factionalized along ideological lines. Such factionalization is not related to their function and it has hampered the defence of local government. In the case of London, two associations eventually formed: the Association of London Authorities which is constituted wholly by Labour councils, and the London Boroughs Association which is constituted wholly by Conservative councils. Again the corrosive effect of unmanaged tribalism is evident. The net result has been an irretrievable weakening of the cause of London and local government in debates with the national government.   Ex. 5.13

Each faction needs to develop a position and an approach to handling the debate on the issue, and the group members are then expected to support what the faction decides. Adherence to the factional line creates

partisanship. Partisanship develops as much from opposing the positions taken by others as by proclaiming the faction's own preference. Linkage between opposing factions is maintained to ensure that procedures for debate and other transactions are effectively developed. Argument tends to be through the exchange of value assertions between partisans of the various sides. Facts are marshalled and manipulated to support the preferred value position.

Leadership and Status. Members of a faction are equivalent. Each person has an equal vote, and therefore equal power when the time comes to exert it. So equality is impersonal and not related to personal identity. In practice, it is best to minimize status inequalities in order to enable debate within and between factions.

Leadership is naturally accorded to someone who can fight effectively for the factional view. Such a person must feel strongly about the issue and should be able to articulate the members' passion clearly and forcefully. The factional leader is usually powerful in other ways, including by virtue of wealth, prestige, authority or capability.

Factional leaders typically require skills in negotiation and compromise in order to ensure that there is due recognition and some payoff for the faction. The governing body of the association is expected to take a balanced view and weigh up the claims and powers of various factions. Members on the governing body who wish to have the freedom to press their viewpoint sometimes stand down temporarily.

Entry and Exit. A faction is created by a spontaneous coalescence in which people naturally find themselves opposing others in regard to a particular matter. Joining and leaving factions is therefore not usually a problem, unless one is expected to be a member of a permanent faction which pushes for unity on most issues. The discipline of a faction may be irksome, and the intensity of feeling generated may be uncongenial. However, refusing to join a faction and not adhering to the partisan line may mean being quite powerless within the association.

Identity Formation. Passions rise in factional debate. The pressure on the individual to adhere to the line taken by the group may feel intense, but the impact on identity should be negligible. Nevertheless, factional choice should feel entirely personal. Joining the social group is now a matter of personal preference. Factions and internal priorities are a way of asserting an identity established by higher level values. They go wrong when the choice feels like an identity issue. If a choice seems to determine personal identity, then inappropriate expectations and attitudes come into play.

Factions and the process of setting internal priorities demand that a person own up to a particular orientation when faced with a decision affecting the good of the association to which he belongs. A person joins a faction in order to exert an influence, but he may do so tactically in order to win support on a separate issue. Not uncommonly, a member of an association will be unsure as to which side to choose. This internal conflict mirrors the external conflict once the choice is made. Repeated abstention is a way of avoiding involvement.

Because choices here may relate to interests and desires relevant to the person's wider situation, conflicts of interests become possible. In other words, a person pushes the association to do something of personal benefit irrespective of whether or not it is in the best interests of the association. Most public bodies now recognize and deal with conflicts of interest, but businesses and charities too often tend to turn a blind eye.

Limitation. Factions and internal priorities reflect the lowest and most tangible level of value clarification and assertion. As described in Chapter 3, the issue of what can actually be done in the situation still remains open. This needs to be resolved by setting objectives which are strategic (L-2), and then setting tactical objectives (L-1) to produce the required outcome. Purposes in these implementation levels are the responsibility of individuals rather than groups — even though their development and pursuit often requires the construction of groups.

REVIEWING NATURAL SOCIAL GROUPS

We have now examined the levels of value and the relation of value and identity to natural social groups. There are a two topics — identity and work-life — that deserve mention in relation to these groups before this initial clarification of purpose and value is brought to a close. Keep in mind that the ideas in this brief review will be examined in more depth in the remainder of the book.

First, we must over-view the whole hierarchy to see how the identities of individuals and their social groups are linked.

Linking Personal and Group Identities

Personal Uniqueness. The proper appreciation and handling of the five distinct types of natural social group depends on recognizing that each emerges from and is attuned to the nature of a corresponding level of

value. Everyone deals with all these social groups and develops and establishes a personal identity as a social being through participation within them. So personal identity is developed across the full set of group identities.

It seems very possible that the *function* of the hierarchy is (a) to ensure the dominance of natural social groups in the integration of values within the identity of persons; and (b) to ensure the progressive emergence of personal responsibility for those groups as the hierarchy is descended.

People must be responsible for their social groups and be able to master them. In this process, they must not deny the essential qualities of each sort of social group. Success in this endeavour has not been marked to date. The notion of social group identities being linked with personal identity deserves some further exploration. It seems that the handling of individual differences by groups, and the choice of personal identity by individuals, are each reflected in clusters of types of social group and corresponding value. Table 5.1 diagrams these two sets of clusters. (The clusters parallel those within the lower five levels of purpose as shown in Table 3.5 in Ch. 3; and cf. Master-Table 4.)

Social groups depend upon the similarity of values held by people. In other words, group identity is intra-level. However, personal identity is not aligned with the levels but crosses them. So people within groups may hold dissimilar values. In the case of humanity (or unions), tribes and communities, group cohesion and sustenance demands active efforts to transcend, minimize, overcome or control differences between people. These social groups accept that differences do exist, but see these as being principally provided for at lower levels. The groups do not allow themselves to be defined in terms of the qualities of any particular person. This higher cluster tends to limit personal freedom and is challenged by uniqueness.

By contrast, the formation of associations and factions with their associated freedoms of association and expression depends on individual differences and the value of uniqueness. This lower cluster provides the means for asserting and realizing individual identity in a social context.

Choosing a personal identity is more problematic and reveals a different clustering. It will be recalled that tribes deliberately socialize their members to view their value systems as real, true and right. Ultimate values, too, cannot be shaped by each person because they define our common human quality and the potential for handling values. Often the articulation of ultimate values is handled by the tribal value system.

Table 5.1: How values link the individual and the social group. The way individual differences are handled and the scope for identity choice by a person reveals clusters of levels. Note that group identity is intra-level, whereas personal identity crosses levels.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES	TYPE OF VALUE	NATURAL GROUP	INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
Group formation depends on overcoming individual differences.	Ultimate values —	Humanity	Identity choice is unconscious or forced by the group.
	Value systems —	Tribes	
	Social values —	Communities	
Group formation depends on fostering individual differences.	Principal objects —	Associations	Identity choice is developed or chosen by the person.
	Internal priorities —	Factions	

Memberships of humanity and tribes impose an identity which a person has little choice but to accept. Even where the tribe is chosen, entry is difficult and the value system is virtually unmodifiable. The compensating factor is that each person's identity is securely stabilized.

Communities, associations and factions, by contrast, may be self-consciously chosen and used to develop personal identity. Social values require self-exploration and the recognition of one's inner needs; and communities may be chosen which suit one's needs and which allow one to exert a degree of influence. Associations require development of personal interests and activation of a commitment to pursue certain objects. Priorities allow for the expression of identity and the assertion of one's own views and desires, so factions should be freely and passionately chosen.

Group Multiplicity. For each of us, our personal identity is one, but our social groups are many. Each form of value releases a powerful form of human energy within us which in turn engenders an intense social force in a group setting. In accord with the inherent nature of values, this energy and force has potential to be used either for good or harm.

Social groups at higher levels properly need to influence the functioning of social groups at lower levels in order to manage the social energies and forces. A degree of reverse influence by each group on its group context is also evidently needed.

Recognition of our basic humanity and emergence of union is of especial importance in this regard. When union is activated, tribalism and blind loyalty can be partially transcended and a force for tolerance is

released. In the absence of union, the negativity of tribalism potentially interferes with cooperation within communities, and inhibits formation of inter-tribal associations.

It follows that a state or sovereign society — defined to include families, local communities, organizations, institutions and government — must be built on ultimate values as well as the other varieties of value. Otherwise it could not reconcile internal tribal differences, consider posterity or work constructively in a pan-national or global context.

Note that a sovereign society is not a natural group. Many originate from conquest or colonization. Sovereign societies are a rather modern invention and few work as well as they might. They must seek to weld together natural groups for reasons acceptable to those groups, but usually based around the need to protect natural communities. The cohesion of society is therefore potentially problematic, and the maintenance of membership and identity requires continuing effort. By the end of the book we should be in a position to appreciate the values, obligations, institutions, authorities and intentional processes required to create a viable and strong society.

Turning back now to natural social groups, we must recognize that, despite its dangers, tribalism dominates social life. Sometimes this is evidently beneficial. When a community is a true nation with a common language, culture and tradition, then a dominant value system ensures a stable society. In the present time, given the neglect of ultimate values, it creates a sense of despair.

Tribalism is difficult to manage. When a state is constituted by an empire of territory-based nations, as in the former USSR, there will be persistent dissatisfaction, coercion and disintegrative forces generated by tribal loyalties. If a society is multi-cultural but without territorial divisions, then social discord is also liable to be endemic — at least until a unifying value system develops or people become more generally capable of union and the pursuit of ultimate values.

Unfortunately, the stability that comes from uni-cultural societies also has its price. When a tribe and a community are territorially coterminous, the potential for negativity towards outsiders seems to be enhanced. Nation-states enable the social forces of loyalty and belonging to mix and form a dangerous brew that is easily whipped into war-fever.

Tribes, as conceived here, are not limited to ethnic or national varieties. Tribes operate in all domains — religious, cultural, scientific, occupational. They produce structures and loyalties that have the potential to transcend territorial boundaries and inhibit war. The current growth of international meetings of chemists, linguists, finance ministers, sportsmen, farmers, churchmen, union leaders, businessmen, editors, engineers, poets and others is to be fostered and welcomed. Even religious pluralism and cultural mixtures in society, temporarily problematic though they are, may well serve the long term good.

Communities cannot control tribes and their values, but they can control the activities of their members. Communal living and social values have a binding and healing quality for people because of their rationale in meeting personal needs and their capacity to foster personally desired associations. Communities are able to limit and control associations formed within them. Indeed, they must do so. Associations get their resources from the community and act to affect the community. So an association can only thrive if the community broadly supports and tolerates its endeavours.

For associations to thrive in the face of uncertainty, they need factions within them to generate debate on controversial issues. It follows that the association must be capable of handling the factionalizing process. If an association allows factions to disregard its needs, then its progress may come to a standstill and, at the extreme, it is torn apart.

This hierarchical influence of one group on another which harnesses personal energies and provides some control over social forces, also leads to efforts to make the different forms of group coterminous.

Some alignment of social groups is possible and appropriate. Indeed it cannot be stopped.

For example, it is natural that a degree of fellowship and community (L-5) should develop amongst those most involved in an association (L-4), or amongst people who work closely together (L-2/L-1); or that members of a faction (L-3) of a particular association should associate themselves formally with outsiders and create new independent associations (L-4); or that tribes (L-6) should create small communities (L-5) so believers can live together, and should set up associations (L-4) in order to promote their interests.

If full coterminosity were possible, then membership of just one social group could provide for all our needs and concerns. This is the dream of dictators. It leads to tyrannical control, suppression of dissent, weakness of associations, and sterile uniformity. To imagine only one tribe implies conquering the world. Within a tribe to imagine only one community would be to deny cultural and historical differences. Within a community to imagine only one association would be to centralize all activities in one bureaucratic governmental organization. Within an association to imagine only one faction would be to deny individual differences.

The converse of this scenario, a multiplicity of diverse social groups, seems to be inherently good. The energies of spirituality, loyalty, belonging, enthusiasm and passion can then be released and properly deployed as each person and group sees fit. The invisible hand operates benignly and in the long run each and all will benefit. Progress may be slow and halting, and the cost may sometimes be appalling, but to speed it up by imposing uniformity is not a dream but a nightmare. Mankind needs diversity. Tribes need communities which adapt to people and situations. Communities need many competing thriving associations. Associations need regular intense factionalization. Pluralism is positive — at least over the long term.

Utopia. There is however one unique group which does offer a high degree of coterminosity: the family. In the family there should be union; there can be a single value system; the household should form a community; and the members are an association dedicated to nurturance and socialization of the children and emotional support of the adults. Desirably, the family factionalizes in various ways in response to inner controversies. In any case, the need for inter-generational boundaries means that parents and children will set up permanent factions. The family is the breeding ground for human energy in all its forms. It should foster spirituality, inspire loyalty, provide for belonging, create enthusiasm and engender and contain passion. No other social group can or should aspire to be so versatile.

But utopian communities do so aspire. The urge to

recreate in community life the unity and spirit of the family as it desirably ought to be seems to be at the root of past and modern utopian experiments. Many communes are no more than six or seven members, smaller than some conventional families, and the majority have less than thirty members; rarely, a commune reaches the size of a village. (None can begin to be compared to a sovereign society.) Such communes may explicitly call themselves families, or refer to the leader as father or mother and the members as brothers and sisters. Like families, they serve their own members and benefits for outsiders are secondary; and, again like families, internal relations are more significant than external relations.

Utopian communes have one great advantage over the family — joining and staying is a matter of choice. Perhaps this is why few last longer than a generation. Entry to a commune is invariably contingent on adherence to a value system emphasizing harmony, mutuality and cooperation. Because the commune is the domestic unit, the production unit, the political unit and the religious unit, it provides principal objects to which all must enthusiastically subscribe. Disagreement may be permitted, but permanent factionalization is avoided because it leads so easily to break-up.

Values and Social Life in Organizations

Finally, it may be helpful to introduce something here about the way values relate to work and social life in organizations.

Work groups differ markedly from the natural social groups just described because they are about organizing activity in order to implement given values. We noted earlier that implementation involved strategic objectives and tactical objectives which cannot themselves be regarded as values. Pursuing such objectives is executive work, and groups constructed around such objectives are task-focused.

Work groups and executive organization are linked to social groups by common social values and principal objects. The social values reflected in any activity must accord with social values in its territorial community and wider social network. The principal objects of an organization must be set by a constituting body which is essentially an association. This link is illustrated in Master-Table 4.

It was emphasized that when people work together over time they come to think of themselves as a natural social group — typically an association or a community. So something needs to be said here to indicate the role of values in organizations. I will start with responsibility for the work to be done.

Responsibility for Work. Determination of strategic and tactical objectives is primarily a matter for an individual **prepared** to be responsible for the outcome. Nevertheless people need to work together in groups to progress large-scale tasks. Such large groups are typically organized into a work hierarchy and called organizations — or, more precisely, executive-led organizations. Within an executive hierarchy, smaller work groups are common. Management teams, project groups, working parties, planning fora, consultative meetings and the like proliferate.

The executive organization and its smaller work groups differ from value-based social groups in that the determining factor in their creation and operation is the *work to be done* and activities to be performed. Groups are constructed with people who are able and authorized to do the work and expected to achieve. In other words, issues of social identity remain secondary.

Strategies and tactical objectives are not primarily about expressing social or personal identity, and these identities are not altered by such objectives. Aspects of identity are, of course, expressed through work. Indeed they are essential for its success. Work must take account of purely personal things like aspirations, talent, inner feelings and convictions about social life if it is to be fulfilling. However, if identity drives intrude inappropriately, the work group becomes dysfunctional. For example, a work group may then persist beyond its useful life, or it may start operating outside its brief, or inappropriate people may insist on joining it.

Work and Identity. Here we are focusing on identity as a social being (not identity in general), and on how organizations harness that identity and enable its expression through work.

Social values and principal objects affect whether a person enters the employ of an organization, and they remain the primary stable protectors of the person's identity within it. Staff are aware that results must be produced and that they must adapt themselves when deciding, accepting and pursuing strategic and tactical objectives. Having said that, how well any person works and adapts depends greatly on the congruence between their values and those of the organization. It follows that managers must simultaneously deal with three dimensions to maximize achievement: managing the results; managing the culture (i.e. the internal community); and managing each person.

Managing the community and individuality demands recognition of values — and this comprises the identity factor in management.

The identity factor is currently being influenced from two directions. External pressures on organizations to respect their staff, maintain their health, and foster their personal development exist but tend to be resisted. A greater impetus comes when managements recognize the potential energy which can be liberated by activating values in the service of the firm. The popular management literature now speaks endlessly of vision, culture, commitment, values and beliefs. Implications of such an approach to work can be understood by using the hierarchy we have delineated. (What follows here is merely illustrative: further elaboration is provided in later chapters.)

If firms are not to be soulless machines, they must provide for the humanity of those in their employ. Although ultimate values (L-7) are rarely talked about, people at work should seek to experience and express clarity, strength, patience, concern and joy. And a deep grounding of relationships in autonomy, respect, trust, fairness and harmony is obviously desirable. Such an atmosphere is essential to foster creativity.

A firm that wishes loyalty must develop and emphasize its own value system (L-6). This entails socializing its staff. Even if socialization is rejected as too difficult or improper, all firms need to recognize that certain essential ideas (e.g. efficiency, customer service) may be absent and may need to be instilled to maintain viability. In any case, an implicit value system always operates, and the various value systems of employees generate issues powered by conflicting beliefs, standards and loyalties. These issues must be positively managed.

A firm also needs to realize that it creates a community (L-5) in which a degree of equality, mutuality and personal relating is essential. To get external support and maximize internal support, the firm must recognize that staff share most of the values which are given importance in the relevant wider communities. In a firm as in any social group, people must deliberately work at participating and cooperating; and they should feel supported by others in general (and not just by their superior). Some firms may wish to go further and encourage a sense of belonging in the firm (cf. Ex. 5.9).

All staff should have a positive sense of participation through their personal interest in the firm's principal objects (L-4). At the very least all staff should experience a good match between their interests, occupational or professional training, and the objects of the post they hold. Senior managers, especially, need to be fully committed to their jobs and to the organization. High pay alone cannot achieve commitment, but participation can be enhanced through employee shareholder schemes which offer a degree of ownership.

Staff will press for priorities to suit themselves, and efforts may be made to accommodate these interests and preferences. Firms might even develop a full-fledged representational system (apart from any trade union arrangements) in order to foster staff input into controversial decisions on priorities (L-3).

The Firm as a Way of Life. The army, the church and the civil service are organizations which have long been recognized as defining the identity of those working within them. Socialization is given a high priority, and life-long security and community are provided in return for acceptance and obedience. Some firms take a similar view, especially in Japan (see Ex. 5.14).

Taking Identity Seriously: Large Japanese firms account for one third of the Japanese workforce. Building on feudal and militaristic traditions, they have taken identity-definition and social reinforcement to extremes. As far as possible, jobs are provided for life in return for devoted loyalty, and mutual support and consensus are prized above individual assertion. The result is that staff work late and on weekends, voluntarily take about one half of their two weeks annual leave, and socialize with work colleagues. There are hidden costs to such a regime: for example, managers spend on average less than 5 hours waking time per week with their families, death from over-work occurs, and women are necessarily precluded from work so as to care for children and the home.

Ex. 5.14[26]

Designing the social life of an organization is not straightforward. It is obvious that different cultures and different types of organization will require different approaches to identity support. But effective and ethical management in all cases depends on recognizing the varieties of value and human energy available, and on accommodating to the different forms of social group generated by employment.

TRANSITION

From what has been presented so far, it must be clear that to have values without value conflicts is a nonsense. No community, no firm, no partnership, indeed no utopia is conflict free. Successful utopian experiments like the kibbutzim, monastic orders, and the Hutterites recognize and manage conflict. Denial of value conflict where it exists is counter-productive and the attempt to abolish value conflict entirely is usually evil (as defined in Ch. 4).

Total harmony demands destruction of values and the needless restriction of possibilities and human identity. Suppressing differences and promoting conformity may ensure stability, but it tends to breed stagnation. Exposure of conflicting viewpoints and debate

stimulates social life, but tends to create disorder. According to the ultimate values and value systems in a society, differential importance will be assigned to things like stability, conformity, dynamism, adaptability, disagreement, self-control and debate.

The argument in this chapter suggests that the aim for unity and consensus in respect of values needs to be confined to genuine states of union and based on ultimate values. At all other levels differences are of the essence. Sometimes value differences are integrative, sometimes divisive. To ensure that conflict based on exclusiveness and division does not get out of hand, each person, organization and society must make an effort to recognize and foster union and ultimate values in all areas of social life. Given this context, we need diversity and multiplicity of values and social groups, together with their appropriate coexistence, cooperation, competition, and synthesizable opposition. People must be expected to differ on the balance they seek in society between community needs and individual interests. This is the basis for adherence to distinctive political ideologies.

The handling of value conflict depends on recognition of what is possible, on avoiding the injection of hostility, and on assigning responsibility for resolution appropriately.

Above all, the hope that mankind can be unified by a single value system or school of thought needs abandoning. The framework being presented in this book is total, but it is assuredly not a totalitarian system. It has been deliberately designed to provide for differences and to open up possibilities. It is no more a blueprint for social life, than Newton's laws are a blueprint for the London Underground. In the same way that Newton's laws govern the possibility of constructing and running a subway, it is proposed that the framework being presented here governs the possibility of working with values and designing social life ethically.　　　❉

Master-Table 3

The hierarchy of values and types of social group.

The left-hand section contains definitions of values (purposes). The right-hand section identifies the associated natural social groups and some of their properties. For further details and explanations see text

L	Type of Value & Definition	Type of Good	Social Group & Function	Energy & Antithesis	Participation & Cohesion	Relations: Linked and Separated	Leadership & Status	Group and Personal Identity
7	Ultimate value. A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.	Absolute good	Humanity To enable union.	Spirituality : Anti-sociality	Being : Communion	Reconciliation and Harmony	Free-floating charisma Equality and uniqueness	Humanity is the ground of all group and personal identities.
6	Value system. Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain.	Theoretical good	Tribe To preserve social distinctiveness.	Loyalty Betrayal	Socialization : Solidarity	Coexistence and Negativity	Symbolic ritual positions Informal hierarchy	Tribal identity defines personal identity.
5	Social value. A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Potential good	Community To meet social needs.	Belonging : Isolation	Mutuality : Fellowship	Cooperation and Positivity	Public figures – elected or emergent Fluctuating inequalities	The person and the community shape each other's identity.
4	Principal object. An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	Achievable good	Association To promote an interest formally.	Enthusiasm : Apathy	Commitment : Partnership	Alliance and Competition	Governance structures Designed differentials	People define the identity of the association.
3	Internal priority. A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use	Quantifiable good	Faction To ensure a particular view prevails.	Passion : Fanaticism	Siding : Partisanship	Coalition and Opposition	Powerful individuals : Impersonal equivalence	Factions enable assertion of personal identity.

Master-
Table 4

Natural groups and organizations.
Natural social groups are the way people share and develop values, while work groups (quintessentially organizations) are the way that acitivities are pursued. The diagram shows the role of social values and principal objects in linking natural and work groups.
Similar clustering of levels occurs in both cases, driven either by the value and social group, or purpose and responsible body.
For further explanation and details on the clustering, see text Tables 3.5 and 5.1.

NATURAL GROUPS

INDIVIDUALS				TYPE OF		SOCIAL	
Relations		Formation		VALUE		GROUP	
Values/groups	L7	Values/groups	L7	Ultimate values	define	Humanity	
controlling		controlling				contains	
differences	L6	identity	L6	Value systems	define	Tribes	
						living in	
	L5		L5	Social values	define	**Communities**	can be
						requiring	
Values/groups	L4	Values/groups	L4	Principal objects	define	**Associations**	can be
reflecting		reflecting				which need	
differences	L3	identity	L3	Internal priorities	define	Factions	

WORK GROUPS

RESPONSIBLE BODY		TYPE OF PURPOSE		ORGANIZATIONS			
				Formation		Relations	
Wider society	sets	Social values		L5	Goals/bodies providing	L5	Goals/bodies providing
enables							
Constituting bodies	set	Principal objects		L4	stability	L4	orientation
who create							
Governing bodies	set	Internal priorities		L3		L3	
who appoint							
Top officers	set	Strategic objectives		L2	Goals/bodies generating	L2	Goals/bodies generating
who appoint other							
Executants	set	Tactical objectives		L1	change	L1	impact

NOTES

1. This framework is briefly presented in Ch. 7. It first appeared in: Kinston. W. *Being a Person: Psychoanalytic Theories and Identity Systems.* Paper presented for the British Council in Munich, 1989.

2. Wilson, E.O. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.* London: Belknap, 1975.

3. **Freud, S. (1910)** *The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words.* Standard Edition, Vol. 11, pp.155-161. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1957.

4. From: Donne, J. *Devotion XII.* In: *The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of John Donne.* London: Oxford University Press, 1929.

5. Buber, M. *Paths in Utopia.* (Transl. R.F.C. Hull) Boston: Beacon Press, 1958.

6. This theory was developed with an American psychoanalytic colleague, Jonathan Cohen, in a series of papers and conference presentations. See especially: Kinston, W. & Cohen, J. Primal repression: Clinical and theoretical aspects. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,* 67: 337-355, 1986; Kinston, W. & Cohen, J. Primal repression and other states of mind. *Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review,* 11: 81-105, 1988.

7. This example is taken from a study of communes in the USA in the last 150 years: Kanter, R.M. *Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective.* Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.

8. Commentators with a religious background, make this point. See, for example: Bellah. R. et al. *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life.* Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985. Most secular commentators focus on social values and personal needs: maintaining a two-parent family, the relief of poverty, sustained primary school education &c.

9. Jung's analytical psychology broke with orthodox psychoanalysis on this account. Also see: Assagioli, R. *Psychosynthesis.* New York: Viking, 1965. In the USA, a so-called 'third force' psychology movement developed through theorists like Maslow suddenly discovering 'being' (*Toward a Psychology of Being. (2nd Ed.)* Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1958). Other psychologists who have experienced this revelation include: Anonymous. *A Course in Miracles.* Tiburon, Calif.: Foundation for Inner Peace, 1975; Fowler, J.G. *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning.* San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982; Peck, M.S. *The Different Drum: Community-making and Peace.* London. Rider, 1988. As evidence of the growth of these ideas, a *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology* now exists.

10. Such views are expressed in: Wilber, K. *Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution.* London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1983; Csanyi, V. *General Theory of Evolution.* Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982; Curtis, E.S. *Evolution or Extinction: The Choice Before Us.* London: Pergamon Press, 1982; Chaisson, E. *Universe.* New York: Prentice Hall, 1988.

11. Dihle, A. *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity.* London: University of California Press, 1982.

12. Spencer. H. In: *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. (2nd Ed.)* London: Oxford University Press, p.508.

13. Cardinal Ratzinger. *The Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian.* Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Rome, 1990.

14. *New English Bible with Apocrypha.* London: Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, 1970. The first quote is from Joshua 10: 28-32; and the advice of Moses is provided in Numbers, 31: 17-18.

15. Garrett Hardin has written trenchantly on the subject of tribalism, altruism and social life. The quotation is from: *Stalking the Wild Taboo.* Los Altos, Calif.: Kaufmann, 1973. Also see: Hardin, G. *The Limits of Altruism.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.

16. Bishop, P. & Darton, M. (eds.) *The Encyclopaedia of World Faiths.* London: Macdonald and Co., 1987: New religious movements among primal peoples. pp.307-311.

17. See, for example: Freidson, E. *Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge.* New York: Dodd Mead, 1970; Berlant, J.L. *Professions and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975; Larson. M.S. *The Rise of Professionalism.* San Francisco: University of California Press, 1977.

18. This line of therapy was developed by Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy. See his book with G. Spark: *Invisible Loyalties.* New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

19. Rousseau, J.J. *The Social Contract.* New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959.

20. Levels of community and government is a related framework developed to aid the restructuring of local government in the UK. The ideas have not been published, but see: Wilshire, D. & Kinston, W. A local revolution. *The House Magazine: The Magazine of the Houses of Parliament,* June 20th 1988, p.6.

21. Hawken, P. *The Magic of Findhorn.* Glasgow: Fontana, 1975.

22. An account of theories of utopia is provided in: Goodwin, B. *Social Science and Utopia.* London: Harvester, 1978; The example of the convent is taken from: Caplow, T. *Goals and their Achievement in Four Utopian Communities.* In: Kanter, R.M. (ed.) *Communes: Creating and Managing the Collective Life.* New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

23. Such ideas are characteristically emphasized by theologians and philosophers rather than psychologists or sociologists. See, for example: Rossi, P.J. *Together Toward Hope: A Journey to Moral Theology.* London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983; Buber, M. *I and Thou.* (transl. W. Kaufmann) Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1971.

24. Tocqueville, A. de. *Democracy in America.* (ed. P. Bradley) New York: Vintage, 1948, Pt. II p.106. Tocqueville's notion that ideas are the basis for associating is consistent with the proposition that principal objects and interests link to ideas in the hierarchy of experience. Principal objects are not activities but ideas for activity (cf. Master-Tables 1 and 2).

25. Smith, A. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759 1st edition; 1853 New Edition), Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1969.

26. Horsley, W. *Nippon: New Super-power.* London: BBC Books, 1990.

Chapter 6

Making an Ethical Choice

We now understand something about setting purposes and developing values. On this base it is possible to consider how to make choices which are ethical in principle.

For a choice to be ethical, some obligation must be met. Obligations are important because they are seen as powerful tools for resolving value disputes. But choosing between obligations is at times even more debatable than choosing between values. And even after an ethical choice has been made, people argue about how it should be implemented. Sometimes it seems almost impossible to cut the Gordian knot and make an ethical choice, especially amidst the welter of debate.

Conducting ethical debate. For many, ethics brings to mind interminable and rather unpleasant conflict. It is as if ethical choice is not about moving forward in a right and good way, but about plunging into acrimonious disputes.

Ethical debate, like all value debate, is intense and heated. So it goes wrong very easily. Debate is required whenever a choice is challenged in terms of an expected obligation. We can challenge any choice in this way, but do so most commonly when we are affected by something which seems unreasonable, unacceptable, inappropriate, personally disadvantageous, harmful to others, unfair or hypocritical. Where ethical choices in a community seem inconsistent, challenge is also likely. Ethical challenge is particularly common when matters of freedom and survival are involved. Survival is essential if choice is to have any relevance, and freedom is essential if choice is to have any meaning. Dead people and automata are relieved of making ethical choices — the rest of us are not.

The basic requirements for productive ethical debate are, first, some common ground for argument and inquiry; and, second, the exercise of virtue during the debate and choice process. The first impersonal requirement is developed by logical analysis to ensure that proper discussion can in principle occur. The second personal requirement is based on emotional self-control and increases the likelihood that debate will contribute to a beneficial resolution. The absence of

virtue means the emergence of folly, extremism, recklessness, arrogance, indifference, injustice and corruption — common, but not a pretty sight.

The numerous problems in public debate (see Box 6.1) are of course mirrored in our personal dilemmas. We lose our heads, confuse and delude ourselves, fail to inquire, ignore our precise responsibilities, and experience inner conflict. So how are ethical choices ever made?

We must not be too discouraged. All of us are aware that obligations influence our actions, and we operate on that basis. We do make ethical choices — all the time. Many organizations and governments, despite their failings, are generally preoccupied with doing what is good and right, avoiding harm and creating benefit. Acting on obligation is far too central to human existence for methods of ethical choice not to have emerged during the evolution of consciousness and social life. The aim of this chapter is to reveal the different answers that mankind has produced.

INTRODUCING APPROACHES TO ETHICAL CHOICE

It is a significant and profound step when we move from asking why we *in fact* want children to be educated to asking why we *ought to* want children to be educated — rather than, say, to be working for the family or to be playing freely. To say that education is a social value and also part of our value system merely indicates that we view education as an important communal ideal and regard it as a personal necessity. This explains that education is not merely a momentary preference but of great significance, but it does not explicitly clarify why that significance is right and good.

It turns out that we can rather easily elicit a value system which goes further and provides *a coherent basis for the obligation to value* the education of children. Such a meta- (or higher order) value system meets the need for ethical choice. Elicited ethical choice systems were found to be based on widely respected obligations — confirming the general philosophical view that certain fundamental axioms of ethics are universal.[1] These

Problems in Ethical Debate

The present chapter focuses on one major problem in debate: the use of different approaches to obligation. However, there are many other problems that interfere with effective debate. Here are some:

⇨ **Poor self-command.** Unless tolerance is activated and self-command exercised, the natural negativity between adherents of different value systems deteriorates into ridicule, mockery, vituperative abuse, and name-calling. Such release of hostility is often encouraged by politicians rather than rebuked e.g. in reference to intellectuals calling for legalization of addictive drugs, a UK Home Office minister argued to applause from the 1989 Conservative Party Conference that 'people who are soft on drugs are soft in the head'. Ad hominem insults such as 'you would say that because you are a scientist/man/politician/socialist &c' cannot be sensibly countered; nor can accusations of 'playing God' or 'defying God'.

⇨ **Distortion of realities.** Wildly discrediting worthy if flawed attempts to tackle social problems ignores just how difficult it is to make progress. Politicians and managers often ignore the limits on available money, time or energy in pursuing their case. One also hears arguments that any change in, say, sexual behaviour, is the thin end of the wedge or a slippery slope which will lead to yet more undesirable change. But this denies the reality that things change all the time, and that ethical choice must be continually renewed. It is also misleading to argue that because laws cannot control personal choices (e.g. for prostitution or drug-abuse) they are a waste of time and effort. Good well-designed laws have a very real force and effectiveness.

⇨ **Ignorance of the facts.** Facts do not determine obligations, but they do affect the way obligations are perceived and applied. Debate in a fact vacuum tends to polarize around two opposing values. For example, one leading philosopher argued publicly that the embryo research debate was about *either* respecting embryos and the sanctity of life *or* responding to the plight of the infertile. But inquiry reveals that it is also about the value of research on genetic abnormalities which lead to a life-time of pain and disability; about the value of free inquiry and knowledge; and about how any benefits of research are likely to be distributed within society.

⇨ **Loose arguments.** Some analytic rigour may assist debate if the arguments are complicated, if the terms used are crucial, or if spurious or inconsistent propositions are being argued in ways that superficially appeal. Of course, verbal trickery may be deliberately used: for example by misrepresenting the opposition's case, by putting up a linguistic smoke screen (cf. use of 'pre-embryo' in the debate on embryo experimentation), or by producing impenetrable prose (cf. some of the articles opposing ordination of women in the Anglican church).

⇨ **Forgetting responsibility.** Many debates proceed without identifying exactly who is responsible for what. For example, we may properly ask anyone at all whether criminals deserve to die for certain crimes. After all, each of us is responsible for choosing our beliefs and managing the consequences. But we confuse the issue if we ask the man in the street whether the death penalty should be introduced. Only the government is responsible for such choices. The man in the street cannot possibly appreciate the implications for legislation, the impact on sentencing or pleading, or the reactions of criminals, policemen and lawyers; nor is he responsible for managing the results of the choice.

Box 6.1

superordinate value systems appear to be natural, possibly innate, frameworks for making choices in terms of obligations.

Whenever and wherever a choice is made, whether it be controversial or self-evident, grand or mundane, deliberate or implicit, then a preference is being stated and alternatives exist. Defending any choice in terms of action-related values (i.e. priorities, but in this context usually called reasons or criteria) carries little ethical weight because it is not much more than a resort to brute assertion. The ethical challenge to choice must be met instead by stating an obligation of universally recognized significance.

Ethical challenge presses for clarity about the obligation used for the resolution of value conflict. Again it must be reiterated: ethical challenge and choice is not confined to academic disciplines like medical ethics; nor to philosophical and theological favourites like censorship or abortion; nor to personal conflicts like balancing a father's needs with those of his children. *Any decision at all can become an ethical issue just by calling for a justification of either the choice or its reasons in terms of obligations.*

All value systems have adherents and generate identification. The universal systems for ethical choice were found to be no different. Although all are useful, and sometimes particularly appropriate, people tend to value one or two systems predominantly and are either dubious about or wholly reject others. (Readers may well find themselves having such reactions). Conscious identification with a particular system eases inner conflicts and is socially adaptive, but at the cost of excessive partiality.

The ethical choice system is both a mentality (or psychological approach) and a social arrangement (or conceptual approach) which determines how choices are made and implemented in principle. Like most popular value systems, the ethical choice systems are rarely articulated as such in practice. Instead they manifest as a regular approach to choosing, an approach which feels right and natural to the chooser. Rather than use the clumsy phrase 'ethical choice system', I will generally refer to *an approach to ethical choice*.

Each approach is constructed around a single core ethical obligation, and includes other inter-related ethical elements like virtues and vices, and ethical aspirations.

In any social group, ethical clashes between people potentially release fanatical destructiveness. So finding a procedural approach acceptable to all parties to a controversy is helpful. The approaches offer this because each revolves around a readily recognized

injunction linked to a core obligation; and each feels internally logical and complete. Arguing at cross-purposes occurs when protagonists insist on applying different approaches to the same issue. Of course, an approach, like any value system, can do no more than orient. It cannot determine the need for choice, or the quality of inquiry and debate, or the outcome, or the sensitivity of implementation.

The present aim is to describe all the ways that people go about choosing ethically. The nature and inherent assumptions of the various approaches to ethical choice, as found in practice and in the literature, are the focus of attention rather than any particular controversial issue. Research suggested that each approach is felt to be good and right in itself, and that adherents feel each is applicable in virtually all cases. As a consequence, the many examples must be seen for what they are: illustrations of a point being made, not advocacy or defence of a particular view or choice. Each example could (and for other purposes should) be looked at from many other perspectives, and each deserves far more detailed examination than is possible here.

The approaches were initially discovered piecemeal and empirically, with little sense of how many there might be or what the relationship between them was. They appeared at first to be unrelated competing systems. However, in sorting out their distinctive features, it became apparent that each had a source level of purpose which imparted a characteristic flavour to the approach and contributed to the sense of conviction in its use. Once this was recognized, the seven approaches to ethical choice could be rapidly identified and related, and other hierarchical features were then noted. The basis of each approach in a corresponding level of purpose is the formal argument for completeness, because completeness can never be proven empirically.

I will first say something about an essential perspective in ethics, and then describe the general features common to all the approaches. After a brief summary of the complete set, the bulk of the chapter will be given over to describing each approach in detail. Finally, as an extended illustrative example, we will take on the mantle of the US government and use all the approaches to help us decide whether or not we should legalize addictive drugs.

Teleology or Deontology

In earlier chapters, it was quietly assumed that obligation is intelligible only in connection with action, preference and purpose. Although such a view is conventional in much social science, it is not taken for

granted by modern philosophers.[2] One of the deepest controversies within philosophy has been whether ethics is indeed concerned with notions of goodness and purpose and so *teleological* (from Gk. *telos* – purpose); or whether ethics is really *deontological* (from Gk. *deon* – duty), that is to say, obligations stand alone as unique self-imposed requirements or duties without any need to refer to intentionality.

The teleological view holds that it is self-evident that people have reasons for their choices, and that the good justifies the right. The danger in such thinking is the tendency to accept that ends justify any means. Classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle) were unambiguously clear that ethics was inextricably interlinked with the search for ultimate values like truth, goodness and happiness. Indeed, the notion of duty hardly existed prior to Kant (1724-1804).

Kant attempted to set forth the primary principles of morality apart from all subjective considerations of personal preference or inclination. Many modern philosophers have gone further and claimed that classical (teleological) ethics rests on a mistake. It just does not make sense, they argue, to ask why we should fulfil a duty; and, they continue, consequences are irrelevant in assessing the goodness or otherwise of ethical behaviour. In this deontological position, there are only means. The fundamental ethical question is then seen as: what is right? Rightness is invariably assured by an authority of some sort. The danger in such thinking is that it implies a blind performance of duty.

Because testimony to the good ultimately emerges from inner experience which is ever-changing, teleological ethics is inherently fluid and subjective. Because deontological ethics is based in the worth and sanctity of authority, stability is assured and values appear to be objective. Related to this is the issue of whether man has indeed the freedom to choose and change, or whether our actions are determined in some way. Teleology seems to allow freedom of choice by the individual because dynamic pursuit is required; whereas deontology seems to imply static obedience by the individual because given duties are not rapidly changed. Teleology offers flexibility but seems uncertain because gradations of goodness along a good-bad continuum are recognized; whereas deontology offers certainty but appears rigid because right and wrong are discrete categories.

Neither point of view has triumphed. Although philosophical allegiance to one position or the other exclusively persists, many modern philosophers accept both as valid without attempting to resolve the clash; and a few seek ways of reconciling the two perspectives.[3]

Perhaps the final arbitration might best be left to the non-specialist public. In my researches and consultations, I discovered that people found it equally meaningful, and not at all tautological, to speak of having an intention to fulfil (or to refuse to fulfil) a duty or having a duty to pursue (or to refuse to pursue) a purpose. Similarly, what was held to be good could be judged to be right or wrong, and what was held to be right could be considered good or bad. In other words, in everyday life, the two perspectives were sharply distinguished but tightly linked.

The conclusion that seems to follow from these various arguments is that any *adequate understanding of ethical choice must precisely accommodate and do justice to both teleological and deontological perspectives.*

The main difficulty with teleological ethics lies in the mystery of transcendence and ultimate values (i.e. absolute good, Being, God). Once the transpersonal and spiritual nature of man is accepted, this difficulty fades. The account to be provided strongly argues for the reality of this domain. The main difficulty with deontological ethics lies in the arbitrariness of imposing a structure. Once the need for structure and social authority is accepted, this difficulty fades too. Again, the account to be provided argues that such things are inescapable in human society. I would feel that this book was successful if it did no more than foster a wider recognition of these two great realities of the human condition.

Properties of Each Approach

Certain valued features of each approach have been identified during the research and from the literature. These properties are italicized here and highlighted in the later detailed accounts. (They are column headings in Master-Tables 5 and 6.)

The starting point for the empirical analyses were the *injunctions* and *interdictions* in actual use. The injunction (e.g. 'choose reasonably') and the interdiction (e.g. 'don't be unreasonable') are the instructions given within each approach in respect of the polarity: good and bad (if teleological) or right and wrong (if deontological). They are used for support or criticism and approval or disapproval of decisions.

Expanding and explaining these imperatives revealed the characteristic *core obligation* within the approach. The injunction and obligation lie at the heart of the approach and shape any choice, inquiry, compromise, justification or activity generated by it. The core obligations may be viewed as ethical maxims (deontological) springing from communal needs, or as social values (teleological) springing from personal needs. Their

observance brings benefit to the individual and community, and ignoring or neglecting them harms the individual and community.

The core obligation is always related to an inherent *duality* (or dialectic) which generates a tension of opposites within the approach. The content aspect of the duality is the *ethical aspiration*, while the contextual aspect is an associated unavoidable *ethical constraint*. The aspirations form an experiential basis for judging motives, and appear to be a form of obligation or inner authority. Many ethically-minded people mistakenly view aspirations as achievable goals rather than inspiring ideals. Not achieving an aspiration then generates an agonizing sense of failure. If simultaneously the validity of the constraint is denied or minimized, then a well-meaning but disastrous course of action may be inadvertently promoted. (This is simply another example of the way people use value systems inappropriately to determine choices.)

The aspirations appear to emerge progressively in a hierarchical fashion. The logical resolution of the aspiration-constraint duality at one level creates the constraint at the next higher level which can only be overcome by invoking a new and more encompassing ethical aspiration. The progression is described in the overview of the approaches to follow and is represented in Master-Figure 7.

In practice, the inherent duality is synthesized in satisfactory choices using each approach. Proper handling of the duality leads to expression of a characteristic *cardinal virtue*, while failing to resolve the tension expresses a characteristic *cardinal vice*. Many virtues and vices link more generally to the handling or mishandling of one or other aspect of the duality.

Classically, the cardinal or natural virtues were prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice; and these reappear in the present framework. However, of the three Christian theological virtues, only charity appears (the other two are faith and hope). Of the four Buddhist spiritual virtues, only vigour and wisdom appear (the other two are mindfulness and concentration). Three of the four classical Chinese virtues appear — love, justice and wisdom — while the missing fourth is *li*, a mix of ritual piety and social propriety. Interestingly, only one of the seven deadly sins, pride, emerges as a cardinal vice. (The other sins are: anger, lust, gluttony, avarice, envy, and sloth.)

Virtue is about deliberately choosing and acting well. It is a worthy quality of a person which develops through application and self-discipline. Virtue ensures that each choice becomes an opportunity to be grasped to strengthen one's inner self. Vice is an ethical flaw. It

refers to deliberate wickedness which develops through depravity and self-indulgence. Virtue and vice are therefore matters of the will, and part of a person's identity. Hope and faith do not fit this definition: hope is essential for life; and faith is essential to maintain the spiritual dimension of existence.

Each approach to choice invites identification and is capable of generating a distinctive personal identity. The approaches are so alive and self-contained that we often personify them, referring to a conventionalist (say) as a type of person rather than a way of choosing. In consultancy work, we found that people spontaneously and rapidly labelled themselves. The identity element in the approaches means that the use of *feelings* and the handling of inner experience is important during ethical choice.

The aspiration-constraint duality is usefully illustrated by defining an *extreme circumstance* (sometimes called a 'hard case') in which the experience of ethical choice is stark and unavoidable. In the face of the intense emotional pressures invariably generated by such extreme circumstances, confusion and demoralization set in until a course of action judged ethically satisfactory is found and pursued. Each approach therefore generates its own typical form of *investigation* with characteristic foci of inquiry and debate to promote resolution. Once a way forward is identified, certain characteristic *quandaries* present themselves and demand effective handling. Standard methods, adapted as appropriate to the situation, have emerged for each approach.

Examples of the use of the approaches by persons, firms and governments will be provided. Readers are again reminded that they may be tempted to engage passionately with the examples. However, the examples are highly simplified and do not try to promote or defend any value position or choice. They aim only to illustrate aspects of the approach.

The main *criticisms* of each of the ethical systems will be identified. Like the common criticisms of types of value, they tend to express a distorted or prejudiced rejection of the approach by an adherent of an alternative approach. However unavoidable *limitations* do exist in each approach, and these serve as the logic for moving up to the next level.

Summarizing the Approaches

The set consists of five actual approaches and two contextual and potentiating approaches. This arrangement is an image of the five levels of purpose which are used for endeavours, and the two higher levels of purpose which provide the context and potential for

endeavour. The approaches have been named with terms which, though not established in the literature, fit their nature.

In order, the approaches, with their injunctions which explain the labels, are: *rationalist* which is founded on choosing what is reasonable (L'-1); *conventionalist* which is founded on choosing what is acceptable (L'-2); *pragmatist* which is founded on choosing what feels appropriate (L'-3); *individualist* which is founded on choosing what is to the advantage of the chooser; (L'-4); *communalist* which is founded on choosing what is beneficial overall for all concerned (L'-5); *legitimist* which is founded on choosing fairly (L'-6); *transcendentalist* which is founded on choosing authentically (L'-7).

The properties of the seven approaches are summarized in Master-Table 5 and their use is summarized in Master-Table 6. The approaches will now be defined in terms of their core obligations; and the hierarchical evolution of the aspirations and constraints, as shown in Master-Figure 7, will be explained.

L'-1: The rationalist approach. This system is based in the obligation to meet practical objectives which are self-evidently sensible and worthwhile to the chooser. The ethical aspiration is a solution for a current problem, but realities typically put a constraint on what can be achieved. Even a wise choice, which produces a solution that takes social factors into account, may demand some social changes. At a certain point, the degree of change affects existing values and social identity sufficiently for it to be resisted strenuously. The result is a new ethical dilemma which can only be resolved at a higher level.

L'-2: The conventionalist approach. This system is based in the obligation to conform with widely held views on what is valued and proper within the chooser's relevant social group. The ethical aspiration is the maintenance of continuity within the group, but inevitable changes in current values emerge as a constraint. Present values, whether based in continuity or essential change, constitute a potential for development. However, improvement can only be ethical if that potential is deliberately shaped in a particular way. Pursuit of such a course requires a move to a higher level.

L'-3: The pragmatist approach. This system is based in the obligation to pursue values which are personally preferred by the chooser, which bring some wider benefit, and which can be easily applied. The ethical aspiration is the pursuit of the chooser's ideals; while current potentials constrain what is feasible.

However, the elusiveness of ideals, the uncertainty of potential, and the need to produce beneficial results expose the chooser's limitations and vulnerabilities. This vulnerability can only be overcome by moving up to the next level.

L'-4: The individualist approach. This system is based in the obligation to ensure the chooser's security and interests in the light of existing power relations. The ethical aspiration is strength in the chooser, while the chooser's limitations or vulnerabilities operate as a constraint. The chooser's egoism depends on the balance of strengths and vulnerabilities. Egoism interferes with relationships between people because it reflects inequalities of capability and opportunity. This difficulty can only be overcome by moving up again to a higher level.

L'-5: The communalist approach. This system is based in the obligation to balance all anticipated consequences in relation to the needs and interests of all concerned, including the chooser. The ethical aspiration is the exercise of altruism, and the constraint lies in the capacity of the individual i.e. in egoism. Altruistic choice incorporates the opinions and preferences of the chooser. In other words, exercising altruism from an egotistical base is an expression of individual autonomy. However, autonomy does not focus on the needs of the social group as a living entity on which each individual constituting it depends. So a new dilemma results which must be dealt with by handling choice at a yet higher level.

L'-6: The legitimist approach. This system is based in the obligation to set a rule which is accepted as right by the chooser and others within the social group. The ethical aspiration when setting rules is to serve the common good and maintain the social group, but the choice of rule is constrained by the need to preserve the autonomy of those within the group. Taken together the common good and individual autonomy comprise the temporal realm. A focus on ultimate values which transcend time, culture and circumstance is lacking. Only by moving to a higher and final level can the constraints of temporality be overcome.

L'-7: The transcendentalist approach. This system is based in the obligation on the chooser to respond to a deep inner sense of what is right and good, a sense which emerges ultimately from the eternal and divine. The ethical aspiration is the realization of spirituality, but the claims of temporality persist as a constraint. Ethical choice now involves infusion of the temporal by the spiritual. This chooser must confront a specific situation as deeply and as authentically as

possible. In effect, one encompasses the constraint of realities, but now perceived in the broadest possible sense — which returns us to the rationalist approach (L'-1). So the hierarchy is completed.

Each approach includes aspects of approaches at lower levels, while the upper two approaches pervade and constrain all others. This is because legitimist choices govern and direct the individual as a member of a social group; and transcendentalist choices govern and direct the individual as a unique person and a member of humanity. Now we will turn to consider each in detail.

L'-1:
THE RATIONALIST APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The first approach to ethical choice focuses, like tactical objectives (L-1), on the means for producing results. At this level of purpose, values are taken as given and their realization has been broadly determined. What is required is precise specification of activity so that results follow with confidence and certainty. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the rationalist approach is to be found in specific sensible and practical means which will produce a good result. The rationalist asks: 'What will really deal with the problem we all see? What will achieve the result we all want?' So choice for the rationalist is ethically justified if it is instrumental in the achievement of worthwhile goals.

Principal Features. The *injunction* is to do what is reasonable. All action to deal with an ethical matter is expected, by definition, to have a rationale (its purpose in the situation) and that rationale is 'good' if it is reasonable, and 'bad' if unreasonable or misconceived. The associated *core obligation* is the need to do something that clearly meets concrete, self-evidently sensible and worthwhile objectives. In other words, to produce a solution. This implies both that the means to good ends are known, and that the value of these ends is properly appreciated. The rationalist approach is clearly *teleological*.

Improving Schooling: Raising educational standards in the UK was seen as an urgent necessity in the 1980s. The self-evidently worthwhile objectives in this area were universal literacy and numeracy, coverage of sufficient subjects by pupils, and higher standards of teaching. These ends could be achieved by the Government through the introduction of a national curriculum with core subjects, national testing, comparison of attainments in different schools, and assessment of teacher performance. The objectives were felt to be incontrovertible by both the public and the teaching profession, and the means were largely seen to be eminently reasonable. So the national curriculum could be introduced, and controversy focused on what precisely was to be in the curriculum, how tests were to be conducted, and similar implementation issues.

Ex. 6.1

The content-context *duality* found here is based in the *aspiration* to improve matters by finding a solution to obvious problems — in Ex. 6.1: the problem was poor educational standards — in the face of realities, usually social, which put *constraints* on what can be done — in Ex. 6.1: constraining factors included resource availability, public opinion, the structure of the education system, teaching skills and staff attitudes. An exclusive focus on constraints results in a failure to come to grips with the ethical necessity for choice. An exclusive focus on a solution to the problem results in choices which are described as academic or theoretical — correct but divorced from the realities which any effort at improvement must recognize.

The tension between the solution and the realities must be handled by the *cardinal virtue* of wisdom. Wisdom ensures a balanced approach and reflects a harmonization of given facts and given values. Being wise is, of necessity, a value-laden and judgemental matter: first, because it is based on estimating the potential for actual benefit; and second, because it depends on the way social realities are perceived.[4] Folly is the corresponding *cardinal vice* generated partly by false values or neglect of the facts, but, above all, by a failure to strike a balance between how a defined problem may be resolved in principle and the surrounding realities affecting practical action.

Irrationality and Cold Rationalism. Self-defeating actions are often described as irrational rather than foolish. But what is irrational to the beholder, may be rational to the actor. On occasion, a challenge to apparent irrationality may reveal that the chooser possesses unexpected profundity. My own observations suggest that most irrational actions flow from an inadequate appreciation of what is instrumentally required.

To avoid charges of irrationality and to simplify otherwise complex matters, technocrats and bureaucrats may foolishly neglect emotional factors. This leads to an inadequate understanding and a failure to produce a workable solution. In present-day analyses of ship disasters, for example, human error is conceived in narrow terms which largely ignore social and organizational factors in shipboard life.[5] Paradoxically, such cold rationalism is irrational.

Nevertheless, many see rational choice as equivalent to a cold neglect of emotions and values. This is understandable because the tradition of rationalist-empiricist inquiry does indeed emphasize the use of reason and

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facts to achieve a unique or optimum conclusion. People (other than scientists) are properly suspicious of such science because it is common knowledge that theoretical knowledge, technological understanding, and vast databases do not and cannot alone specify what should be done in any social situation. In most cases, the realities are simply too diffuse for formal systematic inquiry. The key point to recognize is that rationalist *choice* is distinct from rationalist *inquiry* and the former is intrinsically and overtly social while the latter tries hard not to be. Rationalist ethical choice absolutely demands awareness of values (though restricted to those commanding wide acceptance) and rationalist decision-making similarly recognizes the need to make values explicit because the process is built on priority-setting.[6]

Feelings. Feelings are part of the social realities and so they need to be identified and taken into account during choice. Reason and knowledge are useful here to clarify, shape, harness and work with feelings. Sensory awareness, a key tool in any inquiry, needs to be turned inwards so that one's own inner experiences may be observed. At the same time, by resonance, the feelings and moods of others can be discerned.

Although passionate involvement is necessary for the solution of any problem with an ethical dimension, passion has its problems. Rationalists are concerned that feelings should not inappropriately intrude. To handle passion, self-containment and self-command are essential virtues. Irrational choices commonly indicate a deficiency in self-command. For instance, loss of temper or panic often leads us to say and do things that we can later see are self-destructive. When this occurs regularly, some inner change in ourselves to align inner and outer awareness is required.

Using the Approach. A rationalist-style *investigation* is called for whenever dispassionate consideration of a particular situation is required to determine or to advise on a way forward. The inquiry process can often drain off emotional pressures which would otherwise build up and threaten efforts to make a sensible choice.

Commission of Inquiry – Type I: Some government commissions of inquiry are expected to conduct rationalist investigations. In the UK, the Government was obliged to set up a Royal Commission on the NHS because of the intensity of feeling about how badly it was managed following a reorganisation in 1974. Similarly the Widdicombe Report on the conduct of Local Authority business flowed from public concern about the rights of elected councillors and the propriety of their behaviour. Each commission had a brief to find an effective way forward. In pursuing the brief, they handled highly emotive and controversial matters and came up with some radical

recommendations. They took evidence, questioned existing and conflicting social views and values (and practices flowing from these), commissioned research and determined facts. Although they provided sensible plans of action to resolve the problems uncovered, the plans were only partially implemented by the Government (which was evidently using a different approach).   Ex. 6.2[7]

Debate following rationalist investigation considers whether the worthwhile objectives identified will indeed be met, whether they are as worthwhile as claimed, and whether any mechanisms proposed to prevent harmful side-effects are likely to be effective. Debates which have taken this form include the one among US scientists on the strategic defence initiative (SDI or Star Wars) as a deterrent, and the one among UK psychiatrists on the closure of large mental hospitals to improve patient care.

The *extreme circumstance* is one in which there are worthwhile objectives, but there is such intense emotional pressure that the capacity for reflective thought is blocked. In states of intense envy, terror or rage, objectives cannot be appreciated, and debate becomes impossible. Unless the disruptive emotions can be disciplined, behaviour will not be altered, and a maximally beneficial resolution will not result.

Economic Regeneration: Governments of countries whose economies have been ruined by over-manning, excessive debt, incompetence, over-centralized control, and corruption often turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. Such assistance is typically conditional on the adoption of certain policies which are described in ethical terms: i.e. as socially responsible. The approach used is invariably rationalist because the agency does not have the authority or knowledge to clarify and handle local value conflicts. The IMF therefore feels compelled to produce proposals that meet self-evidently worthwhile objectives like low inflation, higher productivity, adequate investment, and modest growth. However, IMF proposals like removing subsidies for inefficient industries and reducing the size of the state bureaucracy are in effect austerity measures which, at least temporarily, increase prices and unemployment. So they arouse intense emotional opposition in the affected populace. Governments may then be unable to implement the changes needed.   Ex. 6.3

As the above example (Ex. 6.3) illustrates, the *quandary* generated by rationalist ethical choice concerns how to find a way in which objectives can be achieved given the values and feelings of the person or people involved. Overcoming opposition poses different challenges in the case of choices by a firm, a government and a person.

Opposition to rationalist-based solutions within organizations, say restructuring or introducing new

systems to combat inefficiency, are dealt with by pro-grams to reorient and develop staff. Staff may also be moved about or even dismissed if they do not co-operate. However emotional conservatism and ex-pediency usually mean that major change occurs only when a new chief executive is appointed, following a take-over or attack by a corporate raider, or in response to some financial or social catastrophe. It is just as diffi-cult keeping public sector agencies up to the mark. Large long-stay mental illness and mental handicap hospitals, for example, often contain patients in con-ditions of unnecessary regimentation and neglect. Closure is a workable rationalist choice because the institutions are the product of 19th century fear and ignorance and better treatment alternatives are avail-able. However, a closure policy in the UK was only introduced following a series of scandals involving gross maltreatment and cruelty towards patients.[8]

In the case of a person, the wisdom of a course of action may become evident, and yet he may say he is unable to pursue it. The line between defining inner opposition as 'feeling unable' rather than 'being unwill-ing' is a fine one. The former emphasis provides the basis for psycho-dynamic therapy. The latter emphasis has led to maladjustment being seen in ethical terms. For example, a father who crashes his daughter's car and says it was an accident, when his other behaviours, his slips of the tongue and his dreams indicate that it was a jealous attack on her boyfriend, would be said by a Freudian to be using unconscious defences. It might be simpler to say that the father is engaged in self-decep-tion, or more bluntly, that he is lying. Following this latter logic, rationalist forms of psychotherapy have been developed. Rational-emotive therapy identifies a relation between illogical assumptions and thought-patterns based in values and beliefs on one hand, and dysfunctional emotional states on the other. Through a process of systematic inquiry and ethical challenge, the therapist helps clients fulfil themselves.[9]

Governmental and quasi-governmental organiza-tions, which are distant from the scene of operations where passions run high, often adopt the rationalist perspective. Even when the approach is unlikely to be effective, the proposals may appear sensible and com-pelling. As illustrated in Ex. 6.3, societies have great difficulty handling their own swings of feeling and mood. Because governments express the feelings of the people, leading or controlling such swings is problem-atic. The populace cannot be dismissed or trained like employees. So, no matter how unrealistic their passion-ate demands, no matter how severe the longer term consequences of giving way to them, a government may have to submit to the electorate's emotional pressure.

Limitations. The rationalist approach founders if the problem is poorly understood, because the neces-sary link between the problem and obvious action is missing. This seems to be the case all too often in rela-tion to the most serious social problems like unemploy-ment, poverty, and racism. Even if the action seems obvious, rationalism is positively foolish if a consensus on worthwhile objectives is unavailable.

> **Resolving the Prison Crisis:** Long-standing and worsening overcrowding in UK prisons will not be solved by the obvious and apparently rational response of building more and better prisons, because the purpose of impris-onment is not at all clear. There is no consensus on the various potentially worthwhile aims of imprisonment — reform, punishment, vengeance, custody, deterrence — which, in any case, are not being met singly or together. Many academic observers hold that imprisonment is overused in the UK. From a rationalist perspective, it would be concluded that a prison building programme is not ethically justified at present. The rationalist argues that it is necessary, first, to debate and determine what is being aimed for in relation to each of the varieties of offender; and then to ensure that sentences and facilities are designed to deliver whatever is decided in each case. The social realities which constrain such an apparently sensible course of action are formidable.   Ex. 6.4[10]

The commonest *criticism* of rationalist-based choices is that they ignore people and their wishes and values. If this is so, then there has been a mishandling of the situ-ation. A person operating wisely within the rationalist approach does recognize the significance of feelings, and does take these into account as part of the context. However, he also believes that it is necessary to ensure that ethical decisions are not unduly swayed by transient emotions or sectional values — his own or other peo-ples. As a result, rationalists are not overly sensitive to the political process. They want priorities set rationally (i.e. in terms of effectiveness and efficiency) rather than politically, and tend to be contemptuous of compro-mises with vested interests and articulate pressure groups.

Many of the examples in this section reveal that worthy ethical choices are frequently controversial and difficult to impose. People react as if their values are being ignored. And, in truth, some value change is frequently implied by the choice. To appreciate and deal with this phenomenon of apparently wise changes being viewed as anathema in society generally, it is necessary to move to the next ethical system.

L'-2:
THE CONVENTIONALIST APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The second approach to ethical choice focuses, like strategic objectives (L-2),

on acting within values which are given. At this level of purpose, values have been determined and a feasible outcome which realizes them must be devised. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the conventionalist approach is based in the idea of sticking with given values and seeking to realize these. The conventionalist asks: 'What do we usually do? What will everyone accept?' Choice for the conventionalist is ethically justified if it emerges from the values inherent in long-standing views, customs and practices.

Principal Features. The *injunction* here is to do what is acceptable within the social group. The group might be a family, or a community, or society, or a club, or a firm. Whatever is acceptable in the relevant setting is held to be 'right', and whatever is unacceptable is held to be 'wrong' — regardless of the actual problems facing the individual or the group.

> Management Inertia: Rationalist-based and centrally-inspired management changes in the NHS between the major restructurings in 1974 and 1989 often had little effect on deep-seated problems. Doctors tended to respond to management initiatives with the cry: 'This is unacceptable!' Managers socialized in a bureaucratic-administrative culture were more tactful but equally opposed. Government reforms meant the introduction of dynamic managerial values, but the culture regarded such change as undesirable and unnecessary. Managers would often assume that the proposed initiative 'does not apply to us'. Where some action was demanded, as in a reorganisation, people would be slotted into the new posts with new titles (and often increased salaries) but with little change in their activities. No-one was ever disciplined or dismissed for such behaviour.   Ex. 6.5[11]

The *core obligation* here is to conform with widely held views about what is valued and proper within the social group relevant to the chooser. Many values become embedded in social rules. So adherence to an existing rule, whether explicit in law or implicit in custom, is often an expression of conventionalist choice. Laws and other rules are not automatically followed and enforced, and often fall into disuse or disrepute without being publicly altered. Conventionalism demands that one pays heed to rules which are widely valued, and ignores those which are not.

The conventionalist obligation to conform applies irrespective of any objective assessment of the value or consequences which flow from the choice. The static quality of conformity, the irrelevance of consequences, and the link to rules all indicate that this approach is *deontological*.

The tension-producing *duality* that emerges here is based on the *aspiration* to maintain a continuity of values despite unavoidable processes of change. Persistence of

sameness (continuity) is the prime support for individual and group identity, so choice here is about identity maintenance. Continuity of existing patterns of valued behaviour and of long-standing habits of thought and feeling is essential for social stability and coherence. Any significant change affects perceptions and beliefs about what is important and therefore threatens value change and eventually identity change. Change is therefore the *constraint* on choice.

Identity change generates transient confusion, and this temporarily inhibits or precludes ethical functioning. In psychological and spiritual terms, identity change is equivalent to death because it equates to annihilation of an old self and rebirth of a new self. So value change, whether for better or for worse, generates a fear that instability and chaotic functioning may lead to death and disaster. It is a short step from this fear to repression or violence.

The tension that results between the aspiration to remain rooted in past values and the need to respond to pressures of change can be handled by the *cardinal virtue* of moderation or temperance. This virtue ensures that both continuity and change are valued. The corresponding *cardinal vice* is extremism which manifests differently according to the type of imbalance. Extremism leads to stagnation if the past will not be abandoned, and to disruptive activism if the value of historical conditioning is not recognized. Finding the balance is particularly difficult for those whose value systems commit them to maintaining traditions (e.g. many clergy) or to those whose value systems commit them to radical change (e.g. many sociologists).

> Moderate Muslims: Muslims in the UK wish to preserve their culture, and the position of women within it. They need to decide whether to educate their girls in all-Muslim schools or within English schools. Fundamentalists want an extreme form of Muslim education for their daughters in single-sex classes. They wish for a focus on Arabic rather than English, an emphasis on the study of traditions and religious observances appropriate to women, and the learning of domestic crafts. The usual academic curriculum is not viewed as necessary or suitable. Muslims, who are less extreme, find it possible to maintain their values within English schools by ensuring girls receive religious instruction at home or at the mosque, retain most of their traditional dress, get excused from swimming classes, and adhere to their dietary laws. This moderation gives them the opportunity to sustain their Muslim identity and family values while simultaneously permitting adaptation to English culture. This is especially relevant to future UK employment which takes personal self-sufficiency for granted.   Ex. 6.6

Conventionalist choices are dominant in all societies and social groups. Despite the value which is assigned

to enterprise and achievement in the West, failure is often preferable to success if that means violating convention. Keynes once noted that 'a sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way with his fellows, so that no-one can really blame him.'

Ethical Relativism. The development of modern social sciences, particularly anthropology, sociology and history, has led to an appreciation of the enormous variety of moral experiences, value assumptions and social rules. The view that 'right' and 'good' might be relative terms in that they described or expressed the approval of the speaker as conditioned by his society became popular in moral philosophy at the turn of the century.[12] Somewhat earlier, Hegel, despite his passion for freedom, had concluded that the demands of tradition within a society (including its institutions and laws) were of paramount importance in choosing well.

Long before this, reflective observers had noted that there is no practice so abhorrent to one group — slavery, sexual use of children, torture, wife-murder, human sacrifice — that another group's custom cannot allow it, or even demand it. Peruvian Indians, for example, 'kill members of their own tribe by slow torture if the priest has pronounced a curse on him. Children thus cursed die a slow death by whipping and branding with hot irons to exorcise the demons gradually so that the soul, when it leaves the body, will be pure.'[13]

Feelings. Any change in a core social value or violation of a value system produces immediate emotional reactions oriented to preserving identity. Feelings therefore provide the touchstone for assessing the ethical significance of any proposed change. Emotional reactions to new ethical choices are the stuff of public life. These emotional reactions are regarded as wholly justified by the individuals concerned, and are seen as reasonable by others within that society. They are an expression of loyalty — that potent social force which effectively controls the introduction of identity-based change. Individual people and whole communities may react with violence and may prefer suffering, even death, to value change.

Using the Approach. The prominence of the conventionalist approach to choice ensures that change in social values and customs tends to be actively opposed, blocked or delayed whenever it threatens. Existing values and customs are maintained and promoted in the press, and affirmed by politicians and other public figures.

When social change is overt and unavoidable, a conventionalist-type *investigation* may be instituted. This inquiry occurs when people wish to be clear about what the traditional and currently held values actually are, what the challenges are, and how inevitable changes might be handled without abandoning long-standing attitudes and values. Extensive consultation with those affected is the prime tool in this endeavour. The ethical debate during an inquiry and afterwards consists of conflicting assertions about what values in the community are most important, and how the final decision will affect existing values and future behaviour within the community.

> Commission of Inquiry – Type II: Recent scientific developments allow a woman to have a child without necessarily having a husband or sexual intercourse. This dramatic change in a custom which is so intrinsic to personal and social identity generates intense controversy and demands an ethical response. In the UK, the complexities led the government to set up an official Inquiry under Mary Warnock. In an introduction to its Report, she stated that the 'members of the Inquiry were reluctant to appear to dictate on matters of morals to the public at large'. The importance of feelings in reaching moral conclusions was also emphasized. The author suggested that 'most ordinary people agree with Hume' that ethics is 'more properly felt than judged of'. Dispensing rapidly with an appeal to ethical principles or general benefits, she argued that 'we were bound to have recourse to moral sentiment, to try....to sort out what our feelings were'. Because the Report was mandated to advise on legislation, these feelings had to be compatible with what was broadly acceptable in society. Evidence was therefore taken widely from about 400 organizations and prominent individuals. The committee of inquiry examined and balanced existing conflicts of social views and values in an effort to find a consensus, and did not feel obliged to question or inquire into the worth or logic of these in any depth. In the area of embryo research where public opinion was not fully developed, the committee was unable to make proposals.　　　　Ex. 6.7[14]

The *extreme circumstance* is one in which value change is rapid, widespread and uncontrollable. Such a situation precipitates a moral crisis. If the moral crisis is not resolved, then new internal divisions begin developing, leading potentially to a breakdown of the old order. Societies experience a moral crisis when technical developments, foreign customs, environmental change, or economic upheaval not previously handled by conventions within the community impinge sharply on social awareness. In a society, this may mean riots and revolution or a change in government. For example, the collapse of Soviet hegemony and communist party domination in 1989 meant that Eastern Europe faced massive social change. Some countries, like Czechoslovakia and Poland, had traditions which supported a

relatively peaceful transition to democracy and a market economy. Others, like Jugoslavia and the USSR, lacked such traditions and so suffered civil wars and instability.

Moral crises may also occur in organizations. When a new chief executive introduces a radical new approach to management, a phase of widespread anxiety and a staff exodus is common. Major alterations in the firm's political context or business environment can similarly produce panic. Globalization of markets and shortened product life cycles, for example, have affected many firms who clamour for protection and subsidies in order to cling to their old ways. For a person, ethical stress may occur at life transitions like marriage or following some disruptive event, like losing a secure job or emigrating. Failure to handle the moral crisis leads to mental breakdown or physical illness.

The *quandary* that flows from conventionalist choice concerns how to support established values while at the same time proposing and progressing inevitable or essential changes. Everyone finds that they have views on the issue. Any proposed mixture of modified and re-affirmed values is never entirely satisfactory. Supporters and opponents emerge, argue and demonstrate. Newspapers thrive: for example, one tabloid headline following publication of the Warnock Report (Ex. 6.7) screamed: '*Ethics Undermined*'.

Handling public controversy usually involves: providing extensive opportunity for expressions of dissent and visible public debate, slowing or phasing the introduction of change, using trials and tests to detect and remedy untoward consequences, providing compensation or special arrangements for those who object to or suffer from the proposed change, preserving the status quo wherever possible, and allowing voluntary opting-out from the changes for those adapted to the old arrangements.

A Woman's Place: Socio-cultural and demographic changes in the West have led to the need to change the middle-class notion that a woman's place is in the home. However, many men and women in the UK still find it unacceptable for women to reduce their responsibility for the household and the children. So management of this transition is being handled with great care. Although no mother is forced to work, and the value of a woman as housewife and mother is constantly re-affirmed, women's roles are changing. To assist the change in attitudes while allowing maintenance and evolution of the conventional identity, firms are beginning to offer creches, job-sharing, and part-time work. Some local councils have provided nurseries for working women, and have set up back-to-work confidence-building and re-training schemes. Fathers are offered paternity leave by employers to give

them the opportunity to be responsible for housekeeping and child-care. Children's books which do not portray men and women in stereotyped roles are commissioned and used for reading lessons in schools. The media now regularly offers features and reports of women and men acceptably succeeding in the new roles.   Ex. 6.8

A key element in managing new arrangements is the active use of socializing techniques (cf. Ex. 6.8). For a person, this means allowing oneself to be exposed to what feel like alien values. Within organizations, this means things like providing special topic-awareness seminars, supporting natural champions of the new values, and re-designing incentives. Within society, this means things like altering the curriculum in schools and universities, expecting the media to educate, and fostering relevant crusading and campaigning bodies.

Limitations. The principal *criticism* of the conventionalist approach is that it fails to question existing values when this seems patently required. Some critics go further and deny the validity of the approach. Such people miss the importance of values for identity and seem unaware that identity needs to be actively maintained. Continuity of identity must be seen as a profound and fundamental ethical aspiration. Existing values need therefore to be recognized as the foundation from which anything practical and worthwhile must grow.

This deep truth in the conduct of human life and social affairs is particularly emphasized in classical philosophies. The *I Ching*, for example, notes that 'the superior man does not tread upon paths that do not accord with established order'.[15] Aristotle also put it succinctly: 'No one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else.'[16] To reiterate the point more bluntly: if the consequence of the continuity drive is that possibilities for constructive development are missed, or that revolutions produce regimes identical to those overthrown, or that barbarous customs are maintained, so be it.

If an acceptable way forward is found, continuity of values is ensured in the process of change. The problem with this is that the ethical vision remains fixed on the ground. The state of mind during conventionalist choice deliberately limits the potential for development. Values are allowed to persist even if they are known to be harmful. The first step in remedying any persistent bad is to take the step of asserting that something better is possible. Then, without condemning the whole, reality can be modified. In other words, the creation of a better world depends on a determination to build positively on present potentialities and possibilities. Such a move requires the assumptions of a higher ethical system.

L'-3:
THE PRAGMATIST APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The third approach to ethical choice focuses, like internal priorities (L-3), on the brute assertion of a preferred value from among alternatives. At this level of purpose a range of relevant values have been determined, and those which are especially desirable in a particular situation are selected and emphasized to control decisions, action and tangible changes. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the pragmatist approach springs from the need to impose a value from among agreed values. The imposition is naturally based on the desires and predilections of the person choosing, as well as the need to ensure beneficial change results. The pragmatist asks: 'What feels best? What will lead to some tangible improvement now?' Choice for the pragmatist is ethically justified if some beneficial change can be certainly and easily achieved.

Principal Features. The *injunction* is that whatever is chosen should feel appropriate. Such choices are 'good'. Choices are 'bad' if they feel inappropriate, because personal conviction cannot then be developed. Appropriate choices must both embody sensible worthwhile objectives, and also be generally acceptable. Unless both these criteria are met, the choice will not be understood or supported and useful results are unlikely. Hence the pragmatist approach includes rationalist and conventionalist assumptions modified by a focus on the chooser's responsibility for actually producing some increment of social benefit.

The *core obligation* is to recognize the variety of values immediately relevant to the problematic issue, pursuing those that are most desirable for the chooser and which can be easily applied to produce a modicum of tangible wider benefit. The ideals and preferences of the chooser will depend on his or her own social identity and experiences. This approach is regularly used where choice is absolutely necessary without delay, and where beneficial consequences will follow if the person responsible grasps the opportunity that presents. So the pragmatist approach is clearly *teleological*.

Nixon's Pardon: President Ford had to decide whether or not to offer a pardon to Richard Nixon after he resigned the Presidency of the USA following the Watergate scandal. Ford emphasized that, as President, his primary concern was the good of the country as a whole. In this regard, there were two desirable values which clinched the decision for mercy. First, there was the need for a reduction in the bitterness and divisiveness in the populace which was generated by Watergate; and, second, there was the need to protect the credibility of the institutions of government. The President also noted that grant-

ing a pardon for Nixon was quick and easy, while legal proceedings would be lengthy, complex and potentially inconclusive because of the intensity of feelings that would be aroused. He judged that it was inappropriate to apply these considerations to others involved in Watergate, and they were tried and found guilty. So the general abstract ethical rule of equal justice under the law was not held to be paramount in this case.   Ex. 6.9[17]

When urged to introduce rationally-required changes, pragmatists repeatedly point out somewhat defensively that 'I must live and act in the world as it is'. 'The world as it is' refers to the demand for continuity. It is reasonable to hold that reality, even social reality, evolves on the basis of a multitude of forces and pressures beyond the capability of any single person to control. Such an image sees the future as emerging from present potential. The current flow of forces defining the most natural possibilities and potentials are therefore the *constraints* to choice. If ethical progress is to occur, then the world as it is must be changed in the direction of an ideal: which is the ethical *aspiration*. So the tension-producing *duality* that emerges here is that of ideals and potentials.

In psychotherapy, eclectic practitioners choose interventions pragmatically. The therapist offers ideals like openness to experience, close relationships, responsibility for oneself, physical fitness, social integration, and productive work — and gets the client to agree to them. Pragmatic therapists also assume that progress then depends on the potentials of the client — things like intelligence, temperament, family background and social position.

An ideal fosters and orients the search for improvement. The best that is ever possible in relation to any ideal is to approach it. But, unless an ideal is kept in view, day-to-day decisions are experienced as futile and cynical, and the pressure for improvement ceases.[18] Things are then done because they can be done, and not because they express desires and hopes.

The pragmatist may recognize that a situation is deeply unsatisfactory, but refrains from wholesale condemnation, because upheaval and discontinuity must still be avoided where possible. The pragmatist recognizes and accepts a reality of multiple pressures and opportunities from which specific improvements need to be identified, selected and implemented.

The Family and the Law: Legal processes in the UK are primarily oriented to the individual and based on adversarial methods. However in family matters this generates complexity, expense, insensitivity and harm to family life. The conventionalist approach viewed this as a worthwhile price to pay to maintain the integrity of British Law. However, a committee set up to find a way of overcoming

the problems took a rationalist approach and its Report proposed instituting special Family Courts. Such a solution would have been opposed by vested interests and been difficult to legislate and implement. Instead, a pragmatic approach has been adopted. In the two decades since this Report, a large number of small improvements to legal processes have been introduced based on the values of family life, sensitivity to the needs of children, and consent rather than contest between marital partners. More cases are now heard in civil courts, divorce law change has led to conciliation work which eases out-of-court decisions, child representation has been improved, and young children in sexual abuse cases can now be interviewed in private with a video link to the court room. Social change has also occurred incrementally as groups have coalesced around the ideals. Independent conciliation counselling services were widely set up in the 1970s. A Solicitors Family Law Association, formed in 1982 and with 2000 members by 1990, upholds a code of practice which promotes a conciliatory approach. In 1988, the Family Mediators Association was established to extend the scope of conciliation to include detailed discussion of financial issues.   Ex. 6.10[19]

Unless something that is feasible is chosen, then the ideal is no nearer. An unworkable choice is ethically inappropriate, and eventually produces dejection and disillusion. Facing reality demands a vigilant attitude and a sober and cautious recognition of risks and future uncertainty. Utopianism, the denial of feasibility issues, is the antagonist of genuine improvement. "The perfect", said Machiavelli, "is the enemy of the good." The *cardinal virtue* that results from resolving the ideals-potentials duality is prudence; while failure to handle the tension leads to the *cardinal vice* of recklessness. Reck means care, and recklessness implies moving without due care for either ideals or potentials or their balance. This vice is frequently linked to naivety and a refusal of people to recognize their inexperience.

Pragmatism as a Doctrine. The doctrine of pragmatism (etym. Gk. *pragmata* - acts, affairs, business) is practical and experiential in nature. It is based in the notion that our experience of effects and practical consequences determine our conceptions. " 'The true', to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."[20]

In systematic inquiry, a pragmatic view leads to the adoption of a hypothesis-testing approach and a belief in the piecemeal growth of knowledge. In decision-making without ethical considerations explicitly in mind, pragmatism implies a focus on necessary action and personal experience rather than on thinking or theory. Pragmatic managers seize opportunities and are satisfied by incremental improvement.

In the ethical domain, pragmatism implies an active

continual striving to make things better. Beyond this, it is perhaps most demarcated by what it avoids: first it avoids identifying transcendent goals (e.g. pure ultimate values like truth); second, it avoids seeking perfect or ideal solutions; third, it avoids being constrained by any postulated principles (including ethical principles, as illustrated in Ex. 6.9).

These values have earned it an undeserved bad name. Politicians in power who manage what feels utterly unmanageable often seem to epitomise the worst. Stanley Baldwin, twice British conservative prime-minister early this century, honestly admitted: 'I would rather be an opportunist and float than go to the bottom with my principles round my neck.'

Put positively, however, pragmatic values enable a maximum of care, caution, openness and flexibility in choice. They permit a diversity of life-styles and beliefs (i.e. 'pluralism') and minimize conflict. Pragmatists frequently produce results when others produce nothing but hot air. In contrast to rationalists who insist on change whatever the cost to people, pragmatists produce change in a piecemeal way that lessens hurt and diffuses popular reaction. In contrast to conventionalists who object to radical change on principle, pragmatists object because they do not see a comprehensive assault on the ideal as feasible. Social scientists in many fields have backed pragmatism and argued that grand designs are impracticable, arrogant and undemocratic.[21]

Feelings. The judgement of appropriateness which is intrinsic to pragmatic choice is based more on feelings than on reason or observation. (For some years, the label offered to clients for this approach was 'experientialist' to avoid confusion with 'pragmatic' as a type of decision-making.) Managers commonly speak of a gut feel or inner sense which guides them. They find that their immediate feelings suffice to assess the relevant ideals, immediately applicable values and existing potentials. In any case, in most social situations and especially in a crisis, hard facts are scarce and there is little but feelings and intuitions to depend upon. If an individual in a complex social arena is emotionally out of touch either with himself, with the issue or with the mood of the group, then ethical choices in a crisis are liable to be inappropriate.

Using the Approach. A pragmatist-type *investigation* to discover what is appropriate is most evidently called for when there is a crisis. An inquiry is launched into what values and ideals are in play and what alternatives are immediately open. An early step in this process is to decide whether to ignore or dismiss the crisis as trivial, or whether to assign it value and use it as an

opportunity. The obvious current preferences of those most directly involved are given a high priority. Distant undesirable consequences are less certain and felt to be less relevant. If the inquiry is successfully pursued, the choice resolves the immediate crisis as socially perceived. If not, then there is the sense of a lost opportunity and stagnation. The crisis is likely to persist, and the chooser may lose the respect of others.

The *quandary* generated by a pragmatist choice concerns how to persuade the individuals and social groups affected that a good course of action has indeed been instituted. This means that the choice must satisfy a multiplicity of tribes (pressure groups, constituencies) and their value systems. The usual recommendations include: communicating effectively, recognizing and highlighting value differences within and between tribes, moving ahead very rapidly, and creating a new constituency out of those who will benefit from the changes.

> NHS Reform: After both the 1979 and 1984 elections, the UK government contemplated major reform of the NHS. Each time, it turned away pragmatically in the face of the enormous difficulties. Then at the end of 1987, news of staff shortages, closure of beds, and budget deficits began appearing nightly on national television news bulletins. The state of crisis was only defused by the Prime Minister announcing a review. The White Paper which emerged from this opportunistic review was not a worked-out plan developed by experts, nor did it consider and deal with existing values. It appeared to be a product of pragmatist considerations, because it was based on long-standing feelings of the politicians that: a) change was essential, b) market orientation is a good thing, and c) hospitals should have greater freedom of action. The long term consequences of adopting these values were almost impossible to determine. Virtually all interest groups saw the White Paper as a threat. However the Government launched its most complex and comprehensive communications and public relations exercise ever, instituted a rapid program of implementation, exploited differences between professionals and managers, and built up new constituencies (like the General Practitioner fund-holders) which split and weakened the opposition.
>
> Ex. 6.11[22]

The *extreme circumstance* occurs when a situation develops such that existing ideals no longer hold sway or the potentials to support them disappear. The political transitions in the USSR with the collapse of the communist economic and political system, and in South Africa with the rejection of apartheid, are cases in which pursuit of the original ideals became impossible. In such cases, to avoid a state of breakdown, new ideals have to be developed which take account of the actual social potentials. This is not easy because realities are changing while the old ideals are deeply embedded in

the minds of people in leadership positions. Organisations have similar difficulties: for example, the transition from rapid expansion to careful consolidation is often fraught because it means a change in the ideals of those driving the company. Such change is frequently associated with removal of the chief executive responsible for the astonishing success of the company: this occurred in Apple Computer in the USA with the removal of Steve Jobs, and in Next Stores in the UK with the removal of George Davies.

Limitations. *Criticism* of the pragmatist approach has been most vociferous within the philosophy camp because it appears so opportunist, subjective and expedient. Choices are seen to be too simplistic, too short term, too bendable to the circumstances, and above all too concrete and personal. However, once again the criticism appears misplaced. And opposition in principle is always opposition in practice. Mackie, examining how a person should proceed to develop and improve a moral system, surely an ethical issue, epitomizes a pragmatist line without apparently being aware of this. He argues persuasively that 'we should advocate practicable reforms', and warns against 'utopianism'. He notes that there are a multiplicity of moral systems associated with different social groups and used by them for internal relationships. He cautions that our influence will be limited to the degree of our involvement and position within these. He advises us to take advantage of fragments of the moral system we prefer, to preserve them, and to put pressure on other fragments so as to modify them in the light of what we feel to be valuable. A text-book case![23]

Appropriate choices do enable sustained progress towards something better. But ideals are vague and potentials are uncertain. Choosers are exposed to criticism without compensating returns. This reinforces the intrinsic tendency to take only small limited steps. It is rare that a sole focus on external benefits can release any individual's full capacities for achievement. Yet significant and substantial improvement does depend on the full use of these capacities. To bring human power fully into play, it is necessary to move up to the next system.

L'-4:
THE INDIVIDUALIST APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The fourth approach to ethical choice focuses, like principal objects (L-4), on the distinctiveness of endeavours and their associated resources. At this level of purpose, value can be precisely defined, owned by individuals, and realized in specific enterprises. Those who see an endeavour as

realistic and worthwhile commit themselves and some of their resources to it. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the individualist approach is based on recognizing that individuals are the basic elements and source of power for good in any endeavour and in any society. The individualist asks: 'What is in my best interests? Am I being exposed to too much risk?' Choice for the individualist is ethically justified only if it protects and strengthens his position.

Principal Features. The individualist approach starts from the assumption that individuals — persons, organizations or governments — should commit themselves and their resources in a particular choice only if it is to their benefit. This means, first, that their security must be ensured, and second, that their interests must be forwarded. This benefit to the individual may be measured in material terms, in terms of values and feelings, or in terms of social prestige.

> Organising Scientific Research: The research grant application and review process in which academics compete for funds is built around an individualist approach to choice. In considering whether to apply for a grant, researchers are strongly influenced to further their own interests, both in terms of their scientific concerns and in the light of their own career and status. The interests of the main funding agencies are to promote good science and to respond to societal pressures. These agencies use their power to influence the topics investigated and the methods used. They aim to support the best researchers only. So proposals are funded or turned down without regard for the researcher's personal needs or the needs of his or her colleagues, institutions or families. Strong research is allowed to thrive at the expense of weaker projects, and more able researchers are expected to control less capable ones. Furthermore, the successful researchers become key figures in the research establishment and regard it as natural to promote their own scientific values. Ex. 6.12

As illustrated in Ex. 6.12, the individualist approach develops around the *injunction* of advantage to the chooser in a context where there are many other choosers acting similarly. Decisions which are self-advantageous are felt to be 'right', and anything which disadvantages the chooser is felt to be 'wrong'. In making individualist choices, aspects of previous approaches may be easily discerned. The chooser's advantage depends in part on making a choice which solves evident problems, which considers group values and accepted rules, and which forwards ideals appropriately. But these obligations are modified by the overriding emphasis on benefit for the self.

What an individual may achieve is related very directly to the resources commanded. Too often, resources are seen in financial terms only. In the case of a person, resources also include intellectual capabilities, emotional or cultural resilience, other material backing, loyal support, and social status. Others are always actually or potentially in the equation when an individualist choice is made. They are likewise competitively seeking their own advantage, and the balance of resources defines the power relationship. The power balance, rather than the absolute position, is directly relevant to maintaining security, and hence to any determination of what in the event counts as self-advantageous.

In sum, the *core obligation* is to ensure security of position, and to develop whatever benefits for themselves the power relationships of the choosers permit. Genuine power, it seems, confers its own legitimacy, and must be appropriately used to obtain advantage for the individual. Aphorisms like 'might is right' reflect this ethical dimension of power.

Choice here is a means — a means for self-benefit; and the individual, too, is a means — a means for the realization of principal objects. The concern for security and survival also takes the focus off the ends relevant to the particular issue. The individualist approach is therefore inherently *deontological*. The individualist approach emphasizes the intrinsic value of the individual and the over-riding value of survival. So it is not to be reduced to egoism in a pejorative sense.[24]

The inherent *duality* within the approach is that of strengths and vulnerabilities. The *aspiration* is for invincible strength in all domains, and the power for good that may flow from this. Strengths deserve respect. Achievement of any significance demands ambition, stamina, determination, perseverance and industry, all virtues which express strength.

Weaknesses must also be recognized because they act as an ever-present *constraint* in any choice. Anyone who does not recognize their own vulnerabilities and limitations is unlikely to succeed for long. For a person, such an appreciation leads to the virtue of humility. Unrealistic over-concern with vulnerability and risk leads to stagnation, cowardice and vacillation. Proper handling of the tension between strength and vulnerability, including the management of actual or potential deterioration in one's well-being and position, leads to the *cardinal virtue* of courage or fortitude. The corresponding *cardinal vice* is arrogance. Arrogance may develop in the presence of genuine strengths or to cover up serious weaknesses. In either case, the cardinal vice expresses a loss of balance.

It is a truism of management consultancy that firms should build on their strengths and take account of their weaknesses. It seems that the individualist approach is

appropriately prominent in business. Firms are, after all, brought into existence to pursue certain objects, and it is not surprising (and probably requisite) that they adhere to an approach to choice where ethical conviction is related to endeavour.

Individualist choices in a competitive environment can be a force for good in society as well as in firms. Without competition, firms invariably take advantage of their position by becoming self-satisfied, careless of their product or service, and neglectful of their costs. Prices rise and quality falls. Companies frequently argue that competition is unnecessary to improve quality, and that customer demand is lacking. However, once a competitive environment is established, success depends on a firm recognizing its strengths, eradicating or minimizing its weaknesses, improving quality and price, and sharpening customer appeal and loyalty. This tends to produce more customers by generating a wider range of distinct services or products which are tailored more closely to needs, preferences and affordability of actual and potential customers.

Denying the need for individualist choice by firms is equivalent to encouraging weakness. Provision of state subsidies for monopolistic enterprises encourages managers to use conventionalist or pragmatist approaches. But this leads to escalating inefficiency and ineffectiveness because customer needs and preferences change and better cheaper ways of meeting them emerge, while the firm does little in response. Many UK businesses, like British Steel, British Leyland, British Airways and the National Coal Board which were protected by the UK government, maintained uneconomic practices, unresponsive services and overmanning for years. In most Eastern European countries, industries had been subsidized for decades leading to exactly the same defects, worsened because of the collectivist ideology which minimized or even opposed individual responsibility and initiative.

Competition is not so much about defeating or destroying rivals as about the ascent and decline of values. The individualist approach assumes that a better world depends on one's own values triumphing and others following or serving these values (cf. Ex. 6.12). Among firms, value dominance shows up as imitation; whereas between states, it tends to lead to hostilities. Competition between states based in marxist-socialist and capitalist-democratic values led to escalating hostility in the decades following World War II. World tension eased in 1989 with the general collapse and capitulation throughout Europe of communist political and economic systems. World tension subsequently increased as the clash of values between ethnic groups started involving whole states.

Self-Sacrifice. To act to one's own disadvantage is generally a nonsense. Self-sacrifice as a policy governing choice is probably not a meaningful notion for an organization or state. And individuals who inadvertently or deliberately allow their emotional reserves to run down, their health to be damaged, their fortune to be diminished, or their status and reputation to be tarnished, are generally held to be foolish and undeserving of support by others. Self-sacrifice as an occasional well-judged gesture is another matter. It is an expression of strength: so it leads to self-approval. And the person emerges stronger in character: so it enhances the likelihood of future success and may even improve reputation.

Of course there are times for personal sacrifice, and there are certainly things worth dying for. In such cases, it is usually possible to discern the individual metaphorically living on in the idea, value or group which has generated such loyalty.

Child Sacrifice: The decreasing quality of education and school disruption within the UK state system in the 1980's generated an ethical dilemma for many middle-class parents. Despite adhering to the values and principles of comprehensive State education, many nevertheless felt obliged to send their children to private schools. This decision was invariably based on considering what was in the best interests of the child. But some parents chose to sacrifice their children to their principles and kept them in state schools. One journalist, for example, described how adherence to her convictions led to her child being bored, suffering unsupervised classes, missing lessons through teacher strikes, and crying at home. Even in this case, individualism was used as the rationale. The mother argued that it would be to the child's advantage to realize that principles should not be lightly discarded.

Ex. 6.13[25]

Feelings. The individualist considers feelings when determining the balance of resources. Because feelings like anxiety and shame and wishes like those for revenge or admiration may drive or tempt us to act to our own disadvantage, emotions have often been seen as entering the resource balance sheet on the debit side. However emotional strengths frequently tip the balance when individuals are evenly matched on other criteria. Hope strengthens persistence, pleasure increases stamina, admiration provides confidence, and anger bolsters determination. Even anxiety, guilt and shame can and should be viewed as helpful experiential signals that permit people to reorient themselves and their attitudes when they are in difficulties (see Ch. 7: Master-Table 12).

Using the Approach. An individualist-style *investigation* is called for when an individual needs to gain an advantage, or at least not lose out, in the competitive

struggle for resources or dominance. The aim is to gain a decisive advantage and to minimize losses. Inquiry may be necessary to clarify where a person's advantage really lies and what the balance of power actually is.

Appropriate choices placate the strong, and exact compensation or support from the weak. This is what Realpolitik or Machiavellianism is all about. For example, the victor in a war must deal with the loser. It was normal policy in the warring city states of ancient Greece to execute or take into slavery all the males in order to protect against future revenge. Although the Athenians abandoned this policy, 2000 years later a related policy was applied after World War I and it led to World War II. After World War II, it was realized that building up the defeated powers was likely to be more advantageous to the victors than weakening them, as long as some safeguards against militarism were in place. This proved correct.

The *extreme circumstance* is one in which an individual's strengths have been neutralized either by the situation or by the actions of another. A firm's competitor may engage in penetration pricing that removes most customers at a stroke. If this is not handled promptly and effectively, then collapse is likely. A dictator, like Pinochet in Chile, may voluntarily give up authoritarian powers so as to gain respectability, but find that his other strengths are not sufficient to maintain public support. It is of course obvious that a person's prospects are seriously impaired if a key resource like health or wealth is lost. To counter or prevent extreme circumstances which threaten disaster or death, the individual feels forced and even entitled to take desperate measures.

The *quandary* generated by individualist choice relates to exactly how others are to be overcome or adapted to. Recommendations are available in textbooks on getting and using power.[26] The methods involve developing professionalism, using toughness, manipulating resources, obtaining and using intelligence, orchestrating ceremonies, timing interventions for effect, and balancing returns against effort.

Limitation. Conventional wisdom is chary of recognizing the ethical importance of individual advantage. So *criticism* of the individualist approach is widespread. The same mentality obscures the wisdom of knowing one's limitations, makes a virtue of self-sacrifice, and promotes envy. Such an extreme position bolsters an equally inappropriate countervailing view in which the individual is glorified, the social group and its needs are denied, and the idea is promoted that anyone can do anything if only they want and try hard enough.

Excessive restrictions on individuals seem to flow

from a perverse assumption that people are inherently and irredeemably evil. If that is so, this book is pointless, and nothing that anyone does matters. Such a viewpoint is neither practical nor life-enhancing.

Successful enterprises, including those endeavours striving to create a more humane society and a better world, absolutely demand powerful individuals. Individuals who benefit from an endeavour become both more powerful and progressively more able and willing to contribute to that endeavour. Such an endeavour results in benefits which flow directly and indirectly to others. (In economics, this is pejoratively called the 'trickle down effect'.) By contrast, individuals who suffer on account of any endeavour, become progressively less able to participate, and often less willing. In the end the endeavour itself is unlikely to be as successful as it might.

It is true that in the presence of unsatisfactory laws or lack of competition individualist choice may generate gratuitous harm. However, the responsibility for a suitable regulatory context does not lie with the individual but with society and its governing institutions.

Government Training Programme: The UK in the mid-1980's was faced with severe unemployment, and so the government introduced a variety of employment and training initiatives. One early programme made millions of pounds available for firms, voluntary organizations and local government to set up schemes. Monitoring was not in-built; and eventual employment was not ensured. The ethical choice for many organizations was whether or not to participate, given the urgings of the government, the financial inducements, and the project's deficiencies. Apart from any social duty, their prime consideration had to be whether it was to their advantage to become an agent of the initiative with all the work which that entailed. In the event, the absence of proper controls and lack of competition between agents resulted in many schemes of poor quality, benefiting the agent but not doing much for the unemployed. There was also widespread exploitation of trainees and corruption in the operation of schemes. However, some schemes of reasonable quality were provided by solid organizations, who themselves gained benefit from participating.   Ex. 6.14

The individualist approach, just like the pragmatic and conventionalist approaches, gets maligned far too often. But nothing is more natural or necessary than self-interest. Those that decry individualism are frequently the first to argue for rights — but rights belong to individuals and derive their legitimacy from the individualist approach (see Ch. 8). Individualist concerns need to be seen as life-enhancing and the axis around which all ethical choice revolves.

The individualist approach highlights real conflicts of interest, and positively builds on the inequality of

strengths and weaknesses among people. The ancient Chinese recognized inequalities and resolved the problem by distinguishing the sage or superior man who by benefiting himself naturally benefits others, from the inferior man who harms himself and others in his scramble for security and power. Given the general lack of sages and the need for individuals to look after themselves, specific attention must be given to improving relations between people, and ensuring benefit is more widely distributed. This requires movement up to the next ethical system.

L'-5:
THE COMMUNALIST APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The fifth approach to ethical choice focuses, like social values (L-5), beyond the bounds of a single individual, endeavour or institution to a wider relational network. At this level of purpose, values enable people to relate and participate constructively within a community. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the communalist approach comes from recognizing the effects of choice in the wider social context, and on seeking to strengthen relationships between individuals in a group. The communalist asks: 'What is best for everyone? Does anyone or any sub-group suffer excessively?' Choice for the communalist is ethically justified if it explicitly recognizes and attempts to balance all the effects on all who are directly or indirectly affected by the choice.

> Family Intervention: Psychiatric treatment requires a doctor to balance care and support for the patient with involvement of relatives — either to help the patient or for their own good. Access to relatives is ethically problematic if the patient refuses permission. This may stem from a wish for confidentiality, a desire for independence, hostility to relatives, or delusional beliefs. From a communalist perspective, the issues are how a family being adversely affected by the patient's condition can be helped without harming the patient, and how the family can be involved to help the patient despite his or her opposition. Responses which seek to find the balance include: enabling self-help, providing separate professional help for the family, involving other agencies, and encouraging the relative to self-refer.   Ex. 6.15[27]

Principal Features. The communalist approach focuses on the fact that choices have ramifications which extend in time, person and place beyond the chooser and his immediate situation. It assumes that the benefit or otherwise of a proposed course of action needs to be explicitly estimated in relation to others in this wider picture. Other labels for this ethical approach include utilitarian, systemicist, proportionalist, communitarian and consequentialist.[28]

The *injunction* here is to do what is beneficial overall in the actual circumstances. This is 'good'. Doing what is harmful overall is 'bad'. An extreme implication of such a broad requirement is that obligations in all the other ethical systems should be taken into account. The new *core obligation* is to recognize and balance the anticipated consequences of any choice, taking into account all factors and the needs and interests of all persons, including the chooser, in determining benefit. For example, any firm should aim to benefit itself (i.e. its owners), its executives, its workforce, its suppliers, its customers, and society as a whole — and not just one or a few of these groups to the total exclusion of others. Maximizing benefits is certainly a desirable if inevitably uncertain goal, but maximization holds in all approaches and is not a unique element of the present core obligation. The communalist approach is evidently *teleological*.

The communalist approach originates from an awareness that individuals exist within a network of relationships and so each needs to consider others involved in those relationships. People depend on others but frequently deny the importance of relationships and imagine they are self-sufficient. This denial at a personal level often spills over into misleading images of organizations or societies as isolated entities. But networks of organisations and societies are the rule, and mutual inter-dependence is characteristic of those that deal or trade with each other.

In any industry, a multiplicity of firms, not a monopoly, is what is socially desirable. This is the basis for competition whose benefits have already been noted. Any organization benefits by creating cooperative developments, by devising and using common standards, and by participating in joint lobbying of government on behalf of their type of activity.

Economists and management experts have suggested that the near future will see businesses integrating themselves far more into the world economy through alliances: for example by minority participations, joint ventures, research and marketing consortia, partnerships in subsidiaries or in special projects, and cross-licensing. Relationships will not only develop with other firms, but also with universities and local governments. The reasons put forward for these linkages are that firms are no longer self-contained, and the world has become industrially and economically borderless. Products are designed in one country, manufactured in parts in two or three others, to be marketed and sold in yet others. In addition, the technological system which must be tapped is dispersed amongst many firms; and instead of discrete markets there is a rapidly changing global scene.[29]

States, too, recognize their interdependence now, and find it mutually beneficial to support each other. Cooperative liaisons between nations in respect of trade, cultural exchange, research and development, post and transport are common in all parts of the world despite competitive or even antagonistic behaviour in certain spheres.

The recommendation implicit in the communalist approach is that individuals should choose so as to benefit others (as well as themselves) even if this is not compulsory. The intrinsic *duality* is that of altruism versus egoism. Altruism is the *aspiration* and is expressed by such virtues as magnanimity, generosity, mercy, and gratitude. Egoism, meant non-pejoratively, is the *constraint* on being altruistic because egoism defines the individual's actual strengths and vulnerabilities.

The individual with few capacities and resources can function altruistically only to a most limited degree. So the biblical injunction in Leviticus 'to love thy neighbour as thy self' must be assumed to be an injunction to love one's self a great deal. Weak individuals are likely to be selfish and pusillanimous, and psychoanalytic researches suggest that ego weakness underlies gross egotistical behaviour such as malevolence.[30] Healthy egoism is manifested by appropriate self-respect and self-regard. It depends heavily upon the receipt of genuinely deserved attention, respect, approval and admiration from others. Altruistic choice is possible because it is one source of such supplies. Uncontrolled egoism leads to the search for wealth and status, because these are generally more likely to attract approval and admiration than are wisdom, virtue or altruism.

The resolution of the tension within the duality results in the *cardinal virtue* of benevolence — or charity or love or humanity — or *ren*, the supreme Confucian virtue. In business, this virtue is often termed enlightened self-interest. The failure to resolve the tension leads generally to the *cardinal vice* of indifference. For evil to triumph, the saying goes, it is only necessary that good men remain silent. Arendt, following this approach, suggests that "it was sheer thoughtlessness" that led Eichmann to act so evilly. He was not a psychopath or criminal or stupid, but was diligent and concerned to advance himself. In this way, he "never realized what he was doing."[31] Negligence, thoughtlessness and other varieties of indifference are the antitheses of relationship and community.

Feelings. Feelings enable us to appreciate the needs and interests of others; and to assist in drawing boundaries which specify who should be regarded as being affected in any choice. Feelings are also essential to the intuitive balancing of benefits and harms that seem likely to flow from any choice.

In the long run, it is nearly impossible and certainly undesirable for a person to remain emotionally unaffected by the sufferings of others. Doing so requires hardening oneself. This is a brutalizing process and is self-damaging. In the absence of such brutalization, the natural sympathetic identification between people means that any benefit for another tends to be felt to be a benefit for oneself, and any harm to another tends to be felt to be harmful to oneself. Adam Smith suggested that the fact that people tend to be short of feelings for others was perhaps the only reason for considering altruism as ethically superior to egoism.[32] This rather pessimistic conclusion is not so true within families.

> Family Decisions: A family man may have to decide whether or not to emigrate for the sake of his career. He might be in a position to insist on the family adapting to his decision. But on such a big issue in families, authoritarianism can easily go wrong. A communalist father would immediately seek to take into account such things as the effect on his wife's career, the disturbance to the children's schooling, and relations with elderly grandparents, friends and relatives. Other factors, such as the benefits for all from higher earnings abroad and previous agreements about where to live would also be relevant. The simple choice of emigrating would evolve into a complex set of related choices associated with emigration and seeking to meet reasonable claims of all. The final outcome would represent a satisfactory balance of all anticipated benefits and drawbacks in the light of the needs and interests of all the family.   Ex. 6.16

Misconceiving Altruism. Totally disinterested altruism is utterly impractical and does not exist outside theological or radical academic texts.[33] It is inappropriate to expect altruism to be realized as a way of life because an aspiration is defined by the fact that it can be sought but not realized. When treated as a goal, pure altruism becomes indistinguishable from masochism and fosters exploitative tendencies in others. In any case, pure altruism cannot be manifested because any altruistic act simultaneously boosts egoism. For the most virtuous souls it does so by affirming identity and integrity; for others by gratifying a sense of superiority or pride.

Wisdom demands that one should never ask people to act against their own self-interest, and that some self-interest should be recognized in any act. We could then recognize without embarrassment that benevolence does indeed serve self-interest, whilst being mean-spirited and nasty is not only vicious and inhumane but usually self-defeating. In Chapter 5, it was recognized that altruism is best realized in a community where

reciprocation is possible and self-depletion can be prevented. But even reciprocity brings problems: in the Ik culture, altruistic gestures create such a painful sense of indebtedness that people strive to avoid benefiting from them.[34]

A further problem with altruism is that it operates without accountability: that is to say, the altruist is not responsible to anyone for the benevolent act, not even to the person being helped. Some altruistic choices ignore the recipient's wishes, or even cause long-term harm, and yet people are nervous about rejecting aid and biting any hand that feeds them.

Taking all these points together, it seems reasonable to suggest that genuine disinterested altruism is found most often in small enduring groups; and that it operates best when it expresses identity, is conventional and likely to be reciprocated, is limited in scope, and requires a minimal amount of deference.

Using the Approach. Communalist-style *investigation* is called for when the balance of consequences of some action for all those concerned is in question. It is then necessary to take a systems approach and provide a model of the situation and its environment. This involves recognizing who is affected, identifying the key factors, anticipating likely effects and changes through time, and assessing the relative costs and benefits. To do this properly requires 'participative system modelling', a method which can become very complex.[35] Ethical debate in practice is usually systemic in a broad sense, but much less scientific. It typically involves speculating on consequences of proposed actions, identifying various individuals or groups previously ignored, clarifying who can best tolerate hardship or lesser benefits, and considering a variety of possible choices which affect different groups and with different consequences.

Major social developments seem to require systemic modelling if they are to avoid defeating their objects. For example the development of the welfare state in the UK after 1945 was associated with penal taxation (up to 98%) and persistent discouragement, disparagement and neglect of those with entrepreneurial abilities. This eventually contributed to a general economic decline followed by a backlash in the 1980s that caused much suffering. The end result of the once noble communalist enterprise may well have been to undermine the altruistic ethos within society.

Will the UK decision to proceed with the channel tunnel linking England to Europe be beneficial for future generations when the country's environment, culture, and prosperity are considered as a whole? Rather than scare-mongering, it is worth reflecting on

the failure of another high technology development the Aswan Dam (Ex. 6.17).

> **The Aswan Dam:** The Aswan dam in Egypt seemed to meet a real requirement for irrigation and power and to benefit the population generally. However it proved to have many drawbacks. Over 100,000 people were displaced. Almost one third of the water is wasted because of evaporation and leakage into surrounding rocks. The steady irrigating streams favour the snails that transmit schistosomiasis, a painful debilitating disease which needs to be fought. The naturally fertilizing Nile silt has been lost and much of the electricity produced has had to be used to make fertilizer. The loss of silt has also led to progressive erosion of land in the Nile delta, and has dramatically reduced the tonnage of fish caught there. In due course, salination of the soil, a consequence of irrigation previously prevented when flooding leached out the salts, will cause permanent loss of fertility along the Nile banks. Ex. 6.17[36]

The *quandary* that characteristically emerges in communalist inquiry is where to draw the boundary of concern within which people are given roughly equal consideration. Most people, handle this by recognizing a gradation of sympathy according to proximity, similarity and association. For a person, sympathy might be maximum for intimates, somewhat less for friends, still less for acquaintances, still less for countrymen, and so on. Organizations and governments act in a similar fashion, favouring insiders and supporters before outsiders and opponents. A degree of inequality of consideration seems unavoidable. In the case of decisions taken today to protect the environment, the hypothetical views of still unborn generations have been regarded as worthy of inclusion. However, the hypothetical effect on possible life in other galaxies has not (yet) entered the discussion. The particular issue usually determines just how far concern can reasonably, conventionally, appropriately, self-advantageously or beneficially be taken.

> **Toxic Waste Disposal:** If toxic wastes have to be produced in the service of society, they must be disposed of safely. Organizations in some countries have taken this to mean dumping the wastes in other countries whose firms or governments benefit financially and who do not understand the consequences, or do not consider them. The suffering within foreign countries is experienced as distant and less serious than that potentially suffered within the home country. Awareness of global interdependence has led to a greater concern for the environment. There also appears to be greater altruistic feeling amongst people internationally. These factors tend to make even legal dumping in poor countries an unethical choice. Ex. 6.18

The typical *extreme circumstance* occurs when there is a need for a sacrifice. For example, a local community

may be expected to suffer, say by allowing a nuclear waste dump or an airport development, in order that the rest of the country may benefit. In war zones, an injured friend may be left behind so that others can escape. If such situations are not handled satisfactorily, then feelings of guilt and unworthiness, or of being exploited and manipulated, will persist. The most extreme case involves certain loss of life. Caiaphas put the dilemma neatly to the community leaders in Jerusalem so many years ago: "Is it not better that one innocent person be put to death than that the whole people perish?" Horrific stories tell of survivors of shipwrecks or aircraft crashes who decided to kill, even eat, one or more of their number so that the rest of the group might survive.[37]

Limitations. Communalism is a natural, popular and useful approach to ethical choice, but intense *criticism* within the philosophical literature abounds. Mackie, for instance, calls it a grandiose fantasy, an irrational myth and a recipe for disaster; while Finnis stamps it as senseless.[38] Mackie claims it is utopian because people are not capable of considering others fully; impossible because the calculations required to assess benefit overall cannot be carried out; and indeterminate because it is never possible to finalize what factors count, what the distribution of benefit should be, what weighting should be applied and so on. However, such criticism seems excessive and is surely overly mathematical. All that any approach can achieve is to organize thinking around a particular obligation: and communalism certainly does this. Although the balance of benefit and harm for those affected may be difficult to be sure about or gain agreement on, it is not an ambiguous or unreasonable obligation.

Ascending the approaches, we have seen a steady progression from a group-orientation to an individual-orientation and this now culminates in communalism. Communalism reveals the individual as an autonomous being concerned for a self that exists within relationships and which therefore requires concern for both self and others.

However, from time immemorial, the idea of leaving ethical choice to an autonomous individual, depending as it does on the exercise of virtue, has been seen to be insufficient. Aristotle noted that virtues are about what is difficult for humanity. In any case, virtues like benevolence cannot take account of the common good or the needs of the social group beyond each particular individual's awareness, strivings, and capabilities. The maintenance and well-being of the social group is essential to the preservation and operation of individual autonomy. So, paradoxically, the practice of individual autonomy becomes a new constraint to be overcome

for the benefit of the individual. This takes us to the next higher system.

L'-6:
THE LEGITIMIST APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The sixth approach to ethical choice focuses, like value systems (L-6), on the theoretical structures which control and constrain choices. Value systems bring sustained order into the operation of value and intention within particular domains of action. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the legitimist approach stems from setting a general (i.e. theoretical) rule which channels and organizes choosing within any approach. The legitimist asks: 'What rule could deal with the issue? Will people follow the rule now and in the future?' Choice of a rule is ethically justified for the legitimist if all in the social group regard it as fair.

Although setting a rule may be precipitated by a particular situation, it has to apply to an indefinite variety of subsequent similar-but-not-identical situations. This means that the rule must be distant from action, quite distinct from immediate goals (strategic or tactical objectives), and somewhat abstract in nature. To ensure rules are workable, they are often systematized to form a coherent and consistent code. Rules cannot be applied to dictate choice in particular situations. In medieval times, books were written in which attempts were made to resolve hard cases of conscience. The authors took the general rules of religion and morality and applied them to particular problems where different obligations conflicted. However, casuistry (as this was called) fell into disrepute because it simply did not work.

Particular situations either call for setting a new rule, or for a non-legitimist approach to choice. Situations in themselves never demand the blind following of rules. Of course, rules, once set, do affect choices (including the setting of subsequent rules), but rules cannot determine choice because each approach perceives rules according to its own nature. In the nature of things, pragmatists obey rules which feel appropriate and conveniently ignore those which do not; conventionalists choose rules which are customarily followed, and so on. Legitimists, of course, advocate respect for rules and adherence to them in general. They tend to regard expedience and other informal obligations as subsidiary and assume that, in the long run at least, following rules produces the best overall result. It follows that the most satisfactory rules are negative in that they indicate constraints or restraints, leaving specific choices open to the operation of autonomy and situational assessment.

Despite the limitation on what rules alone can achieve, much debate about what choice is ethical mistakenly attempts to apply available rules. Be clear: choice means intervening to produce a particular result in the complexity of the social world. Previously set rules never in themselves indicate what choice is right and good now in this particular situation — only people using one of the approaches can do that. (Rules may be used retrospectively to judge whether a choice is right or wrong in some communal or legal or doctrinal sense, but ethical judgement is an entirely different matter to ethical choice.)

Types of Rule. Research revealed that several types of rules may be set. These are: prescriptions (L"-1), conventions (L"-2), tenets (L"-3), rights or duties (L"-4), maxims (L"-5), laws (L"-6), and absolutes (L"-7) as shown in Master-Figure 9. I will examine these rules in detail in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. The focus in this section is on rule-setting as a mode of choice, and the account aims to be broadly applicable to all types of rule.

Principal Features. The *injunction* when setting rules is to be fair or just. Such a choice is 'right'. A rule which is unfair or unjust is 'wrong'. Just rules are not simply a matter for judges or legislators. Fair rules in a family, in a school room, or in an organisation are the very foundation of a culture within which individuals may thrive and willingly contribute.

British Standards: The British Standards Institute exists to set rules which govern the effectiveness and safety of a wide variety of products and services. In developing recommendations for achieving quality within organizations, the framers of the British Standard (BS5750) have been communalist in their explicit concern for all involved — society, shareholders, employees, customers &c. However, their mode of action is legitimist because they have produced rules and because they demand the setting of organizational rules which establish BS5750 in the firm. The influence of lower level obligations is not difficult to see. The British Standard states that firms ought to ensure that their product or service: meets a well-defined need, use or purpose (rationalist); complies with currently applicable standards, specifications and statutory requirements (conventionalist); satisfies customers' expectations (pragmatist); and is made available at competitive prices which will yield a profit (individualist).
Ex. 6.19[39]

Ethical rules are as necessary for good social life as grammar is for good communication. The more we create organizations and communities, the more we should be concerned about the quality of rules that we set. The rule is typically set on the basis that adhering to it is right even if it feels inappropriate or seems unfair in a particular situation. We noted earlier that Kant con-cluded that following rules was what ethics was about: no action performed from desire or inclination could be moral. Because the rule is a public structure and its setting demands authority and implies obedience, the legitimist approach is *deontological*.[40]

The *core obligation* lies in setting a rule which is accepted as right by the chooser and all others in the relevant social group. All rules need to emerge from an authority legitimated by the relevant social group. The nature of rules is that they identify support and strengthen natural groups — the community or society, the tribe, the association or organization, the faction. This means that rule-setting supports other approaches to choice without displacing these.

The legitimist approach is concerned above all with regulating the relationship between the individual and the group on which the individual depends. Membership of a group means contributing to the formation and maintenance of its rules. So instilling respect for rules is part of the socialization of any child. To survive, a group must organise itself to ensure that rules are set and followed, and that breaches of a rule are responded to promptly. In any organization, for example, there is a continuing temptation for choices which harm the organization or its staff. Victimization of subordinates, rudeness, bribes paid or received, and dangerous work practices all need to be handled by setting rules and regulations. (Often rules of this sort are termed ethical policies.)

The tension-producing *duality* that emerges here is that between the common good and individual autonomy. The *aspiration* being pursued by setting rules is the common (or collective) good. Unlike communalist choices where equality of benefit is problematic if not impossible, rules can aim to benefit each and every individual absolutely equally within the group because all individuals share a common and equal interest in the sustenance and well-being of the group. The *constraint* to establishing such rules is the autonomy of each individual, because rules cannot make exceptions.

Over-emphasis on either side of the duality leads to deeply unsatisfactory situations. On the one hand, unmitigated exaltation of the common good leads to rules being set which repress and stifle uniqueness and generate a tyranny of the majority.[41] For example, trade unions exist to protect and promote the interests of each member. But situations have frequently developed in which the leaders become distant from the membership and set rules which seriously infringe the liberties of individual members. Strikes without ballots, punishment of members who disagree with the union line, and closed shop agreements all decrease the autonomy of members. If autonomy is being excessively infringed, a

person should be able to work for the introduction of a better rule, or replacement of the rule-makers. As a last resort, people may join or create another group. Disaffected trade unionists within the UK's National Union of Mineworkers, for example, set up the Union of Democratic Mineworkers.

> Vietnam War: The anti-communist war in Vietnam became progressively more unpopular in the US, and so conscription became essential. But US society was divided on Vietnam. Those who saw the war as basically unjust felt that legalized coercion was wrong. Many of those who accepted the draft escaped into drugs or subsequently broke down physically or mentally. Others avoided the draft, using a variety of excuses. Some left the country. Some accepted imprisonment rather than fight. Meanwhile, many community leaders called for new laws to be passed based on a withdrawal from Vietnam. They sought abolition of the draft, and full amnesty for all conscientious objectors. These things eventually came to pass. Ex. 6.20

On the other hand, unmitigated exaltation of individual autonomy leads to social chaos or neglect (as exemplified by the nearly rule-less anarchist communes: see Ch. 5), destruction of the weakest, tyranny by minorities, free-riders or freeloaders who take from the community but do not give, and exploitation of common goods (known as 'the tragedy of the commons'[42]).

The present balance in many societies seems to be towards autonomy. It is noticeable, for example, that in setting laws about abortion, the academic debate has been largely in terms of individual autonomy — the rights of the mother and foetus and the duties of professionals. By comparison there has been little discussion of what common good is being pursued or what sort of society is being realized by whichever solution is ultimately endorsed.[43]

Autonomy is important of course. The common good cannot be effectively promoted without it. But, as it turns out, individuals need to be supported and guided in childhood to value their autonomy. As adults, they find that this autonomy cannot be expressed or protected in the absence of a well-ordered social group. To be autonomous without receiving recognition, value and responsibility from the group is difficult if not impossible. Finally, autonomy is liable to be harmful without group control. We saw earlier (in the discussion of individualism and in Ex. 6.14) that the inherent and desirable competition between individuals can only promote the common good if the social group sets rules felt to be fair.

Resolution of the conflicting claims of the group's well-being and the individual's autonomy leads to the *cardinal virtue* of justice. Justice is the quintessential community-oriented virtue. It reflects an inner striving to act with a sense of proportion. What the relevant aspects are in deciding fairness must be determined in the situation by the chooser. As with communalism (utilitarianism), the impossibility of mathematical exactitude does not invalidate the search for justice. The corresponding *cardinal vice* is injustice.

Feelings. The feelings particularly relevant to rule-setting are those of fairness and unfairness, of responsibility and guilt, of participation, belonging, alienation and isolation. Such feelings run deep in people.

> Fair Pay: Pay is too often handled coercively, either during negotiations between unions and management or in the form of individual incentives. In the case of union negotiations, the result is interminable strife over differentials and encouragement of leap-frogging pay claims. In the case of incentives, the result is a weakening of intrinsic motivation and the promotion of self-interest over the cooperation on which organizational achievement depends. An alternative approach is to tap into what feels fair. The market typically gives an indication of a fair rate, and research suggests that people have a deep feeling for fairness about pay. Some research suggests that rules about pay might be possible by linking it to work complexity and weight of responsibility. The crude use of pay as a motivator not only minimizes the significance of fairness and undermines the possibility of using rules, but also generates counter-productive feelings like alienation from the work-group and greed. Ex. 6.21[44]

Using the Approach. Legitimist *investigation* to support ethical choice is necessary when there is a need to develop and institute rules to permit or aid cooperation between individuals in the group. The rules either establish the consensus view on behaviour, attitude or thought, or aid resolution of conflicts of interests and needs within and between the members of the group. Rules can be conscientiously designed, and precisely and clearly specified in the course of this inquiry. Rules for enforcement, monitoring and handling non-compliance may be determined simultaneously. Debate over all these matters may be intense.

Ethical rules survive and benefit the social group only if they are well designed and authoritatively set. Rules which are unsatisfactory tend to be ignored, and may bring into disrepute other rules, or even the social group and its institutions of authority. This weakens ethical choice and ethical judgement in general. Each approach has its own view of whether a rule should be followed. So, rules are most effective if they are designed to recognize the obligations in the other approaches. In other words, rules need to be directly relevant to current problems (L'-1), to embody social history and tradition (L'-2), to reflect common ideals

(L'-3), to benefit people as individuals (L'-4), to remind people of the special claims of others (L'-5), to support the social group and be consistent with other related rules (L'-6), and to feel absolutely right and fair (L'-7).

> A School Admission Rule: The desire in the UK for comprehensive secondary education to be provided in mixed ability classes led to the establishment of a rule that controlled the proportions of pupils admitted according to their scholastic ability. Although this rule could be generally applied, it was not effective for many reasons. It was easy to get around by both parents and schools. It broke with history and convention. It did not feel appropriate to many. It was not indispensable. Above all, benefits for individuals were neither widespread nor obvious e.g. remedial needs were not properly met, the gifted were not developed, and attention to the average student was disturbed. Insisting on poor rules like this one contributed to the discrediting of comprehensive education as a whole.
>
> Ex. 6.22

Because all ethical rules deliberately aim to channel and limit the individual, the *quandary* generated is how to handle the diminution of individual freedom that results. A variety of possibilities exist. One tradition would say that such curtailment should be kept to an absolute minimum. Another might argue that individual freedom must be viewed as secondary. A further possibility is to propose the maximum involvement of people in rule-making.

From what has been said so far, it follows that the first duty in the ordering of any group is for it to evolve or devise just rules to govern its members' actions. The *extreme circumstance* here is one where the group as a whole is chaotic or strife-ridden. Rules are then needed more than ever but they cannot be set. Families in poor socio-economic circumstances which do not carry out basic family tasks have been found to be severely disorganized and to lack the ability to set necessary rules to govern work patterns, management of finances, association with friends, or care of their children.[45] When a social group is deeply divided, as occurs in communities like Northern Ireland, it is extremely difficult to formulate rules which are generally regarded as just and have the support of all. Rules regarded as unjust by large sections of the group are difficult to enforce. People tend to flout the rule and risk the consequences as we saw in the case of the Vietnam conscription law (Ex. 6.20).

Limitations. *Criticisms* of legitimism focus largely on the abstract and general nature of rules. Rules seem either too indeterminate to take account of shades of circumstances fully, or too nit-picking and detailed in an attempt to overcome this difficulty. Often the new

rule conflicts with previous rules and makes application problematic. However, such criticisms expect too much of rules. In particular, they expect rules to determine choice when they can only govern or channel it. As emphasized at the outset, attempts to choose solely by rules never work. Philosophers may play games of increasing the precision of rules, positing hierarchies of rules, or invoking meta-rules such as 'estimate the relative stringencies of the rules in each case', but these simply do not fit with the way people actually operate.

The most serious criticisms are about the way the approach is implemented and not about the approach itself. For example, the rule-setting process may be too slow and cumbersome. Setting a rule may be used to justify coercion, even violence in the case of the state, in order to secure compliance. The idealization of a perfect authority may encourage slavish and mindless choice according to the letter of the rule. Such phenomena are a function of the maturity of people and their societies and not indictments of the legitimist approach itself.

Setting a rule may well serve the general good without unduly curtailing a person's autonomy. However, even if all the requirements of the temporal order were met, as represented by resolution of the dualities of the six approaches so far considered, the spiritual order has yet to be taken into account. This distinction, perhaps hazy now — at least in philosophical and scientific circles — was well recognized in classic times. Protagoras, a sophist, is made by Plato to explain that men fought each other until given *dike* (law, justice) and *aidos* (shame, honour) which were essential for social living.[46] Dike has been considered, and it is now necessary to turn to aidos in the next and final ethical system.

L'-7:
THE TRANSCENDENTALIST
APPROACH

Source of Conviction. The seventh and final approach to ethical choice focuses, like ultimate values (L-7), on experiential states that transcend the person and the situation. This level of purpose is the source of all value, is equivalent to absolute good, and is routinely associated with deities. Correspondingly, the *source of conviction* in the transcendentalist approach is the use of the self as a channel to absolute, possibly divine, guidance which must be wholly good. The transcendentalist therefore asks: 'What choice is morally or fundamentally required?' or 'What does my essence and integrity demand?' or 'What does God want of me?' Choice for the transcendentalist is ethically justified if it is driven by a genuinely deep and transpersonal inner sense of

what is good and right. For those of a religious disposition, the choice is man's but it originates from God. It follows that the transcendentalist approach provides ethical conviction and faith to feed all lower level approaches.

Principal Features. The *injunction* in this approach is to be; or, if pure being sounds mysterious, to be aware and to be true to oneself; or, in the language of modern humanistic and transpersonal psychology, to be authentic.[47] Only through one's own self, that is to say through inner awareness and open imagination, is it possible to make contact with one's true self, with others, and with the deepest sense of the situation. So, awareness and authenticity are 'good'. Correspondingly, being false, artificial or hypocritical is 'bad'. To turn away from awareness is to turn from humanity and from God.

As indicated above, the *core obligation* is to be found in a natural response to a deep inner sense or inspiration of what is right and good. Such responses are aided by a realization that they emerge from the eternal and divine. The transcendentalist approach emphasizes pursuit of the good in so far as it can be known, and so it is the ultimate and dominant *teleological* system.

Because of the deeply personal character of choice within this approach, readers must be referred to their own experience for examples. Numerous examples are available from mythology, holy books, the lives of great men, and great literature. The transcendental choice may accord with the choice reached within any of the preceding systems, although the process for reaching the choice is different. This difference becomes most evident when the transcendental choice is counter-intuitive, and not in accord with preconceived values or conscious desires.

Samuel, the Prophet: Old Testament prophets, like Samuel, were frequently undecided about the best course of action in complex social situations and would talk with God. Samuel's sons were corrupt judges, so the elders of Israel came to him to appoint a King to govern instead. Samuel did not personally approve this idea. However he prayed and the Lord replied: 'Listen to the people and all that they are saying; they have not rejected you, it is I whom they have rejected. .... Tell them what sort of King will govern them.' Samuel painted a realistic picture of an oppressive monarch but the people still wanted a King. Samuel prayed again. The Lord replied: 'Take them at their word and appoint them a King.' Samuel did so. Without diminishing Samuel's gift of prophecy, one might well regard the words of God as Samuel's deep insight into what he should say in the situation, despite his own misgivings and personal preferences.   Ex. 6.23[48]

The *duality* that emerges here is that of spirituality

and temporality. The *aspiration* is to be attuned to and in harmony with the spirit, and to be guided by this. Spirituality depends on maintenance of faith and hope and a deep and mysterious sense of participation in the interconnectedness of all being. However, the temporal order imposes a *constraint* on what is possible. In the temporal domain, compromise is valuable, uncertainty unavoidable, and doubt necessary.

On the one hand, turning wholly away from the mundane is undesirable except for those few with a monastic or hermitic type of religious vocation. For the rest of us, severe material deprivation spoils freedom and perverts ethical choice. On the other hand, turning wholly away from the spiritual means to fragment oneself, and to be cut off from the power of being, including metaphor and myth, that constitutes the cosmos and makes human life possible. Few desire this. Doubt in God or a God-equivalent is not secular maturity but evidence of spiritual disturbance.

Resolution of the tension between these two great orders of existence results in the *cardinal virtue* of integrity. Integrity ensures that the eternal and spiritual serve as the ultimate aspirational context which guides the temporal and mundane. Integrity refers to the maintenance of a state of wholeness, completeness or perfection (from L. *integer* - intact). The corresponding *cardinal vice* is corruption (from L. *corruptus* — destroy, ruin). Corruption blocks meaningful human relationships, and leads to treachery and betrayal of the self and others. Sadly, the integrity of a person may be labelled as betrayal by the social group.

Luther's Conversion and Heresy: Martin Luther did brilliantly academically, and then to the distress of his family and friends, he entered a monastery in obedience to a call from Heaven. He devoted himself to his new vocation and further studies with equal dedication and insightfulness. The corrupt sale of indulgences was doctrinally and practically abhorrent and led to him posting his 95 Theses in 1517. Thus commenced a flow of controversial writings dealing with a whole variety of theological, biblical, institutional and practical matters. To maintain his integrity, he broke church rules of ritual, convention, belief, and rights. This ultimately led to his excommunication.   Ex. 6.24

Spirituality appears to be an aspiration that is primarily a property of persons. The aspiration can be realized in part in the process of union (as we saw in Ch. 5), but union does not do away with the need to handle the demands of temporal reality. As new religious movements become established as churches, union often tends to be debased by temporal concerns which ensure popularity. However, some spiritual movements have found ways for groups to resolve the tension (see Ex. 5.3 and Ex. 6.25).

The Fashion for God. Over the last century, it has been increasingly fashionable for philosophers and scientists to deride God, the transcendental, spirituality and pure Being. Or, at least, to regard these notions as either private and non-discussible or devoid of meaning and utility. However, from earliest times until very recently, the ultimate source of ethical understanding and virtue in behaviour could not be otherwise imagined. Plato and Aristotle, twin sources of the Western tradition, took the divine interpenetration of reality for granted in a way that was emotionally neutral and intellectually supportive. At the same time, in the East, Confucius and Chinese philosophers in the subsequent two centuries also made ethical action the mainspring of all achievements and social relations, while still rooting life in Tien (Heaven), the supreme cosmic spiritual **power.**[50]

In modern times, affinities with this tradition can be seen in the work of theistic and atheistic existentialists like Bergson, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre; anti-rationalist personalist theologians like Barth, Buber, Tillich, and Niebuhr; and transpersonal or spiritual psychologists like Jung, Krishnamurti, and Gurdjieff. The view presented by such thinkers is that the individual exists and creates himself in acts of free choice. The very ground of being should be rediscovered and re-experienced daily. Choice is critical for being, and all transitory human values — value systems and social values — are insignificant. These thinkers recognize that man, at moments of crisis, touches the infinite and transcendent which can never be formulated, verified, explained or proven.[51]

Feelings. Experiential reality is now paramount because transcendental awareness can only manifest through feeling states and symbols. Ethical choice emerges here in the form of an intuition, which is driven primarily by the imagination (not by conscience or reason). As already emphasized, the choice may be counter-intuitive. Sometimes it is communicated by an inner voice, hallucinatory vision or dream. It then takes the person and associates by surprise, as in the case of Samuel (Ex. 6.23) and Luther (Ex. 6.24).

Using the Approach. Transcendentalist *investigation* is required when personal integrity is at stake and when transpersonal guidance is felt to be needed for choice. For example, a citizen with strong law-abiding convictions may regard a particular law as unjust, and wonder whether she should refuse to obey it despite serious consequences. The choice here must not be made using the conscience, which is an accident of upbringing, but by some deeper awareness of a higher ethical reality.

The self is the vehicle for the expression of this higher reality. So the person must conduct the investigation by turning inwards to gain awareness and spiritual support. Habitual self-awareness and the deliberate practice of integrity generate inner confidence in ethical choice. Study of ethical tracts and contemplation of virtues in the lives of others is also helpful. Methods to activate inner awareness may also be useful. These typically ensure that a conducive state of consciousness is developed through meditation, concentration and focusing of attention. Spiritual counselling which does not impose on the person may release blocks. The key tasks are to locate the individual within himself or herself, and to develop the capacity to self-reflect and avoid automatic identification with one's own experience and everyday intuitions. Spiritual aids such as prayer, ritual, holy scriptures, body control (like yoga) or oracles like the *I Ching* may be used.

The transcendentalist approach comes into its own in deeply felt or highly complex situations involving others, especially in extreme circumstances of any sort. Any possibility may then be chosen — as long as integrity is not compromised. The *extreme circumstance* characteristic of this approach occurs when a person's integrity is being directly assaulted. If it is not possible to accommodate to the situation or escape from it while maintaining integrity, then death appears preferable. In Camus' memorable phrase: 'It is better to die on your feet than live on your knees'.[52] The alternative to physical death is a spiritual or emotional death in which the person goes mechanically through the motions of living, but is not energized or involved.

and mental illness, but intense guilt and shame, and dysfunctional social attitudes. Survivors have had great difficulty in bringing up children with positive values including a belief in the possibility of a better world.
Ex. 6.26[53]

The *quandary* that emerges when using transcendental choice is how to communicate the choice so that its true nature is known. Others commonly doubt whether the choice genuinely expresses inner awareness (inspiration or divine guidance) — or reflects either self-delusion or the effect of temptation, preference or convenience. For example, if the choice is admirable, the chooser may struggle internally with a sense that the choice is based on pride. Counter-intuitive choices (i.e. which oppose personal beliefs, views or norms) require integrity and courage to pursue, as in the case of Samuel (Ex. 6.23). Choices which run counter to social norms engender social rejection and condemnation, as in the case of Luther (Ex. 6.24), and sometimes punishment, as in the case of conscientious objectors.

Limitation. The chief *criticism* of transcendentalism focuses on the difficulty in being sure about insight, particularly whether it has been kept free of outer social and inner emotional forces. Many in authority fear it offers a carte-blanche for each to do as he pleases. Self-delusion is as possible in the ethical realm as in other areas of knowledge, perhaps more so. And self-exculpation is a risk. But such things need to be seen as a form of corruption, ignorance or illness. As already noted, much modern philosophy is unsympathetic to a transcendental approach. Some arrogantly dismiss transcendentalism as utterly implausible and childish; some confuse it with listening to one's conscience; and some view it mistakenly as an abdication of responsibility for rational thought.[54]

Because spirituality and temporality cannot be fused to form a new constraint at a higher level — unless it be a deep perception of realities (L'-1) — the hierarchy is completed practically as well as logically. The evolution of the dualities suggests that ethical choice might well be seen as ensuring that the highest ethical aspiration, for spirituality (L'-7), takes cognisance of and ultimately penetrates the most basic ethical constraint, awkward realities (L'-1).

REVIEWING APPROACHES TO ETHICAL CHOICE

The seven distinctive approaches to ethical choice that emerged in the research have now been described, labelled, ordered and illustrated: rationalist, conventionalist, pragmatist, individualist, communalist, legitimist, and transcendentalist. We saw that these seven

allow for both teleological and deontological viewpoints (in alternating order as it happens). Because the topmost level is transcendentalist, the framework seems to suggest that people have a sense of what is right and good which emerges ultimately from an unconscious union with Being/God.

Certainly, ethical choice requires a conviction about what is right and good, a conviction whose origin is mysterious.[55] But this conviction can attach itself to any of the approaches, and it may explicitly repudiate transcendentalism. The completeness of the set of approaches is logically derived from the notion that conviction in each emerges from a focus on one of the seven levels of purpose. The approaches are discrete but their hierarchical relationships are intuitively evident when one considers the evolution of aspirations and other properties.

Analyses of obligations in actual situations have thrown up a greater variety of approaches to ethical choice than is generally evident from the literature. Most writers tend to focus heavily on communalism (under the label of utilitarianism) or legitimism (under the label of deontology). Transcendentalism (under various labels) is also popular as part of the New Age movement. Although these three approaches are of great importance, my researches and everyday observation indicate the widespread and effective use of the other four approaches.

The regular application of any of the lower five approaches is discretionary. However, setting rules within a group is essential for a satisfactory social life (L'-6), and authenticity is essential for a satisfactory personal life (L'-7). The communalist approach (L'-5), the most complex of the discretionary approaches, is also generally judged to be ethically superior, in so far as a concern for all rather than just for the chooser is explicitly sought. The individualist approach (L'-4) provides for the strongest drive towards achievement, but is the source of the destruction that comes in the wake of truly creative individuals. The pragmatist approach (L'-3) provides the greatest certainty in achieving some tangible benefit whilst recognizing a multiplicity of value positions. The conventionalist approach (L'-2) stabilizes social identity and is the ultimate base for grounding all changes in values and behaviours. Finally, the rationalist approach (L'-1) provides a focus on means and so ensures that choice is practical and effective.

Personal Liberation. The ethical systems show a progressive personalization and liberation of the individual human being from situational embeddedness. At L'-1, the rationalist approach is almost completely depersonalized. Man is embedded in problematic

situations, and people (even the chooser) may need to be altered or removed to maximize benefits. At L'-2, the conventionalist approach sees people as equivalent to each other, because customs and traditions, by definition, are similar from person to person. Personhood is submerged within this similarity. At L'-3, the pragmatist approach explicitly introduces personal preferences and differences in value position into the choice process. At L'-4, the individualist approach goes further by placing each person and his survival and interests at the centre of ethical choice, and assuming each person is responsible for himself. At L'-5, the communalist approach recognizes that each person exists within relationships, and posits the value of care and concern for others. At L'-6, the legitimist approach protects all individuals and the social group on which each individual depends, but without seeking to determine the handling of specific situations. At L'-7, the transcendentalist approach affirms the uniqueness and creativity of each person and fosters choices which recognize the significance of the eternal and the good.

Making the Choice. All or most approaches are usually relevant to any issue. Yet when something specifically has to be tackled, individuals are likely to identify predominantly with just one (or two) of the approaches and put the others to one side.

Unfortunately, ethical debates are futile if opposing camps argue from within different approaches. Like any battle of value systems, there can be no meeting ground. The only way out is to adopt an encompassing overview so that each camp can appreciate and respect the approach taken by others. This framework offers such a perspective because it unequivocally values each of the approaches and provides a place for all.

But taking an overview is not to step outside the framework. There is no alternative apart from the seven which have been identified. It is not even clear how meaningful it is to speak of choosing the best (or right) approach, because self-consciously choosing which approach to use must be carried out with one of the approaches! A comprehensive view of any issue may be obtained by applying all seven approaches, even though there is no superior way to synthesize the results. I will now illustrate the whole framework by applying each approach to the same choice issue: whether or not to legalize addictive drugs.

LEGALIZING HARD DRUGS AN EXTENDED EXAMPLE

The issue to be decided is whether addictive drugs like cocaine and heroin should be legalized or whether prohibition should be maintained.

What is the situation? The US and other governments have not been able to prevent the use of addictive drugs and the crime, ill-health, social decay and violence which flows from trafficking and abuse. Prohibition creates crime and puts the authority of the state at risk. International trade is estimated at $500Billion. It seems that 'the greatest beneficiaries of the drug laws are drug traffickers'.[56] Despite US requests and aid, governments of Colombia and other supplying countries have not been able to stop the producers. In Columbia, drug producers have declared war on the government, and successfully terrorize the judiciary and politicians. The money they obtain buys support from many local people as well. The US Government's customs and police force do not have the strength to stop cocaine entering the country or being distributed and taken. Society is preoccupied with drugs as a moral issue, but the war on drugs has failed. Officials have been publicly pessimistic.[57] As penalties for drug trafficking have increased, the imagery of war has heightened and the trade has become more violent and professional.[58]

Why is the issue ethical? Drug legalization is an ethical issue for three reasons. First, addictive drugs are harmful to the individual and wider society, and prohibition is leading to many harmful effects including the stimulation of crime. Ethical injunctions are being violated in the sense that unacceptable, inappropriate, unlawful activities thrive. Second, a value controversy exists: drug use and drug legalization or prohibition is supported or opposed according to different value systems within society. Intense emotions surround the issue. Third, the ethical meta-principle of consistency appears to be violated in that some addictive and dangerous agents like cocaine and heroin are banned and some, like alcohol and tobacco, are not.

Who is responsible? When making an ethical choice, the responsibility of the chooser must be clear. It is amazing how easy it is to decide something and come down on the side of virtue if one is not responsible for implementation and can avoid suffering if the choice is disliked by others or turns out to be mistaken. In this case, we will assume that the responsibility for choice lies with the US Government.

As we consider the application of each approach in turn, the reader can imagine himself as a Congressman, Senator or President. Please note: the aim here is not to provide a complete definitive analysis of the drug problem or to persuade anyone, but rather to illustrate the consequences of making different assumptions about how to choose ethically. You may well imagine alternative arguments within particular approaches or argue the differential applicability of the approaches.

But remember: 1) any debate must lie within a single approach; 2) denying the validity of any approach is counter-productive.

Using Rationalism

The rationalist asks: *is there a worthwhile objective to be met by legalization using available means?* The answer is clear. YES — there are many. Legalization would: (1) decriminalize the activities of large numbers of people; (2) allow better control of the availability and use of drugs; (3) allow monitoring or control of price and quality of drugs; (4) remove money from the criminal subculture; (5) allow for taxation revenue on profits from sales; (6) save money spent on control; (7) reduce drug-related deaths and crimes like prostitution, bribery, theft and fraud based on drug money; (8) reduce drug-related illness like AIDS; (9) help rescue states like Colombia from anarchy; (10) allow the Government to become less involved with the domestic affairs of countries like Columbia; (11) provide work and jobs in a new industry.

The means are available to pursue the above objectives through legislation. Of course, there would need to be regulation of production, distribution and sale. Steps could and should be taken to discourage use and abuse of drugs: for example by taxation, control of advertising and distribution, limiting availability and public health measures.

The rationalist also asks: *is there a worthwhile objective being met by prohibition?* The answer is less clear, but No is the most likely conclusion. Vast sums of money are being spent on a failed attempt to enforce prohibition: from $1B in 1980, to $4B in 1988, and up to $8B in 1990.[59] Of course, work and jobs are provided in the policing and drug control drives, but this is non-productive expenditure. In any case, prohibition has not worked in the past, is not working now, and is unlikely to work in the future.

Prohibition does enable a symbolic war against evil, and the public rallies behind it. But this objective does not appeal to the rationalist: if a fight against evil is wanted, why not make it useful and winnable by fighting illiteracy, tax evasion or corruption in high places instead?

Verdict. The rationalist conclusion is that it is *reasonable to legalize* and *unreasonable to prohibit*.

Using Conventionalism

The conventionalist asks: *is it socially acceptable to legalize addictive drugs?* The answer here is reasonably clear. On balance: No. American society tends to allow the use of certain addictive drugs like caffeine, nicotine, alcohol and many tranquillizers and to prohibit, more or less completely, other drugs like sedatives, narcotics, hallucinogens, and stimulants like amphetamines and cocaine. The logic or lack of logic behind this categorization is irrelevant for a conventionalist. The brute fact is that hard drug legalization is an anathema.[60] It is true that certain countries, like the Netherlands, have taken a more liberal approach without harm, but the conventionalist does not regard the values of other societies as relevant.

The conventionalist also asks: *is it socially acceptable to prohibit addictive drugs?* The answer is unambiguous: YES. Prohibition currently exists, and most people expect it to continue. Government policies and pronouncements have been prohibitory and condemnatory of drug-taking for many years, so legalization would be a dramatic and traumatic turnaround. Prohibition of alcohol did fail, but the fact that it was even attempted reveals something of the cultural tradition. Substances with the potential to damage the foolish and inadequate are generally believed to need tight regulation. Hard drug use (unlike alcohol use) represents weakness and dependence, while abstinence represents strength and self-sufficiency. The public clearly accepts prohibition as a way of expressing such values.

A thoughtful conventionalist might well consider whether the time had come to abandon prohibition and modify habits of popular moral thought. Prohibition would be abandoned if it could be shown that a view of hard drug use as a beneficial custom was rapidly increasing, and that the marketing and use of drugs was evolving largely out of society's control. This does not seem to be the case, and the conventionalist approach urges the blocking of any such evolution of attitudes and behaviour.

Verdict. The conventionalist conclusion is that it is *essential to continue prohibiting,* and utterly *unacceptable to legalize*.

Using Pragmatism

The pragmatist asks: *is it appropriate for us in the US government to legalize addictive drugs in the present situation?* The answer is fairly clear: No. The main values uppermost in the government's mind are two: the view of voters which the government is expected to represent, and the moral high ground which represents the relevant ideal. Retaining the moral high ground is important because a government does well when it is seen to be in a war on the side of good against evil.

It is evident that most people simply do not want greater availability of dangerous substances liable to

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misuse by their children. Addicted individuals gain some minimal pleasure in life with drugs but they rarely vote so the potential constituency for legalization is weakened. This allows most voters to ignore the poverty and suffering that underlie the urge to abuse and deal in drugs, and lets them blame the use of drugs on personal weakness. Only when the costs in money, social disruption, disability, and deaths associated with prohibition are themselves becoming unacceptable, will the potential for legalization develop.

The pragmatist also asks: *is it appropriate for us to continue prohibiting addictive drugs in the present situation?* Again the answer is a fairly definite YES. Prohibition and the associated condemnation of hard drugs is easy and straightforward, while legalization with controls would be difficult and complicated. To many voters, the imagery of war generated by prohibition is appealing, and legalization would look like losing, giving in, or even rewarding crime. Taking the situation as a whole, the gut reaction of a politician with his finger on the public pulse seems to be to keep on and toughen prohibition.

Verdict. The pragmatist conclusion is that it is currently *inappropriate to legalize* and that it is perfectly *appropriate to continue prohibiting.*

Using Individualism

The individualist asks: *would the US government's security and advantage be increased by legalization?* The answer here is: NO. The concern here is not so much with the power or security of the nation in relation to other nations (because that is probably unaffected), but with the security of the government in the domestic context.

Those in government have, by definition, the power to legalize. However, this power depends on the support of the electorate. If the public regard legalization as giving way to evil, then whatever the long-term gains to society as a whole, severe electoral risk would be courted by lifting prohibition. The opposition party would immediately exploit the situation and might well force a humiliating back-down or use the choice to discredit the administration and sooner or later to regain power. The government does suffer from the fact that it is unable to prohibit effectively. Legalization might well solve this problem, at the same time demonstrating leadership and generating funds via taxes, but the risk of forfeiting voter support seems too great.

The individualist also asks: *would the US government's security and advantage be increased by continuing to prohibit addictive drugs?* The answer seems to be: YES. Again, there is no international pressure for legalization. Most

allies also prohibit hard drugs and would be dismayed by any softening of the line. Domestically, the balance of power amongst voters is heavily tilted to prohibition, with only a tiny minority of academics and intellectuals seeking reform. Little harm will come to the government itself (as distinct from drug-takers and those unhappily caught up in drug-related crimes) from continuing prohibition. It might well be that changing social mores or the cost and humiliation of the failure of prohibition will one day force the government's hand, but this situation does not currently exist.

Verdict. The individualist conclusion is that it is to the *advantage of the government to refrain from legalization and to maintain prohibition.*

Using Communalism

The communalist asks: is it *more beneficial or more harmful overall to legalize or to prohibit addictive drugs?* The answer is not clear. The main sub-groups within society who have an interest (outside government itself and its drug-related agencies) are non-drug users, those highly susceptible to future drug abuse, drug users, those suffering from the criminal side-effects, and those obtaining money or living off the drug trade. (People in other societies also need some consideration, but a government has a duty to put its own people first.)

Factors relevant to benefit (as explained when considering the rationalist approach) primarily affect the poor. Even most of the crime is aimed at the poor, or occurs amongst criminals. The bulk of the population are non-takers and would not be directly affected by legalization. However some would be protected by the reduction in criminal activity, and all would benefit from a reduction in criminality and the release of resources to aid the poor.

Drug use in society might well increase, but those most susceptible at present could be given some protection. It is very likely that a proportion of middle-class non-takers would become addicts and would thereby be harmed.

The harmful effects on the population as a whole of appearing to condone evil or of giving in to criminal activity are difficult to assess, but might be substantial. The effect on the criminal sub-culture of being deprived of a lucrative trade is difficult to estimate. The harmful effect on the country of the opposition winning future elections if legalization goes ahead and then repealing the laws is also relevant, but uncertain. Finally, future generations might possibly benefit from a more rational approach to drugs.

Verdict. The communalist conclusion is that *it may*

possibly be more beneficial overall to legalize. However benefits are difficult to estimate with any certainty and moving from a state of prohibition to ensuring achievement of those benefits would be very complicated.

Using Legitimism

The legitimist asks: *is either drug legalization or prohibition fair?* and wishes to determine this by using and setting rules. Although the example is itself legitimist, it is meaningful to consider whether to set a superordinate rule governing legalization or prohibition. This would imply dealing with the US constitution which determines the validity of laws. The right to take drugs of any sort in private could be seen as a basic human freedom like the right to bear arms. Either the constitution could be modified by referendum or the current prohibition could be challenged in the Supreme Court as an illegal and improper infringement on personal liberty. However, the US government is under no pressure to bring a test case or conduct a referendum.

Alternatively the legitimist approach could consider the US government as an individual and the social group as the nations of the world. The legitimist could then ask: *what rule should the US government and other governments in the international community set in regard to the powers of governments to prohibit or legalize addictive drugs?* At present there is no international rule demanding either drug prohibition or legalization; and the government would not want its own future freedom of action curtailed by setting such a rule.

Verdict. The legitimist conclusion is that *no rule should be set to govern whether or not to proceed with legalization or to maintain prohibition.*

Using Transcendentalism

The transcendentalist asks: *Is either drug legalization or prohibition an authentic act?* A government does have a duty to foster authenticity. It can reduce hypocrisy and corruption amongst its citizens by passing laws which accord with the nature of human beings.

Drug use is a normal human activity which has gone on since humanity emerged and which is only wrong because the law says so. The right to drugs is a form of property right and an expression of liberty. Constraining entitlements and freedoms is only justified when harm to others is obviously being prevented. Drug-taking need not necessarily harm oneself at all, and need not harm others. The prohibition of drugs appears to confuse distinctions between drug-use and drug-abuse, and between drug-taking and drug-dealing with its related crimes. Prohibition, not legalization, seems to be the bringer of harm. Prohibition is also hypocritical because wealthy people can and do get drugs in a trouble-free way whereas the poor are scapegoated and criminalized.

However, the transcendentalist in government must be practical and realistic (like Samuel in Ex. 6.23). This means asking: *which of legalization or prohibition is really the right thing to do now?* Despite all the logic and facts, and putting expedience and self-interest aside, would continued prohibition or would legalization really produce better people, a better society, and the right result given present realities? Each legislator has to face this issue personally, in much the same way that each person must face the issue of whether or not to take drugs when offered.

Verdict. If a transcendentalist approach were used in government, each legislator would acknowledge the current hypocrisy and then vote, following meditation or prayer, according to a deep inner sense of what was best.

Making the Choice

Each approach exists independently in its own right. The seven cannot be summed in any logical way. Nevertheless, by gathering together the verdicts for each approach some general picture may emerge. In this case, the answers given to the question as to whether it would be ethically proper to legalize addictive drugs are:

- **L'-1:** Legalize
- **L'-2:** Do not legalize.
- **L'-3:** Do not legalize.
- **L'-4:** Do not legalize.
- **L'-5:** Probably do not legalize.
- **L'-6:** Do not constrain legalization.
- **L'-7:** Personal choice: no general guidance.

The overall verdict seems to be to retain prohibition. The most concrete approaches — conventionalist, pragmatist and individualist — are decidedly against the idea. The communalist approach is uncertain. The legitimist approach is neutral and against any rule which would constrain the choice of legalization. The transcendentalist approach emerges from private personal reflection. The only approach which clearly favours legalization is the rationalist approach. Not surprisingly, drug prohibition continues at the time of writing.

OUTLOOKS ON CHOICE ACTION AND INQUIRY

If you, the reader, have persevered to this point, you will have some inner sense of affinity with one or more of the approaches; and, possibly, an increased tolerance of the others. If I have conveyed these ideas well, you

may even have started to wonder about your habitual handling of certain matters in your work or personal life.

When you felt your way into the approaches, you may have become aware that they touch closely on the ways by which you get confidence when making decisions, or get certainty when trying to know about something. This is not the place to explore systematic inquiry and decision-making in detail, but the similarities that you sensed should not be suppressed. In fact, approaches to decision-making and systematic inquiring can be shown to emerge, like ethical choice, from seven-level frameworks.[61] I have laid out the three sets of approaches in Master-Table 8 for interest. You may find that levels which suit you differ in the various domains.

In each of these three great domains — inquiry, choice, action — the approaches clarify assumptions with which people have been found to identify spontaneously. A similarity exists between approaches because of the close connection between the three domains. All action demands inquiring and implies ethical choice where value systems collide; all inquiring is action and may lead to ethical dilemmas about what ought to be done with the results of inquiry; and as we have seen, ethical choice calls for both inquiring and action.

Another reason for similarity is that each seems to flow from a personal outlook. By applying certain beliefs, albeit unknowingly, to the practical business of knowing, doing or choosing, people have created the approaches. These beliefs have been elaborated more systematically as philosophical doctrines. (The labels in Master-Table 8 were chosen primarily to be useful and appealing in consultancy, and not to meet doctrinal criteria of purity.[62])

The personal outlooks implied by each level are as follows. At L'-1, move forward logically. At L'-2, deal with things as everyone agrees they are. At L'-3, take small, easy, desirable and obvious steps. At L'-4, reconcile diverse conflicting outlooks. At L'-5, develop the whole system by balancing all relevant factors. At L'-6, impose a structured approach. And at L'-7, let the Spirit move you.

Transition. Ethical considerations constrain decision-making. To delve more deeply into ethical choice, we must now focus on the legitimist approach which contains rules which seek to constrain use of the other approaches. The easiest way into rules is through an examination of human identity and those moral institutions, founded in rules, which have emerged with the evolution of humanity in order to protect our social existence.   ❖

Master-   **Properties of the seven approaches to ethical choice.**
Table 5   The core obligation can be viewed as either a social value (L-5) or an ethical maxim (L''-5)
        See text for further details and examples.

L	Type of Approach	Core Obligation	Classification	Injunction to choose: (Interdiction)	Aspiration and Constraint	Cardinal Virtue Cardinal Vice
1'	Rationalist	Meeting practical objectives which are self-evidently sensible and worthwhile to the chooser.	Teleological	Reasonably (Unreasonably)	Solutions and Realities	Wisdom : Folly
2'	Conventionalist	Conforming with widely held views on what is valued and proper within the chooser's relevant social group.	Deontological	Acceptably (Unacceptably)	Continuity and Change	Moderation : Extremism
3'	Pragmatist	Pursuing values which are preferred by the chooser, bring some general benefit, and are easily applied.	Teleological	Appropriately (Inappropriately)	Ideals and Potentials	Prudence : Recklessness
4'	Individualist	Ensuring the chooser's security and interests in the light of existing power relations.	Deontological	Self-advantageously (Self-disadvantageously)	Strengths and Vulnerabilities	Courage : Arrogance
5'	Communalist	Balancing all anticipated consequences in relation to the needs and interests of all concerned including the chooser.	Teleological	Beneficially overall (Harmfully overall)	Altruism and Egoism	Benevolence : Indifference
6'	Legitimist	Setting a rule which is accepted as right by the chooser and all others in the social group.	Deontological	Fairly (Unfairly)	Common good and Individual autonomy	Justice : Injustice
7'	Transcendentalist	Responding to the chooser's deep inner (and essentially divine) sense of what is right and good.	Teleological	Authentically (Hypocritically)	Spirituality and Temporality	Integrity : Corruption

Master-Table 6

Using the approaches to ethical choice.
Note that all or many of the instigating factors are usually present in any choice situation, so the option of which approach to use is open.
See text for an elaboration of these summaries and for examples.

L	Type of Approach Duality	Instigated when:	Topics of Inquiry and Debate	Extreme Circumstance	Quandary	Features of Implementation	Principal Criticism
1'	**Rationalist** Solving the problem while recognizing realities.	A serious problem must be tackled dispassionately.	Will worthwhile objectives be met? Are they really worthwhile? What side-effects will there be?	Intense emotional pressure.	How to achieve goals in the face of intense emotive resistance.	Set up reorientation and educational programs.	Too insensitive.
2'	**Conventionalist** Maintaining continuity given the pressure for change.	Social change becomes overt and unavoidable.	What are the existing values? How inevitable is change? What will be the effect on current values?	Rapid widespread uncontrollable change.	How to enable change while supporting established values.	Consult and allow dissent, phase change, compensate, allow some to opt out, resocialize.	Too reactionary.
3'	**Pragmatist** Pursuing ideals within the bounds of present potential.	The situation demands immediate action.	What ideals are relevant? What is desired & believed? What can be done easily to ensure some benefit?	Collapse of ideals.	How to persuade everyone that the choice means an improvement.	Communicate well, move ahead rapidly, foster pluralism, create groups who will benefit.	Too expedient.
4'	**Individualist** Developing strengths without neglecting vulnerabilities.	Competition for resources and dominance exists.	Where does advantage lie? What is the actual balance of power? How can losses be minimized?	Loss of an essential resource.	How to overcome or adapt to others.	Be professional, husband resources, balance returns against effort, be tough.	Too self-centred.
5'	**Communalist** Choosing altruism by virtue of egoism.	Others need due consideration.	What will the effects be? Who will be affected? Who can tolerate hardship? What else might help?	Need for a sacrifice.	How and where to draw the boundary of concern.	Use participative system modelling, develop a system of choices, build on relationships.	Too complicated.
6'	**Legitimist** Serving the common good and individual autonomy.	Individuals must each govern their behaviour in a group setting.	What is the best rule? Is it acceptable now? Will it suit in future? How will it be monitored and enforced?	The group is chaotic and riven with conflict.	How to handle the diminution of individual freedom.	Ensure that rule-setting is participative and authoritative.	Too indeterminate.
7'	**Transcendentalist** Realizing spirituality in the midst of temporality.	Personal integrity must be asserted.	(Use of meditative and related techniques to enable openness to an inspired intuition.)	Extremity of any sort, especially an assault on integrity.	How to communicate the nature of the choice.	Draw on inner strengths, tolerate social rejection if necessary.	Too open to self-delusion

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Master-Figure 7

The hierarchical evolution of ethical aspirations and constraints.
These belong to the approaches to ethical choice. Clearly the highest aspiration is spirituality and the most basic constraint is the situational realities. The emergence of each level is based on resolving the duality of aspiration and constraint at the preceding level. This resolution serves as the constraint at the higher level, where a new higher ethical aspiration is invoked. (The term in bold is the ethical aspiration, and the term in italics is the constraint.)

Level / Approach	
7' *Transcendentalist*	**Spirituality** / *Temporality*
6' *Legitimist*	**Common good** / *Individual autonomy*
5' *Communalist*	**Altruism** / *Egoism*
4' *Individualist*	**Strengths** / *Vulnerabilities*
3' *Pragmatist*	**Ideals** / *Potentials*
2' *Conventionalist*	**Continuity** / *Change*
1' *Rationalist*	**Solutions** / *Realities*

Master-Table 8

A comparison of approaches for ethical choice, decision-making and inquiry.
The approaches are all used by people in the imperative mode; and the research has developed principles or injunctions for use in design. The implicit outlook has been abstracted from these principles, but it is not offered as having an independent reality.

L	Implicit Outlook	Ethical Choice	Decision-making	Inquiry
	Each outlook applies across the three domains.	Each approach offers a sense of conviction.	Each approach offers a promise of confidence.	Each approach offers a guarantee of certainty.
1'	*Move forward logically.*	**Rationalist** — Use means which logically achieve ends which are self-evidently worthwhile.	**Rationalist** — Use values, objectives, priorities and plans to move forward.	**Formal-analytic** — Use self-evident ideas assumptions and logic to develop analyses.
2'	*Deal with things as everyone agrees they are*	**Conventionalist** — Conform to values which are widely held in your social group.	**Empiricist** — Use detailed, valid and reliable information to solve existing problems.	**Empirical** — Use general agreement as to the facts to discern regularities.
3'	*Take small, easy, desirable and obvious steps.*	**Pragmatist** — Pursue values you prefer which also bring some wider benefit and are easily applicable.	**Opportunist** — Use opportunities for action where some achievement is certain and easy.	**Explanatory** — Use hypotheses and comparisons of alternatives to get increments of knowledge.
4'	*Reconcile diverse conflicting outlooks.*	**Individualist** — Ensure your security and interests by recognizing and using power relationships.	**Dialectical** — Use disputes between different parties to reach a compromise solution.	**Dialectic** — Use conflicts between ideas to develop an encompassing synthesis.
5'	*Balance all relevant factors.*	**Communalist** — Produce the outcome which best takes account of the needs and interests of all.	**Systemic** — Use a model including all factors to generate an optimal-feasible strategy.	**Holistic** — Use modelling to represent the situation as completely as possible.
6'	*Impose a structure.*	**Legitimist** — Set explicit general rules which you and others in the group accept as fair.	**Structuralist** — Use structures and procedures to provide legitimate authority and order.	**Dialogic** — Use ratiocination to get a structured and authoritative theoretical base for inquiry.
7'	*Let the Spirit move you.*	**Transcendentalist** — Respond to your deep inner sense of what is right and good.	**Imaginist** — Use intuition and inspiration to gain deep personal commitment.	**Contemplative** — Use unconscious awareness to create imaginative possibilities.

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FRAMEWORK of PURPOSE
(Primary Hierarchy)

Level 1	Tactical Objectives
Level 2	Strategic Objectives
Level 3	Internal Priorities
Level 4	Principal Objects
Level 5	Social Values
Level 6	Value Systems
Level 7	Ultimate Values

APPROACHES to ETHICAL CHOICE
(Secondary Hierarchy)

Level 1'	Rationalist
Level 2'	Conventionalist
Level 3'	Pragmatist
Level 4'	Individualist
Level 5'	Communalist
Level 6'	Legitimist
Level 7'	Transcendentalist

ETHICAL RULES
(Tertiary Hierarchy)

Level 1"	Prescriptions
Level 2"	Conventions
Level 3"	Tenets
Level 4"	Rights/Duties
Level 5"	Maxims
Level 6"	Laws
Level 7"	Absolutes

Master- **Figure 9**   **Nested hierarchies in the framework of purpose.**
Note that the hierarchy of approaches to ethical choice is based on the primary hierarchy of purpose and lies wholly within level 6. Each approach is a system of values. The hierarchy of purpose and the hierarchy of ethical rules are in single boxes indicating their holistic nature; whereas each ethical approach (or system) is in a discrete box reflecting its distinctiveness.

NOTES

1   This view, clearly stated in modern times by Immanuel Kant in 1785 (*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.* (Transl. H.J. Paton). London: Hutchinson, 1948), has been repeatedly reiterated. See, for example: Hare, R.M. *Freedom and Reason.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963: Habermas, J. *Legitimation Crisis.* (Transl. T. McCarthy). London: Heinemann Educational, 1976.

2   This is evident from standard texts like: Nowell-Smith, P. *Ethics.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954; Brandt, R.B. (ed.) *Value and Obligation: Systematic Readings in Ethics.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1961; MacIntyre, A. *A Short History of Ethics.* London: Duckworth, 1966; Hospers, J. *Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Problems of Ethics.* New York: Harcourt Brace and World Inc.,1961; Finnis, J. *Fundamentals of Ethics.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

3   For example: Both teleology and deontology are accepted as valid by J. Finnis op. cit. [2]; and E. Shirk (*The Ethical Dimension.* New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1965); while an attempt to reconcile the two perspectives is provided in: Sesonke, A. *Value and Obligation: The Foundations of an Empiricist Ethical Theory.* San Francisco: University of California Press, 1957.

4   This is emphasized more by scientists with a systems orientation rather than by those with a conventional rationalist-empiricist orientation. See, for example: Kuhn, A. *Unified Social Science: A System-Based Introduction.* New York: Dorsey Press, 1975; Kast, F.E. & Rosenzweig, J.E. *Organization and Management: A Systems and Contingency Approach.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983; Rahmatian, S. & Hiatt, C. Toward an information-based theory of irrational systems behaviour. *Systems Research.* 6: 7-16, 1989. (Of course, many social scientists recognize in their accounts or critiques that facts are imbued with value and depend on perspective, but they typically do so without a concern to produce practical solutions to problems.)

5   Martin Dyer-Smith, personal communication.

6   Herbert Simon, for example, emphasizes that rational choice depends on using facts and values (*Administrative Behaviour.* New York: Macmillan 1957). However a rationalist decision or ethical choice need not be rational in the sense of being fully logical and fact-based. I have summarized the nature of rational inquiry in: Kinston, W. A total framework for inquiry. *Systems Research.* 5: 9-25, 1988; and the essence of rationalist decision-making in: Kinston, W. & Algie, J. Seven distinctive paths of decision and action. *Systems Research,* 6: 117-132, 1989. A rationalist culture within organizations is slightly different again, see: Kinston, W. *Strengthening the Management Culture: Phasing the Transformation of Organizations.* London: The SIGMA Centre, 1994, pp.43-53.

7   Royal Commission on the National Health Service. *Report.* London: HMSO Cmnd. 7615,1979; Committee of Inquiry (Chairman, David Widdicombe). *The Conduct of Local Authority Business.* London: HMSO Cmnd. 9797, 1986.

8   A popular account describing sleepy management and the need for 'corporate raiders' is provided in: Sampson, A. *The Midas Touch.* London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989. The slow-ness of reform of mental institutions is described in: Martin, J.P. *Hospitals in Trouble.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984.

9.   Ellis, A. *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy.* Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1962.

10.   The example is taken from rationalist-empiricist reviews of the UK system: King, R. & Morgan, R. *The Future of the Prison System.* Farnborough: Gower, 1980; Ashworth, A. *Sentencing and Penal Policy.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983; Rutherford, A. *Prisons and the Process of Justice: A Reductionist Challenge.* London: Heinemann,1984; Garland, D. *Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies.* Aldershot: Gower, 1985.

11.   For two different types of research account noting the inertia of NHS management, see: Harrison, S. *Managing the NHS: Shifting the Frontier?* London: Croom Helm, 1988; Kinston, W. & Rowbottom, R.W. *Making General Management Work in the National Health Service.* London: Brunel University, 1989.

12.   See, for example: Westermarck, E. *Ethical Relativity.* London: Greenwood Press, 1932

3.   Clark, L. *The Rivers Ran East.* New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954, p.164.

14.   The Report of the commission with a special introduction (from which the comments are all taken) is provided in: Warnock, M. *A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology.* London: Basil Blackwell, 1985. The quotation from Hume comes from his *A Treatise of Human Understanding* (1738).

15.   Wilhelm, R. *I Ching.* (transl. C. Baynes). London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1951: Hexagram 34, *The Power of the Great.*

16.   Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics.* (Transl. D. Ross, rev'd J. Ackrill & J. Urmson) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 228.

17.   Ford, G. Text of the Pardon for Richard Nixon. Quoted in: Baum, R. (ed.) *Ethical Arguments for Analysis (Brief Edition).* New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1979, pp.198-199.

18.   This approach to using ideals in management is well made by Russell Ackoff in: *Redesigning the Future.* New York: Wiley, 1974.

19.   The Report proposing Family Courts is: Department of Health and Social Security, Great Britain. *Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families* (Chairman: Sir Morris Finer). London: HMSO, 1974.

20.   The quotation comes from William James (*Pragmatism.* New York: Nelson Hall, p.222). As in all the other approaches, the account does not seek to follow any particular doctrine closely. A name like pragmatism is chosen simply because it seems to catch the flavour of the approach. The original and best known American exponents of the doctrine of pragmatism, Charles Peirce and William James, disagreed among themselves about what precisely it entailed. Other leading American pragmatist philosophers were John Dewey and E.A. Singer, the latter being indirectly linked to the present book by his influence on C. West Churchman and hence the systems movement.

21.   See, for example: Smith, A. *The Wealth of Nations.* London: Dent, 1910; Hayek, F. A. *The Constitution of Liberty.* London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960; Lindblom, C.E. *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-Making through Mutual Adjustment*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1965.

22. Department of Health. *Working for Patients*. London: HMSO. Cmnd. 555, 1989.

23. Mackie, J.L. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. Quotations and his advice come from p.134 and pp.147-8.

24. Egoism in the pejorative sense is associated with the ideas of Hobbes, Nietzsche and Freud. Man, Hobbes argued in *Leviathan*, is characterized by an unbridled selfish desire which would lead to war of all against all, except that this is abhorred. So societal or moral laws became no more than articles of peace (Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*. (ed. R. Tuck) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). A nearly identical view had been put forward almost 2000 years earlier by the naturalistic confucianist, Hsun Tzu (see: Wing-Tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). Freud too pictured men as centres of aggressive self-regard, engaged in perpetual incipient warfare each against the other. Each wants everything and struggles for anything. Freud noted that these aggressive id urges, impervious to reality, becomes socialized, and the aggression reappears in the superego or conscience (*Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) Standard Edition, Vol. 21, pp.64-145, London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1961). Both Hobbes and Freud were primarily exploring human nature and the basis for society, and were not concerned with the present more limited task of designing an approach to ethical choice. Nietzsche, by contrast, did design an ethical system based in individualism more or less as presented here. Its flaw lay in his one-sided view that strength and the power flowing from it were infinitely desirable. This meant that, as well as courage, the paramount virtues were cruelty and stoical endurance, and that weakness was despised (*The Philosophy of Nietzsche*. (ed. G. Clive) New York: New American Library, 1965).

25. The journalist was M. Foster whose account was entitled: 'A government that abandons pupils to beat down teachers'. *The Independent*, 25th August, 1989.

26. See, for example, the bibliography in: Siu, R.G.H. *The Craft of Power*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979.

27. This example was extracted from: Bloch, S. & Chodoff, P. *Psychiatric Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; and Atkinson, J.M. & Coia, D.A. Responsibility to carers - - an ethical dilemma. *Psychiatric Bulletin*, 13: 602-604, 1989.

28. These terms are a minefield for the uninitiated who will come to little harm by regarding communalism as equivalent to utilitarianism. Below is a brief explanation of the various terms:

Consequentialism expresses the obligation to consider the consequences of any choice on others. More formally, it has been defined to mean that 'the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome, as judged from an impersonal standpoint which gives equal weight to the interest of everyone' (Scheffler, S. (ed.) *Consequentialism and its Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988 p.1). But postulating 'equal weight' generates a notion which is often too restrictive in practice.

Utilitarianism is epitomized by the phrase 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. In this form, it has become inextricably associated with the ideas of Jeremy Bentham (*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789). London: Athlone Press, 1970) and John Stuart Mill (*Utilitarianism* (1863). London: Dent, 1972). The term 'good' in this context is often associated with pleasure as an overriding goal and with producing social reform. Both notions are contentious and are not necessarily implied by communalism. To complicate matters further, philosophers have distinguished many different types of utilitarianism. I have come across 'rule u.', 'act u.', 'preference u.', 'institutional u.', 'cooperative u.', 'psychological u.'.

Proportionalism leaves any reference to society implicit and claims that the ethical imperative is simply to 'compare the benefits and harms promised by alternative possible choices...and make that choice which promises to yield a better proportion of benefit to harm than any available alternative' (Finnis, op.cit.[2]). But any focus on maximizing benefits is unnecessary and confusing. Maximization applies to all choices in all approaches because it simply expresses the principle of beneficence: of two goods choose the greater. The specific focus in communalism is to 'balance' within the general requirement to maximize. When balancing, there is no requirement for precise quantification — at least not any more than there was in any other approach.

Systemicism was used in earlier drafts of this chapter as a non-controversial label which would help me escape from the intense unresolved philosophical dispute that surrounds utilitarianism and cognate terms. However this label overemphasizes inquiry and minimizes the centrality of relationships within a group or community.

Further discussion and debate can be found in: Lyons, D. *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965; Hodgson, D.H. *Consequences of Utilitarianism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967; Smart, J.J.C. & Williams, B. *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973; Sen, A. & Williams, B. (eds.) *Utilitarianism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

29. See, for example: Sen, A. *On Ethics and Economics*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987; Ohmae, K. *Triad Power: The Coming Shape of Global Competition*. New York: Free Press, 1989; Ohmae, K. *The Borderless World*. London: Collins, 1990; Drucker, P. The futures that have already happened. *The Economist*. October 21, 1989, pp.27-30.

30. See, for example: Kernberg, O. *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism*. New York: Jason Aronson, 1975.

31. Arendt, H. *Eichmann in Jerusalem. (Rev. Ed.)* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, p.296.

32. Smith, A. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. (1759 1st edition; 1853 New Edition), Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1969.

33. A social science classic espousing disinterested altruism as if it were practical is: Titmuss, R.M. *The Gift Relationship*. New York: Random House, 1971. See critique in: Hardin, G. *The Limits of Altruism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.

34. Turnbull, C. *The Mountain People*. London: Pan, 1974, p.121.

35. The method has been developed by systems scientists. See, for example: Ackoff, R.L. op.cit [18] and *Creating the Corporate Future*, New York: John Wiley, 1981; Checkland, P.B. *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice*. New York: John Wiley, 1981.

36. Farvar, M.T. & Milton, J.P. (eds.) *The Careless Technology*. Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, 1972.

37. Leslie, E. *Desparate Journeys, Abandoned Souls*. London: Macmillan, 1989.

38. Mackie, J.L. op.cit.[23], pp.129-134; Finnis, J. op.cit. [2]. When these authors speak of utilitarianism, they are referring to communalism.

39. *British Standard 5750. Quality Systems*. London: British Standards Institution, 1987.

40. Rule setting and adherence is sharply distinguished in the literature from the search for personal advantage (individualism) or general utilitarian benefit (communalism). Legitimism is sometimes referred to as deontology and, with utilitarianism, is portrayed by popularizing philosophers as one of the two alternative approaches to ethics. (See, for example: Lee, S. *Law and Morals: Warnock, Gillick and Beyond*. London: Oxford University Press, 1986.) The philosophical or jurisprudential version of legitimism, contractualism, has been stimulated by the work of John Rawls (*A Theory of Justice* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), but it seems to be concerned less with the setting of a rule as a way of choosing and more with ensuring common reasonable agreement to a rule so it can be used for retrospective judgement. (See, for example: Scanlon, T.M. A Contractualist Alternative. Ch. 3 in: DiMarco, J.P. & Fox, R.M. (eds.) *New Directions in Ethics: The Challenge of Applied Ethics*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.)

41. Two classic texts here are: Tocqueville, A. de. *Democracy in America*. (ed. P. Bradley) New York: Vintage, 1948; Hayek, F. *Law, Legislation and Liberty*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1979.

42. Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. *Science*, 162: 1243-1248, 1968.

43. The present debate is elaborated in: Brody, B. *Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1975; and Langerak. E.R. Abortion: Listening to the middle. *The Hastings Centre Report*, 9 (5): 24-28, 1979. An alternative view is provided in: Rossi, P.J. Rights are not enough: Prospects for a new approach to the morality of abortion. *Linacre Quarterly*, 46: 109-117, 1979; Hauerwas, S. *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic*. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1981; Churchill, L.R. & Siman, J.J. Abortion and the rhetoric of individual rights. *Hastings Centre Report*, 12 (1): 9-12, 1982.

44. The idea of felt fair pay was developed by E. Jaques (*Equitable Payment Rev.Ed*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) and has been tested by R. Richards (*Fair Pay and Work: An Empirical Study of Fair Pay Perception and Time Span of Discretion*. London: Heinemann, 1971). The role of pay in motivating employees is reviewed in: Herzberg, F. One more time: How do you motivate employees? *Harvard Business Review*. January-February, 1968. A range of practical and ethical reasons against using pay as a motivator together with a short bibliography is provided in: Kohn, A. Why incentive plans cannot work. *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1993.

45. Minuchin, S., Montalvo, B, Guerney, B.G., Rosman, B.L. & Schumer, B.G. *Families of the Slums*. New York: Basic Books, 1967.

46. Plato. *Protagoras*. (Transl. W.K.C. Guthrie). Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956.

47. Tart, C. (ed.) *Transpersonal Psychologies*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1975.

48. 1 Samuel 8. In: *New English Bible with Apocrypha*. London: Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, 1970.

49. For Rudolf Steiner's own account, see: *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*. New York, Anthroposophic Press, 1986. For a review of Steiner's contribution, see: Harwood, A.C. Article in *Encyclopaedia Britannica 14th Ed*. 1961, Vol. 21. pp. 377-378.

50. For the linkage of morality and spirituality, see: Eliade, M. *A History of Religious Ideas. Vols 1-3*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, 1982, 1985. For Confucian thoughts, see: *The Analects of Confucius*. (Transl. A. Waley) London: Allen & Unwin, 1938.

51. At the time of writing, we appear to be in one of those periodic popular resurgences in spiritual awareness. Similar movements were evident in the 1890's, 1930's and 1960's. The theoretical discoveries presented in this book can be regarded as a potentially less ephemeral expression of this awareness.

52. The quotation of Albert Camus can be found in: *The Rebel*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.

53. An account of the concentration camps is provided in: Kogon, E. *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. New York: Berkeley Medallion, 1958. The experience of being an inmate is described by Bruno Bettelheim in: *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age*. New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1960. The effect on survivors is described in: Lifton, R.J. *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.

54. For examples of such philosophical dismissals of transcendentalism, see: Mackie, J.L. op.cit. [23]; Singer, P. *Practical Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

55. A long-standing philosophical issue has been what the origin of ethical sense is. The three candidates have been reason, feeling or a special sense called ethical intuition. The view adopted here is that access to Being/God and beyond to the Void occurs through the imagination, although reason and feeling contribute to the inquiry process and articulation. This access is the ultimate source of human ethical experience. Such an account broadly aligns with the views of Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Confucianism and Taoism, Kant and Hegel. It is most at odds with empiricists and materialists, whether teleologists or deontologists, who see ethics as based in brute fact, brute desire or brute reason.

56. Nadelmann, E.A. Drug prohibition in the United States: costs, consequences and alternatives. *Science*, 245: 939-947, 1989.

57. Berke, R.L. 'President's "victory over drugs" is decades away, officials say'. *New York Times*, September 24, 1989, p.1.

58. Alexander. B.K. *Peaceful Measures: Canada's Way Out of the "War on Drugs"*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1990; Trebach, A.S. *The Great Drug War: And Radical Proposals that Could Make America Safe Again*. New York: Macmillan, 1987.

59. Figures from: *The Economist*, September 2, 1989, p.p.21-24.

60. Becker, G.S. Should drug use be legalized? *Business Week*, August 17, 1989, pp.22-23; Church G.J. Should drugs be made legal? Thinking the unthinkable. *Time*, May 30, 1988, pp.12-19.

61. Accounts are provided in: Kinston, W. & Algie, J. op.cit. [6]; Kinston, W. op.cit. [6]; and Kinston, W. *Decision Systems, Inquiring Systems and a New Framework for Action*. London: The SIGMA Centre, 1991 (unpublished manuscript). The labels used in Master-Table 8 are slightly modified from these sources in the light of recent experience.

62. Ralph Rowbottom pointed out the similarity of outlooks and Jimmy Algie emphasized their philosophical associations. It is impossible to explore the implications of the proposal in the text paragraph without going in depth into the details of the practical issues of choosing, doing and knowing on the one hand, and the philosophical doctrines on the other. In any case there is no agreement about what precisely constitutes any of the doctrines. The natural intensity of disputation between rival philosophers leads to each doctrine being splintered into numerous varieties understandable only by the cognoscenti, much as we saw with utilitarianism [28].

It should be recalled that approaches, as I describe them, are not impersonal structures theoretically created by philosophical ratiocination. Rather, they are identity structures discovered in association with personal styles of working, inquiring and choosing in the course of my efforts to assist people reflect on what they are thinking and doing. In other words, my concern has been to choose appropriate names, not to adopt, define or modify academic doctrines.

Nevertheless, a few points are perhaps worth making in regard to nomenclature and how far a common philosophical doctrine applies across the three domains. Rationalism seems to apply at L'-1; and the distinction between rational inquiry and rational choice in relation to values was discussed in the text. A similar phenomenon is apparent at L'-2. Empirical inquiry seeks to produce knowledge independent of social values and conventions. But empiricism is linked to conventionalism in so far as it depends on freely given general agreement. At L'-3, pragmatism, apart from its piecemeal incremental nature, appears slightly differently in the three domains: being meliorist in choosing, opportunist in decision-making, and hypothesis-driven in inquiring. At L'-4, dialecticism is perhaps more a method than a doctrine. It emphasizes the inevitability of conflict between interests and ideas (in inquiry), between groups or classes (in decision-making) or between individuals (in ethical choice). (The doctrine of individualism has ramifications far beyond its use here.) Systemicism applies quite naturally across the three domains at L'-5. In ethical choice, systemicism is wholly oriented towards people relating within a group (cf. [28]), while holistic inquiry can be completely depersonalized (so-called 'hard' systems thinking). Systemic decision-making, sometimes referred to as a 'soft' systems or socio-technical approach, usually lies in-between these extremes. L'-6 is the theoretical level in each case: structuralism, legitimism, and dialogic inquiry fit together but a doctrinal label covering all three is not immediately obvious. Transcendentalism, at L'-7, points to the supremacy of a force that lies beyond individual intuition. It links to imaginist decision-making and contemplative inquiry because this force operates in people through the imagination — and experiential access to the imagination is handled by contemplation. Some philosophical schools cover more than one approach: for example, positivism usually includes both rationalism and empiricism, and experientialism covers both transcendentalism (where the stress is on authenticity and awareness) and pragmatism (where the stress is on usefulness and coping).

Chapter 7

Developing Identity

Once we start making choices and following them through, we define who we are. When the choice is to set rules and publicly value those rules and abide by them, we create a continuity which is of the essence of any social identity. Our ethical choices and ethical rules define us for ourselves and others.

Ethics finds its origin in the felt obligation to sustain and protect human identity and, because man is a social being, community identity. We have explored the identity-defining quality of values and seen how values link people and social groups (Ch. 5). We have also discovered how ethical choices are made, and recognized that each approach operates as part of a person's identity (Ch. 6). It seems indeed that all of ethics revolves around the bedrock of human identity.

The time has come to explore human identity in a little more detail — just sufficient to orient us as we move to the very heart of society and its ethical concerns. Until now, I have deliberately restricted myself to a conception of man as a social being. Although this remains the focus, the qualities of such an identity do not and cannot capture the totality of being human. Even if responsible participation in society is identity-defining, it says little about things like inner feelings or intimate relationships, which most people would view as intrinsic to their identity. Readers more solidly located in psychological or economic disciplines may feel uncomfortable with the emphasis on responsibility, community, participation, work, ethics &c.

Because society must serve people in the most fundamental way, it has evolved moral institutions which not only enable social being but also specifically support other aspects of a human identity (via social being). The main focus of this chapter is on these natural moral institutions. But before they can be examined and their rationale understood, we need to have some appreciation of what 'human identity' involves.

A review of the general literature on identity is out of place. It reveals a bewildering variety of apparently conflicting and even contradictory approaches. My understanding and inquiry in this domain were again based on my efforts to help people, that is to say, on my work as a psycho-analyst and psychiatrist.[1]

INTRODUCING IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

I rapidly discovered that practical and theoretical differences in the psychotherapy world are so extreme that practitioners and theoreticians of each school segregate themselves. Each school bolsters morale and loyalty through attacking significant rival schools and ignoring the rest as insignificant. A unified theory was obviously not possible. However, it seemed to me that underpinning any theory of the mind (or whole human functioning) there had to be assumptions of what it is to exist as a human being. If there could be multiple conceptions of existence, then there would have to be multiple theories explaining and using those conceptions. I speculated that a framework specifying sharply distinct systems of assumptions and calling for many theories must exist. This proved to be the case. To put this finding in the context of the previous chapter: just as there is more than one way that a person can make and justify their ethical choice, so there is more than one way that a person can develop (and repair) their identity.

Origins of Human Identity

Human existence and identity are rooted in experiencing. The elemental forms of experience were identified earlier as a hierarchy which ascends as follows: sensation (L-I), image (L-II), emotion (L-III), idea (L-IV), intuition (L-V), identification (L-VI) and imagination (L-VII).[2]

Our concern is identity, so we need to focus now on identification (L-VI). Identifications are the basic components of any human identity. Identification is an experience: we feel our identifications and we can recognize identifications in others. We use identification both unconsciously and deliberately to relate to others, and to influence them and ourselves. Many identifications are transient, but others become permanent parts of our identity. We may say that a human identity is an organized set or system of persistent interacting identifications. So identity is not just what defines our self or makes us recognizable, it is our very existence and experience of existence.

Because experience is at the root of identity, it is necessary and possible to construct an identity by making identifications which assign special significance to one of the basic forms of experience over and above the other forms. Given seven elemental forms of experience, this leads to precisely seven sharply distinct approaches (systems of identity assumptions) for developing and sustaining an identity. The relationship between experience and identity development is illustrated in Master-Figure 10. It directly parallels the relation between the approaches to ethical choice and the framework of purpose (cf. Master-Fig. 9: Ch. 6). The full picture is shown in Master-Figure 16 in Ch. 8.

Each approach serves as a scaffold for constructing an identity and simultaneously puts constraints on what is possible. (In this, the approaches are again similar to those for ethical choice which define how choices can be made in principle, but do not select issues for choice or indicate the required choice.)

Identity construction is, of course, normally an intuitive and largely unconscious process which involves all approaches to some degree. But psychotherapy and (especially) psychotherapy training and research evoke the need to be self-conscious and coherent in dealing with identity. This effort is what produces multiple perspectives.

I must emphasize that evoking psychotherapeutic notions here is unavoidable. There is no other way to see identity clearly. Other disciplines — philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology — may take a position on the nature of human identity, but only psychotherapy seeks to work with identity directly. The research rule established at the beginning of this work is that valid knowledge only comes from interventions and notions that clients accept and use. So my psychotherapeutic work and the psychotherapy literature must be the prime source of knowledge in this context.

Summarizing the Approaches

Social being is just one way of conceptualizing and developing an identity. It has been emphasized so far because of its close link with action, values and ethics. Now it is time to recognize other forms of existence and different approaches to the development of identity.

These seven approaches are first described here in the briefest of outlines. To be oriented to what is to come, see Master-Table 11 which sets out the main characteristics of the approaches in a matrix form. Details of the psychotherapies and theories whose observations and assumptions provide the evidence for the classification will be only mentioned in passing and in the Notes. Those interested in psychological distur-

bance and its management should see Master-Table 12. Master-Figure 13 shows the evolution of the identity systems in terms of their dualities.

All forms of existence and all approaches to identity development are relevant to everyone because each is so obviously essential to identity maintenance and to healthy functioning. Each realm can be understood as emerging from the previous one as an attempt to grow within it reaches a peak. We start the summary from sensory existence which is the irremoveable basis of all identity.

L'-I: Sensory existence: Sensation (L-I) is dominant — so one can be a **sensory being**. This means being embedded in a physical milieu, having a drive for equilibrium and a need for stimulation, and being satisfied by sensory contact. A person's identity is essentially that of a receptive being, but a degree of physical activity is nonetheless needed to ensure a flow of stimuli. As the focus on being active increases, a new identity realm emerges based on bodily function.

L'-II: Vital existence: Image (L-II) is dominant — so one must be able to see the self, that is to say be a physical or **vital being**. This means being embedded in body structures and functions, having a drive for vitality (health/energy/survival) and a need for concentration, and being satisfied by controlled activity. A person's identity is essentially defined by physiological or instinctual functions. To develop identity on the basis of such functions, they must be symbolically elaborated. As the use of symbolization increases, a new identity realm emerges based on whole body states.

L'-III: Emotional existence: Emotion (L-III) is dominant — so one can be an **emotional being**. This means being embedded in feelings and flows of feelings, having a drive for attachment and a need to be valued, and being satisfied by emotional roles which permit the secure containment of desired feelings. A person's identity is essentially defined by whole body states. Identity is developed by generating mind-based states which identify with and master these physiological emotions. As the mind becomes dominant, a new identity realm emerges based on the idea of a self.

L'-IV: Individual existence: Idea (L-IV) is dominant — so one can be an **individual being**. This means being embedded in a world of people, having a drive for self-esteem and a need for respect, and being satisfied by acceptance from others. A person's identity is essentially defined by a concept of 'the self'. Identity is developed by interacting with and adapting to others. As attention to others increases, a new identity realm emerges based on self-other relations.

L'-V: Relational existence: Intuition (L-V) is dominant — so one can be a **relational being**. This means being embedded in relationships, having a drive towards self-actualization and a need for recognition, and being satisfied by gratification of wishes. A person's identity is essentially defined by a group, itself defined by the relationships of its members. Identity is developed by asserting individuality within a relation. As the group becomes more important, a new identity realm emerges based on the evolution of social life.

L'-VI: Social existence: Identification (L-VI) is dominant — so one can be a **social being**. This means being embedded in a particular society at a point in historical time, having a drive to participate and a need for responsibility, and being satisfied by intentional activities. A person's identity is essentially defined by the roles adopted in society. Identity is developed by using social situations to extend those roles. As situations are universalized, a new identity realm emerges based on an eternal and trans-social reality.

L'-VII: Transpersonal existence: Imagination (L-VII) is dominant — so one can be a **transpersonal being**. This means being embedded in the cosmos, having a drive for spirituality and a need for faith, and being satisfied by union with others and 'being' in general. A person's identity is essentially defined by the soul or divine spark within. Identity is developed by a search for God or that entity of which the soul is a part or representative. There is no higher identity realm, because increasing the focus on God, especially if conceptualized as the void, leads to the extinction of identity (mind, self) altogether. (Note that this state is close to receptivity in sensory being, so returning us to L'-I.)

It seems likely that the roots of all forms of identity are present from an early stage. Mothers usually act as if this is so, and a developmental process can be discerned. Soon after conception the embryo experiences sensations which even at birth are still unintegrated (L'-I). The baby becomes more evidently integrated at around six weeks. Research suggests that the infant has prenatal memory (images), and soon becomes aware of its body and its capacity for voluntary control (L'-II). Valuation of the infant starts prior to birth, but an intense process of bonding occurs in the early months after birth. Once experiences are rooted in the infant's body and mother-infant bonding is established, mutual exchanges of emotion between mother and infant soon develop (L'-III). Structuring of the self probably commences not long after birth, but a stable cohesive idea of a bounded self is not thought to emerge till around 24 months (L'-IV). Relationships, already evident, become more significant in the oedipal period when the

father-mother-child network dominates family life (L'-V). Societal roles press on the child at school if not earlier (L'-VI). Spiritual awakening in childhood is possible; and, even in the face of parental suppression, universal concerns and ultimate questions commonly surface during adolescence (L'-VII).

If we look deeply into ourselves, it is likely that one or two of the identity realms feel more real, more certain and more usable to us. It is these that we use for personal growth and to make our vocational choice. Naturally, we preferentially activate these to gain knowledge about the human condition. Each approach therefore needs to be seen as a distinct realm of existence, generating distinctive theories of the mind or self. These different realms are most apparent when different therapeutic techniques are chosen and when observing which social supports are used.

There is a natural but unfortunate tendency for adherents, or indeed any of us, to ignore or attack one or other of the approaches to identity as either secondary, irrelevant, or misconceived. But as human beings, we need them all. And, whatever theorists may say, society seems to agree with this view, because (as we shall discover in the second half of this chapter) it recognizes them all in the form of special moral institutions.

Language Problems. Theories devised within one realm tend to dismiss other realms entirely or describe their elements in ways that seem strained and extreme to adherents of those realms. A major problem in debates hangs on the meaning of common terms. Of course all approaches must deal with similar phenomena and use the same labels for them. They consider: relationships, self-assertion, distress, satisfaction and so on. But similar words can mean almost entirely different things in the different approaches. Contact, for example, requires some sort of physical stimulation for sensory being, whereas it needs to involve the transfer of emotions for emotional being. A relationship in vital being is about doing something active together, whereas it is about mutual recognition for relational being. Self-assertion is about maintaining faith for transpersonal being but about ensuring notice and acceptance by others for individual being. (Try explaining these terms — contact, relationship, assertion — in the other approaches.) The Master-Tables provide further examples.[3]

Illustrating the Properties

Without having to be experts, readers of this book do need to know that there are distinct realms of personal identity which demand proper social recog-

nition and handling. Many apparently irrational values (like jogging and male superiority) and mysteriously self-defeating behaviours (like non-stop television and warfare) are, on close inspection, powered by human identity in one form or other. Changes in organizations and in wider society should not, either in their aims or their methods, fly in the face of human nature.

So each approach to developing identity will be described, even if only briefly. Rather than explaining the properties of any identity system first in an abstract way as might suit a psychology text, I will illustrate most of them by reconsidering social being. As the account proceeds, I will italicize those categories which I use subsequently to describe each approach.

Social Being. The notion that a person is a social being has been the identity assumption so far. Social being takes for granted that a person is inextricably and self-consciously part of — that is to say fully identified with — a range of social institutions, especially its moral institutions. In other words, *experiential primacy* is accorded to identification. Because the form of identity is social, the *dominant reality* is also social. Social existence is *embedded* in a particular society at a point in history. Each person participates in society's evolution and is moulded by its features.

Functioning well implies whole-hearted involvement in society: whether by supporting or by disputing its various institutions and aspirations. Conversely *poor functioning* is expressed by a detachment from societal life, aimlessness, and the neglect of social values and institutions. Dysfunction leads to a lack of concern for posterity and a parasitic attitude toward the community. The *felt sign* of such disturbance is the experience of alienation. Further deterioration leads to social isolation and ultimately to reclusion or vagrancy.

Each person has an *identity drive* for orderly participation in communal life. For this to be possible, an individual must be seen as inherently capable of carrying responsibility, and able to discharge it on behalf of other autonomous people. Without a *supply* of responsibility, there is no way to modify society and alter the course of history. So responsibility simultaneously aids the individual and develops the community. Through accepting responsibility, a person can be socially recognized, socially channelled, and socially valued.

Given responsibility, individuals can impact on the social environment only through being intentional: the inner ability and will to pursue purposes. *Satisfaction* for social beings is about operating with a sense of purpose, and this means working. Intentional activities, commonly (but not solely or necessarily) entrepreneurial or employment work, are also the basis for *self-expression*.

Pursuing a purpose in society involves organizing and managing. Organization within a social body (also called an organization) provides for stable legitimated roles from which it becomes possible to influence society. Managing is the dynamic counterpart of organization whereby people and events are suitably orchestrated to produce desired results.

Interpersonal interaction within this approach is based on the joint pursuit of a shared purpose, with the parties to the interaction taking on different roles. Identification with the purpose and role activates and energizes participants. In so far as the social value of the end result sustains the participants, conflicts centre on details of emphasis and achievement rather than on personalities. Whether the group is a family, a business or a nation, proper matching of personal characteristics and potentials to management needs, purposes and roles is of the essence in ensuring both personal fulfilment and effective group functioning.

The nature of social being corresponds to the legitimist *approach to ethical choice* because responsible participation in society depends on rules being set. Without rules applicable to all, social life, with its demand for cooperation and the handling of differences between people, would be impossible. Rules would be useless if it were not inherent in our nature to follow them. It is the explicit recognition of oneself as a social being that allows us to accept the authority of rules and to view them as valuable tools. Social being also ensures that the legitimist aspiration for the common good is meaningful and urgent. This correspondence suggests that social being exists at the sixth level of a theoretical framework for identity development.

Additional Properties. Nothing in the above should feel new or strange to the reader. It merely restates assumptions that have been explored and adopted previously (cf. Introduction to Ch. 5). Now we must note some further characteristics of identity.

The first of these was evident in the summaries: the *dualities* which exist in each system. The pattern of these dualities resembles the pattern found in the progressive emergence of approaches to ethical choice (cf. Master-Figs. 7 and 13). As with the approaches to ethical choice, the dualities have a context-content form. In developing identity, the context is a growth-promoting potential for that type of identity, and the content is the stabilizing core of that type of identity. The core is innately and automatically available, but a person must strive to activate and use the growth-promoting potential. From within the system, the duality appears as an unresolvable and sometimes confusing dialectic. Transcendence of the duality generates a new

essential core for identity at the next higher level where a new growth-promoting force emerges.

It will be recalled that teleological and deontological perspectives alternated in the hierarchy of choices (see Master-Table 5: Ch.6). The teleological good-bad distinction supported a notion of continuous and diffuse grades of quality, whereas the deontological right-wrong distinction was discrete and precise. This phenomenon is paralleled here in regard to *identity boundaries* which oscillate between being externally located and diffusely defined and being internally located and distinctly defined. So the odd levels are similar in that they foster identity fusion and submergence of self — within stimuli (L'-I), within feelings (L'-III), within the group (L'-V), and in the universe (L'-VII); whereas the even levels foster identity distinctions and the assertion of boundaries — of the body (L'-II), of the self-concept (L'-IV), and of one's responsibilities in society (L'-VI).

Finally, characteristic *vocations*, identity *threats* and *identity disorders* are included to sharpen up the differences between identities. Comparisons here may also help the appreciation of those approaches which are not immediately congenial or intelligible.

THE IDENTITY REALMS

Keep in mind that everyone requires all approaches to developing identity. For example, threats to identity characteristic of an approach you rarely use can still affect your well-being and cause dysfunction. Nevertheless, each identity system is its own relatively self-contained mode of existence, and each of us does have preferential identifications. Dysfunction, to continue the example, usually emerges in the realm with which we are most identified. A person strongly identified with one realm assumes that the world, including even the author of this book, is likewise identified. If the reader can use the Master-Tables to identify his or her own preferred system at this point, this may help in engaging with the ideas as the argument evolves.

We are now ready to examine the identity realms in turn, commencing from the most concrete and tangible.

L'-I: Sensory Being

At the most concrete identity level, *experiential primacy* is assigned to sensations (L-I); and, as a result, the *dominant reality* is sensory. Identity as a sensory being means that one is *embedded* in a material world, that is to say, in the physical environment. Identity here is organized around physical sensations like colour,

shape, warmth, touch, sound and smell. The *identity drive* is to reach and maintain a state of internal equilibrium. The *essential supplies* which sustain the self are stimuli. Maintaining equilibrium and a sense of stability involves the regulation of inner tensions generated by impinging stimuli, whether in the form of sensations, images, emotions or ideas.

Satisfaction for a sensory being involves physical (i.e. sensory) contact — like touching and being touched, making and hearing sounds, looking and being looked at. Attractive things and animal pets can be particularly gratifying. Satisfaction is most likely if stimulation is varied and interesting. But even painful stimuli are better than nothing. As stimulating contact intensifies, excitement develops until over-stimulation becomes painful and disabling. The other typical *threats* to well-being are neglect and boredom. *Self-expression* depends on maintaining a state of (sensory) awareness and generating arousal in oneself and others. Arousal informs others who are expected to be aware. Making a noise or wearing a particular hat, for example, may be a statement about oneself. To *function well* in this system is to be integrated and able to tolerate stimulating input: colloquially referred to as feeling together. *Dysfunction* is about feeling over-whelmed and unable to handle more stimuli. Further deterioration leads to disintegration. Psychological dysfunction is *signalled* by the sensation of pain — like a headache, cramp, sore eye, or skin irritation — which is meaningful in the context of the person's current life-stresses.

There is an *identity disorder* associated with an inability to attribute meaning or feeling to body states which has been called 'psychosomatic personality'. Such people seem to be fixed in sensory being, cannot properly use image to develop themselves, and lack access to higher level identity development.[4]

Adherence to fashions, addiction to television, down-market tabloid newspapers, rituals of dining, desires for colour, enjoyment of wines, use of make-up and perfume, muzak, desultory conversation — all these testify to the importance of stimulation and sensory being in interpersonal relations and communal life. Many *vocations*, like cooking, entertaining, furniture design, decorating, handicrafts, fashion modelling depend on sensory sensitivity, stimulating others and generating coherent interesting patterns. Not surprisingly, sensory psychotherapies are popular. They include: therapeutic massage, aromatherapy (massage with aromatic oils), flotation therapy (in a tank of salt water), and reflexology (massage of the sole of the foot in places claimed to map on to the rest of the body). It is just possible that acupuncture works in this way.

Sensory being potentially promotes a materialistic

orientation to life. At times, it gives the impression of being depersonalized — much like the criticism that was levelled at the rationalist *approach to ethical choice*. A link with the rationalist aspiration — to find solutions — comes from the stimulating and disturbing nature of problems. Their removal reduces tension and so supports the identity drive of sensory being. Those institutions, like etiquette and ceremony, which exist to support sensory being, also have an impersonal and surface quality.

The *duality* faced in sensory being is receptivity (or passivity) and activity. Sensory being is at core a state of passive receptivity, while tension regulation demands a degree of activity. Activity is essential to stimulate others and to optimize the quantity and quality of stimulation received: that is to say, it is growth-promoting. Psychologists still argue whether sensation is a matter of passive direct reception or is generated by an active process in the brain, often concluding that sensation is ultimately part of the mystery of consciousness. Certainly, without some minimal activity, habituation occurs and sensation ceases. But complete absence of sensation is impossible: in sensory deprivation experiments auto-stimulation is provided by hallucinations.[5]

At the next level, the outer-directedness and diffusion of sensory being gives way to an internal and well-defined identity based on bodily functions.

L'-II: Vital Being

At the second level, a person feels distinct from the environment because the body and its functioning become the *dominant reality*. A person's identity is felt to be *embedded* in bodily structures and functions, that is to say in voluntary and visceral activities. This is the realm of instincts and reflexes. Control of these is therefore equivalent to self-control and mastery of reality. Focus on the body is associated with an *identity drive* for vitality without which endeavours are weakened, intentionality suffers and life itself is put at risk. Vitality manifests as health, vigour and intense physical activity. It is associated with the urge to stay alive, and hence safety and survival. *Supplies* of concentration are *essential* in this approach. Without deliberate focus and careful attention, exercise, for example, cannot be engaged in beneficially and safely.

Bodily functions and intentional physical activity (like sport) can be attended to and affected primarily through the use of image (L-II). Dieting, for example, is as much about body shape as physical health or fitness: indeed much dieting is unhealthy. Because *experiential primacy* lies in image, image-based thinking, perception and memory are used in therapies rather than words and ideas. The Alexander technique, for

example, is a body-based form of psycho-therapy which uses posture and images of the body to heal disturbance; and so does dance therapy. Most forms of behaviour therapy, like desensitization, are also image-driven and body-based.[6]

Self-expression using the body demands muscular and mental tension to maintain position and readiness, and movement to allow for coordinated directed responsiveness. Intense, coordinated and rhythmic exercise is *satisfying* and leaves a person feeling relaxed and invigorated, even exhilarated. By contrast even minimal physical activity with which the person is not properly identified leads to exhaustion or enervation, and generates the potential for illness or accident. A failure to ground one's self in one's body leads to simple activities like talking, breathing or running becoming uncoordinated and dysfunctional. Modern methods of teaching sports like tennis and skiing frequently use image. Teachers seek to activate identity processes like commitment (e.g. to the ski edges) rather than focusing on the mechanics of bodily performance.

A person *functioning well* in this system is healthy, fit and energetic; whereas being unhealthy, unfit, or debilitated reveals *dysfunction*. Exhaustion is the *signal* of emerging dysfunction. The typical *threat* is prolonged exposure to perceptions of danger, generally called stress. Stress is associated with lapses in concentration, loss of energy and eventual physical illness. Stress-based fatigue, sometimes called depression, frequently leads to further misuse of the body, most seriously by overuse of alcohol and drugs (medicinal and addictive). The proper vital response is enthusiastic exercise, but people may allow themselves to lapse further into a state of lassitude.

The stress-reducing effect of exercise is recognized by popularizers of healthy living. Exercise in the Western tradition is primarily oriented to toning up the voluntary musculature, although effects on internal organs like the heart are recognized.[7] In the Eastern traditions, exercises to enable control over internal organs are common. In Chinese Qi-gong, for example, physical exercise is primarily developed to benefit internal organs.

The characteristic *identity disorder* is probably the psychopathic-hysteric personality, with **psychopathy** appearing mainly in men and hysteria mainly in women. Such people seem to be fixed in vital being, cannot properly use emotion or value to link to others, and lack proper access to higher level identity development.[8]

People maximally identified here find their *vocation* in work which uses the body and requires concentration on its functioning. Sports professionals, physical

education teachers, singers, musicians, dancers and physiotherapists must all concentrate on using their bodies well and helping others do so. *Interpersonal relations* depend upon engaging in joint physical activity: the obvious example is sexual activity, whose beneficial effect appears to be well-established at last. Bodily activation and interaction also occur in dancing, sport and brawls.

Just as the conventionalist *approach to ethical choice* submerged individuals in the group, vital being seems to do likewise in the sense that all bodies are similar. Sports, for example, can be promoted and adopted all over the world without people feeling their personal or cultural identity is being threatened. (This is not true of sensory-based things like decoration or cuisine.) When we later examine the institution that concerns itself with the use of bodies: popular morality with its strictures in regard to sex drugs and violence, we find again a tendency to suppress individual differences and preferences. (Note that the identity disorder at this level, the psychopathic-hysterical personality, reveals popular morality being dramatically violated.)

Another link to conventionalism is noticeable. The ethical aspiration of this approach is for continuity. This aspiration is paralleled in the vital realm by the psychological drive for safety and survival, wishes for immortality, and the perception of death as extinguishing identity.

The *duality* when using the body is between instinctual function (or activity) and symbolic function. This duality is again a source of controversy. Theorists argue, for example, about whether dream imagery is to be seen as purely reflex and biological or whether it is a symbolic production. Activity and receptivity, the previous duality, cannot easily be distinguished in bodily function because being receptive may be an active process and vice versa. Interestingly, Freud emphasized that instinctual functioning combined both active and passive components.[9] Instinct is inescapable and vital being is necessarily built on and constrained by the body's reflex and automatic tendencies. The use of bodily functions for identity development requires the deliberate application of images which are the simplest form of symbol. So symbolic activity, as found for example in professional dance, is growth-promoting.

At the next level, symbolic and instinctual activity cannot be differentiated and identity once more becomes externally located and diffusely defined.

L'-III: Emotional Being

At the third level, the *dominant reality* is emotional because identity development depends on emotion

(L-III) having *primacy*. Existence is now *embedded* in an all-enveloping ground of feelings and emotion-laden imagery called 'psychical reality' by Freud, and the 'inner world' or 'inner reality' by modern psychoanalysts. There is an *identity drive* for attachment which leads people to value others. Whenever one person is valued intensely by another (or a group), each becomes significant, symbolically and practically, for the other. Feelings develop in the person and a sense of taking on an emotional role follows. The inner world is therefore contingent upon *supplies* of value and is pervaded by a good-bad polarity.

Emotions invariably produce symmetrical or complementary pairings: anger, for example, may engender anger or fear. The pair (anger-anger or anger-fear) is the whole over which identity is spread. Each person is, and acts as if he or she is, just one part of that whole — whether or not it consciously feels that way to them. Identity depends on being whole (by definition), and the drive to attach oneself flows from this part-status. Permanent or even temporary separation is the principal *threat* because it signifies loss of part of one's identity — and hence loss of identity or psychic death.

Self-expression involves the use of feelings; and *satisfaction* is about emotional containment i.e. taking on an emotional role which maintains and holds certain feelings. One may use other people, animals, things or places, or even fantasies to contain emotions. The aim here is to activate or dispose of pleasant and unpleasant feelings by one of two means: either the feeling is modified by using a defence (like displacement or suppression); or it is relocated within oneself (introjective identification) or elsewhere (projective identification). The term identification is used to emphasize that feelings here are part of one's identity (and not just a transient experience).

When things go wrong, feelings are not properly contained and a person feels bad. In this situation, emotions are dumped or evacuated unfairly on to the nearest available person or object — a common enough observation in family and organizational life. The handling and exchange of feelings and emotional roles is the focus of analysis in some forms of dynamic psychotherapy.[10]

Modification and relocation of feelings can generate confusion, particularly if the awareness of those feelings is suppressed. Even more serious is the temptation for a person to split good feelings from bad feelings. If this happens, things and relationships are perceived and created as entirely good (and so embraced), or entirely bad (and so avoided or attacked). Such *poor functioning* is destructive. In reality, there is a need to contain, express and cope with both positively- and negatively-

valued feelings in ourselves and in others. Such *good functioning* is constructive. Anxiety is the *experiential signal* that destructiveness is imminent or in process in reaction to a threat. As destructiveness increases, the individual searches for scapegoats and becomes progressively more paranoid.

Destructive people generate intense emotional states in those involved with them. People whose destructiveness is oriented towards being good, needed or loved are typically supported and exploited rather than confronted, and therefore receive little assistance. People whose destructiveness is oriented towards being bad, unwanted or hated are regarded as immature or disturbed and are confronted and rejected.

The *identity disorder* associated with an inability to handle this system is known as primitive, infantile or borderline personality. People with this disorder seem to be fixed in emotional being, cannot properly use ideas to maintain their equilibrium, and lack proper access to higher level identity development.[11]

Interpersonal relations are built around the generation and exchange of emotions: a husband and wife may evoke feelings which create emotional roles in which (say) one is forever hurt and the other constantly irritated. Some people welcome and use emotion, find intense attachments congenial, and are prepared to live out roles based on emotional experiences. They take up *vocations* like social work and dynamic psychotherapy. People who resist taking on and changing emotional roles in response to others who are emotion-based tend to be described as hard or cold.

Although personal feelings and value preferences now enter identity, one person is not fully distinct from others. Continuing the above example, a woman may have repetitive relationships with apparently different men, all of whom turn out to feel hurt and miserable with her. Her feelings are not dominating the relationship as it seems on the surface, but rather evoking their complement and completion in his feelings (and vice versa). This corresponds to the situation in the pragmatist *approach to ethical choice* where the chooser's own values appear to dominate because they fit within an ideal emotionally invested by others.

Values activate emotional being, so we now have an explanation for the intensity of feeling that is mobilized in defence of values and value systems. Emotional being makes it easy and natural for people to feel critical and antagonistic toward rival value systems and their adherents. Only where their own value system insists on tolerance and respect are people likely to contain and master these feelings.

The *duality* here is that between mind-based experiences and body-based experiences; or more briefly, mind-body: perhaps the most notorious of philosophical controversies. The modern debate commenced over 300 years ago when Descartes proposed dualism in preference to mentalist (higher level) or materialist (lower level) solutions to the problem of existence. Psychologists have also puzzled over whether emotions are primarily perceptions of body changes (the James-Lange theory) or whether the body reacts in response to mental emotions (the Cannon critique). In the present way of thinking, bodily states of anxiety, fear, joy and so on provide the stabilizing core of identity, while mind-based states (similarly labelled) offer the potential for growth through the clarification of values (meanings) associated with the feelings.

The intangibility of mental states and the unambiguous nature of bodily states make these two seem irredeemably distinct. Yet by turning inwards again, it becomes possible to insist that man is a psychosomatic unity or a unique embodied mind with distinct boundaries.

L'-IV: Individual Being

At the fourth level, an identity implies existence as a separate being — and at last the notion of an enduring psychological self is apposite. The *dominant reality* may now be properly described as individual. *Experiential primacy* is accorded to ideas (L-IV) — because 'the self' is, in essence, an idea. The self is a stable abstraction which reflects and establishes continuity, psychic boundaries and internal structure, despite the flux of feelings and corresponding self-images, and despite varying sensory inputs and bodily changes.

A person feels *embedded* within a world of other similar people. So concern for privacy emerges in order to maintain self-boundaries and ensure uniqueness. The *identity drive* is for self-esteem and the *essential supply* to meet this need is respect. Respect covers affirmation and approval of both the positive and negative aspects of the individual. All aspects of the self are seen as contributing something essential to the unique whole. Respect for oneself is a correlate of receipt of respect from others, which itself depends on respecting others. *Vocations* which express the self abstractly and depend on approval from others include that of author and actor.

Satisfaction comes from acceptance by other people in the environment. Ventilation of feelings, for example, is therapeutic when this is met by no more than the listener's acceptance. (By contrast, ventilation supporting emotional being requires certain feelings to be contained by the listener.) Because acceptance is the basis of all social life, rejection and contempt are direct

threats to identity. *Self-expression* takes the form of establishing and articulating stable entitlements and developing dynamic adaptations to the entitlements of others. Many forms of therapy are based on such assumptions.[12] *Interpersonal relations* work best when participants' entitlements are similar in key respects and not too much adaptation is demanded of either. Each person is then likely to be intuitively understood and respected by the other, and any conflicts may be resolved by negotiation and reciprocity.

In order to obtain a continuing supply of respect, people may adapt to such an extent that their feelings and actions are no longer consistent with their idea of themselves. This is the essence of *dysfunction*. Being false or artificial in this way is commonly associated with excessive, insufficient or inappropriate entitlement claims. *Functioning well* means being genuine and owning uniquely personal and private wishes, emotions, memories and thoughts, whether they are desirable or undesirable, honourable or dishonourable. These are used to maintain a sense of reality. Shame is the *experiential signal* generated by the urge to become false by hiding or covering up the true self.[13]

Persistent rejection by significant others and failure to assert oneself leads eventually to collapse. If this occurs in childhood, a characteristic persistent *identity disorder* known as narcissistic personality results. Such people seem to be fixed in individual being, cannot properly use intuition within relationships, and lack proper access to higher level identity development.[14]

The ethical dimension is now emerging ever more strongly because individual being is where the self becomes at last whole, stable, bounded and unique. Such a self is capable of being explicitly valued and socially protected. It is the assumption of distinct private individuals with their entitlements and their need to adapt that underpins notions of basic freedoms, personal duties, and positions in a social structure. There is an obvious direct link to the individualist *approach to ethical choice* because it is not possible to do what is advantageous to oneself without a clear conception of a distinct self. The need for respect from others to maintain self-esteem and the importance of acceptance mean that individualist choices do not neglect the social dimension entirely.

The new *duality* is that of the self and the other. The assumptions of this approach mean that an other is sought who resembles the self. This raises the possibility of confusion. Even ideas, the underpinning of individual identity, are not easily localized within just one person. Yet there must be a distinction between self and other if a person's separateness and privacy are to mean anything. This difference is found in the logic of the dualities. The 'self' (i.e. self-concept or self-representation) is evidently the stabilizing core of any individual identity. The 'other' provides the growth-promoting potential because the other's entitlements and provision of respect and acceptance put pressure on the person to adapt and grow.

The tension within the duality is resolved by the self becoming inconceivable without an other, and the other becoming inconceivable without a link to the self. In other words, the relation between self and other becomes the new dominant reality. It is immediately obvious that there are many 'others', each defined by relationships. So any identity dependent on a net of relationships has boundaries which are, once again, externally located and diffusely defined.

L'-V: Relational Being

At the fifth level, identity is conceived largely in interpersonal terms, and the *dominant reality* is relational. A person is fully differentiated and autonomous but *embedded* in networks of relations. The *identity drive* in this system is the realization of a person's full potential — self-development or self-actualization to use the term popularized by Maslow.[15] The *essential supplies* are recognition within the relationship, especially of unrealized potentials within the self.

Interpersonal relations depend here on exchanging and sharing inner experiences in such a way that an intersubjective reality develops. This spontaneously evolves as the relationship deepens. Each person is regarded as autonomous and is expected to pursue their own interests and inclinations within ever-changing relationships, which they partly shape. So *satisfaction* in relationships takes the form of gratification of desires. Frustration indicates lack of satisfaction and threatens the relationship. Because people, hidden potentials, relationships, and even what is actually desired in a relationship, are complex and intangible, such matters can only be recognized, assessed and handled through intuition (L-V). Intuition is therefore accorded *experiential primacy*.

Self-expression and recognition take place through the establishment and evolution of relationships whose stability and quality depend on mutuality and dialogue. Mutuality implies the capacity to tolerate all varieties of experience and to relate experiences (the self's or the other's) to the circumstances. Mutuality is non-coercive, so alterations in the relationship require a process of dialogue to protect autonomy and to provide an intuitive way to resolve difficulties. Most humanistic psychotherapists work with the assumptions of this system.[16]

Successful mutual gratification of personal wishes means that relationships are felt to enable achievement. If any *vocation* can be assigned here, it is probably that of the entrepreneur who uses intuition, builds relationships, activates networks, and insists on personal autonomy to get things done. Natural leaders do much work in groups, form strong inter-personal bonds and depend on their intuition.

Identity development is equated with growing within relationships. So aggressive behaviour of a partner, for example, should not lead to distancing, retaliation or passive tolerance, but rather to an attempt to discover its source — possibly in misunderstanding or fear. Causing suffering to the other in a relationship must be accepted as inevitable at times. But it should be dealt with by open acknowledgement, attempts at reparation, and a determination to prevent a repetition.

Scapegoating or non-recognition are typical identity *threats* because they preclude effective and genuine relations. *Functioning well* within a relation generates a sense of liberation. *Poor functioning* is recognized by inhibition which blocks the flow of intuition, leads to frustration of wishes, and generates claustrophobic feelings in relationships. Psychotherapists regularly find inner conflicts underlying inhibitions. Guilt is the characteristic *experiential signal* of inhibition, because it is a form of internal punishment for non-actualized wishes that are reasonable and appropriate in a relation. Deterioration with increasing guilt and worsening inhibition ultimately produces a state of psychological paralysis.

Conflict, guilt and inhibition characterized those middle class neurotics treated by Freud, and on which his theory of the id, ego and superego is based.[17] Neurotic personality is therefore the characteristic *identity disorder.* People who are neurotic seem to be fixed in relational being, cannot properly use identification, and lack proper access to higher level identity development.[18]

In the communalist *approach to ethical choice*, benevolence (the cardinal virtue) and altruism (the ethical aspiration) require people to operate autonomously and yet to view themselves as existing within relationships. In other words, communalism is linked to or based upon a relational approach to identity. Maintaining good relations is time-consuming and demanding, so institutions which support this effort are needed in society: the most important of these being ethical teachings.

The *duality* here is that of the group versus individuality. Relationships automatically create groups and the group provides the stabilizing core of identity within the approach. The growth-promoting potential which emerges is the individuality of each person in

shaping the relationship and group reality. The degree to which one's self-concept should be submerged and shaped by the group identity is never straightforward. It is not even clear, for example, whether a person's apparently spontaneous actions and private intuitions are a property of the individual or whether social reality interferes so much that they are a product of the group. Psychoanalytic therapists and psychologists tend to see the individual as determining features of the group. Whereas group and family therapists and sociologists argue that the group has the primary reality and that individual experiences and actions are manifestations of the group process.

At the next level, groups are constituted and defined by individuals, while individuality and autonomy are simultaneously provided by the group. In short, existence becomes truly social.

Autonomy is now expected to operate responsibly. This results in an identity with boundaries which are, once more, experienced as internal and distinctly defined.

L'-VI: Social Being (Again)

The social approach to identity development was summarized earlier (in: Illustrating the Properties); and it has been repeatedly explored, assumed and reasserted in previous chapters following its emergence in the introduction to Ch. 5. The two main points to recall are that identity is now embedded in a societal and historical existence, and that social being requires a person to carry formal and informal responsibilities in relation to others who are autonomous. The typical *vocation* which requires this form of inter-personal relating is that of an official or bureaucrat in an organization or government department. Life-long campaigners and radicals are also rooted in social being.

In this way of thinking, there are two stages in resolving any difficult situation. The first is to recognize that it means asserting a social identity which is a complex of enduring values and current purposes; and the second is to gain clarity about the precise responsibility and purposes of those involved. A variety of existential and radical therapies have taken social reality as their starting point.[19]

Social isolation, loss of purpose and removal of responsibility are identity *threats*. These social conditions are simultaneously generated if there is a breakdown of the social environment on which each of us absolutely depends. The resulting *identity disorder* is the traumatized personality. People who are traumatized seem to be fixed in social being, cannot properly use imagination to heal themselves, and lack proper access to the transpersonal dimension.[20]

The *duality* found here is that of role and situation. It is never entirely clear whether an identification or acceptance of responsibility is based on a current social role or whether it is taken on because it is called for by the social situation. Roles are the stabilizing core of any social identity, while evolving social situations provide the growth-promoting potential. Situations may enable roles to be modified, extended or abandoned. The urge to transform self, society and historical reality can only be realized by accepting roles and responsibilities. In other words, this duality appears to relate to the 'social continuity — social change' duality of the conventionalist approach to choice: but there continuity was the aspiration and change the constraint while here continuity in role is limiting and change according to the new situation offers hope of improvement.

To resolve the duality would mean creating an identity in which the identity core is relevant to any social role or social situation. Such an identity would have to transcend culture and time. So once again identity boundaries become external and diffuse, this time potentially encompassing the entire cosmos.

L'-VII: Transpersonal Being

At the seventh level, identity transcends both the person and society by its emergence from a *dominant reality* referred to as transpersonal by psychologists, as transcendental by philosophers, and as mythic by historians of religion. Within this identity, a person experiences an inter-connectedness and commonality with all things going beyond the present time, place and culture. A person is now *embedded* in what is variously termed the cosmos, the All, the universe, the ground of Being, Absolute Reality, or God.

Transpersonal being is often recognized in the form of a soul, spirit, divine spark, higher self, overself, or superconscious. The *identity drive* within this system is spirituality, and the *essential supply* is faith. Without faith, the transpersonal realm where God is to be found cannot be recognized. Paradoxically, supplies of faith are replenished by recognizing the realm. Just as we become aware of participation once social reality is recognized, so we become aware of faith once transpersonal being is recognized. Awareness is the beginning of knowledge, so faith cannot possibly be opposed to knowledge. Nor is it equivalent to superstitious credulity as hard-headed people fear.

Both faith and the sense of the sacred are part of the structure of consciousness, as impartial religious scholarship suggests and as every religion asserts. There have been many personal and social accounts of the experience of God as the ground and ultimate, and their uniformity is striking and undeniable. It seems

that to live as a human being is to be divinely inspired — to have a soul — whether we understand and accept this or not. This idea is the perennial philosophy — a phrase coined by Leibniz and popularized by Aldous Huxley. It follows that doubt is the *experiential signal* of a failure to thrive in the transpersonal realm. Being utterly overwhelmed, deep despair and wilful cynicism are serious *threats* to spiritual functioning. Note that atheists and sceptics must draw on transpersonal powers to gain their sense of conviction, even in the process of deriding spiritual notions.[21]

Experiential primacy is accorded to the creative imagination (L'-VII). So God is always approached imaginatively with the use of symbols, metaphors and analogies. *Satisfaction* comes from union with others, or anything and everything outside oneself. If God is defined as a being or a form of being and described using ultimate values, as in most Western religions, then union with God (or God's love, will etc) is sought. The conscious realization of union depends on the imagination. It is assumed that the transpersonal realm is entered by the imagination, and that it is also created and sustained by it. We have already noted (in Ch. 5) that union involves establishing and maintaining a state of harmony through active attunement.

Union enables the perception of helpful meaning in personal and impersonal events. The absence of union leads to a form of blindness expressed as a denial of meaning or a felt sense of meaninglessness. The question of whether life or history has a meaning or purpose is a question about whether there is a further point of reference distinct from man. The answer, as provided by sages and spiritual movements within every culture throughout recorded time, is unequivocally in the affirmative. This reference point is the ground of all being: God. History, even cosmic evolution in this way of thinking, is essentially the slow but progressive unfolding of human consciousness towards an ultimate state.

Well-functioning creative people *express themselves* within the transpersonal system in a detached way. At the height of inspiration, they typically feel as if they are a vehicle for something beyond themselves. They often characterize their creativity in terms of an active pursuit of ultimate values; and in their attempt to reach the essence of something, perceive that essence in all things and all things in that essence. The person *functioning well* feels serene. When *functioning poorly*, a person is filled with anguish, and suffers a sickness of the soul. Further deterioration can provoke a state of torment and spiritual crisis: the dark night of the soul.

The various identity disorders mentioned so far are associated with a deficient use of transpersonal awareness. However, I have been unable to find any *identity*

disorder specific to this system. I suspect that social disorder and loss of integrity is the consequence of severe failure. If so, man in the modern world needs to be in search of a soul.

Some schools of psychotherapy, like Jung's analytical psychology and Assagioli's psychosynthesis, have recognized the soul and see God as an irreducible experience of man. Their ideas are drawn from religious philosophies, esoteric traditions and mythology. Therapies like transcendental meditation, psychic healing, yoga, faith healing, and simple prayer all assume an inner source of healing which can be activated by deliberate attunement. Teachers like Gurdjieff, Ouspensky, Aurobindo and Krishnamurti were really therapists of the soul. In their view, the soul is the source of all creativity, energy, harmony, and ultimate value.[22]

Interpersonal relationships within this approach strive towards union, maintenance of faith and hope, and recognition and reconciling of differences. Attunement allows each person to understand what cannot be said by another, and to bridge deep personal or social gulfs. Religion is the social institution which is dedicated to defining and affirming the significance of transpersonal reality. It allows people to share an understanding of existence, and provides them with a mode of interaction with the intangible. The religious life is the characteristic *vocation* supported by transpersonal being. Poets too may be primarily identified here.

Transpersonal being naturally corresponds to the transcendentalist *approach to ethical choice*. To make choices within this approach requires activation of the self as a channel to absolute guidance — which is presumably and probably of divine origin. Opening this channel has been discussed already, but it is worth noting that spiritual paths exist which build on each of the approaches to identity development. For those

identified with the sensory being there are techniques of heightened sensory stimulation, for example, using chants and incense; for those identified with bodily activity there are techniques like T'ai Chi Ch'uan, hatha yoga and ritual dance; for those identified with emotional reality, there are devotional methods; for those identified with ideas there are philosophical techniques; for those identified with intuition and relational being there is prayer and dialogue with God; for those identified with social being, there is the religious vocation and the way of service to others; for those identified with transpersonal being there is the mystical path.

The perennial theological controversy is whether God is utterly other and separated in essence from man (i.e. transcendent), or whether God is ultimately identical with man or within man if only this is realized (i.e. immanent). This dialectic of immanence-transcendence is a version of the *duality* of soul-God. The soul is the stabilizing core of transpersonal being, and God contains the growth-promoting potential seeking to draw the soul on upward to an ever-greater awareness and deeper experience of spirituality.

This final duality may be overcome by mystical techniques to generate an identification with the void, pure nothingness, which lies unthinkably outside of existence. This experience, typically fostered in Eastern traditions, has been described with a number of terms — enlightenment, liberation, samadhi, nirvana, satori, moksha, wu.

Spiritual enlightenment involves a sensation of an intense white light and dissolution of the self. It is a sustained experience of oneness, non-dual cognition of ultimate reality, and dissolution of the separate personality into the universal mind. But this is no longer a human identity, and it lies beyond our present concern with values and social life.

Master-Figure 10

The framework of experience with its nested hierarchies.
The framework of experience is in a single box indicating the holistic nature of personal experience. The secondary hierarchy of identity reflects the primary hierarchy and lies wholly within L-VI. These approaches are discrete systems of assumptions and properties and so are in distinct boxes.
The natural moral institutions are a hierarchy nested within the L'-VI system of the secondary hierarchy. These institutions, though discrete, interact strongly to define the identity of a community and its members.

NATURAL MORAL INSTITUTIONS
(Tertiary Hierarchy)

Level VII″	Organized Religion
Level VI″	Governance System
Level V″	Ethical Teaching
Level IV″	Social Structure
Level III″	Communal Ideals
Level II″	Popular Morality
Level I″	Formal Etiquette

APPROACHES to IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT
(Secondary Hierarchy)

Level VII′	Transpersonal
Level VI′	Social
Level V′	Relational
Level IV′	Individual
Level III′	Emotional
Level II′	Vital
Level I′	Sensory

FRAMEWORK of EXPERIENCE
(Primary Hierarchy)

Level VII	Imagination
Level VI	Identification
Level V	Intuition
Level IV	Idea
Level III	Emotion
Level II	Image
Level I	Sensation

Master-Table 11

Properties of the seven approaches to identity development.
The matrix summarizes characteristic assumptions and properties of the seven approaches to developing an identity. Note that the type of identity is also the form of the dominant reality and descriptive of the nature of human existence. The lower term of the duality is the stabilizing core of identity and the upper term is the growth-promoting potential (or source of hope). See text for further details.

L	Type of Identity*	Embedded in:	Boundaries	Identity Needs: Drive & Supplies	Satisfaction (Lack)	Well-Poor Functioning	Inherent Duality	Example Vocations
I'	Sensory being	Physical environments	External and diffuse	Equilibrium met by providing stimulation.	Sensory contact (Neglect)	Integrated — Overwhelmed	Activity and Receptivity	Decorator Fashion model
II'	Vital being	Body structures and functioning	Internal and distinct	Vitality met by providing concentration.	Controlled activity (Fatigue)	Energetic — Debilitated	Symbolic function and Instinctual function	Sportsman Dancer
III'	Emotional being	Feelings and flows of feeling	External and diffuse	Attachment met by providing value.	Emotional containment (Feeling bad)	Constructive — Destructive	Mental states and Body states	Social worker Psychotherapist
IV'	Individual being	A world of people	Internal and distinct	Self-esteem met by providing respect.	Acceptance from others (Rejection)	Genuine — False	The other and The self	Author Actor
V'	Relational being	Relationships and networks	External and diffuse	Self-actualization met by providing recognition.	Gratification of wishes (Frustration)	Liberated — Inhibited	Individuality and Group	Entrepreneur Leader
VI'	Social being	Society at a point in history	Internal and distinct	Participation met by providing responsibility.	Intentional activities (Aimlessness)	Involved — Detached	Situation and Role	Official Campaigner
VII'	Transpersonal being	The All (Cosmos/Being)	External and diffuse	Spirituality met by providing faith.	Union with the other/Being (Meaninglessness)	Serene — Anguished	God and Soul	Priest Poet

* Terms like 'individual', 'self' and 'existence' are frequently applied instead of 'being' to several or all the identity descriptors

Master-Table 12 — Psychotherapy and the approaches to identity development.

This matrix provides an analysis in relation to psychological development, disturbances, techniques and theories.

Notes:
Everyone uses all approaches implicitly. Self-expression has static and dynamic elements which are listed in that order.
Lack of satisfaction is invariably a threat. Threats at unrecognized levels generate dysfunction in the level habitually used
Freud's contribution is more complex than the Table suggests. See text for further details.

L	Identity (Reality)	Self-expression involves:	Identity Threats	Signal of Dysfunction	Identity Breakdown	Identity Disorder	Psychotherapies (Non-psychoanalytic)	Psychoanalytic Theorists
I'	Sensory being	Awareness and arousal	Boredom; overstimulation; neglect.	Pain	Disintegration	Psychosomatic personality	Aromatherapy; reflex zone therapy; shiatsu	Paris school
II'	Vital being	Tension and movement	Stress; inattention; fatigue.	Exhaustion	Illness	Psychopathic – hysterical personality	Alexander technique; behavioral conditioning; dance therapy.	(None)
III'	Emotional being	Modification and relocation	Separation; confusion; hardness.	Anxiety	Paranoia	Borderline personality	Transactional analysis	Klein
IV'	Individual being	Entitlement and adaptation	Rejection; contempt; devaluation	Shame	Collapse	Narcissistic personality	Client-centred therapy; cognitive therapy.	Winnicott Kohut
V'	Relational being	Mutuality and dialogue	Non-recognition; frustration; scapegoating.	Guilt	Paralysis	Neurotic personality	Humanistic therapies.	Freud
VI'	Social being	Organization and management	Aimlessness; loss of responsibility; social isolation.	Alienation	Vagrancy	Traumatized personality	Existential therapies; radical therapy.	Kinston & Cohen
VII'	Transpersonal being	Harmony and attunement	Despair; being over-whelmed; cynicism.	Doubt	Torment	(Sickness of the soul)	Psychosynthesis; transcendental meditation; analytical psychology.	(None)

Master-
Figure 13

The hierarchical evolution of dualities in identity development.
The term in bold is the growth-promoting potential of the duality and the term in italics is the stabilizing core of any identity within that reality. The stabilizing core and the growth-promoting potential are transcended and apparently synthesized to produce a new stabilizing core at the next higher level, where a new growth-promoting potential emerges. See text for further explanation.

Level	
Approach	
VII'	*Transpersonal*
VI'	*Social*
V'	*Relational*
IV'	*Individual*
III'	*Emotional*
II'	*Vital*
I'	*Sensory*

God
Soul

Situation
Role

Individuality
Group

The other
The self

Mental states
Body states

Symbolic function
Instinctual function

Activity
Receptivity

INTRODUCING THE NATURAL MORAL INSTITUTIONS

Despite the variety of valid and necessary approaches to identity development, it still remains true to say that, ultimately, a person can only realize himself or herself within a society at a particular moment of history. In short, man is a social being. The founding fathers of sociology — Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber — were unyielding in this assertion. We must stick with their perspective, but without surrendering our newly won clarity about other realms of human existence. Society too recognizes all these realms, as it must, and provides institutions to support them and therefore itself.

We need and want social arrangements which ensure that each and all of us are the 'right' sort of social being. Of great importance in this regard are seven **natural moral institutions**. These primal institutions emerge spontaneously within any enduring community, giving it both character and coherence. They control or constrain much social interaction and ensure responsible participation. Newcomers who reject or ignore them are in effect refusing to integrate.

The natural moral institutions are special because their specific *function* is to define and develop social being (L'-VI) itself. They do so by recognizing the significance of each of the approaches to identity development described in the previous section, and by building on natural human concerns within those approaches. As a result, they can be arranged in ascending order as follows: *formal etiquette* (L"-I), *popular morality* (L"-II), *communal ideals* (L"-III), the *social structure* (L"-IV), the *ethical teaching* (L"-V), the *governance system* (L"-VI), and *organized religion* (L"-VII).

These seven moral institutions demand full identification by all members of society. They are inherently within the ethical domain precisely because they are identity-defining and identity-preserving both for the person (as a social being) and for the community.

The present aim is not the enormous and impossible task of discussing and describing each of the natural moral institutions in detail. Instead I want to throw light on certain of their features in order to open up the exploration of ethical entities and to begin clarifying the ethical authorities of any society. Keep in mind that these seven moral institutions are primal expressions of humanity and that they develop spontaneously in all societies, traditional and modern. Legislation may strengthen or undermine an existing institution, but the institution itself is not a product of legislation. These institutions, unlike many which are described in later chapters, are highly resistant to straightforward design and re-design.

Although the natural moral institutions embody binding rules and have a deeply conservative character, some degree of autonomy within them is always possible. The degree of autonomy varies according to the institution and according to the type of society. If variation were impossible or unthinkable, cultures would never change or progress. But people experience any change here as deeply significant because these institutions are identity-defining: that is to say, they are part of the foundations of their existence.

Ensuring that any institution, spontaneous or designed, actually serves people rather than enslaving them is difficult. This task possibly ranks as the greatest challenge to humanity. The first step is to gain greater self-awareness: especially in regard to the characteristic rules used by these natural institutions. Rules, as we shall soon see, are the versatile building bricks of any social order and the stumbling blocks to inter-cultural harmony.

Summarizing the Institutions

Ordering the natural moral institutions into seven levels reflects their emergence from each of the seven approaches to identity. Because a person's identification with these institutions generates a social identity, the hierarchy can be placed within the sixth approach to identity development, social being (L'-VI). The hierarchy also reflects a progressively greater significance for social coherence.

The positioning of the natural moral institutions is diagrammed in Master-Figure 10. (See Master-Fig. 16 in Ch. 8 for a fuller picture.)

Each institution contains rules found in lower-level institutions together with an additional characteristic type of rule. In other words, the first institution contains one type/level of rule, the second contains two types/levels, the third three types/levels and so on. The arrangement is shown in Master-Figure 14. The institutions are far more than just the rules of course — they include history and physical objects, for example — but the rules are particularly relevant when working with values or seeking social change.

In ascending order, the characteristic types of rule are as follows. *Prescriptions* are intrinsic to etiquette (L"-I); *conventions* emerge with popular morality (L"-II); *tenets* characterize communal ideals (L"-III); *rights* define the social structure (L"-IV); *maxims* are found in the ethical teaching (L"-V); *laws* are intrinsic to the governance system (L"-VI); and *absolutes* are needed by organized religion (L"-VII).

The relevant properties of the natural moral institutions are summarized in Master-Table 15. By way of

introduction, the function of each of these institutions is indicated below, together with its principal foci of concern, its characteristic rule, and the impersonal need of society which it meets.

L"-I: Formal etiquette coheres society by requiring a common identification with what constitutes correct behaviour in public interactions. Etiquette meets society's need for ceremony and impersonal respect. Its focus is sensory, and it controls matters like gestures, dress, dining, and speaking. The characteristic type of rule is a **prescription** which specifies a correct behaviour precisely.

L"-II: Popular morality coheres society by requiring a common identification with the right attitudes in regard to use of the body. It therefore deals with matters like sex, drugs and violence which use or affect the body. Popular morality meets society's need for conformity. It uses **conventions** as well as prescriptions. Conventions specify the right attitudes and change slowly as the social group evolves.

L"-III: Communal ideals cohere society by requiring a common identification with its essential values. The ideals include **tenets** which specify what values are to be unquestioningly affirmed, as well as conventions and prescriptions upholding those values. The focus here is emotional: ideals engender and sustain human energies in the service of society. Ideals include any aspect of a society which evokes an intense attachment and can be idealized: the language, the countryside, the great buildings, the method of government and much else. These communal ideals are transmitted during socialization, but loyalty to ideals is ultimately a matter for each person's conscience.

L"-IV: The social structure coheres society by requiring a common identification with its proper boundaries and internal differentiation. The social structure deals with the need for order in society and expresses the rights of membership, as well as embodying certain tenets, conventions and prescriptions. **Rights** specify what is due to and from each person according to their classification, and so their focus is individual. They include each person's claims, powers, duties (or responsibilities), privileges, immunities, disabilities and liabilities. The social structure is sustained and modified according to each person's use and respect of their rights.

L"-V: The ethical teaching coheres society by requiring a common identification with what constitutes proper social functioning. Its focus is on the handling of the inter-personal relationships inherent in social life, and it meets society's need for virtue in its members. The ethical teaching includes **maxims** which specify the general requirements for virtuous functioning; and also rights, tenets, conventions and prescriptions related to these. The teaching is usually to be found in religious-philosophical writings which are assigned respect and authority.

L"-VI: The governance system coheres society by requiring a common identification with the means for deciding what rules are to be enforced and how. Its focus is on security, peace, justice freedom and well-being for members of the society. The governance system meets the need for stability through the maintenance of order. **Laws** are the distinguishing rule-type, but maxims, rights, tenets, conventions and prescriptions are also important. The system determines the governing organs of society — legislative, judicial, administrative — which must also operate, maintain and shape the system.

L"-VII: Organized religion coheres society by requiring a common identification with a solution to the meaning of life. The focus of concern is the mystery of social existence, its uncertainties, its suffering and its evils. Although religious doctrines are transpersonal and harness the experience of the sacred to embrace all humanity, an organized religion is coloured by immediate social needs and mundane concerns. For example, it authorizes the governance system. In return, the religion may be established officially. All religions characteristically build on **absolutes** which enjoin utterly abstract duties; and they also contain regulations, maxims, rights, tenets, conventions and prescriptions, all imbued with an absolutist streak. Religions use scriptural and clerical authority as a substitute for (or channel to) the ultimate source of all authority, God.

Properties. In describing and comparing the various moral institutions, certain properties (italicized below and in each account) will be regularly examined.

Each type of institution has a distinct *function*. In performing its function, each handles certain human concerns. These can be traced back to a distinct *approach to identity* — which is, therefore, highly reinforcing for the institution.

Each institution is built around a characteristic type of *rule*. Society values the rules greatly. People often call them moral values. Each member of society is expected to internalize and identify with its moral institutions. As a result, people feel a definite obligation not just to conform to the rules, but also to value them and ensure others conform. Because the institutions are accepted as natural or inevitable, authority and responsibility for

them is diffusely distributed and felt to be both personal and communal.

The institutions are quintessentially social and yet communities are made up of unique individuals. So the way *individual differences* are handled by each moral institution deserves note. From the communal perspective, each ensures survival by meeting an *essential need*. Determined rejection of any of the institutions makes it difficult if not impossible for a person to remain a full member of society. *Change*, even when spontaneous, is difficult and anxiety-provoking, progressively more so as the hierarchy is ascended. Yet dissatisfaction and dissent is not uncommon. To obtain *compliance*, socialization is a viewed as a continuing process with distinctive inducements and sanctions. These include permission for acceptable forms of dissent. Each type of natural moral institution has inherent limitations and receives a characteristic type of *criticism*.

Now, each of the institutions will be taken in turn and explored with examples.

L''-I:
FORMAL ETIQUETTE
AND ITS PRESCRIPTIONS

All societies recognize that the everyday brushing up of one person against another needs to be definitively controlled. To do this, systems of **formal etiquette** spontaneously develop. The *function* of formal etiquette is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with what constitutes correct behaviour in public interactions. Formal etiquette is defined by *rules* which have the quality of **prescriptions** and call for ritualized or near-automatic observance. Prescriptions specify precisely what behaviour must be performed, when and how.

The prescriptions in formal etiquette deal with the minutiae of physical interaction in regard to matters like: dressing, grooming, speaking, dining, gesturing, time control, touching, and posture. In other words, etiquette protects, supports and derives its rationale from the sensory *approach to identity* (L'-I).

Etiquette helps control the mutual and unavoidable sensory awareness and sensory stimulation that people generate in their social interactions. Any behaviour is potentially given significance by people and treated as a communication about the relationship. Ceremony can control such automatic attributions. Society needs a minimum of ceremony and ritual to avoid unnecessary misinterpretations and to function smoothly. Society has an *essential need* for ceremony because this is the only way that people can show genuine respect for each

other on superficial, formal or transient acquaintance. Such provision differs from each person's requirement for respect (L'-IV) based on their unique individual qualities. Etiquette is about showing and receiving respect unambiguously during interaction, whether or not that respect is actually felt.

The prescriptions of formal etiquette are not optional or amenable to personal preference. If we fail to use eating implements as prescribed, then we are behaving rudely and will generate offence. The evolution of etiquette is obscure and secondary to changes in the higher institutions. Etiquette must also meet the practicalities of daily living, so new inventions like the telephone, television and air travel call for new etiquette rules. Ceremonies are not easily re-fashioned, but people who are foci of popular attention, celebrities, can have an influence because they are allowed a certain license; and then others emulate them. Note that celebrity status depends on superficial things like pomp, public profile and splendour rather than personal merit or virtue.

Maintaining Etiquette. *Compliance* with etiquette feels natural. The inducement to comply is the feeling of confidence and certainty that comes from the sure knowledge that one is doing precisely the right thing. Also, because we are all sensory beings, the stimulation that etiquette provides meets a deep need and this reinforces its use. Compliance with etiquette is therefore its own reward, and the result is ritualized automatic adherence. Failure to follow etiquette is liable to generate shame and confusion and may bring proceedings to a halt. The usual consequence of not following etiquette is that someone will exert direct control, either forcing the offending person to comply or preventing him from proceeding. For example, some editors now regard use of the masculine form of a pronoun to include the feminine as a breach of etiquette, and so they rewrite material (like the previous sentence) without asking for permission, or they return the manuscript and instruct the author to rewrite.

Formal etiquette ignores *individual differences*. Perhaps that is why it has been simplified in Western societies in association with the social trend to individualism. Even so, many prescriptions remain. They become particularly noticeable in cross-cultural interaction. In regal and diplomatic circles, where appearances are important and where individuals must relate in terms of what they represent not what they personally feel and think, elaborate ceremonies persist.

Because etiquette is somewhat mechanical and impersonal, *change*, while not always welcomed, is not

necessarily problematic. The usual *criticism* of an etiquette prescription is in terms of its artificiality. When justified, this usually indicates that the prescription has outlived its usefulness. It no longer communicates respect meaningfully, possibly because of evolutionary change in higher level institutions. For example, the etiquette requirement that a man should open the door for a woman now conflicts with communal ideals of equality.

Etiquette is essential in social life. But society must do more than just support sensory being. And the protection and preservation of social identity and society itself requires more than merely ensuring impersonal ceremonial respect.

L"-II:
POPULAR MORALITY
AND ITS CONVENTIONS

Every community finds it needs to develop agreement on the control of bodily activities and urges to handle not just sensory but physical encounters between people. In other words, it must regulate and support vital being (L'-II). Because such activity and interaction often take place in private or in small groups and under very varied situations, precise behavioural control through prescriptions is not always appropriate. A more general control using attitudes is required so that each person can handle and adapt to different situations in a similar way. This control over attitudes is provided by *rules* which have the quality of **conventions** or are viewed as norms. The result may be called **popular morality** or conventional morality (or sometimes: the moral code). Its conventions do, of course, lead to prescriptions seeking to exert precise behavioural control over body use.

The *function* of popular morality is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with the right attitudes to hold and follow in regard to bodily matters. Matters covered in this *approach to identity* include: sexuality; the consumption of alcohol and drugs to alter the body's functioning; affectionate and aggressive contact between people; participation in sports and other physical activities such as dancing and music; handling the sick, the hurt, the dying and the dead; modes of suicide or ritualized killing; the physical handling of animals; and work (which originated as a bodily activity). It also covers the use of money including interest rates, lending and gambling. (The link to the body seems more distant in this last group. Perhaps the link is to be found in payment for work, or the psychoanalytic view that money is unconsciously equivalent to faeces, the child's first precious possession.)

Attitudes to Death: The social acceptance of life-endangering activities shows great cultural variation and temporal evolution. Gladiatorial sport was prominent in Roman times. Until recently, duelling was regarded as honourable in central Europe even though it was illegal. Capital punishment, even where legal, is used to a greater or lesser extent according to convention. Bullfights in Spain lead to the death of the bull, whereas those in Portugal do not. Fights between animals are accepted in some countries but not others. In the West, insect fights are not viewed as deplorable in the way that dog fights are, but the Jains in India take precautions not to kill insects accidentally. Slaughter of animals is carried out differently by different religious groups, sometimes in ways thought by non-believers to be inhumane.   Ex. 7.1

All communities within which one must live and deal — the household, the neighbourhood, the locality, the region, the whole country — produce their own version of popular morality to accord with the amount and quality of physical interaction they generate. As a result, the moral conventions in a small isolated village will have certain features quite distinct from those in the centre of a cosmopolitan capital city within the same country. Popular morality reflects the strongly felt and *essential need* for a degree of uniformity and conformity in society. So the smaller and more tightly knit the community, the more restrictive popular morality is likely to be.

Responsibility for maintaining morality appears to be disseminated throughout society, with every single person aware of the various conventions and prescriptions and expected to ensure they are upheld. Popular morality therefore tends to suppress *individual differences*: newcomers to any community, for example, are expected to recognize and adopt the local morality. It seems that most people find popular morality an absorbing preoccupation: it is the subject matter of much humour and gossip and it sells mass circulation tabloid newspapers.

Because popular morality is in the hands of the whole community, single individuals, no matter how prominent, cannot decide it. Although public figures may exert some influence during transitional phases, they are generally expected to adhere to popular morality in an exemplary fashion. Becoming eminent may be difficult if immoral behaviour, or its advocacy, becomes public knowledge. Publicity over the birth of an illegitimate child, sexual peccadilloes, alcoholism or financial scandal has ended the career of many ambitious politicians.

Maintaining Morality. The demand for *compliance* with this institution is intense. Depending on your point of view, popular morality always seems to be too rigid or too lax. The prime inducement to morality is the social acceptance accorded to those who adhere.

Conformity produces feelings of security and ease. The complementary sanction is social rejection expressed through the spontaneous exertion of social pressure. Direct compulsion is not permitted and is generally impractical. Our needs as vital beings are most easily met through adhering to popular morality and this provides it with further reinforcement.

Any person known to have offended against popular morality may suffer considerably. He or she may be avoided or ignored, discriminated against, have their activities or career unofficially blocked, be forced from public office, sent hate mail, or be vilified in the press. The greater the sense of moral violation, the greater the intensity of pressure on the offender (or offending group). At the extreme, people may be physically attacked or killed and the assailant seen as justified or even heroic.

Organizations and social sub-groups are as subject to popular morality as persons. Firms may for a time resist moral pressures in society, but if social pressure builds up and exerts itself in ways that are commercially damaging, the firm soon modifies its stance. The same is not true for ethnic groups. Territorially dispersed minorities, whose conventions and prescriptions in popular morality diverge in an extreme way from the surrounding populace are a challenge to the pressure for social conformity. Because of the intensity of feeling and pressure, ghettos are likely to develop and un-bridgeable schisms in society may form.

Change in popular morality usually occurs in response to new circumstances, new knowledge and the pressure of higher level institutions. Without external forces, change is slow. Boxing is still promoted and accepted world-wide and even funded by governments as a sport, despite unambiguous evidence for many years that the contestants aim to damage each other's brains — and regularly succeed in doing so.[23]

Premarital Sex: Sexual intercourse prior to marriage was regarded as immoral in the West in the first half of the 20th century. However the development of contraception, sexual hygiene and medical treatments for venereal disease, undermined any practical rationale; and developing notions of personal autonomy weakened the hold of convention. As the behaviour of public figures changed, an intense and emotional public debate was provoked. The result was a gradual change in moral attitudes to the point that sexual initiation and experience prior to marriage became regarded as a positive good in many circles. In these circles, premarital sex is viewed as an expression of freedom and responsibility, and as an aid to the development of personal maturity. Whether premarital sexual relations are acceptable in any particular community setting is still determined by local conventions.

Ex. 7.2

Rejection of popular morality means acting in secrecy or being branded as immoral. A person then becomes an outsider and may be forced to leave the community entirely. Reconciliation with the community requires acknowledgement of the transgression and positive demonstration of a willingness to conform. But non-conforming individuals of a like mind often welcome exclusion and abjure reconciliation. They may band together spontaneously in a sub-community within the main community, as occurred in the hippie communes and love-ins of the 1960s. People in such new communities find that they evolve their own moral conventions which turn out to be as strict in their own way as any in the community that they abandoned.

So *criticism* of popular morality really reflects a preference for different conventions rather than the abandonment of morality or conformity altogether. A more specific criticism is to be found in the way that popular morality turns private decisions into social problems and thereby exacerbates personal difficulties. For example, the use of an intoxicant like caffeine, nicotine, marijuana, opium or alcohol is not necessarily a social (or personal) problem until popular morality makes it so.

Moral crises are recognized when rational action demands attitudes at variance with popular morality. Popular morality in many countries has severely impeded the handling of the AIDS epidemic: in Uganda, for example, promiscuous heterosexuality is normal and has spread the virus widely. Similarly, moral conventions which inhibit discussion of sexual activity, especially with children, impede the diagnosis of child sexual abuse. The use of anatomically correct dolls in diagnostic play sessions has proved particularly controversial in some countries.

Aspects of popular morality are invariably embodied in the law, even though their private and personal nature often makes them poor targets for legislation. Monitoring and enforcing the law cannot but be insensitive and intrusive in regard to bodily matters. In such cases, enforcement is unlikely to work. Prohibition of alcohol in the USA in the 1920s was a spectacular failure. In the same way, whatever the form of sexuality desired in a society, it is certainly impractical, and probably harmful overall, to criminalize certain sexual habits between consenting adults in private.

Popular morality adapts itself to the history and circumstances of local neighbourhoods and communities in a way that the governments and religions cannot. Exertion of informal pressure can be sensitively adjusted according to the individual and the situation,

and morality can evolve as a natural social process. In the case of AIDS, for example, sexual conventions amongst homosexuals have changed markedly following public awareness of how infection is spread.

The conformity demanded by popular morality is a powerful force for unity. Fortunately, its concerns are relatively circumscribed: something which could never be said of the next natural moral institution.

L"-III:
COMMUNAL IDEALS
AND THEIR TENETS

All social groups come to endorse values which members prize intensely. These values are taken to be essential, natural, and deserving of loyalty. They are the **communal ideals**. The *function* of communal ideals is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with values which must be unquestioningly affirmed. In other words, the characteristic *rule* is a value which is a **tenet**. Ideals include or imply both conventions disposing people to certain responses, and also prescriptions demanding specific actions.

Communal ideals may encompass any aspect of a society or social life which evokes and enables attachment and loyalty. People feel strongly about certain social institutions, their mode of government, certain buildings, parts of the countryside, their language and mode of education, some aspects of relationships between people, types of food and their preparation, and so on. We can be sure we are dealing with a communal ideal if most people are deeply attached to that aspect of their society, vigorously defend it against all criticism (especially from outsiders), and proclaim its value even in the face of their own complaints and the reasonable arguments of others against it.

Health Care Systems: The American and British health care systems have evolved very differently. The USA system is viewed as a product of private enterprise — even though government expenditure and regulation is high and most people are insured through their jobs. Health care costs per person are four times higher than in England — and yet life expectancies are lower and infant mortality is worse. The system does provide a great deal of choice but many have no continuing care at all. There is also much over-treatment: up to 30-50% of some surgical procedures are inappropriate or without benefit. The NHS in the UK is publicly financed, and provides reasonably good quality care at a low cost, but generates rationing and long queues for treatment, almost abolishes choice, and is insensitive to patients' preferences. The most striking thing about the American and British health systems is that they are defended so vigorously in their own societies despite their serious defects. The British

regularly make the unsubstantiated claim that the NHS is the envy of the world. For decades, representatives of each country have viewed the idea of adopting aspects of the other's system with horror.   Ex. 7.3

Communal ideals recognize emotional reality rather than cold logic, and so they originate from and support the emotional *approach to identity* (L'-III). Ideals provide for the emotional unification of a society, enabling people to feel part of a community, and only truly themselves when they are within it. Ideals liberate the powerful energies associated with values (cf. Ch. 4). Societies have an inescapable *essential need* for these energies if they are to survive in the face of disintegrative tendencies and challenging stresses within and economic forces and enemies without.

To ensure that people in society share ideals, their inculcation occurs universally during childhood. In his structural model of the mind, Freud developed the notion that values promulgated during childhood by the family, school and other influences are internalized together with associated inducements and threats as the superego, ego-ideal or conscience. So the conscience is the repository and guardian of communal ideals.[24] Once socialized, the adult can adapt easily to others similarly socialized because all share and define themselves in terms of the same underlying values. These values govern their attitudes and thence their behaviour. Whereas popular morality and formal etiquette are experienced as external social requirements, communal ideals call for the personalization and internalization of authority. Social stability and cohesion depend on communal ideals feeling like the personal property of each member of society.

Maintaining Ideals. Society entitles and expects families to inculcate its values and to control exposure of their children to moral influences. Variations in family circumstances and modes of upbringing as well as individual variability mean that consciences and personal values will vary. In addition, different activities and concerns within society invariably lead to emphases being placed differently on a wide range of societal things. However, while it is essential to tolerate *individual differences* in ideals within society, it is necessary to have a certain unity in regard to society as a whole. Too disparate a mixture of ideals inevitably puts a strain on society.

To allow greater flexibility and more recognition of the diversity of individuals and sub-groups, pluralism (of value systems) may itself become an ideal. In the Netherlands, for example, they speak of 'compartmentalization', which refers to the presence of many

organizations with the same aims and objects but infused by different philosophical, religious or ideological assumptions.

The conscience deals out self-approval and pride if the internalized values are followed, and disapproval, self-reproach, guilt, and remorse if those tenets are breached. Given our identity as emotional beings, we willingly project ourselves and our feelings into communal ideals. So these become reinforced at the same time as our identity is strengthened. *Compliance* is also externally ensured in society using both inducements and sanctions. Espousal of ideals meets with a warm endorsement whereas their rejection leads to trouble. As with health care (Ex. 7.3), whatever the merits of a new idea, if it crosses society's current ideals, it meets a wall of misunderstanding and opposition. Because knowledge, for example, is idealized, an established academic found it difficult to publish a thoughtful article arguing that ignorance is preferable in certain circumstances.[25] Rejection of a communal ideal is taken to mean being disloyal or having a conscience which permits or even demands socially objectionable activities. Others then feel a responsibility to oppose and prevent such ideas and practices.

Because the family is the transmitter of communal values and the guardian of the conscience, governments attempting large scale social engineering bring intense pressure to bear on the family. This has occurred in recent decades in Iraq, Cambodia, and East Germany; and it was widespread in China under Mao, and Russia under Stalin. In these regimes, children were indoctrinated at school and encouraged to inform on their parents if they detected incorrect thinking — sending them to torture, imprisonment or death and so destroying the offending family unit.

Communal ideals are rather slow to *change* because of the emotional hold they have on people and the continuity they provide. Except during times of transition, attacks on communal ideals are muted within society at large. However, certain institutions, like the universities and radical periodicals, may take it on themselves to analyse and challenge ideals. From their detached perspective, certain *criticisms* regularly emerge in relation to the inherent conservatism of communal ideals, especially the taboos on new thinking and the blocks to innovation that result.

Communal ideals provide society with energy and enable people to feel a part of worthwhile society. However, they do not clarify how a person should properly fit within society. For this, a higher level moral institution built around the significance of the individual is required.

L"-IV:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
AND ITS RIGHTS

All societies distinguish all of their members from those in neighbouring societies, and differentiate their members to a greater or lesser degree. These distinctions define the **social structure**, an institution built on *rules* which are **rights**. Tenets, conventions and prescriptions are also found within the institution bolstering these rights. The *function* of the social structure is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with a defined bounded social entity and its internal structure. The corresponding expectations of society on its members (i.e. of each member on every other member) is that they fulfil certain duties. So the internal structure of society is based on differential rights and duties accorded to different roles and classes of its members.

The social structure is concerned with distinct, separate and self-contained aspects of individuals. Its origin and rationale is to be found in the self-contained and self-motivated existence assumed by the individualist *approach to identity* (L'-IV). The social structure must deal with anything an individual may do — like obtaining material necessities, associating with others, working, owning property, transacting business, marrying and so on. In all societies there is both equality and differentiation in respect of such matters, and the exact details vary greatly. The resultant pattern of social rights and social duties is invariably complex.

The Pollution Concept: The Hindu caste system divides all citizens into four main groups: priests and sages, warriors and rulers, merchants and farmers, and labourers and other unskilled workers. The untouchables belong to no caste and are therefore excluded from normal social life. Each caste has its rights and duties. The key rules distinguishing the groups and determining social activities and relationships concern pollution by association with such things as death, bodily excretions and alcohol. The main castes are further subdivided leading to over 6000 castes in all. Ritual status exists side by side with secular status based on such factors as wealth, land ownership, education, and skill. The relationships between ritual and secular status and the principles of movement between castes are complex in the extreme. Caste government and inter-caste relations are justified via religious and mystical tenets. The caste system provides for a wide variety of social needs, and escape from it is almost impossible.
Ex. 7.4[26]

A less ambiguous name for those rights which arise spontaneously within a society might be 'membership' or 'customary' rights. As well as having membership rights which establish the commonality of all members,

the social structure also provides for differentiation. For example, each person carries numerous social roles — parent, employee, patient, friend, colleague, club member &c — and each of these has a distinctive set of membership rights. In other words, the social structure classifies and institutionalizes *individual differences* and provides for order.

The *essential need* for order in society is uncontroversial because order is so central to the whole system of society. Without order, people cannot realize those social needs for energy and conformity mentioned in relation to previous natural moral institutions, nor meet subsequent needs for virtue, stability and meaning associated with the institutions to come. However, any order depends on adherence to rights.

Rights are the written and unwritten rules within social groups indicating what is properly due to and what is properly due from an individual by virtue of membership. Sociologists and anthropologists sometimes refer to a membership right as a status. What is due from an individual is commonly termed a duty or responsibility rather than a right. Legal scholars differentiate rights and duties still further into powers, claims, privileges, immunities, disabilities and liabilities. I will usually use the term right to include all related terms including duties, unless a special emphasis is required.

In any social structure, the minimum general duties are: (a) tolerance of others when they exercise their established rights, and (b) trying positively not to violate the established rights of others. If this can be achieved, social order prevails and the basis for peaceful activity and change exists.

Because *rights are probably the most confusing of all* ethical entities, now is the time to assert their importance and commence their clarification. It is worth noting that some philosophers pour scorn on the very idea of rights. Two centuries ago, Bentham referred to them as "nonsense", and more recently an eminent modern moral philosopher, MacIntyre, concluded that "belief in them is at one with belief in witches and unicorns". However, if a right is defined as 'something one can exercise, earn, enjoy, give, claim, demand, assert, insist on, secure, waive, or surrender', then it is indisputable that such things do exist. Rights are social facts (not fictions) because they are the basis for social structure.[27]

Rights exist whether or not a society conceptualizes and formulates them, or whether learned academics think they are important or not. They exist even if the concept of a separate individual is weak. In the same way, they exist even when the culture emphasises what

is expected of a person as opposed to what a person may expect as due to them. If rights did not exist, society would lack structure and a person could be treated utterly arbitrarily and could behave similarly. Not only would this be humanly intolerable, it would remove all meaning from the notion of membership of a society.

In recent debates about the structure of society, much concern has focused on those rights which apply solely by virtue of being a citizen, irrespective of ethnic origin, religion, sex, social status, occupation, wealth, property, language or any other differentiating feature. Rights which apply across the board to all citizens in a society are sometimes termed basic or fundamental rights.

Note that society has members for whom the basic rights and duties are modified or abrogated because they are not part of the citizenry (defined as those who choose the government). Slaves fell in this category in the past. Today, people like prisoners, children and the severely mentally ill or intellectually handicapped are not full citizens. They are **placed** under the control of people assigned powers to apply force to control a wide range of their living activities. Society's non-citizen members cannot associate freely to discuss their situation and pursue their needs, and they have difficulty exerting what rights they do possess.

The minimum rights in any society are: (a) the right to live, and (b) the right to some freedom from arbitrary interference. Without the former a person has no guarantee of existence, and without the latter the community has no guarantee of existence. The degree to which those two fundamental rights are accorded, as well as any additional rights, depend on how enlightened citizens in that society are, and on the type of regime in power (cf. Ch. 12: G-6 and G-7).

Maintaining the Structure. *Compliance* with the social structure is natural, even if it feels or seems unfair. The inducement to assert one's rights and perform one's duties is that this is the prime way that each obtains the benefits of membership in that society. The sanction that flows from neglect or passivity is the likely abuse of one's rights and the loss of those benefits. Rights assume and demand a sense of oneself as a distinct individual. So identity requirements reinforce the significance of social structure, even if the current structure is viewed unfavourably.

Differentiating people evokes notions of classes which are permanently inferior or superior (or midway). As a result, the usual *criticism* of the social structure is that it institutionalizes *actual injustices*. Such injustice only matters in social terms when it is experienced as such by many in the community. Often

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injustice is tolerated because of inherent beliefs, conventions and practices plus pressures to maintain order. (In very recent times, however, external bodies and societies have felt increasingly entitled to exert pressure to reduce what they perceive as extremes of injustice.)

Once the perception of extreme injustice starts growing, it markedly reduces the incentive of members to identify with and uphold related rights and duties. This poses a threat to order and the existing structure, so *change* of some sort becomes necessary. Political revolutions are often about structural change to remedy injustice. Even more limited change generates intense anxiety and has the potential to release violence. For example, the attempt to replace the caste system in India by Western conceptions of equality has not been successful after 40 years of trying. Mahatma Gandhi's efforts in this direction led to his assassination; and in more recent times limited proposals to improve the access of untouchables and lower castes to government jobs have led to rioting and deaths.

The social structure provides necessary order and is a natural focus for legislation, especially since many existing (non-legal) rights are open to the criticism of being unjust. Although legislation may attempt to remedy injustice, legal change is only a change in the legal system — not in the social structure. Real change means change in that structure. So legalizing rights is not a panacea for ending injustices.

Injustice may be unavoidable, but it is never desirable. Fortunately, at least some of the injustices bedded into the social structure can be relieved or even overcome by the next moral institution. This one seeks to ensure that relationships in society are operated in way that is intrinsically good.

L''-V:
THE ETHICAL TEACHING AND ITS MAXIMS

An institutionalized guide to moral conduct, whatever the circumstances, is to be found in all societies in the form of an ethical teaching. (Sometimes this is called a moral teaching or an ethical code.) The ethical teaching includes examples of all of the rules so far identified and in addition contains a new type of *rule*, the maxim. Maxims specify general requirements of virtuous functioning. For example, the rule 'to love your enemy' is a maxim. It would seem odd to say that it was a social duty or that enemies had a right to be loved. In any case, the social structure does not have a place for enemies.

Maxims imply the capacity for autonomous choice

and a voluntary commitment by each person to their group. Maxims commonly regarded as part of Western ethical teachings include: keeping promises, telling the truth, defending the innocent, and showing mercy for a wrongdoer who repents.

As these examples indicate, the ethical teaching is concerned with the virtuous handling of personal relationships. In an ethical teaching, *individual differences* are recognized fully and valued. The way a person should respect and handle these is not specified in detail, because of the wish to encourage adaptation to the particular relationship and situation. In this way, the ethical teaching supports the exercise of individuality and gains its rationale from the relational *approach to identity* (L'-V).

Ethical teachings may also deal with a person's relationships with him or herself, with embryos, with members of other species, and with the natural environment. Animal rights, for example, are not rights that have any meaning within the social structure because animals are not responsible for the social order and can neither exert nor waive their rights. However, the ethical teaching can include rights for animals as a way of clarifying what constitutes a proper or virtuous relationship with an animal.

The *function* of an ethical teaching is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with what constitutes proper social functioning. Virtue in society is an *essential need*. If ethical precepts are not followed and virtue is treated with contempt, the social system is weakened and the possibility of social breakdown looms. If no one kept faith, or treated others with kindness, or forgave wrongdoing, then social relations would collapse into a state of mutual distrust and enmity. Communication and exchange would become difficult and inefficient. Eventually society itself would cease to function. This is something that few desire.

Honour among Thieves: Once a follower of the great Chinese brigand Chih asked him whether thieves had any use for wisdom and morality. 'To be sure, they do,' said Chih, 'just as much as other people. To find oneself in a strange house and guess unerringly where its treasures lie hid, this surely needs Inspiration. To be the first to enter needs Courage; to be the last to leave needs Sense of Duty. Never to attempt the impossible needs Wisdom. To divide the spoil fairly needs Goodness. Never has there been or could there be anyone who lacked these five virtues and yet became a really great brigand.'
Ex. 7.5[28]

Acting virtuously means living by society's ethical teaching. The ethical teaching is usually elaborated by philosophers, although the source is typically found in a society's official religion. In the West, the medieval

ethics of Abelard, Anselm, Augustine, Bonaventura, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, primarily concerned itself with the development of a Christian ethical code. In the East, most of the great Chinese philosophers have developed or elaborated ethical teachings which focus on the conduct of social life while taking the divine for granted. Ethical teachings do not necessarily agree with each other. Confucius (551-479 BC) emphasized discriminating amongst people and situations, practising humanity, using arts and ceremony, fulfilling moral obligations, respecting inborn nature, and governing by moral example. Mo Tzu (479-438 BC) thought most of this to be ill-advised, and especially condemned fatalism, music and ceremony. He generated an ethical teaching which urged minimizing differences amongst people, obeying the will of heaven as defined by superiors, agreeing with superiors, and producing profit and practical benefits.[29]

Change in the teaching means a cultural revolution and it is rare. By contrast, superficial changes are routinely required because the content and application of ethical maxims must be constantly kept topical. The particular social virtues emphasized at any time and place — say: from among honesty, trust, fairness, mercy, generosity, compassion, wisdom, or humility — depend on what is most urgently needed by society. Ethical teachings are continually re-activated, re-formulated and re-interpreted by whomever desires to exert moral leadership in the community. Anyone at all may apply the ethical teaching to try to improve the conduct of those they deal with. For example, piracy has moved from the high seas to computer terminals, so software houses block the copying process to prevent unauthorized duplication of their programs. Unfortunately, this causes practical problems for genuine purchasers. Now many firms have removed the copy-protection and apply ethical pressure by reminding users that distribution of copies, however undetectable and easy, is wrong because it is stealing.

Occasionally, rather than merely emphasizing or reinterpreting given maxims, attempts are made to re-articulate a complete ethical teaching by synthesizing and systematizing maxims. Spinoza's attempt is the most well-known in the West. There has also been a recent attempt in Japan (see Ex. 7.6).

Moralogy: Hiroike founded the Institute of Moralogy in Japan to develop and promote 'the science of supreme morality'. This is based on the moral teachings of Jesus Christ, Buddha, Confucius, Socrates and Amaterasu Omikami (the Heavenly Ancestress of the imperial house of Japan). Hiroike extracted five maxims from their writings. These are: 1. Ensure motives are disinterested (i.e. be altruistic); 2. Maintain a belief in the benevolence of God (i.e. never despair); 3. Give duty precedence over rights (i.e. be responsible); 4. Show respect and loyalty for lines of succession — the ortholinons which include the nation, the family, and the religion (i.e. maintain social continuity); and 5. Seek enlightenment and salvation. A sixth has been added by followers: recognize that actions have results according to their moral worth. The practice of these maxims, summarized as benevolence, involves justice, self-sacrifice, expiation of others' faults, self-perfection, criticism and self-examination. Such a philosophy is communalist (L'-5) and derived from the relational approach to existence (L'-V). Hiroike distinguished moralogy sharply from society's usual morality which he saw as preoccupied with personal rights and duties (L'-4) and rooted in the self-centredness of individual being (L'-IV).

Ex. 7.6[30]

Maintaining the Teaching. It is evident that society needs its members to internalize the ethical teaching and use it reflexly. Certainly each person wishes to be treated in accordance with it. However, while the receipt of any virtuous action is beneficial, the production of a virtuous action on its own may generate little immediate benefit to the producer. Worse still, any person may benefit himself greatly in the short term at the expense of another by ignoring the teaching. People are therefore repeatedly exhorted to adhere to the ethical teaching in the face of the temptation to abandon it. Most teachings abjure coercion, so following the path of virtue demands an effort of self-command and an inner resistance to the urge to do what is expedient. Triumphing by violating the ethical teaching is so easy that evil-doers, modern tyrants as much as mythical villains, regard virtue as a fatal weakness to be utterly eradicated in themselves and ruthlessly exploited in others. This is criminal in spirit.

Criminal teachings are perverse because they destroy themselves. Each time a person benefits by breaching a maxim, others are encouraged to do likewise in order not to lose out. When standards spiral downwards like this, the social fabric is weakened. If a criminal organization like the Mafia infiltrates city government, for example, every official or business transaction soon involves a rake-off. Individuals who attempt to oppose this bribery and extortion are ruthlessly beaten or killed, and their firms disrupted. As a result, capable individuals and respectable businesses move out until eventually there is nothing left to exploit and the town collapses in a state of poverty and self-disgust.

The paradox of ethical teaching is that *compliance*, however essential for society, cannot be communally enforced and still remain true to itself. Virtue must be voluntary to have its full effect. The main inducement to follow the ethical teaching is the social approval and admiration which results; while the sanction for breaches is social condemnation. If a breach is recog-

nized, then the offender may be asked to justify the action. If this reveals that the individual did not properly realize the significance of the breach, and that conventions permitted the breach, then little is usually done beyond exhorting better behaviour. A virtuous person will have appreciated the significance of the breach, and an apology and provision of due compensation will ensure reconciliation. Reinforcement of virtue comes from the gratification associated with relational being, because unrepentant (or even repentant) ethical violation generally leads to loss of trust and, if persistent, to the termination of a relationship.

If there is a widespread failure by people to follow the ethical teaching, then the situation is more serious. Even the governance system cannot mend the situation because it is operated by people who are part of that dysfunctional society. Gratuitous or self-serving lying to the public, for example, seems to be widespread amongst governments.

Criticism of the ethical teaching centres on the fact that, like virtue, it seems so demanding and even unrealistic in the turmoil of everyday life. The ethical teaching, though fundamental to the quality of social life, is not by nature strictly enforceable. Worse, it potentially encourages weak individuals to choose to disregard the maxims and to exploit those who adhere to them. In order to prevent exploitation and instability, a higher level moral institution naturally emerges to confront hard social realities explicitly.

L"-VI:
THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM AND ITS LAWS

All social institutions depend upon a bedrock of social stability, and so all societies develop an institution dedicated to maintaining order within the community. This is the **governance system** which is characterized by *rules* which are formally sanctioned laws or regulations. Its *function* is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with the means for deciding what rules are to be formally enforced and how. The governance system specifies the form and operation of government. Government itself is a cluster of special social bodies whose members collectively rule society. So it is quite possible to idealize and support the system while hating and opposing the government.[31]

Laws constituting the system reflect core social values and enable a precise definition of rights and duties for participation in the ruling of society. The governance system also depends on and uses maxims, rights, tenets, conventions and prescriptions which support all the paraphernalia, arrangements, techniques and practices which go into developing, sanctioning, monitoring, and enforcing laws. The institution evidently emerges from and supports the social *approach to identity* (L'-VI).

Governance arises primarily from the *essential need* for stability and peace in any community. Even an imposed peace is worthwhile. Violence and instability generated from within or without make social existence almost unbearable and ordinary activity scarcely possible. A central authority is also needed to provide certain things that the collective as a whole needs or wants but which will not, cannot, must not or should not be spontaneously taken up by individuals. In the last century, most governments have moved with variable success far beyond the deepest needs for peace and stability. Almost every domain — education, health care, energy, transport, even leisure — has felt the hand of government.

Legal regulation and enforcement must be distinguished from non-legal or private regulation and social pressures. The paramount requirement for stability through legal enforcement is an awesome thing because it implies the moral use of coercion, ultimately physical force and death, to control citizens. A free citizenry recognizes that its wish for sovereignty requires it to assign any form of government a near-monopoly on the exercise of threats and force. Nevertheless, there is an assumed underlying condition (or perhaps hope) that coercion of individuals will only occur when it is genuinely needed for the common good.

A governance system evolves spontaneously and comes to be taken for granted and idealized. People under one system look askance at the workings of others and wonder how and why the populace endures certain aspects. Japanese faction-dominated politics, German elitist technocratic management, American pressure group democracy, British tolerance of the individual, Asian authoritarian governments — all reflect distinct cultural heritages.

Despite the evidence that the governance system evolves to suit the culture, social engineering efforts persist.[32] But the theoretical merits of democratic, theocratic, aristocratic, monarchic and other systems and their variants are not as relevant to the average person as the perceived defects of the particular government of the day. I suspect that Samuel failed to convince the Israelites to stick with judges as rulers rather than a king because the current judges (his sons as it happened) were corrupt. There is at least no report in the Bible of any discussion of the relative merits of priestly, judicial or kingly rule.

The powers of any governance system are legislative, judicial and executive. The doctrine of separation of powers, most powerfully argued by Montesquieu, has led to the use of a range of distinct bodies to provide for institutionalized checks and balances defined within a legal system.[33]

A simple division of the legal system is into public and private law. Public law is organizational in nature and deals with the privileged position of government in its dealings with people. It includes constitutional law which formally sets up the governance of society, administrative regulation which covers procedural and executive matters of government (like raising taxes, providing services, waging wars), and other official areas (e.g. ecclesiastical and military law). Private law is juridical in nature and views government as another individual in the social realm. It includes civil and commercial law which handles claims individuals have on each other or the state, and criminal law. Criminal law applies when the community regards a particular harmful act to be so serious for the ethical order, for the very fabric of society, that it needs someone, the government, to prosecute whether or not the particular person or people harmed wish to do so.

The most important sort of laws from an ethical perspective are those which govern the conduct of ordinary members of society so that it is just — I mean 'just' as understood and defined in the ethical teaching and as evolved in customary practice. These laws are not simply replicas of, say, membership rights or moral conventions, but are modified to suit the formal nature of any legal system. Laws assume the existence of *individual differences* and try to protect them by providing a framework for their formalized handling.

The notion that laws and government inherently restrain man's brutish tendencies appears misguided. Laws can and do legitimate every sort of brutishness. Hitler and Stalin used parliament and the courts to harm and kill millions of people. Despots simply find ways to remove parliamentarians and judges who refuse to endorse the laws that they desire. Justice is important, but governments and their legal systems regularly show themselves to be more concerned to maintain social order and stability than to deliver justice.

A system of positive law with constitutional control of the legislature and executive permits the 'rule of law'. In absolutist regimes, rule by decree replaces rule of law. If the law forbids absolutism and does not acknowledge a superior authority within the community (e.g. from priestly edicts), one speaks of the 'supremacy of the law'. This is possible only if a community has a genuine desire for the law and accords it supremacy. The guardian of the governance system is

'the law' and the courts. As we shall see, the law enables a definitive answer to be given in courts of justice as to whether something is right or wrong according to that society.

Maintaining Governance. The governance system is mostly taken for granted by people in a stable society. Rejection of the system is not compatible with continued membership of the society. Breakdown of the assumptions which sustain government action leads to disruptive conflict and anarchic chaos. This has occurred in recent times during civil wars (such as that in Lebanon), the terminal phases of dictatorships (such as Ceaucescu's in Romania) and when empires disintegrate (as in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union).

Change to the governance system is controlled from within it. Pressure for such change may build up through successful social movements. However, the power implications and procedural aspects mean that actual changes are complex, lengthy, and controversial. Transformation of the system (rather than just a change of government) may occur if people are subject to continuing venality, incompetence, class bias or disconnection in a succession of regimes. These mark historic junctures in the development of the society. A coup, usually masterminded by army leaders with physical force at their disposal, tends to generate a more repressive system. A revolutionary movement in which people rise en masse and overthrow the regime may provide the basis for a beneficial transformation — as in the USA in 1776.

Governance is preoccupied with the issue of *compliance*. The system, even if autocratic and maintained by physical force, only persists as long as the public accept it. Yet they do so apparently without thinking too much about it. Extra-legal inducements for each person to maintain the system are relatively minor. Individuals may experience personal satisfaction and feel a diffuse public support in recognizing their mode of governance. By contrast, penalties for explicitly rejecting the system through contempt of court, treason or subversion are typically harsh. The main reinforcement probably comes from the identity needs of social being itself, because without governance it is hard to see how social existence would be possible at all.

Criticisms of any governance system abound. The commonest complaints are: that the system is a juggernaut that crushes individuals; that it is inherently elitist or discriminatory and panders to special interests; that it is intrusive and coercive or absent when needed; and that it places too much power in the hands of a few. The complexity and brute power of modern government is awesome. Even in 13th century England, administrative

and judicial processes had become so complex that it was impossible for the ordinary citizen to appreciate or penetrate them.[34] As a result, those in government too easily become identified with it and remote from ordinary people. This enhances its corrupting effect.

The necessary powers assigned to government invite its take-over by a dominant class and this also discredits the governance system. Modern ideology-dominated social engineers view any evolved system as unsatisfactory. Individualists and liberals complain of excessive restraints on personal freedom, while collectivists and ecclesiastics complain of insufficient order and authority.

Stability and good government are difficult to realize. But all suffering and injustice cannot be removed however well-designed the system and however enlightened the government in power. People need to find meaning in the tribulations of their social existence and be helped to tolerate imperfection. A supreme natural moral institution with greater regulatory power, able to justify governments and laws, and with more concern for man's ultimate well-being is required. This need is met in society by organized religion.

L"-VII:
ORGANIZED RELIGION
AND ITS ABSOLUTES

Skeletal remains in Neanderthal burial sites suggest that religion existed in the first small communities of cave-dwellers more than 50,000 years ago. As social life evolved, so did religions. Religion was developed and sustained then as now to bring the totality of existence under social control: in short to harness awe, structure the sense of the sacred, and master mystery. As city-states and then empires and civilizations emerged from 5,000–3,000 BC, the importance of **organized religion** emerged too. A single widely accepted religion tames spirituality, reduces existential anxieties, provides for a communal identity and enables social cohesion.

The *function* of any organized religion is to cohere society by requiring a common identification with a solution to the mystery of social existence with its uncertainties and suffering. Religion provides answers to questions of origins, of life and death, and of the nature of man and society: it asserts whether or not a Supreme Being (God) exists and how God and the soul are to be imagined; it explains how life emerged and where it is going; it tells whether life exists after death and how suffering and evil are justified; it determines the value of human life and specifies certain basic qualities of people. In offering such explanations, the

religion is meeting each person's and the community's deepest and most *essential need* to possess and share the meaning of existence — not its need for validated knowledge or technical expertise.

Religion generally fosters restraint of selfish and anti-social tendencies, fills people with hope, and enables suffering and evil to be borne. Beyond these social measures, religions respond to the sense of awe that results from contemplating the infinite universe and wondering about the place of humanity within it. It recognizes a transcendental reality and is built on a recognition of the sacred and a sense of the numinous or holy. So it supports and gains its rationale from the transpersonal *approach to identity* (L'-VII).

All organized religions contain a theoretical component including myths and beliefs, and a conduct component in the form of rituals and guides to behaviour, as well as experiential and organizational components.[35] Even if scientific knowledge replaces most of the theories of religion, it cannot replace its values and injunctions in regard to conduct. Nor, of course, will science penetrate the ultimate mysteries. Science can do no more than, as here, document (or, as so often elsewhere, attempt to disqualify) spiritual and mystical experiences which suggest the existence of an unseen power entitled to obedience and reverence.

Religions are characterised by *rules* which are **absolutes**. Absolutes specify the path of duty in the most abstract way possible and merge man with God or Being. Religions typically see man as made in the image of God or as a microcosm of the cosmos. In Hinduism, for example, dharma refers both to cosmic order and right conduct. God may be referred to wholly abstractly as Absolute Reality or as The Absolute. Although God is not essential to religion, absolutes are. Buddhism, for example, is an atheistic religion based on four Truths. The first three Truths are: suffering is part of existence; desire is the cause of suffering; and suffering ends when desire ends. The fourth constitutes the Noble Eight-fold Path which is the way to know the Truths. The Path is: right views — i.e. tenets; right intention, right speech, right action and right livelihood — absolutes forming the deontological core; and right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration — i.e. virtues required for personal development.

The link between religion and ethics is evident on etymological grounds alone (L. *religione* = obligation OED). Organized religion therefore seeks to invest all previously discussed institutions with a moral character, and strives to control and specify rules within these institutions too. As Buddhism illustrates, the absolutes are so contentless and abstract that they defy direct interpretation. The various absolutes in a religion may

often be reduced to a single epitome. In the Judeo-Christian ethic, it might be stated: Love God and all His Creation. In Confucian thought: Become perfect in word, thought and deed. In Advaita Vedanta: Realize the Absolute.

Here we must recognize that organized religions are social institutions which mediate transcendental realities within current historical and cultural limits. Prehistoric religions, for example, were organized around the perspectives and concerns of hunters, fisherman and early farmers; while historical religions recognize kingship, politics, economics and law. Indeed all developed religions are concerned with the whole gamut of the social order including government, war, education, family life, domestic activities, food, sexuality, and personal differences. When operating well, their end result is the consecration of life and the stimulation of the will to live and create in society as it is. In principle at least, religions recognize and value *individual differences* while expecting individuality, in the sense of subjectivity or ego, to be transcended.

In order to preserve the faith and maintain a hold on members, the church organization takes control of the religious absolutes and generates a wide variety of lower level rules (including laws for members) which are also infused with an absolute quality. Religion is the main source of social cohesion in all simpler societies. Even in modern Western societies, religion seems to be the only available base for a moral community. (This is the wider meaning of church). We see in Islam, Christianity and Judaism that the response to intense secular pressures is to form fundamentalist groups which encourage voluntary withdrawal into virtually closed communities.

Religions are generated by one or more inspired founders and their immediate followers, but they are not organized or official at that stage. If the popular imagination is caught, a social movement commences and the private religion of the few becomes the popular church of the many. The spirituality and philosophy of the original founder then becomes modified to accommodate the limited horizons, existing beliefs, superstitions and anxieties of ordinary people. The religion can be said to be official when it dominates society and is explicitly used to define the social-political order in terms of God's authority and its historical scriptures. Its doctrine is then accepted as superior to temporal law and as legitimating government and kingship. Government in turn may then legally establish and promote the religion. (However, if parliament is sovereign as in the UK, then an established religion will be subject to state control over its doctrine, government and discipline.)

The absolutes of religion are socially channelled by scriptural commandments or religious laws and church regulations. The absolutes are realized in reality by each person's virtuous conduct in line with its ethical maxims. But lower levels of rule are also important. Religions specify rights and duties as the example of Hindu castes illustrates (Ex. 7.4). Adherence to certain tenets is emphasized to ensure allegiance and emotional commitment. The Roman Catholic church, for example, has a catechism which is a simple memorizable exposition of what all Catholics should believe and defend. All religions include a variety of conventions and strive to dominate popular morality; and all use ritual and prescriptions to extend control of behaviour to sensory interaction with the self (e.g. waking, bathing, thinking), with the community (e.g. the common language) and with the natural world (e.g. responding to the seasons). Of all prescriptions, those in the liturgy governing worship are particularly significant. Even though Confucius emphasized ethical living and rejected the superstition and magic of his time, he still regarded the meticulous performance of rites and ceremonies of worship as essential to express reverence for a supreme cosmic spiritual power (Tien).

Maintaining the Religion. The tendency of organized religion to shape the other moral institutions in its society means that it may be difficult for members of the community to distinguish the boundary between religious observance and cultural practice. Islam, in many places, still strongly resists attempts to separate out its religious sphere.

Where an organized religion is official or coterminous with society, its maintenance is unproblematic because it pervades the culture. Rejection of such an institution becomes extremely difficult because all the sanctions primarily associated with lower level moral institutions are used — penalties, condemnation, exclusion, opposition, rejection and direct control. However, religion has the potential to generate a particular form of non-coercive *compliance* based on trust. A genuine fellow religionary can be trusted, while the person who actively dis-identifies himself from the true faith, the apostate or non-believer, is distrusted.

Religion also provides a straightforward way to activate and nourish transpersonal being and is in turn reinforced by this identity realm. However, because its function is essentially social and practical — the security of the community and the prosperity and good conduct of its members according to Giordano Bruno writing in the late 16th century — organized religions are deeply conventional and suspicious of transcendental support. Bruno, despite his deep belief in God, was burned alive for teaching Copernican ideas.

Change in an organized religion is complex. Religions have always evolved through contact with other faiths and through unavoidable internal arguments. Yet any serious internal challenge to the essentials of a religion is inconceivable. Deliberate modifications are actively opposed and labelled heresy. Heretics, believers in those modifications, are condemned and usually ejected. Over the centuries, schism and tension within churches recur as competing sects generated by inspired devotees try to sustain or re-vivify the original spirit of the founder of the faith.

Replacement of the religion within a society is possible but rare and associated with massive social upheaval. It occurs, for example, as one of the sequelae of conquest (e.g. the European impact in black Africa) or when near-absolute monarchs are converted (e.g. Ashoka's conversion to Buddhism). Completely new religions emerge spontaneously at times of spiritual upheaval when social life evolves to a higher level of complexity and awareness. The transition from hunting-gathering to farming, and the transition from small farming villages to cities and civilizations were just such extraordinary times. (Some say that the present development of inter-connectedness of all people on the planet and the growing recognition of our inter-dependence and responsibility for the planet is yet another of these extraordinary transitions.)

Although the spirit of religion battles against envy, malice and meanness, organized churches are forced to accommodate to the level of spirituality and ethical development of their members. Because whole societies have not been generally marked as yet by self-reflective awareness and spiritual depth, so religions as practised would rarely have been praised by their founders. Thinkers within the churches are only too aware of the perversions of spirituality that occur within their clergy and congregations. Much American Judaism, for example, more or less dispenses with the idea of God; and Anglican congregations have been found to defend against the purpose of their church in a variety of ways.[36]

Spirituality, it sometimes seems, can only be preserved by sweeping away the authority, ritual, bureaucracy and legalism of churches — and yet this fails to recognize that organized religion is a communal need.

Although people still believe in God, modern secular institutions struggle with the notion of a need for religion in society.[37] Secular *criticism* finds religion of any sort too pervasive and controlling — although this is precisely the qualities needed to fulfil its function. Liberal-scientific values and traditional religions seem to be like oil and water. Rationalist opponents of religions start by criticizing the way churches have

preyed on the fear and credulity of the populace, then point to the hypocrisy and corruption of priests past and present, and finally repudiate metaphysical tenets like soul and spirituality as irrelevant or nonsensical.

Faith is an identity need and organized religion seems to be the only social institution which meets that need. When religion becomes an anachronism or even anathema, movements like science or Marxism offer their own absolutes as vehicles for faith and take on the qualities of religion. But they fail in regard to the ultimate questions and do not deeply satisfy most people. The result is that the widely felt necessity for religion is met in diverse and competing ways: via traditional churches, sectarian movements, messianic cults, and New Age events. Each provides a social identity but none can ensure that this identity is naturally that of the wider community. As a result, a crucial element of social coherence is lacking.

Embracing the value of a multi-faith society, rather than being a solution to this dilemma, seems to pose new problems. It is in the nature of religions to be driven by absolutes, to have some hold over government and the legal system, and to wish to reshape both its members and wider society. An official religion, if sufficiently committed to spiritual values, may tolerate competitors, but it cannot cooperate with them at a fundamental level because each embodies a distinct value system. How the forces of chaos and evil are to be controlled in society with purely secular tools and without a common structure of rules derived from absolutes is still not clear. The result must be a loss of meaning, an inability to tolerate the sufferings and difficulties of life, and a confusion between right and wrong — a state of affairs whose consequences are entirely predictable.

An organized religion is the most powerful natural moral institution and offers the most encompassing 'given' approach to morality in a society. We have reached the limit both intuitively and logically, and so the tertiary hierarchy of the framework of experience is now completed.

REVIEWING IDENTITY

Our aim in the chapter has been to gain clarity about what it means to be human so as to avoid excessive simplification or reductionism when designing ethical arrangements in society. We have examined distinctly different approaches to developing identity, and have found that their concerns underpin different natural moral institutions in society. These define our social identity and ensure the survival of society. In teasing out the details, it emerged that the approaches to

identity development and moral institutions form two further linked hierarchies. Each hierarchy revealed a progressive emergence from sensory-material embeddedness to contact with being and spirituality — much as in the hierarchy of purpose (Ch. 3 & 4) and the hierarchy of approaches to ethical choice (Ch. 6).

Ensuring Survival. If survival and proper functioning as a human being are indeed ethical imperatives, we now see that functioning well means that the person must be sufficiently: integrated (L'-I), energetic (L'-II), constructive (L'-III), genuine (L'-IV), liberated (L'-V), involved (L'-VI) and serene (L'-VII). If any one of these criteria are not met, then a person is in need and social relationships may be harmed.

We have also discovered a set of essential supplies for identity maintenance — stimulation (L'-I), concentration (L'-II), value (L'-III), respect (L'-IV), recognition (L'-V), responsibility (L'-VI), and faith (L'-VII). Each of these must be an ethical requirement, because failure to provide them is harmful and, at the extreme, means death through illness, accident, chronic self-abuse, suicide or murder. So long as a society or moral institution, or indeed any person or organization or relationship, provides these essential supplies, it will receive heartfelt support and reinforcement.

This analysis of personal identity can be applied (with care) to relationships, organizations and societies as well. For example, a marriage, firm or society can also suffer from: an unresponsiveness to warning tensions (L'-I), attitudes of neglect (L'-II), scapegoating (L'-III), contempt for itself (L'-IV), rejection of potential (L'-V), irresponsibility (L'-VI), and lack of convictions (L'-VII).

A society's survival depends above all on its natural moral institutions: upon maintenance of a minimum of formalized etiquette to provide ceremonies which signify respect and oil interaction; on popular morality to ensure a degree of conformity in regard to common activities, especially in relation to the body; on ideals to ensure people feel attached and energized enough to strive and even to die for their society; on the social structure to provide order and give each person a position; on an ethical teaching to promote virtue and enable decent functioning; on a system of governance which can enforce rules and maintain stability; and on a religion to give shared meaning to the trials of temporal existence, enabling people to tolerate the imperfections of their society and the pain of the human lot.

Improving Organizations. Because even small organizations are (secondary) communities, they too require all the moral institutions in order to thrive. By and large these are adopted from wider society, and adapted to suit the nature of the organization.

People who may be strangers must interact, so etiquette and ceremonies adapted to the needs of the organization are essential. For example, dress rules must vary in a restaurant, fashion boutique and boardroom. The firm develops its own version of popular morality related in part to the work and type of people attracted to it. Different domains — say: banking, publishing, theatre, welfare, academe, politics, ministry — foster different attitudes to such things as alcohol, sexual activity and money. Any organization must also provide its own distinctive circumscribed ideals which all can share.

The equivalent of the social structure is the designed internal structure based on posts carrying authority (rights) and responsibility (duties). Organizations should uphold and affirm the ethical teaching through developing and respecting an ethical code suited to their activities. Organizations operate within society's governance system but, as well as keeping the law, they also need their own governance, formal regulations and appeal procedures to ensure justice. Finally, although this is a rarity nowadays, it follows that organizations might well have an official religion or specific provisions for spiritual reflection. This could help ensure that ultimate values affected choices, activities, work relationships and community interactions. The excesses and destructiveness of religion would have to be severely curtailed to avoid disrupting work.

Engendering Hope. All the natural moral institutions are essential and powerful. However, in practice and to a greater or lesser degree, all are perceived to be faulty. (Discontent with these institutions was one of the pressures driving the inquiry and writing of this book.) In practice, the institutions seem, so often, to embody stagnation, sustain injustice, permit intolerance and ignore corruption. To deal with any form of suffering, including that generated by those very institutions which define us as social beings, we need hope.

Hope is the inner sense that we can survive and even improve matters, somehow. But where does hope reside and how can it be activated? Hope, I suggest, is not just another virtue like courage or humility which we can take or leave, emphasize or minimize. People intuitively know that hope is life-sustaining, and that hopelessness and helplessness form a lethal combination. It seems that hope must link with the hierarchy for sustaining and developing human identity.

The essential core in each approach to identity development is irremovable: that is to say we need

make little effort to be receptive, act instinctually, have bodily experiences, develop a self-concept, relate in a group, take on roles and possess a soul. But shaping and creating an identity depends on the presence and use of the growth-promoting potentials: that is to say, to thrive on life we must do things, make links (symbolize), attribute value, respond to others, insist on our individuality, use situations, and seek God. I suggest that *these growth-promoting forces embody hope*. Using them demands an effort of will and opens the possibility to a change in one's personal state.

Helplessness is life-threatening because it negates the will. Hopelessness is life-threatening because it means abandoning oneself. Together they generate a devastating disconnection from the range of identity-strengthening and growth-promoting forces at our disposal.

Hope is a property of each person, and not of a group or its institutions. A group whose mood is one of despair and whose institutions are rotten may still be capable of great things if even just the occasional person can sustain hope. This makes protecting each person and the possibility of individuality of the greatest consequence for the improvement of society. In other words, ethical design must not only deal with individual needs and community needs, it must also respond positively to diversity.

Protecting Diversity. In a complex society it is not easy to respond to the wide variety of groups and communities, much less deal with each single person's uniqueness. For this reason, each natural moral institution recognizes the fact of diversity and has a characteristic way of handling individual differences. A progression has been noticeable in the accounts, and it deserves a brief review here.

Formal etiquette views differences between people as utterly irrelevant. All are expected to follow the ceremonial prescriptions without any excuse, and individual differences are largely ignored. Popular morality deals with the existence of varying attitudes to bodily matters by suppressing or overcoming them. Communal ideals accept and tolerate differences but within relatively narrow limits. The social structure, however, responds positively to individual differences and brings them under control by classifying and institutionalizing them. The ethical teaching fully recognizes and values differences and guides their informal handling. The governance system assumes that there are differences between people and that they need protection. It seeks to ensure that these differences are properly handled via formalized and enforceable rules and procedures. Organized religion values and sustains individual differences while expecting them to be transcended by recognition of a profound commonality.

As a result, for a person in harmony with society, the institutions seem to become progressively less coercive. Coercion is maximum at the lowest two levels: etiquette is kept through direct external control, while popular morality is maintained by an external pressure. At the next two levels, coercion is internalized: the person's conscience provides direct inner control over communal ideals, while an inner pressure operates to maintain one's position within the social structure. At the next two levels, documentation is used to help people operate freely by knowing precisely what the moral framework is: the ethical teaching shapes internal control, and the governance system shapes external control. At the highest level, religion aims to be liberating by enabling all to move freely in harmony with the divine will.

Producing Violence. Unfortunately, people are not always in harmony with their society or the divine will. So the natural moral institutions do not seem quite so benign in practice. They pose a threat to the individual and individuality because the demand for identification tends to be backed with all the force that the social group can muster.

Violence appears to worsen as the levels are ascended — the reverse of what should be the case (in theory at least). Flouting popular morality generates greater violence than breaches of etiquette, and civil war and terrorism may be justified by conflicting ideals or persisting injustices in the social structure. Even ethical teachings are not immune: the doctrine of jihad makes total war an ethical requirement in Islam. Violence perpetrated in the name of stable government is common the world over. It is not surprising that those societies, which are dominated by notions of revenge and retribution should envisage that religious transgressions will provoke the wrath of a God. Given that a wrathful Omnipotent Supreme Being will destroy the world and condemn sinful people to eternal horrors, religious torture and persecution to prevent such outcomes seem not merely justified but almost mandatory.

From the group's perspective, individuals are too often recalcitrant. The group then feels there is no way to avoid violence. The amount of violence seems to depend on the enlightened use of the ethical teaching by the group. Although Salman Rushdie may have written blasphemous material, the execution order from Iran's ayatollah, the *fatwa*, contravenes Islam's ethical teaching according to scholars. Unfortunately, custom and social pressures have always enabled priests to incite their followers' capacity for hatred and revenge.

Transition. Work with values invariably touches on the identity of the person and of the social group. This is why it is so sensitive. Because the sensitive handling of diversity and uniqueness is so important, the various approaches to human development had to be clarified. Because developing and strengthening social life is a major research aim, it was essential to elucidate the identity-defining moral institutions. All efforts at improvement must recognize their nature, influence and staying power.

In the modern world, social design must take account of diversity within and between societies, a diversity which is expressed via idiosyncratic moral institutions. Even ethical teachings which seem so benign and general become inextricably inter-linked with other features of society and the religion which gave rise to them. So attempts to universalize any

natural (i.e. local or national) moral institution are liable to be experienced as an alien imposition. By contrast, *particular rules of all types may be abstracted from their moral institutions, adapted as appropriate, and offered for universal use.*

Taken alone without cultural trappings and communal identity demands, rules can be unexceptionable. Devised specifically to meet the concern at hand, rules prove to be invaluable.

Rules are the way forward in ethical design. The seven types are fundamental and elemental entities, akin in their significance to the seven types of purpose. We have met them here only in passing. We are now ready to explore them more directly, starting with an account of their nature and some straightforward applications within organizations and society. ✱

Rules in society's natural moral institutions.
The natural moral institutions get their character from the highest type of rule (in bold) because these shape and influence rules of lower types.
As a result, the institutions become progressively more complex and powerful. See text for further details and explanation.
Note that the horizontal hierarchy of the institutions lies within social being (L'-VI) and the framework of experience, whereas the
vertical hierarchy lies within the legitimist approach to ethical choice (L'-6) and the framework of purpose and value. Cf. Master-Figure 16.

Levels	L"-I Formal Etiquette	L"-II Popular Morality	L"-III Communal Ideals	L"-IV Social Structure	L"-V Ethical Teaching	L"-VI Governance System	L"-VII Organized Religion
L"-7							**Absolutes**
L"-6						**Laws**	Laws
L"-5					**Maxims**	Maxims	Maxims
L"-4				**Rights**	Rights	Rights	Rights
L"-3			**Tenets**	Tenets	Tenets	Tenets	Tenets
L"-2		**Conventions**	Conventions	Conventions	Conventions	Conventions	Conventions
L"-1	**Prescriptions**	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions

Master-Table 15

Properties of society's natural moral institutions.

These form spontaneously within any complex society to foster its survival and coherence. The various rules support social being by providing the basis for identification and responsible participation. The place of these institutions in the theoretical framework is shown in Master-Figures 10 and 16. Note that these institutions operate within social being and provide a foundation for both personal and communal identity. See text for further explanation and details.

L	Types of Moral Institution	Identity Realm Link and Typical Concerns	Society's Survival Need	Main Rule Type and Focus	Ensuring Compliance: Sanction & Inducement		Approach to Individual Differences	Common Criticisms
I″	Formal etiquette	Sensory: dress, appearance, dining, speech.	Ceremonial respect	Prescription deals with social behaviours	Direct social control of behaviour	Certainty of doing what is right.	Ignored and irrelevant	Too artificial and mechanical.
II″	Popular morality	Vital: sex, aggression, work, alcohol, drugs, money.	Conformity	Convention deals with social attitudes	Social rejection	Social acceptance	Suppressed and overcome	Too rigid or too lax; worsens personal problems.
III″	Communal ideals	Emotional: any property of a society which enables attachment.	Energy	Tenet deals with social values	Social opposition	Social endorsement	Accepted and tolerated	Blocks learning from outsiders; creates taboos.
IV″	Social structure	Individual: claims, duties, powers, disabilities, privileges, immunities, liabilities.	Order	Right deals with social boundaries	Losing benefits of membership	Gaining benefits of membership	Classified and institutionalized	Institutionalizes injustice.
V″	Ethical teaching	Relational: handling personal and social relationships.	Virtue	Maxim deals with social functioning	Social condemnation	Social admiration	Recognized and valued	Too demanding and unrealistic in everyday life.
VI″	Governance system	Social: maintaining peace, order, justice, freedom and the common good.	Stability	Law deals with social enforcement	Public penalties	Public support	Assumed and protected	Too overwhelming; too corruptible; too bureaucratic.
VII″	Organized religion	Transpersonal: mysteries of existence – especially evil, suffering, and God.	Meaning	Absolute deals with social existence	Being distrusted	Being trusted	Sustained and transcended	Too pervasive; too controlling; too hypocritical.

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NOTES

1   The seven level hierarchical approach to be offered here shows evident links to the findings of other researchers. These include: Maslow's five level hierarchy of needs (Maslow, A. *Toward a Psychology of Being.* 2nd Ed. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1968); de Mause's six stages in the evolution of child care (de Mause, L. The Evolution of Childhood. In: *Foundations of Psychohistory.* London: The Psychohistory Press, 1982); Meltzer's four dimensions of experience (Meltzer, D., Bremner, J., Hoxter, S., Weddell, D. & Wittenberg, I. *Explorations in Autism: A Psychoanalytical Study.* Perthshire: Clunie Press, 1975); the levels of consciousness described by a variety of authors (Wilber, K. *Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution.* London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1983; Csanyi, V. *General Theory of Evolution.* Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982; Curtis, E.S. *Evolution or Extinction: The Choice Before Us.* London: Pergamon Press, 1982; Chaisson, E. *Universe.* New York: Prentice Hall, 1988); and also levels defined in the esoteric traditions. All this work has been drawn on in a general way. At the very least it supports the notion of a hierarchical system. To my knowledge, the full model as outlined here has not been previously recognized or described. I publicly presented an earlier version in Munich in 1989 at the invitation of the British Council under the title: *Being a Person: Psychoanalytic Theories and Identity Systems.*

It is worth noting at this stage that the identity systems map empirical reality in that they bring order to a bewildering array of therapeutic techniques and psycho-dynamic theories. People can and do use them to alter themselves and others. The framework has no relation to psychological trait theories, stereotypes &c. Nor to psychiatric nosology: schizophrenia, for example, manifests differently depending on the context provided by the systems. Nor are they 'ideal types'. The identity systems have nothing in common with the universal personality types of sociologists like Vilfredo Pareto (*Mind, Self and Society. Vols. 1-IV.* New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1939). The sociological types of David Riesman (*The Lonely Crowd.* New York: Doubleday, 1958) are about conformity and express a cultural ethic (cf. G''-3³; Ch. 9) i.e. they express identity but are not a form of human identity.

2   The structure of experience was noted earlier in order to illuminate the inner motivations which corresponded to the distinctive forms of purpose and value. See Ch.s 3 and 4, and Master-Table 2.

3   The confusion engendered by the same words having entirely different implications according to the value system in which they are embedded is more obviously counter-productive in management than in therapy. See: Kinston, W. *Strengthening the Management Culture: Phasing the Transformation of Organizations.* London: The SIGMA Centre, 1994, p.8.

4   Psychosomatic Personality: These individuals manifest primacy of sensation and action together with an impoverishment of feelings. They use few emotional terms, and so feelings are not well-differentiated. Requests for a description of feeling result in descriptions of external events. Even dramatic or painful events are recounted with little emotional overtone. Affects cannot be properly localized in the body, and the person seems unaware of the common automatic bodily reactions that accompany the experience of specific feelings. Outbursts of affective behaviour like crying or temper may occur, but the premonitory feeling stages are not recognized. On questioning, the individual is unable to explain the outburst other than in terms of a vague sense of upset. Thinking shows a preoccupation with minute details of external events (which depend on sensation), but few fantasies (which depend on image). Because symbolic elaboration of events does not occur, external reality is adapted to in a simple, precise and quasi-normal way.

The above ideas are associated with the Paris school of psychoanalysis: Marty, P., de M'Uzan, M. & David, C. *L'investigation Psychosomatique.* Paris: Presses Universite de France, 1963. Also see: Nemiah, J.C., Freyberger, H. & Sifneos, P. Alexithymia: A view of the psychosomatic process. In: *Modern Trends in Psychosomatic Medicine. Vol. 3.* London: Butterworths. Ch. 20, 1976; and McDougall, J. The psychosoma and the psycho-analytic process. *International Review of Psycho-Analysis,* 1: 437-459, 1974.

Autism may possibly be an identity disorder even though biological factors certainly play a part in many or most cases. Psychoanalysts have reported that autistic children have an identity that is material and rooted in sensation, while being severely deficient in images and higher level experiences. The autistic child lacks memory and thought, and has no understanding of time; but sensory modalities, though in disarray, are evident. Only things which can be touched and manipulated seem real. Sensations, often repetitively self-generated, embed the child in the world around; but the various senses wander, each to its most attractive object, leading to mental incoherence. Things are not valued by the child and they may be replaced as long as the substitute generates the identical sensation. Contour and outline are crucial — not meaning (symbol) or function (purpose). See: Tustin, F. *Autistic States in Children.* London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1981; and Meltzer, D. et al op. cit. [1].

5   See: *The Oxford Companion to the Mind.* (Gregory, R.L. (ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1987) for summary articles on sensation (pp. 700-701) and isolation and sensory deprivation experiments (pp. 393-4).

6   For the Alexander technique, see: Alexander, F.M. *The Use of the Self.* New York: E.P. Dutton, 1932. For dance therapy, see: Laban, R. *The Mastery of Movement.* London: MacDonald & Evans, 1958. For behaviour therapy, see: Wilson, C.T. & Franks, C.M. (eds.) *Contemporary Behaviour Therapy: Conceptual Foundations of Clinical Practice.* New York: Guilford, 1982.

7   The significance of exercise for health is well-recognized in the medical literature but awareness of the identity dimension and the importance of exercise for subjective well-being is generally neglected; cf. Gloag, D. Exercise, fitness and health: people need to be more active more often. *British Medical Journal,* 205: 377-378, 1993.

8   Psychopathic-hysteric personality: Prolific elaboration of fantasies, bodily preoccupations and deficiencies in the sphere of emotions and valuing are the essential features of the disorder. In hysteria, body involvement shows up classically in the form of unconscious simulation of physical

illness. Emotions in hysterics are typically superficial, exaggerated, minimal or disconnected. Another version of hysteria consists of numerous physical complaints in several organ systems, leading to multiple hospitalizations and operations without a specific medical diagnosis. These women refuse to accept psychological explanations for their condition, and have an increased incidence of relatives suffering from psychopathy and alcoholism. Psychopathic personalities show anti-social conduct and are unable to use values and emotions properly. Fantasy elaboration emerges as uncontrollable lying or impersonation. Psychopaths show a lack of ethical judgement and seem unaware and unconcerned that such judgements are being made by others. So they are unable to conform with the most basic requirements of social and interpersonal life and show repetitive criminality, vagrancy, belligerency, drug abuse, alcoholism, sexual abnormalities and suicidal behaviour, as well as physical complaints.

Two classic accounts of psychopathic personality are: Robins, L.N. *Deviant Children Grown Up: A Sociological and Psychiatric Study of Sociopathic Personality.* Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1966; Cleckley, H. *The Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to Clarify Some Issues About So-called Psychopathic Personality.* 5th Ed. St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Company, 1976.

9. Freud, S. (1915) *Instincts and their Vicissitudes.* Standard Edition, Vol. 14: 117-140, London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1957.

10. A therapy based on analyzing the exchange of identity states between people has been developed by Eric Berne (*Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy.* New York: Grove Press, 1961). Melanie Klein has developed a school of psychoanalysis based on the assumptions of this identity system (*The Writings of Melanie Klein. Vols I-IV.* London: Hogarth Press, 1975).

11. **Borderline Personality:** Some people experience extreme vulnerability to abandonment and aloneness, and find it difficult to distinguish between themselves and others. They show intense needs to be merged in a personal relationship, but fear closeness because of a lack of control over their destructiveness. They seem to lack an inner conception of an enduring containing counterpart, and so have difficulty sustaining ordinary inter-personal relationships. Destructiveness is usually overt: self-mutilation, suicidal attempts, ruinous behaviour, substance abuse. Such episodes are often triggered by separations or losses. Ideas have little hold over the personality, so contradictory and extreme emotional positions are held at different times. Words tend to be experienced as emotional implements or parts of the self, rather than as abstract conveyors of meaning. So speaking or listening may be felt to be highly dangerous. Emotions, especially anger, may escalate and alter rapidly in response to changing circumstances. So much time and energy is spent coping with the disorientation and inappropriate activities that flow from emotional storms and associated misperceptions of self and others.

For a general psychiatric account, see: Stone, M.H. *The Borderline Syndromes.* New York: McGraw Hill, 1980. For a psychoanalytic account, see: Kernberg, O. *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism.* New York: Jason Aronson, 1975.

12. Non-psychoanalytic therapies are of two main forms. The first is epitomized by Carl Rogers who emphasizes empathic listening, non-judgemental reflection and unconditional positive regard (*Client-centred Therapy.* Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951). The second form comprises cognitive therapies in which the focus is on seeking and correcting misconceptions and illogical and maladaptive assumptions or styles of thinking e.g. Beck, A. *Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders.* New York: International Universities Press, 1976; Ellis, A. *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy.* Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1962. Psychoanalytic theorists focused on this identity system include Donald Winnicott (*The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development.* London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1965) and Heinz Kohut (*The Analysis of the Self. A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders.* New York: International Universities Press, 1971). The technical emphasis is on narcissistic support including accepting and adapting to the patient, respecting the patient, not making emotional demands, and being with the patient.

13. See my account of shame and a bibliography in: Kinston, W. A theoretical context for shame. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,* 64: 213-266, 1983.

14. **Narcissistic Personality:** The person manifests a surface normality in emotional and social life, but once this is penetrated, severe disturbance is marked. There is an excessive degree of self-reference and self-centredness, an over-valuation of personal abilities, an intense need for love and admiration by others, a demandingness, and a lack of consideration for others. There is often shallowness of feeling, experiences of boredom, and a tendency to ruthlessness. The failure of intuition results in insensitivity and lack of empathy. Relationships tend to be exploitative or parasitic, with a deep depreciation and contempt of others, and a denial of dependency. Rage is released when the individual's sense of entitlement is frustrated, or when imperfection needs to be accepted. Psychoanalytic exploration typically reveals a weak and vulnerable inner self kept distant from relationships because of deep distrust and intense envy.

For more details, see: Kernberg, O. 1975 op. cit. [11]; Kohut, H. 1971 op.cit.[12]; Winnicott, D.W. op.cit. [12].

15. Maslow, A. op. cit. [1]

16. In comparison to therapies based on individual being, there is more emphasis on active inner searching, improving the congruence of feeling and action, and expecting to grow through relationships. For example, see: Bugental, J.F.T. *Psychotherapy and Process: The Fundamentals of an Existential-Humanistic Perspective.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978.

17. Freud never produced a consistent integrated model of the mind and did not address the issue of identity. His final major contribution in 1923 was the id-ego-superego model of the mind which fits neurotic personalities (L'-V) excellently (*The Ego and the Id.* Standard Edition, Vol. 19: 12-59, London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1961). His earliest contributions focused on historical events (L'-VI) and bodily tensions and instincts (L'-I and L'-II); while his other major contribution was the recognition and the

therapeutic use of psychic reality and the repressed and unrepressed unconscious (L'-III).

18. **Neurotic Personality:** The neurotic is capable of a reasonably full range of experiences and can perceive external reality in a relatively undistorted way. However, relations are driven by wishes which are over-valued and do not link to realistic features of the situation. Because perceptions are distorted by wishes, the neurotic intuits and acts inappropriately at times. Conflicts between wishes are also a problem and the neurotic is particularly inhibited in relation to ordinary wishes which are internally judged as unacceptable. Criticising and controlling attitudes coalesce within the neurotic to form a severe conscience which generates a burden of irrational guilt. Freud's major discovery was that guilt and conflict lead to symptoms which are symbolic attempts to get both conflicting wishes and needs for punishment gratified, without either the neurotic or others affected by the neurotic inhibition or symptom being aware of what is happening. Neurotic behaviour may be tolerable in relationships but it interferes with role performance and limits social achievement.

Neurotics experience a good deal of anxiety and shame in relation to their wishes, as well as guilt. All these affects are commonly regarded as a cause of dysfunction, rather than as signals that wishes are not being properly handled. If signals are treated as a problem or threat, a 'shoot the messenger' policy is often instituted. Attempts to avoid the signals may lead to shifting between identity systems. For example, permissiveness and assertiveness have been socially promoted as ways of overcoming guilt-ridden inhibitions within relationships; but, unless mutuality and dialogue are promoted, a L'-IV identity is liable to be activated and the L'-V dysfunction will remain untreated.

19. For examples of existential therapy, see: May, R. *Psychology and the Human Dilemma.* Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. 1967; and Yalom, I. *Existential Psychotherapy.* New York: Basic Books, 1980. For therapies linked to radical social change, see: Agel, J. (ed.) *The Radical Therapist.* New York: Ballantine Books, 1971.

20. **Traumatized Personality:** Trauma is a disruption in historical continuity by an event which overwhelms a person and does not permit experiential assimilation or accommodation. Traumatization may occur at any stage of life, but childhood is the period of greatest vulnerability. The traumatic event feels like a catastrophe. The person cannot participate responsibly in it, and thoughts and feelings about it do not get properly registered. So a failure of identification results. The event remains within the person at a bodily level in the form of disconnected images and sensations. A sense of a hole (fault, gap, defect) in the mind results. The person's subsequent life unconsciously expresses the trauma. Catastrophic repetition always threatens to recur in the form of an accident, the unfolding of life circumstances, or through deliberate choice. A variety of anxiety and depressive symptoms may be present. Purposive functions like judgement and decision appear defective and tend to limit achievement; while the imagination is constricted for fear of experiencing anything which might recall the trauma. The aim of therapy is to recover the trauma and reconstruct the event so that it can be incorporated in the individual's personal history. This reconstruction must be developed on

the basis of evidence. It may be aided by the therapist's intuition, but it benefits from proper investigation. The person has to become convinced about what happened because a new identity must be created based on recognition of past (social) realities. These still limit what can be, but the person can at last make creative and realistic decisions.

Wider society in the West has become far more aware of and disturbed by child neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse in recent years. This has enabled psychoanalysts, as trapped in convention as everyone else, to start to recognize the origins of their patients' disturbances in actual traumas. See, for example, the books of Alice Miller (*For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence.* London: Virago, 1987; *Thou Shalt Not Be Aware.* London: Pluto Press, 1991). Psychoanalysis can reveal more subtle forms of trauma. A coherent psychoanalytic theory of trauma and its consequences is provided in: Kinston, W. & Cohen, J. Primal repression: clinical and theoretical aspects. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.* 67: 337-355, 1986; Primal repression and other states of mind. *Scandinavian Psychoanalytical Review,* 11: 81-105, 1988; and related papers.

21. The late doyen of religious historians, Mircea Eliade, concluded that faith and the sense of the sacred are intrinsic to human consciousness. See his: *Patterns in Comparative Religion.* London: Sheed & Ward, 1958; and *A History of Religious Ideas. Vols. 1-3.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, 1982, 1985. A classic text is: Otto, R. (1923) *The Idea of the Holy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959. Also see: Tart, C. (ed.) *Transpersonal Psychologies.* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. A popular summary of the perennial philosophy is provided in: Huxley, A. *The Perennial Philosophy.* New York: Harper, 1970; and also Wilber, K. op. cit. [1].

22. Transpersonal psychotherapy is more a movement attempting to deal with the modern split between psychology and religion than a systematic theory. However, all transpersonal therapists seem to work explicitly or implicitly within a conception of 'the great chain of being'. See: Lovejoy, A.O. *The Great Chain of Being.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936; Kahn, H. *The Soul Whence and Whither.* New York: Sufi Order, 1977; Schuon, F. *The Transcendent Unity of Religions.* New York: Harper 1975; Wilber, K. *The Atman Project.* Wheaton, Ill: Quest, 1980. For the work of Carl Jung, see: *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung.* (Transl. R.F.C. Hull) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series. For the work of Robert Assagioli, see: *Psychosynthesis.* New York: Viking, 1965. As an example of spiritual teachings, see: Krishnamurti, J. *Commentaries on Living: Series I - III.* (ed. D. Rajagopal) London: Victor Gollancz, 1965, 1967; and Anon. *A Course in Miracles.* London: Arkana, 1985.

23. See the evidence collected in: *The Boxing Debate.* Report of the British Medical Association, London, 1993.

24. Psychoanalytic views of the conscience are provided by Freud in *Mourning and Melancholia* (1917) and *The Ego and the Id.* (1923). (See, respectively: Vol. 15: 243-258, 1957 and *Id.* 19: 12-59, 1961 in the Standard Edition, London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.) Also see: Klein, M. & Riviere, J. *Love Hate and Reparation.* New York: Norton, 1964. Christian literature uses the term conscience in a

somewhat different way. It comes to refer to the practice of autonomous reflection within the context of the given creed. However, the realities of the conscience as defined here hold. Priests as school-heads and school masters used to beat children regularly when this was customary. They must surely have believed it was right to do so. Most had been treated in the same way when they were children and society permitted harsh discipline ('spare the rod and spoil the child'). In other words, their consciences permitted beating, even though infliction of suffering on helpless children is not the Christian message. Autonomous reflection might have led to this conclusion and encouraged them to override their conscience.

25. Hardin, G. Earthquakes: Prediction more devastating than events. In: *Stalking the Wild Taboo*. Los Altos, Calif.: Kaufmann. 1973.

26. Hutton, J.H. *Caste in India*. 4th Ed. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1963.

27. The definition of a right comes from: White, A.R. *Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1984, p.171. Also see: Milne, A.J.M. *Human Rights and Human Diversity*. London: Macmillan, 1986. Utilitarians generally dislike rights which get in the way of producing general benefit. The quoted comment of Jeremy Bentham, which comes from *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), is typical. Those who are concerned with a moral community and its cohesion also wish to neglect rights. Hence the quoted comment of the philosopher, Alistair MacIntyre, from: *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London Duckworth. 1981.

28. Waley, A. *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China*. Doubleday: New York, 1939 pp. 71-74.

29. Wing-Tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. Confucianism is discussed in Ch.s 2-6; and Moism in Ch. 9.

30. Ball, R.E. *The Crown, the Sages and Supreme Morality*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1983.

31. The framework here distinguishes, as we all must, between the governance system (L"-VI) and the government (G-6²). The governance system uses rules to indicate the precise composition and role of government. To put this another way: the function of any government is to make and implement practical and cultural or ethical decisions on behalf of society within the explicit (constitutional or legal) and implicit (conventional or customary) limits of the governance system.

32. For example: A thoughtful proposal for the complete re-design of the institutions delivering Western democratic government has been offered by Friedrich Hayek in: *The Political Order of a Free People*. (Vol. 3 of *Law Legislation and Liberty*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.) His aim is to overcome the present corrupt and weak behaviour of governments which is due to their over-responsiveness to well-organized pressure groups and majority opinion. Unlike many of his other contributions to issues in the public arena, these proposals on governance have had little impact and are not discussed outside academe.

33. Montesquieu, C.L.de *Spirit of the Laws*. (ed. A.M. Cohler). London: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

34. See: Hogue, A.R. *Origins of the Common Law*. Indiana: Liberty Press, 1966; Brand, P. *The Origins of the English Legal Profession*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

35. Smart, N. *The Religious Experience of Mankind*. New York: Doubleday, 1969.

36. For an account of American Judaism, see: Woocher, J.S. *Sacred Survival: The Civil Religion of American Jews*. Indiana Press, 1986. For an account of problems in Anglican congregations, see: Reed, B. *The Dynamics of Religion: Process and Movement in The Christian Church*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1978.

37. Opinion polls regularly show that a large majority of people believe in God. Society therefore displays a multitude of ways to handle this belief (cf. Blackham, H.J. *Religion in a Modern Society*. London: Constable, 1966). Marx's aphorism that 'religion is the opium of the masses' needs to be put alongside his statement that "religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general basis of consolation and justification." (Marx, K. & Engels, F. *Collected Works*. London: Lawrence & W., 1975. Vol 1, Section I, Part I: p.607.)

Chapter 8

Setting Ethical Rules

Rules are the quintessential ethical entities. Disconnected from the ebb and flow of events and feelings, provided and backed by authority and subjected to prolonged critical scrutiny, rules are the deontologists' dream.

An ethical rule may be simply defined as *a statement of duty which seeks to govern the social conduct of individual members of a community.* In other words, rules are a theoretical context deliberately superimposed on practical decisions, just as communal life is a group context for individual activities. Following ethical rules means deciding and acting in a way that is, by definition, right. So rules have the power to legitimate conduct. They possess authority and are a form of authority. Whereas purposes gain their force from a range of internal motivational states, rules gain their force from a range of external authorities intrinsic to a society.

The rules were revealed during the investigation and application of the legitimist approach to choice (L'-6: Ch. 6), and then re-discovered and ordered within society's natural moral institutions (H^{III}: Ch.7). For many people, following the rules in such institutions, especially religion, is synonymous with being ethical or leading a moral life. However, for design purposes, the various types of rule are far more important than those institutions within which they originated during man's cultural evolution.

Abstracted from the institution, severed from particular identity realms, and denuded of the trappings of tradition, rules may be defined to govern conduct in a wide variety of settings. When we view rules in this disconnected and instrumental way, we look for conscious adherence to them. For rules within natural moral institutions, by contrast, we assume automatic adherence based on socialization while growing up.

When nothing changes, tradition and the existing moral institutions suffice to guide people. Designing rules is then no more than a philosopher's pastime. When actual or potential social change threatens, people become disoriented and demand rules. And philosophers start writing articles in newspapers.

Changes in society — whether evolutionary like over-population, reactive like discontent with socio-economic class injustices, or deliberate like technological innovation in health care — disturb accepted ways of living. Such changes generate a diversity of opinions, and put public figures and institutions under strain. They lead to a range of new and possibly unwelcome activities which stimulate an urge to guide and constrain the way people respond.

Ethical rules may be set either to assist, resist, or modify social change. Rules devised for new situations still specify obligations and define what is right, just as in the moral institutions. However, when new rules emerge, identification with them cannot be assumed. Adherence depends instead on recognizing the authority behind the rule, and perceiving the rule as socially or rationally necessary.

Apart from the need to handle change, rules help to manage the diverse inclinations of community members. Ethical rules may be put forward in two ways: either seeking to change others — that is to say other people, other organizations, or public officials; or seeking to change oneself or the group's own members. Rules in businesses are mainly of the latter sort, seeking to guide and control employed staff and to reassure customers and public supervisory bodies about the internal workings of the firm.

Social movements, trans-national bodies, government departments and organizations of all sorts contain quasi-communities, and those within them need rules just like territorial communities. Rules can be designed and authorized in organizations and associations with an ease that is unthinkable within wider society. Of course organizations participate in society just as people do, so they are affected by societal authorities and may propose or seek to influence society's rules.

To understand rules fully is as challenging a task as to understand purposes fully. My aim at this stage is limited. I wish to examine the nature of rules and clarify the numerous practical differences between the different sorts of ethical rule. I will also identify the various ethical codes created by systematizing rules of a single type, and provide a variety of examples of the deliberate use of rules and codes. Finally, during

the review of the chapter, I will discuss the principal tension in using rules in society: freedom for the individual vs coercion on behalf of the group. This account of rules will enable a systematic examination in Ch. 9 of society's ethical (i.e. rule-based) authorities.

INTRODUCING ETHICAL RULES

Ethical rules specify obligations within a community. They may be defined singly; or a number of rules may be structured and systematized to form a code or framework. Rules are hypothetical or theoretical entities — i.e. rules are value systems (L-6) — until most people in a community recognize their necessity — i.e. rules then become social values (L-5) as well. Even for a useful and necessary rule, this essential transition from an idea to a need is difficult. It depends on instruction and exhortation, which in turn depend above all on clarity about what the rule is. Rules must be explicitly and precisely formulated so that they can be explained, followed and sensibly improved.

Rules create a self-consciously recognized constraint when using any of the approaches to ethical choice. Recall that legitimist choice was about setting rules in response to an ethically problematic situation. Because legitimist choice was at the sixth level, it seemed likely there would be seven special types of ethical rule, one relating to each approach to choice — just as the sixth level of purpose contained the seven approaches, one relating to each form of purpose. This conjecture proved correct. Each of the seven types of rule turned out to have a logical-intuitive basis of legitimacy in a corresponding approach to ethical choice.

The various rules will be described in terms of properties which are common to them all. These properties will now be explained with the key terms italicized.

Properties of Rules

The core obligation of the legitimist approach is that any proposed rule should be accepted by all in the community. General voluntary acceptance, always difficult to obtain, is only possible if the rule is perceived as supporting the aspiration for the common good. In particular, the rule should ensure group continuity and cohesion. It turns out that each type (level) of rule serves a distinctive *function* in regard to such goals. Because each approach to ethical choice can be used for rule creation (which is after all itself a matter of choice), it is not surprising that a different *basis of legitimacy* for each type of rule can be traced back to these systems.

The various rules and codes are each developed in a characteristic way within society and within organizations. Each gains its force from a distinct source of *authority*. Authorization in practice tends to be complex because there is often a distinction between who devises the rule or code, who legitimates the rule or code, and who handles breaches in the rule or code. The actual authorities used vary in different societies and also according to the rationale for developing that type of rule. It is essential, however, to recognize that there are sources of authority inescapable in any community. We may usefully describe such sources as primal.

The inherent authority and scope of rules together with their binding quality means that *change* in any rule (or introduction of a new code) is likely to be experienced as deeply significant by those affected. Although rules appear to be binding, this cannot be so — except for absolutes. Indeed absolutes positively prevent detailed lower level rules from being completely binding. Paradoxically, an essential ethical rule is freedom of choice. If choices could not be made freely, a change of rule would be a contradiction in terms; and personal autonomy, rather than being a constraint in legitimist choice, would be non-existent.[1]

Nevertheless, compliance is of the essence when a rule is set. A properly set rule carries an expectation of widespread compliance. Achieving compliance is another matter entirely, and each type of rule varies in the control which is required and possible. Because compliance cannot be taken for granted, inducements and sanctions for *gaining compliance* require special attention. What is permitted for rules within the moral institutions is not usually possible or suitable for artificially designed rules. Nevertheless, failure to comply with a current rule, whether inadvertent or deliberate, must be dealt with. If the rule is part of a code, breach of one rule is a violation of the code as a whole. Because breaches are so serious, specific ways to assess and deal with breaches and to control people are needed.

To increase the likelihood of compliance, there is often an urge to press for introduction of enforceable rules, that is to say regulations or laws (at L"-6) rather than depending on lower level rules and codes. But this is not always possible and such a course is often positively unsatisfactory. Partly to counter this perverse craving for enforceability, the particular *advantages* of using rules at each of the other levels will be noted. Advantages notwithstanding, each type of rule has natural limitations and comes in for a specific sort of *criticism*.

Summarizing the Rules

The hierarchy of rules contains seven levels which derive their legitimacy from each of the seven types of

Table 8.1: Common synonyms for rules. The synonyms below are some of those found in the literature. The general terms are commonly used at all levels, and many of the others (e.g. guide, standard, regulation) are not level-specific either. The items in italics have a specific place elsewhere in the framework.

	General terms	Rule, value, axiom, *policy, principle.*
L"-7:	Absolute	Commandment, *imperative.*
L"-6:	Law	Regulation, canon, bye-law, edict, ordinance, statute.
L"-5:	Maxim	Precept, guide, adage, motto, proverb, saying.
L"-4:	Right	Entitlement, duty, claim, power, privilege, liability, immunity.
L"-3:	Tenet	Belief, dogma, assumption, article of faith, ideology, *conviction.*
L"-2:	Convention	Norm, expectation, guideline standard, *custom.*
L"-1:	Prescription	General instruction, requirement, protocol, *direction.*

approach to ethical choice. In ascending order, the names given to the rules and the associated codes are: *prescriptions* (L"-1) which may be organized into a protocol or *code of practice; conventions* (L"-2) which together form a group's *ethos; tenets* (L"-3) which may be systematized into a *credo; rights* (L"-4) which may be presented in a *charter; maxims* (L"-5) which may be formulated as a *code of ethics; laws* or regulations (L"-6) which are generally organized into a logical *system;* and *absolutes* (L"-7) which comprise the *eternal verities.*

The hierarchical positioning of the seven types of rule has been diagrammed earlier in Master-Figure 9 (Ch. 6). A fuller picture linking rules with the moral institutions is now provided in Master-Figure 16. The main practical properties of rules and codes are summarized in Master-Table 17. The more general properties of rules can be found summarized in Master-Table 21 (Ch. 9: G"-1).

By way of a brief introduction, the function of each type of rule and code is specified below, together with its relation to the community, and an indication of its use. The source of primal authority is also noted.

L"-1: Prescriptions are set to ensure that all know and perform certain social actions strictly as specified. Protocols and **codes of practice**, which are made up of related prescriptions, are used to control activities of people in particular social roles and situations so as to prevent potentially harmful or unfair consequences. Communal leadership is the source of authority. So any prescription, even if worked out by experts, must be proclaimed as practical, desirable and obviously right by whichever person or public body is widely recognized as leading in the domain. Leadership in organizations rests with the governing board and it has the power to authorize codes of practice for implementation by relevant managers.

L"-2: Conventions are set to ensure that all know and apply certain attitudes generally in their conduct. In any community, an **ethos** of related conventions limits discretionary action in a wide range of areas. Such constraints are based in existing values which are given authority by the mainstream, usually the majority, of members. This ethos evolves spontaneously but it can be shaped or developed in a constructive way by social leaders (opinion-formers in associations, managerial leaders in firms) who articulate and promote particular conventions.

L"-3: Tenets are set to ensure that all know, affirm and express certain values in daily life. A **credo** constructed out of related tenets powers all enduring and effective social sub-groups within the community. Tenets and credos devised for specialized activities are transmitted in society via educational institutions. New credos emerge in social movements. Organizations take on tenets from contemporaneous movements, particularly if a powerful leader insists. However, tenets are highly emotional, and new tenets cannot be properly applied without some re-socialization. So the primal authority for tenets, ultimately, is each person's conscience.

L"-4: Rights are set to ensure that all know and respect what is due to and from each individual in a class. Rights (including duties) may need clarifying and stating in a **charter** when there is an inherent power imbalance or recurring conflict between classes in a community. These classes may interact freely in society (e.g. doctors and patients), may be contained within an organization (e.g. managers and work-force), or may involve whole organizations whose users form a class (e.g. newspapers and their readers). Detailed work on any charter is a matter for class representatives, but each individual involved should own the final result.

The authority derives. ultimately, from the power of the class within communal life.

L"-5: Maxims are set to ensure that all know and meet general requirements for virtuous functioning. Maxims are specified to maintain confidence within relationships, either between people in a community setting or between a sub-group and individuals in the wider community with whom members of the sub-group deal. Any social group whose members adhere to maxims is said to be 'self-regulating'. and forms what may be called a moral community. Codes of ethics, which are constructed out of maxims, are common in the professions and are needed in large organizations where managers have wide powers and considerable discretion. The code is tailored from an accepted ethical teaching to suit the nature and social context of the activity. The teaching is the source of primal authority.

L"-6: Laws are set to ensure that all know and obey those rules which need to be enforced to maintain a stable social order. Laws apply to the whole community and are organized into a system to minimize inconsistencies and incoherences which would undermine their effectiveness. Laws in quasi-communities are usually referred to as regulations. Firms, schools, churches and other associations need to use law-like regulations to maintain order. Laws and law-like regulations only operate within well-defined borders, so the territorial community is the nation-state or sovereign-society. Regulations in organizations are authorized by the governing body, but these must always stay within the law and can be judicially challenged. So primal authority is located in the law.

L"-7: Absolutes are set to ensure that all know and aspire to the path of duty. Duty is epitomized in universal and abstract forms like: 'choose good and reject evil'. Such epitomes can be organized as the eternal verities obviously applicable anywhere by anyone at any time. Absolutes express the essential spirit of ethics and derive their authority from ultimate values which are underpinned by God (in religious teachings), transpersonal existence (in psychological accounts), or Reason (in philosophers' tracts). A group may choose a particular absolute as its guiding dictum: Hippocrates suggested *primum non nocere* (above all. do no harm) for doctors.

Ethical Dispositions

Adherence to society's natural moral institutions is a product of socialization and is therefore relatively unproblematic. Compliance with newly created rules and codes, however, requires a degree of self-discipline.

To comply may sometimes feel unsatisfactory, and compliance may even be judged wrong from a transcendental point of view.

The difficulties with compliance are many. Rules are all oriented to the collective good — that is to say to the good of the organization or the common interests and needs of others — and not to the specific interests and needs of any particular individual. Hence it may well be to one's own specific benefit to ignore the rule. Further, because rules apply generally, they can feel impersonal and may not invite identification. In any particular situation, the social benefit that flows to the individual from following a rule may be minimal, or uncertain. Finally, because sanctions often receive greater emphasis than inducements, a negative quality surrounds compliance with rules. All these features of rules make compliance difficult at times. Ultimately, adherence to a rule or code at any moment depends on the approach to choice adopted and the motivation provided by inner obligation.

The exercise of inner obligation cannot be taken for granted, and it seems that there are a number of enduring motivational capacities which support its operation. The term I will use for this sort of capacity will be *ethical disposition*. A different and characteristic ethical disposition is required for each type of rule. Ethical dispositions are linked to the ethical aspirations and through them to the motivating experiences: the three referring to successive planes of drive within the self (see central column in Master-Fig. 16). The progressive increase in self-consciousness and discipline which evolves with each of these three planes of motivation deserves note here.

The basic motivations, experiential states found in the lowest plane (H^1), are a constant part of human nature — much like the forms of purpose or the forms of experience with which they link. Given ordinary parenting, a child develops awarenesses, intentions, desires, interests, needs, inner obligations and inspirations. Very little effort is required to recognize and translate these into action. Nevertheless, the coherence, effectiveness and ethical direction of such motivations are not to be taken for granted. Inspiration and inner obligation play a crucial role here. Inspiration is essential for the successful instigation and completion of complex or important endeavours. Inner obligation is the guiding drive which ensures harmony and appropriateness amongst the five lower types of motivation. It ensures, for example, that intentions fit with needs, or that desires take interests into account.

Inner obligation, itself, has an internal structure — the ethical aspirations (H^2). Although the aspirations are not as self-evident as motivations, they too seem

largely unavoidable. They are, after all, a part of the essential systems for ethical choice. However, like these systems, aspirations require some degree of reflection and conscious valuation if they are to be effectively pursued. Continuity (L'-2) and altruism (L'-5), for example, are felt to be more difficult to appreciate and pursue than intentions (L-2) and needs (L-5). Aspirations are also more problematic because of their associated constraints (cf. Ch. 6: Master-Table 5 and Master-Fig. 7).

The ethical dispositions, like the ethical rules and the identity-defining institutions, exist in a still higher plane, and constitute a structure within the conscious and deliberate pursuit of the common good. The principal dispositions revealed within the framework are meticulousness (L"-1), conformity (L"-2), dedication (L"-3), respect (L"-4), virtue (L"-5), obedience (L"-6) and autonomy (L"-7). Even more than the aspirations, these dispositions are evidently dependent on self-conscious creation and cultivation. They are what self-conscious development of the self as a social being is all about. Most people find certain forms of ethical disposition more congenial and inherently motivating than others. However, a fully rounded social being needs to develop them all, and know when and how to exercise them. In what follows, each disposition will be defined and described briefly in association with each level of rule.

We can now examine rules and codes in more detail. Each level of ethical rule will be taken in turn and described in terms of the properties explained in this introductory section. The earlier caveat still applies to the examples: they are meant only to illustrate a point and do not pretend to be an exhaustive analysis.

L"-1:
PRESCRIPTIONS
AND CODES OF PRACTICE

Nature. At L"-1, the rules to be followed emerge from the need to have a practical guide to the detailed means for achieving something worthwhile. Hence the *basis of legitimacy* is to be found in the rationalist approach to ethical choice, an approach in which pure means are valued (L'-1). Kant referred to these rules as 'hypothetical imperatives'. In the present context this type of rule is better termed a **prescription** because they are like general instructions or non-discretionary requirements.[2]

The *function* of any prescription is to ensure that all know and perform certain social actions strictly as specified. They are required if harm or unfairness obviously results from an incorrect or omitted action.

This is why the prescription is said to be right. Prescriptions are like general instructions. They may be usefully grouped to form a protocol or code of practice. Such codes aim to ensure that a range of inter-related potentially beneficial activities are performed in a particular way and to the letter. The link to formal etiquette (L"-1) is evident, but the range of concerns is no longer constrained to protecting sensory being (L'-1). Note that ceremony and ritual are not an issue, and that prescriptions must have a practical rationale rather than being symbolic.

Prescriptions are typically developed by groups of experts in the field, usually leading practitioners or senior academics, for some or all elements of the community. To be effective in society, a prescription must be backed by the *authority* of community leaders or those social bodies with a standing in society in regard to the topic. The prescription to 'stop smoking' from the Royal Colleges based on a review of the evidence can be authoritative in a way that advice from a family doctor or the conclusion by a researcher in an academic journal can never be. The prescription to 'read the fine print before signing anything' might best come from the Citizens' Advice Bureaux or Consumers' Association. The prescription to 'use seat-belts every trip' might appropriately come from a Minister of State for Transport or Health. These are examples of prescriptions primarily aimed at encouraging each person to act to protect themselves.

In the case of organizations, the power to adopt a code of practice lies with its governing board. But boards are generally inclined to accede to their managers' wishes not to be fettered by rules of any sort. So when politicians or community leaders hope that organizations will adopt a code, an official or formal inquiry procedure leading to a public report is required. A representative committee needs to be set up by whomever wishes to address the issue with inputs from affected organizations. Such inquiries may be government-sponsored (cf. Ex. 8.1 and 8.2), but not necessarily. In the UK, the 'code of banking practice' was set up by the British Bankers Association, The Building Societies Association and the Association for Payment Clearing Services. Public quasi-official bodies of this sort bring pressure to bear on governing boards.

Ethical prescriptions within firms, whether or not stimulated by external pressures, should likewise seek to protect individual people. One bank, concerned to reduce its losses due to stolen credit cards, issued a prescription to its staff which specified that customers should not be informed of the bank's liability. That particular prescription aimed to protect the bank

unfairly at the expense of others and so fails the ethical test.

> Controlling Embryo Research: A Report on the ethics of embryo research in the UK was produced by a small group of non-representative experts: a medical socio- logist, a physician, a lawyer, and a clergyman who was a physicist. The Report recommended adoption of a variety of prescriptions including: no doctor or nurse should be compelled to participate against their con- science, written consent of the mother should be obtained, no financial inducements should be offered to mothers, those receiving transplants must not be told whether the material came from a miscarried or aborted foetus. The Report did not wish these prescriptions to have the status of law, but expected them to be adopted by existing ethical committees who vet research proposals in UK hospitals. If the criteria are not met by any particular study, the ethical committee should take steps to stop the research by refusing permission to commence, or by removing facilities from use. Criticism of the Report focused on whether such committees would actually act as responsible bodies and take such steps given their poor record of supervision. Ex. 8.1[3]

Prescriptions seem especially required for activities where behaviour is regarded as actually or potentially ethically problematic (as in Ex. 8.1). Often this is where the envisaged change runs contrary to current practice and convention. For example in a store where the attitude to complaints has been that the fault lies with the customer, it may be necessary to stipulate in detail such matters as: how exactly the customer is to be addressed, what immediate action is to be taken with the goods, which manager is to be informed, what compensation should be offered, and so on.

Because prescriptions must be closely specified to suit the situation that people are in, the first stage is often the production of guidelines to aid development of a code. Professional or trade associations and government inquiries which wish to foster code development often provide such guidelines (cf. Ex. 8.1). For matters to improve, each relevant firm or agency must use the guidelines to tailor and implement their own precise detailed code of practice (cf. Ex. 8.2).

> Preventing Child Abuse: From official inquiries into scan- dals, national guidelines have emerged in the UK for handling actual or potential cases of child abuse. These include ensuring there are mechanisms of proper com- munication and cooperation between agencies, rapid involvement of relevant professionals, and sensitive hand- ling of families and documentation. Such guides need to be adopted and specified in detail within the hundreds of separate agencies involved throughout the country. So, in a particular agency with nurses working in the community, the code of practice states that: if the nurse has any reason to suspect abuse of a child, then she must verbally notify the appropriate Local Authority Social Services

> Office and follow up with a written account, must immedi- ately make contact with the family doctor and arrange an examination, must inform a designated specialist nurse, must notify other relevant community staff, must maintain clear records including signing and dating all entries, must record any explanations offered, and must not make any accusations. Failure to follow these instructions pre- cisely is a breach of duty irrespective of such things as the nurse's own judgement as to the reliability of the in- formant, the ability of other professionals or agencies to provide help, the wish to protect or help the parents, or even the principle of confidentiality. In short, no personal judgement or situational feature removes the obligation to follow prescriptions in the code. Ex. 8.2[4]

Gaining Compliance. The need for a prescription or code of practice implies potential resistance at a value level. Authority alone does not generate com- pliance. Users of a code should understand the rationale of each prescription. Unless prescriptions are self- evidently necessary and meaningful, the rationalist basis of legitimacy is missing. This rationale is part of the inducement to comply. It asserts that what one is doing — stopping smoking, using a seat-belt, calling the police — will be a means to producing a good result and so must be the right thing.

Because any particular business might be disadvan- taged if it alone adopted a particular ethical line, firms within an industry commonly form an association to control their own conduct. They are likely to agree to bind themselves voluntarily to a code of practice which they have had a hand in producing and which they know others will adopt. Unfortunately, in the present climate it is not unusual for firms to use a code of practice to limit the degree of ethical control. English banks, for example, were pressed in the 1980's to introduce a code of practice governing relations with customers, but after much delay their initial proposals failed to sat- isfy anyone but the banks themselves.

A quasi-autonomous body may be required in addition if independent monitoring of a code is felt to be desirable. When such regulatory authorities are non- statutory, they are assigned few overt powers other than to foster self-regulation, and to determine and publi- cize whether or not a breach has occurred.

> Advertising Codes of Practice: Advertising is an area of public sensitivity. Many UK firms operated their own codes for many years. These were further supported when the Advertising Association, representing all sides of the British advertising business, developed a general code. To aid self-regulation, an independent but non-statutory Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) was set up in 1962. Its primary task is to develop and promote the British Code of Advertising Practice. This contains a vast number of prescriptions comprehensively covering adver- tising subjects and issues: e.g. investments should specify

that their value may go down as well as up; vitamins must not be claimed to produce weight loss. To produce this code, the ASA undertakes research into the public's reactions to advertising, surveys adherence to the code, investigates complaints, and publicizes findings. Persistent offenders are not formally penalized, but have difficulty in placing advertisements.   Ex. 8.3[5]

Because adherence to a prescription (or non-compliance) is overt and public, the possibility of social control exists. People are not just encouraged and expected but often forced to adhere to applicable prescriptions. Smoking, for example, is now banned in many areas including planes, hospitals, cinemas and restaurants where previously it was accepted as natural.

Within most organizations, implementing codes of practice and sanctioning non-compliance are matters for the responsible managers. Managerial sanction is a form of direct control over people in certain roles: it may involve disciplinary action, transfer from the task, or dismissal from the organization. So, an employee who decides to reject a code is forced to work in a different organization which has not adopted that code, or even to leave that field of work entirely. The possibility of direct overt social control means that *change* in a prescription or code of practice is relatively straightforward — providing those responsible see the need for it, and the proposed changes are evidently sensible.

Detailed codes of practice are unlikely to bear fruit unless those operating them possess the particular *ethical disposition* known as meticulousness. A meticulous person knows exactly what is required and pays careful attention to detail. Such a person is positively disposed to follow prescriptions strictly, irrespective of personal preferences or any pressures in the situation.

Pros and Cons. Within an organization, there is little difference between a prescription and a regulation, because both lend themselves to enforcement. In wider society, however, the difference is marked. The *advantages* of using prescriptions rather than laws are many. Prescriptions may be specified in a more straightforward way than laws; and can be more rapidly introduced or modified by the recipient, whether a person or an organization. Organizations must formally adopt a code and may adapt it to maximize its appropriateness and effectiveness. In this process, responsibility is actively accepted. For an employee, breaching a code is far less stigmatizing than law-breaking. Most importantly, breaches can be followed by direct and immediate control of the situation, and the delay and high cost of legal proceedings are avoided.

The main *criticism* levelled at the use of codes of prac-

tice is that they ignore the feelings and preferences of those people or organizations (like the recalcitrant banks) who are compelled to operate the code. Within organizations, it is usual to find that the staff operating a code have not drawn it up. Indeed, the prescription may be required precisely because there is felt to be an urgent and ethical necessity to alter the behaviour of people in certain roles. In such cases, the code will feel unnatural or seem wrong to them, and implementation will be difficult.

In other words, even the simplest and most rational of rules and codes embodies values whether or not this is apparent. Prescriptions like all other types of rules are values. So they affect an individual's identity and communal participation. Prescriptions which persistently override peoples' feelings will not feel fair or right to them, and so they will not be maintained. Rules and codes based on a greater force which controls the attitudes governing behaviour in social settings are therefore required. This takes us to the next level.

L"-2:
CONVENTIONS AND ETHOS'S

Nature. At L"-2, the rules to be followed emerge from the need to have constraints which are an expression of the values current in the social group. Here, the *basis of legitimacy* is clearly the conventionalist approach to ethical choice (L'-2). The rules themselves are typically referred to as **conventions** (or sometimes norms, standards or expectations) and taken together they constitute a group **ethos** (sometimes loosely called the culture). The ethos determines the prevalent tone within a social group, and shapes conduct indirectly.

The *function* of a convention is to ensure all know and apply certain attitudes generally in their conduct. It is often preferable to introduce conventions, say, to 'reduce litter' or 'stop the waste of energy' than to specify prescriptions. Once people accept the convention, they can find a wide variety of idiosyncratic and locally appropriate ways to follow it. Firms are also likely to innovate in those areas knowing that the public is disposed to respond. But introducing new conventions in wider society is equivalent to altering its defining values. This is a task primarily for politicians, civic-minded people, pressure-group spokesmen, clergy and similar opinion-formers. Still, they have no authority above and beyond the desire of the public to have someone speak up on the issue. The *authority* behind the rule remains diffusely located within the community. Unanimity on values is never found, so conventions are an expression of the mainstream or majority.

Conventions will evolve within any community to constrain discretionary action. People need conventions to know what is acceptable in general as they negotiate their interactions. The acceptability of a convention is what makes it right and gives it a natural feel, not its rationality or appropriateness. So even a compelling need for change may not lead to the alteration of established conventions.

> Professional Conventions: The medical profession is permeated by an ethos that is difficult for individual doctors to resist. Conventions dictate a pattern of differential fees and fee-sharing between different specialists which has evolved and is not based on any intrinsic qualities of the work. Surgeons, for example, usually get paid far more than physicians. Conventions also control the non-medical social handling of patients. In one society a doctor is expected to take time to listen and reassure, in another to prescribe a pill, in another to inject a drug, in another to provide suppositories. Should what is expected not be provided, the patient gets upset and feels poorly treated. This, combined with attitudes of relatives and professional colleagues, puts considerable pressure on the doctor to conform.   Ex. 8.4

In organizations, conventions lend themselves to a degree of management. If conventions are left to emerge spontaneously, the result may be profoundly unsatisfactory in terms of the mission (cf. Ex. 8.5). The ethos in any department and any operation as a whole should be monitored, shaped and supported by the leadership. Even so, as in wider society, conventions are given reality and *authority* by the social group as a whole. So a board or senior manager cannot simply decide a convention and issue an edict. Leaders must introduce new conventions sensitively and win support for their desired ethos. If they succeed, responsibility for the conventions becomes disseminated throughout the organization and everyone accepts them and ensures they are upheld by themselves and others. Concern for maintaining the desired ethos must never let up. Because conventions are dynamic and continue evolving, the situation can easily become unsatisfactory again.

> Changing an Agency Ethos: The ethos that had evolved within a voluntary social work agency impeded work. For example, process was given more attention than results, information was devalued and computer solutions ignored, people overworked to the point of falling ill, and overly personal reactions to routine managerial difficulties were common. Such things were not amenable to control by prescriptions or codes of practice. As managerial values were introduced, things changed. It became a matter of convention that work would be shared around without waiting for a state of crisis or an emotional explosion, discussions of priorities became the norm, computers were accepted as a sensible aid rather than as a

> depersonalizing intrusion, and a task orientation sensitive to people prevailed. Social pressure resulted in the resignation of a few managers who could not conform to the new ways.   Ex. 8.5

Aspects of popular morality (L"-II) naturally enter into any ethos. The subject matter (sex, aggression, money &c) is relevant in any group and is not amenable to control by a code of practice. A bank, for example, recently issued a dressing code for its staff. Specific prescriptions could have been agreed, but the bank referred generally to the expectation that staff should avoid dressing in a sexually provocative way. This is a matter of evolving convention and within the sphere of popular morality. So it generated intense resentment in staff who objected through their union officials.

Gaining Compliance. Unless conventions are based in current values, they will lack the conventionalist basis of legitimacy. Conforming to these values leads to social acceptance and a feeling of security, both powerful inducements. Leaders promote ethos *change* by fostering and channelling the evolution of values and conventions. An ethos is much like popular morality in the sense that control is exerted ultimately through the spontaneous exertion of social pressure.

Within organizations, the sanction of social rejection may be further backed by indirect or informal action like being passed over for promotion or failing to be re-elected to a committee. Within wider society, such immediate controls on individual people or firms are largely absent, but pressure can be brought to bear via the media and through boycotts. Breaches of convention can bring a whole sector into disfavour. At the time of writing, banks are being excoriated for their unconventional business practices which include altering charges without notice or agreement and extracting payment by debiting accounts without permission. Where firms must be allowed discretion despite their tendencies to operate on the borderline of acceptability — in their advertising for example — specific formal channels are needed to focus attitudes and to bring sustained and systematic pressures to bear (see. Ex. 8.6).

> Advertising and Conventions: Ethical monitoring agencies which must define and aid enforcement of codes of practice necessarily become involved in assessing and reflecting local moral conventions as well. The code of advertising practice referred to in Ex. 8.3 must take account of public tastes as well as pressures in regard to decency. To achieve this, the ASA sponsors research into how advertising is being understood, and assesses how public opinion is moving. The findings from such research lead to continual modification of the code. In addition, adjudications under the code are made in the light of

'standards of decency and propriety that are generally accepted at present in the United Kingdom' [para. 3.1]. Conventions of decency, popular morality, vary greatly between countries: one television advertisement showing stockinged legs was banned in the USA, could only be shown after 9 pm in the UK, and won a prize in France.

Ex. 8.6

Conformity is the necessary *ethical disposition*, and is, perhaps, the most easily developed of all the dispositions. Parents and teachers demand it, reward it and get it (more or less) from children. Possibly this is why conformity is so commonly seen by philosophers as not ethical at all — or even as the antithesis of what is ethical. From the elevated perspective of many writers on ethics, public attitudes and majority views, with the mundane values and popular morality which they generally embody, often appear so debased and so contrary to higher principles that to put a value on conformity is almost sacrilegious. Like the reaction against the conventionalist approach to ethical choice, this position is too extreme. To conform is not necessarily to be blind, nor is it to deny the validity of higher level rules and other ethical dispositions. Conformity complements humanity and enlightenment: without it, the person is not accepted in the social group, and the other higher ethical dispositions will not lead to any practical social good.

Pros and Cons. Conventions are fuzzy, but this is precisely one of their main *advantages*. It means that conventions can control matters that are semi-private or touch on popular morality, can allow for gradations in adherence, can permit a variety of ways to follow them, and can evolve gradually without stoking up controversy. In an organization, for example, distinct ethos's can be created which are adapted to the history, circumstances and needs of particular departments or divisions, whereas any system of regulation must apply as stated across the whole company.

Criticisms of convention focus on its unique strengths: mainly its fuzziness and its basis in conformity. It is sometimes forgotten that law itself depends ultimately on vague and poorly understood conventions in a community to respect the law and to accord it supremacy. The real limitations lie in convention's roots in attitude. Attitudes cannot always be harnessed. For example, conventions which do not accord with the way people view reality and social life can never be stable or effective because they do not seem to make sense. So introduction of the rule of law, for example, is difficult in societies habituated to absolutist or corrupt rule. A new type of rule at a higher level which governs how people sustain or refashion their attitudes is required to deal with this problem.

L"-3:
TENETS AND CREDOS

Nature. At L"-3, the rules to be followed emerge from the need to specify precisely what values each individual should regularly use when choosing. These values become rules and are recognized as **tenets** (beliefs, dogmas, assumptions, articles of faith). To be tolerated in a community, any set of tenets must be compatible with communal ideals (L"-III). Tenets must also accord with personal beliefs if a person is to use them. The *basis of legitimacy* for such tenets presumably derives from the pragmatist approach (L'-3) in which personal-cum-social ideals form the ethical aspiration.

A set of inter-related tenets forms a **credo** or belief system, ideology, creed or dogma. Such terms bring to mind just how important tenets are for members of political and religious sub-groups within a community. But all associations at some time or another do (or should) ask themselves what they stand for and believe in. The identity, cohesion and endurance of any association depend on tenets which maintain a loyalty and uniformity of approach of members. Clarity about tenets is especially valuable to help newcomers decide whether they can comfortably fit into the group culture.

The *function* of tenets is to ensure that all know, affirm and express certain values in daily life. Rules are right by definition. So, even when scientifically derived or proved, tenets do not depend on the facts. The point is that our deepest guiding values define who we are and cannot be a matter of preference or evidence. They must remain a dogmatic statement of emotional truth. In short, tenets are lived if they are followed at all. Their origins and use in the pragmatist approach (L'-3) and more distantly in setting desired priorities (L-3) confirm their emotional nature.

Businesses which are pragmatically driven may avoid credos, but there is an increasing recognition that the right sort of management culture is a competitive asset. An explicit and genuine credo can be the defining core of such a culture. Many firms do have corporate credos: a well-known one is Johnson & Johnson's which lists a full range of desirable aspects in the relations which (it affirms) 'we must' have with consumers, staff, communities and stockholders. The full one page text is reprinted in a handbook produced by the Ethics Resource Center (USA) which notes that the credo is the oldest and simplest approach to developing an ethical **code.**[6]

Executive-dominated enterprises may view explicit tenets as optional, but other types of endeavour like regulatory authorities and social movements cannot do without them. Members of a probation board, for

example, are guided in their judgements by tenets in regard to punishment, danger and incarceration. Those joining a popular movement do so precisely because it proclaims certain tenets. Religious movements, for example, commence from a core of tenets which become elaborated and modified over time. At the time of writing, new tenets about the place of women in the Anglican church are being proposed. These could lead to such things as God being addressed as a woman, women being able to become bishops and so on. The real point is that tenets, just like any other form of rule, may be proposed, debated, adopted or rejected.

Of course, whether people understand and use a new tenet is another matter. People accept tenets, respect credos and join movements according to the dictates of their conscience. As noted in regard to communal ideals, the conscience is the key *authority* when it comes to belief. It dispenses self-approval and self-disapproval and exerts control from inside in a direct fashion.

Tenets of movements become tenets of organizations which grow out of the movement (see Ex. 8.7). However, unless tenets are restricted to high level abstract assumptions, they have the potential to create schisms within the group. Religious organizations differentiate from the originating movement, for example, on the basis of what seem to outsiders to be small differences of opinion. The splitting of left-wing political parties and psychotherapy organizations is also tenet-based.

Psychoanalytic Tenets: The International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) formed originally by Freud has demanded adherence to certain tenets from the very beginning. Things like the unconscious, infantile sexuality, defences, dream interpretations, and transference are not just current theories, but rules of thinking and working which cannot be rejected while remaining a psychoanalyst. The use of tenets so close to inevitably changing clinical theory made the IPA vulnerable to schism. Jung, the first President, led the way through his doubt of the importance of sexuality in all disorders and his emphasis on other ideas like the collective unconscious. Adler's belief in the importance of inferior-superior relations, social relations and the use of modified therapeutic techniques led to another split. Horney's and Fromm's emphasis on cultural factors led to a further schism. And so on. Ex. 8.7

Many phenomena which used to be held as dogma have been reworked by science with great benefit. As a result, most scientists treat scientific methods and assumptions as tenets. In areas where science has made little headway — organizational life, political choice, personal commitment, spirituality — the field is wide open for competing idiosyncratic beliefs and creeds.

For example: there are two theories about motivating staff which are actually managerial credos. The tenets of theory X hold that people dislike work and responsibility, need to be coerced and controlled to achieve, and want security above all; while the tenets of theory Y hold that people find work natural and enjoyable, desire self-direction, seek responsibility, and do not use most of their potential.[7]

Gaining Compliance. Unless tenets are based on what people actually believe or are prepared to believe, they will lack a pragmatic basis of legitimacy. Even then, gaining compliance to a new credo may be problematic. Tenets come to coincide with personal beliefs through a socialization process, and the support from others for tenets is also a powerful inducement to comply.

Commercial firms must take socialization of their employees seriously if they wish to modify tenets. For example, the tenet 'a focus on quality reduces costs' runs counter to everyday experience in most firms and yet one strand of management thinking holds it to be essential. Some top executives regard the introduction of new tenets as too difficult. Many seek to recruit people who already hold the desired tenets. Others imagine that external consultants can do the job for them. There is often the wish to introduce new values without speaking of credos or considering existing beliefs and values. Seemingly worthy attempts at culture change often do little more than generate cynicism and demoralization amongst staff, because the effort to get the new values internalized as beliefs and recognized as communal tenets is missing. Instead, hypocrisy persists. If a credo specifies openness, equality and long-term success while the reality is secrecy, hierarchy, and expedience, staff live the reality not the credo.

From the personal perspective, genuinely accepting entirely new tenets demands something akin to a conversion. Even if the idea that women are inferior to men in some general sense is wrong and socially damaging, getting such an idea changed, internalized and treated as a tenet may take generations. Social movements are usually required: like the suffragette and feminist movements in this case. Movements commence through the banding together of people articulating new ideals and passionately convinced that existing societal tenets need to change. Most people do not go along with a movement in its early stages, and their resistance may generate extreme counter-measures by activists (cf. Ex. 8.8).

Conversion to Normalization: Normalization is a recent ideology which has generated a new approach to caring for people with learning difficulties. It was developed to

deal with the widespread tendency for such people to be maltreated and even dehumanized. Normalization aims to increase autonomy and improve the quality of care offered to sufferers. Relatively non-contentious are prescriptions in regard to labelling e.g. substitute the term 'learning difficulties' for 'mental handicap' , and conventions describing attitudes e.g. treat the person as a 'client' not as a 'patient' . But some rules are seen as harmful in a particular context, and so generate intense controversy. For example, the prescription that 'the client must always participate in all conferences concerning them' may produce discomfort and constrain staff from contributing during a discussion. Managers may then judge it inadvisable to implement this rule. Promoters of the code regard such apparently reasonable opposition as showing that managers do not really believe in normalization. Training anticipates such opposition. It uses group pressure and powerful emotional techniques akin to brain-washing to convert people and dispose them to adhere to the tenets of normalization.   Ex. 8.8[8]

Even when people become intellectually convinced that tenets upheld by their conscience are out of step with tenets in their organization or community, they may be unable to adhere to the new rules. Many of the patients treated by Masters and Johnson for sexual inadequacy, for example, were found to have been inculcated with beliefs that sex was harmful, degrading and dirty.[9] Despite their wishes, they found it difficult to adopt and use new tenets of sexuality. Altering their consciences involved making themselves emotionally vulnerable and accepting an intense exposure to the new rules of sexual life. All psycho-dynamic therapies seek the formation and internalization of new tenets. They do so by creating an intense, intimate and usually lengthy attachment to the therapist as a precursor to re-working and modifying early socializing experiences.

In other words, once tenets are established in a society or organization, *change* is difficult to arrange. In tribal bodies like churches, political parties and professional associations, maintaining the orthodoxy is a prerequisite to reaching leadership positions. When a person's beliefs no longer fit the group's dogmas, they willingly depart the group — this is known in the church as apostasy; or they attempt to change the group's dogma by proposing new tenets — this is known as heresy. Orthodoxies have a variety of techniques to deal with new tenets. They may avoid or stifle debate; co-opt modify and assimilate the new ideas; isolate and marginalize the proponents; or, at the extreme, proscribe the heretical tenets and use force to subjugate, persecute and expel heretics.

Complementary Medicine: Analytic biological and epidemiological sciences underpinning Western medicine are based on tenets of reductionism. Holistic medical practitioners wish to introduce the tenet that each person must be seen and treated as a unique whole. Such ideas have always existed in medicine, but not in its scientific basis. Like other successful heretics, the supporters of holistic medicine offer a critique of biomedical science by highlighting its failures. A recent BMA review of complementary medicine was organized without proper participation of the main complementary medicine organisations, which include a research council. At the outset, the Report branded non-conventional practices as non-scientific, thereby weakening their acceptability, if not wholly depriving them of legitimacy.   Ex. 8.9[10]

Dedication, a form of passionate conscientiousness, is the *ethical disposition* which must be cultivated if a person is to recognize and act on tenets unwaveringly. Dedication depends on a well-developed conscience which idealizes the relevant tenets and governs actions accordingly. Dedication is a personal quality which does not emerge at the behest of fashion or an executive command. Put another way, people must believe in what they are doing and be dedicated if they are to achieve anything substantial in the face of inevitable obstacles. If a group member publicly ignores or challenges the tenets, others lose confidence in him very rapidly and doubt his loyalty. Restoration to a position of trust is difficult without a convincing explanation, retraction, and explicit re-dedication to the creed.

Dedication to new tenets requires a period of reflection and a determined effort to face and work through internal opposition based on previous convictions and habits. The person must make an internal shift in commitment while receiving a diffuse but genuine social support. Any culture change project must allow for these processes and recognize that they differ from those required in most management change initiatives.

Pros and Cons. Tenets to which people are genuinely dedicated have distinct *advantages* over laws or regulations because no external edict or force can be as potent as the conscience. Tenets allow people to act as their own policeman, judge and penal system. Whereas the legal system must deal with matters after the event, the conscience can prevent wrongdoing because it can deal with the state of mind before anything has taken place.

The emotional quality of tenets gives them the potential not only to unite people but also to empower them and their particular group. *Criticism* of tenets focuses on their capacity to foster social tensions and conflicts between communal groups. Tenets which we accept seem so eminently reasonable and necessary, whereas the tenets of other groups so often appear invalid, incomprehensible, dangerous or unimportant. Our group's tenets are considered and essential,

whereas others seem to be slaves to their ideology. The community must deal with such attitudes towards group differences if group power is to be safely released. Power will be used constructively if individuals are sure of their authority and responsibility in relation to others, and this requires rules at the next level.

L"-4:
RIGHTS AND CHARTERS

Nature. At L"-4, the rules to be followed emerge from the need to constrain the handling of power imbalances between classes of individual, given their diversity and mutual inter-dependence. A class is an abstract but immediately recognizable classification or categorization applicable to community members e.g. minors, entrepreneurs, commuters, unskilled labourers. The rules define and protect the individuality of those in the class, and aim to manage feelings of unfairness in the distribution of benefits and dis-benefits engendered by class differences and social arrangements. The *basis of legitimacy* for such rules clearly derives from the individualist approach to ethical choice and dialectical decision-making (L'-4); and there is an obvious relationship to the social structure (L"-IV) within which the position of each person is determined in relation to a variety of social classifications which apply.

Class imbalances emerge contentiously in particular situations involving particular individuals, who are described as the protagonists or parties to the dispute. The rules are known as **rights**. Situations often call for rights to be brought together in a **charter** (or declaration or convention). Note that although each person feels the possession (or absence) of rights, they are actually the possession of a recognized class of persons in society.

The Prototypical Charter: In 1215, the Magna Carta (Great Charter) defined the relative rights of the Monarch and the Barons and others in England. These rights include: No.8: No widow shall be forced to marry so long as she wishes to live without a husband. No. 10: If anyone who has borrowed from the Jews any sum, great or small, dies before it is repaid, the debt shall not bear interest, while the heir is underage. No. 40: To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or justice. No.41: All merchants shall have safe and secure exit from and entry into England and be free of all evil tolls. No.54: No one shall be arrested or imprisoned upon the appeal of a woman for the death of anyone except her husband. All these rights are unambiguous and can (in principle) be strictly observed. The Magna Carta, granted by King John in the midst of a rebellion, was not subsequently upheld. It only reached its final statute form when Henry III issued it in 1225. It was then reissued and confirmed at least 37 times down to the time of Henry VI.
Ex. 8.10[11]

The *function* of rights is to ensure that all know and respect what is due to and from each individual in a class. Rights need to allow for differences and power imbalances while enabling the relationship and integrity of each party to be maintained. Rights, like the other rules, also apply to non-personal individuals like firms and governments. For instance, the leaders of the four powers that divided Germany after World War II spoke of their rights during the re-unification process.

It is not easy to impose a right (or a duty) on a category of individual. The very notion with its origin in individualism implies that each class and its members must, in some way, be allowed to have a say in its own rights. So, the source of *authority* in relation to rights is ultimately the power exercised by the affected class. (Apparently might is right!) Class power, in turn, depends on the efforts of every person in the class affected by the rights. Although most classes — consider widows, war veterans and newspaper readers — do not form a natural social group, organizations can emerge as a voice claiming to defend their interests. In developing and devising rights or agreeing to a charter, representative arrangements are usually needed and such organizations come to exert an influence on the decisions of public bodies.

Many inter-class relationships within society and in organizations show mutual dependence and yet an obvious power imbalance e.g. between managers and subordinates, between employers and staff, between doctors and patients, between lawyers and clients, between newspaper editors and readers, between researchers and subjects, between sellers and consumers and between universities and their students. In all these relationships, unthinking expedience or sheer self-interest of the dominant party will lead to unjust or unnecessarily harmful practices developing. These can be avoided and the relationship in general strengthened if a statement of the rights and duties of both parties are specified and agreed. Charters in such situations invariably take their shape and force from existing moral institutions as adapted to the conflictual situation.

If charters are operated voluntarily, they can benefit both parties e.g. instituting an employee's charter could help boards introduce changes while raising staff self-respect and morale; and instituting a student's charter could aid maintenance of discipline while fostering maturity and releasing creativity.

Types of Right. The language of rights is confused in the extreme. The trouble is that rights have come to

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be used to refer to virtually anything an individual desires or feels entitled to. Such an emotional basis is unsatisfactory because rights are inherently limited to what others, or the social group as a whole, can actually assign, do or provide. For example, it is meaningless to talk of rights to health or intelligence because these are not within the gift of society or other individuals; whereas it is meaningful to consider possible rights to health care or schooling. Rights are frequently spoken of as if they invariably imply advantage, but rights include what is due from someone, that is to say responsibilities or duties which may be burdensome.

Rights and duties get muddled. When politicians seek the responsibilities of office, their minds generally focus on the powers that will be theirs by right, whereas their constituents envisage the performance of duties which elections confer by right. Common parlance is subtle: to have a responsibility *for* something is a right which is a power, whereas to have a responsibility *to* someone is a right which is a duty or accountability.

Rights and duties tend to go together because if something is due to you it is frequently the case that something complementary is due from someone else e.g. if you have the right to be paid, then someone must have the duty to pay you. However the same thing, say free passage in the streets, may be due from others to you and also due from you to them. At times the notion of duty is virtually synonymous with the notion of right. For example, if one has a duty to vote, then the right to vote must exist as well.

Legal scholars like Hohfeld have gone further and distinguished four types of rights, each of which exists in a positive and negative form. There are rights in respect of being treated (or not being treated) in a certain way. This may be termed a claim (or an absence of a claim). There are rights in respect of avoiding (or not avoiding) being treated in a certain way. This may be termed an immunity (or a disability). There are rights in respect of being enabled (or being expected) to act. This may be termed a privilege or liberty (or a duty). Finally there are rights in respect of being enabled to act on others (or being blocked from doing so). This may be termed a power (or a liability).[12]

Gaining Compliance. Adherence to rights and duties should benefit each individual in the class, otherwise the individualist basis of legitimacy is missing. If benefits to each party are not direct and obvious, compliance will be problematic. It is precisely because rights proper seem more self-advantageous than duties that rights have come to be thought of as divorced from duty. *Changes* in rights (or new charters) characteristically generate intense opposition because as soon as any

class obtains and asserts rights not previously accorded, the balance of power in the relevant arena starts shifting. King John was typical in signing and then evading what he had signed (Ex. 8.10).

Compliance depends on each person in the parties to the charter (e.g. each teacher and each student) recognizing their class membership and feeling an inner pressure based on it to use and respect the charter. To support this tendency, charters benefit from mechanisms which encourage people to exert their rights, allow adherence to be monitored, and enable disputes to be openly and fairly resolved. In firms, for example, a worker may have a representative assist him at a special tribunal. In wider society, social workers and Citizen's Advice Bureaux provide information and counselling; and advocates may be provided for those with difficulty speaking up for themselves.

Charters are often named after the weaker party — hence consumer rights, patient rights, workers' rights — and seem to play down associated responsibilities and respect for the rights of the stronger party. It is easy, perhaps tempting, for the stronger party to take advantage of its position. Even after agreeing to a charter, it may nonetheless be disposed to victimize anyone who attempts to use it. If this occurs or is likely, social pressure needs to be orchestrated by a representative body of the class: e.g. the union may take up a case in relation to management practices, a health pressure group may protest about the handling of a patient at a state hospital, the student society can complain on behalf of a student to the university authorities. Alternatively, a regulatory authority of some sort may be used. Ombudsmen, for example, have been appointed in many countries to help people assert their rights in dealing with large impersonal or monopolistic bureaucracies like local government.

If the rights violation is recognized and accepted, the offending party needs to provide restitution or compensation, an appropriate apology and an agreement to accord due rights in future. Active steps may have to be taken to ensure that attitudes are reoriented, that disadvantages accrued during the period of violation are rectified, and that arrangements are in place to ensure there is no repetition.

Respect is the *ethical disposition* which fosters the recognition and assertion of rights, and enhances the likelihood that they will be accorded. Humiliation or maltreatment suffered at the hands of a stronger party is evidence of a breakdown in respect. It will be recalled that supplies of respect, both self-respect and respect from others, are essential to maintain self-esteem and support existence as an individual (L'-IV). Respect increases the likelihood that the exertion of rights will

enhance social cohesion. Anyone who abuses the rights of another implicitly devalues a whole class, and so weakens the community. Devalued people often find it difficult to maintain their self-respect, and then their feelings of inferiority may release aggression which causes further loss of respect. So community tensions and discord are heightened in a vicious downward spiral.

Pros and Cons. As noted above, people who feel their own position is weakened or jeopardized tend to reject the rights of others. They engage in overt or covert resistance and promote a different balance of power. Until rights are backed by law, class representatives may determinedly pursue their own ends to the detriment of others and even society as a whole. So rights present a potential threat to peace, order and stability. As a result, and unlike rules at previous levels, it is wholly appropriate to make them a focus for law-making.

> Parents Oppose Children's Rights: The children's rights movement has been associated with the uncovering of physical harm, sexual abuse, neglect and exploitation of children by parents and relatives. This has led to increased supervision of families and more orders to take children into care. As a result, organizations have formed to uphold 'parent's rights' and to oppose, or at least limit, official intrusion into family life, external control of family behaviours, and compulsory removal of children from the home. The UK government finally responded with a Children's Act (1989) which emphasises that children do have rights and that parents have responsibilities rather than, or as well as, rights in relation to them.   Ex. 8.11

Nevertheless, the sensitivity that surrounds the need for differential rights (or the wish to eradicate differentials) means that there are often *advantages* in introducing a new charter initially on a non-legal basis. This enables discussions to take place, helps anomalies to be clarified, and ensures that something will be formulated. Violations can then receive publicity without necessarily invoking public penalties. Beliefs can be gradually modified. Attitudes can adapt. If legal status were required *ab initio*, such documents would never see the light of day. Even if they were produced, those most affected would refuse to endorse them. In short, legalizing rights does not necessarily lead to real social change.

> Rights of Children: When the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) is ratified by 20 countries after 10 years of debate, it will become international law and binding upon them. However, there will be no judicial machinery to enforce the law and no right of individual complaint. Many of the Articles run counter to practice and law even in relatively advanced countries like the UK where separation of children from parents occurs as a

consequence of immigration policies (cf. Art. 9), hitting children is still condoned (cf. Art. 19), and boys as young as 15 are being remanded in prison with adults (cf. Art 37).   Ex. 8.12

Criticism of those rights which are not binding in law often concentrates on difficulties with enforcement — but, of course, this applies to all the rules thus far. Criticism which is more to the point emphasizes the potential for conflict generated by the very act of defining and recognizing rights. Whenever power relationships are altered — which is precisely the purpose of new rights and duties — those who lose power tend to feel that the developments are unfair. This results in conflict, as exemplified in the clash between supporters of parents' rights and childrens' rights (Ex.s 8.11 and 8.12). The result is that rights campaigners, when fighting discrimination, often discriminate or advocate discrimination against members of previously powerful classes, and even persist in discriminating against other vulnerable classes. Criticism is often targetted at crusaders seeking the assignation of new rights. The most undermining criticism is that they hold extremist views which are not truly representative of the class.

Taking a rights perspective alone is insufficient as a guide in many situations. Consider the not uncommon situation of a hospital patient harassing a nurse.[13] The nurse's rights may indeed be violated, but to avoid the patient or to retaliate does not seem to be ethically desirable, and appealing to a charter or adjudicatory body is hardly the answer. Such situations can only be dealt with ethically using rules at the next level.

L"-5:
MAXIMS AND CODES OF ETHICS

Nature. At L"-5, the rules to be followed emerge from the need to regulate the handling of relationships so as to maximize the likelihood of an overall beneficial result. The *basis of legitimacy* for such rules can be found in the communalist approach to ethical choice (L'-5). These rules will be referred to as **maxims**. Maxims are often encapsulated as proverbs, mottos, adages or wise sayings. Maxims are a form of rule developed to govern personal relationships irrespective of issues of individual advantage or power, and their origin is society's ethical teaching (L"-V). An *organized collection of* maxims designed for a particular purpose is termed a **code of ethics** (or sometimes a code of conduct).

The *function* of a maxim is to ensure that all know and meet the general requirements for virtuous functioning. So maxims tend to be more widely applicable and more self-evidently good than previous types of rule. Maxims apply as much to organizations and govern-

ments as to persons. For example, although governments may break verbal undertakings by their ministers and diplomats (just as people may break promises), it is usually accepted that the ethical precept requiring adherence to agreements freely entered into still applies.

Maxims appeal to the *authority* of the current ethical teaching. Because the teaching is a natural moral institution, the legitimacy of the maxims is immediately recognizable and readily granted without detailed reference or debate. An ethical teaching can be said to define a moral community; and maxims only have validity and automatic respect (as opposed to lip service) within such a community. Those assuming moral leadership in any community address challenges by emphasizing particular maxims and virtues that seem relevant. Calls for restraint and tolerance at times of civil turmoil, exhortations to be industrious and thrifty when economic conditions worsen, pleas for honesty and truthfulness to resolve a scandal, exemplify the use of maxims.

Any individual, person or organization, can determine maxims and virtues for their own use. For example, the general maxim 'to respect confidences' might be expanded in a business to confidentiality in regard to tenders, or confidentiality in regard to advice. The maxim to 'care for others' when applied within a chemical firm might become: 'protect those who produce, package, transport, use and dispose of our products from potential hazards'. Such a maxim could lead to responsible managers devising and implementing a wide variety of prescriptions, conventions, duties, procedures and policies.

One investigator claimed to have found over 400 codes of ethics covering a wide variety of occupations — everything from museum curators to private detectives to public relations. However, the organized use of maxims is most evident and credible in established professions, most prominently medicine. (Hence the choice of examples in this chapter.) Membership associations of doctors and those of other professionals — including social workers, lawyers, accountants, dentists, statisticians &c — seek to gain and maintain the confidence of the public by giving guidance which spells out the virtue of its members while not infringing their autonomy. The code of ethics re-works maxims from within the accepted ethical teaching adapted to suit the stresses of professional activities. The maxims in a code are typically formulated in a very general and unarguable way which facilitates their internationalization. Because the maxims seek to be applicable in any situation, they must be articulated so as to allow considerable latitude in performance.

Maxims for Doctors: The Canadian Medical Association captures the flavour of what a code of ethics is about by opening their code with seven maxims. These are — 1: Consider first the well-being of the patient. 2: Honour your profession and its traditions. 3: Recognise your limitations and the special skills of others in the prevention and treatment of disease. 4: Protect the patient's secrets. 5: Teach and be taught. 6: Remember that integrity and professional ability should be your only advertisement. 7: Be responsible in setting a value on your services.

Ex. 8.13[14]

A code is also significant in business, because if a firm gets a reputation for operating ethically, it is undoubtedly strengthened. By providing a recognizable and respected common social framework, a code of ethics helps employees and professionals to do what is right and to explain their actions. In a US survey of corporations and associations, a well-handled code of ethics was claimed to provide legal protection, to increase pride and loyalty, to enhance customer/client and public good-will, and to reduce corruption (theft, bribery).[15] Code development within firms should engage with pay incentives because staff often feel that the design of these incentives encourages them to cut corners and indulge in sharp practice. However, one business ethics consultant working in telecommunications and financial services firms over several years reported that not a single firm had ever agreed to examine its incentive system as part of its ethics programme.[16]

Gaining Compliance. Adherence to a maxim should be in everybody's interest. Otherwise the communalist basis of legitimacy is missing. But the awareness that everyone benefits is a comparatively weak inducement to comply. As in the ethical teaching, people may find that by not complying, they gain benefits at the expense of others. For example: should a surgeon allow himself to be tested for hepatitis B virus to protect patients — given that, if he is infected, he loses the right to operate? One surgeon described the unhappy consequences of discovering his infection and reported that his street-wise colleagues had advised him to ignore potential harm to patients and assert his right to refuse to be tested.[17]

In a moral community, action and choice should be determined by the exercise of autonomy and virtue. So adherence to maxims is a voluntary matter. Like the surgeon or an employee of the chemical firm, each person is given considerable freedom about how to interpret a maxim and, in the public domain, even whether to follow it or not. The ethical teaching underpinning any maxim invites identification, and identification makes virtue easy. Others may view virtue with admiration, but for the virtuous person, it is no more

than being natural. Correspondingly, adherence to a maxim with which we are not identified is a constant struggle against passions and expedience.

An Association Breaks the Code: Psychiatrists in the USSR were involved in the abuse of patients for political purposes for many years. This contravened the code of ethics developed by the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) in its Declaration of Hawaii. In order to avoid expulsion from the WPA, the Soviet Association resigned in 1983 and slandered the British Royal College of Psychiatrists. The Soviets attempted to be readmitted at the WPA Congress in 1989 in association with Gorbachev's attempt to re-vitalize the USSR via perestroika and glasnost. However, the Soviet contingent imagined that they could do so without acknowledging that there had been abuse, and without bothering to retract their slanders. Eventually they admitted their abuse and apologized. So a conditional reinstatement in the WPA was then agreed subject to Soviet reforms and their monitoring by the WPA. A report in Izvestia referred to readmission, but ignored the conditions. It also referred to the full membership accorded to an untainted rival Soviet Independent Psychiatric Association as 'temporary membership'.   Ex. 8.14[18]

Although ethical teachings have a perennial relevance, maxims and codes of ethics do need to *change* at least superficially to meet new circumstances and challenges. Modifications take the form of a re-interpretation or re-articulation of already recognized maxims. The rise of big business, for example, has led to a demand for the development of business ethics. The opportunity for unethical business operations has dramatically increased in recent decades due to the large amounts of money now involved, the sheer size and complexity of many businesses, the absence of public awareness and scrutiny, increased opportunities for fraud, and over-close connections between many businesses and governments. Applying an ethical teaching to the complexities and legalities of business requires dedicated effort, probably best based in academies.

The *ethical disposition* requiring cultivation in relation to maxims is virtue (or propriety). Virtue is comprehensive. It implies adherence to the ethical teaching, development of a full range of specific virtues, and (according to Plato and Aristotle) the exercise of these virtues and other ethical dispositions in a proper order and balance.

Virtue is so difficult for people that social support for it is essential. The government or public bodies and professional associations may establish regulatory authorities and authorize them to define and monitor ethical maxims relevant to a sphere of activity. In the case of the professions, ethical violation affects the confidence of the public. So most professional associations provide codes of ethics which allow for investigation,

even though disciplinary responses are usually limited to reprimands and expulsion from the association (cf. Ex. 8.14 and 8.15).

The greater the significance that society attaches to proper conduct in a particular domain, the greater the likelihood that statutory regulation of professional or business conduct will be imposed. Statutory regulatory authorities exist to monitor and ensure propriety in a wide variety of areas e.g. financial deals, medical treatment, aesthetic choices in the public sphere, discipline within organizations, sexual and racial discrimination.

Protecting Medical Virtue: A doctor's membership of the British Medical Association and adherence to its code of ethics is voluntary. However, registration with the General Medical Council (GMC) is compulsory if a doctor is to practise legally in the UK. The GMC contains lay members and is empowered to investigate 'serious professional misconduct' (i.e. breaches of the profession's maxims) which are brought to its notice. Following initial scrutiny to see if there is a case to answer, a committee documents the allegation, and then there is a formal inquiry in which lawyers are used. Removing a doctor from the register, temporarily or permanently, and so preventing further practice is the sole and powerful sanction. Civil and criminal proceedings may occur in parallel as an independent matter according to the law and within the court system.   Ex. 8.15

Pros and Cons. Maxims are flexible and useful tools. If adhered to, their *advantages* over regulations or laws are many. Maxims provide for trust, smoothness, flexibility and simplicity in social dealings, and avoid the complexity, bureaucracy and impersonality inherent in legalistic arrangements. For example, a firm's ethical policies written as regulations are usually unreadable, while maxims can and must be memorable.[19] Adherence to ethical teachings can also mitigate the effect of unfair or harmful rules at lower levels, and of laws which are ineffective or draconian.

Self-regulation implies responsible action, and this means: first, that there is a suitable explicit code which is felt to be binding: second, that the spirit of the ethical teaching must imbue the individual; and third, that the individual is part of a moral community. Wherever ethical teachings are not voluntarily adopted, legal controls are commonly followed, if at all, to the letter rather than in the spirit. In the UK, for example, bringing in the criminal law to control fraud resulted in a meagre 28 prosecutions over 13 years.[20] Where ethical maxims are undeveloped, laws are unlikely to be passed.

Propriety in Financial Services: Many practices within financial services — conveniently delaying orders, holding cheques, dumping unwanted stocks on clients, insider dealing, front-running, giving biased advice, releasing

false information, churning, exploiting regulatory loop-holes — seem to be a mixture of theft, fraud, abuse of trust, and bad faith. Such behaviours are the convention in most countries at present and so the usual response by governments has been to gloss over all but the grossest abuses. Here are two examples.

Japanese Banking: It became clear in 1991, that lead-ing banks in Japan had been issuing forged deposit notes, doing business with criminal organizations, and compensating large clients for losses. They did so with the tacit and active support of officials, and were allowed to lie with impunity to official inquiries into their activities by using formulae like 'I forget'. The amount that Japanese banks have withheld from (defrauded?) Japanese deposi-tors through excessively low interest payments is said to be of the order of £300 billion.

English Self-regulation: Leading figures at Lloyds of London, the insurance market, fight for self-regulation but seem to believe that this means deciding what to do to protect the business when complaints of impropriety cannot be hushed up — not that it implies a duty on pro-fessionals to adhere to pre-specified maxims in terms of which their behaviour would be impartially and publicly judged. In recent decades massive losses due to negli-gent underwriting and scandalous practices have led to personal disaster and suicides of people who put up capital. Lloyds underwriters regularly lose legal cases asserting negligence: but waiting for the law to determine fault means ignoring self-regulation.   Ex. 8.16[21]

The *criticism* of maxims is that, like virtue itself, they are too vague and too discretionary. This makes them unreliable and too dependent on personal integrity. Maxims resemble social values (L-5) in their inherent self-evident goodness, and resemble the communalist approach to ethical choice (L'-5) in the difficulty of applying them given the complexity of social situations.

Ethical maxims, though fundamental to the quality of social life, are not by nature strictly enforceable. Worse, they potentially encourage weak individuals to choose to disregard them and to exploit those who do adhere to them. In order to deal with such defects, a higher level is required containing strictly enforced and impartially adjudicated rules.

L"-6:
LAWS AND SYSTEMS
OF REGULATION

Nature. At L"-6, the rules to be followed emerge from the need to enforce basic values and ethical con-cerns dealt with by rules at lower levels. The twin characteristics of definitiveness for the whole com-munity and formal enforcement make these rules, generally called laws (or regulations) seem the para-digm for rules, indeed the only real sort of rule. But in each of the previous sections we saw that laws are not at all the optimum type of rule to govern all situations.

The *basis of legitimacy* for laws is the legitimist approach itself (L'-6) in which value is assigned to rule-making. Laws, it will be recalled, emerge with the governance system (L"-VI). Laws are either defined in the courts by abstraction from custom and as *ratio decidendi* of earlier cases, or from statutes passed by a legislature.[22] The laws of ethical significance are those rules of just conduct which restrain individuals from harming or interfering with each other (i.e. civil and criminal law).

Laws seek to ensure that certain rules cannot be ignored. Because laws are so definitive and apply im-partially to the whole community, it is essential that new laws are formulated unambiguously and devised so as to fit with what exists without internal contra-dictions. In other words, the code should be a **system of regulation**.

The *function* of laws is to ensure that all know and obey those rules which need to be enforced to maintain a stable social order. So laws can only operate within precisely defined boundaries: for communities, this is the state or nation. Within any bounded community, there are invariably differences of view among in-dividuals about what rules are essential and exactly how and when they apply. When these differences cause socially intolerable conflict, laws are enacted by the legislature or decided in the courts. Given that the law-making process has not been perverted, it must be seen as ethical in principle and based in necessity and con-sent. Social order protects individuals from harm, and organizes and regulates group affairs for their benefit. That is to say, having laws (even bad laws) is inherently good.

Any formally constituted social group — business, club, association, school, church — could not function without its own system of regulation. Regulations are often known as canons in churches, or as bye-laws in associations and community bodies. Regulations in all such circumscribed social groups must be consistent with the laws prevailing in wider society. For example, hitting school-children is legal in some countries — and may therefore be either permitted or forbidden by school regulations; but it is illegal in other countries — in which case corporal punishment in schools is never permissible.

Any rule at a lower level can become a regulation. For example, a governing body may decide that certain duties (L"-4) previously assigned at the discretion of managers should be given only to people with parti-cular qualifications; or that a maxim (L"-5) such as 'to

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be dedicated to the firm' needs defining in relation to what off-duty work is permitted or prohibited. Similarly, the membership committee of a sports club, but not the club manager, may convert a convention (L"-2) about dress into a regulation. As with societal laws, such regulations are binding on everyone in the organisation and allow for enforcement.

The transformation of rules into laws is also evident within society. The most mechanical-seeming laws on traffic control or tax calculation derive from prescriptions (L"-1) in that they specify behaviour precisely; legal controls on alcohol consumption or sexual activities formalize popular moral conventions (L"-2); legal provision for capital punishment or euthanasia enshrines social tenets (L"-3); laws about property, shareholding and free passage assign rights and duties explicitly (L"-4); and the law of contract upholds ethical maxims of honest dealing and promises (L"-5). Laws exclusive to this level (L"-6) concern: the making of laws, the monitoring and enforcement of laws, how a judgement is made about whether a law has been violated, sanctions for breaking the law, and provision for managing the sanctions and rehabilitating offenders. Laws also provide for justice to prevail by incorporating terms like 'reasonable' or 'fair' in their wording (L"-7).

Gaining Compliance. Adherence to a law should generally benefit the community without unfairly penalizing any member — otherwise the legitimist basis of legitimacy is missing. The support each person gives to the governing authority which guards the law-making process is itself an inducement to abide by laws. On a smaller scale, voluntarily entering a firm or joining a club is taken to mean entering a quasi-society and agreeing to abide by its official regulations. On the larger scale, choice is largely absent and people need to be socialized to support the legal system. That is to say, each person is automatically expected by himself and by the group to adhere to laws. Still, all laws and regulations are backed by force or threats of force.

Laws, like all rules, guide and restrain conduct rather than determining it. Adequate socialization, a just legal system, and suitable laws lead to a minimum of coercion. As a result, breaking laws is often easy. So any system needs to incorporate rules indicating how breaches will be prevented, monitored and handled. Usually a breach leads to a warning or a penalty.

Penalties have included confiscation of money or property, restriction of liberty by imprisonment or supervision, compulsory work, temporary or permanent physical injury, execution and exile or deprivation of citizenship. Even where a penalty is appropriate and convention demands that it be severe, it is socially desirable that reconciliation with society remains possible. Exercising a vengeance that embitters offenders and creates permanent outcasts is self-defeating. Offenders should be able to make a fresh start on the basis of future compliance with the law. Repeated offences are characteristic of those who are unable to cope with social life, those who are mentally unbalanced, and those who have a psychopathic identity: known respectively as the sad, the mad and the bad.

Organizations also insist on penalties. The association governing a sport, for example, may have a committee which can examine and judge an offender, impose fines and forbid further work in the sport temporarily or permanently. Businesses too may discipline or dismiss staff. It appears that the regulations are not so much about the direct exertion of force as about providing a known framework of procedures which regulate the use of such force.

The *change* of a law has wide social significance and must be formalized and proceduralized to ensure that it is based in social necessity and community consent. This may take a considerable time while more and more people come to recognize why a new rule is needed or why an old rule is harmful. If the delay is long, people may evade or refuse to comply with the existing rule in the hope that their actions will be ignored. If many do likewise, then that law will fall into disrepute and disuse. In society, the individual may join with those of a like mind and campaign for a change in the law. This may even mean working to install a new government who will pass the desired laws. In the extreme, a person may seek to leave the society for another with more congenial laws. Widespread dissatisfaction with laws is therefore a precursor of revolution, anarchy and social collapse.

Obedience is the *ethical disposition* ensuring scrupulous adherence to laws or regulations. Obedience is not to be equated with abdication of responsibility or slavishness. Obedience on its own is insufficient for ethical living; but without obedience, any society disintegrates. It is worth noting the degree to which the freedom of members of organizations may be curtailed by necessary obedience to regulations. Staff within a firm may be told how they should spend their time, to whom they may talk, and what they should wear — a degree of control which would be unacceptable in the wider social context. So long as nothing illegal is proposed, managers have little scope to challenge the constitutionality of regulations passed by a governing board. The demand for obedience goes to further extremes in total institutions like prisons and secure

mental hospitals, which are closed societies from which inmates cannot escape.

Pros and Cons. The peculiar *advantages* of laws are their sharp definition, authoritative nature, comprehensive applicability, impartiality, and procedural clarity. However, as noted when examining each of the lower level rules, these qualities can be disadvantageous when used improperly. When laws are created, they subtly alter the non-formal rules and do not necessarily serve the function of the lower level very effectively. It follows that no amount of legal regulation to prevent unfair discrimination can obviate the need for maxims, customary rights and duties, tenets, conventions, and prescriptions which support fair treatment of people.

Criticisms of laws, statutes and systems of regulation are many. In their nature, they tend to be negative and constraining, partly because the laws and judicial processes become so complex. Bulky volumes containing long sentences in small type seem not to be designed to be read and mastered except as a penance. So the system becomes impossible to appreciate by ordinary people. Some firms now have special ethics departments with legal specialists, ethical officers and ethical philosophers producing and interpreting rulebooks. In the case of society, a dedicated legal profession evolves and the expense of legal proceedings rapidly escalates beyond the reach of most people. To outsiders, the procedures and formalities seem to become more important than the aim of the rule. The more that legal authorities become remote from the members of the group, the more do laws and regulations become rigid, pedantic, dogmatic and sterile.

Laws tend to be unsatisfactory, or even unjust, because they are static whereas organizations and social groups are dynamic. Furthermore the procedures involved in producing laws result in them being more oriented to conventional values or public opinion rather than to higher principles. By invoking fear of punishment, laws invite adherence to the letter rather than the spirit. In the end, not breaking laws is essential but not enough, because knowing what is permitted does not clarify what is good.

Laws allow for enforcement, sanction restraints on freedom, and even permit physical coercion (in total institutions and society) or instant expulsion (in a firm or associations). Unfortunately, those with the authority to make and enforce laws are fallible. Furthermore unless laws (and all other types of rules) are adhered to in the spirit they are useless. An ultimate rule generated and sanctioned by an infallible and indisputable authority appears required as a final buttress for rule-making.

L"-7:
ABSOLUTES
AND THE ETERNAL VERITIES

Nature. At L"-7, the rules to be followed emerge from the need for unchallengeable guidance. Rules of this sort may be termed **absolutes**. The only possible *basis of legitimacy* for such rules is the transcendentalist approach to ethical choice (L'-7). Taken together, a set of absolutes constitute **the eternal verities**. By tradition, absolutes have been provided by God and offered as part of the divine law within religions (L"-VII). Philosophers, distancing themselves from religion, have produced similar rules using Reason or the Nature of Man as their source. In our present psychological era, we might say these rules emerge from transpersonal being (L'-VII).

The *function* of absolutes is to ensure all know and aspire to the path of duty. Indeed the very notion of ethics loses sense without an absolute rule to live ethically (whatever that may mean). It follows that absolutes sustain the whole edifice of ethical rules, the use of the ethical approaches to choice, and the pursuit of values. Absolutes embody righteousness. They have been formulated on the basis of austere meditation (Buddha), divine revelation (Moses, Mohammed), and reasoned reflection (Confucius, Kant). For those lacking spiritual conceptions, the ultimate authority is a transpersonal ultimate value (like Reason or Justice or Compassion) with which one can be completely identified. This is equivalent to locating *authority* in a deity or the transpersonal self. Logically, there can be no higher level of rule, and no higher rule-making authority.

Absolutes underpin ethics within all social groups although their spiritual origin is not always recognized. Absolutes focus on duty and goodness: the timeless and universal deontological and teleological imperatives. Examples include the principles of beneficence: 'good is preferable to evil' and 'choose the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils'. Another, sometimes called the Pauline principle, is 'evil may not be done for the sake of the good'. An absolute suggested by Hippocrates for use by the medical profession is: *primum non nocere* — above all do no harm.

Kant's absolutes included 'to treat others as ends not means', 'to use maxims that you would wish to be a universal law', and 'to harmonize ends amongst the individuals in the community'. Although, we may be in doubt as to what such absolutes imply, the requirement is clear: each of us must use them as best we can whenever we can. Kant's view was that goodness depended on the use of goodwill which was brought about by an awareness of duty. It follows that cultivating awareness,

appreciating responsibility, and using goodwill are part of the eternal verities.

As the above examples illustrate, absolutes are typically contentless or so abstract as to defy direct interpretation or localized ownership. Absolutes are assumed to be applicable to everyone in all communities at all times. Once realized they are not subject to *change* and do not need adaptation to suit particular situations, organizations or societies.

Gaining Compliance. Adherence to an absolute should be self-evidently and unquestionably right, not just for each person now, but for all people in all times, otherwise the transcendentalist basis of legitimacy is missing. Compliance with an absolute is equivalent to the individual will moving in harmony with the natural order or God's will. So any notion of control links to cosmic forces rather than personal or social influences. Adhering to absolutes, though a matter for each person, is usually supported in the community by religions.

According to many religions, violation of absolutes (God's will) leads to catastrophic destruction of the world. This needs to be recognized as symbolic. Because absolutes emerge from ultimate values, breaching them is equivalent to releasing evil. Events then unfold outside personal identification; and efforts to deal with matters become meaningless gestures.

> Tragedy: The power of tragedy lies in the way that a flaw in the character of the hero results in the release of evil and social consequences which cannot be undone. Shakespeare's greatness surely lies in part in his deep understanding of these forces that move mankind and society. The destruction following the evil act is inexorable and awesome. In Hamlet, a fratricidal murder leads to madness, deaths by murder accident or suicide of all the protagonists, and a foreigner taking over the country. In King Lear, the father's inability to recognize flattery leads to civil war, loss of the kingdom to foreigners, his madness and death, and deaths of all his family except for his exiled daughter. In Macbeth, the failure to control ambition leads to madness, murders of adults and children, and foreign invasion.   Ex. 8.17

An individual can reject an absolute, but that is to embrace evil. If evil is chosen, relationships and events are likely to become unfavourable, and a person becomes increasingly alienated from himself or herself. Of course, many tyrants, petty and grand, have constructed social relationships built on fear and hatred, flattery and lies — and yet died quietly in their beds. But the damage they have caused lives on after them, and their memory is reviled.

If the path of duty is regularly neglected, social abhorrence develops. The ethically flaccid person without a sense of duty is suspected and avoided. Conversely, the more real the absolute becomes for us, the more trust others have in us, and the more trust we develop in our own actions. Our misjudgements and mistakes, when they occur, are tolerated and forgiven. This is a powerfully self-reinforcing pattern. It seems that there is no refuge from our responsibility for our self and our universe — which is equivalent to saying that there is no refuge from God. Whatever our past actions, re-finding faith (via transpersonal being) and recognizing the power and value of absolutes and ultimate values is always an option.

Autonomy. The *ethical disposition* that facilitates adherence to absolutes is autonomy. Autonomy is expressed in an act of reflection and will. Thus Aiken writes: `as a moral being, [each man] must....be free to decide absolutely for himself what the law really is`.[23] Autonomy allows and encourages people to contemplate ethical rules and requirements, and then attempt to accept (or change) the kind of person they want to be and the life they want to lead. Autonomy is the exercise of freedom. But such freedom is not license. It means being prepared to modify our interaction with ourselves and with the world, and implies developing awareness of psychological and social forces.

The etymology of autonomy is Gk. *autos* = self, and Gk. *nomos* = rule or law. The term was first applied to the independent Greek city states, not to persons. As we saw when the social structure was explored, a minimum of freedom is the basis on which any society is constructed (Ch. 7); and as we found when the legitimist approach was explained, individual autonomy constrains all formal attempts to promote the common good (Ch. 6).

Autonomy can be ceded, but this is hardly the way for the disposition of autonomy to be developed. Wholly uncritical acceptance of authority and tradition saps autonomy, and so fostering such an attitude is evil. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoyevsky portrayed the Grand Inquisitor upbraiding and rejecting a reborn Christ. The reason was that He gave man freedom to decide between good and evil and did not recognize mankind's need and desire for miracle, mystery and authority. The habitual demand by many churches that autonomy should be abdicated is the object of rationalist attacks on religion. Evil of this sort seems to be the basis whereby a church usurps the divine role and ends by persecuting its most brilliant followers.[24]

> Luther's Stand: Martin Luther was conscious of the weakness of human efforts in attaining the absolute good which alone could avail in the sight of a perfectly righteous God. He concluded in the Winter of 1512-13 that God did not judge the sinner according to his merits or good works, which being temporal were inevitably vitiated by

sin. Instead, God accorded grace and mercy given that good works were undertaken with due faith. Subsequently he went on to criticize and dissent from many of the church's activities and doctrines. His persistent refusal to submit to the authority of the church led to his excommunication. At the fateful Diet of Worms in 1521, when asked to recant, he said : 'Unless I am convinced by the testimony of Scripture or by an evident reason — ....since it is certain that [the pope and council] have often erred and contradicted themselves — ...my conscience is taken captive by God's word and I neither can nor will revoke anything.'   Ex. 8.18[24]

Pros and Cons. The advantages of absolutes are their immutable, universal and unarguable qualities. These qualities are only possible because of their abstraction. But this is the focus of most *criticism*. Yes, we should do what is right and we should avoid causing harm, but what precisely is right? and what exactly counts as harm? Such questions confuse the issue: absolutes operate on the basis that no temporal authority (not even the state or tradition) and no amount of precision or detailing can capture the spirit of duty. Without that spirit no specific rule will be properly respected or adequately followed.

A further line of criticism focuses on the need to recognize autonomy and/or God, neither of which are subject to social control or external scrutiny. From the perspective of transpersonal being, this is just how it should be. God and man's responsibility are one; or, put another way, man exercises a divine responsibility. A person can choose to turn away from duty, this deepest and most fundamental of human responsibilities, otherwise autonomy would have no meaning.

Closure. Absolutes are the most encompassing and most abstract form of rule that is possible both intuitively and logically (in terms of the framework). No higher levels of rule are therefore possible and the tertiary hierarchy of purpose is now completed.

REVIEWING ETHICAL RULES

The seven sharply distinct varieties of rules that emerged from the exploration of legitimism have now been described together with the codes in which they are often formulated and systematized. The different types of rule are: prescriptions, conventions, tenets, rights, maxims, laws and absolutes. They are identical with those found in the seven moral institutions which have emerged spontaneously in the course of human evolution. We have seen similarities and correspondences between rules in the natural institutions and artificially created rules and codes for society and its organizations.

Two matters deserve bringing to the fore. The first is the way that rules vary in their tendency to be controlled by individuals or by their social group. The second is the relation between rules and communities.

The Individual and The Group. All individual activity in a group context must be legitimate, and rules provide for that legitimacy. In practice, it is impossible for everybody to share in the making of every rule except in families and similar small groups. Rules therefore raise the issue of freedom of the individual and constraint by the group. In particular, we must be clear about whether a rule can be defined in a purely personal way (maximizing freedom) or whether in a purely social way (demanding constraint and possibly coercion), or whether some combination is required. Our analysis reveals that the answer is different for the different types of rules.[25]

For prescriptions to be effective, they must be communally recognized; and yet to be used at all, they must be recognized and respected personally. Conventions are similar. Any convention articulated by an individual alone and not held and used in the group is not part of social reality. It is not a convention at all. At most it is an idiosyncratic attitude. Conversely, a convention which does not feel intrinsically right or real to an individual involved cannot be operated. Rights, too, are inherently private and public simultaneously. Unless the right (or duty) is personally held it cannot or will not be discharged and there will be no solidity in any assertion of its significance. But if the right is not a communal property, then it is not recognized by anyone as having any real existence. In such a situation, the right cannot be claimed or discharged.

Tenets are different. It is perfectly possible for a person to recognize a *social dogma* and to conform outwardly to its tenets and hence maintain it in the community, and yet to reject it inwardly. In the same way it is perfectly possible to hold *personal beliefs* and to act in those terms without others knowing about these. Of course, some link between the two forms of tenet is essential in a healthy society. Maxims and laws are similar to tenets in this respect. In the case of maxims, one can distinguish between *popular precepts* which are communally recognized, generally respected and publicly available and *personal virtues* which are inner self-chosen maxims providing inner private guidance as to conduct. In the case of laws, the distinction between *private regulations* imposed by organizations and *public laws* generated by the government is straightforward.

Absolutes, finally, cannot be devised, respected or followed unless they reflect a fusion of both the personal-internal and the public-social.

Rules and Communities. It will be recalled that values defined different types of social group (cf. Ch. 5). Social values were the core of communities which are the basis of society. Clarification of the rules has revealed that *each type of rule aligns with distinctions among and within communities.* L"-7: Absolutes apply to all communities because they do no more than affirm the most general rules about being good and just. L"-6: Laws apply to particular bounded communities formally (and if need be forcefully) regulating the members. L"-5: Maxims apply to a moral community whose members accept a particular ethical teaching. L"-4: Rights apply to social classes whose members are defined by categories within a community. L"-3: Tenets apply to enduring associations, formal and informal, within a community. L"-2: Conventions apply to the mainstream of the community. Finally, at L"-1: Prescriptions apply to the elements of a community, particular social roles held by individual members.

Transition. We have said little about which rules might be considered enlightened, just as we said little about which values and purposes might be desirable. This is a matter for individual reflection and articulation by social authorities. Enlightenment could be assessed academically and quasi-objectively by assessing which rules are actually agreed or similar across nations or religions; or subjectively and philosophically, by assessing how far the criteria of universality would be desirable in respect of a given rule. Finding rules which could or should be ethical universals, the ultimate moral authorities, has been a dream of almost all ethical thinkers and writers. The present analysis makes it clear that the only true universals are the nearly contentless absolutes at L"-7, just as the only universally shareable values were ultimate values at L-7.

However, in so far as people in the nations of the world are all human beings and the nations form a community, then rules at lower levels may be developed that in practice (if not in principle) and for now (if not eternally) are universal. A genuine world community within which all people of all nations are under similar obligations is even conceivable because all share the earth, its oceans and atmosphere. Without international laws and maxims a genuine world community, whether of people or nations, could not operate at all. While the notion of certain common rights as a counterpart to membership of this world community appears a reasonable aspiration, genuine commonality of tenets seems less achievable, and common conventions and prescriptions make little sense except in practical matters (like ensuring letters get delivered).

The danger of emphasising universality is that it may lead to the neglect of genuine differences between people and groups. Given that a moral institution cannot be created by fiat, the tendency would be for moral authorities of one group to dominate over others. But any such imposition promotes the potential to authorize coercion and unleash violence. Yet peace and prosperity depend on international cooperation and the institution of rules of some sort transcending particular states.

But ethical authority is not simply a problem for the world community. Every person in the smallest society must recognize its existence and somehow accommodate to its pressures. Ethical authority involves more than the determination of rules and their arrangement in codes. Nevertheless, the moral institutions and the fundamental types of rules are the basis for understanding ethical authority. It is now time to use what we have learned so far to confront this awesome topic. ❖

Master-Figure 16

Linking the frameworks of experience and purpose via motivation.
Basic motivations link experience and purpose; ethical aspirations link approaches to ethical choice with approaches to identity development; and ethical dispositions link ethical rules and the natural moral institutions of society. See text for further details and explanation.

	TYPES of ETHICAL RULE	Ethical Dispositions	NATURAL MORAL INSTITUTIONS	
Le	Absolute	Autonomy	Organized Religion	Level VII″
Le	Law	Obedience	Governance System	Level VI″
Le	Maxim	Virtue	Ethical Teaching	Level V″
Le	Right	Respect	Social Structure	Level IV″
Le	Tenet	Dedication	Communal Ideals	Level III″
Le	Convention	Conformity	Popular Morality	Level II″
Le	Prescription	Meticulousness	Formal Etiquette	Level I″

	APPROACHES to ETHICAL CHOICE	Ethical Aspirations	APPROACHES to IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT	
System 7′	Transcendentalist	Spirituality	Transpersonal	System VII′
System 6′	Legitimist	Common Good	Social	System VI′
System 5′	Systemicist	Altruism	Relational	System V′
System 4′	Individualist	Strength	Individual	System IV′
System 3′	Pragmatist	Ideals	Emotional	System III′
System 2′	Conventionalist	Continuity	Vital	System II′
System 1′	Rationalist	Solutions	Sensory	System I′

	FRAMEWORK of PURPOSE	Basic Motivations	FRAMEWORK of EXPERIENCE	
Level 7	Ultimate Value	Inspiration	Imagination	Level VII
Level 6	Value System	Obligation	Identification	Level VI
Level 5	Social Value	Need	Intuition	Level V
Level 4	Principal Object	Interest	Idea	Level IV
Level 3	Internal Priority	Desire	Emotion	Level III
Level 2	Strategic Objective	Intention	Image	Level II
Level 1	Tactical Objective	Awareness	Sensation	Level I

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Master Matrix 16

Master-Table 17

Properties of the seven types of ethical rule and associated codes.

The rule types are those found in the natural moral institutions, but no longer linked to particular identity realms (cf. Master-Fig. 16).
Note that the immediate source of authority for a rule or code varies with the frame of reference (e.g. employee hierarchy, association, nation).
See text for further details and examples. For a more general account of the rules, see Master-Table 21.

L	Type of Rule & Code	Function	Application	Changing Rules	Advantages (over Laws)	Common Criticisms	Ethical Disposition
1″	Prescriptions may be organized as a Code of practice	To ensure all know and perform certain social actions strictly as specified.	When people need precise instructions on what to do to avoid harm.	Change is easy because it flows from rational inquiry.	Straightforward; unambiguous; easy to monitor.	Ignores feelings and preferences of the people affected.	Meticulousness
2″	Conventions may be organized as an Ethos	To ensure all know and apply certain attitudes generally in their conduct.	When discretionary action must be constrained in a widely accepted way.	Change emerges because the social group and its values evolve.	Adaptable; feels natural; enables graded adherence.	Too fuzzy and undefined; generates excessive conformity.	Conformity
3″	Tenets may be organized as a Credo	To ensure all know affirm and express certain values in daily life.	When a group needs to strengthen its culture by activating ideals.	Change is difficult because people must be re-socialized.	Powerful; preventative; personally owned.	Too distorting; too emotionally invested; too controlling; too difficult to install.	Dedication
4″	Rights may be organized as a Charter	To ensure all know and respect what is due to and from each individual in a class.	When conflicts due to power imbalances between classes need to be reduced.	Change is opposed because the balance of power is altered.	Less threatening; allows refining; enables gradual acceptance.	Generates conflict; worsens prejudices; fosters extremism.	Respect
5″	Maxims may be organized as a Code of ethics	To ensure all know and meet general requirements for virtuous functioning.	When individuals in society need confidence in the self-control of others.	Change is superficial because the same maxims apply in new situations.	Based in trust; activates virtue; flexible and simple to operate.	Too vague; open to exploitation; too dependent on the individual.	Virtue
6″	Laws may be organized as a System	To ensure all know and obey those rules enforced to maintain a stable social order.	When differences of view on what rules are essential become socially intolerable.	Change is formalized because it must be agreed as a social necessity.	Carefully defined; comprehensive; backed by socially permissible force.	Too pedantic; too mechanical; too complicated; too rigid; too procedural.	Obedience
7″	Absolutes may be organized as The eternal verities	To ensure all know and aspire to the path of duty.	Applicable by any one anywhere at any time.	Change is absent because it is unnecessary.	Universal; immutable; eternal.	Too abstract; too contentless; too uncontrollable	Autonomy

NOTES

1. There is however the special case of personal vows or oaths which are transcendental rules willingly set for oneself only, and which cannot be broken whatever the circumstances. In the Hindu *Mahabharata* epic, the sage-prince Bhishma finds himself fighting on the side of evil as a result of his vow to serve the Kingdom of Hastinapur.

2. Kant implied that hypothetical imperatives were not ethical. See the discussion in: Foot, P. Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. 1952. In: *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978.

3. Polkinghorne Report. *Review of the Guidance on the Research Use of Foetuses and Foetal Material.* London: HMSO Cmnd 762. 1989.

4. The prescriptions were extracted from: York Health Authority. *Child Abuse Procedures.* 1989. Note that the guidelines are conventions and tenets which have emerged from maxims and rights. The influence and inter-relation between rules of different sorts is a complex topic not fully examined in this book: see Note [25] below and Ch. 9.

5. Code of Advertising Practice Committee. *The British Code of Advertising Practice.* London: CAP Committee, 1989.

6. See: Ethics Resource Centre, Inc. *Creating a Workable Company Code of Ethics.* Washington, DC, 1990. The comment on credos is in Section IV: Code Structure.

7. McGregor, D. *The Human Side of Enterprise.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

8. Wolfensberger, W. *The Principle of Normalization in Human Services.* Toronto, Canada: National Institute on Mental Retardation, 1972. Wolfensberger's passion is evident in his equation of the mishandling of the mentally handicapped with genocide.

9. Masters, W.H. & Johnson, V.E. *Human Sexual Inadequacy.* Boston: Little Brown, 1970.

10. The account is taken from correspondence in the British Medical Journal following publication of the Report of an inquiry: BMA Board of Science and Education. *Alternative Therapy.* London: BMA, 1986.

11. Walker, D. M. *The Oxford Companion to Law.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p.795-797.

12. As noted in Ch. 7 in relation to the social structure, rights seem to be a perennial source of confusion among the experts as well as among ordinary people. The following texts are useful. Cranston, M. *What are Human Rights?* London: Bodley Head, 1973; Dworkin, R. *Taking Rights Seriously.* London: Duckworth, 1977; White, A.R. *Rights.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Hohfeld was concerned with legal rights, not rights in social life generally, but his distinctions are still valid and relevant. See: Hohfeld, W.N. *Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. In law, the various terms describe legal relations of legal persons, and there are a variety of logical relations (jural correlatives and jural opposites) beyond those described. Considerable clarity is gained in particular situations by using the various terms precisely. For my purposes, right is generally sufficient to represent the full range of terms. If what is due to someone is to be emphasized rather than what is due from them (duty), I use the phrase 'right proper'.

13. 'COHSE issues sex pest guide.' *The Health Services Journal,* 27th June 1991, 101, No. 5258: p.6.

14. As quoted in: British Medical Association. *The Handbook of Medical Ethics.* London: BMA, 1984.

15. Opinion Research Corporation. *Implementation and Enforcement of Codes of Ethics in Corporations and Associations. ORC Study #65334.* Washington DC: Ethics Resource Centre, 1980.

16. Ciulla, J. Breathing new life into a corporate code of ethics. In: Mahoney, J. (ed.) *Business Ethics in a New Europe.* Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992.

17. Kennedy, S. An elementary mistake? *British Medical Journal,* 302: 1614, 1991.

18. The code of ethics for psychiatrists is the World Psychiatric Association Declaration of Hawaii as ratified in Vienna, Austria, 10th July 1983. The abuse of patients by psychiatrists was documented in: Bloch, S. & Reddaway, P. *Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The Shadow Over World Psychiatry.* London: Gollancz, 1984. The events referred to in Ex. 8.14 are described in: Bloch, S. Athens and beyond: Soviet psychiatric abuse and the World Psychiatric Association. *Psychiatric Bulletin,* 14: 129-133, 1990.

19. The US Ethics Resource Center warns against the 'regulatory mentality' and gives many examples of company maxims in: Ethics Resource Centre, Inc. op. cit. [6].

20. The Serious Fraud Office prosecution rate in the UK is taken from: Hall, M. Regulation in crisis. *Banking World,* 11(1): 26-27, 1993. About half of the prosecutions led to convictions, so very few people indeed are suffering from their improper activities. Note that these were criminal proceedings requiring any conviction to be 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Civil proceedings, which are based 'on the balance of probabilities', would have probably produced more convictions.

21. Michael Lewis provides an entertaining if slightly horrifying insider's account of the attitudes of people dealing in bonds and related financial instruments, in: *Liar's Poker.* London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989. The account of the situation in Japan has been taken from regular reports in *The Economist* between 1990 and 1993. The material on Lloyds is based on: Mantle, J. *For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Lesson of Lloyds of London. (Rev. Ed.)* London: Mandarin, 1993.

22. Theories of legal positivism, as developed most notably by Hans Kelsen, divorce ethics/morals and law and take the extreme view that all true law is legislator's law (e.g. *General Theory of Law and State.* New York: Russell, 1961; *What is Justice.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957). Such a view leads eventually to totalitarianism (cf. Brunner, E. *Justice and the Social Order.* London: Butterworth, 1945, p.7). All moral theories of law seek to recognize sources of authority outside or beyond that of the government in power.

23. The quotation is taken from: Aiken, H.D. *Reason and Conduct.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Similar views of autonomy are to be found in: Hare, R.M. *Freedom and Reason.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963; and Dworkin, G.

The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

24. The Grand Inquisitor's speech is to be found in: Dostoyevsky, F. *The Brothers Karamazov.* (Transl. D. Magarshack). Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958, Vol. 1, Part 2, Book 5, Section 4, pp.288-310. For an account of the evolution of one church, see: Pelikan, J. *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. 5 Vols.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

24. The information and quoted speech have been extracted from: *Encyclopaedia Brittanica (14th Ed.)* Vol 14, pp.491-498, 1961

25. This analysis is the basis for determining the influences of types of rules on each other. Further pursuit of this topic would take us into appreciating participation, interaction between established institutions and the government of society. As such, it lies outside the scope of values as 'mental software' and requires its own definitive text.

Chapter 9

Accommodating Ethical Authority

As we pursue what seems good to us, we are aware, sometimes dimly and sometimes blindingly, sometimes comfortingly and sometimes disturbingly, that rules channel us. We cannot do anything we want. The twin requirements for authority and for conformity to authority permeate our lives and the society within which we find ourselves.

Even those who defiantly reject conventional authority — intellectuals like John Maynard Keynes or drop-outs like Timothy Cleary or revolutionaries like Trotsky — bind themselves with strict rules of their own making and demand conformity from their associates and followers.[1]

But authority, whether of external or internal origin, seems to be the antithesis of freedom. The ethical challenge is to harness and design ethical constraints in a way that minimizes coercion, defends freedom and permits social life to flourish.

In the self-aware society, all claims to authority and demands for conformity to rules must be subject to scrutiny, analysis and potential revision. Such reflective awareness, absent in traditional societies, is a defining quality of modern ones, especially those that claim to be 'free'.

Natural moral institutions evolve spontaneously, but change too slowly to handle the continuing protean flow of complex social issues. In any case, what we must appreciate is how and how far social authority and moral institutions can be self-consciously shaped. Science has no answers, but social science has recognized many of the tools that people have intuitively developed: notions like ideology, social justice, human rights, custom and standards. The substantial elements of such ethical creations, as in natural moral institutions, are ethical rules.

Rule-based entities are the ultimate authorities in any society, forming the basis for its cultural integrity and force. Despite their significance, cultural forces are given far less prominence in the analysis of international affairs than politics, economics or personalities.[2]

An authority refers to *any entity, abstract or constituted, which has legitimate control over the exercise of power in*

society. Our primary concern is with abstract or ethical authority, that is to say rule-based authority. In Ch.s 7 and 8, we have already noted the way that ethical rules can put bounds on action, attitudes, beliefs, entitlements, functioning, enforcement and the sense of duty. Now the use of rules to define ethical authority can be explored in depth.

Rule-based authority has the virtue of being powerful without having a mind of its own. For practical purposes, power is a property of individuals. So when we take rule-based authority and locate it in positions (Pope, President, Judge) or social bodies (government, tribunals), then powerful individuals are indeed created. I will refer to such entities variously as actual, established, official, constituted, governmental or public authorities. These bodies, the preoccupation of many social scientists, are authorized variously to develop, determine, uphold, monitor or enforce ethical rules. But all actual authorities are subject in the end to pure rule-based authority — ethical entities whose appreciation by academic writers is so often partial, biased or unnecessarily obscure.

The present framework provides a golden opportunity to clarify the nature of fundamental ethical authorities evident and needed in modern complex societies. It will also be possible to understand their link to constituted authorities and other individuals in society (see G-5 & G-6: Ch. 12).

Ultimate Values. To accommodate authority constructively, we must seize every opportunity for design. Designing authority is about embodying ultimate values in social institutions and managing the twin requirements of freedom and compliance. It is not about bolstering society's governing agencies, still less about using force to determine a particular utopian or doctrinal end-result.

The dominating ethical concern and ultimate value from a communal perspective is usually held to be fairness or justice. In Adam Smith's phrase, justice is the 'main pillar that upholds the whole edifice' of society.[3] So, a social vision based on material prosperity is just not enough for people. Social life is unbearable without

a minimum of fairness, just as personal life is intolerable without a minimum of freedom. If a sense of injustice is a component of the pursuit of the good, which is usually the case, then people are disturbed. Life was never meant to be fair, and perfect justice is out of reach. Nevertheless, sooner or later any widely perceived injustice in society presses for correction.

Justice, in short, is an absolute, the pre-eminent social virtue and one of the idealized goals of progressive societies. But other socially oriented ultimate values — liberty especially, but also peace, harmony, fraternity, equality and truth — are not any less important for all that. As noted previously, some minimum amount of actual freedom is absolutely essential if communal life is to be tolerable (cf. L"-4: Ch. 8; G-6: Ch.12).

Freedom within a just society is the pre-eminent aspiration of the enlightened individual. Freedom without enlightenment emerges as unbridled license and becomes the enemy of justice. Positive freedom for individuals is more or less desired by a community according to its dominant ideals and ideology.

The Aims. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the ideas and axioms, the social processes and relations, that underpin the notion of authority in society. I want to provide a consistent and coherent account of the most important ethical features of social life and define the limit of what is humanly and socially possible. The various forms of ethical authority will be defined and the relation of rules to justice, authority and freedom examined. The chapter does *not* provide model principles or an account of what constitutes a perfectly just society. It only seeks to clarify the tools, mechanisms and principles which define the authority needed to sustain society and foster its ethical development.

Societies have evolved an extraordinarily wide variety of rules, authorities and related ethical arrangements. I will not be reviewing them to see whether history reveals a genuine process of cultural evolution to some ideal higher form — as suggested by thinkers like Comte, Hegel, Marx, Toynbee, and Chardin. I believe there has been progress, but I take diversity for granted as a good thing. My approach remains resolutely one of assisting design within that diversity, not proposing a blue-print.

It is for each society, mainly via its influential civic-minded personalities, to consider its own authorities, to check how its present arrangements operate and to debate how and where improvement might be required and possible. Whether or not societies actually do improve, the continuous search for improvement is inherent in everyone's notion of ethics. In a similar

fashion, it is for each organization, via its members, governing bodies and responsible managers, to consider its internal ethical arrangements. It is for each person to look into themselves and reflect on their own personal development and ethical outlook. Each of us must consider how we might support or modify authoritative rules within our organizations and wider society.

I offer the framework for people to use as they think best. Whether you are naturally rebellious, traditionalist or reflective, I take it for granted that you can only develop or support changes to existing arrangements if they have some measure of consistency with the deep spirit and evolution of your society.

Although both criticism, redesign and change go on all the time in modern society, the very notion of tinkering with ethical rules and confronting authority is anathema or hubris for many. So we need to be clear about what is possible.

The Possibility of Design. Society has an intrinsic order described by systems scientists as self-organizing or autopoietic.[4] Its rules (best seen as a form of value system: L-6) operate for the most part outside awareness, and are all the more successful for that. Most rules, from shaking hands to the abhorrence of incest have evolved as man and culture evolved. They have emerged spontaneously, persisted through selection, and are the product of experience not science. As Hayek puts it: "our whole civilization rests, and must rest, on our believing much that we cannot know to be true."[5]

Bringing customary rules and forms of authority into awareness permits the dangerous possibility of design. Once this process starts, there is no going back. The limitations of design reflect in large part the state of present society and the limitations of its members. Respect for enlightened convictions about what is right, a mature understanding of social realities and the bounds of knowledge, and the sensitive handling of individuals all play a part in the effectiveness of design. Grandiose conceptions of social destiny, ambitious self-aggrandizement, utopian demands and the glorification of reason all contribute to its disaster.

So, in promoting design, I am not supporting coercive idealized imposition by arrogant know-it-alls. Instead, I am encouraging a reflective mentality applied to the spontaneous order evident in existing society. It will be already evident from the rules (as discussed in Ch. 8) that some seem to lend themselves to creative imposition, others are inherent in the existing order, and still others impose a modification on what is inherent.

I have tried to specify *those assumptions which have evolved culturally as humanity has evolved, and which are reflected in social orders of the widest variety.* All design (I suggest) uses the framework to be offered, either implicitly or explicitly. So the framework exists as an abstract reality for anyone at all to recognize and harness. I will try to expound it as simply, as accurately and as helpfully as I can.

The message here as elsewhere is that there is something to be gained by appreciating the beauty of the framework and the nature of its component parts. On the positive side, controversial and difficult situations can be resolved satisfactorily by intelligently using the framework. On the negative side, severe problems are all too likely sooner or later if the framework's principles are ignored, misunderstood or deliberately violated. Using the types of rule as the basic elements, it is possible to appreciate the emergence of the authoritative arrangements essential for social life. Most, if not all, of these arrangements will be familiar to readers, although their constitution by a pattern of ethical rules may come as a surprise.

Application. My focus throughout is on a sovereign society and its members, because this includes the full panoply of political, organizational and cultural complexities. However, as we saw in Ch. 8, the same notions and similar (but not identical) analyses apply to more restricted communities like a neighbourhood, or secondary communities like those found in a firm, professional association, or church. Greater recognition of the internal community dimension of large organizations is certainly an urgent need for those within them, and would benefit people and communities without as well.

My consultancy studies have involved government, communities and inter-organizational efforts. But the amount of work in this area has been rather limited in comparison to work on values and management within organizations. So these conceptions and the practicalities of their use are less well developed.

INTRODUCING ETHICAL AUTHORITIES

Rules taken on their own are important sources of authority — but insufficient for society. Society requires its ethical rules to inter-connect and inter-relate. If higher levels were not tightly linked to lower levels, authority would be incoherent and the result would be personal confusion and community fragmentation. Connections between the rules are evident everywhere. For example, we noted in passing in Ch. 8

that when a professional association sets a code of ethics (L"-5), it must also indicate the rights and duties (L"-4) of members if a complaint is brought. Affinities between the different sorts of rules have also emerged. It was evident, for example, that the higher-level rules — rights, maxims, laws, absolutes (L"-4 to L"-7) — positively lend themselves to universalization, whereas the lower-level rules do not.

On careful examination, other groupings of rules became evident. Eventually, it became clear that all possible adjacent combinations were relevant to maintaining authority, and indeed essential for appreciating conformity while protecting individuality and freedom. The value of clarifying such a pattern was further supported by the usefulness of an identical analysis of the primary levels of purpose hierarchy, which reveals how values can be (and are) effectively realized in society (see Ch.s 10 and 12).[6]

The seven basic types of ethical rule can be grouped in combinations of adjacent levels in seven different ways: in one's, in two's, in three's and so on. I use a Greek-based terminology for the groupings: monads, dyads, triads, tetrads, pentads, hexads and heptad. Each of these contains a corresponding number of groups: i.e. there must be one heptadic group (of seven levels), two hexadic groups, three pentads, and so on (cf. Master-Figure 18). *Each grouping defines and illuminates a distinct and significant contribution to the requisite and ethical handling of authority in society.* So each has a social function and important practical and personal implications.

Language and System. Because the seven levels of rule form a hierarchy, the seven groupings which structure these rules systematically to form ethical authorities must also constitute a hierarchy. The rules create what I call an *elemental hierarchy* — in this case a tertiary hierarchy (H^3) — and the authorities form what I call a grouped or *structural hierarchy* ($_5H^3$). The seven social processes which give rise to the seven groupings in the structural hierarchy start from the 7 elemental rules and reveal 21 additional rule-based authorities. Together, these 28 authorities maintain a society within which individuals can separately and jointly thrive.[7]

In explaining the functions and structures of the various groups and groupings, I have sought to find characteristic labels and adjectival qualifiers that can (a) help fix and remind us of the fundamental nature of the ethical authorities and their social function; and (b) clarify the systemic inter-linkage of all 28 groups.

There is a logical evolution through the groupings starting with the monads and working upwards. This is

shown in Master-Figure 18 whose bold labels are designed to be read downwards column by column and from left to right. The ethical process, labelled at the top, is analysed into authoritative entities (groups) which reveal a type of ethical authority derived from rules, which is labelled at the bottom. This type of authority in turn supports, requires and constrains a higher and more complex ethical process at the top of the next column.

I discovered that the inter-linkage and inter-relations of the groupings and groups is expressed through the build up of internal levels of the groups within each grouping. Each internal level maintains a constant quality depending on its position (cf. Master-Table 20). For example, in any group within any grouping, it is the second (internal) level which has the potential to ensure (and so should be designed to ensure) the social acceptability of the rule-based authority.

Each authority is a complex ethical entity which deserves far longer and more detailed analyses and discussions than I can provide. My scope is limited. I want mainly to offer what seems to be currently lacking, a complete overview. This reveals a marvellous and rather simple system with an intuitive appeal. I also want to clarify the basic nature and function of the various rule-based authorities and their relationships to each other, to ourselves and to the community. Most of what follows is well-established in academic discourse, but some is not. Nevertheless, the various perspectives and arrangements should be immediately recognizable to the reader.

A General Account. The ethical heart of any social order lies in its ability **to judge conduct (G"-5)** so as to determine whether it is right and fair, and then to have these judgements accepted as authoritative by all. This ethical capacity depends on three great and definitive frames of reference found in any society: its custom, its law and its morality. These immediately recognizable and pervasive authorities, which justify and bolster the simpler authorities, do not exist on their own in some arcane philosophical fashion. They are the product of the continuing efforts of actual communities and are experienced as precious possessions.

Communities cannot exist without a sense of wholeness or unity. The practical activities of any community can be seen to be built on an abstract order or system of rules, the ethical order, which provides members with a deeply consistent, coherent and constant authority. People must wholeheartedly and freely **engender the will (G"-7)** to sustain an ethical order despite imperfections in the actual social order. If there is no general will to preserve a community and its ethical order, it soon becomes riven by discord and hatred. Its

institutions are devalued or corrupted. Authority disintegrates at all levels. People become fearful and start fleeing. Brutal in-fighting commences, with social life and property randomly despoiled. Disintegration of this sort has been evident in places as different as Somalia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Rwanda in the 1990s. The ethical order may not be ideal. But to be ethical it must aspire to an ideal, and to be socially viable it must be willingly sustained by almost everyone.

The ethical order can only be sustained and utter disaster avoided if everyone in the community **recognizes authority (G"-1)** and is prepared to accept the rules of certain fundamental and inescapable authorities as binding. These primal authorities have already been encountered; they are: ultimate values or God (L"-7), the law (L"-6), the ethical teaching (L"-5), class power (L"-4), each person (L"-3), the community as a whole (L"-2), and community leaders (L"-1). These seven authorities are the foundation on which all other abstract and actual authorities depend. The enlightenment and appropriateness of the rules produced by these primal authorities and their influence, especially on those in government and other established authorities, ultimately determine the ethical condition of any society.

It is evident that the ethical order is not in the hands of a government, but must instead be built up through a complex interaction between individual members of society and the community as a whole using inputs of a wide variety of essential institutions. Nevertheless, government is vital to orchestrate and regulate this process. Between the recognition of primal authorities and the evolution of the great ethical frames of reference lie three increasingly complex ethical processes in which official authorities play a part.

Primal authorities and ethical rules give rise to governmental bodies and established authorities which have one essential rationale: **to maintain the community (G"-2)**. This duty is fundamental because personal existence and even physical survival depends on a viable community. In those areas where the poor decisions of members could lead to the disruption or disintegration of the community, guidance by ethical principles is mandatory. Choices needing guidance deal with essential aspects of communal life like ensuring basic respect, meeting member needs, handling status differentials, and so on. Principles handle conflicts between primal authorities by ensuring that broad acceptability to the community is given paramount importance.

Principles maintain the community, and they must be articulated by responsible individuals who have a deep feeling for them. Once articulated, they become available for general use. But applying principles widely

in a consistent way is liable to push society in a particular direction and potentially supports a particular conception of cultural progress. The second step, therefore, is to **socialize individuals (G"-3)** during such a process so that people know exactly how the ethical order is or should be developing. This depends on positions which people have internalized and see as natural and right. Positions possess the authority to make or resist challenges to the existing order because there is, of course, no right condition for society apart from most people wanting it so. As a result, internalized positions must be affirmed in a dogmatic fashion to be true to oneself and to win over others.

If positions are taken up by people or embedded in society, then conformity to them is expected. Socializing efforts and conformity requirements touch on and potentially violate the identity of people, local communities and organizations, as well as of society itself. It becomes necessary therefore, as a third step, **to protect identities (G"-4)**. Conformity and identity maintenance can be achieved through an entity setting and adhering to its own minimum standards. Once standards are used to appraise and sustain conduct or arrangements above a minimum, conflicting views about what is right are likely to arise between individuals — either in private affairs or between individuals and governmental bodies in public matters. These differences of view may lead to disruptive disputes. Definitive resolution is needed if the society is to cohere and if people are to operate freely and peacefully within it. So judgements which are generally viewed as just are required — and this brings us again to the frames of reference (G"-5).

One final grouping, the hexads, remains to be explained. Between the freely embraced abstract ethical order (G"-7) and the definitive and encompassing frames of reference (G"-5) which judge proper conduct in the actual social order, lies the need **to regulate obedience (G"-6)**. Without use of the ethical disposition to obedience, authoritative judgements might be ignored or challenged. The whole ordered edifice would crumble. Full obedience must be legitimately imposed using one or other of the two types of categorical and inescapable imperative recognized by all — the moral imperative and the pragmatic (or legal) imperative. These are experienced as the most powerful authorities of all.

A Systematic Summary. An ultra-brief systematic summary of the seven groupings and their logical evolution with definitions and keywords now follows. The full picture is represented diagrammatically in Master-Figure 18. The properties of the seven groupings are summarized in Master-Table 19. The linkage

between the different groupings in the structural hierarchy is evidenced by their distinctive internal form, and this is shown in Master-Table 20. Master-Table 27 provides further details of the inter-relation and operation of the structural hierarchy in association with the review of the groupings at the conclusion of the chapter.

G"-1: Recognizing Authority. The 7 monadic groups (1 level per group) *ensure that constraints defined by recognizable authorities can become binding obligations on all*. This grouping reflects the existence of seven types of ethical **rule** which provide for cohesion and order in society. Rules defined by any recognized authority must be *unequivocally respected* whatever the situation. Rules constrain what is permissible in a community. Yet where decisions must be made which might release communal disorder, rules are usually found to contradict or conflict with each other. This rule conflict must be handled ethically: but being ethically correct cannot be separated from being socially acceptable. This requires an authority which incorporates an additional level of rule.

G"-2: Maintaining Community. The 6 dyadic groups (2 levels per group) *ensure that choices affecting the community and its viability can be authoritatively guided*. This grouping reflects the existence of six types of ethical **principle** which provide guidance and help resolve or reconcile disintegrative conflicts. Principles must be *acceptably applied* if members in the community are to tolerate the outcome. The application of principles therefore constrains individuals, as well as having potentially far-reaching consequences for society. So principles need to be devised and applied within a specific orientation to ethical progress. Such ideas about how or whether the community should change depend on authorities which incorporate an additional level of rule.

G"-3: Socializing Individuals. The 5 triadic groups (3 levels per group) *ensure that members can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and change*. This grouping reflects the existence of five types of ethical **position** which define the nature of the ethical status quo and possible progress. Positions must be *dogmatically affirmed* to capture people's attention and become internalized. Internalized positions enable conformity and so support and constrain social identities. Correspondingly, promoting new and supposedly progressive positions potentially modifies and may harm identities. Preserving and developing a valued identity lies at the core of all ethical endeavours and such a threat cannot be ignored. The ethical requirement to protect identity can be met by authorities incorporating an additional level of rule.

G″-4: Protecting Identity. The 4 tetradic groups (4 levels per group) *ensure that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative self-chosen minimum.* This grouping reflects the existence of four types of ethical standard which correspond to identities intrinsic to social life. The standard helps to define and protect these identities. Standards must be *deliberately adopted* if they are to be expressions of identity which are owned and acted upon. The adoption of standards constrains individual conduct. But appraising conduct in terms of self-chosen standards leads to differences of view as to what is right. Where the dispute is significant, society requires a basis for making a definitive judgement which ensures justice is done. This can be provided by authorities which incorporate an additional level of rule.

G″-5: Judging Conduct. The 3 pentadic groups (5 levels per group) *ensure that differing views of right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement.* This grouping reflects the existence of three types of ethical **frame of reference** which are taken as definitive by all. The frames provide three distinct but related approaches to dispensing justice. The frames slowly alter and need to be *virtuously evolved* if they are to be accorded the necessary deference and respect. The evolution is propelled by the effect each has on the other and by judgements made using the frames. The frames of reference both support and constrain the demand for obedience sought by social authorities or powerful individuals. Regulating the requirement for obedience and so controlling the natural disposition to obey (or rebel) can be met by authorities incorporating an additional level of rule.

G″-6: Regulating Obedience. 2 hexadic groups (6 levels per group) *ensure that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time.* This grouping reflects the existence of two types of ethical **imperative**, one based on laws and deriving from pragmatic social demands and the other emerging from the spirit of duty towards others and the community which lies within each person. Imperatives must be *legitimately imposed* within society to be viewed as categorical. Once they are imposed, obedience to a wide range of rules

can be ensured in an orderly fashion. As a result, the imperative both constrains and supports the will of an individual. What is needed is a common will in all the members of the community to sustain a coherent set of rules which define a good and just society. This can be generated by an authority which incorporates an additional and final level of rule.

G″-7: Engendering Will. 1 heptadic group (7 levels per group) *ensures that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems right.* This grouping reflects the existence of an ethical **order** which is wholeheartedly and *freely embraced*. This is the abstract order providing the underlying authority for whatever the actual social order may be. The ethical order must be both personally valued and communally upheld. Any order depends on people willingly adhering to certain rules, and so it constrains, activates and supports authority. People must recognize certain essential embodiments of authority in any community, the primal authorities. If they do, they will allow themselves to be bound by rules which such authorities generate. We return in this way to the elemental monads (G″-1).

The creation and handling of authority within society and its organizations will now be systematically examined by considering each of the groupings from G″-1 to G″-7. In each case, I will identify the function, manifestations and properties of the authority defined by the grouping. Then the nature of each of the groups (i.e. types of that authority) within the grouping and their interrelations will be explored in turn. Each section will conclude with a brief review together with a Master-matrix summary.

The appropriate starting place for appreciating accommodation to authority is with its most elemental form: simple ethical rules. And the logical starting place is the seven level hierarchy of ethical rules which defines all the elemental forms rule and authority. All more complex types of ethical authority must, by definition, somehow spring from this hierarchy. This hierarchy can now be re-labelled as the monadic grouping (G″-1), and we must now re-consider it.

Master-Figure 18

The framework for accommodating ethical authority.
A diagram of the structural hierarchy formed by systematically defining all combinations of adjacent levels of ethical rule in the elemental hierarchy.
The processes above the groupings indicate what must be handled ethically in any society; and the resulting form of authority is described beneath the groupings
See text and Master-Tables 19, 20 and 27 for further details and explanation of the whole framework.

	G"-1 Recognizing Authority	G"-2 Maintaining Community	G"-3 Socializing Individuals	G"-4 Protecting Identity	G"-5 Judging Conduct	G"-6 Regulating Obedience	G"-7 Engendering Will
L"-7	Absolute	Natural Justice Principle	Distributive Justice	Universal Standard	The Morality	Moral Imperative	
L"-6	Law	Legal Principle	Legal Responsibility				
L"-5	Maxim			Societal Standard			
L"-4	Right	Human Right Principle		Individual Standard	The Law		The Ethical Order
L"-3	Tenet	Ideological Principle	Cultural Ethic				
L"-2	Convention	Social Policy Principle	Communal Role	Communal Standard			
L"-1	Prescription	Civility Principle	Good Practice		The Custom	Pragmatic Imperative	

revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing
7 types of binding **RULE** supporting and constraining Community	6 types of guiding **PRINCIPLE** supporting and constraining Individuals	5 types of internalized **POSITION** supporting and constraining Identity	4 types of minimum **STANDARD** supporting and constraining Conduct	3 types of definitive **FRAMES OF REFERENCE** supporting and constraining Obedience	2 types of categorical **IMPERATIVE** supporting and constraining Will	1 type of sustainable **ORDER** supporting and constraining Authority

Generic Labels:

ELEMENTAL DIFFERENTIATION	CONSTRAINED DYNAMISM	SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT	SELF-CONTAINED OPERATION	PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION	STRUCTURED INTEGRATION	HOLISTIC UNIFICATION

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Master Matrix 18

Master-Table 19

The groupings of levels of ethical rule generating ethical authority.
Abstract authorities, labelled in the content column, emerge from grouping the seven levels of ethical rules to form a structural hierarchy (G"-1 to G"-7).
Groups within these groupings define ethical authorities needed in any society. See Master-Table 27 for further properties and relationships of the groupings.

G	Nature	Function in Society	Content (Group Structure)	Characteristic when Ascending the Groups	Implications for Social Design	Some Typical Errors
G"-1:	Recognizing authority unequivocally	To ensure that constraints defined by recognizable authorities can become binding obligations on all	Ethical Rules (7 monads)	Groups reflect progressively greater autonomy and weight of ethical responsibility in making choices.	Primal authorities of seven distinct types must be respected by all established authorities.	Confusion about what different types of rule can achieve; an excessive use prescriptions and laws to enable coercion.
G"-2:	Maintaining community acceptably	To ensure that choices affecting the community and its viability can be authoritatively guided.	Ethical Principles (6 dyads)	Groups reflect progressively greater demands for willing cooperation amongst members of a society.	Government is about using principles. Scholarship to develop and assess ethical principles is needed.	Treating principles as rules and failing to see that principles need to be weighed and balanced against each other.
G"-3:	Socializing individuals dogmatically	To ensure that members can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and change	Ethical Positions (5 triads)	Groups reflect progressively more powerful societal requirements for conformity with ethical rules.	Orchestrated public debate is needed for progress, so freedom of expression and association are essential.	Regarding positions as if they were unitary e.g. only one form of distributive justice, only one valid ethic.
G"-4:	Protecting identity deliberately	To ensure that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative and self-chosen minimum.	Ethical Standards (4 tetrads)	Groups reflect progressively profounder conceptions of social identity, each of which needs protection.	Progress depends on developing standards, and providing for monitoring and arbitration.	Confusing standards which define an ideal, an actual, a goal, or an expectation with standards which define a minimum and an identity.
G"-5:	Judging conduct virtuously	To ensure that differing views of right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement.	Ethical Frames of Reference (3 pentads)	Groups reflect a progressive move from respecting the past, through handling the present, to creating a better future.	There are three types of justice and social power. The law mediates between custom and morality.	Over-valuing or under-valuing one of the frames; trying to fuse distinct frames.
G"-6:	Regulating obedience legitimately	To ensure that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time.	Ethical Imperatives (2 hexads)	Groups reflect a shift from pragmatic and temporal considerations to spiritual and eternal considerations.	The ultimate personal and social sources of obedience are absolutes and laws respectively.	Attempting to unify temporal and spiritual powers in one authority to avoid intrinsic tensions; over-personalizing societal authority.
G"-7:	Engendering will freely	To ensure that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems right.	Ethical Order (1 heptad)	The group of all levels reflects the sustenance of a social order which unifies all inner-personal and outer-social obligations.	The need for all to create a society in which what each member ought to do is what each wants to do.	Denying the need for communal restraints on individuality; denying the need to maximize personal autonomy.

Qualities of internal levels in each of the groupings of ethical rules.
These properties apply to each of the groups within a particular grouping. The Table shows how each grouping builds
on the previous one. Note that the highest level (in shaded bold) gives the grouping its characteristic quality. In the formulae
on both sides, 1°L refers to the first level in a group or grouping, 2°L to the second level &c. See text for further explanation and examples

	G"-1	G"-2	G"-3	G"-4	G"-5	G"-6	G"-7	
	Authority	Community	Individuals	Identity	Conduct	Obedience	Will	
	requires	requires	require	requires	requires	requires	requires	
	7 types of	6 types of	5 types of	4 types of	3 types of	2 types of	1 type of	
	RULE	**PRINCIPLE**	**POSITION**	**STANDARD**	**FRAME OF REFERENCE**	**IMPERATIVE**	**ORDER**	
	to be	to be	to be	to be	to be	to be	to be	
	respected	applied	affirmed	adopted	evolved	imposed	embraced	
7°L							**Freely**	7°L
6°L						**Legitimately**	Legitimately	6°L
5°L					**Virtuously**	Virtuously	Virtuously	5°L
4°L				**Deliberately**	Deliberately	Deliberately	Deliberately	4°L
3°L			**Dogmatically**	Dogmatically	Dogmatically	Dogmatically	Dogmatically	3°L
2°L		**Acceptably**	Acceptably	Acceptably	Acceptably	Acceptably	Acceptably	2°L
1°L	**Unequivocally**	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	1°L

DEFINITIONS:

Unequivocally	:	In terms of what is clearly recognized as an obligation by all concerned.
Acceptably	:	In terms of what is expected and allowed by most in the community.
Dogmatically	:	In terms of what is to be believed without further proof or doubt.
Deliberately	:	In terms of what is self-consciously owned, claimed and conformed to.
Virtuously	:	In terms of what is required by ideals of virtue and justice.
Legitimately	:	In terms of what is formally specified and enforced.
Freely	:	In terms of what is necessary, desired, right and good for oneself and all

G"-1: BINDING RULES

Nature. In understanding society's ethical authorities, we must start somewhere. The obvious place is a conception of a person as an autonomous social being who accepts the need for an authoritative rule-based ethical order in his or her society. This acceptance has at least three bases: a *firm pragmatic basis* — order and authority are essential to ensure personal survival and control by rules must be generally fairer, safer and more peaceful than control by particular people; an *unavoidable altruistic basis* — order and authority are essential to pursue the common good and rules can be devised with the common good in mind; and *an unequivocal philosophical basis* — freedom requires bounds if it is to exist at all and these bounds must be authorized to have any validity in society.

People supporting the ethical order in society are committed to ethical conduct because the order involves recognizing obligations. These obligations limit freedom to enable freedom. They seek to prevent chaos and conflict which would make life intolerable. When we exercise our freedom within an order which we create and sustain, then we are being ethical — at least in the view of our community. But if there is to be such an order, it must be imbued with authority. Recognizing social authority is therefore the essential starting point for any design of, that is to say any intervention in, the existing order of society.

To appreciate the nature of authority in society, it is necessary to start with rules because they are the elemental ethical device embodying social authority. Rules reflect the existence of certain easily recognized and inescapable authorities. I call them *primal* because they are inherent in social existence.

Rules are not new to us. In choosing with the good of the group in mind, we found that choices involved setting and adhering to rules (Ch. 6). In exploring society's natural moral institutions, we found that rules were their essential common characteristic (Ch. 7). To work with rules requires clarity about precisely what sorts of rules may be defined. Systematic inquiry along these lines has revealed seven distinct varieties of rule in a seven-level hierarchy (Ch. 8).

Clear specification of obligations in society depends on recognition of these various types of rule and of the different authorities dealing with them. Put another way, any particular obligation or sense that a limitation is for the good of a community becomes explicit and generally usable only when it is fixed as a rule.

Although rules at each level are dependent on those at higher and lower levels for their full realization and integration in social life, the levels may be considered

and used separately. This is the approach characteristic of this first grouping. Any type of rule is binding on people if set and endorsed by an appropriate authority. This means that rules are specified so as to be *unequivocally respected*. This in turn demands precision in definition of rules.

One might say a rule should be strictly followed or adhered to, but this might communicate the misleading implication that the rule indicates what to do. Or it encourages the mistaken notion that prescriptions, often in the form of laws, are the ideal type of rule. As we have seen already (in Ch.s 4, 6 & 8), rules are values or obligations which constrain rather than determine action, and certainly never decide outcomes or results. (Let me remind you why: decision and action flow primarily from facts and objectives, with a dash of habit and convenience. The determinants of results are even more complicated — certainly far beyond the control of rules.) So 'respect for constraints' captures the ethical requirement better. Even a person who breaks or does not follow a rule can be said to respect it if he is aware of a transgression or accepts judgement in its terms.

The nature of the elemental rules is that they embody primal authorities. These permit rule generation and application by established authorities. To challenge the rule is to challenge the authority; respecting the rule means recognizing the authority that created the rule; and recognizing the authority means adhering to its rules. Effective development and use of the more complex rule-based authorities depend on the use of the elemental rules and eventually appeal to primal authorities.

So rules and authority are almost synonymous in practice: it is meaningless to speak of a rule, unless there is genuine authority behind it; and the substance of any authority is found in the rules it supports. Rules fit the definition of an authority; and two of the primal authorities, the ethical teaching and the law, are essentially constituted by rules. The *function* of a rule is to ensure that constraints defined by recognizable authorities (abstract or actual) can become binding obligations on all.

In summary: starting from the conception of a person as an autonomous social being who accepts the need for authority to maintain a rule-ordered community for the common good, we are inexorably led to recognize the seven level hierarchy of rules which implicitly or explicitly underpins authority in all societies.

Because each level is considered here as a group, there are seven monadic groups which correspond to the seven levels and have the same labels. As described earlier, the rules needed to operate a social order are:

Figure 9.1: The monadic grouping forming binding rules.
Seven types of ethical rule which must be unequivocally respected if authority is to be recognized.

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prescriptions $(G''\text{-}1^1)$; *conventions* $(G''\text{-}1^2)$; *tenets* $(G''\text{-}1^3)$; *rights* $(G''\text{-}1^4)$; *maxims* $(G''\text{-}1^5)$; *laws* $(G''\text{-}1^6)$; and *absolutes* $(G''\text{-}1^7)$. The pattern is diagrammed in Figure 9.1. The different properties of the various groups are summarized in Master-Table 21.

Properties

The present task is to do little more than recapitulate the levels of rule, but this time from the perspective of the essential authority in society. We must examine the capacity of people to recognize an unequivocal obligation to follow that authority (i.e. to be ethical), and the effect on personal freedom.

Most of the properties of rules have already been considered with examples, and repetition is unnecessary. The reader can (re-)read the second half of Ch. 7 for details of rules in the spontaneously evolved moral institutions, especially methods for obtaining compliance with these. All of Ch. 8 is relevant: it contains details of the function and application of the rules, differences and difficulties in changing rules, particular advantages of each type of rule, common criticisms, and a note on the related ethical disposition. Here, I will restrict myself to bringing together the general qualities of rules, because these are relevant to the creation of the more complex forms of authority in subsequent sections.

In examining and comparing these rules now, I will first clarify the focus of *constraint* of each type of rule i.e. exactly how it binds people; and explain *to whom it applies* in the community. Then I can identify the *primal*

authority on which everyone and all established social authorities depend when working with rules of that type.

It will become evident as the analysis progresses that established authorities like the government, church, press or courts, characteristically deal with rules at several or all levels simultaneously. As noted earlier, a wide variety of established authorities are usually associated with rule development. It is common to find different authorities working on related aspects of a particular issue in the social order including: investigating whether rules are required, designing new rules, setting the new rules, monitoring established rules, and judging rule breaches. In some cases, more than one authority may contribute to a particular aspect. All such instituted authorities emerge from, recognize and appeal to the primal social authorities.

I will review and highlight essential differences in the way *compliance* to each type of rule is handled. According to the nature of the rule and the authority, the *quality of adherence* varies in practice. This is because formulating some types of rule is certain and incontestable, while formulating others is uncertain and contestable. Rules put an obligation on people to operate strictly within their bounds. Any ethical problem can be addressed using rules and authorities within each or all of the seven groups. Ascending the hierarchy, each group becomes progressively more complex, constrains *personal freedom* less, and correspondingly imposes a greater *weight of ethical responsibility*.

I will illustrate the various rules and authorities using the single example of bribery. Bribery is defined as the

offering, giving or accepting of something to influence the performance of a task for which the proper motive ought to be a conscientious sense of duty. Bribery is an ideal example because bribes benefit the individuals involved at the expense of certain others and the community as a whole. Once bribery becomes established in a society, it feeds on itself and drives out integrity. The crucial defence lies in rules which are willingly observed.

The Seven Rules (Again)

Prescriptions (G"-1^1) are those rules which *constrain* people to perform or not to perform specific actions. As a result, prescriptions determine behaviour but not outcomes or consequences (although it is assumed that these will be beneficial in general or in the long run). Prescribed actions are performed in the context of particular roles: either rather general roles like citizen or consumer, or very specific roles like midwife or insurance salesman. So prescriptions *apply to* community elements: members of the community acting in particular roles. *Adherence* can be certain and incontestable because prescriptions enable very precise specification and assignation. Prescriptions recognize the *primal authority* of informal and formal community leadership. If the prescription becomes part of everyday social life, then *compliance* can be ensured through direct social control using an impersonal command (e.g. a 'no smoking' notice). As a consequence, *personal freedom* may be severely restricted. Given the precision, concreteness and force of prescriptions, the *weight of ethical responsibility* is at an absolute minimum.

Prescriptions can be used to counter bribery. Social leaders and opinion-formers should repeatedly speak out against bribery with very specific statements about exactly what people must and must not do ('never offer a gift to your examiner'). Rules can be introduced in firms and government departments which specify precisely what action must be taken when a gift is offered or a bribe is demanded. Gifts must be defined precisely to prevent confusion with bribes. Prescriptions may be particularly needed to guide staff seeking to win contracts in countries where key officials suggest that gifts are part of normal business practice. (Because there are no second-class cultures, bribery as defined is wrong everywhere.)

Conventions (G"-1^2) are those rules which *constrain* people to hold and act on certain attitudes. As a consequence, behaviour is constrained but not determined. Conventions emerge from and *apply to* the diffuse mass of members who form the mainstream of a community. So they tend to evolve with the community and its widely shared values. The community as a whole

is the *primal authority*. Attitudes enable a degree of discretion in conduct and this element of discretion means that the basis of *compliance* must be social pressure as expressed through public opinion. Conventions often do not get put down in writing because everyone knows what they are. *Adherence* is uncertain and often contested, partly because of their unwritten, fuzzy, evolving and discretionary qualities, and also because of challenging minority viewpoints. The discretionary quality means that the *personal freedom* allowed by conventions is somewhat greater than that permitted by prescriptions. The *weight of ethical responsibility* is still rather low, however, because use of the rules and acceptance of their implications are shared diffusely with many others.

Conventions can be used to counter bribery. The essential requirement is that the community as a whole develops an attitude opposed to bribes. This in turn depends on the predominant values in the community. People who claim to speak for the majority, like most politicians, exemplify adherence to conventions. So their attitude to bribery is a barometer of public opinion. Constructive conventions, the sense that 'no-one here does it', are most effective. Corrupt conventions, the sense that 'everyone does it', feel like permission or justification for bribery. Corruption in Italian public life is a current example: many business people are confused by changes in the direction of propriety; if bribes to get government contracts are to cease, they wonder how they are expected to do business. Exactly what counts as bribery may remain fuzzy, but conventions can make it clear enough that certain payments or gifts are acceptable while others are improper and excessive.

Tenets (G"-1^3) are those rules which *constrain* people in their beliefs. Tenets *apply to* people who are willing members of enduring associations within the community. The decision to join and remain a member of any association is essentially each person's. So the person or rather the conscience of the person is now the *primal authority*. *Compliance* is a social requirement, but it is experienced as an internal matter and it is dependent on inner convictions. This direct personal control over tenets means that *adherence* (or non-adherence) to them can be certain and incontestable. Tenets express beliefs which are developed partly through socialization and partly through reflection, so the *weight of ethical responsibility* felt by a person is now decisively increased. Using tenets is not completely straightforward because they become complicated by the influence of related beliefs, worries, feelings and personal goals, some of which will be unconscious. Nevertheless greater *personal freedom* is available: tenets can help a person reject conventions and oppose public opinion, for example.

Tenets can be used to counter bribery. Tenets about bribery are dependent on people being convinced that bribery is wrong, that the impartial performance of duty will lead to getting the best results in the end, that buying an unfair advantage brings the firm, department or government into disrepute, and so on. Such tenets must be inculcated during upbringing if they are to tap into a person's capacity for self-disapproval and guilt. Societies where it is customary for parents to bribe their children to behave will find that its adults confuse friendly inducements and bribery. Tenets opposing bribery must be given importance in groups of various sorts, and especially in educational settings. Universities, business schools and civil service colleges need courses in ethics in which tenets rejecting bribery are unambiguously affirmed rather than used for superficial intellectual debate. Firms also need to incorporate a ban on bribery in their credo, induct staff into those tenets, and select (or dismiss) staff according to whether they genuinely respect them. Each society needs people committed to the eradication of bribery and corruption in public life to serve on investigating, regulatory and judicial authorities.

Rights (G"-1⁴) are those rules which *constrain* people in their entitlements. Rights are a property of social classes in the community, and so they *apply to* each person in so far as they fit a certain category. Exactly what is due to and from a particular class of person is in the end determined by the power of that class, which is recognizable as the *primal authority*. Each member of the class contributes to its power. Disadvantaged classes do not lack rights: it is just that few of them are positive (e.g. privileges) and many are negative (e.g. liabilities). Classes of people are not inherently organized. So *compliance* with non-legal or customary rights depends on each class member feeling an internal pressure for adherence based on self-interest. Organizations may form to assert and protect the special interests of the class. People in any class may wish to reject their disabilities or liabilities and seek to challenge the privileges and powers applicable to other classes as unfair or harmful. This contest about the rule affects *adherence* and creates uncertainty.

The *weight of ethical responsibility* on each person is now heavier because everyone belongs to a unique set of classes and has a distinctive pattern of rights and duties. However, the assertion of these is made complex by the context of power relations and differential rights (privileges, immunities, liabilities &c) within which such assertion occurs. An essential duty, for example, is to respect the rights of others. Nevertheless, because the exercise of rights and duties (unlike tenets) is under the direct conscious control of each person, *personal freedom* is enhanced.

Rights can be used to counter bribery. Integrity and honesty can lead to privileges being assigned; and, conversely, once a person has been found engaging in bribery, it could remain a permanent social liability. Many countries, by contrast, treat episodes of corruption by their politicians and officials in a cavalier way, and allow them virtual immunity to investigation and/or prosecution. Everyone should have the right and duty to reject and expose corruption. Where staff are poorly paid, bribes may be the only way to supplement income. So customary rights to a sufficient income for officials enhance the fight against bribery.

Maxims (G"-1⁵) are those rules which *constrain* people in their social functioning. Maxims are the rules that, if followed, benefit the individual through benefiting communal relationships and the community as a whole. Being discretionary and wholly good, they only *apply to* those who regard themselves as part of a moral community. Societies have a variety of moral communities within them, each of which appeals to the *primal authority* of an ethical teaching or code of ethics based on it. Each person has control over *compliance*, but this control is buttressed by moral exhortations from others in the relevant community. So there is social pressure for personal control. Because maxims are so obviously good and right, *adherence* is certain and incontestable. *Personal freedom* is again decisively increased. As a result, the use of maxims is often referred to as self-regulation. The *weight of ethical responsibility* is now heavy because breaching a maxim may be personally advantageous, at least in the short term.

Maxims must be used to counter bribery because bribery involves deception, dishonesty, theft and injustice. Those who wish to be regarded as exercising moral leadership, especially church leaders, should strive to engender a responsible community spirit and crusade against bribery. Despite the temporary material benefit for those involved, bribery interferes with good relationships, brings authority into disrepute, and so damages social functioning over the long term. Hence the need for a moral community. Before de-regulation in the 1980's, financiers in London were few and operated like a club with strict rules based on trust: that is to say, a moral community existed. Growth meant that business interactions became diffuse and anonymous. As a result, doing what the law allowed (or had difficulty enforcing) took over from acting with propriety — and scandals proliferated. Maxims foster integrity and honesty and condemn bribery, but what constitutes bribery is left open to interpretation in each situation. For example, managerial agreements with the print workers in the UK news-

paper industry in the 1970's were often in effect bribes to keep the presses rolling.

Laws (G"-1⁶) are those rules which *constrain* people to accept the formal enforcement of certain rules (and the lack of official compulsion for others). Laws *apply to* officially defined members of a community with specified boundaries. Laws resolve conflicts and disputes between members about which existing informal rules count and how. Laws also define new rules which are to be taken as just and right for all future cases. Laws here refer to universal restraining rules of conduct for individuals, whether these be persons, organizations or government — not to those statutes which define necessary executive work of government. Although laws emerge in the courts and via government legislation, the *primal authority* is *the law* itself, which includes previous laws and other lower level rules (see G"-5²).

Laws are instruments of social control which exist to ensure that informal social control is not inappropriate, absent, incoherent, anarchic or violent. In other words, *compliance* is based on accepting the social control of social control. It manifests at the extreme as physical coercion which is officially sanctioned and communally accepted. *Adherence* to laws is usually uncertain and contestable, because they are so complicated by nature, open to differing interpretations, and capable of revision. Although it seems as if laws reduce freedom through their dependence on force, laws (like maxims) provide for the maximum *personal freedom*. This is because the law is supposed to apply equally to all, entitling and encouraging individuals to pursue their own goals while ensuring for themselves that their conduct is lawful at all times. Correspondingly, the *weight of ethical responsibility* to respect the law and not to abuse that freedom of action increases. If communally necessary non-legal rules are regularly violated, then more dependence is placed on laws even if laws cannot properly substitute for them. In the extreme version of social engineering, laws prescribe objectives and decisions which are far better left to the judgement of people in the situation. The net effect then is that laws reduce personal freedom and remove ethical responsibility.[8]

Laws can be used to reduce bribery. Government itself, for example, could be designed to prevent the party in power from bribing the electorate or special interests in order to gain re-election. Similarly, when self-regulation in financial centres fails, it can be effectively bolstered or replaced in part by legal controls. Laws may specifically proscribe bribery in a variety of forms and impose stiff penalties on offenders. Many societies have such laws in relation to permanent public officials like politicians, civil servants, judges and police, and laws which regulate temporary public duties like jury service. Governments can also create special agencies with legal duties and powers to ferret out bribery and corruption in public life.

Absolutes (G"-1⁷) are those rules which *constrain* people both in their sense of freedom by evoking duty and in their sense of duty by evoking freedom. Absolutes seek to ensure that each person abides by the spirit of duty, and they potentially *apply to* all people in all communities at all times. Absolutes can provide this coverage because they are so abstract and contentless. The absolute rule of beneficence — 'choose the lesser of two evils' — is a typical example. Ultimate values, often referred to as God, are the *primal authority* for these rules. Each person gains access to the authority via transpersonal being, that is to say from the deepest sense of self. This deep non-social self is used to control the social self. So *compliance* is based on the personal control of personal control and manifests paradoxically as free will. *Adherence* can be certain and incontestable because the rules are so all-embracing and always applicable. Attention to the spirit of duty in the midst of the complexity of daily life brings to the fore the complexity of ethical choice. Attention to absolutes may require a person to put even laws and maxims to one side. So, although freedom is constrained, *personal freedom* is now at the absolute maximum and the *weight of ethical responsibility* is correspondingly at its heaviest.

Absolutes can be used to reduce bribery, even though they are too abstract to refer to bribery specifically. Bribery corrupts the performance of duty (by definition), so it is easily recognizable as contrary to the spirit of duty and the freedom to use or accept bribes is not one to be fostered. Paradoxically, in accord with the free-will inherent in absolutes plus the absolute of beneficence, a bribe may occasionally be right or at the least the lesser of two evils.

REVIEWING THE RULES

We started from the assumption that a society requires its members to be ethical. We postulated that being ethical in any particular society means having obligations consistent with its ethical order. We took it for granted that these obligations cannot be developed and maintained without some conception of authority. We concluded that social obligations entail *unequivocal respect* for rules irrespective of expedient or beneficial reasons for ignoring them. These now familiar rules are: absolutes, laws, maxims, rights, tenets, conventions and prescriptions.

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Rules are a form of authority, and they demand recognition of certain and unavoidable primal authorities. The primal authorities underpinning the types of rule vary in their power. However, all rules must in the end be acceptable and must be generally respected and used by most people within a community. So conventions, reflected in public attitudes and opinions, appear to provide the pragmatic grounding for ethical conduct, and show primacy over other rules in practice. "All human affairs," asserted Hume "are entirely governed by opinion."[9] The existence of conventions inhibiting bribery, for example, does far more to encourage businesses, schools, associations, and even families to reject bribery than any amount of ponderous laws unsupported by public opinion.

The power of conventions is easily understood. It arises from the primal authority of the community in general (G''-1^2): community is the very foundation of all social life and its mainstream or majority is the dominant force in society. Interestingly, the hierarchy of primal authorities is clearly not a simple expression of their increasing power in worldly terms. In a more enlightened future, it might well reveal decreasing social power in line with the observation in Ch. 8 that the possibility for coercion diminishes as the rules are ascended. At present, communal leaders (G''-1^1) who gain positions of power in government, can of course use laws (G''-1^6) to dominate and tyrannize — and even get the law to appear to support them.

Note that government, though it appeals to all primal authorities, is not itself a primal authority. So the interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty to mean that a government has unlimited powers to do whatever it wishes appears to be deeply misguided.

Once a government is established, then class (G''-1^4) is where power emerges most obviously in society. Here power is no longer an auxiliary of authority but the very essence of authority itself. A particular class may bend the law in its favour, provide the community with its leaders, dominate the majority of the community, harness the ethical teaching, select ultimate values, and penetrate minds. The resulting concrete injustice is probably why sociologists exhibit such a preoccupation with class power. Economists too are con-cerned with class power, especially the fact that, with the connivance of government, non-organizable classes (like tax-payers or consumers or the elderly) are sacrificed and exploited by organizable classes (like labour unions, professional associations or big business).[10]

Because rules embody power and authority, their use generates conflict. Conflicts between rules at the same level can be problematic and stressful for the primal authorities. Consider, for example, claims of different classes or personal struggles to reconcile maxims of loyalty and fairness. However, conflicts between rules at different levels activate clashes between different primal authorities and may cause far more severe difficulties in deciding within a community. Consider, for example, current discrepancies between male-dominated conventions, personal beliefs, feminist claims and impersonal laws in regard to promoting women to top jobs. By moving beyond the monadic rules and primal authorities, it becomes possible to define ethical authorities to handle such inter-level conflicts which might otherwise harm everyone. The first of these concerns the impact of applying rules to community matters.

Transition. Clarity about the different types of rule and recognition of the associated forms of primal authority provide the basis for defining and defending an ethical order in society. The order governs everyday community life and gives people boundaries within which they can experience freedom.

Rules taken separately may make communal life possible, but they do not maintain the community. Nor are rules oriented specifically to dealing with situations where the community might be threatened by the freedom of its own members. Only by giving pre-eminence to communal authority and by emphasizing the general acceptability of rules to most members can such threats be defused. Ideally, any communal authority should be infused with a spirit of fraternity and justice.

So the next step in formalizing ethical authority is to recognize abstract (rule-based) authorities and actual (official) authorities which exist to maintain the viability of the community. Grouping adjacent rules in dyads (pairs) meets this need.

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Master- **Properties of the seven types of binding rule in society.**
Table 21 Respect for rules is based on recognizing the primal authorities in community life. All actual or instituted social authorities appeal to these Rules must be unequivocally respected but each provides for a different degree of freedom in practice. See text for further details and explanation and cf. Master-Tables 16 & 17. Note that Master-Table 17 provides details of the function and application of rules, differences in changing rules, their particular advantages, common criticisms, and the related ethical disposition

Monad (Level)	Type of Rule and Focus	To Whom the Rule Applies	Primal Authority	Basis of Compliance	Quality of Adherence	Personal Freedom & Weight of Responsibility
1 (L"-1)	Prescription constrains actions.	Members as elements of a community.	Community leaders	Social control via impersonal command	Certain-incontestable (because capable of precise specification and assignation)	Absolute minimum (because constraints are precisely specified).
2 (L"-2)	Convention constrains attitudes.	Members diffusely in the mainstream of a community.	Community as a whole	Social pressure via public opinion	Uncertain-contestable (because partial, fuzzy and evolving).	Minimum (because responsibility is shared with others).
3 (L"-3)	Tenet constrains beliefs.	Members of associations within a community.	Each person's conscience	Personal control via inner conviction	Certain-incontestable (because based directly on inner experiences).	Moderate (because internally controlled but partly unconscious).
4 (L"-4)	Right constrains entitlements.	Members of social classes in a community.	Class power	Personal pressure via special interest	Uncertain-contestable (because members challenge explicit rules).	Near maximum (because under direct conscious personal control).
5 (L"-5)	Maxim constrains functioning.	Members of a moral community.	An ethical teaching	Social pressure for personal control via moral exhortation	Certain-incontestable (because so obviously good and right).	Maximum (because rule-breaking may be personally advantageous)
6 (L"-6)	Law constrains enforcement.	Members of an officially bounded community.	The law	Social control of social control via legalized coercion	Uncertain-contestable (because open to interpretation and revision)	Maximum* (because of freedom under the law).
7 (L"-7)	Absolute constrains freedom and duty.	Members of all communities at all times.	Ultimate values	Personal control of personal control via free will	Certain-incontestable (because so abstract and all-embracing).	Absolute maximum (because the meaning and use must be left up to each person).

*Laws may reduce freedom if they are used where other types of rule are required, if society is treated as an organization, or if the legal system does not operate by consent.

G"-2: GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Nature. Society is more than its members taken individually, and even more than the community on which it is built. As well as being a community sustained by social values, a society must be taken to include various enduring and essential institutions, including its government, and must embody ultimate values (cf. Ch. 5). Still, the notion of a community (or networks of closely related communities) remains the foundation of any society. Once the importance of communities and communal life is recognized, then the authority of elemental rules alone and the freedom they enable appear insufficient.

Community life is complex and ever-changing. It is dominated by irrational pressures, conflicting views and practical constraints of many sorts. As a result, the preservation of social cooperation is a continuing challenge. Meeting it requires something more flexible and less binding than rules. In particular, some authoritative ethical guide is needed for decisions on matters which, if misjudged, could lead to members turning against their own community. The variety of decision situations of this sort is great.

The following example should illustrate how unequivocal rules are inherently incapable of guiding such choices. It is obvious that a community should not coerce its members too much or it will lose their allegiance. So people need to know the logic being used in handling any situation which invites the use of coercion to protect the common good — say, a march by a widely-detested political group. Conventions may push for one choice, maxims might push for another choice, and asserting rights will create further conflict. In one community the final choice might be to ban the march, while in another it might be to permit it.

If decisions in such cases are not to be purely reflex, pragmatic, whimsical or otherwise non-authoritative, then they must be made in a way that builds on ethical rules. Above all, they must be perceived as just by most in the community. Note that justice refers here to a communal sense of fairness or fair play rather than to personal conduct under the law.[11] Put another way, official authorities responsible for the decision, and others involved in the debate, need to appeal to some sort of coherent ethical authority to guide debate and to help them reach a defensible decision which is communally acceptable. Getting it wrong could generate an evanescent commotion or even precipitate widespread riots.

What meets this need for authoritative guidance are enduring and respected ethical **principles** which can be selected and applied *according to their relevance*, and which can be *weighed against each other* in coming to a choice. Principles (sometimes called standards or policies) clearly set bounds to choice, are more dynamic and adaptable than rules, and enable the exercise of authority rather than the experience of freedom. The term 'principle' fits here in accord with the notion that they are higher order and less strict than rules.[12] When a person uses principles to guide a choice, ethical discretion is being exercised on behalf of the community. It follows that any principle must be acknowledged and allowed by the community mainstream. So active guiding principles have a dual nature: on the one hand, they must be applied in a socially acceptable way if they are to work; and on the other hand, they are an ethical obligation which, like rules, must be unequivocally respected by all whenever they are relevant.

Grouping adjacent levels on the simplest basis generates six overlapping hierarchical groups, each of which is a dyad. These dyads are represented diagrammatically in Figure 9.2. Analysis has revealed that they are the basis for the construction of principles. The principles can be *applied acceptably* because they emerge from or imply rules backed by primal authorities at the higher level; and they ought to be *unequivocally respected* because they emerge from or imply rules backed by primal authorities at the lower level. The *function* of all the ethical principles is to ensure that choices affecting the community and its viability can be authoritatively guided.

It follows that principles demand the establishment of social authorities which are assigned responsibility for selecting and using them. Principles themselves carry intrinsic authority derived from their component rules, but the responsibility for applying them requires additional communally-accorded authority.

Types. There are six dyads and therefore six distinct types of guiding principle in society. In ascending order, the types of ethical principle are: *civility principles* (G"-2^1); *social policy principles* (G"-2^2); *ideological principles* (G"-2^3); *human right principles* (G"-2^4); *legal principles* (G"-2^5); and *natural justice principles* (G"-2^6).

Each type of principle embodies authority and is absolutely essential in a large complex society because each makes a particular contribution to ensuring social cooperation, which in turn maintains a viable community. Civility principles are a mechanism for communal living and provide the basis for peaceful coexistence. Without civility, people tend to avoid each other as much as possible, and then communal living becomes a poor thing indeed. Social policy principles are oriented to personal needs and so tap into the rationale for people forming communities and participating

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Figure 9.2: The dyadic grouping forming guiding principles.
Six types of ethical principle which must be acceptably applied if the community is to be maintained.

L"-7 Absolutes						$G"-2^6$	
L"-6 Laws					$G"-2^5$		← *Natural Justice Principles*
L"-5 Maxims				$G"-2^4$		← *Legal Principles*	
L"-4 Rights			$G"-2^3$		← *Human Right Principles*		
L"-3 Tenets		$G"-2^2$		← *Ideological Principles*			
L"-2 Conventions	$G"-2^1$		← *Social Policy Principles*				
L"-1 Prescriptions		← *Civility Principles*					

actively in community life. Ideological principles are needed to enable the community to grapple with its inherent injustices, recognize where power lies, and modify its social structure accordingly. Human right principles deal with the unavoidable need for communities to control and constrain their members, while upholding their members equally unsuppressible need to assert their autonomy. Legal principles are required to maintain confidence in the legal system which is essential to deal authoritatively with internal disputes and destructive forces in society. Finally, natural justice principles are needed to promote fairness generally, and to foster laws which minimize injustice. If successful, this maintains a good communal spirit and ensures lower level principles are imbued with fairness.

The six types of principle are applied to six qualitatively different types of community issue. Ascending the hierarchy, the dyads cover progressively more general aspects of community life where facts and concrete goals are insufficient or unavailable to guide choice, and where explicit and impersonal ethical guidance is mandatory. The higher the principle (i.e. dyadic group), the greater the need for willing cooperation from people. In each type of principle, focus on the lower level clarifies the sort of constraint or demand required by the principle, while focus on the higher level clarifies the social acceptability of the principle when applied.

The distinctive properties of the various principles are laid out in Master-Table 22. Before proceeding, a brief summary of the principles is provided here includ-

ing: the function of the principles, the contexts requiring guidance, the composition of the principle, and where responsibility for selecting and applying principles lies.

$G"-2^1$: **Civility principles** shape behaviour so that due respect for other community members is always manifest. They are required to guide choices when handling the informal aspects of interpersonal interaction. Civility principles must be applied using conventions (L"-2) which are socially acceptable, and expressed in behavioural prescriptions (L"-1) which should be unequivocally respected. Their relevance and applicability is determined by the person at the moment of interaction.

$G"-2^2$: **Social policy principles** shape attitudes and organisations so that members' needs are met by society. They are required to guide choices about how interactions and institutions may respond to personal and communal needs. The principles may apply to interactions between people, or between people and organisations, or between individuals and government. Social policy principles must be applied using tenets (L"-3) which are socially acceptable, and expressed in conventions (L"-2) which should be unequivocally respected. Their relevance and applicability is determined by governments faced with social pressures to recognize certain needs.

$G"-2^3$: **Ideological principles** shape social institutions so that fair entitlements of classes of members are met. They are required to guide choices

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whenever the status or power of a class or category of individual is likely to be affected. Ideological principles must be applied using rights (L"-4) which are socially acceptable, and expressed in tenets (L"-3) which should be unequivocally respected. Their relevance and applicability is influenced by political movements and determined by political parties which seek to reshape society.

G"-2⁴: Human rights principles shape social constraints on members so as to protect their freedom as individuals. They are required to guide choices whenever the pursuit of collective goals constrains individuals or whenever individual actions are likely to harm the community. Human right principles must be applied using maxims (L"-5) which are socially acceptable, and expressed in rights (L"-4) which should be unequivocally respected. Their relevance and applicability is determined by legislators, regulatory authorities and jurists in their various deliberations.

G"-2⁵: Legal principles shape legal decisions so as to protect social institutions on which the community depends. They are required to guide choices in handling disputes within courts of justice. Legal principles must be applied using laws (L"-6) which are socially acceptable, and expressed in maxims (L"5) which should be unequivocally respected. Their relevance and applicability is argued by lawyers prior to and during a court case, while the presiding judge or judges make the final determination in the court.

G"-2⁶: Natural justice principles shape the expression of fair play in society. They are required to guide choices in the creation and use of social arrangements including other ethical principles. Natural justice principles are especially involved when rules are in flux and communal cooperation is most needed. To be recognized in society, natural justice principles must be applied using absolutes (L"-7) which are socially acceptable, and expressed in laws (L"-6) which should be unequivocally respected. Each of the social authorities already mentioned feels an involvement in determining their relevance and applicability: i.e. each person, the government, political parties, legislators and jurists.

Properties. Before indicating the categories to be used for describing each of the types of principle, it is important to reiterate that principles, as defined here, clearly differ from rules in many ways. Above all, their authority is guiding not binding — discretionary not unequivocal. The right to vote, for example, is or can be a rule because it is unequivocal (or can be easily made unequivocal through specifying age and other

criteria). Any elemental rule applies under all circumstances. The right (more correctly: human right principle) of free speech, by contrast, can only be discretionary. For example, it usually does not apply to shouting "Fire!" in a crowded cinema, or to revealing business confidences, or to inciting racial hatred. In the nature of things, it is impossible to remove discretion from principles by listing all the possible exclusions or indications beforehand.

So principles point in a particular direction but do not necessitate a particular decision. They are somewhat confusing in their abstract form and only come alive in a particular situation demanding choice. That is when they can be perceived to involve two adjacent types of rule. Principles exist as a multiplicity, and do not form a complete logical system or code. Principles emerge in part from the interaction of primal authorities, and their implications may shift and change relatively easily. They may be controversial as stated, and are frequently intensely controversial in their application. So they depend on the existence of social bodies, often called 'authorities', with assigned powers and duties, again confusingly called 'authority', to act. Although principles must be precisely recognized and given due weight in the situation, whether or not a principle is relevant and should be applied is rarely unequivocal. The weighing up of relevant principles against each other and in the light of the situation generates another potential source of dispute. With all their difficulties, the use of principles of some sort, like government itself, is essential, not optional.

We can now turn to each of the types of principle and describe them in more detail with examples. The description in each case has two parts. In the first part, I will consider the nature of the principle: its specific *function*, its general contribution to maintaining *community viability*, when it must be applied *to guide choice*, its *construction* by rules, and where *authority and responsibility* for selecting and using the principle lies in society. In the second part, I will compare how occasional *misjudgements* in the application of principles are handled, the results of *persistent neglect* or failure to accept and use given principles, and the implication of *deliberate contravention* of recognized ethical principles. Finally a note on the *limitations* of each principle in maintaining the community will serve as a link to the next higher type.

G"-2¹: Civility Principles

Nature. Principles of civility are about being sensitive, considerate and courteous during interaction. All behaviour during an interpersonal interaction should be ethically governed because it says something

about the relationship to the other person.[13] The *function* of a civility principle is to shape behaviour so that due respect to other community members is always manifest during social contact. A salesman dealing with a client, for example, should 'stand or sit at a proper distance', 'express gratitude for cooperation' and 'adapt to client idiosyncrasies'.

Civility demands a certain behaviour irrespective of what one's feelings or duties might be towards the other in the situation. In other words, it requires each person to be thoughtful and to exert self-command. Interactions vary according to the amount of prescription and formality possible. Compare, for example, an annual general meeting, the purchase of goods in a store, an arrest by a policeman, a game of tennis, and an appraisal by a superior. In all cases, there is an informal non-specified component of interaction. In this informal area, appearance, gestures, speech, touch and timing are all relevant to the expression of respect.

Self-command in everyday social relations is the foundation of any social order that considers itself civilized or ethical. No community can develop satisfactorily unless its members are determined to treat each other with a minimum of civility. Principles of civility do not create a community, but they are essential for *community viability* because adherence to them provides the basis, climate or medium through which all social transactions occur and on which all communal life depends. Civility principles are needed *to guide choices* to handle the informal or non-purposive part of interpersonal interactions in a myriad of different situations. The application of principles of civility results in good manners and permits peaceful co-existence despite differences in rank, ability, beliefs, interests or class.

Popular morality and formal etiquette are oriented to certain specific and recurrent situations, and neither can guide the handling of the informal and variable aspects of every sort of particular interpersonal interaction that may occur. Civility principles draw on these moral institutions, but each person has the *authority and responsibility* to select and apply the principles. Like all principles, these must be applied in an acceptable way and then unequivocally respected. Civility principles are *constructed* to ensure that behavioural prescriptions (L"-1) in particular situations accord with accepted conventions (L"-2). It follows that what is considered good manners varies between communities, and even amongst sub-communities within a society.

> Talking: It is civil to speak at a reasonable speed and sufficiently loud. But exactly what speed and what loudness indicates respect for the other party cannot be pre-specified. Discretion must be exercised in the particular

> situation. Furthermore in respect of speaking, there are many other principles of civility which should be borne in mind: one should speak simply, one should speak politely, one should speak clearly, one should speak to suit the audience. Which of these principles are relevant, and which of those are most important, will vary according to many factors. These include the audience (e.g. is the listener hard of hearing, or mentally-handicapped, or a foreigner); the relationship (e.g. is the listener a senior, an intimate, or a colleague); the subject matter (e.g. is it simple, abstruse, or essential); the urgency of the situation (e.g. is the matter routine, special, or an emergency); the context (e.g. what are the acoustic features of the room, how many are being addressed); and the speaker (e.g. his or her natural voice, age, health). The person in the situation automatically has the social authority to decide how to speak, but is expected to decide in a responsible fashion.
> Ex. 9.1

Once civility principles have been applied to a particular situation and a course of behaviour chosen, then that should be strictly followed. In other words, an application of principles of civility leads to an obligation to behave in a particular way in a particular situation.

Between strangers, acquaintances and friends the need for manners despite provocation is easily recognised. Difficulties arise more commonly between family members where familiarity breeds contempt; and between compulsory but unequal relationships (e.g. at work) where power tempts its abuse. At times of civil distress or disorder and in phases of community development when injustices and discontent come to the surface, maintenance of civility is of particular significance.

Dysfunction. A single *misjudgement* in regard to civility is hardly a catastrophe. Being rude, abrupt or late is usually due to self-preoccupation or failure of self-command which is based on tiredness, anxiety, disappointment, anger or personal stress. Breaches also occur when we are abroad or in unfamiliar surroundings. The occasional error is naturally handled via an apology and easily forgiven. A *persistent neglect* of civility is more serious. When uncivil behaviour is repetitive, a breakdown of the relationship is likely at a personal level and sometimes on a social level. For example, a person may not only dislike their current manager because of uncivil behaviour, but may come to distrust all managers or reject a career as a manager.

Far more dangerous is the *direct contravention* of the ethical teaching or deliberate neglect of principles of civility on a systematic basis. When unsatisfactory principles like 'turning up late', 'being uncooperative wherever possible', 'paying no attention', and 'maintaining a threatening posture' become established, community breakdown threatens. Incivility feeds on

itself and potentially invites the release of even more insulting behaviour. The process leads eventually to vituperative abuse and flagrant humiliation, and easily escalates to physical violence. For example: protesters who express grievances against the government by swearing and spitting at police, hurling excrement at them and routinely insulting them as pigs are going too far. Such behaviour is demoralizing and provocative. If it spreads and continues unchecked, policemen are likely to respond negatively. Police hostility to popular demonstrations and maltreatment of suspected offenders, if not already present, will be fostered. A vicious cycle is then set up which undermines the maintenance of law and order.

Wherever there is a power imbalance, maintenance of civility is of the utmost significance. Escalating incivility occurs commonly within households, between children, between children and parents, and between husband and wife as power disparities are used to relieve emotional distress. In organisations, civility amongst staff should be a prime requirement of ethical policies. Shouting at subordinates or the use of threatening and abusive language should be prohibited.

Civility can only be overturned with support of the wider community. Hong Kong police searching for weapons supposedly held by Vietnamese refugees (the boat people) beat them and forced them to squat for hours in their own urine and faeces. Such humiliating treatment was said to have been sanctioned by attitudes to the refugees held by the Hong Kong community. Incivility does not need to reach such gross abuse to be humiliating. A writer jailed for two months, described the way prisoners are treated as parcels, kept waiting with no explanation, grunted at, and generally dehumanised. Again public opinion condones this, apparently unaware that such handling of people cannot possibly foster the cooperation from them that society needs. Instead it brutalizes them, breeds the potential for explosions of violence within prisons, and leads to recidivism.[14]

As these examples illustrate, people who can legitimately coerce others (police, military, prison staff &c) have a particular need for self-discipline because they deal with people who are not only unwilling or unable to respect authority but who are also devalued by the community.

Limitations. Civility is about being respectful toward another in accord with certain principles. Civility is designed to apply to strangers and others with whom contact is transient. It does not provide for that depth of sensitivity which is essential for union. Yet without civility there can be no union. Nor are civility principles enough to cohere a community, because they

do not address personal or social needs in any depth. In the area of personal need, a different and higher form of principle based on tenets must be developed, promoted and applied.

G"-2²: Social Policy Principles

Nature. The notion that their needs will be met is the underlying rationale for people to participate properly in any community. So *community viability* depends on a continuing common effort to support and realize efforts to meet needs. Social policy principles are required *to guide choices* in situations or interactions where decisions must be made about how members' personal and communal needs are to be met. Social policy principles are typically used to deal with matters like housing, education, health, welfare, consumer protection, and policing. The *function* of the principles is to shape the attitudes of people and the policies of organizations so that members' needs are met.

In the simplest terms, social policy principles are designed to ensure that people are looked after in the right way. The relationship between people and organisations or institutions within a society is governed by social values. Seeing values affirmed and feeling looked after in the right way fosters attachment and preserves the community. Conversely, communal denial of needs and neglect of member well-being generates alienation. Nevertheless, this type of principle does not necessarily imply government intervention or provision. A social policy principle may specify that people should look after themselves as much as possible to meet needs for independence and self-reliance.

Not surprisingly, dealing with recognized needs is problematic and controversial. Their handling changes as the community develops greater understanding of the realities and as it becomes more enlightened. As usual, conflicting principles must be recognized and each given due weight in particular situations.

> Contraceptive Use by Adolescents: The principles of social policy that govern the provision of contraceptives might include: parental wishes and guidance should be recognized as valuable; access to a doctor or impartial confidante should be available; education about contraception should be provided in schools but not on television; contraceptives should be freely available in chemists; children should be progressively given their independence. Whether or not a particular 15 year old girl obtains contraceptives would depend on the sensitive application of such principles by parents, doctors, pharmacists, school teachers and others.   Ex. 9.2

The *construction* of any social policy principle depends on the identification of relevant tenets (L"-3) together with the determination of needed conventions

(L"-2). It is self-evident that social policy principles can only be used if they are widely acceptable. Once accepted, they need to be unequivocally respected, and then they imply an obligation to hold certain attitudes. Whereas civility principles are experienced in a relatively depersonalized way, social policy principles with their implied or explicit tenets require a degree of personal engagement. This root in tenets makes it natural for associations to campaign for particular **principles**, or for new groups to form in order to promote and disseminate particular principles.

Many interested bodies develop or promote social policy principles and stimulate public debate. However managing the relation between the community and each person is a specific *responsibility* of government. So government has the *authority* to develop social policy and raise finance in support of its principles.

Principles of social policy are to be found in public pronouncements by ministers or key politicians, in parliamentary proceedings, in circulars and guidelines produced by civil servants, in recommendations of commissions of inquiry, in other official reports, and in consultative documents produced by the government for the public and professionals.

Care for the Disabled: For over 20 years, the UK Government has promoted social policies for care of the mentally handicapped and other disabled individuals. The principles include: 'independent living should be maximized', 'more say and control over their own lives should be allowed' and 'variety of choice should be provided'. There have been inquiries, circulars, reports, legislation, initiatives, and numerous pronouncements. Over this period, relevant activities and services have slowly been scrutinized in health and social care in the public sector and the voluntary sector in the light of these principles. Many changes have been brought about. Although much remains to be done, many of the social policies have been successful in that the principles have become conventional wisdom.   Ex. 9.3[15]

Governments need to use their authority to establish the relevance and weight of the various principles within initiatives known as social policies. In recent times, this authority has led to governments becoming extensively engaged in service provision, and even monopolizing that provision. But the duty to provide services is not a logical consequence of the responsibility to develop principles to shape the meeting of needs, or of the authority to raise money to enable needs to be met. (Government provision is actually a choice affecting the community which flows from the application of certain ideological principles.)

Social policy principles should provide an ethical rationale and moral force for social policies. For exam-

ple, the social policy 'to provide more technical and vocational education', might depend on principles like 'employee education should never cease', 'everybody should be acquainted with modern technology', 'a successful economy needs an educated work-force' and so on. As is characteristic of principles, controversy is likely over their relevance and significance.

Social policy principles are normally developed on the basis of views held by key people in the area, tenets current in the public at large, and knowledge acquired via scientific research. It may even be that tenets accepted by the community are not scientifically defensible. Then the government finds itself in a cleft stick: either attacked by the community for not listening and being taken over by experts, or attacked by the professionals for acting irrationally and causing harm rather than benefit.

Governments may be more or less explicit about the principles which underpin their social policies. If a government sets priorities and strategic objectives without being explicit about its guiding principles, then it is acting too much like a chief executive. The duty of government should be to elicit values, to foster debate, to encourage ethical reflection and to develop popular support for principles — not to find ways to spend taxpayers' money.

The community is not a giant organization to be managed by government. Governments in thrall to the managerial delusion tend to reduce freedom and to produce inefficient and ineffective bureaucracies. Their social policy principles always seem to lead to complex legislation and central provision. But social policies do not always need legislation, and even if they do, a social policy must be seen to be more than law if it is to work. The use of legislation depends upon the nature of the issue, the amount of expenditure, existing statutory arrangements affecting progress, and other factors which make the establishment of a formal obligation and compulsion essential. The social policy principle itself is always (and by definition) distinct from this legislation and apart from the government bureaucracy. The principle needs to be held widely and respected freely within the community.

The guiding principles implicit in policy choices may become apparent through academic study. Such inquiry forms part of the subject matter of University disciplines like social or public policy, policy analysis, social planning, social or public administration, and government studies. Not surprisingly, academics often come into conflict with governments.

Governmental responsibility means that the courts frequently become involved in matters where social

policy principles are relevant. Experts argue about whether or not courts or judges should establish or promote social policy, rather than sticking to the law, precedent and legal principles. However, the fact that judges follow explicit or implicit principles of social policy and articulate these in the process of reaching judgements is undeniable. The UK Law Lords, for example, had no difficulty articulating (and disagreeing about) the principles to be followed by doctors when providing contraceptive advice to under-age girls (cf. Ex. 9.2).[16]

Dysfunction. Social policies may be *misjudged* or misconceived. Errors in the key principles frequently relate to a failure to recognize society's perception of what is socially good. The UK Labour Government's support for secondary picketing and the closed shop ultimately led to its defeat in 1979 because they did not meet social needs or foster social cooperation. These social policies were viewed as manifestly unjust by many people, and they were replaced in the Labour manifesto for the 1992 election.

The unpalatable fact is that societies are so complex that it is far easier to intervene badly than to intervene well. As a result, the key principles of a social policy may not be fully accepted or understood by the government itself, even after legislation. Blockage occurs when proposals are complex, when public opposition or ignorance is great, when economic pressures build up, or when powerful groups bring pressure to bear. In the case of the disabled (Ex. 9.3), major parts of the Disabled Person (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act (1986) had not been implemented by Order of Parliament at the time of writing — probably because the principles have not been fully accepted and because unsympathetic attitudes exist within the service-providing agencies.

Persistent neglect of social policy principles occurs in governments which are excessively reactive and pragmatic. Political decisions are then determined by pressure groups, influence peddlers, vote-catching, expediency, budgetary constraints and so on. Federal Government in the US is judged by many to be ineffective for just this reason. People expect so much of governments, often encouraged by politicians seeking their support. But it is doubtful whether their expectations are realistic. Lacking the discipline of the market, governments do whatever they do inefficiently, ineffectively, and all too often, corruptly. Having a weak grip on the concept of private property, government officials (both elected and appointed) tend to view the resources of every person as potentially theirs. They cannot resist plundering this commons on behalf of themselves or special interests rather than on behalf

of the community as a whole. Big bad government seems like the biggest single reason for economic and social disarray in both developed and developing nations.

An even more serious situation exists when social policies are pursued with principles which *deliberately contravene* ethical teachings and are self-evidently harmful to individuals. Such principles threaten communal life and the social order.

The Romanian Vampire: The principles underlying the social policies pursued by the Ceaucescu regime in Romania appear grotesque and bizarre. As part of the drive for industrial growth, the President sited toxic chemical plants in the centre of populated areas. Factories also mutilated and polluted the countryside. To modernise Romania, he destroyed villages and village institutions without replacing them with modern facilities. Social and welfare policies resulted in amenities that were limited and primitive. His procreation programme forced women to bear children, created ill-health in women and children, and led to such a degree of infanticide that a count of infant deaths was no longer kept. Large orphanages to rear neglected and abandoned children were left to operate under brutal conditions. The eventual consequence was communal violence, the overthrow of the regime, and modification of the social order.

Ex. 9.4

Limitations. The principles of any social policy deal with social needs and guide a general response to meeting these without modifying the status of any person or group. But the very nature of the social structure with its embedded injustice interferes with certain classes of people getting their needs met effectively or at all. Thoughtful people are liable to conclude that some change in the social structure is an ethical requirement. Well-recognized needs are social values, and the idea of meeting them in the community is taken for granted — even if the ways and priorities for meeting them are debatable. By contrast altering the social structure is never taken for granted, and making such choices generates the most intense controversy. It demands a different sort of principle in which rights and class power are taken into account.

G"-2³: Ideological Principles

Nature. Specialization and differentiation are needed in all communities and this lack of homogeneity leads to those status differences defined by the social structure. *Community viability* depends on the stability and justice of that moral institution. Any necessary alterations to the structure must be widely acceptable and engender wide cooperation well beyond the favoured classes. Otherwise civil disorder and repressive control will be unleashed.

Ideological principles are required *to guide choices* affecting the positioning of any class or category of individual in the social structure. The application of ideological principles either confirms and bolsters existing arrangements or leads to structural changes in society. For example, women in the 19th century lacked numerous rights and duties now regarded as customary. Change only occurred once a sense of entitlement built up, tenets about the capabilities and roles of women altered, and demonstrations took place. Once the right to vote was secured, a crucial lever on power was obtained. The status of women improved, the structure of society was decisively altered, and the potential for further peaceful change was secured.

The social structure never provides a definitive guide to its own modification or reconstruction, so without ideological principles deliberate major societal change cannot be sensibly pursued. The *function* of ideological principles is to shape social institutions so that fair entitlements of classes of members in the community are met.

An ideological principle is *constructed* with rights (L"-4) and tenets (L"-3). This accords with textbook definitions of ideology which usually go something like: 'a set of beliefs about the conduct of life and the organisation of society'.[17]

Ideological principles are inherently class-oriented because they include rights and duties. (Remember that the classes referred to here are not restricted to socio-economic categories based largely on education and earnings which are beloved of sociologists and social statisticians.) If an ideological principle is to be used, the rights it enshrines must be acceptable in the community generally. However, acceptability does not mean whole-hearted agreement. Disagreement is the norm because of the implications of assigning rights.

For example, for some decades socialist principles like 'the collective must take responsibility for ensuring that individuals get what they need' have been paramount in the UK and elsewhere. By contrast the New Right movement is guided by principles like 'free market forces must be left to determine the shape that society takes in the economic sphere'. This generates tenets like: 'there is no legitimate role for collective decision-making beyond the need to prevent absolute poverty'. In the third world, principles of collective responsibility have been generally supported, partly to buttress undemocratic regimes. But an about face is now evident: "Freedom to participate in the market according to one's talents and preferences is the best vehicle for the productive use of human capabilities" claims a recent UN Report.[18]

When any principle is used to aid a decision about, say welfare provision or commercial development, particular tenets are harnessed or generated. As a result, ideological principles enable the formation of associations of committed people e.g. in think tanks. Certain tenets, like 'key industries require state intervention', or 'most government services should be privatized', get unequivocal respect within that association. If the principle becomes widely used, then the tenet becomes part of communal ideals.

The explanation and popularization of ideological principles are a matter for political movements. Ideological principles are articulated by the movement's ideologues and intellectuals, and adopted by political organizations and campaigning groups. The general public may be uninterested in ideological debate, but everyone is concerned about their own social status. So the affirmation of ideological principles is an essential part of electioneering.

Changing society in accord with ideological principles is sanctioned and partly implemented by a government. However, the *authority and responsibility* for proclaiming and applying the ideological stance to particular social problems lies with political parties and their leaders.

When an ideological principle does not align with an existing political party, a new party may form as in the case of the Green Parties (Ex. 9.6). Alternatively, independent candidates may campaign at elections to pressure the existing parties to accept a new principle as was the case in the women's suffrage movement (Ex. 9.5). So the consequences of ideology are evident in election manifestos and other unofficial policy documents long before they affect government. On the basis of elections, governments claim a mandate to take a particular ideological slant in their decision-making.

The Women's Suffrage Movement: Political tracts about the fair social entitlements of women were published by Mary Wollstonecraft and by John Stuart Mill. As the suffragette movement gathered pace in the UK in the second half of the 19th century, numerous organisations formed. These came together in 1897 within a National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. Emmeline Pankhurst founded and led the Women's Social and Political Union which escalated the struggle and became identified with the ideological principle that women and men were socially equal. The first enfranchisement Act in 1918 did not fully implement the principle in so far as voting was restricted to married women, women householders and women University graduates over 30 years. Suffrage equality was achieved by a subsequent Act in 1928. However, full social equality has still not been achieved in the UK and the ideological principle of equality between the sexes still guides modern feminist movements and has an impact on election manifestos.   Ex. 9.5[19]

Ideological principles are concerned with the distribution of power and hence affect, directly or indirectly, the distribution of resources within society. They touch on such matters as: the relation between the individual and the collective, economic transactions amongst members of society, development of ideas and their systematic use in social design, the relation of the community to its physical environment, the relation of the community to other communities, conceptions as to the structure of society, and conceptions as to human nature. A coherent set of ideological principles covering these subjects together with certain values and assumptions comprises an ideology.

Like other types of principle, ideological principles are multiple and only guide rather than bind. Critics usually take this to mean inconsistency. Party ideologues and activists see it as betrayal. For example, although the Thatcher Conservative Government campaigned through the 1980's on an ideological platform of private enterprise, free markets and fair competition, in practice things looked different. For example, some monopolies like electricity and bus transport were broken up, but others like telecommunications and gas were retained; private funding was needed for the second Severn bridge but public finance was available for the Manchester Metrolink. Justification of these decisions was offered in terms of other principles like the maintenance of international competitiveness and meeting social needs, and by appealing to practical considerations like feasibility and cost.

Various ideological principles may be relevant when a current social arrangement needs altering. The dispute between parties holding different ideologies is liable to be so heated and personally felt that rational discussion is unlikely to be possible or desired. Even within a political party, controversy about the significance of different principles may be extremely intense, and factions then form behind each of the opposing positions.

> Environment and Society: Awareness that the environment is being damaged by humanity is increasing. Societies themselves are now suffering as a consequence, and this means that their functioning must change. The Green movement is an expression of this development. It has generated a number of ideological principles including the notion that 'economic growth should be halted'. Because the underlying tenets are debatable and such dramatic alterations in the structure of society would result, no existing political party is willing to adopt it. As a result, the movement has produced its own political parties and numerous other campaigning organisations. Existing political parties are coming to terms with the problem by determining how their own ideological principles should guide their approach to the environmental crisis. In the US, the free-market ideology has led

> to a trial of the use of pollution permits (and a market in these) to bring pollution under control.   Ex. 9.6

Dysfunction. The *persistent neglect* of ideological principles in society means that the community has no way of enabling structural change or orienting itself ethically to emerging shifts in power relationships. Ideological principles convert a personal sense of entitlement into a social reality. Without them, systematic debate about possible developments is weak and governments lack a mandate to act decisively on many issues. The end of ideology has an attractive rhetorical ring to it, but as one class-based principle loses acceptability or relevance another emerges into the limelight.[20] In the UK at present, for example, the relatively depressed status of some classes (e.g. Muslims, women, the unemployed) poses a threat to the community and demands urgent attention.

The righting of felt injustice within any social structure is likely to create, at least for a time, new injustices. An occasional *misjudgement* in the application of an ideological principle can worsen injustice. Privatization of a public service without effective regulation may convert an inefficient but fair state monopoly into a private monopoly demanding higher prices, giving poor service for certain classes of consumer, and taking large salary increases for its top managers. In time and with determination, such things can be put right.

However, where an ideological principle is unfounded or erroneous, great harm can result. For example, the ideological principle of 'centralized planning and orchestration of activities' assigned rights and duties to bureaucrats and political appointees who, however brilliant, could not possibly develop and pursue the comprehensive rational control of society that the tenets demanded. In communist countries where centralisation of power and authority became firmly entrenched, the effect was to impede and undermine local management, to demand inappropriate or unrealistic production targets and to foster corruption. The rights and class implications of such principles mean that it is difficult to rectify errors without social upheaval. In Russia, today, many in the classes which benefited from the previous state of affairs are sincerely or selfishly reluctant to alter their ways and hand over their powers.

Far more serious damage to a society occurs when ideological principles are pursued which *directly contravene* ethical teachings and harm members of society. In Hitler's Reich, the ideological principle of Aryan superiority led first to discrimination against Jews and other minority groups, then to the horrendous holocaust, and ultimately to the devastation of Germany itself.

Limitations. Ideological principles are about maintaining or changing the way that society is structured. This means that they depend upon acceptance of a particular distribution of rights and that they focus on specific categories of people. Although they help individual people, the principles are based in rights and tenets which are group-based. So they do not provide any guidance on how the individuality and personal preferences of people can be protected. Neither all women, nor all Jews, nor all unskilled labourers, nor all criminals are the same. As a result, efforts to bring about social change and supposed progress in accord with ideology have all too often violated individuality.

A comparatively recent and profound idea in human history is that each person has certain rights which, once determined, cannot be tampered with by ideological initiatives. Such rights would be inalienable: that is to say, intrinsic to being a person and so neither capable of being given or taken away. To appreciate such a meta-ideological notion, it is necessary to move up to the next type of principle.

G"-2⁴: Human Right Principles

Nature. No community can persist unless it exerts a degree of control over its members' diverse and sometimes destructive inclinations. But, as we have discovered, communal life is built on a certain minimum of autonomy. So *community viability* depends on exerting that control in an acceptable fashion. Principles are required *to guide choices* whenever autonomy is potentially infringed. In practice, this covers two sorts of situation: those in which social activities designed to benefit the community do so by constraining or interfering with individual activities, and those in which individual activities seem likely to harm the community.

Human right principles are based on rights which must be widely accepted. As a result, they are often referred to simply and somewhat misleadingly as human rights. Such labelling contributes to the muddle which surrounds the notion of rights. (It may be helpful at this point to recall again those distinctions discussed in Ch. 8, and to list them together with additional terms covering ideas yet to be explained: see Table 9.1).

We need human right principles because any person is absolutely dependent upon his or her community. Everyone is in danger of being unnecessarily constrained, unfairly treated, excessively interfered with, or even directly harmed by decisions which aim to advance the objectives or well-being of the community. The *function* of human right principles is to shape societal constraints on members so as to protect their freedom as individuals. The well-being of the community remains important, but certain decisions affecting people, ostensibly to support the community, are recognized here as ethically problematic.[21] If people are interfered with excessively, they will start openly challenging established authorities. Such uprisings and civil commotions weaken the community and should be avoided if possible.

In democracies, human right principles are typically formulated to try to prevent or at least minimize the tyranny of the majority. They seek to reduce a government's encroachments on personal freedoms. Diffuse encroachment is all too likely because much government action reflects a tyranny of a minority (i.e. an elite or well-organized lobby) on the majority.

Human right principles promote the obligation to maintain certain freedoms like the right to life; freedom from torture or degrading punishment; the right to security of person; freedom of worship, thought and belief; freedom of expression; the right of peaceful assembly; and the right to be accorded agreed human rights irrespective of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political opinion, ethnic origin, social status or property. It is unusual, but fully consonant with the present approach, to include inalienable duties of each person e.g. the duty of care to fellows, the duty to support one's family, the duty of social cooperation, the duty to participate at least minimally in political life.

A human right principle is *constructed* using maxims (L"-5) and rights (L"-4). Maxims enable its application to be acceptable and the result is a right which should be unequivocally respected. The human right principle of freedom of expression, for example, does not indicate in itself how photocopying should be handled in a society. Photocopying was strictly controlled in the former USSR in accord with somewhat perverse maxims of secrecy and control. Incorporating the maxim of *glasnost* (openness) led to citizens being accorded the right to purchase and use photocopiers for their own use.

Human right principles aid a government in framing laws, developing policies, and judging entitlements in special cases. They also serve as a guide for each person when judging whether or not they are free to do something, and whether or not a collective power is infringing on a freedom.

Only by applying human right principles can one ensure that rights are assigned in accord with maxims which are socially accepted. It follows that the use of such principles is affected by the quality of the ethical teaching current in society and the degree of personal freedom built into the social structure by the rulers of society. Human right principles differ sharply from membership rights in that the social structure exists

Table 9.1: Definitions of different forms of right. Subscripts indicate the level position within the group i.e. a rule which is a right is at the 3rd level in 'the law' and at the 4th level in 'the custom' (cf. Master-Fig. 18). This phenomenon partly explains the diverse qualities of rights. Note that 'human right' and 'universal right' are often used in speech and writing as synonyms for 'human right principle'.

Label	Definition	Formula
Right	A rule which states what is due to or from someone in a social setting. It may take the form of a claim or no claim. an immunity or disability, a liberty (privilege) or duty, a power or liability.	$L^{\cdot}$-4
Membership right	A right which defines the social structure and indicates what is, as a matter of fact, due to and from all members of a particular community.	$L^{\cdot}$-4
Fundamental right	A membership right which, it is claimed, is or ought to be held in common by all (or all citizens) within a particular society.	$L^{\cdot}$-4
Customary right	A right which exists by virtue of its acceptance within a community over a prolonged period of time.	$G^{\cdot}\text{-}5^1{}_4$
Legal right	A right which is embodied in the law.	$G^{\cdot}5^2{}_3$
Moral right	A right judged to be fair according to a particular ethical doctrine — which only has weight if it is accepted as part of the morality of the society.	$G^{\cdot}5^3{}_2$
Civil right	A moral right which applies to political aspects of citizenship i.e. relating to equality, justice, liberty &c.	$G^{\cdot}5^3{}_2$
Universal right	A right affirmed to be applicable to all across all societies whether or not it is legalized or available in fact; and typically used as part of a standard against which a society's membership rights are assessed.	$G^{\cdot}4^4{}_1$
Human right principle	A principle guiding collective choices which potentially constrain personal freedom.	$G^{\cdot}\text{-}2^4$
Human right	A right which is in accord with a human right principle or emerges from its application.	$G^{\cdot}\text{-}2^4{}_1$
Ideological right	A right which is defined to affirm or alter the status of a class within the community.	$G^{\cdot}\text{-}2^3{}_2$
Collective (or people's) rights	Customary rights usually affirmed in opposition to universal rights or to avoid recognizing relevant human right principles.	
Natural right	A right held to exist by virtue of the nature of man. A philosophical term referring to certain moral rights and human right principles.	
Divine right	An authority or power derived directly from God and which, accordingly, can over-ride all temporal authorities.	

whether or not membership rights are articulated. By contrast, human right principles only exist if they are explicitly formulated. When applied, the principle may suggest a new right which conflicts with customary membership rights.

Much misunderstanding comes from the attempt to apply human right principles as if they were strict rules. Human right principles, like the freedoms of speech and association, are only for guidance and to foster cooperation. They seek to reduce social control, but they are not themselves rights and cannot determine collective choices to resolve complicated and sensitive problems. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the forerunner of modern declarations, noted that human rights can be overridden for reasons of public utility, public necessity or to maintain public order. A person may appeal to a particular principle to justify an action, but whether on balance it does so is always debatable. For example, few would now take it for granted that the principle of freedom of worship justifies rituals like suttee in which a widow is immolated with her husband's corpse.

It seems self-evident that freedom of expression should not lead to rights to incite hatred systematically, to breach confidences, to vilify and libel publicly, to preach sedition, or to threaten the life of someone. This is because in each case a maxim (buttressed often by law) makes the application of the principle unacceptable. But it is never clear where to draw the line for free expression in many circumstances: e.g. producing obscene material, proclaiming extreme political views, releasing information about secret governmental activities. The fact that human right principles are not binding rules, as noted in the French Declaration, has been documented repeatedly in modern times (cf. Ex. 9.7).

> Freedom of Expression: The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) stated that 'everyone has the right to freedom of expression' (Sect. 1, Art. 10). This right is however immediately qualified by such 'formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation of rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.'   Ex. 9.7[22]

The distinction between who draws up the principles and where responsibility lies for deciding their relevance and significance was noted in earlier principles. Here the difference is even sharper. The principles are generated by enlightened citizens, campaigning groups and inter-governmental bodies influenced by political theories of various sorts. *Responsibility and authority* for judging relevance and significance in particular situations, however, lies in the hands of legislators at the time of framing legislation; with jurists when challenges are presented or heard in court; and with the relevant regulatory authorities or tribunals in non-legal challenges.

Without some conception of human right principles, a person would be at the mercy of those holding power in the state — which was uniformly the case in the past, and still is the case in many countries. Human right principles are not themselves laws. Nevertheless, to ensure that the governing regime with its awesome power to coerce on behalf of the community does recognize that each person is unique and autonomous, legislation which recognizes human right principles is commonly sought. The result may be incorporated in a Bill of Rights.

> Constitutions and Rights: Every state has a constitution in the sense that there must be a framework of rules which indicates how its government is to operate. But these may pay greater or lesser attention to issues of human rights. Placing human rights at the centre of the constitution of the state is relatively recent in human history. In the UK, guidance on human rights is to be found in famous enactments like the Magna Carta (1215), as well as in modern statutes and in judgements of the courts. Human right principles appear in the formal constitution of the USA. Such constitutions are most common in countries where there is a sharp break with the past and a major alteration in the instruments of government. Indeed, when England was under Cromwell and without a monarch in the 17th century, there was a Bill of Rights (1688). Campaigns for a written constitution in the UK are gathering force, and a proposed Bill of Rights has been drafted.   Ex. 9.8[23]

Human right principles, when established in a society, are claimed to replace the sovereignty of the state (i.e. the government) by sovereignty of the people (i.e. the citizenry). This depends on the existence of a moral community whose majority (and therefore whose government) is unwilling to exert its inclination to coercion and tyranny. This is difficult in the extreme. Such a community tends to control itself by giving power to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. A court of human rights or judicial commission or regulatory tribunal of some sort is needed to decide whether a government's acts or an organization's practices unjustly and unacceptably infringe a human right principle. In the US, the supreme court has precisely this responsibility.

If sovereignty of the people is to lead to a better society, two things are required: first, people must know about human right principles and current rights; and second, people must have confidence that the

judiciary will defend the individual against established authorities.

Dysfunction. Even governments which are systematically guided by human right principles may make a *misjudgement* and fail to apply these at times. When this occurs by oversight, rectification is easy. However, *persistent neglect* of given principles is always tempting for an elected government to avoid political embarrassment or to expedite its ideologically-favoured drive. In the absence of a tradition of respect for the individual and some judicial backing for human right principles, people cannot easily get redress for such violations.

The situation is different when principles of human right are regarded as irrelevant because of cultural traditions or the power of degraded religions. Then the organs of government may persistently oppress people in a locally acceptable fashion. If recognized human right principles are *directly contravened* because the regime views them as an obstacle to be overcome, then oppression may be intense, intrusive and sadistic. The justification usually offered is that the poverty or political problems of the country do not allow for the 'luxury' of human rights. Whatever the explanation, this attitude means that those who are brutal reach power, and they retain power by behaving ever more brutally. Authoritarian government may be benevolent and economically beneficial at times, but if it is not then protest and change is rather difficult. In modern tyrannies, government officials loot the treasury, a secret police flourishes, torture and imprisonment without trial are routine, and terror is an instrument of policy. Reports by Amnesty International reveal that such regimes are still numerous.[24]

Limitations. The use of human right principles, as with all other principles, potentially generates conflict and controversy. But, unlike the previous principles, severe disputes lend themselves to resolution in the courts. The courts are recognized as the ultimate arbiter here as in many matters and they must operate and be seen to operate in a fair way. However, human right principles do not deal with the operation of the courts themselves, and provide no guide to legal processes. So principles with a different character are needed.

G"-2[5]: Legal Principles

Nature. The legal system with its capacity for instigating rule enforcement is essential to the maintenance of stability and order in society. The guardian of the legal system is the courts of justice. *Community viability* depends on people having confidence in the courts and the legal system. Apparent misuse of the courts by

judges with idiosyncratic views or by governments seeking to control the courts for their own purposes causes a public outcry. So principles are required *to guide choices* in deciding and handling disputes in the courts. These legal principles are not laws but they are part of the law as long as they are applied in an acceptable way.

The *function* of a legal principle is to shape a legal decision so as to protect social institutions on which the community and its members depend. Legal principles are therefore a major feature in the argument and reasoning associated with judicial decisions of any complexity. In any particular case, relevant existing legal principles must be recognized, applied and weighed against each other, and new principles created if necessary.

Legal principles are concerned with the common good, like the laws (L"-6) and maxims (L"-5) with which they are *constructed*. Legal principles must be accepted as part of the law within the court system. This means that they must be consonant with sound reason, judicial authority, the nature of relevant institutions within society, and any written constitution. Although ethical teachings are not geared to legal contests and court processes, legal principles must also embody maxims which ought to be unequivocally respected in the case under consideration. In the USA, for example, authors are generally held responsible for textual errors or omissions which cause harm. This principle is based on the maxim that 'a free society requires a free flow of ideas': the flow of ideas is the social institution referred to in the functional definition above. Assigning legal liability to publishers might interfere with this flow.

The *authority and responsibility* for establishing and for selecting and using legal principles rests with lawyers and judges. They do so in the context of the need to present or to resolve a case that is brought to the courts. Even in a court action where there is a law in the form of a carefully worked out statute, uncertainty may exist in the wording or in its relation to the circumstances of the particular case. Over the years, a variety of legal principles have been found to be potentially relevant to interpreting statues (see Ex. 9.9). As with principles already examined, different legal principles point in different directions and never necessitate a particular decision about the statute.

Interpreting Statutes: It is generally agreed that judges must follow statutes, neither restricting nor extending them. However, often the situation is complex and a variety of legal principles for interpretation have been developed. These include: the context rule, the intention rule, the mischief rule, the literal rule, and the golden rule. The con-

text rule holds that words in the Act get their meaning from the context and the application of common sense. The intention rule holds that words must be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act. The mischief rule holds that the Act should be construed in the light of the mischief that the Act was intended to remedy. The literal rule holds that words must be taken exactly as they stand, even if it is evident that had Parliament foreseen the situation the words would have been modified. The golden rule holds that statutes should be construed so as to avoid an absurdity. It is a misnomer to call these guides 'rules', because it is self-evident that none are fully binding and that several may be applied to a particular case. (Note that the avoidance of outrageous injustice is not a legal principle.)   Ex. 9.9

Legal principles, like human right principles, help make the whole of society a moral community, and so they are of greater consequence than the results of a particular judgement. For example, a legal principle may provide guidance as to whether or not a particular sort of case should be brought in the future, and how it might be handled. Once a legal principle has been articulated and established, there is an obligation to pay attention to it in the adjudication of subsequent cases.

Challenging a Minister: The UK Education Reform Act (1988) permitted schools to opt out of local authority control following approval by the Minister. A school in Bath sought and won this approval. The local authority, Avon County Council, opposed it on the grounds that education in Bath would suffer and sought judicial review. The judge quashed the Minister's decision on the basis of the principle that the welfare of the whole county needed consideration. The Minister reconsidered and came to the same decision. The Council again applied for review and was heard by the Court of Appeal and lost. The principle that emerged was that 'an application for judicial review is not the appropriate means by which a local authority should seek to ventilate or pursue its differences of opinion with a Minister'. Such a principle does not block Avon or other Councils taking similar cases to court in future, but would be a factor in deciding whether they do so.
Ex. 9.10[25]

Legal principles ensure that coherent rationales are available as a guide to potential litigants. Although it is desirable that legal principles should themselves be guided by principles of natural justice (to be described in the next dyad), their primary concern is with ensuring that courts operate for the common good. As a result, legal principles affecting the outcome of any dispute vary between particular societies. To return to a previous example: in the UK textual errors or omissions which cause harm are generally the responsibility of the publisher, not the author as in the USA. (Because we are dealing with principles and not rules, liability might be assigned on occasion to the author in the UK, and to the publisher in the USA.)

Laws typically include general words to describe actions like: reasonable, fair, unjust, excessive, significant, negligent. They are placed there deliberately to recognize self-regulation through the use of maxims by individuals, and to allow the exercise of discretion by the courts. This discretion demands the creation and use of legal principles which lie beyond the specified law.

Liability for Inaccuracies in Books: The tort of negligence establishes that a person is liable for damage resulting from their negligence where they ought reasonably to have assumed that carelessness would be likely to cause damage to another. As part of the interpretation of 'reasonably', UK courts apply the principle of proximity. This principle states that a duty of care requires a degree of proximity between the giver and receiver. It follows that the more a book encourages readers to rely on it, the more likely it is that liability will arise. A 'how-to' book would be more likely to do this than a purely informative one or a novel. A further principle that has been established is that mis-statements potentially causing physical harm are more serious than those causing financial loss.
Ex. 9.11[26]

As well as guiding decisions in particular cases, legal principles focus on contextual matters like the operation of the courts e.g. the legal standing of individuals in respect of bringing cases; the activity of sentencing e.g. how to decide severity; the use of precedents e.g. how to regard decisions of different types of courts and tribunals, or whether or not to restrict the validity of an earlier decision; and handling conflicts of laws e.g. matters of jurisdiction, the effects of foreign judgements and choice of laws. Some legal principles are based on notions which are evidently false but which must be taken as true for the court system and society to operate properly. For example, the legal principle that ignorance is no defence is based on the fiction that everyone knows the law. If ignorance were allowed as a defence, it would positively encourage people to pay no attention to the law and fly in the face of the maxim that one should respect the law. Another fiction-based principle states that a person must be considered to intend the consequences of his actions.

Dysfunction. When there is an unfortunate *misjudgement* and a necessary legal principle has been overlooked, there needs to be the possibility of an appeal to a higher court which allows rectification.

If there is *persistent neglect* of legal principles, if they are *deliberately contravened,* or if principles which do not conform to widely accepted maxims are instituted, then the courts are not functioning ethically. Abandonment of the balanced application of legal principles is more likely to occur in authoritarian or theocratic

regimes; or occasionally where democratic dema-goguery holds sway. In these circumstances, courts are seen as instruments of public policy, to be run directly by the government rather than to operate indepen-dently according to the law. At the extreme, courts are expected to deliver predetermined verdicts.

To restate an essential ethical design point: govern-ment must not see itself running the community as if it is a giant organization. If it does so, the good of the whole community will be regarded as more significant than the good of any individual within it. The essential nature of law is then violated and freedom is eroded. In organizations — the Roman Catholic Church would be a prime example — freedom cannot be the over-riding concern and formal regulations (i.e. laws internal to the organisation) are made to give way to organisational goals and values whenever necessary.[27] In a community, by contrast, the good of the whole is a function of each person's voluntary participation.

Limitations. The notion that principles should be just has been taken for granted until now. Civility principles should express fair treatment. Social policy principles and ideological principles should be fair and create a society which feels fair. Human right principles are driven and sustained by the idea they are fair, and legal principles are developed with justice in mind.

But justice in each of these types of principle has been ancillary or contextual. To be sure, proponents of any principle claim it embodies fairness, but accept-ability takes precedence when defining and using them. Legal principles, for example, cannot be solely tested against the abstract notion of justice because they are as much or more concerned with maintaining the abstract formalism and coherence of law and the customs of society as with the substance of the specific case.

Fairness must become central somewhere, however, because it is the ultimate criterion of general accept-ability in society. A communal sense of fairness is vital for social cooperation. The final and highest dyad con-tains principles which seek to embody fairness and embed it in the community.

G"-2⁶: Natural Justice Principles

Nature. The most lofty and general consideration in maintaining any community is developing a spirit of fairness within it. People will tolerate a great deal of hardship if they feel that things are fair. Hardship may even enhance the community spirit by enabling the sinking of differences: but only as long as decisions of all sorts are made in a fair way. Without a sense of fairness, good relationships among people are stunted and the support of individuals for their community is under-

mined and put at risk. *Community viability* depends therefore on consistently and persistently seeking to play fair and minimize injustice.

Decisions where fairness is controversial are never straightforward, so principles are needed as a guide. Natural justice principles, as these may be called, express an intuitive notion of fair play and are required *to guide choices* about the use of any social arrangement. Among the most important of these arrangements are the various other ethical principles.

The *function* of a natural justice principle is to shape the expression of fair play in society. So natural justice principles potentially override all others. They are commonly articulated at times of communal change, especially when a major alteration in existing principles feels necessary.

These principles are *constructed* by absolutes (L"-7) and laws (L"-6).[28] To be active in society, natural justice principles must emerge from absolutes which are widely accepted. All these absolutes can be traced back to the over-riding communal absolute: be fair. Fair play is more important for communal life than prosperity. Wealthy Lebanon, for example, was susceptible to devastation because it was built on an unfair sharing of power and influence between Maronite Christians and Muslims.

If any natural justice principle is to be unequivocally respected, it must be recognizable in society's laws. The talion principle, for example, states that criminals should receive the harm they inflicted as a punishment ('an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'). This seems to derive from a cross-cultural absolute found in all com-munities that 'wrongs should be avenged' or 'wrongs must be righted', and it requires respect for laws which provide for a tit-for-tat penalty. However crude the talion principle seems, the Twelve Tables seems to have established that it puts a limit to the exercise of vengeance. Another principle based on the same absolute requires that the 'punishment must fit the crime'. This has led to laws which punish thieves by having their hands chopped off; and to laws requiring offenders to directly repay their victims or do repara-tive work for the community.

Judicial Review: An oft-repeated natural justice principle states that 'courts should uphold the weakness of the citizen against the power of the state'. The absolute here is: 'be fair' and the laws which have resulted are many. There are now UK laws allowing citizens or organizations to question governmental action through judicial review in a variety of contexts: immigration, housing, social security, prisons, health, education, planning, legal aid, and even commercial matters. In these cases, judges do not assess the wisdom or justice of the governmental

decision, nor its political appropriateness, but rather focus on whether authorities have used their position to exceed their lawful powers. Ex. 9.12

Although natural justice principles must be evident in laws for the community to benefit, they can be applied in more self-contained settings. For example, they may be used to determine regulations which prevent victimization in organizations; and individuals can use them in deciding regulations for their households.

Although principles of natural justice are ideals which seem to be widely applicable, they are so general that they allow individuals and societies to use them very differently. For example, a key principle of natural justice proposed by Aristotle is proportionality i.e. 'equal and relevant aspects of a situation should be treated equally, and inequalities should be recognized in a way proportionate to their inequality'. However, exactly which aspects are relevant and what constitutes due proportion is debatable. Proportionality supports legal principles like 'the penalty should fit the crime', ideological principles like 'to each according to his abilities/deserts/needs', social policy principles like 'target health care to the sickest', and civility principles like 'first come first served'. These lower level principles are not endorsed in all societies, and even where they are there is much variation in their application.

The *authority and responsibility* for applying natural justice principles clearly lies with each person and all government and judicial institutions, and by extension with any social body working for a fairer society. Government debates on laws in the realm of natural justice often do not split along political party lines.

The use of principles of natural justice enables judges in progressive societies which lack a written constitution to bring positive law into harmony with higher ethical notions and to escape from the strait-jacket of precedents. Principles of natural justice allow political parties a chance to escape from the prison of their own ideologies. They also help reform-centred organizations rethink how people's needs should be met. They can even be used to influence the way people and businesses treat each other when they differ.

As before, the principles of natural justice are but a guide and do not determine a precise outcome. For example, if a minor misdeed had horrendous consequences the principle that wrongs should be punished and the principle of proportionality would need to be balanced against each other. Efforts to rehabilitate offenders and reduce the punitive element of sentences usually get nowhere because they are based in maxims to be benevolent and show mercy. These have little force if society values a natural justice principle that calls for punishment and retribution.

Principles of all other types are ultimately justified by natural justice principles and these become the basis for promulgating and buttressing them by laws. For example, rape does not accord with principles of civility because the victim is not being respected; but it's proscription under the law is at least in part because it violates principles of natural justice like 'the strong should not take undue advantage of the weak'. It is similarly possible to appreciate the recourse to legislation in relation to social policy principles. Ideological principles, invariably pursued in terms of natural justice, are virtually impossible to implement without legislation to establish the new rights and duties. Human right principles, also argued in terms of natural justice, create a positive pressure for law-making. For example, if it is accepted that representative government cannot work fairly without agreed freedoms for individuals, then demands to establish these in a legally binding form follow.

Given that natural justice in a society must be realized in laws, the courts and legislature are of great significance. Here is where principles of natural justice must be most assiduously applied. Law must be clarified so that disagreements between individuals and between the individual and the government (as representative of the community) as to the rights and wrongs of any matter are resolved.

In a properly working democracy, the legislature and judiciary are publicly exposed and are liable to come under severe criticism when injustice appears to have triumphed. To deal with this, a key element of natural justice is the principle of reconsideration. This allows any case to be re-examined in a superior context: the upper house or a higher court. Like all applications of principles, the outcome is uncertain. The higher court may or may not allow an appeal and, when it does, the result may be surprising. In parliament, the upper house may reject a bill and this rejection may be accepted or over-ridden by the lower house.

Dysfunction. If there is a one-off *misjudgement* and a principle of natural justice is not applied when necessary, voices are raised in discontent so that the decision can be reversed.

If there is a *persistent neglect* of natural justice, then bitterness develops in the community. Justice is so abstract that this is always a possibility. Even though principles of natural justice apply to the courts and bolster their operation, justice cannot be guaranteed even there. For example, it is a principle that courts will not lend themselves to enforcing an unjust advan-

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tage — but courts do at times (rightly or wrongly) enforce an unjust advantage. Another principle is that courts will not be used as an instrument of injustice — but, again, adherence to the law via the courts does at times generate blatant injustice. Finally, although courts should uphold the weakness of the individual against the power of the state, courts frequently appear to act as instruments of the state rather than as defenders of citizens. If principles of natural justice seem to be repeatedly violated in the courts, the judiciary comes to be regarded as a bastion of the status quo, responding to established powers and dispensing privilege.

Where there is a *deliberate contravention* of natural justice and a systematic refusal to apply agreed principles, then injustice on a far more serious scale results. Stalin's courts were qualitatively different from anything in a democracy in that they systematically accommodated lying, false charges and forced confessions before delivering inhumane sentences. These show trials reflected a flouting of natural justice consistent with what occurred throughout the USSR at that time in many other settings.

Closure. Natural justice principles are the highest and most abstract form of guiding principle because they demand the non-specific application of fairness or fair-play in all decisions affecting the community. There seems to be nothing more profound for maintaining community life, and no more abstract or more general form of ethical principle to ensure general cooperation from community members. The dyadic grouping is now intuitively, as well as logically, complete.

REVIEWING THE PRINCIPLES

Six types of ethical principle have now been identified. Each gives rise to ethical authorities and related entities including the creation of official authorities. Each is essential to the maintenance of a community, and therefore intrinsic to each person's social existence.

Civility principles are the basis of civility. Social policy principles are the rationale for social policies. Ideological principles are the core of ideologies. Human right principles lead to the defence of inalienable personal freedoms and duties. Legal principles ensure acceptability of the legal process and court outcomes. And natural justice principles promote fair play throughout society.

Each type of principle and its users look to higher principles for guidance. Civility principles are concerned with the impersonal and equalizing operation of respect without which communal life would be brutish. The responsibility for civilized behaviour rests with

each person. But each person has needs which must be met if civility is to be maintained, and each looks to the community for guidance on meeting these needs. Governments emerge to handle needs and do so by articulating social policy principles on behalf of the community. When doing so, governments are likely to affirm or alter the status of particular classes, and so they need ideological principles to guide them.

Political parties are built on ideological principles and come to represent certain classes. These principles are needed by government so that class power can be legitimate. In this way, grievances can be dealt with rather than being left to boil over in civil unrest. Political parties are partial and potentially threaten the community with their demands, so impartial jurists, regulatory authorities and legislators are needed to work with human right principles and ensure that particular individuals or minorities are not discriminated against. Any dispute, especially over the use of principles, may end up in the courts. So lawyers and judges must develop and apply legal principles to ensure that the courts operate acceptably.

The wheel comes full circle with natural justice principles which once again depend for their sustenance on each member of the community and all social bodies, especially established authorities.

Reinforcement between Principles. We have seen over and over again that principles of the same type regularly come into conflict. However, principles of different types may, and sometimes must, reinforce each other. Because principles overlap at five levels, L"-2 through to L"-6, adjacent principles have one type of rule in common (cf. Fig. 9.2). This is why principles can reinforce each other and tend to be effective in a community to the degree that they do so. (Exactly the same applies to the various established authorities who select and use the principles.)

Social policy principles can only lead to changes in attitudes if they accord with civility principles which govern respect for persons. Similarly, when social policies run counter to convention, civility becomes difficult to maintain. For example, UK government policies for the care of long-stay mentally handicapped and mentally ill patients in large hospitals allowed for dilapidation of buildings, poor food, poor hygiene and low pay for staff. Such treatment contravened current conventions. Not surprisingly, a break-down in civility frequently developed in the hospitals with patients being neglected and even physically abused.[29]

Ideological principles and social policy principles are similarly linked through tenets. Ideological principles can only be translated into principles of social policy if

the community mainstream endorses certain tenets. When government policies are ideologically driven by the party in power and lack a basis in dominant tenets within society, then controversy erupts and implementation is weakened. Because politicians rather than political parties form governments, ideology is usually tempered in practice — but not always: see Ex. 9.13 — and social policies are restricted to areas where common tenets already exist or can be easily developed.

> Education: A recent principle of UK educational policy was that secondary schools should be 'comprehensive' and have a full cross-section of abilities. This was based on the ideological principle that certain students and particular schools should not be allowed to develop special (i.e. unfair) advantages. From this perspective, private schooling was particularly unfair. The consequences of the social policy were that students with particular abilities or difficulties were not effectively supported, and many state schools could not adapt to their neighbourhoods. Ordinary people believed that meeting children's needs and adapting to localities were important. As a result, state schools came in for much criticism, parents began manipulating the system to get their children into the better comprehensive schools, and private schooling was increasingly supported in direct opposition to the government's ideological principles.
> Ex. 9.13

Human right principles and ideological principles are linked through existing and potential rights. Human rights as expressed in many international conventions are violated regularly in many countries because rights implied by the specified principles are not congruent with either the social structure or the rights which determine the ideological principles pursued within the particular countries. In a similar way, legal principles and human rights are linked through maxims; and natural justice principles and legal principles are linked through laws.

Implications for Government. We have already noted that a number of principles commonly apply in any situation, that acceptability is the dominant criterion, and that there must be a sensitive weighing and balancing of principles before choice. This means that principles introduce a degree of dynamism, debate and adaptability in managing communal life, a flexibility which is absent in the rules which are fixed and unequivocal in their implications.

The discretion available in the use of principles, however exquisitely considered, generates the potential and likelihood of challenge which in itself could disrupt the community. Where responsibility and authority is assigned for using principles is therefore a matter of the utmost significance. The analysis revealed that, except for the extreme groups, civility and natural justice prin-

ciples, authority lies with those in or close to government: politicians, the civil service, political parties, legislators, jurists.

But civility and natural justice are not the exception they seem: civility is about governing one's own impulses and wishes — self-government in the most basic sense; and natural justice is the spirit that makes government tolerable and which everyone expects should infuse government. Without civility and fairplay, government is not welcome and barely possible. When threats, abuse and other manifestations of disregard and disrespect for fellows permeate a community, its foundations are being eroded. When the search for fairness in government policy is forgotten, the logic of government is lost.

This creates an image of a society in which each person must show self-command and yet is dependent on bodies and people who do not always seem to deserve it. Human right principles typify this dilemma: to the man in the street neither parliament nor the judiciary are very accessible or sympathetic when his freedoms are infringed by an organization or a social policy. Having a vote never feels much of a remedy. In any case, most people are far more concerned with the concrete outcome for themselves than with the intricacies of social policy, ideology, human rights and the law. It seems that principles affect people and demand a lot of them, while being abstract, intangible and out of their control.

So the question must be asked: what controls the quality of principles used by governmental authorities?

The Role of Scholarship. Any critical analysis of the principles regulating community life must reside both within and alongside the community. Academic disciplines have this quality. So universities and other inquiry-based bodies like independent think-tanks provide the only effective check on the nature, quality and effects of ethical principles. Dedicated scholarship can assist in developing principles, and can assess their use in practice.

Whenever principles are fundamentally challenged, they are found to depend on rules and other principles, and eventually on an image of the culture and the place of individuals and institutions within society. These conceptions are explored, tested and buttressed by facts and theories. The need for principles has therefore generated speculation and systematic inquiry in a way that rules have not. Few people study desirable maxims, but many study legal principles and human rights, both of which depend on maxims.

In the case of civility, the cultural conception of a person and psychological theories of feeling and inter-

personal experience will underpin (or challenge) principles and their use. For example, unless it is understood that mentally handicapped individuals tend to approach very closely when speaking, people are likely to see them as ill-mannered and treat them in a disrespectful way.

Social policies are underpinned by theories which specify how individuals and organisations ought to relate to each other, and how organisations can be operated. In the health care field, for example, the general desire for good health must be translated into health care policies whose principles recognize and handle problems such as the near-infinite demand for health care and weaknesses in the organizational control of health professionals. Social policy is usually studied from within a discipline entitled social (or public) administration, or as part of government studies or sociology.

Ideological principles depend upon theories of the operation of society, particularly economic considerations which are currently seen as the source of social power and status. The ideological principles generated by recent right-wing thinkers, for example, are based on theoretical assumptions that society has inherent tendencies towards order and justice, and that the entrepreneur is the key figure in ensuring for all the gains to be had from economic growth. Economists, sociologists and others interested in social theory generate and examine evidence for such ideas and try to determine the value of particular forms of social structure or institution like public sector agencies and commercial regulations. The difficulty is that these disciplines are themselves ideologically committed. Research suggests that as students progress through economics they become increasingly puzzled by the notion of fairness; and sociology students are trained to give primacy to social life and all too easily lose sight of the meaning and significance of personal freedom.[30]

Human right principles develop according to the cultural conception of the proper relation of individuals to society. This is the concern of political theory. Although human rights are associated with political models produced by theorists like Locke, Paine and Tocqueville, there are many models of democracy, each with its own set of principles. Held, for example, has distinguished: classical (Athenian) democracy, protective democracy, developmental democracy, direct democracy, competitive elitist democracy, pluralist democracy and participatory democracy.[31]

In the case of legal principles, jurisprudence examines such matters as what the law and legal process is or should be, and the place of the judiciary in society.

The underpinning notions of natural justice are to be found in theories of natural law — of which there are a considerable variety based in philosophy, religion and legal studies. Natural law postulates that principles or laws exist which are valid independently of any positive law and which legitimate the binding force of positive law. Despite modern reactions against this ancient idea, such theoretical work persists and is influential.[32]

Scholars and investigators in the various disciplines develop theories related to principles, conduct empirical studies of their use, and disseminate their findings to influence society. The better ones become advisors to governments, and sit on or chair official advisory committees. The best seek to re-design government and its institutions entirely.

Transition. The use of ethical principles is important if communities are to be maintained through social cooperation. Because support from members lies at the heart of cooperation and community viability, acceptability emerges as the essential criterion — even in relation to justice. The idea that what is currently acceptable should be a guide to what is ethical or just appalls moral reformers and ethical philosophers. Recall their attitude to conventionalist choice (L"-2: Ch. 6).

The aspiration for a truly just society is probably present in everyone. But the very notion of an enlightened society often seems utopian and its pursuit appears disruptive. In this regard, principles have a major limitation in that they are taken as given. They do generate change and the potential for progress if used consistently, but they do not primarily act as authoritative vehicles for change. They hardly touch on the way people think and act to promote ethical progress (or to maintain the status quo).

If communal life is to be ethically designed, then the focus on community maintenance and the criterion of what is expected and allowed by most in the community must be superseded. Social acceptability may be necessary, but it is just not enough.

To bring aspirations for virtue and justice down to earth and to order people's efforts in this regard, some conception of progress towards an enlightened and sustainable ethical order is needed. Any such ideas of progress cannot be purely communal but must find roots and resonances within each person — and this means grounding them in a more complex ethical authority which harnesses personal belief.

On close scrutiny, it is evident that principles are always generated and applied from a particular position which is taken for granted or dogmatically affirmed by whomever is authorized to do so. Movement of society

from one position to another reflects evolution of the culture. Neither culture nor society is an agent and government has no such power. Cultural evolution means that individual members of society are somehow authorized to affirm or alter the rules governing their own social life. In this sense, they are free and equal. To begin to understand the role of the individual, we must now turn to consider the triads,

Master-Table 22   **Properties of the six types of guiding principle in society.**
Ethical principles, which are needed to maintain a community, are dyadic authorities formed by conjoining two adjacent types of rule.
A variety of ethical principles must be applied when making choices which might affect community security and cohesion (i.e. viability).
Note that a wide variety of bodies may develop or promote principles of various sorts. See text for details and explanation.

Dyad No. (Levels)	Type of Principle	Function	Contribution to Community Viability	Type of Decision Requiring Ethical Guidance	Authority and Responsibility for Selection & Use	Theory/Discipline for Development & Analysis
1 (L"s 1 & 2)	Civility principle	To shape behaviour so that due respect for community members is always manifest.	Provides the basic mechanism for communal coexistence.	Handling informal aspects of inter-personal interactions.	Each person	Social psychology
2 (L"s 2 & 3)	Social policy principle	To shape attitudes and organisations so that members' needs are met in society.	Bolsters the rationale for member participation in a community.	Handling interactions mediating personal needs.	Government	Public administration Policy analysis
3 (L"s 3 & 4)	Ideological principle	To shape social institutions so that fair entitlements of classes of members are met	Assists re-structuring of the community when required.	Whenever the status or power of a class of individual is affected.	Political parties.	Economics Sociology Social theory
4 (L"s 4 & 5)	Human right principle	To shape social constraints on members so as to protect their freedom as individuals.	Minimizes coercive control of community members.	Collective action seeking to benefit all or prevent harm by individuals.	Legislators, jurists, regulatory authorities, courts of human rights.	Political theory
5 (L"s 5 & 6)	Legal principle	To shape legal decisions so as to protect social institutions on which the community depends.	Maintains confidence in the legal system.	Disputes within courts of justice.	Judges, lawyers	Jurisprudence
6 (L"s 6 & 7)	Natural justice principle	To shape the expression of fair play in society.	Maintains community spirit by minimizing feelings of injustice.	Creation and use of any social arrangement.	All members of society, and especially official authorities.	Natural law theories

G"-3: INTERNALIZED POSITIONS

Nature. A striking feature of society is the stress that is placed both on the need for stability and conformity in ethical matters and also on the need for alteration and progress to a more enlightened state. It is evident that mechanisms are needed to orient people to accept and follow — or to reject and oppose — the rules and principles which society uses to govern ethical choices in particular situations. Such an ethical authority must be of a sort which a person internalizes so that necessary conformity is defined from within. I call this authority an ethical **position**. A new position may be devised or taken up by a rebellious spirit to promote a conception of ethical progress. Of course, some will view such so-called progressive ideas or the emerging results as a regress or as harmful — and sometimes they are. But our concern is with the underlying ethical mechanism, not the content or its effects.

Ethical positions fulfil an orienting, equalizing and potentially liberating role in any society. For example, passing a law is a major exercise in social change. But the law will be unsuccessful unless people or rather each person is socialized to obey laws in general and prepared to obey that law in particular. Similarly, change in the social order can start from just one person who (correctly or incorrectly) feels and believes deeply that its rules are wrong or unfair and has the power to influence others to think likewise.

To put this observation more generally, ethical rules and principles need to be part of some larger person-centred and rule-based authority — called here a position — which fosters their recognition, bolsters their operation, and channels their influence as society evolves.

A person cannot hold just any position at all. One's conscience, rationality and the cultural context prevent this. For a position to be usable in a society, it must be capable of being internalized by members of that society through socialization processes. New positions, once fully internalized by reformers, enable them to orient their thinking and organize their activities. Crusading and campaigning bodies work hard to get others to believe the new ideas so that eventually the position is institutionalized within society. Active promotion, debate and explanation of the position induce natural processes of imitation, reflection and identification in the wider public. When institutionalisation is complete and formalized by various sorts of governmental and legal creations, the internalized position is taken for granted and seems to be a self-evident part of the culture.

Widely internalized and institutionalized positions can be confidently asserted and promulgated by individuals. Conformity to an established position is continually reinforced by teaching, example and social pressure. Conformity is also opposed and undermined by dissenters and their polemics.

The term 'position' conveys a sense of stability, coherence and system. Such solidity is necessary in a dynamic society. People need to be able to hold a position or vantage point with conviction and to know that it is an authority recognized by others. Such a position steers their functioning in society. It helps them approach decisions and fosters developments in the right way. It also enables leaders and thinkers to organize and institutionalize change.

Ethical positions are evidently more complex and personally involving than rules (monads) or principles (dyads). They too call for *unequivocal respect* and *social acceptability*, but still more is needed. If internalization is genuine and if others are to be influenced, then the position must be capable of being *dogmatically affirmed* in public. The possibility of dogmatic affirmation is provided by adding a third level of rule.

The *function* of any position is to ensure that community members can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and change. This confirms that ethical progress depends on individuals: until people can re-socialize themselves, society's values and institutions will not be modified.

The significance of dogmatic affirmation becomes apparent when rules or principles of any sort are being challenged or need to be changed. This happens when circumstances combine with powerful new ideas. One cannot fail to be struck by the dogmatism of reformers and the equally intense dogmatism of those who defend the status quo. The clash of apparently irresistible forces for change against apparently irremovable traditions generates controversy and all too often abuse, rage and violence.

Academics describe their colleagues' views of rights and justice as barbarous, ignorant and superstitious: 'akin to believing in witches' is the currently favoured epithet. Affirming freedom of speech on racial issues generates disruptive jeering abuse and brawling. Demonstrations for peace lead to rioting, looting and vandalism. Angry abortion protesters asserting the sacredness of life cause deaths. The intensity of feeling in all these cases does not come from following rules or principles but from the ethical position which has been internalized and become part of the person's identity.

Types. Each type of position emerges from grouping three adjacent levels of rule to form a triad. The triadic structure provides positions with a degree of wholeness, solidity and structure. This is what allows them to

be used to order cultural change, described by those in favour as progress and by those against as degeneration.

In all, there are five overlapping hierarchical triads corresponding to five different types of internalized ethical position. The five types of position used to orient members of society are *good practice* (G"-3¹); *communal role* (G"-3²); *cultural ethic* (G"-3³); societal or *legal responsibility* (G"-3⁴); and social or *distributive justice* (G"-3⁵). The five triadic positions are represented diagrammatically in Figure 9.3.

Any position can be explicated by specifying rules at the three levels which constitute it, and it is then defended vigorously in terms of these constituting rules. In each type of position, the bottom level provides the practical basis of the position: it is where *respect must be unequivocal* and where conformity is most evident. The top level is what must be *dogmatically affirmed* to create the socio-emotional pressure, sense of freedom and inner inclination for conformity. The middle level links the top and bottom levels by ensuring *social acceptability* of the position when it is applied in the community.

Each triad defines a distinct focus where socialization is required, conformity expected and cultural progress desired. As the triads are ascended, there is a progression in concern from orienting people to meeting each other's needs to orienting them to meeting society's needs for freedom and justice. The lower triads are close to defining practical living whereas the upper triads resemble a theory of society. Each triad implies those above and below it. For maximum ethical impact in any area, the five triads should reinforce each other, so that ultimately conceptions of distributive justice are expressed in the definition of good practices and come alive in activities.

The five triads reflect progressively more significant authorities and compelling ethical conceptions for which individual conformity is demanded and on which ethical progress depends. As with rules and principles, there are a multiplicity of positions. But, unlike principles which are disconnected, positions either appear to be single or, when multiple, reveal some linkage and inter-connection. The degree of order increases as the triads are ascended.

The main properties of the various types of position are laid out in matrix form in Master-Table 23. Before describing each position in detail with examples, the five types are now summarized very briefly. The features covered include: a statement of the function, the social expression and focus for conformity, the effect on freedom, the constituting levels, and the relationship between different positions.

G"-3¹: A **good practice** is required to orient individuals to acting in a way which meets the needs of others in specific contexts. The focus for conformity is the expression of social values, often documented as a code of good practice which precisely defines what constitutes proper behaviour. This could be experienced as reducing freedom, but, because social values are freely held and equated with personal needs and motivations, it expresses freedom. Any good practice is affirmed

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Figure 9.3: The triadic grouping forming internalized positions.
Five types of ethical position which must be dogmatically affirmed if individuals are to be socialized.

L"-7 Absolutes						
L"-6 Laws					G"-3⁵	
L"-5 Maxims				G"-3⁴		← Distributive Justice
L"-4 Rights			G"-3³		← Legal Responsibility	
L"-3 Tenets		G"-3²		← Cultural Ethic		
L"-2 Conventions	G"-3¹		← Communal Role			
L"-1 Prescriptions		← Good Practice				

dogmatically using tenets (L"-3). It must be based in prescriptions (L"-1) to be unequivocally respected; and it should be applied through acceptable conventions (L"-2). Good practices tend to be naturally discrete and disconnected because they deal with a wide variety of distinct social needs. But the same needs emerge in different contexts and so practices in these various contexts show logical similarities.

G"-3^2: A communal role is required to orient individuals to relating to others in a way that expresses and affirms mutual rights and duties. The focus for conformity is social relationships which maintain the social structure. So roles enable the exercise of freedom. A communal role is affirmed dogmatically using rights and duties (L"-4). It must be based in unequivocally respected conventions (L"-2); and it should be applied through acceptable tenets (L"-3). Communal roles are multiple and distinct, and yet they must be connected for the social structure to be sustained.

G"-3^3: A cultural ethic is required to orient individuals to participating in society in a way that demonstrates virtue. The focus for conformity is a personal outlook, which (in social terms) is a *Zeitgeist* or spirit of the age. This spirit defines the nature of freedom in that society. An ethic is affirmed dogmatically using maxims (L"-5). It must be based in unequivocally respected tenets (L"-3); and it should be applied through acceptable rights and duties (L"-4). A variety of cultural ethics are always in use or on offer. These ethics have diffuse boundaries and are loosely inter-related, sometimes by being opposites.

G"-3^4: A legal responsibility is required to orient individuals to fulfilling their legal obligations to others and to the community as a whole. The focus for conformity is social institutions emerging from laws or other governmental sanction. So this position safe-guards the exercise of freedom. Legal responsibility is affirmed dogmatically using laws (L"-6). It must be based in unequivocally respected rights and duties (L"-4); and it should be applied through acceptable maxims (L"-5). Legal responsibilities are more tightly inter-connected and inter-penetrating because they reflect the necessary coherence of laws.

G"-3^5: A distributive justice, often called social justice, is required to orient individuals to supporting the ethical order and tolerating inequalities in the actual order. The focus for conformity is a cultural conception of a fair way to protect and handle social (or collective) goods and bads. Its aim is to enhance the freedom of each and all. Distributive justice is affirmed dogmatically using absolutes (L"-7). It must be based in unequivocally respected maxims (L"-5); and it should be applied through acceptable laws (L"-6). Distributive justice deals with allocation, competition and adjudication in relation to social (i.e. collective) goods and bads. (It has nothing whatsoever to do with whether individuals follow or break rules of just conduct.) Although there need to be multiple distributive justices appropriate to different forms of social good, a dogmatic absolute leads to a tendency for their unification.

Properties. Each type of position will now be taken in turn and compared in terms of their characteristic properties (italicized here and subsequently put in italics or bold). The *function*, *expression*, triadic *constitution*, and the effect of the *multiplicity* of positions will be clarified first with illustrative examples.

People come to affirm positions of each of the five types simply through being members of a society. They become most acutely aware of these positions if they witness the emergence of new institutions and personally experience a mixture of outer and inner pressures for cultural change.

Cultural change (i.e. new ethical rules and ethical authorities) is rarely easy or smooth because it has to use dogmatic assertion to convince people and to overcome community inertia and antagonism. This dogmatism cannot rest on science but emerges from the cultural tradition itself: one aspect of that tradition being used to modify another aspect. Something will be said about how *conformity* is experienced, the relation of the position to *freedom*, and how *progress* occurs through the internalization and institutionalization of new positions.

Sometimes one position is dominant in society, sometimes several competing and possibly conflicting positions run in parallel. The wish to close the debate or force the pace by using the law is common amongst reformers. So the *relation of laws* to the various positions which do not include laws will be examined. Progress depends on *agents of change* who develop and affirm different positions from those accepted and expected in society. Such people are either seen positively as actual or potential culture heroes, or are viewed negatively as damaging agitators to be rejected or severely controlled, or both — think of Joan of Arc burnt at the stake, or Solzhenitsyn reviled and exiled, or George Bernard Shaw rejected and ignored for years.

Finally, a note on the *limitation* of each position in regard to ethical progress will serve as a link to the next higher position.

G"-3^1: Good Practice

Nature. Meeting needs is the essential rationale for community life and a driving force in every individual. Efforts at improvement that do not tap into recognized

needs and established values at some point will not be respected and can never be accepted. So any progress which claims to be ethical must orient people to perform habitual activities in a way which realizes social values. Such practices are naturally described as good.

In normal circumstances, there is a continuing pressure to meet needs in the best and fairest way. This is often experienced as a sense that current practices are already good and do in fact express what is right. But, of course, in all domains there are possibilities and opportunities to do better. In regard to the social order, this means installing rules which are more tuned to people's needs. Any one who thinks like this endeavours to re-orient people by re-defining the rules governing common social practices. Much handling of people is mediated within or via organizations, and so many new guides to practice must be introduced by managers.

Good practice (L"-1/2/3) overlaps both the informal aspects of interpersonal interaction (civility L"-1/2) and need-oriented aspects (social policy L"-2/3). The *function* of a good practice is to orient individuals to acting in a way which meets the needs of others in specific contexts.

A good practice not only prescribes specific activities which are invariably expected in a particular situation, but also provides rules governing the how and why of these activities. Obviously there are a *multiplicity* of good practices related to the wide variety of needs to be met. Most of these have nothing to do with each other. There is a natural relation, however, between different practices meeting the same or similar need in different contexts. Security practices, for example, will vary in banks, hospitals, cinemas, department stores and prisons; but the rules underpinning them will have much in common.

The rules of good practices find their expression in the formulation of a code. Codes of good practice (or 'best practice') inherently seek to control behaviour and might therefore seem to be restrictive. However, if the tenets are internalized, then this seems perfectly proper in relation to others, and unproblematic in regard to oneself. For oneself, adhering to the code is an expression of *freedom*, the freedom which comes from having personal beliefs align with social needs, that is to say from knowing that one's own tenets are shared social values.

A code of good practice must be differentiated from a code of practice. A code of practice lists a set of prescribed actions (L"-1) to be followed precisely irrespective of personal views. Codes of good practice, by contrast, define and promote social values and are

part of an attempt to convince people about what is right. The code of practice is typically produced and ratified by organizations who feel bound by it. The code of good practice is typically produced by a campaigning group or an umbrella organization trying to raise standards. So it must feel good and right to everyone involved. It is usually acknowledged by affected organizations to be an aspiration rather than a compulsion or contracted commitment. A code of good practice may lead to the formulation of a code of practice.

Constitution. Good practices, on close examination, can be seen to consist of tenets (L"-3), conventions (L"-2) and prescriptions (L"-1). They are controlled and driven by tenets which are dogmatically affirmed. Acceptable conventions which support and embody the tenets in particular decision-contexts develop and bolster behavioural prescriptions which determine exactly what is to be done. These prescriptions call for unequivocal respect. Rights (L"-4) and still higher level rules may support or oppose a good practice, but they are not needed to define one.

Keeping Children in Hospital: In the first half of this century, it was believed that separation of children from parents had no ill-effects. The research and theories, principally of John Bowlby, led to the tenet that children are harmed by separation from their home and families. As a consequence, social practices in hospital care have changed radically. In accord with the present tenet, the convention is to avoid in-patient treatment and to shorten admissions wherever possible. Numerous prescriptions are followed by staff if admission is essential: e.g. children must be allowed to bring in their own toys, books and bedding; arrangements must be devised so that parents can stay and sleep on the ward; each child's emotional state should be formally and regularly assessed by nurses; professionals who can assist emotional adaptation in case of distress — play leaders, child psychologists, child psychotherapists, art or music therapists, occupational therapists — should be available. This change in the way children are treated is not just a matter for staff. Parents are also expected to alter the handling of their child in accord with new conventions, including: talking about the admission beforehand, visiting regularly or staying in with the child, and providing special attention afterwards.
Ex. 9.14[33]

Good practices are far more significant than prescriptive protocols because they depend on personal engagement. The good practice rules, unlike the protocol, cannot be properly performed unless certain tenets are held by the individual and certain conventions are widely appreciated. This is why their introduction often requires public campaigns, educational events, and persuasion verging on brainwashing (cf. the introduction of normalization to care of the mentally handicapped in Ex. 8.8).

Tenets supporting a practice must be altered before new conventions and prescriptions can develop and be followed. Dissent and disagreement are at their most intense when new tenets are being directly introduced. In relation to children in hospital, Ex 9.14, people's views were modified by the films made by the Robertsons which showed the intense distress and emotional decompensation of young children separated from their parents. Even after tenets change, the alteration of conventions and prescriptions may still be hindered by inertia and practical obstacles. Children are still not treated as they should be in many hospitals even when those responsible verbally support the appropriate tenets.

It is perhaps worth noting that although tenets within a good practice may have a direct link to the output of formal research, those with a scientific bent usually claim that tenets within a position are too extreme. Bowlby's work, for example, has been criticized on this account. The point here is that the type of qualified belief generated by academic research is quite different from the unambiguous tenet required to get ordinary people to alter their behaviour.

Dogmatic affirmation must be kept simple, especially in community schemes. For example, police wish to reduce suburban crime by prescribing a range of activities for neighbours, including: keeping an eye on the street, speaking to loitering strangers, and calling the police if anything suspicious occurs. It is difficult to get people to do this unless these practices can be organized in a scheme (called in the UK a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme) bolstered by explicit tenets about policing (e.g. 'crime prevention is everybody's business'), and building on conventions of neighbourliness.

Once something is established and internalized as part of good practice, it has the advantage of being uncontroversial and straightforward. Without the order and control provided by good practices, people would be endlessly disagreeing or unable to pursue a particular ethical course for reasons of cost or convenience (cf. Ex. 9.15).

Designing Road Crossings: Councils have been concerned with the safety of road-crossings, but existing rules previously led them to take account of able-bodied adults only. Current good practice demands that they take account of children, the deaf, the blind, the elderly, and the physically disabled. So crossings are now beginning to be designed with sounds, ramps, bright markings, visual aids, safety islands and other features. All these practices mean additional expense. Once accepted as routine, such safety practices can be budgeted for without justification being demanded on each occasion by the public or by opposition councillors.   Ex. 9.15

Conformity and Progress. Good practices ground progress in the unavoidable reality of everyday community life and the needs of ordinary people. So they demand the most overt degree of conformity. If the tenets are held, then affirmation of the practice is easy. In many cases, of course, people are not fully aware of the tenets on which they base their attitudes and activities. Because good practices define concrete activities to meet real and recognized needs based on a theory (the tenet), they lend themselves to rational inquiry. For example, children used to be seen as little adults and were treated accordingly. As an understanding about their special needs developed, changes in social practice emerged in many areas including their education, employment and discipline, as well as in health care (cf. Ex. 9.14).

Within any particular guide to practice, prescriptions may be modified to adapt the conventions to changing circumstances and minor changes in understanding. Slow and minor changes in beliefs may be accommodated by alterations in social practices without too much difficulty. But social reform is periodically necessary, and this means the wholesale alteration of certain practices or the introduction of rules governing quite new practices. This can only be accomplished with difficulty. Most of the individuals affected show active or passive resistance to new good practice because they do not understand, accept or believe the new tenets.

Codes of good practice are often developed by external pressure groups. When such a code is adopted by an organization, pressure on staff to alter their beliefs and attitudes increases. Codes of this sort are seen more often in the public sector, (e.g. taxation authorities, welfare bureaucracies) than in businesses where customers can usually reject firms that fail to meet their needs.

The attempt to make people change rapidly is common, but rarely successful. In research on equal opportunities carried out in local government, we found that codes of practice and good practice could be rapidly introduced to support equal opportunities, but that these were blatantly ignored, subtly misinterpreted or skilfully worked around for years.

Good practices take time to develop and a long time to become fully internalized. It is usually possible to avoid going along with new conceptions of good practice even if they are held to be obligatory by recognized authorities. *Using the law* is not a shortcut here. Although laws may be passed to hasten the adoption of certain prescriptions (e.g. regulating the building of road crossings), it is not possible to determine, monitor and enforce new good practices in every context where they might be beneficial. All activity is need-based

activity and there is a real danger of over-regulation. In any case, whether the new rules are indeed good and right is often viewed as matter for debate (cf. Ex.s 9.14 and 9.16).

> A Long-standing Practice: The relation between men and women in society is undergoing change. The dominance of men has been embedded in social practices of all sorts and is evident within language, in both its grammatical prescriptions (e.g. the male pronoun should be used to refer to both sexes) and its vocabulary (e.g. many social roles, like spokesman, are given names which seem to suggest that they are to be held by men). Feminists argue that the structure of our language embodies the structure of patriarchal oppression and beliefs about the relation between men and women. Speaking and writing pervade the social fabric and rules governing their practice are difficult to alter. Better practices to replace the current pronoun prescription include using the nondescript plural (as in 'A reader who finds their sensitivities affected...'), and using neologisms like 's/he'. However, as this book illustrates, the new prescriptions have not yet achieved general social acceptability. Consolidation of change in language practices will depend on acceptance of the tenets that women have indeed been and are still being unjustly oppressed and that grammar either contributes to this or might alleviate it. Only then can new and acceptable conventions and prescriptions be created.
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> Ex. 9.16[34]

Agents of Change. People who not only take up and promote new tenets, but also articulate the conventions and prescriptions that follow from them are innovators. Frequently criticized, they must defend and argue their beliefs vigorously and work out the rules of new practices in achievable detail. Some years ago anyone who did not allow people to smoke in his home would be regarded as a non-conformist who flouted the rules of good hospitality. As the harm from smoking and passive smoking became progressively recognized, early prohibitors of smoking were recognized as people ahead of their time.

Anyone who does not participate in practices where conformity would be contributory to their own and others' well-being (e.g. in the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme mentioned earlier) may be within their rights but they are considered obstructive and difficult. An individual who seeks to benefit personally from non-conformity is viewed with distaste and dislike. For example, a businessman who regularly alters the terms of a deal just a few minutes before signing, having created an expectation that the deal was acceptable, breaks with conventional business practice. Such sharp practices, even if legal, are built around anti-social tenets and generate hostility.

Limitation. Good practices are focused on social values and meeting needs of others in particular con-

texts. But they give no indication of what claims any individual can make to get their own needs met. Nor do they provide an orientation to duties or to the operation of the social structure. All social life takes place within social relationships defined by that structure, so orientation here is essential for everyone. It can be provided by moving up to the second triad.

G″-3²: Communal Role

Nature. Whatever place a person may occupy in society, some orientation as to what that means is needed. Otherwise a person cannot function effectively and cannot support the community in a coherent and consistent way. This type of position is called by sociologists, the 'social role'.[35] I am referring to it here as a communal role to clarify that the position reflects an active interplay between the individual in the role (who must be socialized) and other people in the community (who must permit and informally enforce the role). No matter whether the role is described in terms of age, sex, family, history, occupation, socio-economic status, or ethnic origin, society requires certain personal qualities and modes of behaviour. To become truly a part of society, a person must observe, imitate, learn, engage in trial and error, and accept indoctrination in numerous roles.

There is of course a *multiplicity* of communal roles in any community. Although these are distinct, they reveal connections and must appropriately support each other and demonstrate their common origin in the one society. Roles are, par excellence, the connecting device in a community, because they define and maintain the social structure and determine how any one person may approach another person in an acceptable way.

The *function* of a role is to orient individuals to relating to others in a way that expresses their mutual rights and duties. Knowledge of a selection of roles that someone inhabits — a mother, who is 35 years old, lives and works in Oxford as a dentist, helps local charities, is a tennis player and classical music lover, and regularly votes Labour — tells a great deal about them to another member of society. Similarly, performing any social task, say organising the school fair, would be nearly impossible to do properly if a whole variety of conventions, tenets and rights associated with the role of organizer were not readily available and easily adopted.

Any communal role finds its *expression* in social relationships and activity within those relationships. Description of a particular role never prescribes exact behaviours. Roles set a general direction and rule out

certain actions, but within that boundary behaviour is discretionary. In other words, roles demand conformity to certain patterns of behaviour, but do not specify the behaviour itself, habitual or otherwise.

> **Fathers and Politicians:** To know someone is a father is to know that he ought to discipline his children. But no specification of precisely how, how often or when the child is to be disciplined is defined by the role. Similarly to be a politician means to contest elections, but exactly how campaigns are to be mounted is not specified. In these and other cases, needed specifications are best provided by good practices. Whereas the role of father or politician will be similar across a society, practices may differ greatly in various communities within it. There may be certain specific things expected of a father by moral teachings (e.g. kindness), but these do not define the role. The law may constrain what a politician may do (e.g. in raising funds for a campaign), but again this does not define the role. *Ex. 9.17*

Communal roles are the vehicles for the exercise of *freedom* in society. The degree of freedom which can be exercised will, of course, vary with the culture.

Constitution. When the expectations which make up viable communal roles are examined in detail, it is clear that they consist of rights/duties (L"-4) which are dogmatically affirmed, tenets (L"-3) which are regarded in society as acceptable, and conventions (L"-2) which must be unequivocally respected. As illustrated in Ex. 9.17, prescriptions (L"-1) are too restrictive and specific to determine a communal role; while maxims (L"-5) and higher level rules orient performance within a role but are too general to be involved in defining a role.

Communal roles may well flow from one's work. In addition, communal roles are to be found in organizations alongside formal work roles based on performance of activities (cf. G-2³: Ch.10). The communal roles define what is sometimes referred to as the informal system in the organization. Unless there is an awareness of these informal roles, relationships go wrong and work may not get done. Certain nonspecifiable roles are particularly significant: especially the champion. Champions assume rights or duties to lead and achieve. They can energize new ideas at work because they genuinely hold the relevant tenets. But they can only achieve through cooperation in accord with organizational conventions. If the organization has rigid bureaucratic structures which neglect the community dimension, essential informal roles are inhibited, conventions prevent cooperation and change is difficult.

Conformity and Progress. Whether we know it or not, we must present ourselves in particular ways,

not wholly of our own choosing, in order to relate to other people. We generally fall in with these roles naturally. Once operative, they feel appropriate and congenial, almost as if we had not only chosen them but created them.[36] But a role (like a practice) may seem ethically unsatisfactory when judged from a higher perspective. When this is the case, say a priest engaged in a commercial transaction, the role feels unnatural and uncomfortable. We avoid such roles if at all possible.

As a person's life develops, new roles must be regularly adopted. Their internalization demands active socialization. So, when a new communal role is being adopted, a period of adaptation and habituation is required. We get used to it and allow ourselves to be re-oriented by it. The transitional period during role entry is marked by confusion and uncertainty. Eventually the person learns how to operate the new role in an acceptable way, and then unquestioningly affirms the new rights and fulfils the new duties. Changes in communal roles give an impetus to changes in practices which are not necessarily desirable. The progressive emancipation of women in the US, for example, has been associated with serious female crime, previously almost non-existent, developing a pattern resembling that of the men.

Social progress involves the introduction of new roles or the alteration of existing roles. This occurs through the development of new rights or duties: but these are part of the social structure, one of the essential stabilizing moral institutions of society. So progress depends on communal change as well as personal re-socialization.

A communal role may be more easily introduced or altered in principle than in reality. It may be a considerable time before tenets and conventions come into line with the proposed rights and duties to create a coherent position. Because a change in rights means a change in the structure of society, and because roles are rooted in conventions and cannot be pinned down to prescribed behaviours, communal roles are probably even more stable and stabilizing than good practices. This conservative quality of roles impedes social policy initiatives, especially those driven by ideological principles. Pronouncements wash over most people who continue to relate to each other in the same way as before and doing more or less what they have always done. Although adopting new attitudes and beliefs does not feel altogether natural, the social structure does slowly evolve. New roles emerge or are created and old ones disappear, especially as positions at the higher levels change.

> **Changing a Role:**
>
> 1. The role of a teacher changes if teachers are given a new duty to assess children for sexual abuse. The teacher's duty is supported if there are acceptable tenets

e.g. children express themselves truthfully at school during lessons; no-one else outside the family has as good an opportunity to understand the child. If applying tenets of this sort to the problem of child sexual abuse is not accepted, then it is unlikely that the right will be granted. In order to handle sexual abuse of children effectively, conventions need to develop governing the relationship of teachers with parents, with social workers and with doctors. Without unequivocal change here, the new role will not be sustainable. Certain rules of good practice will also emerge of course, but these are part of dealing with the problem and not part of the communal role itself.

2. The role of a policeman changes if a new right to carry guns at all times is assigned. The policeman's right could be supported by the tenet that guns prevent crime and protect the police. Again, if a contrary tenet is generally accepted — that guns encourage more violence and lead to more dead police — then the right will be withheld. Conventions governing the relationship of a policeman to members of the general public, criminals and the court system would alter if guns were issued routinely.

3. The role of a wife changes if she is given the same right to a divorce as a husband. The wife's right to divorce needs to be supported by tenets like: 'women's right to equality with men applies to marriage arrangements'. If, as is the case in many non-European countries, such tenets are not held or other tenets dominate, then the right will be withheld. The right of divorce for women, when followed through to a redefinition of role, leads to changed conventions in respect of such matters as parenting, sexual activity, domestic violence, abortion, crime, and sport. Ex. 9.18

Laws may affect roles or define duties in a new role e.g. that of an ombudsman or an accounting officer in local government. But laws pay little or no attention to socialization. In practice, the person who fills the legalized role can only do so because of tenets and conventions that make it congenial for him and tolerable to others. In short, the law may provide the potential for a communal role, but no more. Even the rights and duties in the role will extend somewhat beyond the legal definition because the incumbent will feel compelled during the exercise of the role to take popular expectations into account.

Agents of Change. An individual who unilaterally takes up a new or idiosyncratic role, or who alters an existing role dramatically, is unwelcome in society. Such a person is an iconoclast: at best regarded as eccentric or idiosyncratic. An idiosyncratic operator may be an agent of change, breaking existing rules and serving as the harbinger of a new role. In his early career, Rupert Murdoch was regarded as a strange businessman. 'Picking up companies while hopping around the world like a demented kangaroo' was how one colleague described him in a television interview. However, as his financial and organizational success

grew and as the cultural ethic changed to favour enterprise, he came to be viewed not as an iconoclast but as an entrepreneur acting effectively in role.

If the preferred role of a person is viewed negatively, say that of a drug addict or vagrant, then the person is labelled as a deviant. Parsons defined deviance as 'a motivated tendency for an actor to behave in contravention of one or more institutionalised normative patterns', refusing (much like society itself) to distinguish beneficial and harmful deviants.[37] Deviance leads to a person being disliked and even ostracised. So deviants often keep together and form their own subculture. The law is remarkably unsuccessful in suppressing deviance. Again, deviant roles can over time become viewed as accepted positions as in the case of working wives and homosexual soldiers.

Limitation. Neither good practices nor communal roles give individuals a broad perspective on themselves or on the preservation or development of their cultural authorities. A wider orienting position is needed to help each person appreciate the limits of freedom and authority. Any sustained influence on others or large-scale attempt to reshape society must take such things into account. Such a position helps determine what sorts of roles and practices are required; and it indicates what is generally expected of people. This orientation can be provided by the next higher triad.

G"-3³: Cultural Ethic

Nature. Culture is the value-based unifying force in society emerging in its artefacts, institutions and historical events. At its core, lies a specification of how authority and freedom are to be handled. Cohesion in society depends on people sharing, implicitly in the main, an understanding of the nature of *freedom* and authority. This understanding or outlook governs the way they think of themselves, what virtues they expect to find in others, and how they participate properly in general.

Such a personal outlook is the *expression* of an orienting position known as an ethic. The reader will immediately think of the work ethic or the welfare ethic or Weber's Protestant ethic.[38] An ethic is sometimes expressed as an 'ism': e.g. paternalism, Puritanism, voluntarism. A cultural ethic expresses a moral order within society, and is akin to a spirit of the age (or *Zeitgeist*).

It takes years, even decades, to develop an ethic, but then the ethic stamps its nature on the period. The chivalric ethic, for example, is synonymous with the age of chivalry and virtues like courage, fidelity, spirituality and love. The ethic may be personified or

epitomized by a modal personality type: e.g. organisation man, homo psychologicus. Sometimes an ethic is referred to as a mentality: e.g. the 'concentration camp mentality' (see Ex. 6.26). The *function* of any ethic is to orient individuals to participating in society in a way which demonstrates virtue.

> Psychological Man and the Therapeutic Ethic: The psychologizers of the human condition, epitomized by Freud, aimed to liberate man from the chains of social control, but unwittingly failed to recognize cultural control. Freud, almost inadvertently, evangelized a new ethic — one which Rieff called the 'therapeutic ethic' and personified as 'psychological man'. Psychological man explores his innermost self. All authority other than his own experiences and feelings is suspect. Culture becomes therapy. Release of feelings rather than their suppression is called for. Self-fulfilment is healing, and work is about personal creativity. Above all, psychological man does not moralize, and does not search for the right moral doctrine. Ex. 9.19[39]

Every culture requires that the moral demands upon people are organised into ethics that are intelligible, dependable and socially desirable. Society provides for a *multiplicity* of ethics to exist in an evolving and loose inter-relation with each other e.g. the philanthropic ethic and the voluntarist ethic have aspects in common. Some ethics grow out of others e.g. entrepreneurialism is an offshoot of individualism. Ethics invite the definition of an opposite which then define each other dialectically e.g. authoritarianism and libertarianism present opposed sets of rules for a good society.

Constitution. An ethic permeates the relevant society. It may be coterminous with it or may spread more widely. When an ethic like the therapeutic (Ex. 9.19) is examined, its constituent elements are found to be maxims (L"-5) to be affirmed dogmatically ('do not moralize'; 'help others by developing your inner potential'), rights (L"-4) to be applied in an acceptable way ('each person has a right/duty to follow his or her own intuitions') and tenets (L"-3) which must be unequivocally respected ('self-fulfilment is healing'; 'work is about personal growth'). Although the ethic is eventually expressed in terms of new or changed communal roles and codes of good practice, lower level rules are irrelevant to its definition. Higher level rules and positions are purely contextual.

The ethic of individualism, as captured so elegantly by Locke, is built on a tenet that 'men are by nature free, equal and independent', the right that 'one should not be subjected to the political power of another without his own consent', and the maxim that 'no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions'. This ethic has become progressively endorsed

and internalized within many societies in the centuries since it was propounded. It is relatively easy for Western readers to affirm and respect the ethic. The main factor affecting the speed of its influence has been the communal acceptance of the rights within it.

> Entrepreneurialism or Intrapreneurialism: A recent text for businessmen endorses the entrepreneurial ethic and inspirationally revises it in the context of recent social and technological changes. The authors claim that: success depends more on people than on money; that work should be fun and should be related to other parts of one's life; that self-management should be the norm because people want to commit themselves and shoulder responsibility; that managers should be coaches and mentors not authoritarian bosses; that success depends on the vision of individuals. The entrepreneurial mentality involves: self-direction and self-discipline, self-nurturing and self-belief, an action orientation, emotional mental and physical stamina, and risk-taking. (Remember that this is *not* a description of a person! It is a mixture of maxims (virtues), rights and tenets which govern the required outlook.) Because most people work in companies and the ethic should apply to them too, the authors invented the notion of intrapreneurship by which they mean application of the ethic within organisations. Ex. 9.20[40]

Conformity and Progress. Conformity reaches its deepest expression here because the dogmatic affirmation of maxims, that most virtuous of rules, taken together with strict respect for tenets, that most passionate of rules, demands and creates an intense identification. An ethic sinks so deeply into the self as to become identified with it. Without conscious recognition, there is no meaning in saying that an ethic is held. This expression of the ethic within personal identity means that, on the one hand, it is deeply resistant to change and that, on the other hand, it drives all progress.

The nature of an ethic reveals that personal change must precede communal or societal change. In the cases of psychological man (Ex. 9.19) and entrepreneurialism (Ex. 9.20), the emergence of the new ethic demanded personal change as the vehicle of social progress. The identity dimension of an ethic spreads to society and becomes expressed in the notion that it is the spirit of the age. As a consequence, the ethic lends itself to use by individuals to alter the culture of their society through altering other individuals — an escalating process, once it gets going.

Holders of a particular ethic find no difficulty in rejecting a new competing ethic. However, they may not be able to stop the emergence of new ideas in society and cannot prevent uncommitted individuals from embracing the new ethic once it gets a foothold. The picture that emerges is that of a battle between the

'old guard' and the 'young Turks'. Progress here is measured in generations, as the saying goes: while there's death there's hope.

A new ethic emerges in an unplanned way as the result of a variety of economic, political and other social forces. The ethic of individualism developed with the Renaissance in the 15th and 16th centuries, and slowly supplanted medieval ethical legalism in which life and society were governed by obligations placed on people by God. The new ethic led to profound changes in every aspect of society, changes which are still being worked out at different rates in different societies. Table 9.2 illustrates how in the area of doctor-patient relationships, individualism has evolved into an ethic of self-sufficiency in the USA, whereas paternalism persists in the UK.

The change in an ethic may be slow and subtle. The ethic of Puritanism in England began in the early years of the reign of Elizabeth I and was central to the civil war in which Cromwell's puritan forces were the victors. The puritan age ended with the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660, but not before English puritans settled the New World. The ethic of Puritanism developed its own distinctive qualities in America before being replaced as the culture evolved.

> Changing The Work Ethic: With the emergence of psychological man in the 20th century, there have been alterations in many notions of work taken for granted by the 19th century work ethic. The older ethic, sometimes called Victorian or Protestant, was characterised by maxims fostering thrift, industry, order and honesty. These are still valid, but they are not given the same weight now as maxims of leadership, courage, and effectiveness.

> (The entrepreneurial ethic reflects a modernizing of the work ethic in line with these new maxims.) Rights included the right to work and the right to organise people into organisations. These still exist but the right not to work and the right to work part-time are now prevalent. The core duty in the work ethic of service to God and society is replaced by the core duty to develop oneself and so support the firm and society. Tenets in the work ethic which focused on God and the importance of virtue have been affected by modern tenets that money determines social status and personal worth.   Ex. 9.21

Laws may bolster an existing ethic or promote a new ethic, but an ethic is not defined by them. A new ethic can develop in direct contradiction to existing laws, because it is focused on the dogmatic assertion of a new, and supposedly more enlightened, maxim. For example, the introduction of capitalism via laws covering banking, property, contract, and employment followed the unification of East and West Germany. But laws alone do not and cannot inculcate an individualist-entrepreneurial ethic characterized by initiative, self-assertion, and self-responsibility.

Agents of Change. An ethic naturally lends itself to personification. Those who develop and transmit the ethic become the cultural elite. The therapeutic ethic is personified in Freud, Adler and others, and transmitted by professional psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. The entrepreneurial ethic is personified in people like Henry Ford and John Rockefeller, and transmitted by recognizably successful businessmen like John Harvey-Jones, Lee Iacocca and Rupert Murdoch. The scientific ethic is personified by Galileo, Copernicus and Newton and transmitted by scientists the world over.

Table 9.2: Differences between societies. The law may establish what a patient's rights are and what a doctor's legal obligations should be, but the ethic remains important in orienting doctors in their professional work with patients so that the law feels right to them. Note that holders of each ethic recognize values defined in the other, but manage to subsume them without altering their position.

Triad Structure	Ethic of Self-sufficiency (USA)	Paternalist Ethic (UK)
L⁵: Maxims	People should be responsible independent agents. Professionals should foster these virtues in their clients.	Patients should respect professional judgement. Professionals should consider the best interests of their clients.
L⁴: Rights	Patients have rights to all the information on themselves and their condition. Doctors have a duty to inform them.	Patients have rights to inquire into their condition. Doctors have a duty to modify or withhold information to protect them.
L³: Tenets	Patients are responsible adults and do not need doctors to protect them from the truth.	People are vulnerable and need to be protected. Many cannot understand or accept their illness and its treatment.

The culture hero often commences as an outsider. To be an outsider is to refuse to live by the rules of the prevailing ethic, but still to insist on participating in society. Society is both fascinated by the outsider and suspicious of the new outlook. Because an ethic is based in maxims and tenets it has a virtuous, dynamic and even inspirational quality which is attractive and yet dangerous. The outsider operates in society in parallel to the existing ethic. Others may gather around the hero or embrace the ethic after the hero's death, and slowly the new ethic may gain ground.

A person whose outlook is based on alien maxims and incorporates unacceptable rights is unlikely to find soul-mates or followers who will adopt the tenets. The role is no longer that of an outsider but an outcast. An outcast tends to go into exile or withdraws from social life.

Limitation. An ethic is slowly assimilated by people until it becomes taken for granted in society and defines its culture. To this point, no type of position has involved legal enforcement. Although each type of position seeks to orient people, none can ensure that each person contributes in a fair way. To meet such a need, a higher type of position which involves laws must be considered.

G"-3⁴: Legal Responsibility

Nature. Laws have the particular function of defining what rules are to be officially enforced within society for the common good. But neither laws nor law enforcement can be taken for granted, because adherence to laws depends on an ethical position in which respecting and keeping the law is an accepted maxim.

Each individual wants other individuals to keep the law, and must recognize that this depends on (customary) duties to keep the law and ensure the law is kept by others. Temporarily ignoring a law or its breach for personal gain or convenience is usually less harmful in regard to that particular act than in regard to the message about law-keeping it sends to oneself and others.

The *function* of legal responsibility is to orient individuals to fulfilling their legal obligations to others and to the community as a whole. These legal obligations, unlike earlier types of position, are fully societal in nature in the sense that each applies forcefully to all. Keeping the law, irrespective of immediate personal gain or loss may be described as the individual's minimal or most basic responsibility to society. Paradoxically, each person's exercise of *freedom* depends on the communal trust and peaceful coexistence that is consequent on everyone internalizing legal responsibility.

Legal responsibility finds its *expression* as institutions formally sanctioned by government: including laws, official regulations and regulatory authorities. The *multiplicity* of legal responsibilities tend to be strongly inter-connected because they stem from the necessary formalism and coherence of laws and legislation.

Constitution. Legal responsibilities are related to the duties which were discussed in association with rights (Ch. 8). The minimum duties in any society were then noted to be tolerance of others in exercising their established rights, and positively avoiding violation of established rights of others. Other basic rights included the duty to obey the law, and the right to assume others will do so likewise. So the constitution of legal responsibilities involves laws (L"-6) which are dogmatically affirmed, and rights and duties (L"-4) that are unequivocally respected. In addition, the acceptable application of legal responsibility depends on maxims (L"-5). Tenets and lower level rules are not directly implicated in the specification of legal responsibility; and absolutes are too abstract to be useful.

Legal responsibility converts laws and legislation into living social institutions.[41] For example, laws which prohibit discrimination against women at work depend on the wide acceptance of a maxim 'to treat women fairly'. So, in business, people have an unequivocal duty to accord women rights to being appointed and promoted on their merits — whatever people may believe or customarily do. The maxim puts social pressure and virtue into the law. When the maxim is not applicable — in this case, say, in relation to heavy manual labour, or not acceptable, say in ancient British universities — then people do not affirm the legal responsibility.

Distinguishing Social Responsibility. Social responsibility is a far wider notion than legal responsibility. Social responsibility is probably best used to refer to a crucial property of human social existence (cf. L'-VI: Ch. 7). Social existence is defined by responsible participation in society. In other words, any member of society does and should *feel* responsible for much more than is enforced by law. People have many deep responsibilities — to God and nature, to one's fellow man, to relatives, to one's associations and country, and so on.

Social responsibility has relatively recently come to be used in another way, as the name for an ethic which can act as a countervailing orientation to individualism or libertarianism. A better term for this ethic might be humanitarian, philanthropic, voluntarist or communitarian. By contrast, some promoters of the ethic of social responsibility seem to dislike laws and have an unrequitable romantic longing for a society based on

altruism in which income tax could be voluntary and rule enforcement unnecessary.

When a commercial firm breaks the law (e.g. by illegally polluting the rivers because the fines are trivial and the benefits great), those in charge know it is not respecting its legal responsibility. The same firm may give to charity and support communities where it operates, and say it does so on the basis of its social responsibility. This has nothing to do with the legal responsibility of the firm as an individual in society. The criminal drug barons in Columbia also won much popular support through providing financial aid to local communities. It would be less confusing to say that community support and similar public relations activities are in accord with a philanthropic ethic. What needs emphasis is that no amount of philanthropy (a choice by the firm which lacks formal communal accountability) can substitute for fulfilling legal responsibilities.

Conformity and Progress. Legal responsibilities define those rights and duties which are currently mandatory in society. Any social reform eventually involves the use of laws because only through laws can a position be formally institutionalized. In this position, internalization within society complements internalization within the person. Conformity here is at its most self-conscious: active steps are necessary to become aware of what one's legal responsibilities are. Any complex society which aspires to be just operates by the rule of law, and the state pursues infractions using force if necessary. However, this is not equivalent to enforcing progress. Laws should only be passed if they are likely to be adhered to. It is more accurate to say that legal responsibilities consolidate the progress generated via the evolution and assimilation of an ethic into the culture.

Any significant progress alters the rights and duties of individuals, changes which inherently generate disputes and disagreements. Where laws and (customary) rights do not hang together well because the maxims are broadly unacceptable, then laws do little. Not only do the hoped-for improvements not materialize, but the importance of legal responsibility is weakened and the legal system itself is brought into disrepute. The laws may not be bad, they may just be ahead of their time. To look at laws apart from the legal responsibilities which they create is equivalent to ignoring what the community expects and is prepared to tolerate.

Competitive Tendering: Laws were introduced in the 1980's to promote the contracting out of public sector services to the private sector in the UK. These laws altered the rights of firms and the duties of public sector employees. The widely accepted maxims behind the laws emphasized the search for efficiency and economy.

However, in the early stages, private enterprise was undeveloped in some parts of the country. New firms there were inexperienced and counted on re-employing ex-public sector workers at lower levels of pay and benefits. To award contracts in these circumstances would have breached maxims. So both local government politicians and apolitical public sector managers become ambivalent about their legal responsibility. They either delayed competitive tendering or arranged for few contracts to be won by the private sector.   Ex. 9.22

Use of the Law. Over-hasty use of the law is not wise. The law is the official expression of the common good, so legal responsibility, in effect, orients each person and organization to put the common good before self-interest. Long ago Aquinas stated that the common good is better than the good of one person. Montesquieu, too, concluded that democracy demanded that people be virtuous and place public interest above private interest. Herbert Spencer concluded that democratic law-making was the highest form of government, but added somewhat pessimistically that "because of this it requires the highest type of human nature — a type nowhere at present existing". Putting the common good before our own unique good is what we do whenever we self-consciously follow the law. It is not quite so difficult as these philosophers make it sound.[42]

Hostage-taking: Kidnapping and holding hostages is illegal. Whenever a government has to deal with terrorists who use hostages to gain concessions, they must weigh up what is in the interest of the kidnapped individual against the common interest. Laws demand that a government should uphold the law and pursue those who break laws. Acceding to the terrorists' demands would encourage further hostage-taking and contravene the generally accepted maxim that rewarding crime is harmful. Above all, terrorists do not have assigned rights to act as they do. In dogmatically refusing to give in to demands, the government is acting in accord with its legal responsibility. Relatives of the hostages naturally find such an analysis painful and depressing. Governments may ignore their responsibility on pragmatic or ethical grounds, but they usually try to keep such illegal deals secret.   Ex. 9.23

Where authoritarian or totalitarian governments are in power, legal responsibility is likely to be poorly internalized. Laws then do not aim at justice but at pursuing the goals of the leadership. Such laws are not passed with consent, so their hold over the populace is weakened. In brutal regimes, many laws do not accord with accepted maxims, so the rights and duties which are demanded are not willingly accorded. In the absence of legal responsibility, the only recourse of such governments is to emphasize the duty of obedience and back this with ruthless monitoring, enforcement, punishment and terror.

Organizations have powers to restrict certain freedoms possible and necessary in a community, as long as the law is not breached. The equivalent of legal responsibility inside an organization is the responsibility to observe its (private) regulations. In principle, a governing body can make obedience mandatory no matter how disagreeable the regulation, but in practice it is unwise to attempt to over-ride maxims accepted by staff and in the wider community.

Agents of Change. In modern democratic society, the government knows that its laws must have the broad consent of the people. So legal responsibility can operate relatively unhindered. Resistance to an existing or new law may be based on a conviction that the law is unjust, which is to say that the maxims on which it depends are not acceptable in the community. Any single person can responsibly reach this conclusion, because all are equal when it comes to assessing social values. In this case, the individual is called a conscientious objector. Conscientious objection is not a matter of personal gain but of asserting a social point of view, and the conscientious objector is seen as campaigning for a change in the law (and sometimes a change in policy too). American conscientious objectors to the draft, for example, played a role in ending the Vietnam war. Similarly, a recent flat rate UK tax known as the community charge was withdrawn following the proliferation of conscientious objectors.

If the law is not obeyed for purely personal reasons — to avoid loss or to ensure gain — the person is an outlaw. Not to act in accord with one's legal responsibilities is to allow others to look after the common good. Most people who evade taxes, for example, still avail themselves of all that is provided by those moneys: from the defence of the realm to cleaner streets. Taking without giving is to be a free-rider. Society's response to free-riding is to increase penalties and to spend more on enforcement. This represents a waste of public resource and does not undo the harm to the communal spirit caused by free-riding.

Limitation. Legal responsibility orients people to follow laws. On its own, it fails to orient individuals to devise laws which deservedly command obedience and respect. Without this orientation, people become confused about what laws are trying to do. All types of position so far considered take for granted that society is oriented to justice. Children are taught to accept the main positions in their society and to obey rather than question the law. But if legal responsibility and other positions are to be unquestioningly accepted, then it must be because of a different and higher perspective — a perspective which enhances freedom and promises

people a fair share of social goods. This takes us to the final and potentially most contentious position which explicitly embodies and affirms a conception of fairness: distributive justice.

G"-3[5]: Distributive Justice

Nature. Each individual is concerned to act freely and to suffer as little restraint or coercion as possible. Each is also deeply concerned about whether the actual condition in which they find themselves is intrinsically fair. So socialization into what is right in these regards is essential.

Freedom in society rests on the possibility of possessing or accessing goods, especially land, which can be used largely as the person wishes.[43] Without the opportunity to acquire and keep assets, there is unlikely to be that minimum protection from arbitrary interference by others which is required for communal life to be tolerable (cf. L"-IV: Ch. 7). But certain goods are of particular significance to society because they are social or collective in nature. These include the resources which define society (e.g. its territory, opportunities to act), or which are part of communal living (e.g. amenities like sewers, protection against epidemics), or which cannot easily be owned or used by one individual without affecting others (e.g. parking on public roads, disposing waste into the atmosphere).

What counts as a social or collective good and how collective goods like (say) clean air or free schooling or health care or rivers (or collective bads like pollution or conscription or taxation) are shared out is naturally a pre-occupation of everyone. Arrangements are required which are widely believed to be fair. Individuals only accept their situation and support their society willingly if they accept that the rules used for dealing with social goods and bads are just.

Whenever these collective goods are allocated, or competed for, or wherever adjudications affect the distribution of goods, fairness is felt to be essential. The position which orients people to the proper handling of social goods and bads is distributive justice — often called social justice. Distributive justice has its subdivisions: allocative justice deals with direct provision of a resource; competitive justice deals with regulating markets which produce and deal in resource; and adjudicative justice deals with the workings of courts and tribunals e.g. for compensation claims.

Distributive justice reflects the most enlightened conception of resource-linked fairness that is available in a particular society. Its *expression* is as a cultural conception of a fair way to protect and handle collective goods. Fair shares in the use of common resources or

socially-created goods aim to enhance the *freedom* of each and all. Whatever rules are chosen, however, individual differences will emerge in the actual distribution of intangible goods and tangible assets. So the *function* of distributive justice is to orient individuals towards supporting the ethical order and tolerating inevitable inequalities in the actual order.

Like rules, principles and other positions, distributive justice is not about producing a particular end result. Nor does it imply active re-distribution of wealth. People may view the principles for handling any particular social good as fair or unfair — or they may wait till they see the end result before expressing their view. Philosophers preach the former stance, ordinary people tend to adopt the latter. Because of the contention that invariably emerges — even if only the disadvantaged protest — arrangements demanded by distributive justice require government legislation and enforcement.

Considerations of distributive justice are unavoidable when common resources become scarce. Whenever a valuable but limited resource is freely available, it will be destroyed if social processes are left to run unhindered. The incentive for each to use the communal resource, slowly but surely destroying it, is irresistible — this is the tragedy of the commons.[44] Overgrazing land and desertification, over-fishing the seas, polluting the rivers, fouling the air, overcrowded streets, destruction of rain-forests, over-population, tourist devastation of beauty spots — in all cases the individual's benefit from using the resource is great. Should anyone voluntarily refrain out of concern for the common good, then someone else will take advantage of the resource. In the end, all race to plunder the resource before it is utterly consumed or destroyed — and hasten that day. Because this would be a social tragedy, people take recourse in legal regulation — despite the suffering caused to particular individuals and even though no form of regulation is perfectly just or unanimously agreed.

The tragedy of the commons not only compels people to choose between regulatory approaches like rationing, queuing, pricing, and official control, but also evokes the need for a conception of distributive justice to orient the application of these methods.

Although equality is a preoccupation and guiding beacon in regard to the determination of distributive justice, it should be obvious that no criterion or approach could ever produce an absolutely equal result or indeed any other predetermined outcome. If that were really desired, continuous Stalinist-type control of society would be necessary and freedom would largely disappear. So distributive justice is not equivalent to a concrete plan for distribution. Much of what is claimed in the name of social justice is actually unjust and anti-social because it is not based in maxims and aimed at the common good, but derives from the power that a class (or special interest) has to press its claims successfully.

It should be immediately evident that clumsy efforts in handling distributive justice may limit freedom, and may disturb the proper workings of a market or judicial system.[45] Markets are a social good, because they are usable by all. So legal protection of markets (e.g. prevention of private and public monopolies, laws enforcing contracts) is actually part of distributive justice. Intervention in markets, by contrast, is rarely beneficial to all. The pressure group which benefits (the farmers, a business sector, a trade union &c) is rarely concerned with justice, even if it claims, sometimes with cultural support, that serving its interest is equivalent to serving the common good.

Note that a spontaneously emerging market which deals so well with individual goods is the inverse of the spontaneous use of the commons which is the reservoir of collective goods. The spontaneous market order produces obvious temporary harm to certain individuals, but leads to indiscriminate and diffuse benefits to all in the long run. Spontaneous use of resource in the commons produces obvious temporary benefits to certain individuals, but leads to indiscriminate diffuse harm to all in the long run. Regulation is difficult and spontaneity easy, so a pragmatic approach to justice and freedom requires markets to be created and commons to be prevented wherever possible. Where markets are natural, they need preserving; and where commons are unavoidable, they need protection.

Constitution. The definition of distributive justice depends on the top three levels of rule. Distributive justice springs from an absolute (L"-7) which is affirmed dogmatically. The currently prevalent use of 'equality of treatment' as an absolute is natural because all members of a community are inherently equal as members. Of course, any community is characterized in its actuality — possessions, status, opportunity, knowledge, health, skills &c — by inequalities between individuals. These inequalities vary over time according to circumstances, personal effort, luck and (in modern times) governmental intervention. This is the nature of communal life (cf. Master-Table 3: Ch. 5).

If any absolute, even 'to treat all equally', is to be usable, it has to be grounded in maxims (L"-5) which support the functioning of society and which can and will be unequivocally respected. The position must then become embedded and used in society via laws (L"-6) which are widely accepted. Such laws are usually

designed by legislators, rather than developed by judges, because they are about managing resources and developing agencies to oversee their handling (cf. Ex. 9.24).

Distributive justice gets converted into legal responsibilities and influences lower level rules, but rights, tenets, conventions and prescriptions are not required to define it.

> **Establishment of the Welfare State:** The establishment of the welfare state in the UK after World War II represented a cultural development of great magnitude. It was driven by a desire for distributive justice in relation to the welfare of the mass of the population. Fairness was rooted in the absolute of equality. On the basis of maxims like 'care for those in need', 'support the unemployed', 'treat the sick', 'relieve poverty', an enormous variety of laws were passed. These laws were clearly generally acceptable to society because they were supported over decades by both political parties. These laws provided social security, redistributed income, and created welfare organisations of all sorts. The welfare state also forwarded a socialist ideology of government provision, state ownership of key industries and efforts at concrete equality — things which contributed to the country's economic decline. **Ex. 9.24**

The crucial issue is how the absolute of equality can be converted into practical maxims. Should criteria of need, merit, or desert be used? Should justice be based on the conception advocated by Rawls: choose the maximin (or minimax) option with the 'most favourable/worst possible' outcome or (to express it more simply) improve the position of the least well off? Should it be a purely procedural matter as suggested by Nozick: entitling people to what they have acquired fairly i.e. by inheritance and earning mainly? Should it aim to minimize envy — in which case, a person is unfairly disadvantaged if he prefers to have what another person has? Or does this pander to an anti-social passion? Should justice do no more than protect against severe deprivation via an assured minimum or safety net as argued by Hayek?[46]

There are always a number of imperfect possibilities for realizing distributive justice (cf. Ex. 9.25). Nevertheless, considerable effort seems to have gone into determining a single correct conception of distributive justice. Such searching for *the* form of distributive justice suggests the existence of only one rather than a multiplicity of positions. The use of distributive justice to generate a fair apportionment of social goods (and bads) in one domain is naturally used as an argument for the same in another domain. But even if one version is dominant in society. and even if the trend towards unification is strong, (stemming as it does from the absolute), distributive justice for free schooling, say, is unlikely to be precisely the same as distributive justice

for ensuring military service, for minimizing pollution, or for improving the health of the population. Different positions in each of these areas may compete for dominance according to which maxims are favoured.

> **Distributive Justice in Health Care:** Several bases for distributive justice have been suggested to govern distribution of resources to promote health in society. (1) Nozick's entitlement. Strictly applied, this would mean that inherited illness is a disadvantage requiring no social compensation, and it would prohibit government spending to aid the uneducated to use health services. This position leads to a distribution that is highly unfavourable to the poor, the sick and the unfortunate. (2) Equality. This might be construed in several ways: as equality of welfare — ensuring people are equally well treated or equally healthy; or as equality of resource use — ensuring people receive equal amounts of resources to support their health; or as equality of basic capabilities — ensuring that health care leads to people being equally able to use and benefit from health care services. All types produce different results and all are problematic because health itself is non-distributable and the relation between resources devoted to health care and health outcomes is complex and uncertain. (3) Hayek's decent minimum, also known as the safety-net approach. By making only the minimum acceptable standard of care generally available, private health care is fostered for those who can afford more than minimum. In practice, what constitutes a minimum is likely to be decided by the availability of finance. (4) Rawlsian maximin i.e. improve the position of the least well off. This conception ignores the consequences of the individual's own decisions in worsening their health. Those who spend on their health are likely to have to support those who do not. **Ex. 9.25**

Economists struggle with the notion of justice. Those who seek the greatest good for the greatest number or want to maximize the benefit to the community as a whole on a case by case basis are in effect denying that distributive justice is an issue. By emphasizing community needs or empirical outcomes, they deny the importance of general rules to orient individuals in deciding what to do for themselves, and they assign zero value to what any one person is due in a just society.[47] Some argue that the controversy about whether any intervention accords with distributive justice is a reason for allowing unfettered market operation. But markets are a collective good and they can be regulated more or less fairly. So decisions about distributive justice cannot be simply circumvented by the use of markets.

Conformity and Progress. Conformity with regard to any distributive justice position is either a deeply buried cultural assumption widely taken for granted or the most problematic position of all. Once the issue of distributive justice is opened up, dispute and debate rage. The sensitive nature of distributive justice

lies in its embodiment of expectation and hope in the face of communal forces and resources. The most difficult periods for a society are those transitions when no clear position on distributive justice has been established. Maxims, it will be recalled, serve to maintain consensus on the proper functioning of a society, so alterations in distributive justice lead to a sense of social breakdown or collapse.

> Czechoslovakia: The upheavals in Eastern Europe reflect the collapse of an ethical order. The whole political system, a basic common good, needed rethinking. The presence of Vaclav Havel as the President in Czechoslovakia has meant that there has been a clear articulation of what distributive justice in the realm of government is about. According to Havel, the absolutes are the need to defend the truth, and the freedom for its expression. In support of these, he calls for a new constitution for the state which is acceptable to the people. The biggest task in the realization of this conception is to find new maxims which will serve as strict rules for social life in the future. He suggests: each man should be responsible for the conduct of society, government should rule by consent, and honourable conduct should be the norm.   Ex. 9.26[48]

The linkage of distributive justice with lower level positions in a particular domain generates an internally enforced system which holds sway in society. Altering distributive justice is therefore the target of many social reformers. Although the anticipated long-run improvement in freedom and fairness may be great, reforming proposals face the problem that the immediate result for some in society may be undesirable. As in health care (Ex. 9.25), different incompatible accounts of distributive justice can usually be developed — and none results in a perfect outcome. As emphasized earlier, seeking a perfect or utopian outcome curtails freedom greatly and may produce severe experiences of unfairness.

Serious complaints about distributive justice (excluding misunderstandings of its limitations) generally reflect a lack of respect for one or more of the three relevant primal authorities. The loss of any spiritual or religious drive in society and neglect of its ethical teaching allows excessive materialism and a self-interested focus on rights which interferes with the sense of duty and tolerance of suffering on which distributive justice depends. If government is corrupt or dictatorial, then the law and the ethical teaching tend to be ignored and distributive justice remains undeveloped.

If a distributive justice position cannot be dogmatically affirmed in society, there is likely to be considerable disruption. Pressure to ignore or avoid legal responsibilities will grow. An anti-social ethic is likely to develop. Roles like that of the black marketeer develop, and corrupt practices flourish. The government deceives its people, other states, and itself. Soviet society and the communist states in Eastern Europe were characterised by distributive injustices in a variety of areas, and showed all these characteristics in pronounced form.

If the relevant maxims are disputed, then there may be irreconcilable conflicts about what constitutes distributive justice. For example, if essential maxims like 'to foster independence and initiative' and 'to protect the weak' are articulated polemically, then it could be difficult to reach a consensus on what constitutes fair income security arrangements.

Agents of Change. The radical is the person who challenges the status quo as fundamentally as possible. The way to do this in society is to introduce a new absolute and challenge the distributive justice positions in many or all parts of society. Most people view radicals and their ideas as a source of danger. As George Bernard Shaw found, reformers have difficulty getting their ideas published. Of course, what is radical in one society may well be orthodoxy in another. So the danger has little to do with the content of the ideas, and much to do with the existing positions in society and the upheaval that introducing any new form of distributive justice entails.

Radical ideas in a new distributive justice position must stand the test of time so that people may become progressively won over. This may take a long time. Mahatma Gandhi's view half-a-century ago that the caste system in India was profoundly unjust has not led to the social reforms he envisaged. Recent attempts to move in that direction by giving more lower caste Indians places in the civil service have led to riots.

In progressive societies, radicals tend to be contained within academic institutions and are allowed to express their views (to each other mainly). In repressive societies, radicals are censored and persecuted wherever they are.

Dissidents and revolutionaries usually include radicals and others who call for immediate change in society. They regard the promotion of new conceptions as insufficient and feel only a limited obligation to the existing pattern of society. Because of society's perceived gross injustice, they feel free to attack it indirectly or directly. Unlike outlaws, dissidents typically refuse to recognize the validity of the courts which try them.

Limitation. Any position on distributive justice must come to terms with the inherent injustice in any social structure, in any spontaneously evolving order, and indeed in life itself. As Ecclesiastes observed: "the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong,

neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill — but time and chance happeneth to them all".[49] Failure to bear reality means that the normal run of disappointments, accidents and chance events are treated as unfair and deserving of collective handouts and government intervention.

The consequences of such an attitude are serious but take time to emerge. People slowly become discouraged from tolerating suffering and cease striving to improve their own lot. They fail to recognize their own contribution to problems confronting them. They are rewarded for dependency and encouraged to feel entitled to being bailed out of difficulties. The resultant subsidies and intervention will itself become a collective good subject to the tragedy of the commons and to the distorting power of special interest groups. The end result must be a diminution of freedom, a disruption of mutual adaptation and adjustment, inefficient markets, progressive economic impoverishment, corrupt elites and an increasingly coercive government.

Closure. Distributive justice positions encapsulate the most powerful means of orienting or re-orienting individuals and through them the community mainstream and societal institutions. There is no more influential way to engage a person in society than through a focus on enhancing freedom, affirming equality, and ensuring access to resources. So there are no further triads to consider. The positions are now intuitively and logically complete.

REVIEWING THE POSITIONS

We have now considered the various types of internalizable ethical positions: distributive justices, legal responsibilities, cultural ethics, communal roles and good practices.

Unlike ethical principles which were oriented to community maintenance and are largely in the hands of those in or close to government, the positions are a matter for each individual and may be used by any of them on their community.

Positions provide the pressure and backing for the operation of rules and principles. In a well-ordered society, we may assume that the functioning of a government is an expression of the ethical positions of its citizens. When governments are authoritarian or oppressive, there is a tendency for more liberal outsiders to view this as against the wishes of the people — but, in the long run at least, people probably do get the government they desire and expect. Freedom, with its uncertainty and openness, is frightening.

When society is stable, ethical positions may be taken for granted and their scrutiny left to thinkers and academics. But when an established order is challenged, positions are proclaimed and examined, challenged and defended.

Practical Implications. From the numerous examples, it is clear that no one person ever sets or establishes a position. Nor are positions simply created and available to be adopted as a matter of rational decision or by government fiat. The positions emerge and evolve in the interplay of argument and action generated by a multitude of forces and agencies constantly at work in society: unattached free thinkers, politicians and journalists, as well as members of campaigning groups, universities, trade unions, churches and other bodies generate a multitude of conflicting possibilities.

It is in the nature of positions that their satisfactory definition could never be determined by a government or judiciary acting independently no matter how just and benevolent its members might be. Nor could a needed position ever be determined from religious or philosophical writings, however wise and inspired. In other words, it is no longer possible to design or establish a particular official authority to handle a position. Responsibility for positions must be assigned to everyone. This is the basis of both individual freedom and social conformity. Socialization by positions is directed to oneself as much as to other individuals; and by using the positions each person can affect wider society and its institutions. For this ethical authority, equality is the safeguard and open debate is the method.

Ethical positions are where freedom, justice, conformity and official authority have to meet and find a compromise that recognizes them all. The lowest two positions, good practices and communal roles, are most evident to individuals because they must be deliberately and personally used and lived. The highest two positions, legal responsibilities and distributive justice, seem more distant and communal in nature and most individuals experience them as a poorly understood context within which they function. The cultural ethic seems to be a pivotal and dynamic type of position which lends itself to use by individuals to thrive in society and to alter other individuals and other positions.

Because accommodation to authority seems to demand so much conformity from people, it is worth reviewing here the implications of the various types of position for individual freedom. Good practices express freedom because they are not operative unless people are won over. Communal roles are the vehicle

for people to exercise what freedom the culture, laws and other social institutions allow. The cultural ethic defines the nature and importance of freedom in social life. Legal responsibility seeks to protect the exercise of freedom and to enforce the culturally accepted view of freedom. Distributive justice seeks to enhance the freedom of each and all by ensuring that social goods are not destroyed or unfairly monopolized.

People hold positions dogmatically and, being socialized into them, they cannot readily give them up even if they want to. If progress is desired, public debate and widespread instruction, persuasion and exhortation is essential. So the main practical implication of positions is that they require people to explore their own ethical orientations and the operation of their society. It follows that the evolution and replacement of positions depends heavily on freedom of association and freedom of expression and communication. Publication and distribution of pamphlets, books, periodicals and newspapers must be open to all. Meetings, lectures and discussion groups must be allowed to proceed unimpeded. Without such things, awareness of existing positions and debate about alternatives is difficult if not impossible. This developing awareness is not to be reduced to politics. It defines the process of cultural evolution and modulation of ethical authority — within which politics is but one dimension.

Precisely here lies the intensity of feeling about freedom of the press. The press is not merely about keeping a democratic society free, a task it shares with the judiciary, the legislature, the government executive and the citizenry in general. It is about enabling society to discover and define itself, something which government is less concerned about. In a society aiming to maximize individual freedom and to progress to greater enlightenment — which is surely the fullest meaning of the phrase 'a free society' — press freedom is particularly important. The media inform, aid and shape public debate and must track new positions so as to foster or to resist them. Newspapers and television news generally contain far more opinion than facts, and all newsworthy facts are naturally reported from the perspective of particular ethical positions. A healthy and responsible media helps people know what their positions are, and ensures they are aware of existing and emerging positions.

A press that engages in libel, that suppresses important information, or that prints lies bolsters the case for press controls. Paradoxically, irresponsibility of this sort appears to be more of a problem in those countries with heavy press censorship. It is a truism that present-day governments find themselves at loggerheads with the press and critical of investigative television. Those

in government come to believe (mistakenly) that their role is to decide and implement what is good for society: an executive or organizational conception with only very limited validity or likelihood of success. Whereas their deeper role is to be guided by the citizenry and to protect and foster the freedoms which enable a society to be as good as the individuals within it can be: a viable custodial conception.[50]

Ethical Progress. Each position at one level influences the positions at the other levels. Together positions in the five groups interlock as a conservative force keeping society unchanged in the face of pressures to alter. Should ethical progress be desired in some particular dimension, then positions need to alter at all levels. This can take decades.

Fundamental change in the institutions of society is justified by conceptions of distributive justice and driven by cultural forces. Such change is consolidated by legal responsibility which ensures enforcement. Both of these positions depend on the emergence of a new cultural ethic which can serve as the personal source of power for the cultural forces behind change. Roles stabilize any change and reflect changes in community life. Finally, good practices, which depend on rational inquiry, can ground ethical change in specific activities. Campaigners for improvement who neglect any of the various positions find themselves blocked (cf. Ex. 9.27).

Citizen Advocacy: Advocacy has emerged recently as a way to aid people who are stigmatized and marginalized unfairly and who lack the ability to stand up for themselves. Distributive justice often allows for discrimination against many people who have learning difficulties, are mentally ill, or are old and infirm. This is evident from laws which do not take account of the way that such problems prevent people from living as full and equal citizens. Those with learning difficulties, for example, cannot argue their case in everyday situations and so do not receive their rights. As a new distributive justice position has developed, laws have been passed to ensure that disabled people will be represented in some way. In the UK, the Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act (1986) has created legal responsibilities for public agencies providing services, and also for people who take on the role of advocate. Few advocates will come forward, however, until an advocacy ethic is established. Advocacy is a complex process, but its essence is a one-to-one partnership between a mature lay person and a disadvantaged person. It involves befriending and providing practical assistance. The cultural ethic which supports advocacy is voluntarist, communalist and rights-oriented. For advocacy to be realized, communal role changes are required including a new civic role of the lay advocate, new professional roles to organize advocacy schemes, and changes to the roles of others with whom the disadvan-

taged person must interact. Disabled persons and their parents must also be socialized into new roles. Finally, new good practices for handling those with disability must be instituted in a wide variety of contexts if their needs are to be met.   Ex. 9.27[51]

The introduction of citizen or lay advocacy illustrates the interlocking of the different positions (Ex. 9.27). From the complete system of five triads, as shown in Figure 9.3, it is clear that tenets, rights and maxims are central to any ethical reform because these three rule types simultaneously affect three positions each. This pattern also re-emphasizes the core authority of the cultural ethic. Establishing a new ethic is pivotal for social reformers because it stimulates alterations in higher level positions to consolidate and justify reform, and it generates new roles and practices necessary for its fulfilment.

Tenets have the most force for ordinary people. They can be dogmatically affirmed to support new good practices, be applied acceptably within new communal roles, and be unequivocally respected in support of the new cultural ethic. In the advocacy example, those leading the introduction of advocacy passionately affirm a variety of tenets about which people are unfairly stigmatized and how they should be helped; those in the new roles must accept and use these tenets if they are to function appropriately; and those engaged in new social practices must explain them in terms of the tenets which are taken to be unarguable. Rights and maxims in the ethic have greater force for those who are or feel responsible for society, because these inter-link with the definition of legal responsibilities and distributive justice.

When the various sorts of positions are not supportive of each other, then conflict results. For example, if the prevalent cultural ethic runs counter to legal responsibility, then illegal activity is widespread. Equal opportunities legislation, for instance, has not been complied with for many years, even in law firms.

People in Glass Houses: The distributive justice of equal opportunities aligns with legal responsibility in the UK. However, lower level positions often conflict. A large firm of management consultants and accountants (who have

probably advised many firms about compliance with equal opportunities legislation and human resource development) recently lost a court case brought by a female employee who had been passed over for partnership. Out of several hundred partners in the firm, only a handful were women. In this case, the business ethic ran counter to the legal responsibility. For example, tenets like 'women cannot take the pressures', or 'women become too tied to their home and family', or 'women lack the toughness to clinch business deals' are probably prevalent amongst the partners. Similarly, roles and practices in the business world are based in conventions and prescriptions about how and where work is done and deals are struck which often implicitly or explicitly exclude women.   Ex. 9.28

Transition. Positions tend to be developed within associations of people inclined towards them. They are debated and discussed in public fora in order to orient people in a way that is believed to be ethical. But whether or not that position (or any other position) truly constitutes progress towards enlightenment is not yet determinable. The best that can be sought is consistency between the positions. The next two groupings (i.e. types of authority) provide a basis for ethically appraising positions and their effects: the first on an individual and assertive basis and the second on a communal and definitive basis.

Genuine conformity with a position, as opposed to playing speculatively with ideas or expediently and temporarily adapting to external expectations, must be deeply consolidated within a person, organization or institution. In other words, positions seek to become part of social identities. But identity is not so readily adapted or altered. As we established earlier, the protection of an existing identity is an ethical imperative.

So conformity is first of all appraised in terms of individual identity rather than the other way around. Existing social entities with an identity — like actual communities, individual people, organizations, official authorities, and sovereign societies — must make an identity-based self-conscious appraisal of existing or new positions and ethical aspects of their conduct. This can be ensured by a more complex authority consisting of four adjacent levels of rule.

Master-Table 23

Properties of the five types of internalized position in society.
Ethical positions, which are needed to socialize individuals, are triadic authorities formed by conjoining three adjacent types of rule.
Positions express and reflect culture and enable ethical change. Note that both freedom and conformity are essential and valued in all societies.
Ethical change is viewed as progress towards enlightenment by those advocating it. See text for details and explanation.

Triad No. (Levels)	Type of Position	Function	Expression	Nature of Multiplicity	Ethical Change	Relation to Freedom	Conformity For (or Against)	Change Agents (Devalued)
1 (L"s 1-3)	Good practice	To orient individuals to acting in a way which meets the needs of others in specific contexts.	Codes of good practice which define, promote and concretize social values.	Disconnected, with areas of connection.	Depends on rational inquiry, and grounds all ethical change.	Expresses freedom.	Overt and easy (or resisted)	Innovator (Non-conformist)
2 (L"s 2-4)	Communal role	To orient individuals to relating to others in a way that affirms mutual rights and duties.	Social relationships which maintain the social structure.	Distinct and connected.	Depends on communal change, and stabilizes ethical change.	Enables the exercise of freedom.	Feels natural (or unnatural)	Iconoclast (Deviant)
3 (L"s 3-5)	Cultural ethic	To orient individuals to participating in society in a way that demonstrates virtue.	Personal outlooks or spirit of the age.	Overlapping or dialectically inter-connected.	Depends on personal change, and drives all ethical change.	Defines the nature of freedom.	Leads to personal identification (or deep rejection)	Outsider (Outcast)
4 (L"s 4-6)	Legal responsibility	To orient individuals to fulfilling their legal obligations to others and to the community.	Social institutions emerging from laws and government sanction.	Strongly inter-connected.	Depends on legal enforcement, and consolidates ethical change.	Protects the exercise of freedom.	Self-conscious (or imposed from without)	Conscientious objector (Outlaw)
5 (L"s 5-7)	Distributive justice	To orient individuals to supporting the ethical order and tolerating actual inequalities.	A cultural conception of a fair way to deal with collective goods and bads.	Tends to unification	Depends on cultural forces, and justifies ethical change	Enhances freedom of each and all.	Assumed automatically (or profoundly problematic)	Radical (Dissident)

G"-4: MINIMUM STANDARDS

Nature. Social conduct and social arrangements are everywhere appraised in ethical terms in order to promote conformity to what is viewed as right and fair. The first and freest form of appraisal is that performed by oneself upon oneself using one's own rules as criteria. Ethical criteria which we recognize as our own ethical authorities are called our ethical **standards**.

Such standards form an authoritative backdrop for all that we do. They are values and obligations which express our identity. We automatically use standards to appraise the rightness of any conduct or arrangement because they ensure we conform to our own expectations. Ethical standards may be used reflexively to assess the rules, principles and positions previously described: especially positions, because the pressure for identification and conformity so characteristic of positions can challenge, even threaten, identity.

Rules need to be *unequivocally respected* in order to demonstrate recognition of authority. Principles need to be *acceptably applied* as well if the community is to be maintained. Positions need to be unequivocally respected, acceptably applied, and *dogmatically affirmed* to socialize individuals. Standards clearly need these three qualities together with the fourth quality of being *deliberately adopted* and owned. Without this fourth quality, standards would not be a self-conscious expression of (social) identity and could not be an authority protecting that identity.

This additional requirement of deliberate adoption and ownership is made possible by including a fourth hierarchical level to create a tetradic grouping. So a standard, like identity itself, encompasses and incorporates internalized positions. Grouping the seven levels in fours generates four over-lapping tetrads, as represented diagrammatically in Figure 9.4.

People mean different things by the term 'standards'. The word may be used to indicate: a conventional norm (L"-2), a set of social controls or bureaucratic rules (cf. the regulatory codes in G"-1), a principle (G"-2), an unattainable ideal (G-3[5]), and a desirable and achievable level of quality (L-2). The essential qualifier in regard to self-defined ethical appraisal is the definition of a minimum. So we may say that the *function* of any standard is to ensure that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative self-chosen minimum.

The importance of focusing on a minimum cannot be over-emphasized. The reason is as follows. The application of ethical standards in society always highlights differences: for example between different areas of functioning (like health or education), between differ-

ent bodies or groups within society (like businesses or social classes), and between different communities within or across societies. Once differences emerge, pressures for consistency, constancy and congruence tend to develop; and then an urge develops to abolish differences because they seem unfair. The result is a potential for the unthinking pursuit of uniformity — which is nothing less than the destruction of distinct identities. However worthy, we must restrain the urge to improve society wherever the quality of functioning seems less than perfect. The nature of averages and statistical variation means that all cannot be brought up to the standard of the best whatever is done. More seriously, this mentality places no value on diversity and raises the spectre of domineering and intrusive over-control. Given that society is built on the responsible exercise of freedom, such a state of affairs is hardly desirable. The way out of this difficulty is to recognize that ethical standards always need to refer to a minimum expectation. Even so, variation in this minimum remains an issue.

In our field research within organizations and government and in reviews of the literature, we routinely find that the significance of identity is poorly appreciated. The idea that attention should be paid to the minimum or that standards should define a minimum is often contentious. As a result, raising standards, which everybody wants, becomes a confusing business. Raising standards sometimes means bringing actual performance up to a minimum and so implies that present performance is scandalous and corrective action is urgent. Sometimes raising standards means raising the minimum itself — which is always desirable but may be rather difficult given that it is equivalent to an identity change. The point is that conformity to a self-chosen minimum is a restriction on freedom which feels natural and essential. By contrast, conformity to an imposed minimum feels alien, unreal, impossible and even undesirable.

If raising standards in an area means no more than raising the quality of something which is already well above the minimum, then this is a matter of setting strategic objectives (L-2). Once standards are above the minimum, the judgement is no longer one of ethical appraisal in the present sense, but a proposal for assigning greater priority (L-3 value). In such cases, valid arguments for improving quality in other areas instead can be readily produced.

Hospital Waiting Lists: In the UK recently, NHS managers were told by politicians that the state of hospital waiting lists was intolerable. Millions of pounds were allocated to remove the problem. However, managers had difficulty in appreciating what was required because waiting lists

Figure 9.4: The tetradic grouping forming minimum standards.

Four types of ethical standard which must be deliberately adopted if social identity is to be protected.

L"-7 Absolutes			
L"-6 Laws		$G''\text{-}4^4$	
L"-5 Maxims		$G''\text{-}4^3$	
L"-4 Rights	$G''\text{-}4^2$		←─ Universal Standards
L"-3 Tenets	$G''\text{-}4^1$		←─ Societal Standards
L"-2 Conventions			←─ Individual Standards
L"-1 Prescriptions			←─ Communal Standards

were the method of rationing. Reducing a waiting list encourages more referrals in the same way that a drop in price encourages more sales. Close scrutiny revealed that there were two separate management requirements: 1) Stopping politically-embarrassing breaches of minimum communal standards like people waiting years for treatment, or having their admission for surgery cancelled very many times. Such injustices are recognized by all and immediate rapid improvement is desirable and possible, especially with extra money. 2) Improving the quality of waiting list management by introducing list validation, appointment systems, better scheduling, effective bed management, etc. These changes are new and challenging strategic objectives which compete with others for priority and do not respond so easily to injections of finance.   Ex. 9.29

Being self-chosen, minimum and identity-defining, the violation of standards is experienced as shattering and inexcusable. Others view breaches as intolerable, disgraceful or scandalous. The resulting moral outrage and indignation activate the inner urge to conform. It follows that attempts to prevent exposure and scandal are common. Where scandalous conduct is known to exist, or where it is long-standing and does not generate shame, it is necessary to assume that the minimum standard is lower than that being claimed.

An identity is a whole. So only a single breach of the minimum tarnishes the reputation of a social body. This is why it is often said that a society should be judged by how it treats its most disadvantaged and vulnerable members. Similarly, no matter how great a person's achievements, a single abuse of trust is devastating. The

conviction and imprisonment of a successful entrepreneur, say, for engaging in illegal share-support operations brands him forever, despite a lifetime of hard work, support for good causes and generous charitable donations.

Types. Minimum standards are developed and defined through a logically organised arrangement of rules at each of four adjacent levels. The different groupings refer to different types of standard as follows: $G''\text{-}4^1$ — social or group or *communal standards*; $G''\text{-}4^2$ — personal or organizational or *individual standards*; $G''\text{-}4^3$ — system, institutional, legal or *societal standards*; $G''\text{-}4^4$ — common or *universal standards*. The organized quality and self-consciousness inherent in a standard lead some authors to refer to it as a morality.[52]

All standards provide authoritative baselines below which a social identity is being violated, and so all generate strong urges for conformity. This conformity protects social life in its various manifestations. The four tetrads reveal four ethical authorities which are expressions of social being: the identity of a community (defined by its interacting members), of an individual (developed intuitively by each person and explicitly by constituted organizations), of a society (defined by its formal institutions and laws), and of humanity (as aspired to by existing sovereign societies). It is evident that, ascending the tetrads, there is a progressively more profound conception of what is involved in social identity.

Analysis of the internal structure of the tetrads reveals that in each case rules at the fourth and highest level ensure that the standard is *deliberately adopted* and owned. This makes conformity natural. Rules at the third level enable the standard to be *dogmatically affirmed*. This makes conformity credible. Rules at the second level ensure that *application* of the standard is *acceptable*. This makes conformity socially possible. Rules at the lowest level, the most concrete expression of the standard, ensure it is *unequivocally respected*. This makes conformity an observable reality.

Before providing a detailed account of each standard with examples, the four types will be listed and described in terms of their function, the focus of conformity and appraisal, their inner structure, the standard-setting authority, and their link to the law. The main properties of the ethical standards are summarized in Master-Table 24.

G"-4[1]: Communal standards are required to protect a community's evolving and undefined identity. The focus for conformity is on activity in public. Communal standards are deliberately adopted to accord with rights and duties (L"-4) customary within the community. They are dogmatically affirmed in accord with tenets (L"-3), acceptably applied through conventions (L"-2), and unequivocally respected in the form of behavioural prescriptions (L"-1). The standard-setting authority is any particular community within society. So communal standards are variable and independent of the law. If communal standards permit violation of the law, law enforcement may be difficult or impossible.

G"-4[2]: Individual standards are required to protect the individual's self-defined identity. The focus for conformity is on functioning internal to the individual. The standard-setting authority is the individual: a person or an organization. Individual standards are deliberately adopted to accord with maxims (L"-5). They are dogmatically affirmed through the exercise of customary rights and duties (L"-4), acceptably applied via tenets (L"-3), and unequivocally respected in the form of conventions (L"-2). Individual standards are also independent of the law. A notable feature of individual standards is that they may easily be more enlightened than the law. If they are not, enforcement of the law on individuals is relatively straightforward.

G"-4[3]: Societal standards are required to protect an officially enacted identity. The focus for conformity is on formally enacted institutions within a sovereign society. The standard-setting authority is the government of society via its main organs: legislature, judiciary, executive. Societal standards are deliberately

adopted to accord with laws (L"-6). They are dogmatically affirmed in accord with maxims (L"-5), acceptably applied through customary rights and duties (L"-4), and unequivocally respected via tenets (L"-3). Societal standards are typically embodied in laws and, even where they are not, the judicial system may be used to appraise conformity with them.

G"-4[4]: Universal standards are required to protect an internationally agreed conception of human identity in society. All societies must be able to identify with this conception if it is to be objectively universal. So the standard-setting authority is a multi-national governmental body, like the United Nations and its commissions. The focus for conformity is on individual rights and duties towards the community. Universal standards will only be deliberately adopted if they accord with absolutes (L"-7). To be dogmatically affirmed, they are expressed as laws (L"-6). Maxims (L"-5) should ensure that they are applied acceptably. Finally, they require unequivocal respect to be accorded to certain rights and duties (L"-4) so that they become customary. It is expected that agreed universal standards should produce changes in existing laws of sovereign societies.

Properties. Standards assume the capability to be ethical in the sense of self-consciously owning rules rather than simply respecting or following them. Internalized positions generated conformity based on quasi-automatic expectations of oneself and others. They were taken up via socialization and not necessarily fully and deliberately owned. Standards, by contrast, are used to strive positively to ensure that rules are part of the self — the public self, the private self, the law-abiding self, or the universal self. So the focus shifts again: from enabling freedom back to enabling restraint.

In examining the four types of minimum standard in detail, I will explore their *function* in relation to a social identity, and clarify in each case the *focus for conformity* and appraisal. I will explain their *composition* by rules and consider the implications of *variations* in standards. Each has a *standard-setting authority* which develops and modifies the standard. Once standards are set, there must be mechanisms or bodies engaged in *monitoring* conformity to the standard. The monitor must be appropriately empowered and freely able to use the standards. Should the monitor find a breach of standards, then immediate remedial action is expected. Because there may be a dispute about whether the standard has actually been breached or not, some form of *judging* or arbitration is potentially required. Finally the *limitation* inherent in each type of standard is noted as a way of moving to the next higher type.

G"-4[1]: Communal standards

Nature. Communal standards are to be found, naturally enough, within groups and communities of all sizes helping to control the public activities of their members. Conformity with communal expectations is essential if member interactions are to be comfortable and smooth. The *standard-setting authority* is the community itself: which may comprise all in society, or be only a limited part like a neighbourhood or town, or a group of people forced together, say in an organization or on a holiday tour.

Being a member of an informal or temporary group is the simplest and most basic expression of social existence. The standards requiring conformity develop informally within any group in order to protect the self-respect and self-image of people as equal members of that group. However the group is not organized enough to define its own nature formally. The *function* of a communal standard, we may say, is to protect an evolving and undefined community identity.

The community's members may find themselves in a variety of settings: at work, at a parents-and-teachers association meeting, in a football crowd, at a political rally, shopping in a centre or dining in a restaurant. Within all these settings the person is engaging in public activity and the individual's identity must be submerged within the group to some degree. Being a part of the group is more fundamental than expressing individuality within it (cf. duality in social being, L'-VI: Ch. 7). When a person feels defined by the group, communal standards become apparent. The *focus for conformity* is the activity released or permitted in the presence of other group members.

Writers like LeBon, Tarde and Fournial wrote at the turn of the century about the populace as 'the masses' which were to be feared and needed to be tamed. They used animal metaphors, like the herd instinct, which emphasized the reduction of individual responsibility and the upsurge of impulsiveness and irrationality in crowds.[53] In so far as there is a group mind (as they thought), then it operates in terms of the communal standard. For example, when a political rally or a football crowd breaks up into looting and brawling many people find themselves constrained to act in ways which are foreign to their usual selves. Police in such settings, acting on behalf of the community, often accept behaviour which would be regarded as intolerable and illegal if it occurred elsewhere.

Irrational and violent crowds lead us to think of the communal standard as set below the individual's standard. However, a communal standard may operate above the standard of certain individuals and can pre-

vent odd or disruptive behaviour. For example, depending largely on teacher and parental attitudes, bullying in school playgrounds may either be accepted or rejected by children. The efficacy of group therapy also depends heavily on the pressures of communal standards fostered by the therapist and aimed at overcoming idiosyncratically destructive or bizarre behaviours of each patient.[54]

Composition and Variation. Although minimum standards on many matters may be independent of the law and pay scant regard for maxims, they do depend on customary rights. Rights (L"-4) enable people to choose their communal standards deliberately and to stand by these standards. For example, people operate with and apply hygiene and safety standards independently of any laws. People running a school fete would be unaware of most legal requirements for hygiene and safety. Hygiene standards in such cases are based on an informal sense of a duty to do things in a way that most people think of as clean and healthy. Safety standards are similarly based on the informal duty to be careful. Such standards (unlike legal requirements) are typically not written down, and what is and what is not above the minimum varies over time because communal tenets (L"-3) vary with moods and fashions. A scare about beef or eggs (despite lack of any evidence or official health warnings or laws about the food) may mean that nothing containing these ingredients can be served while the scare is at its height.

Because communal standards are not written down and evolve or alter with beliefs, it usually becomes evident that they have been breached only after the event, possibly after a scandal has broken. Recently, in response to criticism of kitchen hygiene, a hospital catering officer told the press that cockroaches boiled in soup were not a health hazard. He was surprised at the furore that broke out. But community tenets, not scientific facts, are what counts, and these lead to the dogmatic response that cockroach soup is beyond the pale — however germ-free. Conventions (L"-2) held by the community render the standards acceptable. Meeting the standards depends ultimately on strictly following certain prescriptions (L"-1): in the hygiene example, washing hands, eating off clean plates and so on.

Hospital Vampires: In a large hospital, a visiting dignitary was disturbed by pictures of vampires. These were sited at the entrance to the pathology laboratory where blood was regularly taken from patients for tests. He felt that the patients' right to sensitive handling was being infringed, and asserted that such black humour was not acceptable. Note that no law or hospital regulation had been broken, no patient had complained, and no manager had previously remarked on the pictures. No governor or board,

prior to this event, could have been expected to foresee the need to prohibit such pictures. The hospital manager had the offending pictures removed immediately.
Ex. 9.30

Tenets and conventions can vary greatly within a society according to the particular community, so there may be a wide variation in communal standards within any complex society. Territorially-based communities find that their standards emerge in local government politics which, in democracies at least, cannot help but express a sense of the community identity.

Cooperating with the Police: In some parts of London (UK), non-cooperation with police is a communal standard. This is possible because citizens can accord themselves the right not to cooperate positively with police. Members of these communities strongly believe that the police offer them persecution rather than protection. It is often the norm to steal and take prohibited drugs; and such conventions mean that non-cooperation is socially acceptable. Activities like running a neighbourhood watch scheme would be anathema, while other activities like lying to the police to protect a friend or relative would be unequivocally demanded. In such communities, the local council supports monitoring of the police. In other local communities, by contrast, positive cooperation is the standard. Existing conventions support policing, and beliefs exist which inspire confidence in the police. Not joining in a neighbourhood watch scheme or misinforming the police would be regarded as failing in one's social duty. In both cases, the standards enable conformity within the local community and are congruent with a variety of standards in other areas of the social life of that community.
Ex. 9.31

If communal divisions within a territory exist along ethnic, class, linguistic or religious lines, then there is a communal identity problem and clarity about communal standards may be unachievable. The political process which depends on this root identity cannot easily be harnessed in such situations. Rights or duties which are not enjoined by law may be disputed. Discrepant tenets may generate blasts and counter-blasts of dogmatism. Conflicting conventions make application of any single standard unacceptable. Inevitably, prescriptions for activity in public will differ, and the perception of a breakdown in morality is all too likely. The conflict will be reflected within representative bodies like local government, and whatever prevails will tend to be determined, somewhat tyrannically, by the stronger faction.

Keeping Above the Minimum. It seems that communal standards are the most difficult to ascertain and manage. As described above, they evolve informally and are recognized and *monitored* by those with a feel for communal expectations. Reporters are closely

in touch with communal standards and use the press, radio and television to announce and denounce activities of individuals and associations within the community which do not conform. Any member of the community may attempt to exert control over another member by appeal to standards. People may complain informally or admonish another directly. They may criticize in public via a letter to a newspaper, a phone call to a radio station, or a comment at an open meeting. There is usually a reluctance to single out individuals by name, and a preference to refer to 'undesirable elements' or 'certain people' who are not behaving properly. But, in some situations, falling below the communal standard can lead to expulsion or ostracism.

To change the communal standard is more difficult. Concerned citizens need to organise themselves into a pressure group. If the issue is genuinely a communal concern, then willing workers and donated funds are easily obtained and many can participate. Through such voluntary effort, a community can apply pressure and alter itself. Where the deviant individual is a firm, then the community, individual people or other firms, can go further and exert considerable pressure, as long as they operate within the law (cf. Ex. 9.32).

Boycotts: Many companies in the USA are feeling the effects of consumer boycotts which are based on the application of communal standards of morality. Even if companies are operating perfectly legally, it is within the rights of individuals and pressure groups to expose certain facts and encourage people to boycott companies. PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) advertises details of companies that experiment on animals, and has been picking off companies one by one: first Avon, then Revlon, then L'Oreal gave way. The scandal of dolphins dying in nets set to catch tuna led to pressure being brought to bear on Star-Kist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee (brands which accounted for 70% of sales) and subsequently only 'dolphin-safe' tuna was sold. Friends of Animals used a shaming approach to shoppers by plastering New York with posters saying 'Get a feel for fur. Slam your fingers in a car door.' The fur industry reeled. The Council on Economic Priorities not only gives Corporate Conscience Awards, but also 'dishonourable mentions' — doing so at a dinner organised for 400 business leaders in a top hotel.
Ex. 9.32

Limitation. Communal standards suffice to determine a minimum for public activity, and can foster conformity in regard to externally observable behaviour. But what looks good on the surface may not actually be good. So checks and controls on activities are not equivalent to checks and controls on the spirit imbuing that activity. Also, we observe in everyday life and business practice, that the communal standard ('what everybody does') is too often not just unenlightened but downright damaging. Lofty aspirations are regarded

as an internal, private or domestic matter for each person or organization. To deal with such inner functioning, it is necessary to invoke a higher type of minimum.

G"-4²: Individual Standards

Nature. Anything which is private to a person or to an organisation must be appraised by reference to a minimum standard which is more sophisticated than that used by a community. Individual standards must lock into a chosen social identity of a particular individual. A person's self-respect and the respect received from others is determined largely by the minimum standards to which he is determined to operate in the various aspects of his life whether or not others notice. The *focus for conformity*, therefore, is the individual's internal functioning. The *function* of individual standards is to protect the self-defined identity of the individual. The standard expresses the individual's core self-images and ensures maintenance of self-respect and pride.

However much we may be admired for our particular strengths and achievements, we always assess ourselves in terms of the whole of our life and self. Weaknesses and faults that we ourselves tolerate (and may try to hide or refuse to recognize) determine who we are and we conform to them as much as to our strengths. Note that the conscience alone, the primal authority for tenets, is essential but insufficient. In choosing and using a standard, a person takes into account other primal authorities — especially the community mainstream. So the *standard-setting authority* is each individual as a whole — individual again referring to a person or an organization.

Little is said about the self-respect of organisations, but consider being the managing director or Chairman of the Board in the following examples taken from actual situations. Yours is a tobacco firm: should it follow its competitors and sell cheap high tar cancer-producing cigarettes to third world countries where people smoke to kill their hunger? Yours is a pharmaceutical firm: should it follow its competitors and export drugs banned after testing in some countries to other countries where there are no tests and no ban? Yours is a holding company: should it carry losses of one of its machine tool firms so as to bankrupt its main competitors? Yours is a publishing firm: should it follow its competitors and actively exploit its authors? Your is a public service agency: should it act like other similar public service agencies and manage its overspend by delaying payments to creditors? In all these cases, your organization may well choose to act in a harmful way (like similar organizations) and you may be socially and legally entitled to do so — in other words,

minimum communal and minimal societal standards are not being violated. The issue here is determining the minimum standard which should be upheld by the organization itself, independent of laws or what everyone else does.

This individual standard helps to control inner functioning which is beyond the reach of informal or formal social controls. It is concerned with elements of the self about which the individual is the unique and sole monitor and arbiter. In a person, standards may, for example, be used to control thoughts and feelings judged ethically undesirable. Within an organisation, they may control a myriad of activities which are invisible to outsiders. For instance, few if any consumers can ever know that the manufacture of a new product involves polluting the environment or exploiting certain groups of staff.

Composition and Variation. The standard springs from a maxim (L"-5) which is deliberately chosen. The standard is dogmatically affirmed in terms of the individual's rights and duties (L"-4), and is acceptably applied in accord with tenets (L"-3) held by the individual. The standard is realized by unequivocal respect for certain conventions (L"-2). The different use of the various rules is illustrated in Ex. 9.33.

> The Thrift Collapse: Banking was deregulated in the US in the early 1980s, while at the same time the Federal Government provided guarantees for depositors. In other words, if banks thrived they kept the gains, and if they failed the government (i.e. the tax-payer) suffered, not their depositors or themselves. Given the business maxim 'to pursue profit and avoid risk' and the rights conferred by deregulation, managers in hundreds of thrifts (savings and loans organisations) starting making unsound investments, which eventually led to a debt of over $150 billion. The standards that led to these losses depended on widely accepted business tenets that making lots of money is what it is all about, and that the consequences for society of individual actions are somebody else's problem. Business conventions demanded that advantage should be taken of the government. Relatively few thrifts were run fraudulently: it is estimated that only 10-20% of the irrecoverable debt was dishonestly or illegally produced.   Ex. 9.33

Individual standards may lead to action either in support of communal standards or in opposition to them. Children in playgrounds may be torn between whether to join in with mayhem which they are aware is unacceptable to their parents and teachers and even to themselves, or to remonstrate and refuse to participate, and so risk taunting or even ostracism from their playmates. Variation is natural in the case of individual standards and this may produce distress and conflict. Tenets make the standard generally acceptable and

simultaneously allow the individual to assert that society is wrong.

> **West Indian Discipline:** In the late 1960's, West Indian families in London came into conflict with teachers and social workers because of the adoption of different standards of discipline for children. Parents brought up in the Caribbean believed that physical punishment was the right way to discipline children and help them grow up to be good citizens. Like all parents, they expected teachers to support their socializing efforts. By contrast, English professionals affirmed opposing tenets like 'hitting children is wrong' and 'physical punishment causes adolescent rebellion'. The conventional way to discipline was through deprivation of social contact. Professionals dogmatically affirmed duties which were alien to the troubled families, like: be consistent, explain rules, adapt to the child. Ex. 9.34

Individual standards are developed both informally and formally. An organisation, for example, may explicitly make ethical policy statements which set out minimum standards to govern relations with clients or suppliers, while its chief executive may simultaneously hold and foster certain related values and attitudes without formally enacting them.

There is an unavoidable and necessary variation in individual standards. People differ in the tenets they hold (cf. Ex. 9.34), and so do organizations. Such differences express and enable individuality within the community and are a basis for associations and alliances. The reverse process also occurs: the closer that people or organizations are linked, the more do they exert ethical pressure on each other and, over time, gravitate to functioning with similar minimum standards.

Keeping Above the Minimum. Conformity here barely feels like control, more like being ourselves. With organizations, it may be more difficult to create that feeling as distinct from the communal standard. The persistent maintenance of high individual standards is recognized as integrity. We may repudiate any other type of standard, but repudiation of our own self-chosen minimum is an act of self-betrayal. Individual standards protect against either excessively high or excessively low standards set by the community or in law. Even if a person bows to communal pressures, their own standards may be preserved because individual standards are expressed by an attitude (conventions) rather than by behaviours (prescriptions).

Although many personal standards emerge from a quasi-automatic disposition, self-conscious explication and ownership is needed. For standards to be used in daily living, activities must be *monitored* by a process of self-reflection, self-review and self-criticism. Comments and criticism from others may stimulate and

assist that process, but each person must, in the end, be their own *judge*.

In firms, the board of directors is the judging body which is obliged to consider the organisation as a whole and to review its values and activities within the wider social context. The governing body supported by the top executive needs to monitor minimum standards in all areas of operation. In determining and enforcing their own standards, firms are invariably preoccupied by communal standards both in the sense of what the public will tolerate and as defined by the visible activities of other similar organizations. How attentive any firm (or person) is to legal responsibilities and societal standards will itself be a manifestation of its individual standard.

Communities of firms within a particular industry (tourism, construction &c.) and occupational groups (surveying, plumbing &c.) are preoccupied with their members' individual standards. Members of such communities freely comment on each other's practices or policies if they fall below a minimum. The industry involved may set up its own independent (non-statutory) regulatory authority which can propose and apply standards to particular cases (e.g. the UK's Advertising Standards Authority). However, the offending individual or firm or association may disagree with the standard or with the judgement being made, and there is no possibility of more formal arbitration as long as the law is not breached. Such self-regulatory authorities mostly deliver a reprimand. When membership applies, penalties or expulsion of the member may occur. The member may choose to resign to avoid such action and then little can be done.

Limitation. Individual standards provide the potential for a higher minimum than communal standards due to their basis in maxims rather than in customary rights and duties. But individuals are not compelled in any way to adjust their own standards. Nor need these standards be oriented to society's well-being or to its cultural traditions. However new formal institutions — laws, policies, commissions and so on — must be so designed. Whenever a new enactment is proposed, it is necessary to see whether it conforms with related existing societal institutions. To ensure that this is the case, it is necessary to recognize a higher type of standard.

G"-4³: Societal Standards

Nature. Beyond whatever a particular individual believes or a local community finds acceptable is the issue of what society as a whole has a right to expect of all within it. This general approach to minimum

standards — the defined standards of a society — is expressed in enacted institutions and is forcibly upheld by special bodies. Established formal institutions, in effect, express standards, conformity to which feels essential. Anyone who is identified with a society must accept the application of such standards by those in positions of authority. The *function* of the societal standard, therefore, is to protect an officially enacted identity.

In a particular society, should we expect to find: the mentally ill locked away or wandering unattended in the streets? women ending unwanted pregnancies? safe house-building? attempts to rehabilitate offenders? easy access to government officials? care for elderly infirm people? thriving arts in local communities? fair financial markets? recognition of individual differences? citizens informed about government activities? incentives for philanthropy? The answers to these and similar questions are to be found by examining laws, statutory bodies, regulatory instruments, and government policies. All such institutions have been formally enacted and must be emphatically promulgated. The *standard-setting authority* here is the government of society — its legislature, judiciary and executive. So societal standards are often termed legal or institutional standards.

The *focus for conformity* for government is the existing formal institutions of society. New rules seek to be in line with or better than what previously existed within and through these institutions.

Saudi Arabian Standards: In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the time of writing, Islamic (sharia) law prevails and other legislation is by royal decree. All political parties and trade unions are banned. The death penalty by sword or stoning applies to a wide variety of crimes including apostasy, robbery with violence, corruption, and sexual crimes. Flogging and amputation are regularly used as punishments. Imprisonment may occur without the person being charged, relatives being notified or appeal being allowed. Royal pardons may be granted. All these arrangements are extremely difficult to change. Westerners may find Saudi punishments objectionable, but it should be noted that similar punishments were standard in England in the 18th century and earlier. What would now be regarded as minor offences were then punished by cutting off the tongue or hand, or by deportation to penal colonies, or even by hanging. Societal standards have changed over time so that such punishments seem incredible and barbaric to the Westernized reader.   Ex. 9.35

Whether or not the people agree with institutions enacted by their government, and whether or not the institutions operate as they should in theory, their formal establishment sets a baseline. Societal standards

with their backing by laws are the natural focus for reformers who wish to alter the essence of their society. Public debate based upon ethical considerations is more evident here than in either of the previous two types of standard.

The societal baseline can be legitimately used by people to determine their relations with others, by managers in firms and public agencies to guide their decision-making and review their operation, by politicians who wish to propose changes, by the press and general public as a basis for criticism of particular activities. Existing minimum standards are also used to guide judgements in the courts.

Constitution and Variation. Societal standards are based in laws (L"-6), which are deliberately chosen. The standard is dogmatically affirmed by appeal to society's maxims (L"-5). The standard is acceptably applied in accord with rights and duties (L"-4) conferred on individuals. Finally the standard is realized by unequivocal respect for certain tenets (L"-3). In Ex. 9.35, the tenets of Islam are the underpinning forces.

Statutory regulatory authorities are the standard-using bodies which take over when self-regulatory authorities fail to keep the individual standards of firms or professionals in a particular sector above society's minimum. Authorities and public tribunals are particularly required when the laws are commonly ignored. Anti-discrimination legislation, for example, is frequently ignored. So regulatory authorities are set up to proclaim relevant maxims dogmatically and take offending firms to court.

The drive for coherence and congruence, almost uniformity, among institutions within each society is strong. For example, primary education is usually a governmental concern and it is typically felt unacceptable for attainment to vary too much from one part of the country to another. Similarly, it is felt that handling of complaints about the activities of different public authorities — whether police, health, social security, education etc. — should use a similar minimum standard. For example, instituting an ombudsman or independent complaints commission in one public service establishes an expectation that it might well be required for other public services.

Variations in societal standards across societies are marked and to be expected given their foundation in tenets. Political, democratic and judicial standards in Japan, for example, are markedly dissimilar to analogous institutions in the US, even though the US imposed new arrangements during its post-war occupation.

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Keeping Above the Minimum. Without conformity to its own cultural standards, a society would be eroded by unthinking communal pressures and disintegrated by individual differences. Societal standards require a formal and public *monitoring* process. In public agencies, the governing body may carry this responsibility. Otherwise independent regulatory authorities created by statute are used. In the UK, there is the Monopolies and Merger Commission for standards of competition, the Building Society Commission for standards to be met in savings and home loan organizations, and the Charity Commission for standards to be met by charitable bodies. There are also various Inspectorates and Commissions for schools, prisons, hospitals and social services. As you would expect, the effectiveness of such bodies varies.[55]

The point is that all recognize that communal standards are insufficient and that organizations cannot be left wholly uncontrolled to define what is right in all areas. Conformity to some official policies, regulations and laws are required. Genuine conformity means respecting the tenets underpinning such institutions. Given the nature of tenets, this may be difficult. Official authorities, like the anti-discrimination bodies mentioned above, may then be expected to be the public vehicle for installing values as well as for assessing conformity to minimum standards in particular situations.

New Standards of Community Care: For many years, the impoverished old and infirm in the UK have often been left to fend for themselves. Those who need help all too easily get lost between welfare agencies, each of which sees them as a financial burden. In recent years, the government has decided that this situation is intolerable, and a new arrangement is currently being instituted. In other words, a new minimum societal standard is in the process of being set through legislation and social policies. In the future, a care manager will be provided for each person who needs one. This manager will be responsible for purchasing and coordinating a full range of services to meet the client's needs. Monitoring will be provided by other staff in the relevant agencies. In due course, it is likely that the communal standard, will be opened to official scrutiny by judges, senior professionals and others of the great and the good as independent representatives of society's identity. If the present inadequacy of services and the failure of coordination continues, they will be authorized to label that communal standard as officially intolerable.   Ex. 9.36

Judging whether or not there has been an infringement of societal standards is a judicial or quasi-judicial matter. Judicial review mentioned earlier is a way of checking that ministerial and administrative decisions do not infringe on the minimum standards guaranteed by enactments. Judges are frequently called upon to

determine societal standards — even if these are not embodied in the law. In hard cases there is no alternative. Dworkin notes that the judge's "personal convictions...become the most reliable guide [available] to institutional morality".[56] Formal public inquiries are used when an actual scandal exists, or is suspected, as in the case of maltreatment within mental handicap hospitals or a public transport disaster, or corruption in the civil service. Such inquiries are typically chaired by a lawyer or judge. Regulatory authorities in the form of tribunals are used when there is a flow of issues or complaints in regard to the application of societal standards e.g. mental health review boards dealing with appeals against compulsory detention, taxation review tribunals dealing with challenges to tax assessments, a tribunal council dealing with the functioning of all statute-backed public tribunals.

Limitation. Societal standards operate within societies and are backed by laws, but it is necessary to go further and consider how societies should appraise their own and each other's standards. This takes us to the highest type of self-chosen minimum standard and the most general conception of social identity — that which can be common to all societies.

G"-4⁴: Universal Standards

Nature. One of the driving forces of ethical inquiry has been the hope to develop universally applicable ethical rules and conceptions of a just society. In the realm of minimum standards at least, there has been considerable achievement in the past fifty years; and an extensive range of standards has now been set and ratified. Because minimum standards define a baseline identity, an agreed sameness, for the world community of nations, they must be the foundation for a stable international order. Rights/duties are the lowest level in this fourth tetrad and therefore, as in the other types of standard, the focus of any self-assessment. This has been recognized by the UN which has sponsored numerous standard-defining conventions and institutions which attempt to ensure that certain rights are similar within all societies.

Universal standards declare a conception of man as a social being, which, it is hoped, all societies can freely own and to which all governments and citizenries can work. The *function* of the universal standard is to protect an internationally agreed conception of human identity in a society. Ideally, it should be the most profound notion of social existence conceivable. But the standard can do no more than reflect mankind's current image of itself. The conception is the best that societies are capable of agreeing on at any moment in

time. Present day universal standards now take for granted that each person has a unique value and distinct rights and duties based on an identity shared with all other human beings. (There seems to be less public awareness about intrinsic human duties.)

The *standard-setting authority* can only be some form of international and quasi-governmental body. Universal standards are developed in a formal and diplomatic fashion by bodies which have multi-national governmental representation. Ideally all nations would participate. A new standard is promulgated in a pronouncement which is called a convention, declaration or charter and to which countries become signatories. Unanimity rather than majority voting is of the essence. Universal standards must be infused by a visionary spirit because they recognize or reveal that no society or its government is as free and just as it might be.

Recent decades have seen a proliferation of conventions and declarations in the area of human rights. Some rights have been held to be universal, when simple observation would suggest that they are skewed to beliefs and ideals within the cultures of those devising them. For example the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) proposed such things as the right to holidays with pay, the right to social security, and the right to equal access to public services.[57] Such notions may fit one society admirably without necessarily being seen as a useful or beneficial guide in another.

In the case of religious tolerance, it is easy to see why ratification of a convention has been withheld (see Ex. 9.37). In many societies, human identity has a religious component and mention of atheism in the proposed Draft is dehumanizing. For secular states, equally concerned about humanity, insistence on religious belief reflects the enslavement of man by delusion and the abdication of personal autonomy and responsibility.

Composition and Variation. A universal standard can be deliberately chosen by many and potentially all nations because it is rooted in absolutes (L"-7) which are sufficiently abstract and general to allow widespread assent. The dogmatic affirmation of the standard only becomes possible when it is incorporated in laws (L"-6) — either international law accepted as binding within a society and used in its courts of justice, or societal laws passed to accord with the standard. The acceptable application of the standard depends on maxims which define proper functioning in any community (L"-5). Meeting the standard depends on unequivocal respect for certain rights and duties (L"-4). By excluding tenets, universal standards enable diversity and reduce the spectre of over-control of the individual.

Religious Tolerance: The UN's 1967 Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance has never been adopted, although the Human Rights Commission has been working slowly on it. The preamble to the Draft suggests that the absolute is to respect the dignity and equality of all people. It is noted that religious intolerance has caused great suffering. A maxim is proposed: 'governments, organizations and private persons should strive to promote through education and by other means, understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion and belief.' Theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs are covered. The body of the document consists of rights and duties. Rights include freedoms to adhere or not to adhere to a religion, to manifest religion alone or with others in public or in private, and to express opinions on questions of religion or belief; and there is also the freedom from any compulsion to take a religious oath. Rights to do things — like worship, assemble, teach, learn, disseminate ideas, train, observe rituals, do good works, make pilgrimages, and to organize — are specified. Parents and guardians are assigned duties to inculcate tolerance and avoid discrimination. The Draft also insists on the duties of governments to institute 'immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information' to combat prejudice. Governments are commanded to see to 'the enactment or abrogation of laws or regulations' so as to prevent harmful discrimination, and to use 'national tribunals and other State institutions' to this end.   Ex. 9.37[58]

Variation is impossible, because there is only one set of governments and there can be only one universal standard in any social domain. Marked similarities between universal standards across the various domains should also be noticeable. Where there is dispute (as in the case of religious tolerance), it must simply be accepted that no universal standard exists. Disputes over such fundamentals do not increase the likelihood of war and other human horrors, they simply reveal the way that moral justification for such things is attempted.

Keeping Above the Minimum. Any universal standard is a lever for ethical improvement. That lever will be far stronger if representatives of all governments have worked on and ratified the declaration. But even non-signatory governments may find themselves effectively criticized on the basis of a widely endorsed standard.

The worst offenders ignore criticism, deny the validity of international law, or lie about violations. Attempts to apply or monitor declarations are viewed as unwarranted interference in domestic matters. Sovereignty is held to be paramount. An offending society can be invaded, (as occurred in Uganda in response to the atrocities under Amin) or occupied to help (as in Bosnia and Somalia in response to civil war)

but the grounds are usually humanitarian (the relief of starvation, medical care &c.) or security (controlling refugees, prevention of anarchy &c.) not the enforcement of minimum standards. The needed laws, maxims and rights are intrinsic to society and cannot be imposed by outsiders however desirable or necessary.

Some argue that there are over-riding needs for economic development as well as 'people's rights' or 'cultural rights' which entitle leaders to ignore proposed standards for the protection of individuals. Universal standards, it is claimed would result in the destruction of their traditions and social structure, or give an advantage to already developed countries which can afford them. For example the subjugation of certain classes, like women or ethnic minorities, characterizes certain societies and the effect of giving each person due recognition would indeed be extremely disruptive.

Subjugation must be rejected, but in such societies the scale of change should be soberly appreciated. The avoidance of bloodshed and discord requires a sensible time-scale of change. The issue is not whether conformity to universal standards can be immediately achieved, but whether society's elites recognize the existence of such breaches and whether the society as a whole is striving to modify itself. If not, accepting the universal standard is a diplomatic token rather than a meaningful act. Shortly before its break-up, the USSR acknowledged the numerous long-standing rights violations within its borders. This contributed to the disintegration of the empire. It will be many years before all citizens of the former Soviet Republics reap the full results of this initial commitment to a baseline of universal standards.

The need for universal standards is promoted by campaigning bodies, and then used by them in *monitoring*. Amnesty International, for example, monitors infringements of political rights. It investigates practices and the laws used to sanction these. *Judging* of adherence to universal standards requires special international courts or judicial commissions of inquiry. For example, the European Court of Human Rights was set up by the European Convention of Human Rights for just this purpose. Multi-national tribunals have been proposed for war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Closure. The *limitation* of truly universal standards is the requirement for unanimity amongst governments. This depends on the will of those governments, the culture of human societies, and the evolution of human reflective awareness. It is surely possible in theory, for example, to reach unanimity on a religious tolerance convention (Ex. 9.37). But this would require a better general appreciation of things like: the

role of organized religion in society, the existence of spirituality beyond the bounds of existing faiths, the desirability of peaceful coexistence, and an understanding of human autonomy and creativity as the basis for both atheism and theism.

With universal standards chosen by all countries, the limits of self-determination and self-induced conformity have been reached. There is no further or higher social identity to protect. There can be no stronger actual authority to invoke than an amalgam of disparate governments. So the tetrads are intuitively and logically complete.

REVIEWING THE STANDARDS

We have now considered the four types of minimum standard: the informal communal standard, the private individual standard, the formal societal standard, and the multi-nationally ratified universal standard. These minimum standards are the bases that are used in many public debates for promoting conformity and for appraising whether a particular choice or act is or is not tolerable.

The standards in different realms of social identity dealing with the same or similar issues may be rather different; and they certainly have different consequences. In the one society, for example, the communal standard may hold that hitting children is good for them ('spare the rod and spoil the child') and expect corporal punishment in schools; the personal standard of a teacher may abjure violence of any sort and prohibit hitting children; yet a societal standard may permit physical punishment in schools; and a universal standard dealing with offenders might prohibit degrading physical punishments for children or adults.

Practical Implications. A better world depends on enlightened standards which are self-chosen. In a modern democracy, the pivotal type of standard is that of a person. Individual people are the members of informal communities, the agents in all organizations. Individual people constitute the citizenries which have the potential to regulate governing regimes. And individual people hold political, official and judicial positions in government. Unfortunately, a person involved in proposing universal standards on behalf of a government is subject to severe depersonalizing forces. Still, the notion that everything depends on each person recognizing their unique contribution to creating a better world remains of great significance.

It would follow that if each person's capacity or responsibility to set their own ethical standards (i.e. create an ethical authority of their own) is downgraded,

then the ethical life of society and mankind suffers. Churches have often in practice hampered social development by arrogating supreme infallible authority and expecting people to abdicate their responsibility for standards. Where individual standards are minimized and the church installs elevated institutional standards (like a male priesthood bound to celibacy), communal standards are likely to suffer a compensatory degradation (like priestly misconduct with female parishioners, molestation of choir boys &c).

Self-awareness, self-reflection and fearless self-criticism are needed if minimum standards are to be a genuine self-conscious choice. At present, a better understanding of the monitoring and judging of minimum standards is required, especially within firms and public agencies. The various confusions about standards referred to earlier need to be disentangled. In particular, urgent rectification of breaches in minimum standards must not be confused with ever-desirable improvements in quality. Nor should breaches be reflexly dealt with by imposing bureaucratic regulations: no amount of prescriptions can compensate for inappropriate conventions or erroneous tenets.

The various types of standards can and should re-inforce each other in many matters. However discrepancies between standards set at the four levels are common. Judges regularly find that the minimum standards enshrined in society's institutions conflict with popular sentiments; and public sector welfare agencies regularly suffer from discrepancies (cf. Ex. 9.38). The attempt to align minimum standards in order to avoid disputes is difficult. But people do prefer their public activity to be congruent with their individual standards, and do seek a local community or employer which allows this if they can.

Hospitals Again: UK hospitals are under the control of a Secretary of State and are expected to enshrine societal standards. For instance, policy statements indicate that gross waste is intolerable and waiting time in a clinic should not be excessive. The individual (personal) standard of a particular staff member dealing with clinics may differ from the individual (organizational) standard of the hospital which includes a variety of clinics under different pressures. When managers and doctors set up multiple simultaneous clinic appointments to avoid overt waste of staff time, patients may be kept waiting for a very long time. Whatever the result, because public hospitals are taken for granted by many, communal standards lead people to miss appointments without notifying the clinic and they also become tolerant of lengthy waiting times.

Ex. 9.38

A standard mainly affects other standards of the same type. Organizations, like people certainly influence each other with their standards, and so do societies.

Some influence of a standard on adjacent types is also apparent. Thus a person's individual standards may lead him to attempt to influence communal and societal standards, and vice versa. Societal standards and universal standards are expected to have a reciprocal influence.

When one person, firm or society appears to act according to two different standards, the accusation of double standards is made. In ethical or religious enterprises, double standards are especially scandalous and bring the particular person or organization into long-lasting discredit. Most of us, only too aware of our own defects, get secret pleasure at the exposure of the television evangelist who preaches the sanctity of marriage but lives in adultery; and express shock at revelations that an organization which campaigns for the physically handicapped has been neglecting and exploiting those handicapped people in its own employ.

Nevertheless, seeming hypocrisy may be perfectly understandable and even positively required. When a finance minister of the highest personal integrity deceives the legislature about an impending devaluation of the currency, he is protecting his country as required by his social role. He is certainly operating well above the current minimum (communal) standard expected of politicians. Anyone who finds this repugnant should not pursue a political career.

Social Diversity and Rights. In comparing the different types of minimum standard, the particular significance of rights emerges. Rights are the only type of ethical rule which is included within all tetrads (see Figure 9.4). Rights therefore provide for the possibility of integration across the four types of minimum standard.

On the one hand, rights are the lowest level of ethical rule which can be reasonably defined and developed across societies. On the other hand rights are rules that are inherent in the structure and definition of any community. Rights also need to be developed and owned by individuals and governments. Ideally, coherence and the desire to see any local community as part of the human race demand that certain local rights and duties should be in accord with universal rights and duties. As long as universal rights are a *minimum* standard, a maximum of diversity amongst local communities is possible.

Tenets play a part in three standards — communal, individual, societal — but not universal standards because a variety of cultural and religious dogmas is central to the preservation of diversity. Laws only play a part in universal and societal standards and need to be designed to protect the diversity of individuals within

society and of societies within humanity. Conventions and maxims appear crucial to individual diversity. They ensure that when a person is forced to act in accord with communal or societal standards, awareness of any violation of personal standards may be maintained.

> Burning the Flag: Burning the flag outrages popular sentiment in the USA. It violates communal standards, and often individual standards too. However, it is not a crime and does not breach societal and universal standards. Public indignation at flag-burning has led to calls for it to be made illegal, but the Supreme Court rejected a Federal law to this effect as unconstitutional. A proposal to amend the constitution was also rejected. Burning the flag is a paradoxical act akin to appealing to the right of free speech to campaign for a law to ban free speech. To ban flag burning would be to undermine what the flag represents and would be self-defeating for society as a whole. When Republicans accuse Democrats of 'refusing to protect the flag', they play on the ease with which the symbolic and physical references of the word 'flag' are muddled by people.   Ex. 9.39

Transition. Minimum standards are about self-definition of an ethical identity and require recognition of the ethical authority inherent in human identity. Reaching a balance between the demands of diversity and uniformity, between the aspirations of liberty and the requirements of restraint may be problematic, but it is a matter for each community, each person, each

society. In other words, self-induced conformity to the authoritative identity defined by standards reflects a notion of an authority which is internal and subjective. Standards do not enable a definitive and widely accepted decision about whether conduct in accord with an existing standard is good and right.

We regularly find ourselves appalled by anti-social communal standards, perverse individual standards, hypocritical societal standards, and diplomatically-fudged universal standards. To judge standards in this way is to imply the existence of higher authorities which serve as an all-embracing frame of reference. Society clearly needs such frames. They must be relatively independent of government if they are to judge government. Yet government must secure their existence and guard their operation.

Any enduring overall frame of reference needs to be both more self-evidently virtuous and more complete and general than a minimum standard. The frame itself would have to be an authority which is freely available to everyone in the community. It should lead to an unambiguous determination of what is right and wrong when people disagree and yet be capable of development as society evolves. These requirements can be met by incorporating a further level of rule and forming pentadic groups.

Master-Table 24

Properties of the four types of minimum standard in society.
Ethical standards, which are needed to protect identity, are tetradic authorities formed by conjoining four adjacent types of rule.
Standards must be owned if they are to enable self-appraisal and self-control.
See text for details and explanation.

Tetrad No. (Levels)	Type of Standard	Function	Focus of Conformity	Standard-setting Authority	How Standards Are Set	How Standards are Monitored	Who Judges Breaches
1 (L"s 1-4)	Communal standard	To protect an evolving undefined community identity.	Individual activity in public.	The community.	Informally.	Media investigation, public complaints, informal criticism.	Any member of the community.
2 (L"s 2-5)	Individual standard	To protect an individual's self-defined identity.	The individual's internal functioning (expressed explicitly or implicitly in actions).	Each person or organization	Privately by deliberate choice.	Internal criticism and review, often in response to external comment.	The individual: i.e. governing body in an organisation.
3 (L"s 3-6)	Societal standard	To protect a society's officially enacted identity.	Formal institutions e.g. laws, regulations, government policies, public agencies &c.	Governing organs of a society.	Formal enactments like laws and statutory instruments.	Statutory agencies and regulatory authorities.	Courts and tribunals within a society.
4 (L"s 4-7)	Universal standard	To protect an internationally agreed conception of human identity in society.	Individual rights and duties in a sovereign society.	Multi-national governmental bodies (e.g. UNO).	Unanimously adopted formal declarations to be ratified in law by national governments.	Campaigning bodies, world press, parliamentary fact-finding visits.	International judicial tribunals commissions and courts.

G"-5: DEFINITIVE FRAMES OF REFERENCE

We may be free to choose. We may be free to define ourselves. We may even be free to break rules. But we are not free to make what we do right in the eyes of others.

To know or define or adopt a standard, for example, is one thing: to judge that conduct in accord with the standard is right is something else again. Such judgements are of far greater significance in social life. Recall that the essential feature of minimum standards is that they are an authoritative appraisal by a social entity for its own purposes and in its own terms. So minimum standards cannot deal with differences of view generated by different standards (whether of the one type or of different types).

> Freedom of Information: The societal standard in the UK in respect of freedom of information is one of general secrecy. At the time of writing, the public is prohibited from knowing the length of queues in post offices, or whether there is an interconnecting doorway between No. 10 and No. 11 Downing Street. In all there are over 90 statutes in which disclosure of information is an offence. So the standard is clear and any new Act of Parliament, whether regulating fisheries or the nuclear power industry, would be expected to keep much information secret in conformity with the standard. A judgement can be made as to whether or not using this standard is right and fair, and people may well disagree about this.
> Ex. 9.40[59]

Society can only operate sensibly on the basis that people are free to conduct themselves as they wish as long as what they do is right and fair. Determining whether conduct is right and fair can now, at last, be considered.

People in a society may and will disagree about what is just either because each holds different standards or because it is to the advantage of each to do so. So judgements about just conduct are required which will be taken as an authoritative expression by all. If a judgement is to be delivered so that the difference of opinion is resolved one way or the other, everyone must agree to be ruled by and within ethical **frames of reference**. So: the *function* of a frame of reference is to ensure that differing views about right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement.

Whenever someone claims with confidence that some action or rule is right they are making an ethical judgement which assumes a particular frame of reference. If society lacked such frames and could not deliver authoritative judgements, it would become riven by factions and be ungovernable. It follows that frames of reference must have existed long before being identified as such, and must have always exerted a strong hold on the moral imagination.

For the frame to be agreed, it must be obviously or inherently virtuous, and must enable the dispensing of justice. Note that justice can be applied to the pursuit of any activity whatsoever. So the frames of reference are essentially purposeless and permit people to function as they choose — so long as their conduct is just.

It is the frame of reference with its notions of virtue and justice which gives judgement in its terms ethical weight. The judgement will only be authoritative if it is made by someone empowered to do so within the frame. Note that the person is acting as a vehicle for the frame and judgement here differs from that in the case of standards in being more impersonal, impartial and generally applicable. If there is no frame of reference, or if the frame is viewed as lacking in virtue, or if an unauthorized person uses the frame, then the judgement will be considered flawed or invalid, and differences of view will not be definitively resolved.

The additional element of *virtue* — tangentially relevant in previous groupings but absolutely required for delivering definitive judgements — is provided by adding a fifth consecutive level of rule to form pentadic groupings.

Types. There are three pentads which constitute the three great definitive frames of reference in any society. In ascending order, these frames are: *the custom* (G"-5^1), *the law* (G"-5^2), and *the morality* (G"-5^3). These pentads are represented diagrammatically in Figure 9.5.

The social experience, it must be re-emphasized, is of the judgement being delivered by the frame i.e. the frame possesses the necessary authority and wisdom. Of course, people must make judgements, but they do so as servants of the frame. They are seen as wise in so far as they comprehend the frame and seek earnestly to refine and clarify its nature.

So judgements are not external to the frames but actively constitute them. What judgement the custom, the law or the morality requires in a particular type of situation often cannot be precisely determined other than by going through a social process of judgement in a particular and typical case — known in the law as a test case. As thoughtful judgements using a frame are made, the frame evolves and becomes better understood.

Judgements within a frame are subject to many influences: the five prime influences being rules at each of the five constituting levels. In line with the analyses at lower levels, we may say that frames of reference must

Figure 9.5: The pentadic grouping forming definitive frames of reference.

Three types of ethical frame of reference which must be virtuously evolved if conduct is to be judged in society

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
be *unequivocally respected*, *acceptably applied*, *dogmatically affirmed*, and *deliberately adopted*, as well as being *virtuously evolved*.

The custom, the law and the morality of a society all govern and authorize judgements about what is virtuous and just within it. They are abstract orders of authority which are products of tradition, expressions of culture and affirmations of hope. They are not subject to wholesale redesign or individual control, and their inner coherence prevents rules being thoughtlessly added because they are momentarily convenient or apparently more enlightened. The authority and certainty of the frames makes them an umbrella of freedom for individuals in the culture.

These three great systems of rules apply to everyone, and nothing exists in society which is untouched by them. In moving up the pentads there is a natural progression in temporal orientation. The custom is oriented to the way things have been from time immemorial, so to speak. The law must define the world as it should be immediately. The morality is future-oriented and seeks to create the world as it ought to be. This ordering reflects the intuitive feeling that morality has a natural pre-eminence over law, as law has over custom.

Discrimination Again: For many years, sex and skin-colour discrimination was both customary and legal in the West. Then application of the morality of Western humanism (emerging from individualism and the Judeo-Christian faith) led to a judgement that people should not be treated in such a way in a just society. In response to this pressure, the law is slowly changing. Courts now rule that discrimination on grounds of sex and colour is unlawful — yet discrimination persists. Although the law is upheld when cases are brought, people, including lawyers and police, ignore the law. For example, it is reported that legal firms have unwritten policies not to appoint women partners, and refuse to take account of needs associated with pregnancy and child-care. They see the judgement as to the rights and wrongs of a particular act of discrimination in terms of the custom, and custom allows things that the law forbids. In other industries, publishing, for example, the custom is not so discriminatory and women have rather easily risen to the top. Only when custom everywhere prohibits sex and colour discrimination, will it finally cease.   Ex. 9.41[60]

New rules are called for within each frame as circumstances change. These rules become incorporated in the frame and reinforce it. Nevertheless all frames of reference are conservative. They are deeply embedded aspects of the wisdom of the culture and contribute to the cohesion, stability and continuity of the ethical order. Without continuity, custom has no meaning, the law would be inoperable, and a morality could not take hold in people's imagination and identity. We find ourselves surrendering to these charismatic institutions with their awesome capacity to create and impose order. Each becomes a revered tradition heavily invested with value, emotion, and even fear.

The properties of the frames are summarized in Master-Table 25. As an introductory overview, a brief definition of each of the frames of reference is provided

now, together with the significance of the particular rules in each pentad. As in previous groupings, each pentad has a common inner structure, summarized here and elaborated in what follows.

G"-5¹: The custom enables judgements of conduct which define what has always been taken as right and should therefore continue to be. Custom, which is a matter of *evolving practice* in the community, gains its virtue from maxims (L"-5). Custom must be deliberately adopted by assuming the validity of existing rights and duties (L"-4), and dogmatically affirmed through tenets (L"-3). The values of tradition and stability are especially significant. Custom should be acceptably applied in accord with conventions (L"-2), and grounded in prescriptions which are unequivocally respected (L"-1).

G"-5²: The law enables judgements of conduct which define what must be taken as right now. The law is an *evolving institution* organized by the government. The law is virtuous because it flows from laws (L"-6) which are universally and impartially applicable in a society. The law needs to be deliberately adopted on the basis of existing maxims (L"-5); and dogmatically affirmed in terms of rights and duties (L"-4). The duty to obey the law and freedom under the law are especially significant. The law should be acceptably applied in accord with tenets (L"-3), and grounded in conventions which are unequivocally respected (L"-2).

G"-5³: The morality enables judgements of conduct which define what ought to be taken as right now and always. Morality is an *evolving conception* guarded by organized religion or religion-substitutes. The morality is virtuous because it flows from absolutes (L"-7). It needs to be deliberately adopted by society through laws (L"-6), and is dogmatically affirmed via maxims (L"-5). Maxims which foster altruism and communal responsibility are especially significant. The morality should be acceptably applied in accord with rights and duties (L"-4), and grounded in tenets which are unequivocally respected (L"-3).

The three frames seek to reflect a greater unity: the ethical order of society. It seems as if there should be only one of each type of frame of reference in a society. But this is rarely the case in practice: the law strives hard to be a unity, but the custom and morality are rarely fully unified. The custom differs amongst territorial communities, while the morality is deeply affected by religious differences. Ethnic sub-groups, even those following the mainstream religion, may yet have distinct customs and morality. Historical and territorial factors may even lead to the law being distinct. In a small country like the UK, the replace-

ment of the Scottish and English Parliament by the British Parliament still left Scots law as quite distinct from English law. Both co-exist satisfactorily although national law-making is centralized. In the USA, the law differs from state to state within an umbrella of federal constitutional law and the tendency to adopt uniform laws in certain areas.

Certainly, over time, interactions between similar frames in the one society and between the three types of frame are strong (cf. Ex. 9.41, 9.42).

Slavery: For 2000 years anti-slavery ideas had no effect on Western law. Most readers, if they had lived in classical Athens or the Roman empire or medieval Europe, would have kept slaves or had contact with slaves or been a slave. They would have judged this to be fair according to custom: i.e. maxims made it virtuous; rights allowed it; beliefs supported it; conventions assumed it; and prescriptions dealt with it. The uninfluential sect of Quakers in England were the first to recognize and insist on the immorality of treating a fellow human being as a chattel. On the basis of an absolute rule to love others, the maxim that one should not do to others what one would not do to oneself, the right of each to compassion and care from others, and tenets which emphasized the equality of all in the sight of God, the law stood out as deeply unsatisfactory. In 1761, Quakers repudiated society's laws and deliberately made it a law amongst themselves to have no connection with the slave trade. Slowly the ethical validity of their judgement became more widely appreciated. And then over a few years in the late 18th century, three judicial decisions overturned the law in England. Although legal rights and duties changed almost overnight, custom took longer to alter. In the USA, a civil war had to be fought. Custom still allows slavery to persist in many parts of the world, but the law rarely supports it and now moralities everywhere unequivocally judge the practice to be wrong.   Ex. 9.42

Properties. The three frames of reference will now be taken in turn. The *function*, significance and *advantages* of each will be clarified. The differences in *origin* and *development* of the frames and their *institutionalization* in social life will be briefly examined. The characteristic appearance and processes of *justice* when judging with the various frames will be noted. Finally the *limitations* of each will provide a logic for moving to a higher type.

G"-5¹: The Custom

Nature. Custom builds on rules inherent in the usual past handling of situations. Its *function* is to enable judgements of conduct which define what has always been taken as right and should therefore continue to be. The custom is based in long-standing social habits and is always spoken of as ancient or existing 'from time immemorial' — although even in olden times this

meant only 30-40 years, approximately one generation.[61] Custom serves as a frame of reference which is immediately accessible to all and can be unreflectively viewed as correct or as part of the nature of things. Judgements are continually made in its terms by everyone about every aspect of conduct. The value of custom as a common frame lies in its rapid and routine facilitation of cooperation and effective interaction within a community.

The custom operates with rules from L"-1 to L"-5, and ignores or rejects laws (L"-6) and absolutes (L"-7). 'The custom' should not be confused with 'a custom'. A custom is a general term which may refer to etiquette (L"-I) or to common prescriptions (L"-1), or to conventions (L"-2), or to civility principles (G"-2¹), or to good practices (G"-3¹), or to communal standards (G"-4¹). These examples of custom reflect its root in practice and performance. Conduct in accord with these particular sorts of custom is usually judged to be right because they are part of *the* custom. Restricting custom to rules at the lowest levels would fail to recognize the importance of rights in making custom available to all and the role of maxims in making custom virtuous.

> Tipping: Extra payments for services may be conventional, but this alone does not make the practice of tipping right or the particular tip fair. The judgement that a tip is fair depends on an accepted right for the service-giver to the receipt of a tip, and a duty on the receiver either to offer a tip or to consider tipping. For tipping to be virtuous, there also needs to be a maxim aiding social functioning e.g. 'good service deserves a special reward'. Where a prohibition on tipping is the custom, this is based on duties for the cost of service to be included in the price and use of a different maxim e.g. 'virtue is its own reward'. The complete routinization of tipping — 10% on the bill and money not going to the staff involved — removes the element of ethical judgement while retaining its form.   Ex. 9.43

Origin. There is nothing in everyday life to which the judgement of custom cannot be applied. The operation of the family, of buying and selling, of private property, of democracy would all be impossible in the absence of custom. Custom regulates society and its institutions. In doing so, custom promotes uniformity, ignores the individual, and is ultra-conservative.

Why is custom accepted? The reason is that custom, like it or not, is an unavoidable part of social life. All social groups develop habitual ways of going about things. Custom is simply this social habit made conscious in the form of rules. It follows that its temporal orientation is to the past. Once social habit becomes conscious, its value for the community can be recognized.

The *advantage* of custom is that it is uncontroversial, practical and straightforward. Without custom, habit and past experience would be irrelevant. People would regularly disagree about trivial or basic matters. Every new situation would have to be evaluated and determined using the law. This would be arduous and impractical. It is only a short step from recognizing the value of custom in social life, to making it obligatory, and even to sanctifying it.

Justice. Despite its down-to-earth and apparently unreflective quality, custom is intangible and elusive. Custom is not usually captured in writing, except by anthropologists and novelists, and its quality is situational and fuzzy. At one moment custom seems objective, certain and concrete; and at the next moment it appears subjective, uncertain and no more than a matter of opinion. Justice based on it also has this quality (cf. Ex. 9.44).

Custom is created by the social group as a whole, so anyone in the group can use it to make a valid judgement about something. Disagreement between people about such judgements is likely, but disputes can be definitively resolved by appeal to custom. Procedure is important in judgements under custom. For example, customary justice might insist that women shall not be permitted to give evidence. In modern societies, custom demands that claims should be presented clearly, that all involved should have access, that proceedings should be unambiguous, and that coercion or threat should be proscribed. Tribunals, adjudicating bodies of experts and laymen, may be used to provide some assurance of whatever procedure custom deems just.

Judgement on the basis of custom tends to generate a result, often a compromise, that satisfies all involved. It is also expedient in that it allows for such things as saving face and saving time. The aim is to reach a judgement which works in the immediate circumstances with the people involved. This may require a conciliatory attitude to feelings and personalities.

Popular sympathies, personality factors, political considerations and doctrinal beliefs are all allowed in making judgements according to custom. The urge is to get to an immediately satisfying result. In modern times, this often means getting to the truth. In other words, the substance of the judgement is more significant than the process. (So technical texts describe justice as substantive rather than formal.) Negotiation, arbitration and mediation are typical ways of resolving a dispute using custom.

> Road Repair: A farmer owns a lane which is used by several householders. At law the farmer is responsible for keeping the lane in good repair, but when and how lane

upkeep should be performed is not specified. Slowly the lane falls into disrepair. The householders could take the farmer to court but this would be expensive and uncertain. It might antagonize the farmer and generate long-lasting friction, whatever the outcome. Even if the case is won by the householders, the farmer might delay repair or make unsatisfactory or inconvenient repairs. Custom allows the farmer and the house owners to get together, to agree on a schedule for upkeep of the lane, to decide a share out of the costs that everyone is prepared to go along with according to criteria that are sensible locally and mutually understood. The end result is that the lane gets repaired far more rapidly, and justice of some sort is done.

Ex. 9.44

The need for people to deal with governments and organizations by way of custom has led to the establishment of official tribunals (e.g. in the UK: for disputes about rent, social security benefits, taxation, or dismissal from work). Tribunals can operate locally, speedily and cheaply and use simple informal procedures. Appeal to the law is excluded or restricted, but some supervision is needed to ensure that official tribunals do not act monstrously, beyond their remit, or illegally. A lawyer may sit in the chair, but judgements are based on applying experience, expertise and discretion. Proceedings tend to be inquisitorial or investigative in accord with the drive for substantive justice.

The cost and complexity of legal settlements have led to extra-legal but perfectly satisfactory arbitration, mediation and conciliation services (currently called 'alternative dispute resolution'). These are useful for organizations as well as persons. Pendulum arbitration, for example, is an effective way to settle disputes between union and employer over the justice of a pay deal. The procedure in this case involves both parties agreeing that there will be no conciliation or mediation between the two claims: the arbitrator simply picks one or the other as the fairest deal all things considered and then both parties accept that judgement without further ado.

At its best, custom allows judgements that feel fair, look fair, cost very little, and are readily available. It requires, of course, that both parties must be prepared in advance to agree to the decision and settlement determined by the adjudicator. If the complainant is unreasonably demanding or the defendant excessively unyielding then procedure breaks down and justice will not be done. At the least, legal proceedings must be commenced. Alternatively, the complainant is liable to attack the defendant in frustration. Because the defendant has not accepted the complaint, he will not be disposed to accept the attack. At the worst, therefore, custom leads to vindictive retaliation and lynch or mob

law. For example, the talion law — 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' — is usually recognized by custom. This may be harmless in the playground and even useful in minor disputes, but in wider society it brings with it the danger of lengthy vendettas and blood feuds. Cultures do try to develop ritual devices for ending feuds, but ultimately only law can terminate them.

Forty-Seven Ronin: A breach of etiquette in Japan in April 1701 led to Asano, Lord of Ako, to be taunted by Kira, a palace official. Finally Asano attacked Kira with a dagger and the Shogun ordered Asano to commit suicide the same day. Asano did so. When his retainers in Ako, the ronin, heard of this, they nurtured their revenge until Kira became unsuspecting. On the night of January 30, 1703, 47 ronin attacked Kira's mansion, forced their way in, killed Kira and offered his head at Asano's grave. The shogun was sympathetic to the samurai virtues of pride and loyalty manifested in this act, but decided that they could not be allowed to take the law into their own hands. They were accordingly ordered to disembowel themselves on March 30, 1703. Innumerable poems, essays and plays have been written in Japan about this event.

Ex. 9.45

Development. Custom develops spontaneously in any continuing community of people, and becomes permanent as it forms. It cannot be replaced in whole or part by fiat. Revolutions may lead to a wholesale change in the law: as occurred in France in 1789. A new leader may introduce a radically new religion: as Akhenaten did in ancient Egypt. But custom, as both those cases demonstrated, remains solid and reasserts itself. Custom seeks and finds continuity, no matter how dramatic the surface alteration. Japan, economically and politically devastated by its military defeat in 1945 and subject to a foreign restructuring of the essential elements of its society — government, landownership, commerce, management — nevertheless reasserted many of its old customs in ways adapted to the new conditions and challenges.

The aim of the leaders and thinkers in any society must be for custom to express the highest aspirations (as articulated in the morality and the law). However, the transformation of custom in that direction is always slow. Custom does not alter itself by a stroke of legislation or scintillating moral exhortation. Because the inner structure of existing custom is complex and coherent, the past has a tenacious hold. Once a new virtuous maxim is established, rights must change, tenets need altering, conventions have to modify and prescriptions need to be redefined. If this process solidifies, the custom is altered.

Romanian Elections: Democratic customs did not exist in Romania prior to communism. So, after the revolution in

1989, although there was much dogmatic talk about democracy and liberalism, there were no old habits and ideas which people could easily return to and re-adopt. Few people respected the necessary tenets. Civic rights were not accorded on the basis of equality and did not preclude violence. Politics in the past had been a matter of clustering around different persuasive personalities, not about a conflict between ideas and values. Prescriptions to govern campaigning and voting were not developed. People were therefore confused and at a loss to know what to do. Customs, like intimidation and government by personality, returned. In the first election, Iliescu, a former member of the disgraced Ceaucescu regime, received 85% of the popular vote, far more than any leader in a democracy would ever receive.   Ex. 9.46

Institutionalization. Custom is embodied in the people. The judgement of custom is described as the voice of the people: 'the people have spoken'. The epitome of the people's voice is the chief. The chief usually has a council of elders representing the wisdom (i.e. opinions) of the people and listens to their views. The modern chief is usually called the prime minister or premier and is elected by the people directly or via elected representatives. Advice is provided by a council, cabinet or parliament.

Limitation. The social life of many primitive societies is regulated by custom alone. But custom is insufficient in a complex society for a variety of reasons already mentioned. The most important general criticism of custom is that it ignores the individual and fails to control determined individuals. The administration of justice, for example, is insufficiently developed to prevent blood feuds.

Individual freedom is heavily constrained by custom, because, according to custom, when an individual must make a judgement as to what is right, he is expected to do so in accord with what the community thinks is right. However, people are different, physically socially and mentally, and custom does not fully take this into account. Deviation from custom may also be generated by new circumstances to which custom does not completely apply, and which each person will interpret differently. As communities become larger and more complex, custom cannot develop and diffuse sufficiently rapidly and certainly. Above all, people engage in purposive endeavours which clash with custom. For these reasons — individual differences, social change, community complexity, and purposive endeavour — people are liable, eventually, to break with custom.

Certain customs might be observed for ages without any question of their being challenged. But most customs do eventually become modified or regularly broken. It then becomes necessary to determine which

customary rules should not be changed and which are, in fact, dispensable. This requires development of the law.

G"-5²: The Law

Nature. The law is a frame of reference whose *function* is to enable judgements of conduct which define what must be taken as right now. The law's judgements are carefully preserved and themselves become part of the law. A judgement under the law is only valid if it is reached in a recognized court of justice.

Leading jurists recognize that the law is far more than laws (L"-6) or legislation. Goitein defines the law as 'the sum of all the influences that determine decisions in courts of justice'. Ideally, says Pound, 'the trained intuition of the judge continuously leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons'. 'The life of the law has not been logic but experience' emphasizes Holmes. Such comments make it evident that many elements of custom enter into the law.[62]

Not only laws, but also the social background of judges and the prejudices of a jury affect decisions. For example: judges will determine whether a government has acted reasonably, doing so either in a flexible or strict way depending on the policy and the practical implications of the judgement. Similarly, judges freely apply their own views of family life in judging marital disputes. They may refer openly to societal conventions or the moral code e.g. sadistic sexual acts between consenting men involving somewhat bizarre but not excessively harmful or life-endangering behaviours led to a court conviction in 1990 in the UK on the basis of public unacceptability.

Because the law allows judges to reflect contemporary attitudes and common sense in response to the presenting problem and because juries could not possibly be expected to do anything else, nobody can confidently predict what will be the outcome of any particular civil action or criminal prosecution.

The lowest level of custom, prescription, is excluded from the law. Following a customary prescription is never a legal defence because the law takes precedence over custom in respect of whether a behaviour is right or not. Customary prescriptions may be assigned the force of law if they are not contrary to the law — but then such legal customs are really laws. Courts may instruct a particular individual to act or to refrain from acting in a particular way like reporting daily to the police or not visiting a spouse: but such prescriptions are person-specific instructions and not laws or part of the law to be obeyed by all. The law also excludes

absolutes because of their all-embracing nature and abstraction. In all, therefore, the law encompasses rules from L"-2 to L"-6.

The importance and essential *advantage* of the law lies in its role in preventing undue devaluation, deprivation or inhibition of individuals by society (or powers within it) while still protecting and promoting the common good. It exists in part to protect individuals from particular conceptions that some may hold about what is good. (The most dangerous social body in this regard is the government in power.) Because of the intrinsic rightness and universality of the law, some laws (G"-1^6) legal principles (G"-2^5), legal responsibilities (G"-3$^+$), and legal standards (G"-4^3) have stood essentially unchanged for hundreds even thousands of years.

Laws suggest but never determine how a particular case will be judged — if they did there would be no need for the courts. Like custom, the law values stability and predictability. However, the law differs from custom in many ways. Above all, it opposes arbitrariness and expediency. The law must form an internally consistent whole so far as is possible, and it must evolve coherently with each judgement. This means it must be written and recorded. The law strives to be as clear, precise and objective as possible. The law is a mechanism: and this means that it must be devised so as to be workable.

Capital Punishment: It is very likely that a referendum in the UK at the time of writing would endorse capital punishment. However, regular votes in parliament reject it. This is not simply because of a moral doctrine demanding respect for life: some members of parliament who oppose capital punishment regularly vote in favour of abortion. The opposition occurs on grounds that are purely in the domain of the law. For instance, slight doubts may lead to inappropriate acquittal in order to avoid the punishment. Mistaken judgements could never be undone. Another concern is that virtually all cases would go on appeal to the highest court in the land. Individuals in the USA have been in jail pending a final decision for up to 20 years. This leads to the legal process becoming a penalty in itself rather than providing a resolution. Ex. 9.47

The law is tangible and objective. It is regularly described from two perspectives. On the one hand it is the cement of society (in which case custom would be the building materials to hand). On the other hand it is the medium of change (in which case morality is the blue-print). Although the law focuses on the present rather than the past, it is almost as intensely conservative as custom. However, the law (unlike custom) may change with bewildering rapidity if circumstances demand this. Then something that is right suddenly becomes wrong — or vice versa.

More on Slavery: Based on many centuries of established practice, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General concluded in 1729 that 'a slave coming from the West Indies to Great Britain doth not become free'. The churches at that time were not supporting the anti-slavery movement either, and Lord Dartmouth stated on behalf of the British government that he would do nothing to check a trade so beneficial to his country as the slave trade. By 1772, although legal opinion still held that slave-holding was a well-recognized custom, it had become uncertain as to whether it was one which should be endorsed by law. A test case was brought. Lord Mansfield delayed judgement hoping it might be settled out of court (i.e. by custom), but the law needed clarifying. As a result, the first anti-slavery judgement was passed, and others soon followed. By 1788, church leaders were opposing slavery, and the City too petitioned against it. The Universities also took up the issue. In 1807, a Bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was passed. Other bills followed and in 1832 parliament bought out all slave owners within the empire. Ex. 9.48

A striking feature of the history of the law is the outbursts of great legal activity that shake society to the core followed by periods of orderly development of which the community at large remains unaware. The Twelve Tables of Roman Law which protected the Roman plebeians from patrician domination were developed in such a phase.

Origin. Why do people accept the law? Not because of custom: custom does not require laws. Nor because of force: international law, for example, cannot be easily enforced. Nor because it is a practical and logical necessity: many aspects of the law are irrational and emotional. And it is not enough to say that obedience to the law is part of the law itself. Accepting the law goes along with positively wanting to belong to a community which seeks to enhance freedom by self-consciously clarifying what is right for each and all.

The law has a deep and mysterious appeal. To understand it, we must recognize that the earliest form of the law was an ordeal. And the ordeal, whatever its external details, is a symbolic death and rebirth for the person.

Varieties of Ordeal: The commonest ordeal was the ordeal by water. Sometimes innocence was proved by floating, sometimes by sinking. In ordeal by fire, or its variants using boiling liquids or hot iron, guilt or innocence is determined by the amount of injury caused or the way that injury is manifested. For example, in West Africa, someone accused of theft or adultery used to plunge his arm in cold water and then into boiling oil, with scalding being a proof of guilt. In ordeal by poison, the accused is tested by drinking or eating a potion often containing ingredients like blood, milk, or sea water as well as a toxin. The Greeks used ordeal by lot. A similar sort of Hindu ordeal asked the accused to remove a ring from a pot in which there was a live cobra. Ordeal by

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balance is also a Hindu notion. Ordeal by combat was introduced into England by the Normans. The oath was an ordeal by incantation which risked divine intervention, and this eventually replaced other forms of ordeal.

Ex. 9.49

The ordeal was not simply an activity that had to be endured by an individual, it was a complex religious rite of importance for the whole society. The ordeal required complicated preliminary arrangements to ensure purification and acceptability to the God(s), and was carried out in a precisely prescribed ritual fashion. A court trial still has many of the features of the early ordeal including: the use of the oath, the formality of the procedure, the ritual dress and language, the lack of concern with substantive justice, the black-and-white nature of the judgement, the support of the whole community, the apparently disproportionate time and exceptional expense. Psychologically, an action at court is an ordeal: once the action is over the parties and the community generally feel a sense of relief or release whatever the result.

Acceptance of the ordeal was necessary if one was to participate in society. The ordeal, being part of the religious basis of society, was a matter of social identity which could not be questioned. As the law differentiated and became established, it retained its sacrosanct quality. Judgement under the law remains a profound symbolic event. In modern times, the law continues to ritualize and resolve the primal tension between individual autonomy and the common good on behalf of all. As media coverage and crowds outside courts attest, people with no direct personal involvement in a case may still experience the court process and judgement as an intense cathartic experience. The significance of the law as a frame of reference for everyday life, distant as most of us may feel from it, cannot be over-estimated.

Justice. Because legal justice is driven by laws, its administration is in the hands of the government. Although legal justice may be achieved legislatively (e.g. the Greek trials before popular assemblies, the English Parliament in impeachments), this tends to be expensive, unequal, uncertain and prejudiced. Legal justice may be achieved executively (e.g. by inspectors, commissions or Ministers), but this tends to be expedient, arbitrary and politically biased. Finally and characteristically, legal justice may be achieved judicially using a separate forum with people chosen for their training, knowledge, impartiality, dedication and permanence — the judiciary. In 13th century England, legal professionals handled actions involving the common law even though it was based almost entirely on general and local custom.[63]

Justice generated by a judiciary is, above all, procedural and formal. The judiciary embodies the law and so values predictability, consistency and uniformity in handling individual people and situations. Justice in this sense is repugnant to authoritarian powers, whether religious or despotic, because it diminishes the dependency of people on the grace and favour of those in power. Pope Innocent III, a legal authority and one of the greatest medieval popes, is said to have described the Magna Carta as 'impious, abominable and illicit'. The law is also intensely disliked by populist democrats because it places too much control in the hands of the judiciary, and because it supports individualism at the expense of community goals.

In other words, all law is judge-made (or court-made) law, even though its sources vary and include legislation, precedent, social policy, expert knowledge, ratified international conventions, custom and natural justice. The time has come to recognize more openly that judges do not merely follow or apply the law — they elicit, discover or create it. They do not (or at least should not) do so at whim or for their personal benefit, but must use their perception of social realities to benefit everyone. Social realities and the judicial perception of these realities can, with some difficulty, be shaped by ordinary people and influenced by governments.

Legal justice is characteristically pursued by adversarial or accusatorial proceedings which depend upon the initiative of an individual — a private person, firm or government — to bring an action which must be defended before an impartial judge or jury.[64] The process is characterized by representation and advocacy.

The essence of a legal judgement, now as in earlier times, is that it deliberately simplifies a complicated ethical situation and brings a painful social conflict to a definitive conclusion. The primacy of reason and fact in coming to a judgement under the law must be recognized as a relatively recent innovation. Evidence in earlier times was evaluated according to the prestige and number of persons testifying, and the most reliable and valid evidence was taken to be a confession extracted by torture. Today the rules of evidence are complex and legal logic is still not the natural logic of everyday life. If ordinary logic and facts were all that counted, then open-and-shut cases where guilt is admitted would not have to come before the courts at all — and vast amounts of time and money could be saved.

Development. Laws probably originated initially by reflecting on existing custom and morality, and emerged to compensate for their limitations. Around

450 BC in Rome, the Twelve Tables (so called because they were inscribed on bronze tablets) were the codification of ancient customary law and are the origin of Roman law. Now, as then, it makes more sense to view the law as emerging from what is deeply felt to be right, rather than the reverse. However, Roman law was imposed by many European rulers on their subjects with scant concern for custom or regard for the intense distress and confusion caused.

The possibility of law is based on the human capacity to formalise and generalise and on the existence of writing. These fundamentals allow laws to be promulgated and systematically modified. Printing enables wide dissemination of law reports: so it is a further necessity for full consistency and coherent development of the law in a large country. The formal requirements of consistency and coherence, so essential for law-making and legal judgement, are difficult to meet. This means that, although the law as a whole must take custom and popular feelings into account, the law cannot be left to the populace. Athenian democracy never developed a legal system as such for just this reason.

Two high points in the evolution of law are commonly identified. The first was around 2000BC when Hammurabi gathered together principles and procedures of the law developed still earlier by Sumerian and Semitic judges. His code consisted of 282 sections. It took the legal function away from priests and set up a system of judges under the King. It proscribed blood feuds or private retribution, and covered family, property, commerce, agriculture, and professional responsibilities. The code recognized the mental element in wrongdoing and was severe on carelessness or negligence. It was promulgated for use by courts throughout the empire and enabled Hammurabi to install an efficient government in Babylon with a far-reaching political and intellectual sway.[65]

The second high point was the achievement of Roman law which included the discovery, systematization and analysis of the rules of positive law. Roman law, which originated with the Twelve Tables spread to Asia and Africa and was paramount in Europe for 1000 years. It was progressively applied and developed through interpretations which extended limited and altered it until the system collapsed in the Dark Ages. As already noted, most of the legal systems in Western Europe are still indebted to Roman Law in their structure, form and content.[66]

There is a great deal of implicit wisdom in the law. As with the custom, it is not at all clear why it works and why it fails at times. No one whose concern is justice seeks to alter the law in any fundamental way, because that would be to reject the wisdom of hundreds of

generations and would create destabilizing doubt and uncertainty. Judicial exposition can deal with most cases by arguing from precedent. But circumstances do arise which demand new laws. Legislation is required, for example, when it becomes clear that precedent affirms injustices in the social structure so that judgements embed these in the law.

The massive and perhaps impossible task of introducing a new legal frame of reference occurs occasionally: e.g. when the administration of India was taken over by the English in the 18th century; and when new states are created. The law must now be overhauled in Eastern European countries after decades of totalitarian communist rule. What is required is not simply a new comprehensive set of laws of contract and property (which is difficult enough), but new maxims, new rights, new beliefs and new conventions. For example, the maxim that privacy and secrets are anti-social must go, a workable set of property rights needs to be developed, tenets like 'the collective invariably overrides the individual' must be replaced, and conventions of incorruptibility have to be developed. Such things take many years to solidify in a culture.

Institutionalization. The law may be organized by government — the parliament, the judiciary and the executive — but it is epitomized in the judge. Because politicians are self-interested and subject to populist pressures, tyrannical or inappropriate use of the law is all too likely. Some law will always be made by the legislature, but, once made, the law is best given over to a judiciary dedicated to its preservation and sanctity. Increased control of the legislature is possible by constructing laws that cannot easily be altered by a simple parliamentary majority; or by using two chambers with the upper chamber dedicated to the law and justice, and the lower dedicated to the organization and administration of government.[67] In any case, judges do need to be protected from the wrath of elected politicians, and lifetime appointments are commonly used to provide personal security.

Limitation. The law depends, above all, on the respect accorded to it. So cavalier alterations must be kept to a minimum. To emphasise their importance, laws used to be passed repeatedly. The Magna Carta, for example, was reconfirmed 37 times between the reigns of Henry III and Henry VI. To overcome such repetition and to provide for certainty, consistency and rationality, the doctrine of precedence became central in the law, especially so over the last 300 years. The highest courts in the land, whose decisions must be followed by lower courts, ought to be particularly concerned to be bound by their own previous decisions. Each new issue for judgement must be re-concep-

tualized in the light of existing legal thinking. The principle of precedent, although a bulwark of the law, is a valuing of the past in the present. The law is not expected to foresee future needs or to deal with new circumstances in which existing precedents are inapplicable.

The critical legal studies movement seems to go too far in holding that the law is not distinctly identifiable. But their assertion that the law depends on current conventions is accurate and poses a serious problem.[68] It must be recognized that the law cannot in itself deal with oppression or genuine injustice if these are socially entrenched. The unalterable fact is that the law can neither judge whether the law as it presently stands is just, nor ensure that it is just. Such tasks depend on the use of the morality as a distinct and higher frame of reference.

G"-5³: The Morality

Nature. The morality is a frame of reference whose *function* is to enable judgements of conduct which define what ought to be taken as right now and always. Judgement here is based on an ideal of virtuous conduct in a just society. The morality is an ideal with explicit transcendental qualities. It is grounded in beliefs which are usually described as sacrosanct or sacred, and are explicitly or implicitly part of the religious framework of a society.

From a societal perspective, the importance of the morality in use is that it energizes and directs efforts to recast and improve the law and to reform custom. Conventions and prescriptions which are focused on popular activities and communal pressures should have no part to play in this. Absolutes (L"-7) are the driving force, and unequivocally respected tenets (L"-3) are the foundation. The morality typically underpins and suggests principles of natural justice (G"-2⁶), conceptions of distributive justice (G"-3⁵), and universal standards (G"-4⁴).

Although any morality belongs to a society, it only functions if it is a frame of reference within each person. It reflects all the influences that determine judgements in one's heart of hearts, so it can be used personally or in small moral communities.

Whereas the custom is unavoidably fuzzy and communal and whereas the law must be objective and institutional, a morality must be subjective, symbolic and personal. This morality lies at the core of social being and meets the deep craving of each person for something to believe in and live for within their society.

A society functions most smoothly, when it is permeated by a single moral doctrine. This doctrine is not just another value system but the value system which all value systems in the society should recognize as supreme. The rules within it are the chief moral values defining the morality. Where multiple moral doctrines coexist in a society (as with multiple customs), then any issue may generate a number of different valid yet painfully conflicting judgements about its rights and wrongs.

The orientation of morality is to the future, often the long-term future. This provides the perspective from which it is possible to view the evolution of individual identity and societal identity. The morality is symbolic and aspirational. It does not let itself be compromised by practicalities of the moment. For any person adhering to the morality, it is immediately appropriate and applicable in their own life.

> Pornography and Censorship: The morality of the West would lead to the judgement that producing pornography is wrong because it degrades people and devalues relationships, and that censorship is wrong because it deprives people of autonomy and responsibility for their own choices. The world envisaged by that morality is one in which there is no censorship by the community, and yet no one produces pornography, gains profit from pornography, or is gratified by pornography. At the present time, it seems that we need to decide whether particular forms of pornography should be tolerated or censored. But this is evidently a practical matter, not a doctrinal matter and best suited to the custom or the law. The morality floats above practicalities, drawing people's attention to the fact that the choice involves two wrongs. The morality permits and encourages each person to avoid pornography and to refrain from censorship-like activities, whatever the customary or legal position might be and whatever others might do.   Ex. 9.50

The *advantage* of the morality is that it provides a clarity of vision about right and wrong that is so often absent or obscured in the other frames. Such potential wisdom concerning what is best for everyone and society invites the danger of wanting arrogantly to impose judgements on others. However, it is typically the custom, not the morality, which endorses abusive or terrorizing conduct in pursuit of what is right.

In the past, and still in traditional societies, the morality is that of the local religion and it is incorporated automatically through socialization. If the religion asserts, for example, that suicide or consulting astrologers or masturbation or lending money is wrong, then people judge such conduct to be morally wrong in every case. Judgements using such moral doctrines do not feel like an imposition, but rather the expression of truth.

In societies lacking a unifying religion, there is a profusion of personal doctrines linked to predominant

ethical teachings. These moralities may incorporate similar tenets ('the sanctity of life', 'the dignity of the person'), but they rest on distinctive rights which may not be widely respected or generally accepted. In areas like abortion and euthanasia, differing moral rules have led to bitter condemnation of others. Each camp demands laws to overcome opponents and their beliefs. This is perfectly natural but inappropriate in a society espousing pluralism. The push for deliberate adoption of laws is correct because L."-6 is the fourth internal level of any morality. But a morality demands that people should make these laws *for themselves* to apply within their own moral communities — like the Jews do in regard to the *Halakhah*. Living fully according to the morality demands more than acceptance of the law and few can manage it. It is often said that great men have higher obligations than others. The conduct of sages in Buddhism and Judaism, for example, is judged by more morally demanding rules than that of ordinary people.

Origin. If we ask why a morality is accepted, the reply is that it concretizes the moral imagination which is intrinsic to our existence as human beings. The morality is oriented to an undefined enlightened future in which good people thrive in a just society. The hope for such a future originates and flourishes in the moral imagination. Anyone can reflect on the ethical quality of custom and of existing political and institutional structures, although few seem to do so in any systematic way.

Slavery was originally permitted under the American Constitution. How could those great men who framed the Constitution fail to see that a person should never be treated as a chattel? The subjection of women in Europe is now being questioned in the West. But how did it go unchallenged for so long? The answer must be that people are blind to injustices that are part of custom. To become aware means to abstract oneself fully from the community as it is at present and to enter an imaginary ideal world. In this process, the intractable and insuperable difficulties of realizing such a world, given the present state of things, must be put to one aside.

In a practical and materialist society in which the imagination is not properly valued, ethical judgements about, say, the coexistence of great wealth and great poverty, or the consumption of meat, or the availability of sexual partners for hire do not appear very sensible. Such things appear as uncontrollable phenomena. They are the way things are: custom allows them; the law regulates them. What more need be said? To say more by using the moral imagination requires faith and hope. Whether one should go further and act to alter society

in terms of the morality is a matter of ethical choice. Recall that the cardinal virtues need activation during choice: so prudence may limit action considerably and wisdom may suggest that the harms consequent on imposing moral judgements at a particular historical moment will outweigh moral gains. Prohibition of alcohol in the USA in the 1920's, for example, was a spectacular failure.

Nevertheless, the morality evolves as a coherent entity within which fundamental questions about society can be asked and answered. To repeat: the answer does not itself determine what is to be done, but simply indicates whether what is done is right or wrong, and why (in terms of that framework).

Justice. Using this highest frame of reference, judgement may be passed on any matter and on judgements already made under the law or in accord with custom. Because of its transcendental origin, moral judgement draws primarily on the intuition rather than the intellect or the emotion. Justice under this frame of reference is solomonic and ideal; and the procedure is revelatory and moving rather than inquisitorial or accusatorial. The term, solomonic, comes from the legendary wisdom of King Solomon (cf. Ex. 9.51).

Solomonic Justice: Two women who were prostitutes came to King Solomon in dispute over a baby. Both shared a house and had given birth to babies three days apart. One baby died and an argument arose over whose baby the live one was. The king said: "Fetch me a sword." They brought in a sword and the king gave the order: "Cut the living child in two and give half to one and half to the other." At this the woman who was the mother of the living child, moved with love for her child, protested and said the other could have the child. The other mother said "Let neither of us have it: cut it in two." On this basis, King Solomon gave the first woman the child and announced that she was the true mother. 'When Israel heard the judgement which the king had given, they all stood in awe of him; for they saw that he had the wisdom of God within him to administer justice.'

Ex. 9.51[69]

Solomonic justice is educative and inspiring. It refuses to be bound simply by what is customary or lawful. Custom-based justice is mundane and prudential, and legal justice is narrow and technical, but solomonic justice expresses wisdom and illumination. Plato's philosopher-kings were expected to function in this way. Many parables in Eastern and Western religious folklore reveal a sage or holy man using morality as the frame of reference for judgements, ignoring legality or traditions and penetrating to the essence of the offence and the character of the defendants. Such judgements are seen to be touched by divine grace, or to emerge perfectly as by supernatural

intervention. In other words, solomonic justice emphasizes the fallibility of human institutions and knowledge.

Judgement under morality is dogmatic in nature. So only certain people can make such judgements publicly and be obeyed. A moral system is charismatic and its rules and judgements require articulating by a master, either a sage, saint, prophet or holy person. Charismatic authority is associated with exceptional powers not available to ordinary people. These powers are thought to originate in the divine. (Charisma means favoured by God, or touched by God's grace.) A master is a potential spiritual leader, set slightly apart from ordinary people, tolerant of custom and not enslaved by the law.

The loss of spirituality in society leads to a loss of the importance of masters, a weakening of the sense of identity in society, and an increasing struggle to maintain unity in the presence of diversity.

Development. The development of morality as a frame of reference is inseparable from the evolution of consciousness and the pursuit of the good. Until very recently, this was inconceivable without an awareness of the divine. As repeatedly noted (especially in L'-VII: Ch. 7), the sense of the sacred and divine is part of the structure of human consciousness and society. Although modern society appears to be characterised by de-sacralisation (called secularisation), this can be interpreted as a new and more self-aware phase of spiritual and ethical growth.

For any morality to be widely adopted, it must generate hope, faith and trust. Because the morality must embody hope for a better future, a new version often emerges when society is in despair. The morality then offers a new way to be and to live. The creation and introduction of a genuinely new morality reflects the beginning of a new era in any society. Because it is not tied to practicalities it provides scope for development and diversity in its expression. The morality becomes attenuated or modified in practice by the constraints of the law and the custom (cf. Ex. 9.52).

The Evolution of Buddhism: When Buddha visited his disciples after enlightenment he said to them: 'I am the Saint, the Perfect One, the Fully Enlightened. Give ear, O monks: the Way is found. Hear me.' His gospel of Dhamma was a morality for ordinary men and women. The Four Noble Truths stated the basic tenets that had to be strictly held: that all life is suffering, that suffering derives from desire, that suffering ceases if desire is extirpated, and that desire can be extirpated by following the eight-fold path. The eight-fold path stated a number of self-evidently virtuous absolutes (see L'-VII: Ch. 7). The dogmatically affirmed maxims were prohibitions against killing, stealing, sexual impropriety, lying, and alcohol

use. The morality became widely available when it was deliberately chosen by converted kings who introduced laws making Buddhism the official religion. Buddhism has undergone many schisms, but two main forms emerged after a few centuries: the Theravada form of Hinayana Buddhism, which is the strictly orthodox Doctrine of the Elders, and Mahayana Buddhism which advocated accommodation to local practices and beliefs. However, even Theravada Buddhism contains ideas and beliefs that did not originate with Buddha. Furthermore, it is evident that Burmese, Thai and Sinhalese versions of Theravada are distinct doctrinal entities.   Ex. 9.52

Institutionalization. The roots of any morality are invariably found to lie in organized religions or quasi-religious philosophies like humanism. Although any new morality contains long-standing rules, the message has a revolutionary force because of the discrepancy between moral values and the way people actually live. The tenets grounding the morality commonly foster belief in the leaders of the originating religion. Whether or not such persons have charismatic authority is determined by followers and disciples who respond to the message. The main problem for any society is to keep alive the spirit of the morality and the sense of charisma generated by the spiritual founder.

To deal with this problem, societies have often used the monarch to represent their morality. In the ancient Egyptian civilization, the Pharaoh was the God-King, and the notion of the divinity of the monarch has persisted in many places through the centuries. Emperor Hirohito of Japan only acknowledged publicly that he was not a god under pressure after his country's defeat in World War II. In many countries, like England and Japan, the monarch remains head of the established Church. In some cases, as in Tibet's Dalai Lama, the same person is both spiritual and political leader.

The monarch or spiritual leader rules by the grace of God and is invested with charisma. The unique position of the monarch above the law is encapsulated by the notion of divine right or, in modern times, the royal prerogative which says in essence that 'the King can do no wrong'.

A spiritual head of state is needed to epitomize the morality for all in society. This means remaining above practicalities, politics and legal formalities. Such a role makes for a powerful force for unity within a society, one not provided by many modern elected heads of state who become **politically** embroiled.

Closure. The *limitation* of morality is to be found in its impracticality in an all too imperfect world. Correspondingly, the danger of a morality is its capacity to activate extremist utopianism. However, what seems radical and impractical for the whole community may

be self-evident and possible for enlightened small groups. Their commitment to living their morality encourages or foreshadows change in the wider community: witness the role of the Quakers in slavery (Ex. 9.42).

It is evident that the morality must be the ultimate frame of reference for judging conduct in society. Logically there is no higher pentad. So this grouping is complete.

REVIEWING THE FRAMES OF REFERENCE

The three great frames of reference invoked as authorities during ethical debate have now been defined and elaborated: the custom, the law, the morality. They can be seen to parallel Weber's three bases for legitimate authority: traditional, rational, and charismatic.[70] Weber saw the charismatic as the source of human freedom and creativity, and the other authorities as attempts to establish and routinize the charismatic contribution. He emphasized the anti-economic nature of the charismatic leader, and we have noted that morality naturally fails to deal with the economic and other practical consequences of judgements made in its terms.

The frames of reference reflect three great systems or orders of authority in society. The custom concerns the activity order and focuses on performance and practice. This is the realm of the people who are the source of economic and physical power. The law concerns the institutional order and focuses on the structuring or channelling of activities. This is the realm of government which is the source of political or coercive power. The morality concerns the symbolic order and focuses on the meaning of activities, especially their rightness and goodness. This is the realm of the monarch or other spiritual leader and is the source of what might be called integrative or humanistic power.

Practical Implications. There seems to be confusion about the different spheres of influence of each of the three frames of reference, and their distinctive nature and importance. Although any matter may be judged using any of the three frames of references, the maxim to 'render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and render unto God that which is God's' holds. So we may speak of a customary right, a legal right, and a moral right; or of a customary wage, a legal wage, and a fair wage. Correspondingly a customary duty may be judged illegal or immoral; a legal duty may be judged immoral or alien; and a moral duty may be judged illegal or alien. Where something is not established in custom or law but is deemed to be right or fair, then it

is commonly qualified as moral, just or natural e.g. a moral obligation, a just cause, a natural right.

Matters of social fact, like prices, are first of all based on custom. If doubt exists as to the propriety of a social fact, courts of justice may decide or legislation may be introduced and a legal fact is then created.

A Fair Price: Modern complaints about 'the immorality of exorbitant profits' derive from the moral reprehensibility of greed and the notion of a fair price. However, there are three distinct ways in which the price of goods or services may be set and judged as fair. The market price is a judgement which is reached under custom. It is determined spontaneously through a process of competition. The fixed price is a judgement which derives from the law, and aims to regulate production and costs to balance the benefit for the producers with the needs of the wider community. Such price control is developed by calculation and enforced by officials. The just price is a judgement of fairness which derives from application of morality. This price, defunct since medieval times, determines what is sinful. Its nature is disputed. One view is that it was determined by whether or not it would maintain the craftsmen in their current social status. Another view is that it dealt with imperfect competition and other dark age inefficiencies and aimed to compensate sellers for extra unavoidable costs. Note that a price developed by preventing competition or by deception is judged unfair within all three frameworks.   Ex. 9.53

The embedding of justice in society within the frames of reference has been described in detail. Because the term, justice, is used in so many ways, a summary overview is provided in Table 9.3.

The power of the three frames of reference and the passions they engender have sometimes been forgotten when distinct cultural groups must be assimilated within a single society. Respect for the law has to be insisted upon, but this is difficult when the endorsement of custom and morality cannot be obtained. The result is that there will be profound disagreements between groups about what is right. The law will be defied and attempts will be made by minority cultures to modify the law. The Salman Rushdie case in the UK showed all these phenomena: incitement and threats to murder, which are against the law, were allowed by custom because of their religious origins; and attempts followed to make the law of blasphemy apply to all religions (not just Christianity) as a matter of fairness.

Linking the Frames. Custom maintains that 'what is' is what is good. Morality promotes what is good in theory, which may differ greatly from what is customary. The law protects the individual from particular conceptions of what is good. Some integration of these three frames of reference is possible, based on the extensive overlapping of levels. The law has a mediating

Table 9.3: Uses of the term 'Justice'. Justice means broadly 'to each his due'

Term	Classification and Formula	Meaning
Justice	= ultimate value (L-7) linked to the ethical frames of reference (G"-5)	= a goal of all humanity intrinsic to social life
Justice	= the virtue at L-6	= fairness in a person
Natural justice	= the principle at G"-2[6]	= fair play in decisions
Distributive justice	= the position at G*-3[5]	= fair shares of social goods
Substantive justice	= requirement of custom: G*-5[1]	= fair acceptable resolution
Formal justice	= nature of the law: G*-5[2]	= fair judging procedure
Solomonic justice	= use of the morality: G*-5[3]	= the right judgement
Divine justice	= an occurrence beyond rules	= the right end result

role in so far as it is expected to adapt to custom, and also a custodial role in so far as it aims to shackle custom to morality.

The custom and the law share four levels of rule, so they are likely to affect each other greatly. At times, accepted conventions (within the custom and the law) may over-ride existing laws (only in the law) e.g. when French jurors acquit a husband charged with murder of his wife's lover caught in the act; or when an English judge insists smacking a child is 'traditional wisdom' despite the law. The law may need to deal definitively with conflicts within custom, or to consolidate ethical gains emerging in custom.

The morality and the law are also linked. Morality presses for changes in laws so that its judgements can be widely applied, as was evident in the case of slavery (Ex.s 9.42, 9.48). The custom and the morality show the greatest potential for conflicting and competing tenets, rights and maxims. If the morality is to gain hold, its tenets may need modification in the light of tenets dogmatically affirmed by custom. This characterizes the spread of all religions (cf. the development and adaptation of Buddhism in Asia: Ex. 9.52).

The morality and the custom overlap in three levels (maxims, rights, tenets) and may directly influence each other through popular movements. These social endeavours are based on ideals and ideologies built around these sorts of rules. In this way the morality may permeate the custom, leaving the law to catch up.

Sometimes it becomes difficult to disentangle what belongs to morality and what to law or custom. The controversy over the ordination of women in the

Christian church is an expression of this problem. If laws in society open up roles for women, then it is natural that any institution resisting this is challenged. If Christian morality indicates that it is wrong for women to be ordained, then the Church is unwise to deviate from this in the absence of a new prophet — whatever the law. If custom rather than morality determines the ordination of women, then the Church should consider altering customary tenets and rights to accord with its members feelings of justice.

Academics have sometimes tried to reduce the law to custom. The Volksgeist (folk spirit) was once held as the only legitimate source of law. But this theory seems flawed. The law regularly rules on new social and commercial matters where there is no habitual practice or popular expectation; and jurists regularly look to foreign law and legal necessity when reaching decisions. Whereas all understand the custom, even intelligent lay people cannot understand the law. The opposite trend, with both academic and popular support, has been to view the law as an expression of morality. The notion that the law is based on innate notions of justice or divine will appeals to a religious community. In earliest times, the administration of justice was indeed a priestly function carried out on behalf of the city-state's God; and modern Muslim extremists, who shout that they want the rule of God over people not the rule of people over people, manifest the same view. The present analysis proposes that the law is something *sui generis*, even though it draws heavily on both custom and morality.

The present analysis indicates that all three frames are essential and must be viewed independently if

society is to work satisfactorily. The neglect of traditions and the past is no less a defect than a failure to proclaim moral values and to maintain the possibility of a better future. The law, in its own way, is as noble as the morality: but it is no substitute for morality. Nor is morality capable of becoming law or custom. The attempt to fuse these distinct frames is dangerous. It has led, for example, to the present perversions and misunderstandings of Islam. The core doctrine of peace, tolerance and compassion is being presented as a justification for customs and laws of the most intolerant and violent sort.

Transition. Definitive frames of reference are now established and authoritative judgement about what conduct is right is at last possible. Although such judgements do tend to activate obedience, they exist principally to enable and enhance freedom. So the disposition to obey is constrained and limited. However,

the social requirement for obedience still remains

The ultimate subordination and elevation of both obligation and freedom have not yet been considered. The six- and seven-level groupings provide the potential for all that has been described so far to be energized and integrated within society. This depends on the interaction of will (freedom) and obedience (restraint).

The first requirement is that judgements using the frames of reference should be obeyed in practice. So self-restraint once again comes to the fore. If obedience is not forthcoming, then the ethical authority of custom, law or morality is absent or meaningless. The frame will then fail to protect society from violence and disintegration generated by unlicensed freedom.

Obedience to obligations can be released safely and ensured authoritatively by a yet more comprehensive rule-based authority with an additional level dedicated specifically to this task: the categorical imperative.

Properties of the three types of definitive frame of reference in society.
Ethical frames of reference, which are needed to judge whether conduct is just, are pentadic authorities formed by conjoining
five adjacent types of rule. See text for details and explanation.

Pentad No. (Levels)	1 (L"s 1-5)	2 (L"s 2-6)	3 (L"s 3-7)
Types of Frame of Reference	The Custom	The Law	The Morality
Function	To enable judgements of conduct which define what has always been taken as right.	To enable judgements of conduct which define what must now be taken as right.	To enable judgements of conduct which define what ought to be taken as right.
Time Perspective	Past	Present	Future
Social Reality	Practical & communal	Institutional & societal	Aspirational & theoretical
Generator	Popular sympathies & emotions	Legal reasoning & the intellect	Moral imagination & intuitions
Primal Authority	Community as a whole	The law itself	Ethical teaching/ultimate values
Justice	Substantive	Formal	Solomonic
Judging Body	Adjudicator(s) forming a Tribunal	Judge(s) in a Court of Justice	Sage in a sacralized setting
Judicial Style	Pragmatic & prudential	Procedural & technical	Dogmatic & educational
Proceedings	Inquisitorial – investigative	Accusatorial – adversarial	Revelatory – experiential
Methods	Negotiation & mediation	Representation & advocacy	Inspiration & illumination
Focus	Situational & fuzzy	Objective & comprehensive	Subjective & symbolic
Control	Outer & informal	Outer & formal	Inner/outer & informal/formal
Authority	Traditional	Rational	Religious
Freedom	Restricts	Protects	Defines
Type of Power	Economic & physical	Political & coercive	Integrative & humanistic
Social Form	The People	The Government	The Official Religion
Societal Epitome	Chief/Prime Minister	Judge	Spiritual Head of State/Monarch
Main Advantage	Practicality	Values individuals	Provides hope for a better world
Main Limitation	Ignores the individual	Bound by precedent	Impracticality
Main Danger	Mob law or blood feuds	Expensive, lengthy, incomprehensible cases	Extremist utopianism

G"-6: CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES

Nature. So far we have repeatedly used words like 'should' and 'must' to describe the handling of rules and ethical authorities without worrying too much about how people let themselves be persuaded to introduce and accept obligations. The source of this pressure for obedience can be readily identified in an ethical predisposition associated particularly with laws and the governance of society (cf. Master-Figure 16). If society is to function ethically, then this disposition must be harnessed, and those who seek to use it must be regulated.

Obedience is a powerful force. The famous experiments of Milgram revealed that authority, even informal authority, releases obedience irrespective of the moral or legal significance of the instructions.[71] The person obeying authority does not see himself as responsible but rather as an agent executing the wishes of another. This is a dangerous state of affairs. Society needs the release of obedience to be carefully controlled and legitimately regulated. So obedience must be primarily owed to vital rules and authorities based in rules and never to individuals who assume or are assigned the mantle of authority.

The definitive frames of reference, for example, which are the systems sustaining ethical conduct must be energized and legitimated by something beyond them, something which is itself not a matter of judgement but which can be self-imposed and imposed on others in a way that brooks no objection.

A rule with such force may be called an ethical **imperative**. We know it biblically in the form of commandments like: 'Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother'; and 'Thou shalt not commit adultery'; or everyday exhortations like 'Be kind' and 'Don't be envious'. The imperative is categorical and tolerates no opposition. It assumes and seeks to compel obedience without more ado. The authority here is supreme, possibly divine. Rejection of such imperatives (or 'forgetting' them or thinking they do not apply) puts us beyond the pale: this is why Milgram's findings, replicated many times, are so horrifying.

Obedience to ideas, which is what rules are after all, does not seem to be as natural to most as obedience to another person. The way we are socialized in our lengthy childhood probably determines this tendency. But people come and go and people may change their minds under pressure. Categorical imperatives are a far more satisfactory controller. The *function* of an imperative, it seems, is to ensure that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time. Utterly impersonal, they not only regulate our obedi-

ence but also ensure that ethical concerns are coherently handled.

Imperatives are generated by adding a sixth adjacent level to form a hexadic grouping. The result is two heavily overlapping hexads which correspond to two types of ethical imperative.[72] The sixth level enables the imperative to be *legitimately imposed*. All previous qualities are still needed: so imperatives must undergo *virtuous evolution*, gain *deliberate adoption*, receive *dogmatic affirmation*, be applied in a *socially acceptable* way, and be accorded *unequivocal respect* — in each case via rules at the respective level.

Types. The two forms of imperative required by society are: the *pragmatic imperative* (G"-6¹) and the *moral imperative* (G"-6²). The function in each case is to harness obedience and regulate the activation of obedience. Each imperative links into a distinct type of obedience and draws on a different source of legitimacy. Ascending, the groups reflect a shift *from* temporal obedience with legitimation by governments and their citizens on legal, communal and pragmatic grounds *to* spiritual obedience with legitimation by an indefinable transcendental source recognized as deeply personal and religious in nature. The hexads are represented diagrammatically in Figure 9.6.

Imperatives are expressed in deceptively simple language. What exactly does 'be honest' or 'be gentle' entail? The present analysis suggests that the way forward is to consider who or what the imperative seeks to regulate. Is the concern with regulating the rulers of society and the operation of governing institutions? Or is it with regulating people, equals who see themselves as part of a moral community?

The two types of imperative as found in all societies can now be defined and described with an easy example.

G"-6¹: Pragmatic Imperatives

Nature. Pragmatic imperatives are required to ensure control of society in mundane terms. Their *function* is to regulate demands for obedience generated by the rulers of society. There are two types of ruler in any society: the government and the citizenry (cf. G-6: Ch. 12), and both experience the pressure of pragmatic imperatives.

This imperative seeks to ensure that rulers or their representatives do introduce those rules necessary for the running of society — but only in accord with the imperative. If introduced legitimately, the imperative is a justification for enforcing obedience in practice. The pragmatic imperative encompasses both the custom and the law, the frames of most concern to rulers.

Figure 9.6: The hexadic grouping forming categorical imperatives.

Two types of ethical imperative which must be legitimately imposed if obedience is to be regulated.

Most societies, while recognizing the precious nature of human life, have regarded things like ritual suicide, infanticide, euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, and killing enemies during warfare as necessary for their well-being. So the killing of people is a good example: the pragmatic imperative being 'kill when necessary'. It is easy to see that an imperative like this imposes itself on any citizenry and government whatever society's underlying religion or morality and however opposed any particular member of society may be to killing humans. The rulers of society are able to apply and enforce the imperative through its constituent rules.

Composition. The 'kill when necessary' imperative requires that *laws* regulating killing should be legitimated e.g. by passage through parliament. Laws are the source of imposition, but they must be passed in the spirit of the imperative. This spirit is made clear by other types of rule. *Maxims* must evolve indicating what killing is necessary (i.e. good) and what killing is unnecessary (i.e. bad). This enables war or legally controlled euthanasia, say, to be viewed as virtuous. *Rights and duties* in regard to necessary killing need to be deliberately chosen e.g. who can kill and how must be determined by custom as well as in law. *Tenets* endorsing the necessity of killing must be dogmatically affirmed. *Conventions* about killing, e.g. when police deal with armed criminals, should be applied acceptably; and *prescriptions*, say about the mechanics of capital punishment, should be unequivocally respected.

In other words, the pragmatic imperative 'to kill when necessary' is only effectively integrated and obeyed in society if it is dealt with at all six levels. These rules, ultimately sanctioned by laws, must become part of everyone's life whether they like them or not. Precisely what rules meet that imperative is a matter for the government and for all citizens.

Legislators might seem to have the supreme authority. However, in a free society, legislators should respond to the views of the citizenry in regard to the over-riding pragmatic imperatives; and citizens must accept the responsibilities which accompany this system. The alternative is a tyrannical and absolutist regime which can make laws at whim i.e. regardless of pragmatic imperatives, procedure, lower level rules and primal authorities.

Limitation. But what ensures that people take government and pragmatic imperatives seriously? The personal and communal responsibility for government and much else needs to be imposed and regulated by a higher moral imperative.

$G''\text{-}6^2$: Moral Imperatives

Nature. Moral imperatives are required to ensure control of society in spiritual terms. Their *function* is to regulate demands for obedience generated by each person on behalf of their community, or by a group on behalf of each member. The moral imperative is personal and religious in nature, and the community is

experienced as a moral community rather than as a political society. Implicit within any moral imperative is obedience to a higher spiritual or transpersonal authority, whether labelled Reason, God, or the True Self.

This imperative seeks to regulate people as private individuals rather than as citizens. It constrains them to press for the introduction of rules which are inherently good and right. In accord with their constituent levels, moral imperatives are more attuned to morality and law than to custom.

Composition. Killing is again a good example: here the moral imperative might be 'do not murder'. Its legitimacy within society typically derives from a quasi-religious *absolute* not to harm others or not to murder as found in holy scriptures. *Laws* defining and controlling killing must be evolved virtuously. The law given by God to Moses on Mt Sinai included numerous rules about what killing was to be considered as murder, what was to be excluded. These are obviously well-meaning and based on the way of life at the time.[73] Progressive religionaries slowly modified these over the centuries since. *Maxims* which relate to murder should be chosen deliberately. The maxim to forgive others, for example, can be viewed as part of the imperative because it prevents the escalation of hostility and violence which often **precedes** murder. *Rights and duties* of all in relation to murder, like the right to self-defence with a duty to use minimal force, should be affirmed dogmatically. *Tenets* in the imperative need to be applied in an acceptable way, which respects society and its culture e.g. life is sacred. Finally, *conventions* are need to ensure that any killing is not murder because it is carried out with the right attitude e.g. a depersonalization of those involved in killing. Such conventions should be unequivocally respected. Only if rules of all the above sorts prevail, will murder be distinguishable from lawful killing in both theory and practice.

Behind the moral imperative stands the compelling power of the imagination and cosmic forces, and the ineradicable idea of divine retribution. In the bible, there are numerous accounts of God punishing wrong doers, even destroying entire cities for their wickedness. Jesus, too, was not averse to threats like the withdrawal of the Kingdom of God.[74] In the Hindu view, the iron law of karma is the enforcer. The modern New Age version is that the nature of reality is such that those who are wicked and unjust sow the seeds of their own destruction.

Closure. If the nature of things (God) stands implicitly or explicitly behind the moral imperative, there can be no higher, fairer or more impersonal determinant of obedience.

Applying Imperatives

Proper Interaction. If ethical living is to thrive in society, there needs to be a pre-eminence of the moral imperative and an adaptation to it by the pragmatic imperative. Although the seven levels of rule have very different natures, the underlying hierarchy has repeatedly revealed that rules (and their derivatives) at a higher level take precedence over and legitimate those at a lower level; and that rules at a lower level must adapt to and follow those at a higher level. It is evident that absolutes have no higher type of rule to adapt to or follow, and prescriptions have no lower type of rule to legitimate, while all other types of rule both legitimate and follow.

For maximum impact, the two imperatives should interlock and reinforce each other. In our example, the moral imperative not to murder must be harmonized with the pragmatic imperative to kill when necessary. Without the operation of the moral imperative, the pragmatic imperative to kill when necessary could lead to indiscriminate expedient killing, which would endanger everyone in the community. Without the operation of the pragmatic imperative, the moral imperative to prohibit murder would tend to expand to include all killing and a society would be at the mercy of extremist and anti-social forces within and aggressors from without. This would certainly be harmful. With the two imperatives in harness, society can operate ethically in the world as it is.

People feel they have little choice but to face social reality and to adhere in the main to pragmatic imperatives. However, they generally experience themselves as having the choice about whether or not they follow the moral imperative. This choice is evident when we consider the two different approaches to the same type of rule where the two types of imperative overlap i.e. from L"-2 to L"-6. Rules at these levels are part of both imperatives but our relation to them in everyday living is handled differently according to the perspective provided by each imperative. It is worth examining each level in turn using the standard qualifying phrases (as summarized and laid out in Master-Table 20).

Certain *laws* must be virtuously evolved by society (as part of the moral imperative) and legitimately introduced into society (as part of the pragmatic imperative). The necessity for virtue was recognized by early legal thinkers who captured it in the notion that: *an unjust law is not a law.* Nevertheless there is no simple social mechanism to specify that a law is unjust. Each community must decide for themselves using the frames of reference. So long as the law is passed legitimately, the pragmatic imperative demands that even unjust laws need to be obeyed. The necessity for

imposition is captured by legal positivists with their notion that all law is, can be, and ought to be the invention or construction of legislators.[75] In the general public too, there is an endless battle between those who opt for strict obedience to laws ('conservatives') and others who see the need to resist unjust laws ('progressives'). This conflict represents a failure by each side to recognize the dual quality of laws and the distinction between what is introduced by government and what well-meaning people want the government to introduce.

Certain *maxims* must be deliberately adopted (as part of the moral imperative) and virtuously evolved (as part of the pragmatic imperative). In other words, the moral imperative proposes that once a rule of proper social functioning is perceived as right it should be taken up directly and used to govern conduct. This is why reformers often seek immediate change. For example, one might argue that the moral imperative requires that the torture of prisoners should be stopped immediately. But, in certain countries, this would go against cultural beliefs and traditional habits. The pragmatic imperative, by contrast, suggests that piecemeal evolutionary change with a slow lifting of repression and maltreatment is all that is sensible and indeed possible.

Certain *rights and duties* must be dogmatically affirmed (as part of the moral imperative), and be deliberately adopted (as part of the pragmatic imperative). In other words, proclaiming and asserting deeply held views of proper rights and duties is a moral obligation on each person, whereas the actual assignation of rights and duties is what counts socially. This means that even if unfair arrangements are pragmatically maintained, protest is appropriate. Many whites in South Africa viewed apartheid as serving both moral and pragmatic imperatives and have been resisting its dismantling. Others, however, pragmatically adopted apartheid-based rights and duties without affirming their justice or opposing their removal.

Certain *tenets* must be applied in an acceptable way (as part of the moral imperative), and be dogmatically affirmed (as part of the pragmatic imperative). In other words, the pragmatic imperative simply calls for certain beliefs to be proclaimed and asserted without proof and says little about their use. By contrast, the moral imperative demands that the way tenets are applied must be acceptable to the person and the social group. For example, tenets about minimizing suffering have been used by animal rights activists to justify terrorizing scientists and indiscriminate bombing in the UK and elsewhere. Such activity does not apply the tenets acceptably: terror and violence violate categorical moral and pragmatic imperatives. By contrast, some

academics have obeyed both imperatives in the right way. They have been equally dogmatic about the need for an end to 'species-ism', but they have applied this tenet acceptably by developing guidelines for using animals in medical research.

Certain *conventions* must be unequivocally respected (as part of the moral imperative), and applied in an acceptable way (as part of the pragmatic imperative). When Arjuna asks Krishna how he could possibly justify the slaughter of his family and friends in the great war that is the culmination of the *Mahabharata*, Krishna answers by saying that Arjuna must dissociate himself from the fruits of his action. Krishna insists that Arjuna is morally required to fight in the present circumstances because the conventions of his caste and culture unequivocally call for it.[76] Pragmatically, however, conventions must be applied in an acceptable way. The convention to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction in war, for example, may be put to one side if the opponent does not do likewise. Otherwise, soldiers would be demoralized and might rebel or refuse to fight.

The very highest and very lowest levels of rule have always been distinctive. As top of the moral imperative, absolutes (L"-7) stand sublime, self-sufficient, applicable universally, and legitimating all from outside the realm of temporal authority or consequences — as deontologists have always claimed. Let justice prevail even if the world perish (*fiat justitia pereat mundus*). At the base of the pragmatic imperative, the prescriptions (L"-1) specifying actions are unambiguous and practical.

Practical Implications. Imperatives define the ultimate sources of authority, legitimate imposition and obedience. Purposes can be personalized, that is to say personally created and owned and realized. But imperatives are essentially impersonal. The wide dispersion of power and responsibility in the requisite design and control of social life has been a feature of the analysis so far. But all these authorities, even government itself, must be regulated by imperatives.

Imperatives, which depend on rules of six types operating in concert, emerge as the prime regulators of social life. The sad fact is that societies are not ruled well. The reasons must in part stem from a widespread tendency for people to ignore the moral imperative and fail to discipline themselves; and in part from the tendency for citizenries to neglect the pragmatic imperative and fail or be unable to discipline their governments.

Recognition of the need for moral imperatives often sits uneasily alongside the modern scientific and secular

ethic with its belief in scepticism and with its deep distrust of certainties. Recognition of the need for pragmatic imperatives often sits uneasily alongside the certainties of religious dogmatists.

The moral imperative being about imposing absolutes tempts people to articulate rules at lower levels as if they were absolutes and to imagine that they should be imposed (rather than evolved or self-chosen). The tenet that life is sacred, for example, is perfectly compatible with both the moral imperative proscribing murder and the pragmatic imperative requiring necessary killing. Elevating it to an absolute would make the pragmatic imperative untenable. In other words, many perfectly acceptable dogmatic tenets or useful and virtuous maxims make for intolerable and socially unworkable absolutes.

A tension exists between the two imperatives, with each having a claim to primacy. Each imperative has had its own heavyweight intellectual defenders. Hegel, for example, believed in freedom and the spirit but defended the pragmatic imperative. He argued the case for obedience to those kinship, economic, political and other social relations in which the individual finds himself. Except when society is collapsing, the man who sets up the judgement of his own consciousness against the demands made by law and the traditions of society is to be condemned. Legal positivists argue more simply and pragmatically that agreement about what is legal is easier to reach than agreement about what is right.

By contrast, the supremacy of the moral imperative was defended by Confucius, a teacher usually associated with respect for social authority. He argued that society often contains inferior men and weak rulers, and counselled that the superior man, the sage, must be primarily concerned with what is virtuous and just. While mores must not be opposed, judgements about them must be made; and withdrawal from society rather than participation is sometimes required. Confucius went so far as to think that society might be ruled principally by virtue and example rather than with laws.

Most modern politicians, while concerned to seem pure and on the side of justice, are wary of entering moral minefields. They usually find it easier to leave moral disputation and guidance to others, especially the churches. Churches do defend moral imperatives and argue that what is right and just must not be compromised. The result can be a drift towards what might be called ecclesiastical absolutism.

The Roman Catholic Church: Societies need an order based on absolutes, and the significance of the Roman Catholic Church is profound in regard to this need. The Catholic Church tries to exist as a separate moral community. Its proclamations are presented as absolute and infallible. The Church is nowhere established in the sense of being identified with the state, or being part of the state. Identification with the state politicizes the church — witness Islam in certain Muslim countries. Being part of the state compromises the church — witness the Church of England in the United Kingdom. Instead, the Catholic Church sets itself up as an independent countervailing force. It has always negotiated on equal terms with governments, the results being embodied in concordats between a State and the Pope as head of the church. These concordats reflect the perennial conflict between spiritual and temporal powers.   Ex. 9.54[77]

To strengthen control over social behaviour, attempts are regularly made to claim that the pragmatic and moral imperatives are one. The attempt to make secular law equivalent to theological law seems to exemplify this. The consequence is to centralize cultural and societal authority and responsibility and to suppress political activity and individual responsibility.

Moral and pragmatic imperatives can be obeyed with minimal coercion when they support each other. Stresses develop when they do not. Attempted enforcement of laws against people's will then follows, ultimately using the instrument of terror. Organized religions have regularly used terror (eternal damnation, the fires of hell &c) and violence (wars, persecution, genocide &c) to instil doctrines which run counter to communal requirements. Although churches have declined in secular influence, the use of terror and violence on behalf of absolutes has not. The battles over abortion and euthanasia in the USA have been compared, probably correctly, with the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants in the 17th century.[78]

Transition. Imperatives provide the necessary legitimate authority to enforce obedience in a community and to ensure that demands for obedience are coherent and not abused. In this way, they permit the rules of ethical living to become integrated and established within society. But problems still remain. Above all there is the tension between spiritual-personal and temporal-political requirements. This potential disharmony between the imperatives can only be overcome by linking absolutes and prescriptions, the levels at which there is a failure of identity between the two hexads.

There is also the difficulty with the notion of obedience. Obedience has a passive quality and seems to imply that ethical life can be arranged irrespective of the person's will. In fact, obedience both activates the will (to obey) and constrains the will (to do whatever one wants). Because imperatives are imposed by one-

self or others or God, they are experienced as a disturbance of autonomy, whereas we intuitively feel that ethical conduct ought to be a fully active, wholehearted and autonomous concern. These various difficulties are finally resolved by the authority defined in the last grouping, the heptad, to which we now turn.

Master-Table 26

Properties of the two types of categorical imperative in society.
Ethical imperatives, which are needed to regulate obedience, are hexadic authorities formed by conjoining six adjacent types of rule. See text for details and explanation.

Hexad No. (Levels)	1 (L"s 1-6)	2 (L"s 2-7)
Types of Imperative *Example*	Pragmatic Imperative e.g. kill when necessary!	Moral Imperative e.g. do not murder!
Function	To regulate demands for obedience generated by the rulers of a society.	To regulate demands for obedience generated by a person as part of a group.
Object of Control	Rulers, the citizenry and the government, and through them, society.	Each person and through them the community and thence the rulers.
Concern	Maintaining a political society.	Maintaining a moral community.
Legitimation	By laws: as formally introduced within a recognized legislature.	By absolutes: commandments defined in holy scriptures or in imaginative awareness.
Source of Authority	Human beings have a practical need for rules given their temporality and frailty.	Human beings have a spiritual and religious need for rules.
Ideological Base	Legal positivism.	Ecclesiastical absolutism.
Danger	Unprincipled laws and activities by governments.	Elevating rules better categorized as lower level types to the status of laws or absolutes.

G''-7: A SUSTAINABLE ORDER

We have considered what rules and authorities must be obeyed. We have not yet considered what rules and authority are positively willed by members individually and collectively. This totality corresponds to the ethical order of a society. The order of society is the final and over-arching authority to which everyone must accommodate. All the various ethical authorities so far considered are found within any society and help to constitute and sustain its order. But the order itself must be recognized as an authority which is a distinct totality and unity with its own quality and properties. The order can be defined by the single heptad, as diagrammatically represented in Fig. 9.7.

G''-7¹: The Ethical Order

Nature. An order which is sustainable is the ultimate challenge of ethical design. Societies have manifested a variety of orders whose distinguishing features invite use in labelling. An order, such as that found in Tibet prior to the Chinese invasion might be described as apolitical and compassionate; an authoritarian-ecclesiastical order exists in Iran at the time of writing; a liberal-democratic-capitalist order exists in most Western nations. But all Western nations are not identical and so these epithets conceal more than they reveal. The particular rules within the order are what give it substance.

For an order to be sustainable, its rules must possess a degree of justice which encourages people to organize

their conduct and support their institutions in its light. It is a tautology to say that only sustainable orders persist, but necessary given the arrogance of social engineers. Utopian communities self-consciously designed to embody justice, for example, have rarely been sustained longer than the generation which created them.[79]

In reality, a successful order emerges in a process of trial and error, and reflects an interaction between human frailty, lived experience and thoughtful reflection in a complex socio-physical environment.[80]

The *function* of an ethical order is to ensure that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems to be right. The order depends on the community, its government and each person. People are expected to embrace the order irrespective of their concrete situation and make its rules their moral values. The order defines constraints which make ethical living possible while attempting to bring these constraints within the sphere of personal autonomy. The absolutes provide for maximum freedom – but allow no escape from an awareness of right and wrong. The prescriptions provide for maximum constraint – – although, paradoxically, there is a sense of freedom in strictly adhering to socially endorsed rituals.

The social order is a term which can misleadingly refer to both the concrete and abstract states of affairs in a society. These must be distinguished. The *concrete social order* is an order of actions and actualities, a factual state of affairs no less. The *abstract social order*, the

Figure 9.7: The heptadic grouping forming a sustainable order.
One type of ethical order which must be freely embraced if will is to be engendered

L''-7 Absolutes		
L''-6 Laws		
L''-5 Maxims		
L''-4 Rights	G''-7¹	
L''-3 Tenets		
L''-2 Conventions		
L''-1 Prescriptions		← The Ethical Order

ethical order, is a unified and unifying set of rules, a theoretical state of affairs, a web of expectations, predispositions and obligations, which underpin and sustain the concrete order. The concrete order is made up of actual people, families, communities, firms, associations, public institutions, political parties and so on with different degrees of wealth and influence, all interacting using a net of common values and distinctive purposes. The abstract order is made up of rules, principles, positions, standards, frames of reference and imperatives, many of which operate without being articulated.

The abstract order is not designed to deal with particular people or situations and it cannot determine the specifics of the concrete order. It is rather the essential stabilizing and governing context for an ethically controlled society. In such a society, the pursuit of purposes by particular individuals in particular situations leads to unpredictable results.

The ethical order makes freedom, in the sense of the pursuit of purposes, possible. It is precisely because rules do not specify results in actual situations that people can agree on them and can be determined to sustain them. If expedience and personal gain is put in the balance with rules of the order, then the former, being immediately and concretely beneficial, always win. If this persists and is widespread, the order is eventually destroyed — and so is the society. Rules are always beneficial only in the long run and on the whole.

Legitimism. In this final perspective, all seven levels are indivisible and form one single group. Such a group is intuitively and logically evident. The seven levels were, after all, derived from a single approach to ethical choice — legitimism (L'-6); and rules at each level are implied by and imply rules at the other levels.

The tension identified in the legitimist approach lay between the need and obligation to foster personal autonomy and the need and obligation to serve the common good (cf. L'-6: Ch. 6). The ethical order must resolve this duality. The inherent tensions in legitimism and between the two types of imperative are only resolved if ethical rules and arrangements of all types are *embraced freely* and wholeheartedly by each member of society. This is the additional notion that defines a sustainable ethical order and it can only be provided by absolutes, the seventh level. Only absolutes can feel entirely natural to all at all times.

The more that coercion or brain-washing is required to maintain the order, the less satisfactory the society. This is because good conduct generated by coercion or automatic obedience is ethically inferior to that generated and willed freely. Although the heptad defines an

ethical order, its adoption means that it simultaneously defines a personal code. In other words, the order unifies a community through the individual wills of its members, and provides a definition of what it is to be a good member.

Constitution. The order is based on people *freely embracing* society's absolutes (L"-7), typically as expounded in the principal religions. The order requires that people should value laws and *legitimately impose* them on the community (L"-6). The order must also *evolve virtuously* in accord with certain maxims (L"-5), and should identify key rights and duties (L"-4) to be self-consciously and *deliberately adopted*. The order depends on communal tenets (L"-3) being *dogmatically affirmed*, and certain conventions (L"-2) being *applied in an acceptable way*. Finally people must accord *unequivocal respect* to a range of prescriptions (L"-1).

The order is a unifying force in society, because the order, being a unity, ensures that social life and self-expression in the social sphere has a deep coherence. As a result there are natural links across the levels (see Ex. 9.55 and Ch.14).

Dignity: If the order upholds dignity, then each person willingly recognizes their duty in this regard. Absolutes (L'-7) call for each and all to respect others and make it natural to pass and obey laws (L'-6) such as those on privacy and to block laws which cause humiliation. The order also contains maxims (L-5"), which prevent exploitation of people and needless harm to their sensitivities; and charters which establish rights (L'-4) related to dignity e.g. to warnings about dismissal from work, or informed consent for operations. For all the above to be possible, the order must be expressed by people affirming tenets (L'-3) about the importance of dignity, and ensuring that things like deliberate embarrassment of others is prevented by conventions (L'-2). All will adhere strictly to ritual prescriptions (L'-1), like bowing or handshaking, which signify respect. Should the social order fail at any one of the seven levels, then it is not coherent and dignity will not be fully realized.

Property: The fair handling of property is essential in any order. This needs to start from an absolute (L'-7) which underpins the significance of property e.g. 'respect for autonomy'. Laws (L'-6) must support the absolute e.g. by indicating whether the order allows adults or children to be treated as property. Similarly, lending and selling must be legally regulated. Maxims (L'-5) which guide virtuous conduct are necessary: e.g. it should be clear that one should not steal even in situations where the law does not apply or where detection is unlikely. The order must generate rights and duties (L'-4) which harmonize with the above rules: e.g. ensuring that people repair or replace anything unfairly damaged. Tenets (L'-3), like the idea that stealing is wrong or that sharing is necessary, must be inculcated. Conventions (L'-2) about property, e.g. when lending or donating goods, must be widely acceptable.

Finally, the order requires unequivocal respect based on
unambiguous prescriptions (L'-1) which buttress the above
e.g. indelibly labelling goods to minimize the likelihood
of loss or theft.   Ex. 9.55

People must abide by the entire order and not simply
adhere to rules at one level while neglecting or reject-
ing those at another. Societies have evolved to the point
at which they aspire to manage the ethical order self-
consciously. But they have not yet properly mastered
the tools for doing so systematically and sensibly.
Children are taught the chemical elements but not the
ethical elements.

Social life suffers because the ethical order has been
viewed as pre-ordained or inevitable rather than as a
product of human beings. To live ethically is to accept
the responsibility to live and work within an actual
order: acting in harmony with the ethical order while
simultaneously striving to elucidate and enlighten that
order — with all the compromises and imperfections
that these endeavours entail.

Improving an Ethical Order: A British journalist used the
metaphor of a virus affecting UK society to describe
weaknesses in the UK order. She affirms, for example,
that it assigns too many family duties to government, it
includes maxims which minimize self-reliance. it has laws
which centralize power and weaken the citizenry, it
affirms tenets which weaken open debate. it includes
conventions which breed inter-group hostility, and it uses
prescriptions for matters best left to personal judgement. A
sense of despair permeated the article. Because the
various dysfunctional rules hang together, they mutually
reinforce and sustain society. To live in the UK involves
both respecting such rules and rebelling against them.
They cannot be dismantled singly, nor can they be
replaced as a whole. The journalist can only assert that
something is wrong, link with like-minded people, and
demonstrate her convictions in her everyday sphere of
action. Change in the order depends on the creation and
adoption of an alternative ethic.   Ex. 9.56[81]

The Will. A sustainable order is based on absolutes.
Their generality and abstraction provide the possibility
for the order to be right for each person and therefore
for the community. To live ethically by one's own lights
and simultaneously to **perform** one's social duty
emerges as a person's highest hope. Indeed, the ethical
order must embody hope to be sustainable.

Social existence demands that one positively wills
oneself to embrace the ethical order, despite imper-
fections in the concrete order. The psychopath is
viewed as a danger because he is incapable of under-
standing the way others are swayed by ethical consider-
ations and is insensitive to their values and to social
needs. Less dramatic willed deviations from the ethical
order occur if people are ignorant of what is socially

required, or if they suffer mental illness of physical or
psychological origins. Ethical participation in society is
fostered by taking counsel, engaging in regular self-
examination, and developing self-command.

Many theologians, philosophers and thinkers have
concluded that communal restraints on individuality
are needed. They have observed that society requires
that the good that is particular and private be sub-
ordinated to the good that is common and shareable.
Kant noted that subordination should be autonomous
and voluntary. However, such autonomous sub-
ordination is only fully achieved by the existence of an
ethical order which is perceived to be essentially just.
This willing subordination is not to a person but to
rules. It is a matter of consciously recognizing the
ethical challenge of social existence. To embrace the
social order with full awareness means recognizing the
natural moral institutions and developing one's social
identity. The creation of an order which people regard
as sufficiently just to make it their own is the crowning
ethical achievement of any society.

Its opposite is the society created in George Orwell's
imagination in which conditioning replaces autonomy
and conformity substitutes for freedom. Such a society
runs on lies and war rather than truth and peace.

The essence of utopian communities, as Kanter con-
cludes from her survey, is that they are places where
'what people want to do is the same as what they have
to do'.[82] Right conduct therefore demands either that
one finds such a community, or that one modifies one's
wants to suit the community within which one finds
oneself. In practice, the difference between these
options is not great. Both seem difficult in the extreme.
An order requires each individual to support it, and yet
no individual can change it fundamentally.

Many people feel that to adapt to present-day social
realities is difficult, and that the self-command required
for virtuous functioning in an imperfect and unjust
society is impractical — if not foolish or intolerable.
A slide into sharp practices, beggar-my-neighbour
attitudes, and small-scale corruption is then all too
easy.

Alternatively, utopian communities are imagined to
provide a more congenial context with greater freedom
of action. The reverse is the case. Those utopian com-
munities which Kanter judged successful, at least in
terms of their capacity to survive and the enthusiasm of
the members to belong, turn out to require what to an
outsider seems to be enormous self-discipline and
severe restraints on individuality. Her survey of 19th
century utopian enterprises found that success
depended upon personal sacrifice and investment,

renunciation of intimate relationships, self-exposure, ideological conversion, sharing of property and work, and exclusion from wider society.

To recognize one's own will and harness it to ethical purposes demands self-discipline. So it is not surprising that modern anarchic communes which value freedom without self-discipline collapse rapidly. Put simply, freedom like justice depends on eternal vigilance and effort. Some rules are freely obeyed out of habit or because they are so obviously called for in the situation. The crucial rules, however, are those which it is in the interest of each to disregard, while being in the interest of all others to adhere to. Will is not a matter of recognizing desire or purpose, but rather sticking to principles when expedience and self-interest tempt one to depart from them. Will, we may say, is the capacity to resist temptation.[83]

Conclusion. The order activates and engenders lower level ethical authorities so as to ensure the sustenance of society. At the same time it constrains established authorities to devising or evoking specific rules which are inherent or obviously compatible with the existing order. In this way continuity and coherence at a deep level is preserved despite major changes in the concrete order. This preservation and careful evolution of identity lies at the heart of all ethical endeavours. The recognition of authority operating within the constraints of an existing ethical order takes us back to the monads (G"-1).

The more people willingly embrace the order, the more they can support each other, work for its improvement, and strengthen and integrate their society. The sharing of moral values allows for enormous variability in the conception of the ends to which such conduct is oriented. Right conduct is compatible with a wide diversity of political, economic, personal and organizational values and objectives in society. The whole issue of how to realize values, moral and otherwise, is its own separate subject and one which will be examined in the remaining chapters. Before doing this we need to look back over our odyssey through the seven groupings to overview the entire pattern and understand their relationships a little better.

REVIEWING ETHICAL AUTHORITIES

The present analysis proposes that society's deep design, its abstract order, is made up of ethical rules. These rules are the building blocks of a necessary panoply of ethical authorities. By combining the seven types of rules logically, a comprehensive and elegant pattern of these authorities has been revealed.

Social life at its roots is inherently ethical, that is to say built up out of obligations designed to protect individuals and human identity. Authority comes into play to protect the order of communities within which people must live. Individuals need to accommodate to this order and its authority. What we have found is that there is common sense and simple logic behind rule-based authorities and that, at a deep level, they are all related.

The account reveals that responsibility for ethical authority, far from being a preserve of government or clerics, is (or should be) widely diffused throughout any society. Sometimes the authority may be implicit, only existing as a regular and expected pattern of thought and behaviour. In such cases, design is not so much about introducing something new but about adapting or making known unrecognized rules.

The ethical authorities ensure that rules taken singly (or the primal authorities) do not generate excessive conflicts or acrimony which might disintegrate the community (G"-2), which might disorient people (G"-3), which might disrupt voluntary conformity (G"-4), which might foster unjust conduct (G"-5), which might interfere with obedience (G"-6), or which might weaken the will to participate (G"-7).

The practical implications of each of the various types of ethical authority have already been examined. Using the framework can help to minimize simplistic or biased analyses which limit, oppress and distort human and social potential. Authority is difficult enough to handle without confusion about what is entailed.[84]

In reviewing ethical authority, I will (a) recall its hierarchical nature and examine this further in terms of freedom and conformity; (b) highlight the difficult issue of sub-cultural authority in nation-states; and (c) return to the significance of ultimate values for society. A summary of the main ideas in this review is provided in Master-Table 27.

Authority as a Hierarchy

The seven types of rule form an elemental hierarchy and the seven types of authority, the groupings of rules, also form a hierarchy. Each type of authority in the structural hierarchy emerges systematically and pro-gressively from the preceding one. This is evident from the consistency in internal structure of the ethical authorities (see Master-Table 20).

As noted in the introductory section, there is a natural progression from one grouping of rules to the next: the notion of authority requires rules which support and constrain communities which require principles which support and constrain individuals who require positions which support and constrain identities which require... and so on until we reach the order which supports and constrains the notion of authority so returning us to the starting point.

The conceptual evolution of ethical authorities can also be presented in a reverse order. It is worth repeating the essence of each level and their contents here as a reminder. Then we can look at the hierarchical relations more deeply. We start with......

•the ethical order (G"-7) which ensures that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems right. It is the basis of a deep harmony in society. However, the order is mysterious while people require clarity; and the order should be liberating but authority requires obedience. Such requirements are met by......

•ethical imperatives (G"-6) which ensure that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time. Imperatives, whether moral or pragmatic, are statements of moral truth. Because they emerge respectively from God and from the practical requirements of sovereignty, they exert powerful control. But they are universal and sometimes contradictory, so they cannot enable judgements of the rights and wrongs of conduct in actual situations. This is met by......

•ethical frames of reference (G"-5) which ensure that differing views of right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement. Custom, law and morality each provide an awesome and complex authority within which disputes can be publicly resolved. But these frames cannot be used continually to monitor on-going functioning or be adapted to particular individuals. For this we need......

•ethical standards (G"-4) which ensure that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative and self-chosen minimum. Standards are deliberately designed to protect identity: the public, the private, the societal and the universal self. They are conditioned by the status quo, so they cannot provide authority for changes to authority. Like the frames of reference, they respond to ethical pressures in society. These pressures are organized by......

•ethical positions (G"-3) which ensure that members can be coherently and authoritatively

oriented to ethical challenge and change. Positions stabilize authorities at other levels or re-design them. Positions — good practices, communal roles, cultural ethics, legal responsibilities, distributive justices — tell people how society should function and how they should function within it. But they cannot help decide how immediate community issues of need, power or fair play should be handled. An authority which can direct the response to social turmoil is needed. This is provided by.......

•**ethical principles** (G"-2) which ensure that choices affecting a community and its continuing viability can be authoritatively guided. The different types are: civility principles, social policy principles, ideological principles, human right principles, legal principles, natural justice principles. These principles are evoked and used by community leaders and communal bodies like legislatures, the courts, regulatory agencies and political parties. Principles protect the community but they are not unequivocal. Governments, in particular, are liable to over-reach their assigned authority. So there is a need for.......

•**ethical rules** (G"-1) which ensure that constraints defined by recognizable authorities can become binding obligations on all. These are the sources of ethical power in society and there is no further transition to a more fundamental authority. Rules depend on respect for the primal authorities in social life. The lower four primal authorities, like the corresponding rules, are tangible and personally inescapable: community leaders (prescriptions), the general community (conventions), one's conscience (tenets) and powerful social classes (rights). The upper three are abstract and so need greater appreciation and commitment: ethical teachings (maxims), the law (laws) and ultimate values (absolutes). The proper and thoughtful handling of rules and response to primal authorities gives substance to the notion of ethical responsibility.

Freedom and Conformity. Society needs its members both to have freedom and also to respect authority. People must conform and yet they must do so willingly. The various rule derivatives relate differently to the notion of authority, and have different effects on conformity and freedom.

The upper two groupings contain the sense of authority and the lower two groupings contain its manifestation. The order embodies the spirit of authority which must be freely embraced if authority is to function effectively in the real world. This spirit reveals itself in its most concrete form via the primal authorities and their characterizing rules. The imperatives carry the force of authority needed to maintain

obedience in the community. The principles are applied by official or established bodies, like government, which most people identify with the power of authority.

The frames of reference are impersonal systems of authority which protect a community and all its members, while minimum standards embody the realization of authority within communities, individuals and nations of the world. Positions, finally, are pivotal in permitting the solidification or modification of authority by individual belief.

By considering the effect of the various groupings on conformity, we become aware of an oscillation between restraint and freedom. The odd levels assume and foster freedom, and the even levels assume and require restraint.

In the order (G"-7), conformity is positively desired by each and all and so freedom is enabled. Imperatives (G"-6) assume, demand and exalt conformity and so call for restraint. The frames of reference (G"-5) judge conduct and can decide that conformity is wrong: so they enable freedom. Standards (G"-4) are used to appraise self-defined conformity and so call for restraint. Positions (G"-3) require conformity to be debated and defended and so enable freedom. Principles (G"-2) determine conformity and call for restraint. Rules (G"-1) set inescapable bounds to conformity and so provide again for freedom within and through them.

It is in tyrannical societies that we witness the disabling of freedom and the replacement of justice by conformity. Tyrants centralize and personalize societal power, demand absolute compliance with their wishes, and mock the notion of a just social order. Tyrannical regimes prevent open debate, muzzle the press, proscribe political parties, close universities, control the judiciary, destroy families, indoctrinate and terrorize the populace, abolish or control the churches, and kill off popular leaders and the intelligentsia.

Enlightened Authority. Our concern is to envisage a more beneficent process. The framework has revealed how and why (in theory) the seven groupings must emerge in all societies.

It is intuitively obvious that any notion of society must start from a conception of a coherent and sustainable ethical order (G"-7). The social order embodies and implies ethical institutions of all sorts. However, at its base is the requirement for people to embrace ethical obligations and social responsibility willingly and to recognize the existence of binding rules as defined by distinct recognizable authorities (G"-1). Between the unifying ethical order and the seven discrete levels of binding rules lie a variety of complex

ethical authorities. Rules are insufficiently flexible to maintain a community, so principles must be developed and applied in a way that is socially acceptable (G"-2). To ensure that rules and principles can be affirmed or changed, positions which orient people as individuals must be devised and dogmatically affirmed (G"-3). To assess rules, principles and positions and to protect the social identities defined by these authorities, minimum standards must be deliberately chosen (G"-4). Disagreements about what is right are inevitable. So the frames of reference must be virtuously evolved to enable recognizably just and definitive judgements to be made about any conduct causing a dispute (G"-5). Finally, everything, even the originating conception of a sustainable order, must be controlled by imperatives which are legitimately imposed and obediently followed (G"-6).

We may describe this hierarchy in another way: by emphasizing the key social entities and the possibility of progress.

Again we start with the order which determines the kind of society which people willingly fashion and sustain. The current ethical order is real, and it is on this that the moral imagination must operate and from which hope must be drawn. Here is where ethical design starts, not in the philosopher's study. The order interacts with ethical forces defined by imperatives which lie within each person and are tended by political institutions. These two highest levels generate the potential for an enlightened society. However enlightenment can only be realized through minimum standards deliberately and self-consciously chosen by individuals, whether as a community member, a private person, an organization, a government official or a sovereign society. Here is where diversity and variation must be tolerated and protected. Individual conduct is itself dependent on the frames of reference which provide an evolving all-embracing ethical context. Here is where such freedoms as society permits can be defended and determined. In other words, a just society emerges through an evolution of custom, law and morality in the light of community and member standards. These systems of authority enable the improper exercise of power, even by a government, to be judged and (if possible) reversed.

Changes in the frames of reference depend on cultural development. This focuses attention on the different positions as these emerge in spontaneous and orchestrated public debates and acts of personal rebellion. Whether change is occurring or not, the community must be maintained and regulated through the use of principles. The authorities here are all aspects of government (including 'self'-government in the lowest

and highest groups). The support for government is to be found in various primal authorities which define ethical rules. It is striking how varied are the primal authorities. They include social leaders, the community mainstream, each person's conscience, class power, the ethical teaching, the law, and ultimate values (or God). These primal authorities, the inescapable givens of ethical life, determine the limits of what anyone can achieve.

In other words, the social order provides for a will-driven and legitimate imposition of rules. It grows through virtuous evolution but depends on personal ownership. Although it calls for deep personal conviction, it is built on social acceptability. At base, it is constituted by certain rules which are strictly binding. The ethical order persists because it protects the community while defending individuality. It recognizes and manages freedom and diversity, enabling complicated interactions amongst numerous social forces.

The upper three levels of authority seem more massive and stable — the 'real' authorities — while the lower four levels seem more flexible and contingent. After all, we can make a rule but we cannot make the custom. (A similar pattern was noted in the primary hierarchy of purpose and in the approaches to ethical choice.) Although all authorities are modifiable, all are highly resistant to modification not least because the higher authorities reinforce and depend upon lower authorities (and vice versa). But there is, at least in recent times, a continuing pressure to modify authorities which is often stimulated by sub-cultural diversity.

Integrating Subcultures

Respecting and supporting authority lies at the heart of the maintenance of order in society. It is therefore highly desirable that authorities reinforce each other. Sub-cultures in a nation-state pose a major problem because (by definition) their members wish and are pressed to adhere to their own ethical authorities as well as those in wider society. The concern of any person not to have their interests and identity swallowed up by society's needs and values, is here expressed as the concern of a sub-culture not to be dominated by national authorities. Some form of non-repressive integration is clearly requisite.

Sub-cultures may be based in ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, historical, geographical or even ideological differences. Whatever their origins, they bring or create their own natural moral institutions with which sub-cultural members strongly identify. Their members may speak, marry, work, play, celebrate, worship and provide charity almost wholly amongst themselves. Sometimes it seems as if they seek

to be a nation within a nation. But sub-culture members are still individuals and citizens who, like any other, must pay taxes and submit to the law of the land.

The consequences of failure to resolve sub-cultural differences seem more commonly to generate horrific strife rather than calm assimilation or peaceful secession. When things go wrong, sub-cultural members come to believe that they are victims of injustice and that their identity is not being taken seriously despite all the reassurances to the contrary. At the same time, the majority in society and their representatives come to think that the sub-culture members are exploitative, excessively self-centred, neglectful of wider responsibilities, or even actively subversive.

Problems of discord and turmoil associated with schismatic sub-cultural authority are becoming increasingly common. Although we cannot examine the principles of sub-cultural integration here, it is worthwhile distinguishing sub-cultural and national influences in authority definition and operation. As in the case of rules, at some levels the ethical authority inherently demands a fusion of the sub-cultural and the national, and at other levels discrete and countervailing authorities are essential. In all cases, mutual reinforcement between national and sub-cultural authorities is ethically desirable.

A viable *order* (G''-7) must recognize the multicultural nature of society. I presume it is self-evident that distinct orders cannot coexist in society. Utopian communities that view society as contaminating and seek to create their own order are under continual stress. Either they merge back into society and lose their distinctiveness over time; or wider society turns against them and destroys them. On a larger scale, fundamental conflicts about the very nature of authority in society lead to bloody civil war or genocide.

By contrast, distinctive categorical *imperatives* (G''-6) and recognizably separate *frames of reference* (G''-5) are perfectly possible and indeed unavoidable. On the one hand, society needs its own imperatives, typically emerging from a religious tradition, which the government can legalize; and on the other hand, sub-cultures are virtually defined by their sectional imperatives even though they have no legal powers to enforce these. Sub-cultures cannot easily be made to be different than they are, though their leaders can strive for greater or lesser assimilation. So mutual reinforcement between national and sub-cultural imperatives is highly desirable. In the same way, for society to cohere at all, there must be some common frame of reference in the law and in certain basics of morality and custom. Yet sub-cultural differences in all frames of reference are to be expected and, as far as possible, to be welcomed. Again reinforc-

ing links between the various sub-cultural frames and between these and the national frames are beneficial.

Standards (G''-4) demand a fusion of sub-cultural and wider societal perspectives. In the case of communal and individual standards, those generated within sub-cultural enclaves are simply some among the myriad within society. As defined, there can be no overarching distinctive 'national individual standard' or 'national communal standard'. By contrast, everyone whatever their sub-cultural origin must expect to be judged by universal and societal standards. To ensure voluntary adoption, the multi-national multi-cultural bodies which define universal standards strive for unanimity. In a similar way, sub-cultures should help create societal standards through representatives and in other ways.

Positions (G''-3) are internalized, and so they may be widely held in society across sub-cultural or sectional boundaries. Even well-established popular positions are interpreted, articulated and defended in slightly different ways by each person, and sub-cultural identity will play an important part in this process. So privately-held positions are really distinct entities. Public debate involves the articulation of such personal positions: because only passionate proponents have any influence. Such argument and debate affects the evolution of popular positions: that is to say, the positions generally held in society.

The nature of *principles* (G''-2) are that they apply to the nation as a whole if they exist at all. Ethical principles can only function if they are popularly accepted as valid, even when they are sectional and exclusive. An ideological principle only held by one political party, for example, is still an ideological principle given validity in society. The same phenomenon is evident in authoritative bodies established to use principles like the judiciary or legislature. These must act for the whole and on behalf of the whole and yet their members generally emerge from a particular background and represent a particular way of thinking. Often sub-cultural representation is low and much effort is needed to remedy such a situation.

Rules (G''-1) are inherently a collective or public phenomenon. If they were not general and concerned for the common good, then they would not meet the legitimist criterion for being ethical and the group could not expect compliance with them. However, binding rules are also personal and experiential, and therefore sectional. If they are not oriented to enabling and respecting individual autonomy, including the autonomy of sub-cultural members without necessarily singling them out, then, again, they do not meet the legitimist criterion for being ethical. People, as individuals, will not feel obliged by them.

In the review of rules (in Ch. 8), there was a detailed analysis of the way that the individual and social dimensions affect rule development and use. This made it clear that the various types of rule vary greatly in the balance they strike (also cf. Master-Table 21). That account revealed that there is room for members of sub-cultures to adhere to their own regulations (within the law), to manifest specific virtues (springing from their morality) and to retain their personal beliefs (as a matter of conscience).

Ultimate Values and Authority

Societies are built on values. The political processes which shape the operation of any society are value-based and the ethical processes which shape its enduring culture and deep structure are rule-based.

Values culminate in ultimate values, and the fundamental requirement of societal design, identified at the commencement of the chapter, is the embodiment of ultimate values in institutions and their use and activation by ethical authorities. It is possible to see necessary correspondences between certain ultimate values and the ethical authorities. Ultimate values do not lend themselves to being tied down, so the links here are suggestive rather than definitive.

Rules (G"-1) reflect the eternal search for **peace**. Only if all in a society accept the primal authorities and the notion of obligations binding on all can there be any relief from strife and a tolerable social existence. Primal authorities need, above all, to keep the vision of peace alive.

Principles (G"-2), which aid the operation of established authorities in maintaining the community, assume the eternal search for **fraternity**. Things like civility and fair-play have no meaning without a sense of fraternity; and social cooperation is its practical expression.

Positions (G"-3), which enable public debate and structure modifications to authority, depend on an eternal search for **equality**. It is never clear who will arise from amongst the community with new and inspiring conceptions of what is right and good for each and all. Change has not occurred until virtually everyone embraces and affirms the new position.

Standards (G"-4), being self-chosen and enabling variation and diversity, assume the eternal value of **liberty**. Standards assume and demand, among other things, a definition and defence of individuality. Individuality is a freely determined expression of identity which develops both the social group and the members (cf. L'-V: Ch. 7).

Frames of reference (G"-5), which provide a context for judging conduct, reflect the eternal search for **justice**. These frames are used whenever individual is pitted against individual, or individual against the government. Without frames imbued with justice, society would collapse.

Imperatives (G"-6) which drive people to obey an abstract and impersonal requirement reflect the eternal search for **truth**. Recognition of the deep social and psychological truth of imperatives is the force which supports the ethical order and all rules and hence human existence. Confusion between ethical truth, the truth we live by, and empirical truth, the hard realities, has bedevilled church, science and modern society.

Finally, the ethical order (G"-7) with its requirement for consistency, coherence, cooperation, consensus, and willingness reflects the eternal search for **harmony**. It will be recalled that harmony was identified as essential for the application and release of all ultimate values in social groups (L-7: Ch. 5).

Transition. Ultimate values are the basis of society, the supreme primal authority and the conduit for spiritual forces to reconcile and inspire individuals. Ultimate values enable the tolerance of suffering, reduce the intensity of conflict, bolster morality, and enhance societal cohesion.

An ultimate value within people drives action to realize itself in the actual social order. Given the will to exercise freedom, anyone can do something of value, at least in principle. In practice it may seem difficult.

We now understand the way personal and organizational action is constrained by rules and authority. It is time, therefore, to return to the realization of values. We must tackle the practical issues in doing something worthwhile. We are ready to examine how people can convert values of any sort into tangible reality. ❖

Master-Table 27

Properties revealing the coherence of the hierarchy of ethical authority.
See Master-Tables 18 & 19 and text for further details and explanation.

G	Ethical Authority and Function	Ultimate Value Link	The Process of Ethical Design	Key Social Entities	Evolution of Authority	Conformity & its Effect	Unity and Multiplicity
7"	The Order ensures that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems right.	Harmony	*Moral imagination:* the starting point and hope for a better world.	The person and the actual social order.	Spirit of authority	Desired so enables freedom	Unity
6"	Imperatives ensures that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time.	Truth	*Ethical force:* what makes social life possible and worthwhile.	Ultimate values (God) and the sovereign society.	Force of authority	Demanded so requires restraint	Unity expressed as a duality.
5"	Frames of Reference ensures that differing views of right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement.	Justice	*Ethical context:* the evolving all-embracing context for personal conduct.	Communities; The government; Natural moral institutions	Systems of authority	Judged so enables freedom	Three unities seeking a greater unity.
4"	Standards ensures that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative and self-chosen minimum.	Liberty	*Ethical being:* self-consciously seeking ethical individuality and tolerating diversity.	Communities; each person and organization; the government; multi-national governmental bodies.	Realizing authority	Self-appraised so requires restraint	Multiple discrete connected unities.
3"	Positions ensures that members can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and change.	Equality	*Open debate:* the mechanism of ethical stability and progress.	The media, campaigning and reforming bodies of many types; innovators, iconoclasts, outsiders, conscientious objectors, radicals.	Modifying authority	Debated so enables freedom	Connected multiplicity.
2"	Principles ensures that choices affecting the community and its viability can be authoritatively guided.	Fraternity	*Community governance:* what can and should be ethically designed.	Each person, the government, political parties, legislators, jurists, regulatory authorities — plus academic inquirers.	Establishing authority	Determined so requires restraint	Disconnected multiplicity.
1"	Rules ensures that constraints defined by recognizable authorities can become binding obligations on all	Peace	*Primal authorities:* the means and limits of ethical design.	Communal leaders, community mainstream, consciences, class power, ethical teachings, the law, ultimate values.	Recognizing authority	Bounded so enables freedom	Multiplicity organizable in discrete areas.

NOTES

1. John Maynard Keynes claimed that he repudiated customary morals, conventions and traditional wisdom, and yet wrote that 'the right to judge every individual case on its merits....was *an important part of our faith, violently and aggressively held.*' (From: *Two Memoirs*, London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1949, p.97, my italics.) Timothy Cleary was the 1960's Harvard University lecturer who advised America's youth to 'tune in, turn on, and drop out' preferably with the help of LSD. (Cleary, T. *The Politics of Ecstasy*. New York: College Notes & Texts Inc., 1968). Trotsky helped Lenin organize the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 but was later expelled from the Communist Party (Trotsky, L. (1937) *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).

2. The appreciation of cultural forces emanating from rule-based authority is a new challenge, one which has been given an impetus in the last quarter of this century by improved global communications, concern for sub-cultural diversity in many Western countries, the emerging power of Asian nations, and a widespread upsurge of religious fundamentalism. See, for example: Mazrui, A. A. *Cultural Forces in World Politics*. London: J. Currey, 1990.

3. Smith, A. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759 1st edition; 1853 New Edition), Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1969, p.125.

4. See explanations of autopoiesis and self-organization in the systems literature e.g. Ch.3.13 in: Rodrigues-Delgado, R. & Banathy, B.H. (eds.) *International Systems Science Handbook*. Madrid: Systemic Publications, 1993.

5. Social orders and man's capacity to operate within a social order evolved in a largely unconscious fashion. See, for example: Farb, P. *Man's Rise to Civilization*. New York: Secker & Warburg, 1968. F.A. Hayek surveys this field as part of his condemnation of the elevation of reason to the sole arbiter in social design. The text quotation comes from: *Rules and Order*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, Ch. 1: Reason and Evolution, p. 12. Karl Popper emphasizes that society is an 'abstract order' i.e. a set of linked rules (*The Open Society and Its Enemies*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945). The framework provided here defines the inherent assumptions which any particular 'abstract order' uses. Note that I refer to the abstract (rule-based) order of society as its ethical order. The concrete visible order of society is about actual activities and the actual distribution of prestige and wealth. The ethical order puts limits on what may result, but it is not possible to predict or produce a particular actual order using the abstract ethical order.

6. I felt encouraged to undertake the daunting task of identifying the various combinations, together with their relations and functions, by the success of a similar analysis of the management of executive work within organizations. See: Kinston, W. & Rowbottom, R. A new model of managing based on levels of work. *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis*, 17: 89-113, 1990. The formulations in that paper have been revised and updated by subsequent research and consultancy testing. They are essential to appreciating participation within organizations.

7. I must introduce here the notation to be used throughout: Each *grouping* is identified using the prefix G"- (G stands for the grouping, " indicates the tertiary hierarchy). The numerals indicate the number of adjacent levels being grouped. So G"-3 refers to all groups of 3 adjacent levels in the tertiary hierarchy. Superscripts will be used to indicate a particular *group* within the grouping, such groups being numbered in ascending order. For example G"-4³ refers to the third group of four levels: i.e. the tetradic group which includes L"-3 through L"-6. The inner structures of each of the groups within a particular grouping have a characteristic pattern such that any particular inner level (the third, say) within each group in a grouping (the pentads, say) has a basic similarity (see Master-Table 20). It follows that the notation lends itself to further elaboration: G"-5²₃ can be used to refer to the third (inner) level of the second pentad of the tertiary hierarchy. In this context, G"-5¹₃, G"-5²₃ and G"-5³₃ show an important similarity, even though they refer to L"-4, L"-5, L"-6 rules respectively; as does the third level in any group in different groupings e.g. G"-3³₃, G"-4⁴₃, G"-6²₃. This interesting and important phenomenon, important both practically and theoretically, will be explained as we go; but the more complex notation will be generally avoided.

8. Law and freedom are inseparable in the classic and liberal tradition starting with the ancient Greeks and up to philosophers like Locke, Hume and Kant. Laws unavoidably and desirably infringe freedom in the more modern utilitarian, contractualist, socialist and legal positivist traditions. The former consider laws to be primarily or almost solely to do with just conduct and unconcerned with what actual situations eventuate, whereas the latter consider laws also to be used for shaping society in order to produce a particular pre-ordained just or beneficial outcome. Laws which are little more than organizational objectives and instructions reduce freedom and relate to government in its executive ruler mode (cf. G-6¹: Ch. 12). Also see: Note 22 in Ch. 8.

9. Hume, D. *Essays*. In *Works III*, p.125.

10. For an extreme sociological view, see: Poulantzas, N. *Political Power and Social Classes*. London: New Left Books, 1973. A less extreme view is provided in: Dahrendorf, R. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. London: Routledge, 1959. For a typical economics view, see: Olson Jr., M. *The Logic of Collective Action*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1933.

11. See, for example, L. von Mises: "The ultimate yardstick of justice is conduciveness to the preservation of social co-operation." (*Theory and History*. Yale: Yale University Press, 1957, p.54)

12. This distinction between rules and principles has been noted by others. See, for example: Milne, A.J.M. *Human Rights and Human Diversity*. London: Macmillan, 1986; and Walker, D. M. *The Oxford Companion to Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. The notion of a rule or principle is used outside the sphere of ethics and value — something which is true of positions, standards, frames of reference, imperatives and orders. For example: law-like regularities in science and non-ethical rules for action are often called principles.

13. See: Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J.H., & Jackson, D.D. *Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and Paradoxes*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1967.

14. The two examples in this paragraph are based on newspaper reports. Helm, S. & Hamlin, K. UN reports police brutality against UK boat people. *The Independent*. 15th May 1990; and Taylor, M. Humiliation from the sweat box to Wormwood Scrubs. *The Independent*. 18th May 1990.

15. DHSS & Welsh Office, Great Britain. *Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped*. London: HMSO Cmnd 4683, 1971.

16. The role of the judiciary in regard to social policy is discussed in: Dworkin, R. *Taking Rights Seriously*. London: Duckworth, 1977. The Law Lords views were expressed in the Gillick case, which is discussed in: Lee, S. *Law and Morals: Warnock, Gillick and Beyond*. London: Oxford University Press, 1986.

17. The definition is from: Corbett, P. *Ideologies*. London: Hutchinson, 1965. Useful reviews and discussions of ideology are provided in: MacIntyre, A. *Against the Self-Images of the Age*. London: Duckworth, 1971; and McLellan, D. *Ideology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986.

18. A clear and useful account of the recent battles between apologists for left-wing and right-wing ideologies is to be found in: Bosanquet, N. *After the New Right*. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1983. The UN Report is: United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report, 1990*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

19. Wollstonecraft, M. (1792) *Vindication of the Rights of Women*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982. Mill, J.S. (1869) *The Subjection of Women*. (ed. S. Mansfield) Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing, 1980.

20. The idea that class-based ideas might not play a significant part in politics recurs. See: Bell, D. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. New York: Free Press, 1960. For a more recent re-working of a related notion, see: Fukuyama, F. *The Last Man and The End of History*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.

21. It follows that 'group rights', 'collective rights' or 'people's rights' are distinct from human right principles. The pursuit of group-defined rights (e.g. women's rights, Muslim rights) is an ideological effort to alter membership rights (i.e. the social structure) in accord with certain ideological principles. Protecting personal freedoms in general, however much asserted, is subsidiary. On the international scene, emphasis on people's rights typically comes down to leaders of a society or tribe wanting freedom (power) to restrict the freedom of individual members of their own society or tribe.

22. *The European Convention on Human Rights and its Five Protocols (1950)*. In: Brownlie, I. (ed.) *Basic Documents on Human Rights*. 2nd Ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, pp.242-265.

23. The legal situation in the UK is described in: Munro, C. *Studies in Constitutional Law*. London: Butterworths, 1987. The proposed bill is: Lester A. et al. *A British Bill of Rights. Constitution Paper No. 1*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990.

24. See: Amnesty's International Secretariat Annual Reports which review regimes world-wide. Specific reports on particular themes or regimes are also produced.

25. Information and quotation extracted from Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Science, Ex parte Avon

26. County Council, as reported in: *The Independent*, 15 March 1990 and 25 May 1990.

26. Liability for Inaccuracies and Mis-Statements in Books. *The Author*, C1 (1): 19, Spring 1990.

27. Would-be social engineers regularly forget or perhaps conveniently blur the distinction between governing a community and running an organization (or government department). The differences between communities and organizations have been emphasized by many leading thinkers. See, for example: Weber, M. *Max Weber on Law and Economy in Society*. 2nd Ed. (Transl. E. Shils & M. Rheinstein) Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954; and Hayek, F.A. *Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy. 3 Vols*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, 1977, 1979. Also cf. Note [8].

28. 'Natural justice principle' is also used in the legal literature as a label for unequivocal maxims which define communal virtue and proper functioning e.g. no man should be condemned unheard; no man should be a judge in his own cause (to avoid conflicts of interest). Cf. Walker, D.M. op. cit. [12], p.867.

29. See the accounts in: Martin, J.P. *Hospitals in Trouble*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.

30. A review of studies of the attitudes to fairness of economic undergraduates and graduates is provided in: Frank, R., Gilovich, T. & Regan D. Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Spring, 1993. The love-affair between sociology and Marxism, now dented by the collapse of communism, revealed how personal freedom and initiative was minimized by academics in their efforts to focus on society and the collective good.

31. Held, D. *Models of Democracy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. The classic texts noted in the text include: Locke, J. (1690). *Two Treatises on Civil Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963; Paine, T. *Political Writings* (Ed. B, Kuklick). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Tocqueville, A. de *Democracy in America*. (ed. P. Bradley) New York: Vintage, 1948.

32. Aristotle believed that natural law had authority everywhere and was discoverable by the use of reason. Christian leaders like Augustine and Aquinas used natural law as the bridge between divine law and the state. Following the Renaissance, natural law was resurrected in a new form by philosophers like Hobbes and Locke. Hume and many others rejected natural law. Nevertheless, it returned and is now part of legal studies. It has been used in recent times to assist with the development of international law. Walker describes it as an 'immortal' idea (op.cit. [12], p.871). Also see: J. Stone. *Human Law and Human Justice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

33. Bowlby, J. *Attachment and Loss. 3 Vols*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991.

34. The feminist case is put in: Penelope, J. *Speaking Freely: Unlearning the Lies of the Fathers' Tongues*. New York: Pergamon, 1990.

35. Dahrendorf, R. Homo Sociologicus: On the history, significance and limits of the category of social role. In: *Essays in the Theory of Society*, London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1968.

36. It is clearer that roles in organizations are both an organizational creation and an individual property. See: Ch. 2 of Jaques, E. *A General Theory of Bureaucracy*. London: Heinemann, 1976. (But note that these roles are endeavour-driven rather than belief-driven; cf. Ch. 10.) In society, the situation is less clear. The extreme sociological position gives almost no choice to the individual. See, for example: Durkheim, E. *The Rules of Sociological Method. 8th Ed.* (Transl. S.A. Solovay & J.H. Mueller; ed. G.E.G. Catlin) New York: The Free Press, 1966. Durkheim writes: "The principle of rebellion is the same as that of conformity. It is the true nature of society that is...conformed to when [traditional] morality is flouted." and: "A revolt of the individual against the collective...[is a revolt of]...the collective itself, but more and better aware of itself." (From: *Sociology and Philosophy*. (Transl. D.F. Pocock) New York: Free Press, 1974, p.65-66.) Durkheim is describing ordinary or mundane rebellion which uses existing freedoms. Heroic or inspired rebellion differs in that it reflects an irruption of the transpersonal and higher morality. The collective naturally tries to harness such rebels, especially via religion. If it cannot do so, it has no compunction about destroying the rebel socially or physically. The transpersonal rebel who wishes to generate immediate tangible benefit accepts the need to work within current institutions and mores, using but not surrendering to them.

37. Parsons, T. *The Social System*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951, p.250.

38. Weber, M. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (ed. A. Giddens) London: Allen and Unwin, 1976.

39. Phillip Rieff's main books about the emergence of 'psychological man', are: *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*. London: Victor Gollancz, 1960; and *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966.

40. The inspirational text is: Naisbitt, J & Aburdene, P. *Reinventing the Corporation*. London: Macdonald, 1986; Pinchot, G. *Intrapreneuring: Why You Don't Have to Leave the Corporation to Become an Entrepreneur*. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.

41. A social institution may be defined as those aspects of interactions within society which endure beyond changes in individual participation. Defined in this way, it includes such things as language as well as long-standing organisations, public bodies, rules of all sorts, and patterns of family living. To institutionalize a rule involves making it a part of actual social interaction, not simply formulating it and deciding it. Here the focus is on making laws real rather than words on pieces of paper, and ensuring that legal rights become part of custom and practice.

42. For Aquinas, see: McInerney, R. *Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*. Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982. For: Montesquieu (1748) *The Spirit of Laws*, see the recent translation by A.M. Cohler, B.C. Miller & H.S. Stone (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989). The quotation by H. Spencer is from his *Essays: The Americans* (1891) as included in: *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. 2nd Ed.* London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

43. Hobbes, Montesquieu, Bentham, Hume, Smith and many modern philosophers, jurists and economists have empha-sized the link between property (especially land) and freedom. In their view, the basis of an ordered society rests on adequate laws of property, its transfer, and the enforcement of contracts freely entered.

44. Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. *Science*, 162: 1243-1248. 1968.

45. F. A. Hayek has been scathing about the concept of social or distributive justice. He claims that social justice is: 'a phrase [that] mean[s] nothing at all and that to employ it [is] either thoughtless or fraudulent' (op.cit. [27] Ch.s 8, 9; quote taken from Preface: p.xvi). The present aim is not to determine how to achieve social justice nor even to examine appropriate or inappropriate expectations of social justice which were Hayek's concerns, but rather to clarify that the concept can quite easily be given a useful meaning in the scheme of things. If properly employed, the term contributes to a thoughtful and constructive debate about collective goods where tragedy or monopoly is inevitable and where a conventional market cannot be left to develop spontaneously. (Of course, distributive justice has nothing to do with whether a person's conduct has been lawful.) Distributive justice is not being used here, as socialists seek to do and Hayek feared, to imply that any actual distribution of wealth or goods that emerges is or is not just. The suggestion that all men have an equal share or equal claim to everything which is good or desired is, if not ridiculous, hardly conducive to either personal freedom or collective well-being. Nor does distributive justice (as a triad of rules) seek to define a final state of society to be striven for by government as authoritarians and utopians wish. Instead distributive justice is used here to clarify *how the necessary distribution of goods which are unavoidably collective in nature and whose use is essential to freedom should be approached* by each and all and endorsed by government. The point is that unless distributive justice is adequately handled, people will not tolerate their government and will progressively destroy their own resources. For further discussions on social justice, see: Brandt, R. (ed.) *Social Justice*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962.

46. Even if the average economist rejects or is puzzled by justice and equality, leading economists are pre-occupied with these issues. See: Sen. A. *Commodities and Capabilities*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985; and Sen, A. 'Justice' In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. & Newman, P. (eds.) *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*. London: Macmillan, 1987. Relatively recent influential philosophical contributions to the debate include: Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972; Nozick, R. *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books, 1974; and Hayek, F.A. *The Constitution of Liberty*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1960.

47. In the case of health care (Ex. 9.25), this utilitarian-style approach would suggest that poorer uneducated people who respond less well to treatment should get worse health care than richer better educated people. The QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years) is a simple utilitarian tool promoted enthusiastically by UK economists for use by policy-makers in deciding who should receive health-care paid for out of taxation. (QALYs are described in: Gudex, C. & Kind, P. *The QALY Toolkit*. Discussion Paper No. 38, Centre for Health Economics, University of York, 1988.) Aside from

various practical and methodological problems, the QALY approach implicitly favours younger rather than older patients, women rather than men, white rather than black patients, and upper social class rather than lower social class patients. For a theoretical critique, see: Carr-Hill, R. Assumptions of the QALY Procedure. *Social Science & Medicine*, 29: 469-477, 1987.

48. Havel, V. *Living in Truth*. (ed. J. Vladislav) London: Faber and Faber, 1987.

49. Ecclesiastes. 9:11. *The New English Bible with Apocrypha*. London: Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, 1970.

50. The idea that government might run society as an organization seems to have emerged with the technology of control and the growth and power of organizations. Even social scientists who should know better are prone to speak of the need for 'society to act' with the implication that politicians are in charge. I have emphasized repeatedly that the government is a cluster of special organizations, but a community is not an organization, nor is society (the community plus its private and public bodies). Ethical positions, outspoken people and open debate are the pivotal tools in reshaping society, not governments. Cf. Note [27]. The relation of the government to the citizenry is discussed further in G-6: Ch. 12.

51. See: Wolfensberger, W. & Zauha, H. (eds.) *Citizen Advocacy and Protective Services for the Impaired and Handicapped*. Toronto: National Institute on Mental Retardation, 1973. For citizen advocacy in the UK context, see: Butler, K., Carr, S. & Sullivan, F. *Citizen Advocacy: A Powerful Partnership*. London: National Citizen Advocacy, 1988.

52. For example: R. Dworkin refers to societal standards as 'institutional morality' (op.cit. [16]); and A.J.M. Milne calls universal standards a 'common morality' (op.cit. [12]).

53. Le Bon, G. (1895) *Psychologie des Foules*. Transl. as: *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. London: Ernest Benn, 1896; Freud, S. (1921) *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Standard Edition, Vol.18: 69-143, London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955. Two recent summaries of this area of theorizing are: Moscovici, S. *The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology*. (Transl. J.C. Whitehouse) New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985; and Ginneken, J. van. *Crowds, Psychology and Politics: 1871-1899*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

54. Yalom, I. *The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy*. 3rd Ed. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

55. Klein, R. *Inspecting the Inspectorates*. York: Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust, 1990.

56. Dworkin, R. op.cit. [16], p.128.

57. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948* can be found in: Brownlie, I. op.cit. [22] pp.21-27.

58. The *Draft Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance. 1967* can be found in: Brownlie, I. op.cit. [22]. pp.111-115.

59. See: Northmore, D. *Freedom of Information Handbook*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1990. The illustrations of secrecy are taken from the Introduction.

60. The reference to legal firms is taken from a personal account: Garlick, H. Mothers, lawyers and jugglers. *The Independent*, 23 Nov 1990, p.19.

61. Hogue, A.R. *Origins of the Common Law*. Indiana: Liberty Press, 1966, p.194.

62. Goitein, H. (1924). *Primitive Ordeal and Modern Law*. London: Rothman, 1980; Pound, R. The theory of judicial decision. *Harvard Law Review*, ix: p.53, 1936; Holmes Jr., O.W. *Common Law*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1963. p.7.

63. For the evolution of laws from custom in the UK, see: Hogue, A.R. op.cit. [61].

64. Inquisitorial proceedings which expect the judge to investigate are common in Europe. But this generates a conflict of interest and interferes with impartiality. The European Court, for example, makes its judgements on what is right for Europe and this encourages it to look to the future and help shape that future, rather than judging conduct impartially. Some UK court proceedings are inquisitorial e.g. admiralty courts which can apportion part of the blame to each party in a ship collision. Where the legal tradition is inquisitorial in nature, there is less emphasis on precedent or the binding power of higher courts. But focusing on the facts (what happened) or goals (what do we want) rather than the principles (what is right) actually increases ethical uncertainty, fosters bureaucratic intervention and enhances governmental power.

65. Kramer, S.N. *History Begins at Sumer*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981.

66. See: Jolowicz, H.F. *Roman Foundations of Modern Law*. London: Greenwood Press, 1978.

67. The bicameral arrangement has been proposed by F.A. Hayek. *The Political Order of A Free People*. Vol.3 of *Law, Legislation and Liberty*. op. cit. [27].

68. For an account of this new movement, see: Altman, A. *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

69. 1 Kings 3. *The New English Bible*. op.cit. [49]. It has been suggested that this story is a metaphor for the political division of Israel.

70. Weber, M. *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. (Transl. A.R. Henderson & T. Parsons) New York: Macmillan, 1947.

71. Milgram, S. *Obedience to Authority*. New York: Harper Colophon, 1974.

72. The two imperatives probably link to the distinction recognized by jurists and academics between those legal rules procedurally enforced by government, and those more or less widely accepted moral rules emerging from philosophy and theology. See, for example: Hart, H.L.A. *Law, Liberty and Morality*. London: Oxford University Press, 1963; and Fuller, L.L. *The Morality of Law*. Yale: Yale University Press, 1964. The present approach sees the sharp distinction of law and morality but also recognizes much more commonality and perceives a unity underlying these imperatives.

73. The Ten Commandments are to be found in Exodus 20. More laws follow in Exodus 21 which includes the famous talion statement. Many of these demand the death penalty. Further detailed laws are to be found in Leviticus. See: *The New English Bible* op.cit [49].

74. For example: Matthew 21. *The New English Bible*. op.cit. [49].

75. Hobbes saw laws in this way. Bentham too regarded judge-made, common or unwritten law as 'imaginary, fictitious, spurious'. Marx and Engels viewed laws as a means of dominance rather than a way to justice. Under the influence of socialism and utilitarianism, laws have become widely used for social engineering in this century. Positive law focuses on command, sanction, obedience, duty and sovereignty and is viewed as apart from ethics. Austin, for example, defined law as the command of a superior who had power to impose a sanction on one who did not comply (*Lectures on Jurisprudence*. London, 1879). Positivism is a widely accepted approach to law, especially in the UK and USA. The leading theorist is Kelsen who seeks to free the idea of law from all taint of external or social influences. (See: *General Theory of Law and State*. New York: Russell, 1961; *The Pure Theory of Law*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; *What is Justice?* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957.) The present approach recognizes many of the elements of legal positivism, but puts them together in an utterly different way. Pure legal positivism invites exaltation of the pragmatic imperative (G"-6^1) over the moral imperative, and exaltation of the government as ruler (G-6^1) over the citizenry. Whatever erudition supports it, this extreme view seems wrong-headed and socially undesirable. The present approach also emphasizes that governments are at a deep level controlled by pragmatic imperatives even if superficially they appear to be in control of them.

76. *Bhagavad Gita*. (Transl. J. Mascaro) Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.

77. The unique position of the Catholic Church and the confusion of modern societies have led some philosophers to advocate assigning it supremacy over us all. See, for example: McIntyre, A. *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* London: Duckworth, 1988.

78. Dworkin, R. *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia*. London: Harper Collins, 1993.

79. See the discussion of utopian communities in Ch. 5; and the findings of R.M. Kanter: *Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.

80. At the time of writing, Barbara Amiel provides a regular column in the Sunday Times in which she expresses these sentiments.

81. Hayek (e.g. p.4 Bk. II op. cit. [27]) emphasizes that the order is largely unconscious and implicit, preserved in dispositions and predispositions. My emphasis throughout is on what is involved in making rules explicit, together with the potential benefits and hazards in such an endeavour.

82. Kanter, R.M. op. cit. [79] p.1.

83. By contrast, much legal and political thinking starting with Aristotle tends to equate willing with forceful wishing or wanting. The general will of Jean-Jaques Rousseau, for example, derives essentially from the wishes of the majority. (*The Social Contract*. (Transl. D. Cress) Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). My proposal that the citizenry must consider itself as ruling the government, to be explained in more detail in Ch. 12 (G-6), aligns with Rousseau's ideas. My notion of a personal and communal will is closer to Durkheim's appreciation that the individual inevitably feels freely compelled (apart from any wishes) to express the collectivity while the collectivity reveals its moral obligations through the individual's exercise of freedom.

84. Our research projects recently engaged with confusion around citizenship. John Major, as Prime Minister produced a Citizen's Charter in which being a citizen was portrayed as equivalent to being a consumer of public services. (UK Prime Minister. *The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standard*. Cmnd. 1599, London: HMSO, 1991.) The Speaker of the Houses of Parliament set up a commission to examine citizenship, but his report turned out to be devoted to promoting an ethic of voluntarism. *(Encouraging Citizenship: Report of the Commission on Citizenship*. London: HMSO, 1990.) The recently established Citizenship Foundation is unconcerned with voluntarism or public services but rather with legal rights. (The Foundation's ideas are available in: *Citizenship. Journal of the Citizenship Foundation*. London.) Charter 88, a crusading body seeking constitutional reform in the UK, see citizenship as a civic ideal. Other perspectives could easily be found. None is wrong but all are one-sided.

Chapter 10

Realizing Values: The Building Blocks

Designing a desirable ethical rule, dreaming up a useful idea, or recognizing an emerging social need is one thing, getting it valued within a community, installed in an organization, and used willingly by people, is quite another. We now turn to consider what precisely is involved in ensuring that values are realized and tangible achievements generated. As you might expect, we need to examine a wide variety of conceptual tools derived from the seven basic types of purpose detailed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Trying to realize new values, so alien to traditional societies, characterises modern ones. The idea that social life in the modern world could remain more or less the same from generation to generation is no longer within the bounds of possibility. The values of creativity, discovery, invention, and an endless search for improvement seem to be part of modern society.[1]

Organizational life, too, has moved out of the industrial era of simplicity and stability to a condition of increasing social pressures, intense global competition, constant innovation, rapid technological change and unpredictable cultural turbulence. Managers in firms of all sizes are starting to recognize what politicians have always known: that the ability to work with values is essential for success. After all, work itself is, at its heart, about the generation of value.

The Aim. The present chapter explores the purpose-based tools needed and used by people, groups, organizations and governments. Ch. 12 completes the picture by examining organized endeavours, and the way they are created and regulated. Vast numbers of popular and academic books in many disciplines and domains have been written on various aspects of realizing values. I have drawn freely on that literature. The present intention, however, is to offer something new.

First, I want to define the various purpose derivatives far more precisely than is usual. This is necessary to clarify their practical use and limitations. I also want to show how these conceptual tools relate to each other. In this way, we can gain a comprehensive overview of crucial structures and processes inherent in all complex endeavours. My hope is to stimulate what you, the reader, already intuitively know, independently of any specialist or disciplinary teaching. You must draw on your existing knowledge and experience if you are to use the ideas to operate in a more deliberate and effective way.

Second, I want to show how all purpose or value derivatives find their origins in the seven elemental forms of purpose. This is aesthetically pleasing and greatly helps in understanding and remembering it all. These origins also provide the theoretical framework with an unequivocal root in responsibility and social identity, so giving an ethical quality to its use.

People endlessly, if often unconsciously, impose their values; and communities openly seek to see their values translated into action. There are many different views about how values should determine achievement by society or within organizations. Great debates regularly take place over whether an individualist *laissez faire* or a communal interventionist approach is desirable; or whether grand planning or incrementalism is preferable; or whether science or religion should lead the way. Such controversies can usually be understood as expressions of either conflicting ideologies (Ch. 9), or differing approaches to ethical choice (Ch. 6), or contrasting identity types (Ch. 7), or perennial dualities (Ch.s 12 and 13).

Fortunately, the present task is not to determine in what direction society should go, nor even how it should be taken there. The task is simply to clarify what is involved in realizing values. In pursuing this task, my aim is to provide essential ideas as tools which can be used by people to further whatever they think is important by whatever methods they prefer.

Again I remind the reader that the systematic and hierarchical order of presentation is for ease of exposition only. Everyone must use the ideas in a way that suits them and their situation.

Language. Choosing terms is never easy. However, as previously, common words like 'policy' have been precisely defined in ways that clients have found to be intuitively appealing and useful for their documents and

discussions. Of course these terms are used in practice in many varied ways: policy, for example, has been used as a synonym for each of the levels of purpose and much else; and over 30 different definitions have been proposed for planning.[2] It is not possible (and it would be tedious) to attempt to reference and reconcile all the various definitions and disciplinary perspectives on all the terms. Suffice it to say that the underlying notions offered here draw heavily on disciplinary and domain-based studies, even if the terms used differ somewhat on occasion.

Despite familiarity with most of the ideas to be presented, people have difficulty seeing the big picture. No existing text, to my knowledge, encompasses, labels, defines and inter-relates the full range of purpose derivatives. So, to repeat, the aim now is to provide brief accounts which define and identify the various purpose derivatives beyond doubt, and to clarify their relative positions in a single framework whose logic is based in the universal urge to realize values.

Using the Building Blocks. The building blocks needed and used by individuals singly or jointly to realize values are distinctive forms of purpose, direction, drive and functioning. These conceptual tools are needed in every community and are used by every organization. Whenever and wherever the building blocks are required, their essential nature and constitution is the same. Once understood, they can be applied in whatever setting or with whatever frame of reference the reader wishes. My primary aim is to reveal their nature, so I will illustrate the ideas using easily recognizable examples, mostly from business and government.

Realizing values has two dimensions: realization for the individual (person or organization) and realization for the community. Organizations have a community dimension and are used by people to develop and promote their values to benefit society as well as to pursue valued activities to benefit themselves. The interaction between values upheld and pursued by particular individuals and the significance of those values in wider society lies at the heart of participation. These issues will be partially explored here and further examined in Ch.s 12 and 13.

INTRODUCING THE REALIZATION OF VALUES

The purpose or value derivatives emerge from the *elemental hierarchy* of purpose (H^1) to form another hierarchy made up of groupings of adjacent levels (cf. Master-Fig. 0). I call this derived entity a *structural hierarchy* ($_sH^1$).

In the structural hierarchy, the seven basic levels of purpose can be grouped in seven different ways: in seven groups of one level, in six groups of two adjacent levels, in five groups of three adjacent levels, and so on up to a single group of seven levels. Each grouping carries important practical implications. Each contains groups which are purposive entities, i.e. tools essential for realizing values in organizations and society.

Before carefully exploring and explaining the structural hierarchy grouping by grouping, and internal group by internal group, the total picture is overviewed here.

Achievement is the most tangible expression that values have been realized. Significant achievement of any sort requires the **organization of endeavours (G-5)**. Endeavours demand work, and organization reflects the complications to be addressed in handling that work, especially when many people are involved. Neither work nor organization can be successfully forced: they require a minimum degree of **autonomy**. Values are communal in nature and autonomous endeavours are only possible if there is a general consensus on values amongst those involved and in wider society. Consensus enables the pursuit of values by executive-run enterprises, the preservation of values by mandated regulatory authorities, and the transformation of values in society by emergent popular movements.

Behind the autonomous organization of endeavours lies the essence of realizing values, which is the experience and **exercise of freedom (G-7)** by each person. Freedom implies **membership** of a society and tolerance of the existing social order. Although social identity and values are communal in nature, freedom implies that each person has the potential to determine their own actions. A person can support or oppose aspects of the social order; and join or leave organizations. So freedom is about being actively intentional and participating by imagining a different future.

To be human is to possess intentionality. The capacity to recognize the ethical order, to hold values and to set purposes is revealed in recognizable achievements: paid or unpaid, at home, on the job or in communal settings.

If freedom and intentionality are to operate properly, they must be exercised responsibly. The discharge of responsibility is the same whether the value to be realized is an ethical rule or principle, like respect for elders or freedom of expression, or something mundane like getting to work on time or attractive packaging. In all cases, the crucial responsibility falls to those who select and claim to hold the purpose or value. The development and careful definition of the hierarchy of purpose was carried out precisely to clarify this responsibility. In other words, the seven levels taken as

monads (groupings of just one level) are about defin-
ing responsibility (G-1). Responsibility for pur-
poses and associated fundamental social roles form the
foundation on which the realization of values is built
and on which all social existence depends.

Between the definition of responsibility (G-1) and
the organization of endeavours (G-5) lie three in-
creasingly complex essential purposive processes. Once
purposes are set and the associated responsibility
accepted, people are stimulated to start doing things.
The first step must be to constrain activity (G-2) to
ensure that accepted values are incorporated and have
maximum impact. Giving people directions can
achieve this. Directions focus attention and can be
very effective in shaping activities. But their pursuit
generates change and their constraining quality is liable
to generate opposition. If this resistance is so great that
it impedes progress, the second step must be to over-
come opposition and actively promote change
(G-3). This involves developing drives that lead
people to favour the desired values. Drives energize
people and, if at all successful, generate achievement.
But such achievements are transient and sporadic unless
deliberately consolidated and managed. So the third
step is to recognize the need for adequate functioning
to sustain achievement (G-4). Functioning demands
a continuous and dependable use of purposes, direc-
tions and drives. This is work. Work needs to be
organized in a way which serves the individuals
involved and also wider society — which leads to the
notion of autonomous endeavours (G-5).

One final grouping, the hexads, remains unmen-
tioned. Between independent endeavours (G-5) and
the exercise of freedom (G-7) lies the need to sustain an
ethical order and regulate the power (G-6) released
by cooperative efforts. This grouping identifies the
need for sovereignty and its two guardians — the
citizenry and the government. The interaction of these
entities reflects the ethical order and determines the
potential for realizing values in practice. In other
words, the hierarchy reveals the truism that the realiza-
tion of values in society (G-1 to G-5) depends on the
exercise of freedom (G-7) interacting with the struc-
tures of power (G-6).

The full set of groupings and their groups is
represented diagrammatically in Master-Figure 28. The
properties of the groupings are summarized in Master-
Table 29. The groups in each grouping have a distinctive
internal form which is diagrammed in Master-Table 30.
(Further properties are summarized in Master-Table 40
in Ch. 12.) Taking each grouping in turn now, here is a
summary with definitions, again emphasizing the
logical evolution of the hierarchy.

G-1: Defining Responsibility. 7 monadic groups
(1 level per group) *ensure that values can be affirmed,
chosen and pursued in a social context.* This grouping
reflects the existence of seven levels or types of
purpose whose determination demands distinctive
responsibilities and defines distinctive roles for each
person. Responsibility must be *defined appropriately,*
that is to say in accord with the need for any person or
social body to adapt to the actual social situation.
Purposes typically generate activity in their service —
activity which must be constrained to ensure that values
are reflected in practice.

G-2: Constraining Activity. 6 dyadic groups (2
levels per group) *ensure that chosen values focus minds and
shape outcomes.* This grouping reflects the existence of
six types of direction which help individuals act in
support of their group. Activity must be *constrained
strategically,* that is to say in accord with the require-
ment to maximize the impact of accepted values in the
situation. Directions containing neglected, controver-
sial or new values generate change which is naturally
resisted. Change must be positively promoted if such
values are to make headway.

G-3: Promoting Change. 5 triadic groups (3
levels per group) *ensure that desired values are installed
despite resistances.* This grouping reflects the existence of
five components of any drive which seeks to reinforce
existing values or to embed new values. There are
always equally valid alternative values which might be
preferred, each with its adherents. So any change of
values must be *promoted politically,* that is to say, the
support of those affected must be won and opposition
must be handled. Drives, if successful, generate
achievement which must be sustained if the values are
to persist.

G-4: Sustaining Achievement. 4 tetradic groups
(4 levels per group) *ensure that values are expressed co-
herently and enduringly in activities.* This grouping reflects
the existence of four domains of functioning which
permanently demonstrate values in action. Functioning
must be *sustained rationally,* that is to say, by appeal to
values (i.e. reasons) which are sensible, necessary and
unarguable. Functioning, which is essential for com-
munity living, requires and generates work. Work must
be organized to maintain functioning and to ensure that
its values serve wider society as well as those involved.

The four groupings to this point define building
blocks for the realization of values, and they are the
subject of this chapter.

An important distinction deserves a mention here.
A drive can exist in two modes: entirely for an

individual or entirely for the community. In the former case, the drive is defined within and for an individual, i.e. organization or person, to generate internal change. In the latter case, it is defined by individuals to operate diffusely in wider society to bring pressure on other individuals to change. By contrast, the other three forms of building block — purpose, direction and functioning — only exist in one mode with the individual and the communal dimensions fused. These entities exist for society through their existence for individuals, and the two dimensions cannot be disentangled. In the case of functioning, the communal dimension determines the role of an endeavour in society. Organizations can be set up with markedly different roles and this is the basis for a classification elaborated in Ch.11.

The next three groupings define conceptions — autonomy, sovereignty, membership — which are used to control the realization of values. The associated purposive entities are endeavours, rulers or guardians, and society with its social order. These develop, use and influence the building blocks. The controlling conceptions will be explored in Ch. 12, but they are summarized here for convenience and completeness.

G-5: Organizing an Endeavour. 3 pentadic groups (5 levels per group) *ensure that work serves the values of both society and individuals.* This grouping reflects the existence of three embodiments of autonomy which enable joint endeavours to be created and thrive in society. Movements introduce new values; authorities clarify and preserve values; and enterprises pursue recognized values. All such autonomous endeavours must be *organized consensually*, that is to say by appeal to freely-given agreement on certain values by individuals within them and by those generally without. Successful endeavours generate power which must be controlled if society is to remain stable and ordered.

G-6: Regulating Power. 2 hexadic groups (6 levels per group) *ensure that society, its people and their activities, are regulated by values.* This grouping reflects the existence of two guardians of sovereignty: the citizenry and the government. Sovereignty is essential if a society is to sustain its own ethical order. For sovereign power to be legitimate, it must be *controlled ethically*, that is to say, by appeal to a deep understanding of what is right and good. Sovereignty enables and generates freedom which must be exercised to make social life meaningful and tolerable.

G-7: Exercising Freedom. 1 heptadic group (containing all 7 levels) *ensures that each person uses and evaluates values.* The grouping reflects the existence of a form of membership defined by a particular social order. Freedom and membership, if they are to mean anything, must be *exercised imaginatively*, that is to say by appeal to values which both characterize and transcend present society. Otherwise freedom is indistinguishable from conformity. Put another way: only reflective personal evaluation of existing values can lead to a social order with all its imperfections being supported with full commitment. In turn, only a committed member can genuinely assist in the emergence of worthy new values. Membership, with its associated freedom, generates personal responsibility. This responsibility must be precisely and appropriately defined if values are to be affirmed and pursued in a realistic way. And so we return to G-1.

The ethical starting place to analyse the realization of values in society is with the roles and responsibilities of each person in society. The practical starting place is the performance of appropriate activities. The logical starting place is the seven level elemental hierarchy of purposes and values. These three perspectives come together in the monadic grouping (G-1), to which we now turn.

Master-Figure 28

Purpose derivatives and processes for realizing values in society.

Diagrammatic representation of the structural hierarchy formed by systematically defining all combinations of adjacent levels of purpose in the elemental hierarchy. See text and Master-Tables 29 and 30 for further details and explanation.

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Master-Table 29 **The groupings of levels of purpose used to realize values in society.**

Grouping the levels of purpose forms seven levels in a structural hierarchy. The G numeral indicates the number of adjacent levels grouped together. In all groupings (G), descending the groups reveals progression to more realizable, precise, tangible, or action-based entities.

G	Nature	Function	Content (Structure)	Implications for Society	Implications for Organizations	Common Errors
G-1:	Defining responsibility appropriately	To ensure that values can be affirmed, chosen and pursued in a social context.	7 levels of Purpose (monadic)	Recognition that everyone has the need and ability to fill seven distinct primal roles in social life.	All seven levels need to be recognized as motivating and influencing staff.	•Poor balance between personal and group pressures. •Excessive neglect of one or more roles and levels.
G-2:	Constraining activity strategically	To ensure that chosen values focus minds and shape outcomes.	6 types of Direction (dyadic)	Communication between primal roles at adjacent levels is needed to deal with uncertainty about using values in practice.	Clear, realistic and acceptable directions are needed for cooperation, efficiency, effectiveness.	•Woolly specifications. •Mishandling the social process. •Ignoring value pressures.
G-3:	Promoting change politically	To ensure that desired values are installed despite resistances.	5 components of Drive (triadic)	Values must be constantly revised, reasserted and (re-)installed, even in the most conservative society.	Organizations are quasi-communities and all staff should be engaged when introducing values.	•Failing to recognize the political dimension in change. •Not attempting to introduce any changes.
G-4:	Sustaining achievement rationally	To ensure that values are expressed coherently and enduringly in activities.	4 domains of Functioning (tetradic)	Society requires a wide variety of organizations dedicated to its transformation, differentiation, strengthening and sustenance.	Strong management involves the performance of four types of leadership work.	•Omitting work on mind-sets. •Excess focus on operations. •Absence of strategic thinking. •Poor linkage of the domains.
G-5:	Organizing endeavours consensually	To ensure that work serves the values of both society and individuals.	3 embodiments of Autonomy (pentadic)	Organizing involves compartmentalization and the duties of each compartment should be designed to be synergistic.	Movements, authorities and enterprises must be developed and handled in distinctive ways.	•Expecting efficient services from government, or self-regulation by individual firms. •Misunderstanding regulation
G-6:	Regulating power ethically	To ensure that a society, its people and their activities, are regulated by values.	2 guardians of Sovereignty (hexadic)	The people require guardian institutions and political debate to control the government that regulates their activities.	An organization should consider itself a society in microcosm and work on its framework of ethical rules.	•The government places itself above the citizenry. •Poor working of the political arena.
G-7:	Exercising freedom imaginatively	To ensure that each member of society uses and evaluates values.	1 state of Membership (heptadic)	Society requires its members to show civic virtue by participating willingly, being responsible and acting on what is important.	Values are constantly affirmed by all staff in their relationships, actions and communications.	•Taking society for granted. •Denying the omnipresence of values in all social phenomena. •Devaluing certain members.

Qualities of internal levels in each of the groupings of purposes.

These properties apply to each of the groups (purpose-derivatives) within a particular grouping. The Table shows how each grouping builds on the previous one. Note that the highest level (in shaded bold) gives the grouping its characteristic quality.

In formulae on both sides, 1°L refers to the first level in a group or grouping, 2°L to the second level &c. See text for further explanation.

	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	G-6	G-7
	Each of the 7 levels of **PURPOSE** enables **Responsibility** to be defined	Each of the 6 types of **DIRECTION** enables **Activity** to be constrained	Each of the 5 components of **DRIVE** enables **Change** to be promoted	Each of the 4 domains of **FUNCTIONING** enables **Achievement** to be sustained	Each of the 3 embodiments of **AUTONOMY** enables **Endeavours** to be organized	Each of the 2 guardians of **SOVEREIGNTY** enables **Power** to be regulated	Each of the state of **MEMBERSHIP** enables **Freedom** to be exercised

	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	G-6	G-7	
7°L							**Imaginatively**	7°L
6°L						**Ethically**	Ethically	6°L
5°L					**Consensually**	Consensually	Consensually	5°L
4°L				**Rationally**	Rationally	Rationally	Rationally	4°L
3°L			**Politically**	Politically	Politically	Politically	Politically	3°L
2°L		**Strategically**	Strategically	Strategically	Strategically	Strategically	Strategically	2°L
1°L	**Appropriately**	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	1°L

DEFINITIONS:

Appropriately	:	To meet the need to adapt to the immediate situation.
Strategically	:	To meet the need to maximize the impact of values given in the situation.
Politically	:	To meet the need to win support when choosing from valid alternative values.
Rationally	:	By appeal to a value-based rationale for on-going activities.
Consensually	:	By appeal to a general and freely given agreement on values.
Ethically	:	By appeal to values which are understood to be right and good.
Imaginatively	:	By appeal to values which transcend present society.

G-1: PURPOSE

Nature. If values are to be realized in an ethical way, then all relevant activities must be performed responsibly and purposefully. So ensuring and determining responsibility ought to be our starting point. In practice, too, responsibility for articulating and sticking to a purpose is fundamental.

To appreciate where responsibility for purpose lies, it becomes essential to clarify precisely what is meant by the term. Inquiry along these lines has already revealed that there are seven distinct forms of purpose: five types of value and two types of objective (Ch.s 3 & 4). Clear specification of purpose and sensible assignment of responsibility (and hence realization of values) depend on recognizing these seven distinctions and their properties.

So, starting from the conception of a person as a social being who by nature accepts or assumes responsibility in a social setting, we are forced to unfold the seven-level hierarchy of purpose (see Fig. 10.1). Any particular inner intention or sense that something is important becomes operative only when it is fixed in the form of one of the levels or monadic groups: i.e. as an *ultimate value* (G-1^7), a *value system* (G-1^6), a *social value* (G-1^5), a *principal object* (G-1^4), an *internal priority* (G-1^3), a *strategic objective* (G-1^2), or a *tactical objective* (G-1^1).

The *function* of purpose in realizing values is to ensure that values can be chosen, affirmed and pursued in a social context. Each form of purpose makes its own essential and distinctive contribution. Holding a purpose at any particular level simultaneously entails a specific responsibility to pursue it. Otherwise there would be no meaning in saying that the person held that purpose or value. It also entails a specific social role in relation to its function. Otherwise the person would not be permitted by others to pursue the purpose.

Of course, people often claim to hold values and to be pursuing objectives when this is not the case. When others do this to us, we feel let down. We sense that they are not behaving responsibly. If, as in many organizations, such behaviour is the norm, then cooperation and achievement are severely limited.

Effective use of all of the more complex purposive or value-based tools depend on people selecting and affirming purposes and values in the various forms and accepting their accompanying roles and responsibilities.

Properties

The present task is to recapitulate the levels of purpose from the perspective of the responsibility of a social being i.e. a person sensitive to the historical context and aware of their continuing participation in social groups and wider society. The relevant new properties are summarized in Master-Table 31 and briefly explained here.

We have already discovered (in Ch. 3) that responsibility at each level of purpose has a different form and is exercised in a different way. Here we focus on the *personal responsibility* generated by holding a purpose and

Figure 10.1: The monadic grouping which differentiates purpose.
Seven levels of purpose enabling responsibility to be appropriately defined

clarify to whom the responsibility is owed. Corresponding to the exercise of this responsibility, it is now possible to identify a distinctive social role. This role is so basic that I will refer to it as a *primal role*. These primal roles must be taken on and handled in a way that is *appropriately adapted* to the situation. I am referring here to each person's role as: a human being (G-1^7), an adherent (G-1^6), a participant (G-1^5), an individual (G-1^4), a governor (G-1^3), a leader (G-1^2) and an agent (G-1^1). Any particular communal role (G''-3^2) is a specific development of one or other of these universal and primal social roles. Although people may present themselves as embodying just one type of primal role, it seems unlikely that this is possible. Some people probably do have inclinations and abilities which make one or other role more prominent, but every person probably needs to fill them all, at least to some degree in some portion of their life.

Identity in its widest sense goes beyond social being (cf. Ch. 7 and Master-Matrices 10-13), but social identity is the main topic here, as well as being an inescapable concern for each of us. Holding various personal roles and exercising responsibility obviously uses and affects *the self*. As each person freely accepts and lives the primal roles and responsibilities, so different potentialities of the self are enabled. As each level of value is considered, it will be evident that each role if taken too far poses a particular danger for the self and others.

Overview. The present analysis of the monads offers a more person-oriented viewpoint of purposes than that emerging from an analysis of organizations and social groups presented in Chapters 3 to 5 (cf. Master-Tables 1-4). The argument here starts from the assumption that a person is only recognizable as a social being through their memberships and obligations. It then notes that these are associated with seven distinct roles and responsibilities linked to the levels of purpose. Put another way, the effective operation of complex purposive entities, and therefore of particular organizations and whole societies, depends on effective performance of individual people in these seven primal roles.

Situated in the centre of the hierarchy are principal objects. This fourth level is where value must be turned into action: ultimately by a person, even if through or within an organization. Groups may control values, but action depends on the responsible individual. So here is where each social being potentially comes into his or her own. Personal identity is realized in deeds not ideas or words, so setting and pursuing principal objects is at its core. At this level, an individual's identity must be expressed. So identity pressures determine the objects chosen and role performance. People often speak of the need 'to own' decisions, activities or values: which

means seeing these in terms of principal objects and as expressions of their own identity.

Turning first to the three levels above principal objects, our previous analyses suggest that it is appropriate to speak of these values as societal. To be viable, one's primal roles at these levels (i.e. as a human being, a tribal adherent, or a group participant) must depend on using values which are currently recognized within a particular society. Here group pressures are paramount in role performance. By contrast, purpose in the three levels below principal objects are experienced quite differently. These primal roles (as a governor, a leader, or an agent) tie one to endeavours or organizations defined by principal objects. The discharge of responsibility is primarily determined by immediate reality or situational pressures.

With this introduction (and recalling the accounts of purposes and values given earlier), we can very briefly re-examine each of the levels of purpose in terms of the role and responsibility emerging from it.

The Seven Purposes (Again)

Ultimate values (G-1^7) are universally accepted and eternally pursued states of being. These generate a *personal responsibility* for distinguishing good and evil, right and wrong. This means refusing to be blinkered or overly constrained by values and circumstances in present society. The *primal role* is that of a human being who feels responsible to God or an inner spirit. In today's secular age, one might say responsible to humanity or to posterity or to a particular ultimate value (like Compassion or Reason). Societies vary in their preference for particular ultimate values, but all are recognized to some degree. Everybody has the capacity to function in this role. People who operate in society at this level persistently are thought of as visionaries, prophets or spiritual leaders. Like all social roles, this one embodies beliefs. If society rejects those beliefs, the prophet goes unrecognized in his or her own land.

Ultimate values enable *the self* to transcend time person and place, and so are the basis of selflessness. Unless a person is selfless, they are unable to make contact with a realm of being which is beyond present reality with its inescapable suffering and injustices. Taken to the extreme, however, selflessness becomes self-denial. Self-denial may become the basis for perverse ideologies in which the self, often identified with material needs or bodily functions like sexuality, is denigrated or rejected.

Value systems (G-1^6) are the interlinked valued ideas which order understanding in a particular social

domain. Value systems define the identity of tribes and control individual identity. The *primal role* here is that of the socialized adherent. Adherents are also known as experts, disciples, ideologues, devotees, believers or followers. Any value system generates in its adherents a *personal responsibility* to preserve and perpetuate it, and this involves repeatedly affirming the ideas to themselves and others. All adherents believe that the value system is right, true and real. Each feels a loyalty and responsibility for upholding and reaffirming for themselves and others what the value system is. Adherents feel a responsibility primarily to the value system itself, rather than to the tribe. It often seems to many that others in the tribe, sometimes those in leadership positions, are insufficiently dedicated to the value system, are back-sliding, and altogether too ready to compromise with alien values. These adherents regularly call for tribal renewal and a return to fundamentals. Societies contain a multiplicity of value systems, and their adherents have a role whenever their ideas are relevant: for example, as experts sitting on scientific advisory committees, as the faithful sustaining a political party, as ideological elites explaining a social movement, as believers developing communal worship, as professionals determining practice guidelines.

Value systems are the social basis of *the self* and are crucial to self-definition and self-expression. They permit understanding: alien values seem empty, confusing and wrong. Because we are socialized by value systems, nothing is more natural than to allow these to control our thoughts. The present analysis confirms that we are responsible for what we think, but goes on to suggest that we must not use socialization as an excuse for our views.

Attempts to destroy living value systems are equivalent to attempts to destroy people's identity. This is why adherents die for their beliefs and tribal communities hold them under oppression for generations. Unfortunately, adherents are always in danger of exalting their value system beyond reason, of denying the validity of alternative or rival schools of thought, and of becoming fanatical. Such activities suggest that self-glorification has developed.

Social values (G-1⁵) are freely shared needs-based values serving specific communities. These values are experienced as personal needs as much as social needs, and are immediately recognizable as potential or actualizable goods. Acceptance of a need as a value or a value as a need is not always wholly straightforward, and the *personal responsibility* which emerges here is to recognize and, if necessary, clarify what each and all in the community do in fact need. The recognition of this responsibility leads to the *primal role* of the participant.

Those who participate actively do so on their own behalf and on behalf of others to whom and for whom they feel responsible. A community is made up of its members and so any need recognized even by just one member is, by definition, a need of the community. There are people who find that they have a strong feel for the community and its needs. Thoughtful journalists, for example, do more than just report news, they reflect and even shape social values. Some people prefer to participate by helping voluntary campaigns or working in reform-oriented organizations. Participants who are angry at injustices and feel impatient for change become activists in pressure groups or organizers in social movements. Highly capable or prestigious participants become community leaders, and some are the public figures who make up 'the great and the good' in society. Such people sit on public inquiries and commissions, serve as patrons of charities, explain what is important on the radio or television, and can be found guiding public institutions, holding elected offices, or linking membership associations to wider society.

Social values are essential for personal and communal survival because they tap into basic needs. While excessive conformity with established social values may reflect a blindness to social ills, denial or rejection of social values cuts a person off from others in the community and endangers survival. The progressive discovery and development of social values is an intuitive and reflective process which fosters social progress in the group and enables development of *the self*. Taken to the extreme, a person becomes over-concerned with their own ideas about what is needed and attempts to foist these values on the community regardless of the views of others. The danger here is self-preoccupation and a consequent lack of balance in judgements.

Principal objects (G-1⁴) are the identity-defining activities of recognizable endeavours. The objects demarcate a range of permitted ongoing activities and lend themselves to institutionalization. They also generate a direct *personal responsibility* for owning what is to be achieved overall, and an indirect personal responsibility for whatever is done to fulfil the objects. If the emphasis is on owning in a direct and concrete sense, then the role of proprietor applies. If the emphasis is on commitment to a new risky endeavour, then the role of entrepreneur fits best. However, using the notion of owning and commitment in its most general sense, the *primal role* here is that of the individual, or rather, because our concern is social being, 'the responsible individual'. Of course all roles should be responsible, but the term is most needed here because the term 'individual' is often used to refer to a person

rather than a role. The idea that being an individual implies holding a role flows from the notion that society can and must expect us to be primarily responsible to ourselves for our own activities. By being responsible to himself or herself in this way, each person can exert autonomy and manifest individuality. Each person needs to function like this, for example, when embracing the various primal roles otherwise they will be poorly discharged.

Principal objects are ways of meeting needs, of expressing one's value system in action, and of being human. Because objects and associations based on them enable interests to be pursued, they lock into *the self* via individual self-interest. Self-interest derives from the urge for physical and emotional survival, and extends beyond the accumulation of wealth and prestige. Self-interest is essential to enable a person to decide to join one association rather than another, and to be a distinct individual within a community. Self-interest is also essential for a community if it wishes to liberate its members' enthusiasm and commitment. However, because anxieties about personal survival are at the root of self-interest, there is always the danger that it will degenerate into selfishness.

Internal priorities (G-1³) are the degrees of emphasis amongst valid values or actions for immediate use. Priorities generate a *personal responsibility* to allocate value or to assert preference in concrete terms now. This means considering and ordering important aspects in the situation, or affirming what is most important all things considered. The choice distributes money, approval, time, attention, prestige or other scarce resources. It helps steer and orient decisions made about a person or group, activity or output. The *primal role* is that of a governor — but sometimes called more specifically a commissioner, director, assessor, adjudicator etc. Because the allocation of value is a matter of brute assertion, governing is best done in a group, generically called a board (of governors). The board as a whole makes the decisions. Each governor has a responsibility to the board to consider the issue, to assert a view or take a side, to debate options and implications, and to agree the conclusion informally or by vote. The board itself is responsible to the body which constituted it: most commonly some sort of membership-based association, parliamentary entity or higher board.

Boards weigh up values in reaching a decision. The board is needed because a single person's view is too liable to introduce an unacceptable bias e.g. for reviews, examinations, special complaints, adjudications, appeals, public inquiries, and regulation. Organizations use a variety of informal boards (like steering committees,

management boards, disciplinary tribunals, policy-control groups) as well as their formal governing body. Regulatory authorities are sometimes called boards (e.g. the parole board) because their governing bodies, rather than their executives or secretariat, do the essential work.

The need for governors is enormous because no organization — public, voluntary or private — should be set up without a governing body with at least 3 and usually no more than 20 governors. In the UK, over 300,000 governors are needed to steer state primary and secondary schools alone. Some people find themselves attracted to the governing role. It is not uncommon to find a person serving as governor of a polytechnic, a hospital, and a local charity — often for minimal pay. In businesses, pay is more commensurate with responsibility. There are people who make a livelihood from non-executive chairmanships and memberships of boards in perhaps a dozen firms and government agencies, as well as serving on boards of charitable bodies. Of all the roles, that of the governor appears to be the most poorly understood. Non-executive directors in businesses too often do no more than go through the motions of governance work: they draw a salary and are puzzled when the company collapses virtually overnight. Governors in public agencies are usually more dedicated, but frequently behave inappropriately: like adherents (deciding in accord with their value system rather than the realities in the situation), like participants (putting society before the organization), or like leaders (managing the organization without the expertise, experience or time to do so).

Internal priorities are brute assertions by *the self* of what is most desirable at the moment. They are a legitimate opportunity for emotive self-assertion. Self-assertion is required to protect one's interests and bring a particular perspective to bear in difficult or uncertain situations. However, self-assertion taken too far ignores realities and so acts against one's own interests. Extreme self-assertion may, for example, deny the legitimate viewpoints and valid aspirations of other people who are party to the situation. This will not be tolerated for long and the result is likely to be either some form of retaliation or a factional breakdown of the valued association. So the danger here is self-destructiveness.

Strategic objectives (G-1²) are the desired and feasible outcomes which maximize impact in the situation. The *personal responsibility* which is generated here involves developing a sense of what things are really like, a notion of what course of action is best, and a decision about what outcome can realistically be

sought: in a phrase — what is to be achieved now. This *primal role* is that of the leader. It is both pro-active and reactive, as much responsive as determined. Leaders need to have confidence in their own judgement and capability. Everybody is a potential leader in the sense of needing to decide for themselves what is to be aimed for at any point in their own lives. Parents must decide how to shape the evolution of their family. In wider society, recognized leaders are (or should) be found from among the heads of large corporations, within academic institutions and public bodies, and in the ranks of top jurists and senior politicians.

Leaders in all situations are responsible to those they lead. This is obvious when we consider that any task-based group will spontaneously throw up a leader if one is not provided. Leaders need to recognize that they must win trust and must decide in a way that is broadly acceptable to their followers. The effective value-driven leader abjures bribes and threats (carrot-and-stick), preferring to give willing followers an understanding of the situation and conveying a sense of optimism, determination and hope.

Within an organization, managers can be leaders if they really decide what is to be done and feel responsible *to* their subordinates. All too often, managers feel primarily responsible *for* their subordinates to their bosses. Instead of leading, they may merely activate subordinates by pressing them to respond to higher level demands and to do what has to be done. In other words, the accountability relationship which is essential for control seems to run counter to the leadership relationship which is essential for achievement. For best results, organizations require both relationships to be operated simultaneously.

Strategic objectives require a realistic perception of the situation and what can be done within it. Their formulation requires both a dispassionate appreciation of the situation and its sensitive handling. Because strategic objectives enable achievement, they depend on competence and a sense of self-efficacy. In short, they are the basis for *the self* to be fulfilled. Self-fulfilment is necessary to feel useful and alive. Employees with little variety or influence over their work feel controlled and so are not fulfilled. They experience daily frustration, helplessness and hopelessness, all potent causes of physical illness. The reverse situation applies if the self intrudes too far into the leader role. Then followers are ignored, principal objects are neglected, and unreal visions or the status quo become grandiose vehicles for self-admiration. The result is self-indulgence: a common sight amongst top executives and politicians prior to their downfall.

Tactical objectives (G-1^1) are precise tangible time-targeted results which are steps toward a desired outcome. The emphasis on time deadlines ensures that the objective is not merely wish-fulfilment but is about taking action in the situation and overcoming any and all practical obstacles. Tactical objectives are about process and they define a *personal responsibility* to do whatever has to be done. This *primal role* is that of an agent. To emphasize the fact that an agent does not make the key decisions (which are strategic), agents are often called functionaries, executants, operatives, or administrators.

The managers referred to above who do not act as leaders are behaving as agents. Agents are responsible to whomever has employed them on the particular task. This employer may be referred to as the boss, the contractor, the owner, the instructor, the taskmaster. Workers on the shop-floor often have little option but to function as agents; and housewives often feel the same. Agents either obey orders, follow prescriptions and routines laid down in training, or react to demands and necessity. While they do make judgements about performance and should operate in a sensitive and sensible way, they are not expected to make judgements about the need for their activity.

Tactical objectives are pure means and only contribute indirectly to *the self* and its identity. Here, full attention must be given to activities and impersonal obstacles while personal wishes or needs are pushed to one side. Task completion requires self-control and so distractions from within or without must be ignored. Self-control, which is essentially impulse control, enables persistence. But self-control may lead to automaton-type functioning. A person may become so engrossed in tasks that their own needs, preferences and principles become forgotten. In other words, because tactical objectives do not directly serve the self, there is the danger that successful performance will contribute to self-alienation.

REVIEWING PURPOSE

Disentangling purpose into levels enables personal responsibilities to be appropriately defined, appropriately assigned and accepted. The ever-present dangers are either to hold people including oneself responsible when this is not appropriate, or to deny responsibility for that which is indeed ours. Except in our role as a human being, our responsibility has sharp limits. Sometimes its extent requires careful interpretation. A governor, for example, both is and is not fully responsible for the corporate decisions of a board. A governor does have a responsibility to assert a view to the board, even to confront the board, but the governor

is still bound to uphold the board's final decision. If any decision feels intolerable, the governor needs to discharge his or her responsibility by resigning and explaining why.

We are all captives of our social context and must adapt to group values which we cannot easily or immediately alter. Doctors, for example, can only be held responsible by society for doing what the medical profession deems best — even if subsequently such activities are discovered to be harmful. A doctor, who knows (shall we say by intuition) that a routine valued treatment is harmful and refuses to provide it, is likely to be prosecuted or struck off if the patient complains. The doctor is responsible as a human being to God, as an individual to himself, and as a leader and agent to the patient. But the proper discharge of all these responsibilities pales into insignificance in the face of the doctor's neglect of tribal and social responsibilities. Social pressures so easily dominate over truth and everything else.

Although we are all prisoners of our tribal ideas and community values, ultimate values challenge us to dispute those values we hold to be harmful and to engage in a process of realizing alternative values. We do have a human responsibility to avoid being a mindless adherent or participant, and instead to be an ethical and humane one. To be able to do this effectively, all seven types of purpose must be available for reflection and use, alone and in combination.

Transition. Clarity about the seven levels of purpose and the associated social roles and personal responsibilities enables purposes to be realistically and genuinely articulated. But responsibility alone is not enough to realize values or produce achievement. People must do things. As defined, the various levels have little to say about how activity realizes values. The levels are utterly discrete. Purposes chosen or emergent in each level, often by different people or bodies, cannot be expected to accord with each other spontaneously. Structures and processes which combine and link the different types of purpose are essential to channel and focus activity.

The first and simplest requirement is for something to ensure that values guide those activities which are invariably generated when purposes are responsibly chosen. This implies a degree of constraint. However, if activities do accord with people's existing values, they judge constraints to be appropriate, positively desirable, and as enhancing effectiveness. Grouping adjacent levels in pairs (forming dyads) meets this need for direction.

Master-Table 31

Properties of the seven levels of purpose.
Purposes ensure that responsibility is appropriately defined. Each level is a monad: i.e. elemental and irreducible.
The seven levels of purpose are associated with specific roles, responsibilities and relationships.
See text and review Master-Tables 1-4 for further details and explanation.

Monad (Level)	Level of Purpose	Definition	Relation to Self	Personal Responsibility	Primal Role & Relationship	Pressures	Specialized Communal Roles
7 (L-7)	Ultimate value	A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.	Selflessness with the danger of self-denial	For: distinguishing good and evil.	Human being responsible to God	Theory- or society-based.	Visionaries, prophets, spiritual leaders.
6 (L-6)	Value system	Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain.	Self-definition with the danger of self-glorification	For: affirming ideas instilled during socialization.	Adherent responsible to the value system	Group pressures are paramount	Disciplinary experts, political party supporters, social movement elites.
5 (L-5)	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Self-development with the danger of self-preoccupation	For: recognizing what each and all in the community need.	Participant responsible to the community		Public figures, journalists, voluntary campaigners, social movement activists
4 (L-4)	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour	Self-interest with the danger of selfishness	For: owning what is to be achieved overall.	Individual responsible to oneself	Identity pressures are paramount.	Entrepreneurs (and everyone when acting autonomously)
3 (L-3)	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use.	Self-assertion with the danger of self-destructiveness	For: allocating value in concrete terms now.	Governor responsible to the board	Organization- or endeavour-based.	Members of commissions, governing bodies, councils, authorities, tribunals, committees.
2 (L-2)	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	Self-fulfilment with the danger of self-indulgence	For: deciding what is to be achieved now.	Leader responsible to followers	Reality pressures are paramount	Managers, decision-makers, ministers of state
1 (L-1)	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome.	Self-control with the danger of self-alienation	For: doing what has to be done now.	Agent responsible to the employer		Administrators, unskilled labourers, functionaries.

G-2: DIRECTION

Nature. It is a commonplace that people when locked into an activity forget what is really important; and that people in positions of power, whether politicians or professionals, priests or psychotherapists, managers or academics are tempted to act in ways contrary to the values which legitimate that power. Clearly, activities need to be constrained so that they accord with chosen values, and are not distorted or distracted by other irrelevant values or the vagaries of the situation. To take on a role and have its performance left utterly open, for example, would not make sense. A degree of purposive and deliberate value-control is required. This is acceptable and perfectly possible if the values are already held. Such value-control can be achieved most simply by specifying unambiguous **directions**.

In everyday life, people probably find directions more helpful than the root purposes alone — probably because of the way they reduce uncertainty and bolster the sense of responsibility. For example, principal objects may give a team a mandate to act — but those involved, directly and indirectly, cannot be sure how the project will really affect them and do not feel comfortable with the weight of their responsibility unless the main immediate priorities are also specified. The reverse situation is also true: it is difficult and confusing to work in, or with, a team knowing their main priorities while ignorant or uncertain of the underlying terms of reference. Together, the two levels of purpose specify the team's role. The role specification reduces uncertainty about what will be done, clarifies responsibility, and constrains the team's activities.

Directions provide necessary guidance. There are always many perfectly acceptable values potentially relevant to any situation, so there is often considerable diversity of opinion as to which value will be most significant in enhancing impact. The direction reduces this inherent diversity as well as the accompanying uncertainty. A direction may be compared to a transducer: on the input side, it receives and identifies value pressures of different sorts; and on the output side, it transmits purposes with the potential to constrain and focus. As a result, effectiveness is increased.

A direction can operate in this way because it is formed by deliberately linking purposes set at one level to those set at the level above. The mutual influence between two adjacent levels means that the higher more value-laden purpose can serve as a value anchor indicating what is generally important, while the lower more practical purpose can enable appropriate adaptation. Resolutely adopted and sensitively handled, a

direction can ensure that values are actually used in the situation with maximum effect. So we might say that any form of direction is about *maximizing impact* and therefore defines a *strategic* constraint. Directions bring certain accepted values to the forefront of people's minds. This removes doubt about how to act; and markedly enhances the implications and significance of any particular specification of purpose or value. In short, the *function* of a direction is to ensure that values, chosen from amongst those that are already accepted, focus minds and shape outcomes.

Types. There are six dyads which together constitute the fullest possible statement of direction. Each dyad can be thought of as a distinct type of direction. In descending order, these six types can be labelled: *convictions* (G-2^6); *approaches* (G-2^5); *missions* (G-2^4); *roles* (G-2^3); *policies* (G-2^2); and *plans* (G-2^1). Unlike purposes where all levels are inherent in or strongly implied by any purpose, the dyads present themselves as a number of possibilities for direction. Sometimes two or more types are required in succession. Directions may operate implicitly, but certain situations demand that one or other type should be specifically used as a guide. Descending the dyads, there is progressively more detailed control over what people do.

Each type of direction has a similar internal structure but responds to markedly different forms of pressure. Furthermore, each handles a distinct form of inherent uncertainty in choosing values, and each exerts a distinct type of constraint.

Explicit specification of direction is regularly called for in organizations, and it is obvious that direction is ubiquitous in government and in community life generally. The forms of direction are represented diagrammatically in Figure 10.2, and their properties are summarized in Master-Table 32.

Before considering the general properties of direction and then exploring each type in detail, the six are summarized below in terms of their function, uncertainty, constituent levels and indications for use.

G-2^6: Convictions stabilize a person's ethical stance in changing circumstances. They are useful when it is uncertain how activities can accord with one's deepest values. A conviction emerges from the joint consideration of ultimate values (L-7) and value systems (L-6). The ultimate value gives a conviction its sense of goodness and rightness and so *maximizes impact*, while the value system ensures that it is *appropriately adapted* to the person's socialized identity. Convictions are most evident when explicitly and publicly working with values — so they are needed in domains like politics and the church. Of course, all of us and especially

Figure 10.2: The dyadic grouping which defines directions.
Six types of direction enabling activity to be strategically constrained.

leaders in organizations need the guidance that comes from clarity about our convictions.

G-2⁵: Approaches ensure adherents' correct participation within their community setting. They are useful when it is uncertain how activities can promote orthodox beliefs and views. An approach emerges from the joint consideration of a value system (L-6) and social values (L-5). Those who believe in the value system are concerned to enhance its relevance and *maximize its impact* in the community generally, while social values within the approach ensure that this contribution is *appropriately adapted* to personal needs and the group's integrity. Approaches are developed when adherents cannot ignore emerging or complex social issues. For example, as pollution worsens or top executive pay skyrockets, companies and other social bodies like a church or political party as well as opinion-formers may feel obliged to define their own distinctive approaches to these matters.

G-2⁴: Missions unify participants' wholehearted efforts in an endeavour. They are useful when it is uncertain how general social support can be obtained for an endeavour. Missions try to make the endeavour significant for everyone by being based on a joint consideration of social values (L-5) and principal objects (L-4). The social values are defined to ensure a sense of shared involvement with and concern from and for the wider community because this *maximizes the impact* of the mission; while principal objects are defined to ensure that the mission is *appropriately*

adapted to the situation and the specific people pursuing it. A mission is particularly needed when an enterprise is new or large or diversified. Without a clear mission, the people involved are in danger of losing a sense of common effort. They will then stagnate or concentrate solely on developing themselves, their discipline or their department.

G-2³: Roles identify the current contribution of a part to the performance of a whole. They are useful when it is uncertain how to get synergy amongst activities generated by different endeavours which are the responsibility of different individuals. They emerge from the joint consideration of principal objects (L-4) which are defined to *maximize the impact* of an endeavour (project, area of work, function) pursued by a particular individual (post, team, organization); and internal priorities (L-3) which are defined to be *appropriately adapted* to the current situation and to be relevant to the concerns of all. Roles need to be designed whenever there is a network or system of activities. Definition of role is most needed when the expectations on individuals in such a system seem contradictory, excessive or not clear.

G-2²: Policies coordinate leaders' independent decisions in problematic situations. They are useful when it is uncertain how activities can address an issue with the resources available. A policy emerges from the joint consideration of internal priorities (L-3) and strategic objectives (L-2). Internal priorities *maximize impact* by identifying what is most important, and by

dealing with value alternatives and conflicts which have the potential to misdirect or impede implementation. Strategic objectives specify feasible results which are *appropriately adapted* in terms of both the situation and identified values. Policies are needed whenever controversy exists about what to aim for. Without policies, relatively autonomous decision-makers will work to their own preferences and choose strategic objectives to suit their own local situations. The eventual outcomes are then likely to be patchy, disconnected and incoherent.

G-2^1: Plans organize essential tasks and use of resources in a time schedule. Plans are useful when it is uncertain how activities can produce the desired result efficiently. A plan emerges from the joint consideration of strategic objectives (L-2) and tactical objectives (L-1), the former providing the beacon for what counts as real achievement, and the latter providing scheduled action steps for reaching this. The strategic objective is about doing the right thing, and the tactical objectives are about doing the thing right. The same pattern emerges again: purposes in the higher level *maximize the impact* of the plan, and those in the lower level ensure that the plan is *appropriately adapted* to the situation. Plans are most needed when implementation is lengthy, complicated, expensive and involves many people in many places.

Properties. The various types of direction have much in common. If they are to be usable, they must be specified in a clear, realistic, manageable and acceptable way. All require the formulation to be as precise as possible. Any direction has to be developed and introduced in a social setting. If it is to be effective, it must be upheld in a determined and resolute fashion. Responsibility for a direction lies with whomever is responsible for setting the higher level purpose. But cooperative work with whomever is responsible for the lower level of purpose is also required, because responsibility for implementation lies there. So a degree of joint responsibility must be recognized.

The directions differ markedly according to the types of purpose that constitute them. We have already seen in the brief summaries that the uncertainty which evokes each is different. The same is true of the various *pressures* which must be handled if a direction is to function strategically. The sources of specification, in practice the sources of pressure, are partly inherent — this is the 'pressure for' something which originates in the lower level; and partly of seemingly extraneous origin — this is the 'pressure from' something which originates in the upper level. Neither pressure can be ignored for long without serious consequences for

achievement. As pressures change, so directions change. Change which involves only the lower level appears as an evolutionary process. If it is only the upper level which alters, then change is an upheaval, radical alteration or U-turn. (Change of both levels implies that a completely new situation is being considered.)

Because direction is such a powerful vehicle shaping activities in line with values, a sensitive and sensible handling of the *social process* is essential. Precisely which values are most needed is always uncertain, and how the balance of attention should be applied to the two forms of pressure is always debatable. Alternatives must be examined and discussed. On the one hand, people must be emotionally engaged so that their acquiescence is genuine. On the other hand, disagreements or objections must be systematically and logically handled so that a usable and authoritative specification is finally reached.

Difficulties with direction are legion. Confusions abound over how exactly to keep people on course, and how to prevent their energies being dissipated. Each form of direction is regularly marked by misunderstanding, confusion, neglect and failure. Much consultancy work suggests that people pursue and use values unreflectively. In discussion, they are often hazy about the relevant values, sometimes nervous about commitment, usually unwilling to be constrained, and invariably unaware of the functions and limitations of the various types of direction. As a partial remedy for this, I will concentrate here on the way things go wrong and use examples with this bias.

Of course it is conventional management wisdom that roles should be well-defined, that policies should be set and so on. But, in practice, there is often a distrust of all types of direction. This is compounded by disagreement about what directional terms (like 'policy') really mean in practice, and by diverse opinions about how they should be determined and implemented. (Making directional terms clear and helping people use them properly was the starting point for the research that culminated in this book.)

Finally, starting at the top with convictions, each direction has an evident *limitation* when it comes to constraining activity. This limitation logically drives a need for a more specific constraint in the service of values. In this way, the analysis moves progressively down the groups until plans are reached. Constraints on activity can then be maximally precise and enforceable.

G-2^6: Convictions

Nature. Convictions are the most powerful guide we have. Their *function* is to stabilize a person's ethical stance whatever the circumstances. More particularly,

they provide a degree of control over activity at times of major change. These directions, based on socialization and including ethical rules, principles, positions and standards, tend to be part of one's inmost self. Certain convictions are operative or available at all times: but others exist for use in a particular social role.

Convictions are essential when activities need to be personally and deliberately impregnated with values, or when one must tussle with values. Only value systems (L-6) and ultimate values (L-7) have the necessary hold on personal identity to provide for this. When activities are guided by convictions, personal values permeate all aspects of the process — in deciding what to do, in the doing, and in reviewing the results. Each person will make their own judgement about when convictions need to be developed or activated. Personal choices like marriage and career certainly require them, and so do community choices like wars and social reforms. Successful achievement in any sphere at all depends on the powerful energies released by convictions.

Convictions are intuitively recognized as shaping a person's identity as a social being. They integrate disparate parts of the self and minimize hypocritical action. So acting in conformity with convictions is an expression of integrity. In a conviction, the values given by a value system and embedded in a person's social identity are channelled and reinforced by ultimate values which transcend the immediate society and situation. This means that a person does not feel a creature of the tribe or a puppet of the socialization which has been inflicted or sought — although to others it might appear that way.

To assert a point which will be made repeatedly in this chapter, there is no rest in the process of realizing values. As the most traditional group in the most conservative modern society might say: to stay the same, many things have to change. Long established values must be again and again re-affirmed and re-argued and instilled in children, trainees and novices. Such indoctrination can only be carried out on the basis of deep convictions. The development and expression of conviction is one of the most significant aspects of personal maturation. The ability to clarify and hold a conviction and act on it, despite pressures from others or adverse consequences, gives a person solidity and makes for trustworthiness in the eyes of others.

For those who work directly and explicitly with values — like politicians, primary school teachers, top managers, priests, intellectuals, campaigners — convictions are clearly an essential tool. Anyone in a leadership position comes to recognize that convictions are necessary to get superior results. Without them, achievement is limited because it becomes immediately apparent to followers that the leader is not really behind what he or she says. The leader's exhortations are no more than manipulations. They lack depth, permanence and solidity. Although convictions are not enough on their own, a person can do little of significance, and can never be really successful, without their direction.

Pressures. Convictions are developed from two distinct sources: ultimate values and value systems (i.e. ideas or theories). On the one side, there is the pressure for socialization. However, if ideas and their inculcation are divorced from ultimate values, as in Czechoslovakia under communism, then society becomes devitalized because people find that their efforts lack meaning. If, as in the case of early Zionism, the value system is directly attuned to ultimate values, then people are energized and social development thrives.[3]

Socialization is complemented (and sometimes countered) by a pressure from particular intensely personal experiences. This pressure, derived from the responsibility to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong, is what drives major change in convictions. For example, a person's convictions about alcohol consumption are unlikely to be affected by hearing about its dangers, or even by personally suffering a minor alcohol-related illness. But a severe and avoidable death of a family member due to drunken driving might well create the sort of internal alteration that accompanies conviction formation.

Religious and political convictions, too, are heavily dependent on actual experiences. If a person is on the receiving end of corrupt practices by religious and political authorities, then convictions based on socialization by those authorities are undermined. For this reason, official guardians of creeds and ideologies are regularly embarrassed by their debasement in practice and are inclined to suppress revelations of corruption. Moliere's *Tartuffe* was banned by the church although it was an accurate portrayal of hypocritical sanctimony, commonplace and common knowledge in Paris in the late 18th century.[4]

If the lessons of experience lead to convictions which cannot be openly expressed because of opposition or hostility based on the orthodox view, then people become demoralized. For example, experiences of accidents in manufacturing plants might lead a person to the conviction that improved safety regulations are essential to protect people. If this is not welcomed by business or government, then the person may become demoralized unless some means is found to do something based on that conviction. A progressive society will provide an opportunity for such convictions to be expressed, while a repressive society will not.

Convictions evolve as the ideas within them evolve. For example, convictions about child care slowly evolve as psychological understanding develops (for better or worse) in a society. Similarly, convictions about healthy eating evolve as medical findings emerge. Convictions are radically altered when ultimate values change. For example, social workers with convictions about caring for people may move from being driven primarily by compassion to being driven primarily by justice. In such a case, their personalities and activities may show a major change: from providing services they move to insisting on rights, from supporting individual clients they move to activating whole communities.

Social Process. In the absence of convictions, values can only be weakly realized. However, producing convictions or making contact with them is not always straightforward. The process of developing convictions may be left unconscious and quasi-automatic much of the time. But when we work with values, as parents for example, our convictions do emerge. We are often challenged by our children or their friends when they seem either to lack convictions or to hold ones different to our own. In order to bring convictions to bear and to handle disagreement, we must clarify our present convictions. We find we do that in the process of talking about them or arguing. Convictions may also take shape when writing a diary, memoir, or personal letter. Convictions portrayed in a modern novel, biography, autobiography or newspaper interview help us reflect by revealing how others run their lives.

If working with values is an occupational requirement, then delineating and refining existing convictions must be deliberate. Convictions are to be found in political and religious pamphlets and polemics, usually provoked by the need for change. For example, churchmen in recent decades have had to deal with a range of issues and problems unimagined and unimaginable a few centuries ago: urbanization, gene therapy, AIDS, television, global communication, nuclear weapons, drug abuse, and the juxtaposition of desperate poverty alongside immense private wealth. Such situations cannot begin to be addressed without new convictions. New opinions can be developed while musing in an armchair, but not new genuine convictions. Convictions about the present state of the prison system, say, require reading, exposure to new ideas, contact with relevant people, and visits to jails.

Convictions feel personal but they are social in origin and social in effect. People who work together in the realm of values must find ways of jointly developing and meshing their convictions. In the creation and honing of convictions, an active process of exploration is required. This involves self-exploration through inner dialogue.

Value-workers need to meet or go into retreat to bring deep feelings and troubling perceptions to the surface. Through meditation a person can discuss with himself or herself (or with God), and then the results can be shared. In the process of sharing, personal convictions are deepened further. The same principle is applied in setting up support groups for single mothers, for victims of crime, or for sufferers of particular illnesses.

Meditation is an inner-directed experiential process in which something that feels right emerges in the mind. But meditation can produce false or even quasi-delusional convictions to avoid facing realities or personal change. It may also happen that newly emerging convictions show serious inconsistencies with old convictions or diverge from currently popular views. Such matters require serious consideration. So intellectual objections to whatever emerges may be and should be raised by oneself — because they will certainly be raised by others. Through reflection, it is possible to answer common-sense objections, deal with urges to avoid, reconcile conflicts with other convictions, prepare oneself to answer any hostile criticism from others, and ensure the convictions fit both the value system and the matter in hand.

Difficulties. Genuine convictions are difficult to generate: but, once formed, they are possibly even more difficult to alter. On the one hand, convictions which are held so lightly that they can be put to one side when expedience requires it do not deserve the name. On the other hand, genuine convictions can be intrusive and disruptive when a pragmatic approach seems evidently required. But refusing to hold convictions is not the solution to either dilemma. If convictions are absent when they are needed, a fertile bed for discord, chaos or corruption is created.

In the case of some politicians and managers, it is hard to tell from the outside whether the problem is an absence of conviction or faulty convictions. Convictions, being subject to the magnifying effect of ultimate values, may emerge as dogmatism or unshakeable irrational prejudice. Subjectively, convictions are always right; but, naturally, convictions can be labelled as objectively wrong — that is to say judged authoritatively as inconsistent, unrealistic, or inaccurate.

Convictions are by nature relatively impervious to facts or reasoning. They are a value pressure attempting to overturn brute facts. Convictions offer themselves as the starting assumptions for action, not the end result. They may be deliberately divorced from reality because they exist to channel activities and alter reality in line with values as powerfully as can be imagined. If used in the wrong context, the individual appears peculiar, intransigent or overbearing.

Limitation. Convictions emerge as the end result of an interaction between imaginative experience and embedded group-based ideas. So they are a deeply personal development of the adherent role. Although convictions can provide a person with an inner orientation to life in general, they cannot ensure that all adherents will deal with emerging social needs in a similar fashion. Something less personal, more social and more accessible is required. This can be generated by moving down a group and constructing an approach.

G-2⁵: Approaches

Nature: Whenever it is felt that activities really ought to be determined by certain ideas, then an approach is developed by the guardians of that value system. Approaches make abstract doctrines and theories immediately relevant, because the *function* of an approach is to ensure the correct participation of adherents within their wider community setting. In other words, they link value systems (L-6) and social values (L-5). Approaches respond to the requirement on any theory or doctrine (or tribe) to demonstrate a distinctive and constructive connection with relevant areas of social life. They deal with the uncertainty about how activities can promote the orthodox view. Acceptance of an approach creates what may be termed a 'mentality' in a person, because the approach becomes a quasi-automatic way to think practically. In this way, activities in important areas of social life demonstrate, disseminate and perpetuate adherents' beliefs and enable explicit maintenance of a tribal or ideological loyalty.

Approaches are defined whenever a new problem or issue emerges in society and guardians of the value system wish to be sure that adherents engaging with it are generally upholding and using the correct ideas. Christians, for example, need an approach to creating and handling wealth because on the one hand they live in a society where great value is placed on this, and on the other hand their doctrine seems to suggest that wealth is harmful and poverty is spiritually superior. Without their own approach, Christians are liable to adopt an approach defined within another domain (e.g. becoming Christian-socialists or Christian-capitalists). Alternatively, they may split themselves psychologically in a way that opens them to the accusation (and possibly the reality) of being hypocritical. The worst outcome for the orthodox is that ordinary adherents drift away from Christianity, complaining that it is out of touch with everyday life.

Political, professional, religious and other tribes are not usually coterminous with communities. But tribal adherents are full-fledged participants in their community, and as such they naturally seek some guide on problematic matters which lie outside the total influence of their value system. Approaches, like value systems, are multiple and diverse. So different groups of adherents, either collectively or individually, must develop different approaches to the same problem (e.g. wealth inequalities), each doing so from its own perspective.

The approaches described in this book — to ethical choice, to inquiring, to decision-making, to identity-development — can be viewed as theoretical frameworks (i.e. value systems). However, it is also accurate to call them approaches because they are based in general philosophies and personal beliefs (pragmatism, individualism, transcendentalism &c) which are self-evidently true to some people, and are obviously extremist, wrong or incomprehensible to others. The approach is generated by applying these theoretical beliefs to everyday needs (like choosing, knowing, deciding, personal growth) which are personally and socially unavoidable.

Ill-defined value systems within social movements, like consumerism or holism, may never emerge (outside academia) other than as approaches. Patient-centredness in hospitals, for example, is an approach emerging from a mixture of consumerist and holistic philosophies. It seeks to maximize the impact of ideas like the whole person, responsiveness and autonomy; and does so by defining appropriately actual needs of patients e.g. for relief of distress, comfort, convenience, privacy, company, and explanation.

When businesses refer to the need for culture-change, they are often referring to a wish that staff would adopt a new approach to their work. The privatization of government agencies, for example, requires both the adoption of a new controlling value system and the recognition of radical but necessary social values: e.g. the principle of competition with other firms to meet customer needs must be accepted, and the jobs-for-life and politician-focused attitudes should vanish. For the people involved, accepting the new approach means developing a new mind-set — not an easy task.

Pressures. Approaches can prevent the ever-present tendency for people in a complex society to compartmentalize themselves and put important values, often ethical rules and principles, to one side.⁵

The inherent pressure producing an approach is either the need for social integration of adherents, or the threat of social modification of ideas in a value system. Homosexual Jews, for example, are in a dilemma wherever society fosters openness and accep-

tance of their sexual orientation, because orthodox Judaism condemns it. Without an appropriate approach, such people are either lost to Judaism or unable to function socially. This example illustrates the way that social needs, problems, challenges or temptations raise uncertainties in the minds of adherents. Unless these uncertainties are resolved, group allegiance is weakened, the group as a whole is perceived as extreme or retrogressive, and the social effectiveness of group members is impaired.

Religions may generate approaches defensively to prevent or modify what seems like an expedient encroachment by alien values: cf. the Catholic approach to modern birth control methods. However, approaches may be created positively to aid community life and increase the relevance of a value system. (This was certainly the spirit in which the approaches to ethical choice were developed: Ch. 6.) Political parties, professional associations, scientific theories and other non-traditional and non-religious ideologies experience pressures to develop approaches to a constant flow of significant issues. The existing orthodoxy, the predetermined set of beliefs and theories, is felt to be sacrosanct — and yet the reality of embeddedness in a community cannot be ignored. So, if the orthodoxy has some direct or indirect bearing on a social issue, an urge to shape the social response exists or emerges in time. If community-based challenges are avoided altogether, then progressive marginalization of the orthodoxy is likely. Some members may loosen their adherence, but the more likely result is a split in the tribe along a progressive–fundamentalist dimension.

Approaches evolve with time as social needs alter with the development (or deterioration) of a society. This is most clearly seen in religions and political parties. Over hundreds of years, Christianity came round to recognizing the social values of democracy and scientific inquiry and, correspondingly, their approaches to many issues altered. Over decades, the left-wing political parties have slowly modified their approach to economic management. A revolution in approach takes place when a new value system with its distinctive ideas is adopted. A politician who switches parties starts espousing new ways of handling many issues in society. In the same way, if a businessman becomes deeply religious, his approach to management may well change greatly.

Approaches generally go to the fundamentals: in society — the economy, crime, war; in businesses — efficiency, quality, customers. The absence of an approach where it is needed leads to a weakening of socialization, a confusion about what is important, malfunction in the domain, and conflict within society.

The approach may be missing because a suitable value system (i.e. theory) is lacking. Radically new approaches require detailed investigation and better ideas, a course whose pursuit usually awaits the unambiguous failure of existing approaches.

Quality in firms is a case in point. Any approach to ensure quality, for example, must be based on a set of ideas that credibly define what quality is and how quality can be achieved, and then relate this to a firm's needs and existing values. Until recently, it seemed that quality depended on endless exhortations from managers to shop-floor workers to do better. Total quality management (TQM) is a recent better theory stemming from the work of Deming and others whose valued ideas include: customer sensitivity, clarity of role and purpose, improved management systems, interdepartmental cooperation, problem identification, staff empowerment to prevent and solve problems, statistical control of processes, and the notion that improving quality saves money. When TQM is adapted to the needs of a particular industry and firm, it becomes an approach. Of course, staff are rarely adherents to the ideas, so adoption of TQM is easier said than done.[6]

When old approaches fail, the usual response is to redouble the pressure, become more controlling, perhaps introduce incentives or punishments, and slowly create an artificial world sometimes permeated by covert and smouldering fear and hate. Devising new approaches is more constructive. Deming, for **example**, saw that the slogans and targets approach to quality denied management's responsibility and exhausted vulnerable shop-floor workers who were already doing the best they could. Similarly, Freud over-turned the then popular approach to neuroses, when he recognized how counter-productive exhorting and lecturing was and valued instead the understanding of inner dilemmas. By analysing inner experiences and steadfastly refusing to pressurize people, he created a new psycho-dynamic approach to therapy which has given rise to an enormous variety of methods and stimulated the creation of other useful approaches.

Social Process. Attempts to direct people to act in accord with beliefs and theories are the stuff of social life. Priests sermonize in church, lecturers teach in seminar groups, speakers address rallies, parents bring children into line, politicians appeal to the nation, campaigners write leaflets. Many group activities in management training, church work, professional meetings and psychotherapy are about exploring and insisting upon a particular approach.

In all such situations, the aim is twofold. On the one hand, there is a wish by guardians of the theory, or tribal

leaders, to instruct. People must learn about the approach. They must understand what the relevant social issues and needs are, and how the value system is pertinent to these. They must be encouraged to criticize and raise objections, to which, however, a ready coherent response should always be available. On the other hand, people must also, usually simultaneously, be emotionally pressured to agree to the approach.

Applying moral pressure works best if the receiver shares the value premises of the exhorter. The less the congruence between the approach and the recipient's ideas and values, the more alien and objectionable the exhortation seems. The greater the congruence, the more reasonable. If value alignment is near complete, the receiver enjoys and adopts the approach, and commends it to others.

Firms need approaches to introduce new ideas or ideologies, e.g. performance-related pay in a public sector agency or TQM in a business. The idea or ideology threatens the staff (as an internal community) and they show resistance and reactions more intense than those generated by new posts, new systems or new plans. The approach must be designed to explain the ideas in a way that accommodates to the existing social values and heads off the resistance by indicating the need for the ideas. Getting staff to adopt and adapt new ideas and use them automatically in their everyday activities is difficult. Success does not come from training staff in new skills or imposing a policy. Value change of this sort requires more dedication, determination and education. The ideas must be carefully validated and skilfully adapted. Improvements should be convincingly instigated and demonstrated. Once there is widespread recognition that the approach will not be a fad and that it really does have value, then people become determined to preserve it and seek to educate newcomers in it.

Difficulties. Approaches, like theories and ideologies, are often produced by people of conviction. They can be emphasized and supported with such zeal that they disrupt rather than assist. New approaches, while not as difficult to develop as new convictions, also touch on the bedrock of a person's socialization, and potentially challenge existing beliefs and conventions. However great the need for an approach, it must be developed and introduced with sensitivity and caution if uncontrollable opposition is not to be evoked.

Approaches, like value systems, are diverse. Difficulties in reconciling the variety may emerge. A range of approaches based on radically different doctrines — biomedical, psychoanalytical, behavioural — offer themselves in the therapy of mental illnesses and

behavioural disorders. Sometimes pursuing just one is preferable, sometimes a judicious mixture is best for the patient or client. Imposing a single approach to management in large organizations — quality-based, technocratic, computerization, pragmatist and so on — is rarely productive. Instead different aspects of the organization and different domains and disciplines require different approaches.[7]

Limitation. An approach enables an idea, doctrine, framework or theory to be socially applied and used. It directs adherents in their accommodation to the community and so, like convictions, primarily focuses on the identity of people and groups. However, many activities which require to be influenced by values take place within bounded endeavours — projects or organizations — with a life and identity of their own. Such endeavours impinge on us as outsiders or we serve them as insiders. So some direction is needed to ensure that an endeavour recognizes and is constrained by values held by people who are directly affected or potentially committed. For this we must move down a group to define a mission.

G-2⁴: Missions

Nature. A principal object provides for an internal value consensus on which activities lie within the boundaries of a worthwhile endeavour. On their own, principal objects (L-4) suffer from being inward-looking and quasi-legalistic. Social values provide for a value consensus crossing organizational, institutional and theoretical boundaries, and tap into the identity of the wider community and its needs. On their own, social values (L-5) suffer from being too encompassing and non-specific. Taken together, however, the deficiencies of widely shared values and tightly defined objects cancel out. The result is a powerful consensus-promoting, resource-producing, enthusiasm-generating and identity-developing direction which may be called a mission. The *function* of a mission is to unify participants' wholehearted efforts in an endeavour.

A mission conceives any endeavour to be a unified entity within a social context from which it draws resources. It is used to ensure that any purpose or activity within the endeavour is in accord with or finds a point of reference in values which are both internal and essential to the endeavour, and also externally widely endorsed. The mission engages the support of those involved in the endeavour, and recognizes that they also experience themselves as part of a wider community. It also serves to reassure, in a general way, those who are not immediately part of the endeavour but are affected directly or tangentially. So missions deal with the uncertainty about how to get social support.

To harness efforts effectively, a mission should be specified to provide long-term stability. Objects likely to be temporary or which are **purely** aspirational are out of place. Although missions sometimes seem to be replete with what everybody already knows, unless and until these values are stated, nobody does seem to know what an endeavour or project is about. So the absence of a mission weakens organizations internally and externally.

The function of a mission is met if any and every type of activity pursued falls within it and recognizably serves values in the community. Missions need to be altered periodically to take account of shifts in social values and alterations in the activities being pursued. Such modifications need to be handled with care. Disturbing the twin pillars of stability and consensus created by a mission should not be undertaken lightly.

Missions may be formalized as constitutions. The main activities and structure of associations and companies are often enshrined in a legal constitution, sometimes called a charter. This document frequently includes a statement of those values that explain the significance of the body in wider society. Within the executive or employee body, the needed direction is often produced informally as a 'mission statement'. For example, the management of mental illness can only be developed successfully by a public hospital if it is clear what the relevant community values are and what specific services are to be provided.[8] Departments, functions and other enduring services within an organization generally benefit from clarity about their mission, especially if they are new.

The mission is appealed to when uncertainty emerges about whether or not a particular activity is properly part of the enterprise. Without an explicit mission, voluntary organizations may drift from activity to activity, or become so trapped in a regular grind that innovations are rejected out of hand. In one voluntary social work agency, for example, case work had become the norm and a new Assistant Director encountered intense resistance to the introduction of community-centred support. Putting effort into community work only became possible when the agency's governing council ruled decisively that their mission was relief of social distress and provision of aid to disadvantaged families — not a particular method of work.

Pressures. The inherent pressure when defining a mission lies in the need for an identity which embraces certain distinctive activities. Returning to the example of mental illness services, it is evident that the precise types of service appropriate in a publicly funded hospital may well differ from those appropriate to a private hospital. To reduce constraints, objects may be defined

with a wide scope. However, if the scope is too wide, a mission lacks specificity and gives no direction at all. At the extreme, firms have been known to produce mission statements which are totally devoid of any reference to specific work. They refer vaguely to 'making profits' or 'producing excellence via leadership and strategy'. Such imprecision has the potential to confuse staff and diffuse their efforts. At the top of a business, vagueness fosters mindless diversification.

The other pressure contributing to the specification of any mission comes from popular demands and social concerns in the surrounding community. These values must be recognized and incorporated to ensure the enterprise can recruit employees, find clients, be acceptable to suppliers and generally thrive without harassment. The values in a mission should be reassuring, not radical. In the UK, for example, values like respect for people, high quality products, efficiency, and safety are generally felt to be relevant to businesses even if they are not always observed. People in a firm may differ greatly in what they do, but they are unified by these values in their doing of it. If such values are excessively neglected or ignored, discontent and even antagonism are liable to be provoked from within the firm.

Missions evolve as the key activities become modified, perhaps by market demands or by technological developments. A mission may need to be changed radically if key social values alter. Endeavours then undergo a revolution. For example, when the social value of informed debate replaces the value of supporting the regime, newspapers become quite different in content as well as approach; in a similar way, the emerging social value of care within the community has led to the transformation of mental illness services — including hospital closures, staff re-training, and direct handling of community prejudices.

Social Process. Quite apart from any legal necessity, an organization requires a mission which people can understand and with which they can identify. Ensuring that a mission is developed is the task of the leadership. But a mission really needs to be freely adopted and willingly used by those who are expected to accept its direction. The only way to produce this state is to ensure full involvement. So, although top management may be responsible for producing a mission, means must be found to get suggestions and criticism from staff at all levels. Incorporating these ideas, together with widespread consultation on drafts, can then eventually produce something which has substance and validity.

Participants in any enterprise unconsciously see themselves in two roles corresponding to the two types of purpose: as association members, partners or

employees (hoping to benefit from the principal objects) and as community members or representative citizens, often themselves users or customers (hoping to benefit from the social values). Each of these roles is emotionally significant and potentially supports the other. Their combined activation is the basis for a person giving wholehearted assent to any mission. In the case of large organizations, there is also the need to view staff as a quasi-community with its own social values — which are naturally a sub-set of those within the wider community.

Participants who have objections to the mission, or are alienated for some other reason, may focus on their own work to the disadvantage of the wider endeavour. But the very nature of a mission requires that all working to it must be included if at all possible. So objectors must be dealt with in a sensible fashion. In a large enterprise, the public relations division has a task to help general managers reach staff who have distanced themselves or become disconnected. If these involving tactics fail, then some form of deliberate exclusion is required e.g. by replacing or transferring staff, by selling the division to an outsider or to the disaffected managers, by setting up a separate subsidiary. There can be no place in an organization for anyone who does not subscribe to a well-chosen and realistic mission. The alternative would be to allow incoherence and fragmentation or the creation of organizations within an organization.

Difficulties. Problems in developing and using a mission are legion. One problem is the tendency to treat the whole exercise as a way of manipulating people rather than as a serious attempt to integrate and engage people. Too commonly, a mission exists as a formality with the social values neglected and the principal objects weakly understood and haphazardly pursued. In many firms, social values function as vacuous and vaporous attempts by public relations experts to create a glossy image which has little or no substance in practice. Difficulties arise when an enterprise lets itself become alienated from the wider community. Top management may contribute by viewing emerging social values as something to be resisted, failing to recognize that their own staff take community opinions and the new needs seriously.

Even missions specified with the best of intentions are sometimes no more than a list of worthy virtues and aspirations (social values) and so create no more than a nod of routine recognition. At another extreme, the mission is suitable but so legalistic that no one can understand or use it.

It is precisely because missions are so significant and

encompassing that disruptive elements within an organization may be tempted to use them for their own purposes. Membership-centred organizations and political and religious groups, for example, are particularly vulnerable. Once established over some years, any organization represents a significant resource of people, money, good-will and facilities. Activists perceive that altering a few sentences in the formal mission can completely change the body's operation and style of working. Engineering such a hijack by infiltrating key committees is far easier than setting up a new separate organization.

Limitation. The mission indicates what people generally seek when joining and forwarding an endeavour. However, it does not give any direction as to how any particular individual should operate to support the endeavour, or how necessary interactions between endeavours pursued by individuals should be co-ordinated. To promote cooperation and manage conflict during joint effort, people need the direction provided by an agreed role.

G-2³: Roles

Nature. It is necessary to distinguish between what the endeavour of an individual (organization, person, government &c) is about and how generally it should fit in with other work in the relevant network. The endeavour (project, function, type of work &c) is defined by the principal object while the mode of fit is its role.[9] Roles are therefore based on principal objects (L-4) but contain something more: a statement of priorities (L-3) which make the objects relevant to the greater whole at a particular point in time.

Here are some examples where clarity of role might be essential to guide staff: the role of exporting in a small expanding business, the role of research in a hospital, the role of commercial sales in a voluntary organization, the role of public relations in a government agency. Guidance is needed because such endeavours, immediately and in the future, inevitably involve or impinge upon other efforts in the overall enterprise. Everybody involved needs to know what the specific endeavours — exporting, research, commercial sales, public relations — are about i.e. the principal objects; and also where attention, emphasis, time and money will be placed in pursuing these i.e. the priorities. Clarifying the role in this way enables specific contributions to be inter-connected and related to a total and joint effort. In short: the *function* of a role is to identify the current contribution of a part to the performance of a whole. By defining all roles well, performance can be maximized.

An agreed role both constrains and guides people in dealing with each other. Roles facilitate interaction, increase synergy and reduce misunderstandings. Explicit definition and assertion of a role are essential when different endeavours or individuals need co-ordination because they impinge on each other. If roles in a network defined by an organization or inter-organizational endeavour are not clear, then inter-actions between individuals are unlikely to maximize overall performance. Roles within an organization or strategic business alliance may be tightly structured, but the network in community developments — including, perhaps, voluntary bodies, local government, public agencies, businesses, and citizen action groups — is necessarily far looser.

Pressures. The definition of any role is influenced by pressures, again from two distinct sources. First, the role must be based in the functions which have to be performed. Functional responsibilities are inherent in the position of any endeavour or individual in a net-work: e.g. a personnel department cannot avoid addressing issues of pay, an environmental pressure group cannot abandon its concern about pollution, a head of department cannot ignore leadership work. The functions of component parts flow from an analysis of what is required for effective performance of the mission of the entire system. Managers have been known to forget their function and define their role in terms of activities like attending certain meetings, liaising with other organizations, participating in teams and so on. But then the questions begged are: why are these activities needed? and what is the manager being paid to do in those meetings, liaisons and teams? and how should others respond? So role is primarily a matter of function not action. (Lack of clarity on this point is often at the root of serious management problems.)

The second pressure when defining a role is to ensure that it meets relational requirements. Handling relationships is essential when individuals pursue their own endeavours as part of a larger endeavour involving a network of others. Development of a proposed new role means deciding priorities for action and this involves recognizing existing directions and values which are held and pursued by others and the endea-vour as a whole. Relationships must be handled sensitively and diplomatically in these terms. If roles are defined or thoughtlessly installed without appreciating existing endeavours and work relationships, then conflicts and territorial disputes are liable to develop and become institutionalized. This seems to be a particular problem in the higher reaches of government bureaucracies and in the headquarters organizations of

giant corporations. In these stratospheric realms, roles and teams proliferate with abstract titles, while those involved cannot clearly say what they are about or how they produce synergy.

A danger in firms that are run pragmatically is an overload of tasks, each disconnected from the others. This incoherence overwhelms and exhausts staff. If, however, all work is seen as part of a system pursuing certain priorities, then an extra project or service can be included more naturally by spelling out its role. This entails showing how its nature (principal object) should be tailored to help managers achieve the priorities with which they are currently struggling. Clinical audit of care in one hospital, for example. was more easily introduced when it was explained that its role involved responding to patient complaints, becoming a 'pre-ferred provider', reducing litigation expenses and enhancing cooperative working. Previously, audit had to be introduced simply because it was a 'good thing'.

Any role develops over time because priorities need to change as the situation evolves. In the fluid and poorly defined social setting of a family, for example, it is recognized that parental roles need to alter as children grow up. When people speak of a changing role, this sort of evolution is what is usually meant. The object of local government, for example, is to ensure that its community gets necessary services. The trend in many countries is to view direct provision of services as inappropriate and to pursue this object by enabling service provision. Here again, the role is evolving while the principal object is unchanged. If, instead, principal objects are re-specified while priorities remain unchanged, the role is radically altered and its impact may be markedly enhanced or reduced. For example, if the principal object of research in a firm changes from keeping up with external developments to generating basic innovations, then fulfilling the role demands far greater investment, different staffing and skills, new external relationships and so on — even if the overall priorities for research remain completely unchanged.

Social Process. Roles invariably exist in a network. To some degree a role may be allowed to evolve and adapt with the wider network. Many adjustments to performance can be handled implicitly as people make allowances for each other. Such informal networking is emotionally comfortable and leads to easy agreement. However, active negotiation is essential when a new type of activity is being established or when a sub-stantial change in work is required. Clashes with other activities in the network will provoke objections and disagreements. These conflicts must be sensibly argued until a satisfactory resolution is found. If roles are not actively developed in this way, certain types of activity

tend to lose out unnecessarily, key people responsible for that activity become edgy and unhappy, performance deteriorates, and the wider network may become dysfunctional.

In organizations, pressure for relationships and the comfort of networking may take precedence over the pressure from functions or responsibilities and the effort of argument and negotiation. As a result roles are distorted by empire building, activity becomes chaotic, and the overall endeavour is not forwarded. Instead of being based on cooperation, roles then evolve implicitly as part of a political process in which people battle for personal status and influence. Incentives targeted on individual performance are always in danger of exacerbating this tendency.

In organizations, the need for strong management and clear accountability means that roles should be pro-actively, participatively, and carefully clarified so that they serve the mission. Once defined, maximum autonomy for individuals is then both desirable and possible. Any role definition ramifies through the relevant network. For example, the new work of contracting required in the National Health Service (prompted by the requirement for health care services to be purchased from providers) raised issues of how contracting work fits with other management activities (i.e. its role). Naturally it was associated with dedicated contracting posts, but their roles depended on subtle and not so subtle changes in the roles of planners, accountants, doctors, general managers. information specialists and others. To handle such situations, negotiation with superior and collateral managers, and discussion and consultation with relevant people throughout the organization are essential.

Difficulties. Roles should be defined in an unambiguous way. If they are not, and especially if they are disconnected from the mission, or if the priorities are vague or no more than tactics in disguise, then people are liable to become confused. This is particularly likely in community developments and organizational alliances. The absence of adequate role specifications leads to a loss of focus on what must be done, a weakened drive to achieve, a lessened sense of responsibility, and absent or ineffective interactions. The end result is that cooperation fails and necessary work does not get done.

One problem here is that clarity about immediate priorities may be easier to define than clarity about the principal objects which must be designed to maximize impact. Such failure produces role conflict, role blurring, role ambiguity and avoidance of responsibility. Insufficient discussion and consideration of the

impact of new roles or role changes on the network of relationships is also common. Pragmatic leaders, using the 'let a thousand flowers bloom' principle, deliberately avoid defining roles in terms of function. Roles then define activities rather than directing them and people find their scope for discretion varies unpredictably. Unthinking pragmatists are also prone to alter roles abruptly, disrupting relationships and weakening the communal and cooperative spirit. People react by becoming fearful. selfish, inhibited and over-dependent.

Roles, like convictions and approaches, must suit the individuals most involved, but here one can expect people to make a far more determined effort to adapt. Nevertheless, going to the extreme and throwing the most convenient or most senior person into a job is not very effective and can harm the person. It makes more sense to find someone or a group which can naturally fill the role. Not everyone who can fulfil a role in terms of its principal objects, will handle the immediate priorities well, and vice versa. Not everyone who can meet the functional responsibilities can meet the relational requirements and vice versa. Exactly the same applies in governments' use of public agencies and non-governmental organizations to pursue their policies.

Commonsense says that neither people nor organizations can achieve just because it is asked of them. Yet expecting too much is common, and assuming that people will 'grow into the role' or that an organization will get used to a new type of activity is a much used ploy in the political and managerial armoury of self-deception. Conventions often make it difficult for a person to refuse an unsuitable role extension or change, especially if it confers more status or money. But persisting with a poor fit soon leads to an unhelpful distortion of the role or covert failure with emotional distress and the likelihood of physical illness.

Even when roles are properly specified, acting in accord with them is not necessarily easy. A common response is to distort the work so that there is room to do what is easy, personally liked or advantageous and to ignore what is personally disliked or difficult. Other dimensions of the work may be forgotten or downgraded in the process. It is a commonplace, for example, that many chief executives find their governing body bothersome and undermine its role. A similarly cavalier and confused attitude to roles is evident in organizations which have proliferated tiers of managers: each manager characteristically claims to be doing the 'real' policy or strategy work and insists that the managers in the tier below are doing the 'day-to-day' management.

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Limitation. Roles direct the way that individuals (people or organizations) perform overall in a network, but not the way that they handle particular situations. So roles become a vehicle for the exercise of personal preference, factional pressure and tribal loyalty. It is easy to make decisions on such bases, but to do so breeds disarray and chaos when what is needed is a coordinated effort to produce a worthwhile result. So a more concrete form of direction is required, one which explicitly recognizes and deals with emotional pressures, especially the competition for resources. This direction is a policy.

G-2²: Policies

Nature. Where independent actors are required to produce a desired outcome jointly, each has a partial view and a distinctive situation to handle. So they will differ on priorities (L-3) and no particular strategic objective (L-2) will seem quite right to all of them. As well as being a source of dispute, internal priorities are too non-specific to guide a sustained course of action. Overall strategic objectives will indicate what can and should be achieved given the present reality, but on their own they are too neutral and technical to accommodate different viewpoints or to satisfy the deeper quest for value. By considering the two forms of purpose jointly, a direction can be generated which indicates to all in a satisfactory way exactly what must be achieved now, and why. This direction is known as 'policy'.[10]

Most significant achievements and failures in organizations and governments can be traced back to the presence or absence and quality of policies and their implementation. So policy is important: and yet 'policy' is one of the most abused words in management and government. The label of 'policy' desperately needs fixing. The nature of policy ought to be generally understood by everyone in responsible positions, even if it remains difficult to develop and install good policies. Alternative notions should be given satisfactory alternative labels, say: 'procedure', 'strategy', or 'maxim'. This demands, however, some clarity about what you are trying to do and a determination to use the right conceptual tool for the job.

Whenever the way forward is felt to be uncertain, there will be controversy about what to do. When things are uncertain, protagonists take up varying stances largely based on past experience, self-interest and group loyalties. The marketing, production and development wings of a manufacturing organization, for example, each need to be led by dynamic professional and committed leaders if the firm is to thrive. However, the consequence is that they are likely to see the handling of a new product or service in quite different ways. If these divisional leaders and their staff are going to cooperate in producing something new, then their conflicting perspectives must be respected and differences between them resolved. Policies should be developed to do just this. In short, the *function* of a policy is to coordinate the independent decisions of leaders in either new or problematic situations.

Policies recognize that strategies and tactics need to be different in different places and that the people in charge must be left to choose these for themselves. Government policies, for example, address a variety of leaders: of other countries, of businesses, of quangos, of lower tiers of government, of voluntary bodies and/or people in general. The uncertainty being addressed by a policy is typically characterized as an issue — a focus of intense concern which demands a coherent response. The issue sometimes appears irrational or objectively trivial, but this does not mean it can be ignored. The issue, as they say, must be gripped. Otherwise people acting on their anxieties may scupper the effort or precipitate a chaotic or disastrous outcome. So policy is a matter for governors and leaders i.e. governing bodies and top management in organizations.

Policy-making cannot be used effectively to direct people without an adequate appreciation of the need to address issues by using the two constituting levels of purpose. The basic natures of internal priorities and strategic objectives must be explicitly recognized both during policy development and implementation. Academics or bureaucrats who believe that policy should flow directly from systematic research or analysis fail to appreciate that policy is about managing value diversity, emotive issues, disagreement and uncertainty. Similarly, politicians who believe that policy is simply a matter of insisting on certain favoured values, fail to recognize that the policy must spring from an immersion in the hard realities, an understanding of the problems being faced and feasibility constraints.

For example: worthy priorities of the Thatcher conservative government to make people more aware of what local government did with their money, and to help people bring pressure on their councils to contain spending came to naught. The community charge, a flat-rate 'poll' tax on everyone, was the strategic objective chosen to implement these values. But it failed miserably because the government ignored how complex tax collection was, the way small increases in council spending produced large tax increases, and the feelings of unfairness engendered in so many people. Eventually the tax was abolished in the face of the need

to resort to courts to make collections, escalating hostility focused at central government, and continuing poor control over local government spending.

Successful policy-making in organizations is easier than in government because staff are socialized into following a superior and working with others. Even so, policy is not always used. It is possible, at least for a time, for operations to succeed in the hands of a dynamic chief executive who leads opportunistically and with little delegation or concern for coordination. However, explicit policy-making is absolutely essential within headquarters organizations of group or holding companies like multinationals if they seek any coopera-tion or coordination amongst and within their largely autonomous profit-producing subsidiaries. Work in these supra-operational HQ bodies is very distant from the activities being directed. Policy-making involves developing and promoting new feasible values and ideas to strengthen subsidiary operation, and to express the desired identity of the enterprise. A manager moving up to HQ from a subsidiary enters a world of paper, because the work there is about articulating, debating, analysing and communicating ideas and their practical and financial implications. Of course, policy-making may be noticeable chiefly by its absence, as in one HQ agency (budget: £1.5 billion) whose management we audited. Here under the label of 'policy' were numerous operating targets, service analyses, financial projections, action plans, codes of practice, rules and procedures: none of which dealt with the immediate problematic issues facing the conglomerate.

Policy-making is best carried out when the topic is well understood, clearly defined and well-structured. Poorly understood or ill-structured issues may require preliminary work before the policy process can be entered, and the resulting policy may still carry con-siderable uncertainty and risk.

Pressures. Policy formulation depends firstly on appreciating the issue and the way it relates to desired outcomes. So the pressure for satisfactory results is the inherent shaper of policy. As emphasized above, this calls for deep immersion in the topic and the realities, supplemented by targeted analysis and investigation. It invariably implies a sensible statement about resources which is acceptable to all involved. Unfortunately, managers and politicians alike share an urge to choose what is acceptable to those on whom they depend — whatever the consequences. As a result, when con-troversy develops, decisive action tends to be avoided because it is liable to offend. Often a financial solution is sought when the real resources to be allocated are people's time and attention. Policy-making is about gripping political issues, not throwing money at prob-

lems. It is about tackling problems not avoiding them. It is about recognizing and responding to differences of opinion, not suppressing them. An issue is gripped when a policy is devised which fits the situation and which is generally recognized as resolving uncertainty and controversy by those people expected to imple-ment it willingly.

So the second source of pressure, rationally extra-neous but crucial in practice, comes from the values of those most involved. Often conflicting positions are evident and factions may form. Factional views may seem irrational and self-serving, but they must still be taken into account when formulating policy. From a pragmatic viewpoint, the people involved can block action or retaliate if they are ignored; and, from a rational viewpoint, it is rare that their perspective does not have some validity.

The policy conclusions and the ideas and judgements on which they are based must be articulated and com-municated in a fashion which is logical, clear and compelling. To achieve this, policies should generally be presented separately to the background data or results of investigations (which may be voluminous). The exact wording of policy documents needs to take account of factional sensitivities so as to maximize the likelihood of their joint acceptance of the final result, and it needs to specify precisely what is to be done without fudging. So the phrasing, though necessarily tactful, must be pre-cise and unambiguous, avoiding the tendency to be either over-pedantic or wishy-washy. Policies also need to make provision for monitoring and progressive evaluation. The final policy statement should be pertinent, understandable and memorable. Those who must follow the policy should experience it as helpful.

It is useful to distinguish the priority element from the strategic element, because the latter must be appro-priately adapted to circumstances. Policy evolution is a process in which strategic objectives are altered. If the priorities alter, then this is effectively an about turn: a policy reversal. For example, a government may see reduction of inflation as the top priority in managing the economy. It should be expected to adopt different ways of reducing inflation according to circumstances without calling these modifications a reversal of policy. By contrast, if it accedes to social pressures to allow inflation (say, to reduce unemployment), then eco-nomic policy has indeed been overturned.

Social Process. Because all priorities related to a policy are inherently valid, they need to be taken account of in some fashion in the formulation of the strategic objective(s). A strategic objective is itself exclusive — you get the choice you want or you do not. Nevertheless, by supporting the main objective with

subsidiary or complementary strategic objectives, it is usually possible to be satisfied that all legitimate pressures have been met. The point is that policy-making, like all direction-setting work, should be designed as an integrative exercise and must specifically foster the inclination to cooperate.

When it seems to those involved that priorities are absolutely contradictory — say safety vs cost, or productivity vs training, or low inflation vs low unemployment — then the organization (or government) has got itself into a self-damaging state of mind. Each faction in over-asserting its own view attacks or rejects the other view in an escalating and self-defeating ritual. The attacks are self-defeating because the reality is that both values are absolutely essential to the well-being of the whole. Because policies and the policy process should explicitly recognize all valid priorities, they are essential for breaking such vicious circles. Many so-called culture-change projects in firms are not about introducing new values at all, but about helping top management grip unresolved issues, break vicious circles, and develop the necessary policies which recognize the well-established values of all concerned.[11]

Even the best policies (in rational terms) succeed or fail in accord with the effectiveness of the social process which produces and introduces them. Those with an authoritarian bent who try to concentrate minds solely on results find it difficult to accept that suppressing debate actually impedes short-term and long-term success. There are two key requirements of the social process. First, whoever leads the process must be legitimated to do so or be acting in role. Second, the policy must be evolved so as to feel essential and meaningful to those who must implement it. Policies respond to issues which absolutely need to be gripped. They are not mechanical products developed because 'everyone has them', or according to some pre-defined theory or procedure. What constitutes proper handling, timing and involvement will depend greatly on the setting and the particular issue being gripped.

Some generalizations can still be offered. The sensible development and genuine acceptance of any policy depends on generating dialogue amongst the people to be directed and coordinated. The situation is uncertain, emotional and difficult, by definition. So realistic acceptable policy can only be generated and implemented if there is debate and consultation. This takes time. Instant policy-making may, however, be required as a temporary or interim measure.

Debate should take place in small groups, preferably of around three to five people, but sometimes a few more. For major policy in an organization, the dialogue needs to involve governors and relevant top executives.

Internal policies for divisions and departments demand dialogue between superior and subordinate managers, key external figures, and even the section as a whole (if small). In such small groups, details can be clarified, different value assumptions or biases can be openly aired, and fears can be identified and reduced. This is an emotional process, and the discussion has the quality of an intense conversation in which all have right on their side. As beliefs and feelings are aired, inquiry is needed to supplement and balance advocacy. The group can then move to a consensus on what the issues really are and on the main criteria for resolving these. It usually becomes evident that there are a variety of options for moving forward (i.e. strategic objectives). If the problem is very well understood, then a dominant or best option, usually a set of related objectives, often emerges.

Any significant policy typically ramifies far wider than the small group which determines its shape and likely outcome. So the debate on the issues and options must be opened out. Once a degree of clarification has been achieved in the small group, potential disagreements, objections and misunderstandings by others need to be handled carefully through extensive advance consultation. Everyone or every group potentially affected or with a legitimate interest should be sent draft policy proposals and invited to comment. In the process of debate and consultation, the initial formulations usually need some changes. If none at all occur, it is likely that the consultation was a sham. Extensive changes may entail further general consultation.

Higher level directions must be introduced or installed in a complex process, but policies (and plans) can be implemented in a relatively straightforward way. In the process of implementation, the policy may be distorted or ignored, or new issues may emerge. It is therefore not uncommon to retain a small steering group with a specific policy-control remit.

Difficulties. The social process can go wrong so easily and in so many ways. Governments, for example, have been known to publish policy-related inquiries, consultative documents or responses to consultations at times when the media interest is elsewhere so as to avoid debate and scrutiny. Top managers have been known to insist on tabling never-before-seen bulky documents at a meeting where agreement must be finalized.

But in such cases the policy was at least approached. If the issue is too hot, then there is a tendency to avoid it altogether. An organization may be progressively losing market-share. But tackling this problem may involve choices which cause staff unrest, or which mean writing off a large investment, or which make many senior managers redundant — while still being risky. It is certainly easier, and often feels safer, to make only

minor adjustments. Firms will collapse or be taken over if they do not face issues, but governments with the support of their electorate can avoid issues for years with no other effect than inflicting long-term damage on their country. (Examples are too numerous to need citing.)

Companies commonly have policies in some areas but not in others, with the presence of policy depending more on tradition and management ideology than need. The absence of policy where it is required impedes achievement, lets conflict fester, and dissipates energies. Because businesses often evolve pragmatically and managers avoid working on policy, the notion of 'implicit policy' has been introduced.[12] But an implicit policy, worked out by looking retrospectively at achievement, is a contradiction in terms because it cannot direct or coordinate.

In the public sector, it seems so easy to withdraw from controversy or to use bureaucratic excuses and official powers as a defence in the face of challenge. But avoiding issues tends to increase suspicion and the organization risks being torn apart as controversy intensifies. In one hospital, discharge of well but frail and poor elderly patients became an issue. Relatives complained and staff felt unsure what to do for the best. The situation worsened as the media criticism intensified. The political issue that required handling was whether or not a hospital should keep patients in beds solely on economic grounds (and if not what should be done for such patients). As soon as the issue was directly and openly addressed and an acceptable policy instituted, the public criticism and complaints melted away.[13]

Limitation. Even where policies are satisfactorily constructed and introduced, they may not get implemented. One chairman of a public sector authority confided to me that in 14 years of policy-making not a single policy had been followed up to see whether anything had happened. Those who perceive themselves as suffering through a policy, or having their habitual inertia or free-wheeling autonomy disturbed, may be reluctant to support any policy at all, and certainly not in a wholehearted way. So policies alone are not enough. If policies are to be followed through, a more concrete and controlling action-related direction is essential. As every manager knows, policies suddenly become very real when detailed plans with schedules and targets are required.

G-2¹: Plans

Nature. Plans are devised to direct the details of activity very precisely. Bold strategic objectives (L-2) are insufficient on their own because they give no indication of exactly how they are to be delivered. So-called action-plans, which are no more than lists of tactical objectives (L-1), leave open the question of where this action should be leading. Combining the two types of objective overcomes the limitation of each.

A plan must be anchored by an unambiguous and unchanging strategic objective and should contain time-targeted tactical objectives which can be modified sensibly in accord with evolving circumstances and unexpected events. A challenging strategic objective often requires specification of a strategy, a set of strategic sub-objectives which together are expected to produced the desired end result. Each of these sub-objectives would, of course, require their own tactical objectives; so multiple plans are usually produced. The *function* of a plan is to organize essential tasks and resource use in a time schedule.

If the plans are developed in the context of an agreed mission and an up-to-date policy by people operating within an agreed role, then the results of following them can be expected to be of value. (Of course, if plans take many months or years to be developed – – something not unknown in government-related work — then the strategic objective may become outdated before the planning process is completed.)

Plans are the final generators of things of tangible value i.e. goods or services. Plans simultaneously direct the use of people, space, equipment, time and money, so they are consumers of tangible value i.e. resources. Plans seek to coordinate specific work processes and to constrain people so that output value is greater than input value: in other words, so there is 'value for money'.

Much can be achieved without specifying a plan. However, when the strategic objective calls for a multiplicity of diverse interacting tasks affecting a variety of people at different places and times, it is always uncertain how results can be most efficiently produced. In such cases, some form of detailed planning is usually held to be essential. Any complex project, like the introduction of information systems into a business, for example, invariably requires a planning method of some sort. In the absence of plans, completion of such projects is endlessly delayed, the end result fails to satisfy because circumstances have changed, and gross inefficiencies are generated.

Although plans are valued, plans are not themselves value-packed documents. The tasks and schedules that fill plans are the final pathway of value. Plans seek to constrain people so that values determined and resolved at higher levels will be concretely realized. In other words, they are built on the importance of ensuring that values are effectively translated into action.

Plans also seek to prevent tangible or concrete value — resource — from being wasted. Failure and waste are so easy during implementation if there is a loss of focus on precise details in reality. The progress and outcomes of plans are typically evaluated in terms of the policies which gave rise to them, or (in the absence of policies) in terms of known priorities. If planning takes place in the absence of policies or clear priorities, it is likely or at least possible that tactical objectives, being chosen expediently, will actually violate some desired values.

Another problem emerging when strategic objectives have been decided without policy-work is disruptive disagreement during the planning process. For example, an exercise to plan certain building services in a firm collapsed because different departments were unable to agree about the handling of subcontractors. In the social arena, where planning requires that a multiplicity of public and voluntary agencies should cooperate, political differences make joint achievement extraordinarily difficult. A common fall-back is for planning to focus on numerous small and relatively unconnected projects, each of which seems a good thing to all involved.

Pressures. A plan specifies precisely such things as what is to be done, who is to do it, when things are to be started or completed, which resources are to be used, and what methods are to be employed. So plans are often compendious documents. Flow charts, critical path analyses, time-tables and similar schemas may help bring elements of the plan sharply into focus. The pressure constraining any plan derives from the basic logic of activities: e.g. some things must be completed before others can be started. The pressure for logic is complemented by a pressure produced by circumstances. Plans have to be shaped to fit things like delivery times, staff availability, and the release of finance.

The quality of a plan depends on the validity of both the ideas and the information used to develop it (the logic), and on an appreciation of the circumstances and potentially interfering factors. This means that, ideally, the project must be clearly defined, well-understood, well-structured and developed within a stable environment. Giant projects with political and technological uncertainties require a more fluid planning process than simpler projects. Some things, like theoretical research or creative musical composition, defy explicit planning because personal factors and imaginative processes inherent in the work process are difficult (if not impossible) to define or predict.

Plans frequently require alterations in the specification, ordering or scheduling of tactical objectives as unforeseen obstacles emerge. Such plan changes are to be expected as the project evolves. If, however, the strategic objective changes, then this is more disconcerting to those involved and represents a radical shift even if many of the plan's tactical objectives remain as previously agreed.

Social Process. Planning requires clarity about the facts of the matter in hand. An adequate understanding of the situation and work processes is also essential. So, whereas policy may sometimes be a matter for boards or top managers away from the scene of the action, plans must be developed by those wholly familiar with the realities. If the issue is complex enough to require a planning document, it is usually necessary for the key people to discuss the plan in meetings and to sanction it jointly. The use of teamwork creates a suitable positive atmosphere which allows agreement on the necessary compromises and adaptations essential to the determination of detailed specifications. Everyone in the team must have access to the details, understand their tasks, and appreciate how the parts of the plan fit together. For those more peripherally involved, or subordinates in organizations, planning implies that they will accept instruction.

Plans must be produced in a fashion which is logical, specific, explicit and unambiguous. Project management software may be used to ensure that complex plans are properly organized, represented and reviewed. Plans, unlike policies, do not need to be known in detail by everyone involved.

Disagreements and objections to the details of any plan must be handled if the plan is to win assent. Such problems are typically rational or empirical in nature: one person arguing that there is insufficient space, another concerned that staff need more training to play their part, and so on. Analysis and investigation of such problems are needed to clarify how genuine and serious they are. Once a problem is appreciated, team members feel committed to solving it sensibly. If the problem is insoluble, or demands more resource than has been allocated, then a review of the strategic objective, even perhaps the policy, is called for.

Plans require more regular and more detailed monitoring than policies, and should be fine-tuned and adapted as implementation proceeds. When projects are very complicated, plan control may require an implementation group as well as a steering group. The steering group, as noted earlier, is a policy body which sanctions the plan, ensures it conforms with policy, reviews priorities regularly, checks achievement, and deals with plan-specific sensitive issues as they arise. The implementation group works out the action details, oversees or carries out implementation,

monitors attainment of milestones, investigates serious obstacles and reports to the steering group.

Difficulties. Plans in organizations are primarily developed to control projects which must come in on time and to budget. The detailed work of producing plans is often allocated to staff officers — assistants who are not responsible for operations but organize specific projects within them and coordinate their implementation. Not surprisingly, there is a natural conflict between the rationalist spirit of any plan and the everyday urgency, crises and obstacles of implementation in the midst of an ongoing operation. One consequence is that optimism pervades plans and impossible time schedules are agreed. The social element of plans is often minimized: the time to explain and train people, for example, is often underestimated.

When strategic objectives cross departmental boundaries (as they often do), plans are most needed and yet most difficult to develop and implement. Pragmatic managers feel that there is not enough time for careful detailed planning. They are also prone to agree to objectives in planning meetings (to keep the peace) but then get on with their own agenda and forget or ignore agreements. The neglect of participative team-work increases the likelihood of such an outcome.

Every manager uses plans to a greater or lesser degree. The idea that plans are a matter for headquarters or specialist planners only is a mistake. HQ plans in large corporations are usually forecasts or about growth (G-4^2) rather than simple plans as defined here.

Basic planning (as opposed to forecasting or the strategic development of the whole organization) is fundamental to the control of activity. But production of plans may become an end in itself to satisfy higher management.

Executives may submit plans to governing boards, higher agencies or government departments as a condition of obtaining funds, or to prove they are on line to hitting productivity targets. Here the disconnection of planning from management reality reaches its zenith. Vast documents are produced primarily aiming to get money, or to soothe headquarters bureaucrats. Once money is obtained, its use may have little connection with the plans which supposedly justified it.

Closure. With the production of plans, we have reached the most detailed and concrete constraint on activities in the service of values. Tasks and resources are controlled precisely to produce worthwhile achievement effectively. No further value-based constraint on activity is intuitively necessary or logically possible.

REVIEWING DIRECTION

The six ways to provide direction have now been elaborated. Convictions provide an inner core of unshakeable values that enable us to maintain our ideas, obligations and loyalties whatever the external situation. Approaches remind us of our beliefs and loyalties while orienting us in communal domains outside their sphere of dominance. Missions ensure that each of us and our co-workers thrive on our activities. Roles clarify our responsibilities at work and direct us in dealing with others with whom we must cooperate and jointly achieve. Policies determine an outcome to which we can all work while maintaining our autonomy in a reasonable fashion. Plans tighten coordination still further, now in real time, and ensure that everyone knows precisely what they should be doing, that obstacles are overcome, and that waste is minimized. All these directions will work effectively only if the social processes whereby our agreement is gained and our objections dealt with are well-handled. Of course the content of any direction must be satisfactory as well, resolving the relevant uncertainties and recognizing the distinctive inherent pressures.

Practical Implications. The directions are ubiquitous. So is their mishandling. Their practical significance has been repeatedly emphasized throughout, and many mistakes in their development and use have been described. The emerging implication seems to be that there is an urgent need for people to have a far more solid understanding of the nature and use of directions. This understanding and its proper use depends above all on absolute clarity about the nature of the underlying purposes which constitute the directions. Of all the directions, the least attention seems to be given to convictions and approaches. This accords with the confusion about values and about what working with values entails that is rife in both societies and organizations.

In devising a direction, it is essential to penetrate to the key issue(s) that cause concern and require a sensitive response. Recognizing the issue(s) is a matter of will and intuition which build on knowledge and analysis. The account of the directions probably sounded more rational and organized than they need be in practice. Yet it is almost always desirable for the direction to be systematically developed and properly structured. Directions do need to be defined as a reaction to circumstances and there may not be the time to be systematic or to adhere to the full social process. Even convictions may need to shift with bewildering rapidity. But responsiveness may be no more than an excuse: sudden changes in direction can far too often be traced

to a lack of discipline, insensitivity, mental laziness or inexcusable ignorance.

Where different people or bodies have a distinct responsibility for adjacent purposes, then the dyadic nature of the directions implies the need for joint work to agree on a direction. For example, in developing effective approaches to any social problem, like ecological damage, community leaders need to debate and discuss with church leaders, social scientists, elites of the green movement, and others who can bring different value systems to bear. Similarly, in governmental organizations which sharply distinguish political and management spheres, policy development requires joint work between governors or politicians and top officials. This type of joint work is of particular significance when it comes to introducing new values.

An important assumption in using directions is the pre-existence and pre-acceptance of the relevant values. Governments and top managers in firms often seem to fail to recognize that the values they wish to apply are not, in fact, widely understood and accepted. They then attempt to use directions to produce change without recognizing that these tools are not designed to introduce values, but only to channel the use of currently held values. This is the reason why most computerization projects foundered in the early days, and the reason why many quality (TQM) programmes grind to a halt today.

Decision Approaches. Stating a direction is decisive. It both releases and constrains action. Elsewhere, I have summarized seven distinct approaches to decision and action, (cf. Master-Table 8 and Notes [63,64] in Ch. 6). Any decision method may be used, but specific links seem apparent when uncertainty escalates.

Convictions ought to be developed in accord with one's role and responsibilities. This is why people — the classic example is Thomas á Beckett — often change unexpectedly when taking on a new social role. So the decision approach of last resort is **structuralist**, based in legitimate authority and the importance of autonomy.

Approaches must deal with the marked discrepancy, even antagonism, between the ideas of the few and the shared values of the many. Intense anxieties and emotions may be stirred up, and an intuitive and sensitive way of reconciling the pressures is then needed. So the decision approach of last resort is **imaginist**, based on using imagination and developing commitment.

A satisfactory *mission* must be generated by identifying overarching values and objectives which everyone finds they share or wishes to share in whatever they do.

So the decision approach of last resort is **rationalist**, based on shared values and achievable objectives.

Roles must be defined which allow people with different perspectives and responsibilities to work together irrespective of any particular outcome or what precisely needs to be done. So the decision approach of last resort is **dialectical**, based on resolving disputes through compromises.

Policies can be set in many ways; but the pressure for results and the need for cooperation mean that its generation must be guided by expedience and acceptability. So the decision approach of last resort is **opportunist**, based on ensuring certain easy achievement.

Issues that arise during the production of *plans* are essentially practical and they must be resolved through determination and clarification of the facts. More information will indicate a solution if uncertainty develops. So the decision approach of last resort is **empiricist**, based on reliable valid facts.

The **systemicist** approach is the seventh decision mode and is perhaps reserved for the overview — deciding which type of direction will provide maximum leverage. Alternatively, it seems powerfully applicable to all the directions.

Linkages. Except for plans and convictions, all directions overlap with directions below and above and share both of their levels of purpose (see Fig. 10.2). All directions focus minds and shape outcomes, but plans and convictions represent opposite poles of focusing and shaping. A plan focuses the mind externally and demands that people serve the situation. A conviction focuses the mind internally and demands that situations serve people. The remaining four forms of direction lie between these planes of utter interior abstraction and external tangible reality, between controlling and being controlled.

Because each type of direction responds to higher types and channels lower types, it follows that different directions can support each other. Although any type of direction can be used alone, directions tend to be more effective in practice if they are implemented with linkage in mind. Roles and policies, for example, are linked through priorities. On the one hand, the priorities can only be fulfilled if policies are developed; and, on the other hand, the role must be designed with a recognition that those priorities need addressing. Roles provide the frame and legitimation for generating policies, so role clarity and fulfilment are almost prerequisites for effective policy-making. In the same way, roles themselves are dependent on the mission for their energetic support, and policies are dependent on plans for their conversion into action. So failure of direction-

setting at one level can completely stop progress. Planning blight, for example, is a recognized problem in government agencies where policy-making is poor and time-consuming. Managers put a halt on their own improvements until the new policies which might potentially cut across their plans are made available.

Transition. Controlling every action so as to be absolutely sure that all desired values are being applied at all times is impractical and, if attempted, counter-productive. The very idea offends against our conception of a person as autonomous. A considerable degree of inner control is provided by the inner sense of responsibility associated with elemental purposes (if these are taken seriously). But that control is not sufficiently tightly connected with specific activities. We have now seen that further control can be provided by using direction. This only works if the values in the direction are self-consciously held by the recipient(s). If they are, the direction can sometimes be left implicit or agreed verbally without documentation. If they are not, however well thought out and positively promulgated, the direction will probably have little effect.

All too often, directions which are used to introduce or assert values have a negative effect. Whatever the type, they generate opposition because a mixture of inertia and pre-existing personal conviction influences the disposition to be guided and constrained. When a proposed value is weak or lacking in a person or organization, any direction is liable to be ignored or to receive a hostile response. Of all the directions, only plans really lend themselves to coercive measures, and even then deliberate or unconscious subversion or sabotage is possible.

Resistance is especially intense if the direction seeks to modify ethical rules. Guns have paradoxically come to symbolize freedom and safety in the USA, so directions aiming to control guns founder on convictions. Meeting the needs of patients requires the reworking of professional maxims, so directions aimed to give greater weight to patient preferences and experiences are viewed sceptically by doctors.

Sometimes the new value is not specifically rejected, but nor is it currently recognized and held. In such cases, recipients may be willing to be directed but they invariably become confused about why the direction is needed and what the direction is really about. The point is that *a person's mind cannot be focused and outcomes cannot be shaped by values which are internally rejected, minimized or unrecognized.*

Because of the ethical aspiration and emotional need for continuity (L'-2: Ch. 6), it feels right to people to oppose and resist directions incorporating new values. Still, even though continuity is a good in itself, no society or organization is perfect and the values preserved by continuity invariably include organizational or social ills. Of course, there may be dispute about what those ills are, because what is viewed as bad or harmful by one may be regarded as necessary and good by another.

Changing back to the way things were or moving forward: either path is fraught with difficulties. In the face of confusion and intense controversy, there is the need for a forceful and yet politically sensitive way of promoting change. The tools for asserting and installing particular values are provided by combining the levels of purpose in threes — and developing a drive.

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Master-Table 32

Properties of the six types of direction.

Directions ensure that activity is constrained by chosen values. Each type is a dyad formed by combining two adjacent types of purpose. They assume certain values are held and mediate their pressures in practice as well as dealing with crucial uncertainties affecting activity. See text for details and explanation.

Dyad No. (Levels)	Type of Direction	Function	Pressures determining Content	Uncertainty to be Resolved	Specification is especially Needed:	Social Process Gaining Agreement Handling Objections	Some Consequences of Mishandling
6 (Ls 7 & 6)	Conviction	To stabilize a person's ethical stance in changing circumstances.	From experience & For socialization	How can activities accord with one's deepest values?	When explicitly working with values.	Meditation & Reflection	•Personal demoralization •Organizations lose vitality •Corruption develops •Dogmatism thrives
5 (Ls 6 & 5)	Approach	To ensure adherents' correct participation in a community setting.	From the orthodoxy & For social integration	How can activities promote the orthodox view?	When dealing with new or complex social issues.	Exhortation & Education	•Group loses cohesion •The domain malfunctions •Social debate is weakened •Zeal becomes disruptive
4 (Ls 5 & 4)	Mission	To unify participants' wholehearted efforts in an endeavour.	From popular demands & For a distinct identity	How can activities gain general social support?	When integrating a large complex organization.	Involvement & Inclusion or Exclusion	•Social antagonism grows •Efforts are diffused •Organization is hijacked •The enterprise splits
3 (Ls 4 & 3)	Role	To identify a part's current contribution to the performance of a whole.	From functions & For relationships	How can activities interact with synergy?	When expectations of individuals in a system are not clear.	Networking & Negotiation	•Conflict is institutionalised •Cooperation is neglected •People get confused •Work fails to get done
2 (Ls 3 & 2)	Policy	To coordinate leaders' independent decisions in a problematic situation.	From factions & For results	How can activities address the issues given the resources?	When controversy exists about what to aim for.	Debate & Consultation	•Controversy intensifies •Efforts are fragmented •Vicious circles develop •Issues are avoided
1 (Ls 2 & 1)	Plan	To organize essential tasks and resource use in a time schedule.	From circumstances & For logic	How can activities produce results efficiently?	When implementation is long and complicated.	Teamwork & Analysis	•Resources are wasted •Results are patchy •Delays and dissatisfaction •Disconnection from action

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Master Matrix 32

G-3: DRIVE

Nature. Making a value feature in any situation is difficult. Everyday experience reveals that telling people to use certain values is futile unless they already hold them — and even then acting on a value does not automatically follow from holding it. Directions take for granted that the values explicit or implicit within them will be accepted: but sometimes the values are not recognized or are unequivocally rejected. When values in a direction are not well-established, the direction — be it a conviction, approach, mission, role, policy or plan — is bitterly challenged and, if enforced, may be neglected, pursued half-heartedly, or even sabotaged. If contested or neglected or new values are to find their way into directions and purposeful activities, then something more powerful than a direction is required. This something is a **drive**.

Drives aim explicitly at promoting change by installing values. They carry more emotional and social weight than directions, which means that they can be affirmed and justified more forcibly.

When a particular value is being emphasized in a drive to introduce something new, there are always perfectly valid alternative values which could have been emphasized instead. Top of the list, usually, is an emphasis on values inherent in the status quo. Whatever these values are, our analysis of conventionalist choice (in L'-2: Ch. 6) has revealed that ensuring their continuity is itself an enduring obligation. There is also the need to handle those with a more tangible stake in the status quo — usually labelled as 'vested interests'. The existence of natural conservatism, vested interests and genuine alternatives means that the social process associated with any value-based drive is overtly *political*. It also means that complete support for a drive, even a seemingly urgent and necessary one, is never found.

'Sixty years of progress without change': the slogan attributed to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia reveals that even the most conservative of societies evolve. Such an achievement requires values to be constantly reasserted, though possibly in a somewhat revised form as circumstances change. So drives may be used to maintain continuity against the threat of change; or to overcome the obstacle of continuity in order to engender something new. Either way, drives must counter and overcome opposition. Drives promote deliberate change and are seen as forward-looking if countering stagnation and backward-looking if fighting social evolution.

To engage with change, a drive must energize people. It needs to stimulate thinking about values in general and provoke action in the service of particular values. Drives emerge from the triads, combinations of three adjacent levels of purpose. Values in the third level become the focus of controversy and their choice expresses and resolves the political implications of the drive. The *function* of a drive is to ensure that certain desired values are installed despite resistances.

Those in leadership positions within society and in large organizations are preoccupied with finding ways to introduce new values or revitalize existing values. Leaders recognize that certain values will not only change the way things are, but control people in the service of what the leadership judges to be good. Controlling values is far more effective than controlling activities or controlling people. If a new value is successfully installed, then the value system and the identity of the group as a whole has been modified. People are then controlled from within. Such an ambitious aim depends on understanding and skilfully applying the various components of a drive.

Types. There are five triads which define the five components of a drive. In descending order, these drive components are labelled: *ideals* $(G-3^5)$; *crusades* $(G-3^4)$; *campaigns* $(G-3^3)$; *initiatives* $(G-3^2)$; and *directives* $(G-3^1)$. Each of these may be defined separately and viewed as a type of drive. Descending, the groups reflect a progressively more tangible, direct and time-defined impetus to the introduction of values. Ideals and crusades, the upper triads, produce or sustain desired values; campaigns, the middle triad, generate an immediate focus on recognized and desired values; and initiatives and directives, the lower triads, ensure that blocked but otherwise accepted and desired values produce tangible results.

Each drive component has a similar internal structure. The lowest level contains those purposes which define what is to be sustained or produced. Purposes specified here must be *appropriately adapted* to the situation. Purposes at the middle level direct the change and should be defined so as to ensure the effectiveness and success of the drive component. Purposes specified here are strategic and so must seek to *maximize impact* in the situation. The topmost level is invariably a level of value and any value chosen becomes a focus of controversy. So the values which are specified here need to reflect and harness *political support* for the drive.

The triads are represented diagrammatically in Figure 10.3, and the main properties of the five types of drive are summarized in Master-Table 33. Before describing the drive components in more detail, each is summarized below in terms of their effect on people, their constituent levels, their function, and their social operation.

Figure 10.3: The triadic grouping which defines drives.

Five components of drive enabling change to be promoted politically.

L-7 Ultimate Value				
L-6 Value System			G-3^5	
L-5 Social Value		G-3^4	←— *Ideals*	
L-4 Principal Object		G-3^3	←— *Crusades*	
L-3 Internal Priority	G-3	←— *Campaigns*		
L-2 Strategic Obj.	G-3^1	←— *Initiatives*		
L-1 Tactical Obj.	←— *Directives*			

G-3^5: Ideals encourage people to persevere with the drive and the lower level components despite all obstacles and set-backs. Ideals are formed by combining one or two ultimate values (L-7), with value systems (L-6) and social values (L-5). Their function is to commit people, either within a group or across many groups, to desired values despite any differences they might have. They are the conceptual basis of personally held aspirations, and the source of optimism for the future. Ideals must be built on a potential for change (cf. the pragmatist duality, L'-3, in Ch. 6). Realists who foresee change recognize the need for ideals; and effective idealists (not the starry-eyed variety) see themselves as realists. Ideals emerge as the driving power of social movements. They are explained to those in the movement and to wider society by its elites.

G-3^4: Crusades harness the energies and loyalties of people enduringly. They are determined by the combination of a value system (L-6), social values (L-5) and principal objects (L-4). Their function is to convert people to ideas of potential social benefit. These ideas are initially perceived as values which are sectional, theoretical or tribal in nature. An area of social concern or 'cause' sparks off and sustains the crusade. Crusades are pursued through an agenda for reform (or manifesto) which sets out desired practical achievements which, if realized, would signify the reorientation of the relevant group or wider society. Crusades need champions to emerge from amongst those people who are identified with the cause.

G-3^3: Campaigns activate people temporarily to express a preference and make a particular choice in one way rather than in another. Campaigns are dependent on the linking of social values (L-5), principal objects (L-4) and internal priorities (L-3). Their function is to persuade people to act on their dormant values, values which they know they hold in common with others. This group of people, who may form either part or the whole of a community, are the constituency of the campaign. Campaigners depend on spontaneous support from their constituency, and the constituency needs campaigners to bring to their attention an opportunity to assert its values. To capture attention, campaigns are typically based around pithy and memorable slogans which epitomize the value or needed choice.

G-3^2: Initiatives engage people over a defined time to achieve worthwhile results. They do so by specifying principal objects (L-4), internal priorities (L-3) and strategic objectives (L-2). Initiatives generate activities which forward given and non-controversial but neglected values. Initiatives should contain costed proposals which meet gaps in current activities. So they are the property of organizations, and are best devised with the help of experts.

G-3^1: Directives control people immediately in a crisis situation. They do so by containing internal priorities (L-3), strategic objectives (L-2) and tactical objectives (L-1). Directives produce specific action when there is an intractable value conflict. Directives are embodied as a compulsory decree (authoritative instruction or prescriptive ruling) and are pushed

through by the leadership against all opposition. They are used in objectively dangerous situations in which an impasse exists or is imminent. This crisis sanctions the leader's use of a directive.

Resistance to Change. Value is generally assigned to existing activities, ideas and perceptions because of their present usefulness, or just because of their familiarity. So all change involves value change. People usually need to debate whether change is worthwhile. The first task in overcoming resistance is to communicate and establish unequivocally the urgent need for change and not just the intellectual case. In other words, change must itself become a social value.

Even if the case and need for change is accepted, there are different possibilities — each of uncertain worth, and each benefiting or disrupting different individuals to a different degree. So people can be expected to disagree about which possibility they prefer. In other words, all change has a political dimension.

Getting regular exercise, using computers, recruiting women to senior posts, conserving energy, developing customer responsiveness, allocating money for research, lowering trade barriers, healthy eating — all such apparently desirable things turn out to be extremely difficult to implement in organizations and society. Getting change is difficult because of the value component — the politics — not because of the skill requirements, the costs, or the technical complexities. To succeed in producing change, the support and understanding of the people involved must be actively won.

Directions control implementation and constrain people in a rather rational way. But we cannot operate efficiently or effectively as automata, mechanically doing whatever we are instructed just because someone else (or even a logical part of ourselves) regards it as obviously good or necessary. Values must resonate within us before instructions about what is good or needed make any sense at all. In the case of new values, we have to engage with them, usually against our inclination. Drives exist to encourage and even force that engagement. As a result, drives surround us. Politicians, public agencies, pressure groups and leaders of every conceivable type are constantly seeking to defend and alter values.

And we, both as individual people and as organizations, are often eager to improve ourselves. So we mount our own internal drives to change the way we think and act. Often the values in these drives harmonize with social fads and communal pressures, but at other times they run counter to them.

In the management literature, the prevalence of dysfunctional values is a source of increasing concern. The need to alter values comprehensively currently goes under the banner of culture-change.[14] Managers are told by their consultants and the business schools that true leaders generate such change. However, although a high degree of control over activities is possible within organizations, a similar degree of control over values is not. So culture-change is never a matter of a few seminars, a survey, and a ream of personnel documents. Without drives which are properly developed and systematically implemented, the inertia and scepticism of even loyal and dedicated staff cannot be overcome, and little alters.

Most firms wish to stay out of the political arena, but their location within communities means they are subject to political pressures and popular movements, like it or not. This is because staff within organizations are the vehicle for communal values and have a social identity which encompasses their employee role. Even so, hierarchical control, vested interests and the tendency to compartmentalize private life from work life mean that new values in society do not cross organizational boundaries easily. Organizations in monopolistic positions, whether public or private, are especially resistant to altering their attitudes and practices.

Properties. The five drive components have many similarities. They are all assertive in nature, have an emotional core, and cannot be accepted on a purely rational basis. So all are likely to be opposed, resisted, flouted, by-passed, distorted, subverted, ignored or rejected. Being based in values and change, drives generally stimulate their opponents to brand them as meaningless, wrong, bad, futile, wasteful, harmful, hurtful, dangerous, negative or evil. Despite similarities, there are many differences between the various components. The *nature*, *function* and *use* of each are characteristic. In the summary, we saw that each has a different effect on people and a characteristic time-relation. The *content* of the drive component is determined by the distinctive types (i.e. levels) of purpose which constitute it. There is a different *locus of responsibility* for articulating and pursuing each component, which takes the form of a collectivity of some sort together with a typical role. Drives can fail if the triadic components are poorly constructed and handled, and this *failure* has characteristic consequences. Each component inherently lends itself to a distinctive form of *criticism*.

Starting from the highest, the five drive components will now be taken in turn and examined, with examples, in terms of the italicized properties. The *limitations* of each will clarify the necessity for the more

focused and tangible form or component of drive defined by the group below.

G-3⁵: Ideals

Nature. Ideals are the starting point for all value change and (perhaps less obviously) for all efforts to maintain the status quo under threat. Indeed, without ideals there is no reason to be involved in any beneficial activity or social development except in a survival-driven, fortuitous or mechanistic way.

An ideal moves beyond a conviction to specify something which is more communal, seeks deliberately to unify, and has wider implications. It appears as a value to which everyone might be expected to aspire or at least to accept as worthwhile. Ideals are real and recognizable, but they only exist in the imagination. Ideals can never be fully achieved, only asymptotically approached. This is because any concrete results, however good, can be further improved.

So an ideal is articulated as a desirable conception for diverse people to identify with, aspire to, believe in, and hope for. Ideals have the quality of metaphors which resonate deeply within people. They can be widely shared because they allow for many shades of interpretation, opinion and emphasis. The *function* of an ideal is to commit people to the establishment of certain desired values, despite their differences. For example, ideals like peaceful coexistence, the welfare state, a just society, efficient management, customer-responsiveness, an information culture, a liberal education, or healthy eating can persist even though they mean different things to different people at different times.

Ideals have practical *uses* which is why they must be devised in a hard-headed way and not be viewed as a utopian longing. Ideals should be the recurrent and long-lasting reference point for all attempts to maintain a value-drive within enterprises and popular movements. Any crusade, campaign, initiative or directive which cannot be justified easily in terms of a recognizable ideal soon finds it lacks supporters, and even its beneficiaries may view the drive as irrelevant or undesirable. Above all, the ideal must encourage people to persist and persevere, to tolerate delays and difficulties, and to overcome obstacles.

Content. To activate and yet unify people, an ideal must incorporate needs recognized by individuals and the community, ideas which offer an appealing basis for change, and values universally sought. In other words, ideals are rooted in particular ultimate values (L-7) which can command sufficient *political support*, use beliefs or principles (L-6) which can *maximize impact*, and promote social values (L-5) which ensure an *appro-*

priate adaptation. The ideal seems able to unify groups because it taps into the goodness of ultimate values without demanding union or transcendence, bolsters its constituent value systems without requiring deep intellectual understanding or tribal dedication, and focuses the welter of social values which express popular needs.

An ideal depends on the sensitive choice and use of each of its three constituent types of value for its effectiveness as a drive source. Without social values appropriate to the time and place, the ideal will seem irrelevant. Without a value system suitably chosen from a variety of possibilities, the ideal will lack shape, direction and impact. Without the transpersonal and trans-social sanction of an ultimate value, the ideal will lack a sense of goodness or rightness, and be deficient in inspiration. The integrative qualities of ultimate and social values seem to mitigate the intense divisiveness of the value systems within the ideal, and permit it to be an umbrella for diverse people and groups.

Ideals remain controversial nevertheless. Note that controversy in an ideal lies at the ultimate value level. At different times in the history of a society, different ultimate values are paramount, and these lead to different ideals. The ideal of an enterprise culture starts from freedom, the ideal of the welfare state starts from justice, the ideal of a learning society starts from truth, the ideal of a caring community starts from compassion.

It can be confusing when the term ideal is used to refer to a particular ultimate value only: e.g. the ideal of peace. Bellicose communities that glorify war may still hold peace as an ultimate value, but it is hardly appropriate to describe peace as their ideal. An ideal built on peace as the ultimate value might be better called 'peaceful coexistence'. This ideal will imply different things in different countries according to their value systems; and it will embody social values — absence of war, technology transfers, trading relations, cultural exchanges — which are chosen to be appropriate for all parties. A valued idea is often called an ideal by philosophers; and value systems alone, like socialism, are commonly referred to as ideals — but such usage, again, can be misleading. It is an idealistic product of socialism, like the welfare state or the just society, which is the true ideal (as defined here). Socialists disagree violently among themselves about what constitutes true socialism, but the ideal unifies the warring sects and factions. The ideal can even spread beyond the in-group: in the case of the welfare state in the UK, it drove conservative governments who abhor socialism. Finally, referring to a social value like education as an ideal is also unsatisfactory. Any ideal needs greater depth and complexity if it is to deal with value disputes

and install new values: so we have the ideal of liberal education (with the ultimate value of wisdom and the value system of liberalism) or academic scholarship (with the ultimate value of freedom and the value system of academia) or spiritual growth (with the ultimate value of truth and the value system of a religion).

An ideal cannot specify its mode of realization, because its constituting levels are conceptions which float above any specification of activity. Naturally, the *criticism* which is characteristically levelled at ideals is that they are unrealistic. Such criticism is only valid when ideals are misused. Ideals must be realistic if they are to function as defined.

Social Process. Ideals have the power to awaken people permanently to possibilities of social life at its best. So ideals find their natural home, their *locus of responsibility*, within social movements. A movement is an endeavour pursued by a loosely bounded and minimally organized collection of people. It develops and spreads new values spontaneously and has the potential to transform groups to which its members belong (see G-5[3]: Ch.12). Its elites — self-proclaimed spokesmen, ideologues, academics — conceive, document, defend and disseminate the ideals for the wider public. The ideal, initially, is incomprehensible but vaguely appealing to many. Only through much discussion, explanation and exhortation does its nature emerge. Managers, for example, were at first confused by the phrase 'total quality'; elderly women wonder what 'women's liberation' means; and I still puzzle about the ideal of the 'social market'.

The responsibility for learning about and subscribing to ideals conceived by others rests with each person. In the community this depends on a sensitivity to that area of value and to the need for change. When a person comes to recognize and accept an ideal previously unrecognized or dismissed, the result is an awakening and a sense of needing lower-level components to fulfil the drive and spread the values. Ideals, once understood, are felt as natural and necessary by those who hold them. They not only release energies for social endeavour, but are the best personal defence against passivity and doubt.

Ideals, like the movements which disseminate them, appeal across tribal groups and ideological divides. As appreciation of an ideal grows and spreads, groups of all sorts take it up. By internalizing the ideal, each specific group maintains the loyalty of its members and aids its integration in society. Of course, the way the ideal is explained and used differs greatly according to the group.

Organizations usually need to change their culture in a variety of dimensions and so require a variety of ideals. Any culture-change process requires a mini-social movement and should start with recognition of a worthwhile and relevant ideal — and this must be something more substantial and less achievable than 'to be the best' or 'to beat our main competitor'. Once the ideal is found, the commonest mistake made by managers (aided and abetted by their management consultants) is to set up a programme of implementation, as if the ideal was something tangible like a product or a skill. Behavioural change may then occur, but without the awareness and implanting of new values. An ideal can only be brought into an organization by deliberately adopting it, activating lower level drives, and then using the ideal as the principle criterion to judge all directions, programmes and systems. In this way, new values may be slowly and progressively installed.

Failure. Ideals may fail to unify people to practical ends, but not because they are unrealistic or disproved. Ideals will fail if their ultimate values lack sufficient social support. So ideals which work in Japan may not work in the USA. The welfare state remains an ideal, but the collapse of socialism and the increased focus on freedom rather than justice has weakened its impetus. An ideal will eventually collapse if its ideas lack a sound basis in reason or fact. Racial purity was the nazi ideal, but when the nazi's perverse value system collapsed, this ideal went with it. If it is not possible for ideals to be defined and applied using existing social values, then the ideal is truly utopian. and not a useful tool for practical people in the present.[15] So ideals need to adapt as society evolves and social values change. For example, the ideal of financial independence used to imply avoiding indebtedness, but freedom from debt is no longer a social value or personal need, and financial independence has come to signify the ability to borrow and maintain high levels of indebtedness without fear of foreclosure.

If an ideal fails, a new ideal must be found to take its place. Failure to develop ideals or denying the need for ideals results in cynicism, apathy and loss of energy for making improvements. This is a poisonous and contagious state which can infect a wide variety of activities and eventually weakens the social fabric.

Limitation. Ideals bring people and social groups together, stimulating their individual and collective determination to see that certain values are introduced. But ideals fail to specify how particular issues should be dealt with, and do not indicate what endeavours should be pursued. Ideals also fail to recognize and facilitate the debate between different tribal groups or sectional interests. So a more focused component is needed, one which can orient people to alternative constellations

of values in specific areas and can define practical possibilities. This is provided by moving down a level and devising a crusade.

G-3⁴: Crusades

Nature. The introduction of values (or the defence of values threatened by social changes) can be given a coherent and practical focus by defining a crusade. The *function* of a crusade is to convert people to ideas of potential social benefit. The crusade emerges in response to a particular issue or problem, which is typically referred to as a cause. The crusade generates an agenda of reforming endeavours linked to the cause but does not indicate the methods and details of their implementation. A social group exists or forms around the cause and sponsors the crusade. So any crusade is as persistent and enduring as the issue and that group.

The main *use* of a crusade is to educate people about the practical implications of social change and value challenges embodied in particular issues or problems. If half-way successful, the crusade conditions people to accept what can and should be done about them. Those responsible can then instigate action without fear of a rebellion. If fully successful, the crusade reorients people so that their energies and loyalties serve new ideas.

Whenever the values reflect a social problem needing to be tackled on the broadest possible front, a 'good' cause tends to be established. Recent good causes include care for the homeless, better handling of families in courts of justice, equal opportunities for women, and protection of endangered species. Public crusades for these causes seek a high profile and are pursued pro-actively and persistently. The other type of crusade is mainly reactive to events. For example, we tend to hear about the cause of farmers, whenever there are attempts to limit the subsidization of unnecessary produce; or the cause of banks, whenever public discontent at their inefficiency, ineptitude and unresponsiveness erupts. These causes may be called 'defensive' because their crusades exist to defend vested interests.

Crusades invariably generate political controversy because of their sectional or ideological nature. So there is often a lack of agreement on the worthiness or need for crusades on behalf of even good causes, let alone defensive causes.

Crusades span the conceptual and the practical by their efforts to produce a realistic agenda for reform. In organizations, crusades are essential to install new values. Without a crusade, new ideas only disorient people, whatever their logic or confirmed validity. Many, probably most, staff in organizations at present

are wary of new ideas. But, explain the ideas in terms of new activities or demonstration projects, and then the new values spring to life and genuine enthusiasm becomes possible. In society, the reform agenda for a good cause is typically presented in the form of a manifesto which specifies a seemingly radical and comprehensive range of projects or proposals. For example, a recent UK manifesto for the disabled proposed changes in legislation, benefits, community care, health services, education, employment and training, housing, public transport, leisure and access.[16] Such an agenda can only be realized if the crusade can generate a wide variety of community-based campaigns and organization-based initiatives.

Content. On the one hand, the crusade can only get *political support* and create insiders if it is built around certain ideas and principles, i.e. valid value systems (L-6), which serve the cause. On the other hand, the crusade can only *maximize impact* on outsiders if it is aligned with what the community perceives as its needs, i.e. current social values (L-5), and is pursued vigorously in their terms. Finally, neither insiders nor outsiders can understand the crusade until they see it developed as a set of possible and worthwhile endeavours, i.e. principal objects (L-4), which are *appropriately adapted* to the current situation.

Crusaders should recognize that social values are the chief determinant of social support and effectiveness. A society that tolerates poverty generally is unlikely to be responsive to a crusade for the homeless. An organization cannot sensibly launch a crusade to put women into senior jobs if society sees little need for women to work at all. Opposing or alternative social values in organizations are also relevant: e.g. the values of immediacy and expediency may impede HQ crusades to get efficiency savings through systematic review and re-design of procedures. A crusade is most likely to be successful if its social values are specified in accord with current ideals. The cause of the homeless, for example, needs to be forwarded very differently in an enterprise culture than in a welfare state.

The value system is the source of controversy in any crusade. The ideas behind defensive causes, like farming and banking, are usually left implicit, but no-one is in doubt as to the tribal origin of their proposals. Their spokesmen present arguments in terms of social values in order to gain a hearing and impact: farmers claim to protect the countryside and to secure the national need for food; banks speak of the need for efficiency, risk-management and shareholder return. Defensive causes seek to see off public challenges and work to strengthen their own social position and status.

In the case of crusades for good causes, the social

value is self-evident, but the beliefs or principles behind them may need more deliberate definition in order to get sufficient popular backing. For example, the crusade for family courts in the UK is defined by principles of conciliation and family support rather than the usual adversarial principles.

Often the value system flows from the identity of those behind the crusade. A crusade for the homeless may be furthered on the basis of a Christian value system (e.g. by the board of social responsibility of a church) or on the basis of a socialist value system (e.g. by a left-wing pressure group).

Crusades formulate worthwhile endeavours according to the possibilities. So these are modified over the years as times change or as objects are realized. For example the crusade for family-friendly litigation has been forwarded in the past decades through altered procedures, new types of family courts, acceptance of videotaped evidence by children and so on.

Social Process. Crusades are lengthy efforts and their pursuit can be tiring because of the polarization and intensity of feelings roused by their attempts to re-socialize people. To be effective, they need to be championed. For defensive causes like those of banks or farmers, the *locus of responsibility* for championing is found within umbrella organizations and public relations departments which take on the role. For good causes, like the homeless or giant pandas, voluntary action is required.

Activists must rally to the cause and individual champions must be found who are prepared to dedicate themselves to the crusade. The most vociferous champions may become public figures. Ralph Nader, the US consumers' crusader, achieved renown for his fight against corporate negligence and dishonesty. The cause of consumerism is now well-developed and many consumerist values have been embodied in legislation and accepted by businesses. Total quality management, for example, is the managerial ideology forming the internal counterpart to consumerism. Political parties in most developed countries now see consumers as voters and treat voters as if they are consumers. People have been converted to consumerism.

The survival of a cause and the sustenance of a crusade depend on a definable group, sometimes called a reform group, which takes on itself to overcome resistance and see that change eventually occurs. Newspapers, for example, merely report the progress of crusades. Only when society is reoriented, do they actively run or support campaigns within that crusade. So crusaders cannot depend on general support, but must obtain resources directly from some group and its

circle of supporters. Within an organization, that group should be the governing body (with top managers) which is responsible for the organization and controls its resources. In the case of good causes, the crusading group may gain additional resources for their crusade by grant from government or philanthropic foundations, or by gift from sympathetic members of the community.

The *criticism* inherent in crusades is that there is an over-valuing of the cause. Greenpeace, for example, which has mounted such a successful crusade in relation to care of the physical environment has been regularly attacked for being too biased or one-sided, and for making proposals for new types of activity which are excessive or extreme. For many years, businessmen and politicians viewed Ralph Nader as a destructive extremist. It is possible to have sympathy for a good cause without being fully converted to it and accepting all the related claims and demands. So people may wish to defend homosexuality as a sexual option and strongly oppose discrimination against homosexuals, while still disagreeing with some objects of homosexual crusades like teaching homosexuality in schools or allowing homosexual couples to adopt children.

Organizations which need to incorporate new ideas or wish to adopt a new culture must mount crusades. People at the top must themselves be converted — which means that they cannot imagine the organization succeeding without the ideas. The crusade, in other words, must be felt to be essential to the work and social situation of the organization if it is to have any hope of being successful. For example: the idea of marketing in Europe has been alien to most UK firms. However, removal of customs barriers in 1993 exposed UK firms to European competition and the threat of collapse. Staff lower down the organization cannot properly appreciate the threat (or the opportunity) and are not disposed to change their ways. The crusade must convince them by locking in to recognizably urgent needs and existing social values of the staff. Finally, a package of actions, the reform agenda, must be developed. In the case of *Europe sans frontières*, this would mean changes to business activities like foreign language training, altered distribution arrangements, new marketing initiatives and so on. In the same way, a recent project in a public hospital suggested that a crusade for patient-centredness should focus on better handling of patient contacts with the hospital, developing ward systems oriented to patient needs, and launching initiatives to accommodate patient convenience — all rather radical proposals.

Failure. In the absence of a crusade, people are puzzled by the cause. They do not understand what the

issue is, why it needs addressing, what the possible change is about, and what sorts of things might be done. Crusades may fail because they are pursued half-heartedly: a common occurrence within organizations. If this occurs, people are not converted, energy for change is not generated, and the hoped for social benefit does not materialize.

Outsiders look at a fizzled crusade with a mixture of contempt and satisfaction. Like ideals, crusades do not fail because they are wrong or disproved. They fail because the value system lacks adherents. Enoch Powell's crusade to repatriate Asian and West Indians in the 1960's foundered because the idea of apartheid was disturbing and could not gather sufficient political support. A crusade may fall into disfavour and achieve little if the social values within it are unacceptable. The paedophile cause has a continuing flow of recruits who support the idea of sex with children, but their crusade has failed because people reject the need for children to have sexual freedom or for adult sexual freedom to include activity with children. Paedophile champions tend to end up in prison.

Limitation. Crusades are socializing. They re-orient people and redefine their responsibilities. They enable the development and implementation of distinctive ideas about what a society or organization should value. Although crusades indicate broadly what will happen, like ideals they are distant from the moment of choice. Crusades seek to operate on our minds and are still too general and unconnected to the immediate situation. We become aware of them, sometimes fearfully and sometimes contemptuously, but screen them out as we turn to face present demands. Now, however, we move to the first of the three drive components which impinge directly on our choices in their attempt to ensure that installed values are put into practice. The first stage in this process is the production of a campaign.

G-3³: Campaigns

Nature. A campaign is that part of a drive where the activation of values and the possibility of change are sharpest. The campaign must, as the saying goes, win the hearts and minds of people. The most dramatic campaigns are witnessed at election time. Few voters trouble to read the manifesto or quiz canvassers about the detailed implications of future initiatives. Campaign managers, fully aware of this, orient their efforts to what counts: getting the vote on the day. Ensuring that single simple expression of preference is what the entire election campaign is about. Precisely the same principle applies to other campaigns.

The *function* of a campaign, then, is to persuade people to act on certain dormant values which they already hold in common.

Campaigns are all around us. Their *use* for a one-off expression of preference — when voting or when donating money — is easiest to understand. Campaigns seeking to ensure repetitive choices — doing regular exercise, turning off unnecessary lights, or refusing to drive after drinking alcohol — are far more problematic. The reason is that campaigns activate people temporarily and have a limited life. The sheer repetition of a campaign slogan may lead to a conditioning that induces people to use the value semi-automatically. But people also become saturated and may refuse to pay attention. Keeping a value like 'safe driving' permanently active is difficult even with regular campaigns timed to national holidays and festivals. So crusaders also pressure for more organized and permanent controls like stiffer legal or disciplinary penalties and special monitoring programmes.

Campaigns launched by reform groups tend to be fund-raising in order to provide services: e.g. for potential delinquents, for cancer research; or to pursue their crusade: e.g. for better conditions for incarcerated delinquents, for a ban on smoking where people congregate. Some voluntary sector campaigns target personal actions: e.g. persuading families to adopt or foster an elderly person or disturbed adolescent. When a preference is controversial, governments prefer campaigns because they depend on voluntary choice. Laws which compel compliance may then follow: e.g. campaigns in the UK to wear seat-belts in cars preceded by some years the legislation which made their provision and use compulsory. Campaigns are also useful when enforcement is problematic or impossible: e.g. in making energy savings around the home. In a similar fashion, government campaigns may be developed with the hope of reducing the pressure on public services: e.g. in the area of health promotion.

Firms regularly run internal campaigns, either focusing on business needs (e.g. to improve efficiency, to reduce waste, to foster initiative, to increase quality) or on personal matters impinging on work (e.g. to reduce alcoholism, to lessen accidents, to foster self-development). These campaigns are regularly repeated because their effect is inherently transient. Campaigns may be used to activate policy development. Sometimes, however, they are used instead of policies because they leave staff to decide for themselves how, or indeed whether, to act on the suggested priorities. This friendly flexible quality reflects a person-centred sensitive approach to management at the expense of a task-centred tough-minded approach. Although

achievement is limited, management by campaign is often favoured by leaders in public agencies and voluntary bodies where it would be out of character to adopt a no-nonsense management style which solves problems, grips issues, and confronts staff with failings.

For campaigns to work, they need to be single-minded and well-focused. The cause of protecting endangered species will only be furthered by campaigning for a particular species — 'save the whale', 'protect the panda', 'stop the ivory trade'. A series of campaigns may be launched in order to drive a crusade forward: in the above case, one endangered species being chosen after another. People may be swayed by one campaign but not by another within the same crusade. Campaigns to reduce salt or refined sugar in the diet as part of a crusade for healthy eating seem to be more problematic than those to reduce artificial additives or alcohol. So responsiveness to a particular campaign is not determined by support for the crusade.

The essence of a campaign is captured in slogans: simple pithy sayings that stick in the memory. Creative advertising is in its element here. 'Clunk-click every trip' (promoting the use of car seat-belts), 'Drinka pinta milka day', 'Labour isn't working' (Saatchi and Saatchi's slogan for the UK Conservative party election campaign in 1979), and 'Beanz meanz Heinz' — these are typical of slogans in the public domain designed to keep popular attention on a particular value so as to stimulate a particular choice.

Content. The campaign seeks to mobilize support for a value which is presented as a priority, preference or focus for action (L-3) *appropriately adapted* to the situation. This preference is presented as emerging from a social value (L-5) which has wide *political support*. To *maximize impact*, the campaign requires its own defining aims and objects (L-4).

The political choice in supporting or responding to a campaign is essentially about agreement with the social value. The success of a campaign does not demand re-orientation or conversion in the recipient. Instead it depends on the degree to which its social values are recognized and upheld by people within the relevant community. For example, to counter attempts by animal welfare activists to get fox-hunting banned, a campaign in favour of fox-hunting urged that the sport preserved the environment and provided employment — two currently popular social values. Because campaigns are rooted in social values, campaigners can use petitions which include signatures from people who have only the flimsiest connection or involvement in the issues but who in the act of signing the petition recognize that social value.

The campaign's principal objects are the primary determinant of its impact and effectiveness. Producing a petition may be the principal object of a campaign, but petitions are rarely effective in swaying governments or organizations. Amnesty International runs campaigns whose principal object is to raise public awareness that many regimes wrongfully imprison and torture their people. There is evidence that even brutal regimes are sensitive to world opinion, and that internal resistance and reform groups are supported by knowing that outsiders are concerned.

Campaigns are just one of a variety of activities mounted by organizations crusading for social reform. Often campaign objects link closely to the reform agenda defined by the related crusade. However, a campaign may well be effective without the desired end result of the crusade being achieved. The principal object of the Opportunity 2000 campaign in the UK is 'to encourage companies to take up the challenge of equal opportunities and set programmes and goals necessary for improvement'; while the crusading object of Opportunity 2000's parent organization is 'to increase the quantity and quality of women's participation in the work-force'. In other words, the campaign is successful if certain programmes and goals are in place within companies. But the success of these programmes and goals, and ultimately the achievement of the equal opportunity crusade, is a matter for each company, not the campaign.

Campaigns must go on to define internal priorities which are appropriate for individuals to use in activities or in enterprises under their control. In one of the Amnesty International campaigns mentioned above, the priority was to get people to write letters to government authorities to plead the case of specific named victims of the regime. In the Opportunity 2000 campaign, the priorities included getting companies to commit themselves publicly to publish progress reports at intervals, to attend conferences, to share experiences and to learn from each other.

The most tangible form of internal priority is the giving of money. Giving money to the campaign is a matter of individual priorities because attractive alternatives include spending it on oneself or donating it to a different campaign. Public appeals leave the campaigners largely free to use the money in whichever way they wish to achieve the object of the crusade: i.e. the precise use of the funds is not a defined part of the campaign.

Social Process. Campaigns are a community matter, and they only work with people who already hold the values. The people who hold a value in common form an undefined constituency within the

relevant community. This constituency is therefore the *locus of responsibility* for campaigns. Campaigners emerge from that constituency and serve it by getting all within it to exert their influence on a particular matter. If there is no significant constituency, then the campaign falls on deaf ears and campaigners appear as eccentrics. Many campaigns not only seek to activate their constituency, but are part of a crusade to enlarge it. In campaigns for good causes, campaigners tend to assume that the constituency is or ought to be coterminous with the community.

Large businesses call their key external constituency a market, and seek to define and target it as clearly as possible. They launch advertising campaigns into the community, knowing that their product or service is broadly acceptable to all and positively desired by some. Marketing managers know that people have to be induced to take the decisive step to buy the product or service. Because campaigns are based in social values, the so-called global market does not exist: there is instead a set of markets, each of which requires its own distinctive marketing campaign geared precisely to that territory's social values. Depending on the product or service, the largest natural market territory would usually seem to be the nation-state or occasionally a defined group of similar nations like the Benelux countries or European Community.

The *criticism* inherently generated by campaigns is their intrusiveness and their lack of sustained effect. Unless campaigns intrude — not just on hoardings, in newspapers, at public meetings, and in the streets, but into the home and office by canvassers, mail shots, radio, television, telephone and computer communications — then they are unlikely to deliver their message. Campaigns are about communication and persuasion, not about deception and control. They are oriented to a trusting constituency, not to an enemy. So choosing rhetoric for use in a campaign is a sensitive ethical issue.[17] When campaigns exaggerate and distort the truth or seek to manipulate people for hidden ends, then communication has been perverted into propaganda.

Failure. Unlike ideals and crusades, campaigns can easily fail and be seen by their supporters to have failed. Campaign failure is common and tolerable. Its consequence is that people are not reached and won over. Campaign management is obviously critical to success, but it may be easier for insiders and believers to blame the campaign mechanics than the message being promoted. Campaign failure needs a post-mortem: perhaps the timing was wrong, perhaps the principal object was unrealistic, perhaps the constituency was not developed, perhaps campaign organization was poor, perhaps communication was confused. After due

scrutiny and reflection, decisions must be taken about whether and when to reactivate the campaign and about whether and how to modify it.

The failure of a campaign in an organization suggests that an ideal or a crusade may be needed to establish certain ideas and values more firmly. A common error is to imagine that campaigns will give people new values. Campaigns are friendlier than crusades, but if they are appealing for action on non-existing values, then staff mock the campaign and the stupidity of those running it. Alternatively, where values are known to be already established, campaign failure suggests that initiatives and directives are needed to get results.

Limitation. Campaigns bring values to the forefront of people's minds and invite immediate action. They may release money, determine a momentary choice, or precipitate a long-lasting commitment. Although campaigns may have these practical consequences, they do not themselves engage with practicalities and do not link desired values with the particular results of activities. Campaigns do prepare the ground for tangible changes, but they cannot define the efforts needed. For this, we need to move down to initiatives.

G-3²: Initiatives

Nature. Once people are encouraged (by the ideal), reoriented (by the crusade), and activated (by the campaign), they are ready to pursue values by intervening in ongoing endeavours. An initiative seeks to produce a specific and costed set of strategies for immediate implementation, and so brings installation of values down to earth. An initiative is a complex project which is based on values and which reflects a concerted attempt to ensure substantial achievement on their behalf.

Values which have been successfully created and installed as a consequence of higher drive components may need initiatives to bed them into the operation. Long-standing and well-accepted values which are neglected in practice also need initiatives. So the *function* of initiatives is to generate activities which forward given values which are currently being ignored or paid too little attention.

The *use* of initiatives is fostered by pressures for achievement, often associated with a turbulent social context and escalating competition. The effect of the initiative is to engage people over a defined time to achieve specific results. Organizations launch initiatives all the time: marketing initiatives, quality initiatives, recruitment drives, membership drives. Small communities, or rather their local government or their

community association, can launch a 'town beautifica-tion' initiative, or a 'traffic control' initiative. National governments launch streams of initiatives: e.g. the strategic defence initiative (SDI) in the USA, the 'care for the under-fives' initiative in the UK.

Initiatives comprise a range of related but diverse proposals which are financially viable and feasible. So they need to be designed and delivered by organiza-tions. An initiative needs to be time-limited in order to generate an impact. If successful, its values and com-ponent activities become incorporated into regular operations. The Alvey Project, for example, was set up in 1983 and aimed to improve the UK's competitive position in information technology. This was a 5 year £350 million initiative, jointly funded by the govern-ment (Department of Trade and Industry—£110 million; the Scientific and Engineering Research Council—£50 million; Ministry of Defence—£40 million) and industry and academe (£150 million). Firms and research groups viewed the initiative in terms of their current interests and needs and, if it suited them, put forward proposals for government grants on that basis. Successful applicants built up expertise and commitment to the work valued by the initiative, and became more likely to continue pursuing it after the initiative ceased in 1988.

Content. Initiatives need to have unambiguous principal objects (L-4) which determine their *political support*. They must be communicated and pursued in terms of key priorities (L-3) to *maximize impact*, and then implemented by pursuit of strategic objectives (L-2) which are *appropriately adapted* to the situation.

The choice of the principal objects, together with the resource allocated, is the principal focus of controversy. The total amount of finance allocated to any initiative is commonly described either as far too little by those supportive of it, or as wasteful and unnecessary by opponents – SDI was typical in this regard. Extensive and often acrimonious debates about the total allo-cation tend to dwarf debates about priorities and allo-cations within the initiative. Top managers need to recognize that precisely the same dynamics affect initiatives within their organizations.

All strategic objectives within an initiative are developed and sanctioned by reference to its specific principal objects. However, the detailed development of these objectives and therefore the impact and effectiveness of the initiative depends on the selection of internal priorities. For example, the 'care for the under-fives' initiative emphasized such things as involvement of the voluntary sector (rather than local government services), social care (rather than educa-

tional care), low-cost initiatives (rather than capital-intensive projects), and meeting inner-city deprivation (rather than rural needs).

Within organizations, there may be a tendency to define initiatives in terms of a list of projects or out-comes with little analysis of the objects or explicit work on priorities. The initiative may even come to be regarded as identical to the strategic objectives. This is a mistake because strategic objectives are the most variable aspect of the initiative. Initially they should be defined to suit the situation. The strategic objectives may need to be altered during the course of the initiative as obstacles emerge and experience develops. In any governmental initiative, for example, specific proposals are defined by the various applicants for funds depending on what those applicants (firms, academic institutions, non-profit agencies) see as possible and best for themselves — which naturally alters as the initiative progresses.

Social Process. Initiatives commonly arise from an awareness of persistent gaps or inadequacies in per-formance. The *locus of responsibility* rests with the organization or organizations who deliver that per-formance. People in charge like top managers, board directors or government ministers become aware that some important aspect of their enterprise has been neglected, or that some new kind of activity must now be recognized as important. So a principal object is teased out and asserted or a new principal object is defined, and then this object is publicized to give the necessary changes due importance. Initiatives need to be launched with a fanfare because they must be dis-tinguished in people's eyes from the ongoing flow of policies and strategies. The initiative, like any drive component, depends far more on actively winning voluntary support than does a direction.

Although recognition of gaps is usually easy, the need for an initiative should be thoroughly investigated and established by internal or external experts to enhance its legitimacy. For governments and society, the experts may be university academics, civil service specialists, an official commission, or business consultants. For organizations, a governing body committee, an internal task force or external review body or management con-sultants may do the work. The result of the review process is a set of recommendations or proposals which may be criticized in its details but which is difficult to oppose *in toto*. Those affected are expected to do more than merely accept the initiative. They must positively engage with it, assign resources, and work to imple-ment it. This is why a consultative process is so essential.

Initiatives need to be installed within organizations,

not merely implemented, because they imply a radical alteration to the type of activity performed. So a single initiative may stimulate a variety of policies and plans. Installation typically involves top managers penetrating at least two tiers of management, sometimes more. Initiatives fail if they are merely passed to a subordinate with explanations left to staff in the planning or public relations department.

Failure. Failure of an initiative means that worthwhile results do not emerge despite considerable investment of time and money. In recent times in the UK, a series of government initiatives to increase the skills and education of the work-force generally seem to have come to little. In many firms, quality initiatives have pushed thousands of staff through re-training programmes with negligible results. The consequence of such failures is a loss of confidence in management. So failures require to be understood and explained. In public life, they may lead to official inquiries or academic investigations.

From the present perspective, initiatives will predictably collapse if the principal object does not command support. Attempts to rectify the male-female imbalance at the top of the UK civil service over a period of ten years in the 1980s, for example, led to no changes at all — probably because the Whitehall mandarins responsible for implementation must have viewed the whole idea with horror and dismay.

The lack of impact of many initiatives can be traced to the way they distort existing priorities. This either leads them to be ignored, or causes other worthwhile policies to be neglected. At the extreme, multiple initiatives generate incoherence and cause the organization to flounder. Multiple policies in an organization are to be expected, but too many initiatives exhaust and confuse managers. In a firm, the quality initiative, the computerization initiative, the training initiative, the productivity initiative and the equal opportunities initiative may all be highly desirable. But, if they are genuine initiatives, then their rapid-fire introduction will lead to pragmatic and chaotic responses. Solid achievement of worthwhile strategic objectives becomes most unlikely.

Public sector organizations are particularly vulnerable to this form of overload as politicians set off one initiative after another, interested only in escaping immediate political hot water and unconcerned about previous initiatives now out of the public eye. The point is that managers can do many things at once, but they cannot possibly absorb the importance of many diverse new values. The response to each is liable to be perfunctory and superficial rather than genuine and substantial.

Limitation. Initiatives require that people engage themselves in the active pursuit and implementation of certain values. However, it may be that an organization is deeply divided over its priorities. Then the initiative is just one of many activities competing for support. At the extreme, nothing happens, paralysis descends and decisive action becomes impossible. Such crises are commonly associated with major change. Neither ideals, crusades, campaigns nor initiatives are geared to overcoming internal crises; and none of these drive components can use a crisis positively to install values. What is required is a directive: the lowest triadic group and the most forceful impetus to action on values.

G-3[1]: Directives

Nature. In a crisis, action must be taken. When new values are at stake, just any action will not do. The desired action must embody and forward the desired values. Often the crisis emerges from inaction. It may well be that there is a refusal to take the step and do what is needed to introduce or sustain a much needed value. The parliament of a country, say, may find itself unable to make the painful transition from a planned to a market economy; or a firm's governing body may find that the company is being regularly taken to court because none of its attempts to deal with discrimination come to anything; or a chief executive may find that an endless series of excuses prevents improvement in customer service.

In other words, it becomes clear at a certain point that the ordinary processes of policy-making and implementation have failed. People either refuse to decide on the main priority, or refuse to act in line with that decision. In such situations of political stalemate, one must either wait and pray for something to turn up and save the day, or take firm action which brooks no opposition. A directive is required for the latter more practical course. In other words, the *function* of a directive is to produce specific action when there is intractable value conflict.

Directives take the form of compulsory decrees, authoritative instructions or prescriptive rulings, issued by the leadership and lying within its mandate. Directives are aimed at a particular crisis situation and exert immediate control over insiders while remaining unknown or irrelevant to outsiders. The assumption, evident in the above examples, is that the group is in crisis because of a failure to decide on and pursue a recognized and accepted value. The *use* of directives is based on rescuing a group in the midst of crisis or in a state of paralysis. Urgent or desperate situations absolutely demand an expedient tactical response. The use of directives indicates that rational means of

proceeding via policies and plans have been abandoned, at least temporarily, and replaced by brute assertion. It is assumed that obedience will be rapidly forthcoming.

Often directives are accepted because responsibility for rescue is now firmly placed in the hands of one person, the leader. Of course, should the situation not be resolved, the leader must go. Directives are often disliked by those who are the recipient of them. But, if directives are not issued when they should be, an impasse persists with potentially damaging consequences.

Content. The directive is built on an internal priority (L-3) which requires sufficient *political support* if the directive is to be acceptable. *Maximizing the impact* of the directive depends on the strategic objectives (L-2) embodied within it; that is to say, on precisely what outcome is sought by issuing the directive. The detailed tactical objectives (L-1) within the directive need to be *appropriately adapted* to the circumstances.

In the case of the chief executive unable to get staff to act on the value of customer service, the directive might state that each senior manager must personally contact each customer with a complaint and provide a weekly report to the governing board on the findings and action taken. This directive makes it explicit that customer-service is a priority because it allocates to this work the scarce resource of top management time. The directive clearly indicates a strategy for customer service by its concentration on the personal handling of complaints at top level. Finally, the directive contains a tactical objective in the form of the immediate commencement of weekly reporting.

Social Process. The *locus of responsibility* for directives is the leader or leadership body. It is essential to recognize that not only the content of the directive but also the need for a directive is always debatable. In a social or political setting, the leadership says or implies that the alternative to issuing a directive is abdication or resignation. So acceptance of a directive implies endorsement of the leadership, if not of the particular step taken. The directive is sanctioned impersonally by the crisis it is meant to resolve.

Directives are an expression of naked power. So where leadership is split, for example between a Chief Executive and Board Chairman or between a President and Parliament, the use of directives can lead to severe conflict.

Because directives by-pass the usual political-managerial channels and procedures, those who receive the directive may choose to flout it rather than follow it. So situations which demand directives also require the mobilization of authority and force. When governing a

society, martial law or a state of emergency may be proclaimed and then an extraordinary degree of discretion and power is vested in the leader. Gorbachev arranged this during the break-up of the Soviet Union and so did Yeltsin subsequently in his struggle with the Russian Parliament. Sometimes political crises can only be resolved through government by decree. Brief self-limiting states of emergency are declared in democracies at times of war and to speed response to severe natural or civil catastrophes. Political leaders in states with authoritarian traditions may make a habit of using this instrument of last resort.

Directives are easier to issue in organizations than in communities because of the extensive powers invariably assigned to managers. Under normal conditions, managers in adjacent tiers discuss priorities and plans as part of the implementation process, and then action follows. If no action occurs, it may be necessary and highly effective for the senior manager to issue a directive which brooks no opposition. Those pragmatic managers who have difficulty with people and are incapable of leading by defining and pursuing strategic objectives pin their hopes of success on directives.

Failure. Directives fail if the political judgement as to their necessity is incorrect; if they are used too often; if the strategic objective being pursued is flawed; or if tactical objectives are not appropriate.

Paralysis during analysis, and postponement of the unpleasant while yet more information is collected are common enough phenomena in governments and organizations. Nevertheless the regular use of directives to cut through this stagnation or to avoid the hard work of leadership is not wise. Directives then create the role of 'boss' (rather than leader) because they coercively centralize power, reduce autonomous judgement and action, and evoke fear and confusion. Such directives become increasingly disruptive, contradictory and irrational over time because any boss lacks proper appreciation of the real constraints on subordinate action and is prone to alter priorities sharply and rapidly. Subordinate managers then swim in chaos, the issues they face are not explored, and a sense of values is soon lost. Soon staff spend most of their time trying to work out what the boss really wants rather than concentrating on their work.

Because directives enable avoidance of challenges and queries, their regular use engenders crises which justify further use of authoritarian methods in a vicious self-fulfilling cycle.

The criticism inherent in directives, even when appropriately applied, is that they are dictatorial and foster authoritarian styles of working.

Closure. Just as an ideal was the most open-ended and potentially liberating way to introduce values, so directives are the most specific and coercive way to install them. Logically we have now covered all possible drive components, and the notion of an organized drive now seems intuitively complete.

REVIEWING DRIVE

Moving away from the status quo to develop new attitudes and beliefs and generate new achievements is the most significant and yet disturbing challenge any person, organization or society can face. Handling this challenge requires drive and all articulations of drive are purposive. Using the framework of purpose, it is apparent that drives will have most impact if they contain five components — ideals, crusades, campaigns, initiatives and directives.

Practical Implications. The important stimulus for creating drives is the discrepancy or dissonance which is set up between what is implied by desired values and the current realities. In other words, drives are needed whenever there is a wish to do quite different things or to do things very differently. This wish for change can be oriented either *internally* towards oneself or one's own organization, or *externally* towards others or other organizations.

People are generally opposed to new values for themselves when these are presented or demanded by others — even values that are seemingly attractive. The higher forms of drive are rejected because they imply identity change, and the lower forms are disliked because they disrupt established habits and ongoing activities. Campaigns are the most acceptable form of drive: stimulating, but not too new or demanding.

Drives for new ideas in society are labelled as revolutionary and grand crusades on their behalf are suspect. So new values need to be introduced by small groups of dedicated reformers with the recognition that popular support can only be won over a long period.

Reforming oneself would seem to be more acceptable than being reformed, and it is less demanding than reforming everyone else. In a person, this is personal growth. In organizations, this is a culture-change or holistic organization development. Just as personal growth often fizzles out, so does organizational transformation. Too often no one knows what the new values mean, including those in charge of the installation. The political dimension in value change tends to be minimized or viewed as an insuperable obstacle. Often senior managers are over-cautious or half-hearted. They refuse to invest the necessary time,

energy and money, communicate poorly, and fail to build the political backing which alone can deliver necessary change.

Governments may wish that their citizens held different values, but they are not responsible for society's ideas or values. Governments, and those who expect much of government, should recognize that the primary responsibility for any value change in society lies with the people: within each person and within organizations. Governments are primarily responsive: they only introduce and pursue 'new' values with the support, willing or sullen, of the people.

Linkage between drive components based on the overlapping of levels enables them to be chained together. In a firm, for example, ideals should develop a sense of what is needed generally, while the crusade works out a realistic agenda for change which can gain board and staff backing. Internal campaigns can use the ideal and crusade to mobilize support for new priorities or foci for action. Initiatives can then be launched building on the agenda of the crusade, using the emphases in the campaigns, and justified by the ideal. Finally, if change is insufficient or blocked, or the situation deteriorates, directives can be judiciously applied. (Note that the same level in adjacent components may contain different purposes. In the Opportunity 2000 example, we saw how the objects of the crusade differed from those of the particular campaign.)

Coercion or Consensus. The existence of five distinct drive components illuminates one of the long-standing issues in social change theory, namely: is change primarily coercive or consensual? History and every-day life seem replete with coercion, but others argue that nothing can really happen in society without a consensus. Examination of the drive components in varying social contexts is revealing.

Any drive is potentially controversial and inherently political. However, within this context, ideals lie at one extreme. Being purely imaginative, they can only function properly on a consensual basis. At the other extreme are directives which are action-focused and essentially coercive. The three intermediate components show a progressive move from consensuality to coercion. Crusades unite those dedicated to the cause: supporters flock to it while others look on more or less sympathetically, or launch a counter-crusade. Campaigns assume the existence of communal values and therefore campaigners feel entitled to intrude and provoke support. Initiatives go further and tend to force an engagement, while not quite being tools of naked control like directives.

Within the drive component, a similar pattern seems

to hold. Values in the topmost level reflect a political choice and foster the wish to find a consensus; while purposes in the lowest level, because they are chosen to serve higher levels and designed to be appropriate, lend themselves to being imposed.

The Source of Change. Communities depend on a core of mutuality and consensus, and require mechanisms both to enable change and to preserve continuity. Drives to change others (and so society) are intrinsic to community life. These drives stem from individuals and must be mediated and moderated by social institutions. Drives to change oneself are intrinsic to personal life and must also be supported and moderated by social institutions.

Tribal forces and tribal adherents lie behind all drives in society, and are the source of a powerful and potentially coercive energy. Pressures for change are spread via popular movements and focused through crusading associations staffed by adherents. Promotion of ideals, formation of causes and support for crusades require sophisticated organization. Adherents are then in a position to mount campaigns and launch initiatives into their community. Adherents penetrate organizations and tend to generate inter-tribal conflict within them. At the extreme, they may take over the organization, cause it to split, or produce continuing disruption.

Non-tribal organizations, just like individual people, are resistant to alien tribal coercion from without, but are quite prepared to use drives and coercion internally as long as they are kept firmly under control. Boards and top management are primarily responsible for producing change via drives within organizations. They must prevent or minimize disruption and internal schisms due to excessive tribalism. Coercive directives may be unavoidable in dealing with severe internal conflict or impasse, but their use should be minimized. However, the board must endorse viable ideals, develop essential crusades, mount useful campaigns and resource diverse initiatives.

Transition. If people and activities have been stimulated by a drive, changes occur which are readily perceived as real achievement. Much remains untouched and unchanged however. Furthermore, new issues and problems invariably emerge and these are liable to push the desired values into the background once again. So success of a drive raises the question of how to extend achievement and sustain the new values as part of a new state of affairs, a new identity in fact, rather than as a transient event or fluctuation in the old way of functioning. Sustaining a new way of functioning means re-defining work and the person or organization must face up to whether such an identity-change is really wanted.

The three levels of value within drive components provide a greater degree of systematization of values than do directions, but they do not provide a basis for continuing achievement, nor for self-sustaining identity renewal and re-affirmation. So consolidating gains from drives and sustaining achievement requires a more complex form of purposive entity. What is required are four-level structures (tetrads) which define and enable successful functioning.

Properties of the five components of drive.
Drives promote change and overcome opposition to desired values. Each is a triad formed by combining three adjacent types of purpose.
They are operated by individuals and organizations within communities and directed either inwardly to modify the self,
or outwardly to modify others. See text for further details and explanation.

Triad No. (Levels)	Component of Drive	Function	Desired Effect	Expression	Locus of Responsibility	Inherent Criticism	Consequence of Failure
5 (Ls 7-5)	Ideal	To commit people to desired values despite their differences.	People feel encouraged to persevere despite all obstacles.	Aspirational conception	Social movements explained by their elites.	Unrealistic	Cynicism and apathy weakens the social fabric.
4 (Ls 6-4)	Crusade	To convert people to ideas of potential social benefit.	People's energies and loyalty are enduringly harnessed.	Reform agenda	Causes represented by their champions.	Extremist	People do not understand what the change is about
3 (Ls 5-3)	Campaign	To persuade people to act on dormant values which they hold in common.	People are temporarily activated to choose according to preferences	Memorable slogan	Constituencies activated by their campaigners.	Intrusive	People do not act on their values
2 (Ls 4-2)	Initiative	To generate activities which forward given but neglected values.	People are engaged over a defined time to achieve results.	Costed proposals	Organizations advised by their experts.	Distorting	Disillusionment with management's ability to make progress.
1 (Ls 3-1)	Directive	To produce specific action when there is intractable value conflict.	People in the situation are immediately controlled.	Compulsory decree	Leaders sanctioned by the organization's crises.	Dictatorial	Deterioration in the situation due to an impasse.

G-4: FUNCTIONING

Nature. If opposition to a new value is overcome by a vigorous drive, change can be initiated and a new state of affairs can be established, at least in principle. But each of us is aware of examples of apparently successful drives for change — in our society, in our organization, even in our own life — which seem to catch on and then peter out. Change does occur and achievement is evident, but it is transient or insubstantial or restricted. What we desire and need is a sustained state in which values are continually being realized in activities, not simply an ephemeral efflorescence.

Sustained achievement is about desirable values being enduringly embedded in activities and outputs. This is what functioning successfully in society is about. Drives to install values can cause changes in functioning with the hope, if their impetus is absorbed constructively, that achievement will be enhanced. However, functioning itself is not possible without continuing work, usually hard work.

We are only prepared to sustain achievement through work, even changing our social identity if need be, if we can see, rationally, that this is required. In other words, a type of value must be in place which not only validates directions and drives, but which has the power to coax and entice us to work.

The addition of a fourth level of purpose to form a tetrad provides this *essential rationale*. To reiterate the point: without values experienced as a rationale, people cannot fully engage with on-going purposes, new values cannot possibly gel inside these people, work is done poorly or not at all, and achievement cannot be sustained. So the tetrad is crucial to achievement. The formation of sets of four levels defines **functioning**.

All functioning occurs within entities which possess an identity. Put another way, all functioning is owned by defined individuals. Usually one thinks of an organization — as I will throughout this section — but functioning is equally a matter for self-contained parts of organizations, for individual persons and for governments.

The nature and structure of endeavour-based entities with a definable social identity will be considered in Ch. 12. Here we need to recognize that the functioning of any such entity depends on a set of self-contained, identity-defining, quasi-autonomous, coherently organized purposes and values which determine and sustain its activities over time. Any entity which has the capacity to function finds that its (social) identity is based on those values. That is why functioning lies at the heart of identity in practice. The work associated with functioning demands that identity-defining values be explicitly devised, communicated and institutionalized in a coherent and consistent way.

Types. Four tetrads are logically possible and these correspond to the four domains affecting the functioning of an entity. Each domain itself constitutes a type of functioning. The four domains with their purposive core are labelled, in descending order, as follows: the existential domain which demands continuing work on the entity's *vision* (G-4^4); the attitudinal domain which demands continuing work on the entity's *culture* (G-4^3); the developmental domain which demands continuing work on the entity's *growth* (G-4^2); and the activity domain which demands continuing work on the entity's *operation* (G-4^1).

All four domains of functioning must be worked at if achievement is to be sustained in a turbulent social context. The quality of work in the four domains and their effective interaction affect the survival of the entity. The trend when descending is for an ever more direct influence on performance and the tangible expression of identity.

The four domains have a common internal structure. In each case, the top (fourth) level includes the values which must provide the *essential rationale*, that is to say a reason or justification for work in the domain, which is recognized and desired by all concerned. The third level, as before, is critical to winning *political support* from the various stakeholders for the emphases in functioning in that domain. So value choice here is a sensitive and potentially controversial matter. Purposes selected within the second level constrain functioning in the domain strategically and so need to be defined to *maximize impact*. Finally, values or purposes in the bottom level must be devised to ensure the domain is *appropriately adapted* to the existing circumstances.

In an organization, maintaining adequate functioning and, of course, sustaining achievement are quintessentially leadership responsibilities and yet everybody's concern.

Achievement is most visibly the product of operations. Nevertheless, the other domains of functioning play an important part in ensuring that the operation does indeed achieve, with each domain contributing in its own way. Certainly, the closure of an otherwise efficient operation can be the result of a lack of vision, a dysfunctional culture, or stagnation in a dynamic market.

The four domains of functioning, taken together, mirror the structure of levels internal to each. Because visions can be exciting, benignly inclusive and deeply fulfilling, they provide the *essential rationale* for the very existence of the organization. Modifications to the cul-

Figure 10.4: The tetradic grouping which defines functioning.
Four domains of functioning enabling achievement to be rationally sustained

L-7 Ultimate Value					
L-6 Value System			$G\text{-}4^4$		
L-5 Social Value		$G\text{-}4^3$			
L-4 Principal Object		$G\text{-}4^2$	← *Vision*		
L-3 Internal Priority	$G\text{-}4^1$	← *Culture*			
L-2 Strategic Obj.		← *Growth*			
L-1 Tactical Obj.	← *Operation*				

ture, although generated by the urge to survive seem artificial and strange to many. They must win *political support* to be introduced. Growth, while serving interests and needs in a practical way, directs and constrains achievement and must be designed to *maximize impact*. In other words, growth must be viewed strategically. Finally the operation needs to ensure that functioning is *appropriately adapted* to available resources and circumstances as well as adhering to the vision, the required culture and growth intentions.

We can capture the distinctive contributions of each domain to sustaining achievement and success by noting that the vision must be inspirational, the culture must be viable, proposals for growth must be feasible, and the operation must be programmable.

The tetrads are represented diagrammatically in Fig. 10.4. Note that all include principal objects because functioning expresses identity and objects define the identity of endeavours. Properties are summarized and compared in Master-Table 34.

Before going into further explanations and details, the four domains are defined below, their relation to identity noted, the nature of leadership and special work processes identified, their communal function explained, and the natural response of recipients identified.

G-4⁴: Visions establish a framework of enduring values so that functioning inspires people and guides all work. An identity needs to be defined which has the potential for people to want, spontaneously, to turn it into a reality. The task here is to introduce or activate

ultimate values within a group of people involved in the endeavour. The vision allows for the possibility of an imaginative and personalized approach to work. So developing it and living it is everybody's business. But ensuring that engagement with the visionary domain is maintained is leadership work, and such visionary leadership is transformative. The vision penetrates to the essence of an organization, giving members a deep sense of 'who we are' and 'why we are here'. The vision has the potential to create intense excitement and attraction because it makes ultimate values real and achievable. The inspirational quality enables transformation, both within the internal community and in wider society.

G-4³: Cultures keep certain values prominent so that functioning fits the social environment and maintains individuality. The work here is about recognizing precisely what needs to be treated as important in order to survive. Enduring cultures maintain and express a viable identity, which means one that fits its context and which permits the distinctiveness necessary for survival in the face of competition. The leadership task is to introduce, explain and, if need be, assert certain carefully selected values. Changing a culture is difficult and depends heavily on communication within and without the organization. Support for the leader in this work comes from public relations experts. Effective communication is essential for work in all the domains, but here communication is about dissemination. Work on the culture must recognize staff within an organization as a community or public of equals. Such work differ-

entiates the internal community and wider society too, because it affirms standards and uniqueness as well as belonging. If the work is well done, people are aware of their culture and maintain it with pride.

G-4²: Growth re-defines endeavours so that functioning meets social needs and also brings benefit internally. The work here is about creating developments which sustain achievement and support identity, not just about increasing size or profits. Growth may mean becoming larger, smaller or just different. Growth must be selective. Deciding foci for growth, strategic thinking, is a synthetic and imaginative task. Communication about possible growth occurs in an exploratory process which depends on the cooperation of a variety of people with interest and expertise in the area. Special investigations and teams are often required which may draw further on those working in different divisions of the organization or in different bodies within a network. Note that growth typically crosses organizational structures. Work on a proposal for growth stimulates a determination to define something which can and will succeed. In this way, the internal community is strengthened. Growth also strengthens wider society, because it is based on deliberately forwarding existing communal values and responding to social forces and emerging needs. Absence of growth is experienced as stagnation. It weakens an organization and leads to demoralization.

G-4¹: Operations maintain performance so that functioning produces valued outputs efficiently. All achievement is in the end manifested through concrete operations or projects. Work here solidifies, confirms, substantiates and demonstrates identity as expressed in the vision, culture and growth. Operations are capable of being programmed and their success depends on accountable leadership. The specialized work here is that of management control. Even moderately-sized organizations require a special function, usually called 'general management', which is not tied to any profession or occupation and which is dedicated to the viability and continuity of the operation as a whole. Comprehensive coverage of all operational activities is needed, especially in terms of time scales and finances. Operations have a sustaining function in wider society, being based on the efficient **production** of tangible and intangible goods and services. They also sustain the internal community not only by keeping the organization going, but also by creating a sense of deep satisfaction which is based on being effective and feeling in control. Inefficiency or breakdown of operations threatens rapid collapse.

The Two Communities. The quality of their functioning is naturally of great concern for the group of people involved: e.g. the internal community formed by the staff of an organization. As a result, successful functioning and re-orientation of that functioning are rather sensitive and complex socio-psychological matters. Organizations are at risk if functioning is treated as a purely private, pragmatic or procedural matter. The result is likely to be insensitivity to people and, in reaction to this, dysfunctional staff attitudes.

But functioning and all its domains look both inwards and outwards. So functioning also affects the well-being of the wider community to a greater or lesser degree. Because functioning beds down in operations, it might be thought of as oriented primarily to insiders. However, if the output of operations is too costly or unreliable, then outsiders will be driven off. To reiterate: interaction with the wider community is highly significant because functioning inescapably has beneficial and/or harmful effects on that community.

The key insight here is that *an organization (and indeed each person) ensures functioning of the wider community by functioning for themselves*. On the one hand, functioning maintains the coherence and effectiveness of any individual organization. On the other hand, this same functioning within organizations simultaneously performs an essential role in the wider community. Put another way, the quality of social life and community identity depend on the functioning of a myriad of organizations. Note that organizations are but instruments of people in the community and therefore dispensable or replaceable; whereas the community is the people themselves and embodies traditions and identity.

Each of the four domains of functioning serves one of four distinctive functions required to support a *communal identity*. The identity functions which need to be met within any community, natural or artificial, are: to transform itself (G-4⁴), to differentiate itself (G-4³), to strengthen itself (G-4²), and to sustain itself (G-4¹). The communal identity aspect of the domains of functioning applies within the organization to its internal community as well as in wider society.

Note that government may fund or sponsor various bodies, but it cannot run society as if it were a rational operation or super-organization. Modern society cannot be said to be run by any organization, but it functions as a result of the outputs and interactions of organizations of every conceivable type. In modern times, we use organizations for almost everything: from upholding the ethical order to providing essential services to making life fun. In short: all communal needs must be developed, supported and implemented by work performed *by and for* autonomous individuals, usually in the form of organizations.

Organizations may be classified according to the type of functioning with which they primarily identify, and the communal identity function(s) and societal role(s) which they therefore fulfil: Chapter 11 explains and elaborates this notion.

Properties. The properties of the domains of functioning will be examined in detail with a variety of examples from government, business and other organizations. Attention will be paid to making comparisons and clarifying the distinguishing features of each domain. The emphasis is on the universal responses to domain functioning, rather than on details of the mechanics of working which will vary greatly according to the particular industry or situation.

I will examine each domain's *function* within organizations and its *coverage*. The distinctive contribution to consolidating *identity* will be explained, and the effect on the internal and external community noted. The *content* of the domain in terms of values and objectives emerging from the different levels of purpose will be teased out.

The development and introduction of each type of work demands a sophisticated *social process*. All work must engage with what exists, and so requires assessment of the situation. Work in all domains demands a participative approach and the solicitation of different viewpoints. All work should enable scope for discretion and individual initiative. Nevertheless each domain requires these things to be handled in a different way. Each domain of functioning requires a distinctive *method* to be used for creating a useful purposive output, and each is associated with a characteristic form of personal *engagement* with that output. Differential qualities show up particularly in characteristic *communication* modes and the natural *responses* of participants.

Work performed within pragmatic or bureaucratic cultures commonly pushes together values and objectives in a relatively haphazard fashion. Given a monopoly position or secure government contracts, such organizations may be blatantly dysfunctional and yet persist for years. Something will therefore be said about the form of *leadership* required to handle each domain effectively, and the *specialized work* and associated management discipline needed to aid the leader.

Each domain has *limitations* in securing achievement and maintaining on-going functioning, and this is used to move down to the next domain. However, in many instances, apparent limitations turn out to be an expression of *failure*. Although any effort may fail if it is untimely, under-resourced, insufficiently focused, transiently attended to or poorly communicated, each domain can also produce a failure of functioning in its own unique fashion.

With the above italicized properties as points of reference, we can now examine and compare each of the domains of functioning in turn.

G-4⁴: Vision

Nature. A genuine vision is yet more substantial than an ultimate value, conviction or ideal. Ideals can only be practically pursued when they are expanded to encompass defined activities, and this is precisely what the vision does. Visionary work is essential to social movements, which are idealistic collective enterprises. Democratic movements, for example, require the ideal of a democratic society to be converted into a vision of democracy which can be actually introduced in a particular society. This expansion is made possible by including a set of principal objects: values which are no longer open-ended and which are eminently achievable. If people in those countries recently liberated from authoritarian communism are serious about converting revolutionary change to a stable democracy, then the vision of democracy needs to bed down in institutions like uncensored newspapers, an accountable police force, and competing political parties. All such developments are organization-based and those organizations must themselves aspire to democratic ideals.

Visionary work is the way that responsible leaders of any enterprise can set about determining or altering what it is about and why it deserves to exist. This top tetrad includes all the identity-developing and identity-controlling levels of purpose (cf. Master-Table 3) and so it serves as the strongest possible basis for creating an *identity*. Without a vision, conceptualizing and transforming an enterprise is exceedingly difficult.

The *function* of a vision is to establish a framework of enduring values to inspire people and guide all work. The vision has an encompassing scope and embodies high aspirations. So visionary work is needed to create a stable and stabilizing context for introducing a viable culture, determining growth possibilities and running operations — as well as easing the use of drives and directions. The vision must motivate and unite people in the service of practical achievement. At its best, it generates a deep excitement which is a mixture of conviction, belonging, enthusiasm and inspiration. Genuinely created, these feelings spill outside the organization into associated bodies and wider communities. People start to feel that something is happening which is special, interesting, worthwhile and deserving of support.

The point is that a vision is not an ethereal extra. This is well recognized in enterprises serving good causes like Amnesty International, and in wealthy foundations funding social developments like the Carnegie

Foundation. Visions are natural too in churches — one bishop described his vision as follows: 'The Church has been called into being by God. It exists to offer worship; to make known, by deed as well as word, the love of God in His Son Jesus Christ and, through the Holy Spirit, to draw people into a loving and ever deepening relationship with God and one another. It thereby acts as a sign of that kingdom when all things will find their proper fulfilment in the divine purpose.' The ultimate value here is love, the value system is Christianity, the social values are the need for relatedness to God, communal relations and religion in general, the principal objects are worship and good deeds. As this example illustrates, the *coverage* of a vision feels total — an implicit inclusiveness — while reaching the essence of what the organization is about.

John Major's Citizen's Charter is a vision of the UK government (see Ex. 10.1). Of course visions, especially grand ones, may not be realistic. President Johnson's 'war on poverty' in the US was widely viewed as a failure. Nor are they necessarily good. The visions of some dictators — Hitler in Germany, Mengistu in Ethiopia, Moi in Kenya — appear nightmarish as well as grotesquely unrealistic. Being based in negative ultimate values, such visions produce devastation, corruption, poverty and terror.

The Citizen's Charter: The Citizen's Charter (really a consumer's charter) is the UK Prime Minister's vision for public services. The Charter seeks to generate significant change in the functioning of government departments and agencies, nationalized industries, local government welfare and education services, the National Health Service, the courts, police and emergency services, and key utilities under government regulation. So it is not simply a drive or a particular development. Its eventual realization is dependent on numerous pieces of legislation and policy-development, various promotions and campaigns, as well as growth and operational changes in a wide variety of government-run or regulated enterprises. The ultimate values are freedom and justice; the value system is capitalist/conservative including controversial ideas like competition and privatization; the social values include needs like openness, choice, value-for-money, non-discrimination, accessibility, better quality of service, information about standards, redress. Within each public service, a variety of principal objects have been set as appropriate to their situations. The Charter ramifies widely and has the potential to produce many improvements. Ex. 10.1[18]

Visions remain elusive in most well-established businesses and public agencies which are oriented mainly to their markets, their finances and their operations. Many firms thrive because of their founder's vision but, as time passes and with the retirement or buy-out of the founder, that vision loses its validity and holding power.

Unless a new vision is developed, such firms are living on borrowed time.

Top executives justify the neglect of higher values by arguing that they need to focus on strategies or cost-cutting to maintain competitiveness and sustain profits. But getting the product and service right does depend on higher levels of value which alone give meaning to the word 'right'. A giant corporation can only be energized and unified through a vision. Such inspirational direction can cross national boundaries and help avoid both over-centralization and fragmentation. Visions are inherently humanizing and so they are essential to counter cynical and instrumental attitudes to work which can never release the best in people. Empowerment of staff, a current pre-occupation which means allowing people on the spot to use their discretion and judgement, depends for its success on a framework of pure value that is meaningful and relevant to each member of staff.

Even if not articulated, some vague linkage of an organization's mission (social value and principal objects) to the staff's convictions (value systems and ultimate values) probably exists like it or not. It sometimes seems as if companies in an industry or agencies in a welfare sector pursue a blinkered implicit vision, inadequate to the challenges, poorly communicated and never properly institutionalized. The computer industry, for example, excluded the user for many years and catered to large corporations: non-intuitive interfaces, over-complicated machines and incomprehensible manuals were the norm. Then Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak decided that their company, Apple, would 'make a contribution to the world by making tools for the mind that advance humankind'. Computers, they proclaimed, should be no more unusual in the home or more difficult to use than a washing machine. In a relatively short time, ordinary people had available a genuine alternative computer and Apple thrived.

Content. The *essential rationale* of any vision is provided by ultimate values (L-7). Visions are the way that ultimate values can be introduced into organizations deliberately, unashamedly and unambiguously. These abstract and universal values enable enlightened self-interest. They inspire and attract good people and foster their capacity to contribute — to the enterprise, to the wider community and to themselves.

The vision requires good ideas, i.e. value systems (L-6), which must be chosen so as to gain *political support* from those affected. This choice is a sensitive and controversial one. For example, the visions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin for government of the Soviet Union were initially different, the former assuming a key role for communism, and the latter rejecting it

entirely. However, after an attempted communist-inspired coup failed, it became clear that communism had lost support in the populace and Gorbachev rapidly dropped it. Despite the logical dependence of any firm on its customers, the idea of 'customers first' may not win automatic support from staff if their work is generally distant or opaque to customers. By contrast, it may be easy to win support for the idea of 'mono-polizing market niches'.

Any visionary statement *maximizes its impact* through the choice of social values (L-5). These govern the integration of the vision into the internal and external community and so determine whether insiders and outsiders recognize it as valuable and necessary. For example, the vision of the Citizen's Charter (Ex. 10.1) is supported by the government because of its value system, but the impact on the public and those working within public services flows from its identification of pressing needs (i.e. social values). Similarly, staff may not care too much for a chief executive's beliefs about business and theories of management but they can engage fully with the need for innovative products, reliability, and satisfied customers — and these are the sort of values which determine the success of the firm.

Finally, the vision must be *appropriately adapted* through its choice of endeavours or types of activity i.e. principal objects (L-4). These must fit the possibilities of the times, recognize social forces, and engage with technological capabilities. Principal objects, the most easily modified part of the vision, must ensure that the vision's higher values are met. It follows, of course, that visions have nothing at all to say about outcomes, dead-lines, procedures, budgets &c. In this way, they permit the greatest flexibility in interpretation by all who use them.

Social Process. The vision contains values which define 'what we want to be'. But a vision is a living thing and not simply a formally agreed statement like the mission or a policy. It requires a continuing work process and should feel as much of a preoccupation as the operation. The leader or leadership group has a key role in articulating essential values because unless they are behind the vision, everyone knows that it is not going to mean very much or go very far. However, once the elements of the vision are articulated they can be handed over to others to refine and develop in a con-tinuous process. Once encouraged to think in this way, people spontaneously suggest a range of relevant values which have a utopian flavour and yet are achievable if everyone takes them seriously.

The *method* used to generate and evolve a vision is primarily experiential or imaginist. This is the only way to ensure that personal contact is made with ultimate values. The leadership group must engage in a soul-searching and reflective process. The mechanics of work and daily pressures and irritations must be temporarily banished and questions like 'what is it all for?' and 'why should we care?' must be asked and asked again until a satisfactory answer emerges. The leader must activate ultimate values to produce a viable vision which has a sense of rightness and a humanizing and ethical quality.

The vision should be a pithy statement: explainable in no more than a half-page or page at most. It derives its force from its natural and inherent appeal and the genuine commitment of the leader. So once certain core ideas have crystallized, the leaders must proclaim and espouse the proposed vision to everyone. This *communication* is a form of preaching and evangelizing. The automatic *response* if the message is right is a sense of excitement. This is because the vision generates loyalty, evokes a desire to belong, enhances com-mitment and increases cohesion.

Visionary statements tend naturally to include superlatives and words like 'excellence' and 'best' (because goodness is a diffuse ultimate value). But the content of the message must be more substantial. It is always possible to discover specific ultimate values which people feel are rationally required, that is to say, which make deep sense to them. *Engagement* with visionary work is not problematic, because, if ade-quately devised and communicated, the vision spon-taneously sparks a sense of ownership in participants. If participants truly own the vision, they will want to work on it and improve it. If they are not encouraged to challenge it, enlarge it, shape it and evolve it, they will never live it and benefit from it.

If the content is new to people or significantly differ-ent to what everyone expects, overt appeals to an ideal and the establishment of a crusade may be necessary. However, the process must always have the quality of informality, spontaneity and genuineness because personal ownership is essential. The sudden appearance of posters telling people what they believe in can be profoundly depressing; and an official launch of a vision as part of a marketing-cum-media circus is likely to be wholly counter-productive.

Specialized Work. Articulating a vision is the prime task and vehicle of *leadership*. Because organiza-tions can be altered beyond recognition by taking a visionary perspective, the popular label is 'trans-formative leadership'.[19] Such leadership can only be delivered by the authorized or official leader: e.g. either Chairman of the board or Chief Executive. Transformative leadership is conceptual and emotional, inspiring and challenging, far-seeing and immensely

practical. If leadership is inspired, enlightened and intense, people can be moved to great achievements.

The work depends on the leader cultivating self-awareness, facing reality, meditating on what is really important, and acting authentically.

Commentators recognize that transformative leadership is about modifying dominant beliefs (i.e. value systems) and operative values (i.e. social values) in the service of some end (i.e. principal objects). But they are not always clear that visionary leadership must unite people and overcome natural rivalries and differences. Only by activating ultimate values is this really possible. It seems likely that firms whose leaders pursue work in the visionary domain have the potential (but by no means the certainty) to succeed in a remarkable way. At the time of writing, Anita Roddick's Body Shop and Akio Morita's Sony come to mind. These successful enterprises are permeated by the visionary input of their leaders.

Limitation. Naturally, the success or failure of an organization in practical or monetary terms is not wholly a matter of visionary functioning. External events, unwise politics, ineffective strategies and chaotic people can scupper anything — but such problems are better dealt with in the presence of a vision than without one.

Absence or *failure* of visionary work need not lead to failure of the firm. If the proposed vision is unconvincing, unintelligible or non-fulfilling, staff will ignore it. Visionary work cannot be performed in a bureaucratic or dehumanized way, as an optional extra or a burdensome task. Visionary-sounding slogans blindly copied from a competitor or slickly produced to keep in fashion generate at best a superficial hysteria and are liable to provoke disbelief, cynicism and contempt for the leadership (cf. Ex. 3.14 in Ch. 3). Visionary work cannot be used as a quick fix to coerce productivity out of staff; and a vision as a public relations stunt achieves nothing.

Visionary functioning is necessary but not sufficient to develop the identity of an organization or a community. No vision can alone ensure its realization. For a start, although it recognizes external realities, it cannot **grapple** directly with pressures in the social and economic environment; and it is utterly divorced from daily activities. The next step is to ensure that necessary core values are properly appreciated and available for general and quasi-automatic application to strategic and routine decisions.

G-4³: Culture

Nature. There is always an external social context for functioning, and survival depends on responding to the values in this environment. So social bodies implicitly evolve or deliberately develop a suitable culture. The work here calls for clarifying, sharpening, explaining and maintaining values which define that culture. The culture ensures that people take up certain attitudes and use certain ideas, standards and priorities whenever appropriate and without being specifically instructed to do so. Culture permeates functioning because its *function* is to keep certain values prominent to fit the social environment and to maintain individuality.

Work on the culture is needed to ensure that the organization can thrive in its niche within society and that it is sufficiently distinguished from its competitors not to be ignored or crushed. The culture maintains *identity* and differentiates the organization in the eyes of both insiders and outsiders. Its tetrad encompasses the crusade and campaign triads: and work on the culture does involve crusades in the cause of the firm's necessary identity; and it does use campaigns to activate insiders. Cultural values, like it or not, influence the way staff feel about their organization and the priorities they use to design their systems and shape their everyday actions.

A culture starts from the exclusivity of a value system. So it has a quality of partiality and exclusiveness. It ends in the assertion of preference characteristic of internal priorities. So it has the potential to integrate and resolve conflicts.

Just as organizations have implicit visions, they have implicit cultures which can be deduced from observing actual behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and rituals. The real culture may be a long way away from the espoused culture. Staff specially recruited to fit the theoretical ideal soon adapt to the communal reality.

The *coverage* of the cultural domain must be partial because it is impossible (and undesirable) to modify all guiding values. Culture work should focus down on a particular area of organizational functioning and define a coherent and correct set of essential ideas to be installed. As a result, there is a need for a flow of culture modification projects. Examples include: to get the full benefits of computerization; to increase responsiveness to customers' views; to incorporate new approaches to organizing work. Management is the context for all work, so change in the management culture is the most global form of organizational modification. Such projects are often referred to as 'culture-change'.

Here are two of the vast number of possible ways to improve the management culture. (A) Introduce 'Quality Management'. This might be defined in terms of: customer-responsiveness, statistical process control, cross-boundary working, empowerment, reducing costs by improving quality, and stronger middle

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management. The origin of such a list in TQM writings is evident. (B) Introduce 'Values-based Operation'. This might be captured with ideas like: sharable values, organization-wide objectives, cooperation, innovation, genuine communication, fuller participation, individual liberation. A consultant might point out that unless 'self-discipline' is added to this list, the whole set is weak. Many organizations, perhaps most, might give lip-service to either or both of the above lists of values. However, to become part of the culture, everyone must work on them specifically and self-consciously.[20]

Organizations should be continually re-appraising the internal culture and considering whether or not new ideas are needed. Culture projects are of particular significance in medium to large organizations where staff are not only employees but also form a large public — an internal quasi-community — and where informal debates and discussions are insufficient. Consider for example the internal community in an average general hospital which numbers up to about 4,000 people; or in a large bank which might easily contain 30-40,000 people. In such cases, new ways of thinking are required of thousands of people before any new ways of doing can come about.

No one wants to follow a new set of ideas or to alter their habitual attitudes. So culture modifications, much less wholesale culture-changes, are never positively desired. There are four forces leading to change: the demand for a degree of achievement which cannot be generated within existing values; the convictions of a chief executive who views the existing culture as unsatisfactory; the obsolete or degenerate state of existing values; and the aspirations and morale of staff within the organization. Unless all four forces align, culture-change is difficult. If they are all present, refusal to change is potentially disastrous.

Work on the culture is urgently needed if the social environment — the market, the competition, government regulation — changes dramatically, because what is then important for survival is unfamiliar and seems almost unbelievable to insiders habituated by the previous set of values. If new values are not devised and instituted, senior and middle managers are at sea about how to handle ordinary situations and what, in former times, would be seen as straightforward problems.

Work on the culture may be needed if there are a confusing multiplicity of sub-cultures within an organization; or if there is a serious mismatch between external perceptions of the organization and internal views and activities (cf. Ex. 10.5).

Re-launching Dr. Barnado's: Dr. Barnado's is one of the best supported charities in the UK because of its reputation for caring for orphans. But the reality is that it has long moved its efforts away from orphans to helping disabled and disadvantaged young people. Its logo suggested that it provided protective isolation, but its belief was that solutions should be found within the family and community. People saw staff as spontaneous 'care-givers', but the staff believed they were 'professionals'. Staff also felt that the orphan image was stigmatizing and cut the charity off from the community. Dr. Barnado, the founder, was imagined as a do-gooder, whereas the Charity's governing council wished him to be seen as a campaigning and radical figure. Projects operated with a variety of values and cultures, and conveyed different images through different slogans and publicity material. The determination of a set of core values was therefore needed to create coherence. It was essential to get insiders to agree to the new identity implied by these before publicizing it externally. Ex. 10.4[21]

Wherever they may stand in the managerial hierarchy, each member of staff is equally valuable in the organizational community and has a part to play in successful achievement. The community quality is evident in the reaction of outsiders who perceive the receptionist, the salesman and the managing director equally as representative of the organization. Each staff member has urges to be loyal and needs to belong at work. By harnessing such motivations, firms can mould and shape views, perceptions, and preferences. Beliefs and feelings can be **positively** managed in a way that is not possible in wider society. Firms can, for example, use rigorous recruitment and induction processes and re-socialization strategies.

Despite all the talk of culture-change, there seems to be little understanding of what is involved in introducing new **ideas**.[22] Most businesses do not appreciate the need to manage their individuality positively. It is not uncommon for most staff not to know what the firm stands for or even what it does. When the Prudential Corporation's identity was being re-developed, staff were found to have a low opinion of their own company and to lack confidence in it.[23]

Content. The *essential rationale* for a culture is found in value systems (L-6). Without certain beliefs about the organization, ideas about its distinctive place in society, and theories about its modus operandi, there is no logic or sense to individuality. For example: when John Sculley joined and then ousted Steve Jobs as chief at Apple Computers, it reflected the need to replace certain ideas, appropriate and even essential for a small innovative company, by those befitting a global corporation. Beliefs about how the business is conducted are also relevant to acceptability in the community. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of certain minimum standards within the firm. Minimum standards protect and affirm identity. Such standards of

civility or training or helpfulness or fairness may be vital to success. When something has to be achieved 'at all costs' and minimum standards are not clear, then moral and even criminal violations are likely and functioning deteriorates.

Any organization must take the wider community into account; and all within it should see themselves as a specialized part of that community. So *political support* for the culture depends on an astute choice of social values (L-5). A new agency set up solely to purchase and plan health care, for example, was naturally concerned with the quality and efficiency of services, but sought to win support and distinguish itself from hospitals by emphasizing instead its sensitivity to community views and its close contact with small localities. Such choices always feel risky because different individuals (or sub-groups) tune into different social values, and all are acutely aware of the power of public opinion. In the case of Dr. Barnado's (Ex. 10.4), for example, there was considerable uncertainty about whether the change of emphasis away from the needs of orphans might be publicly unacceptable and so hamper fundraising.

Principal objects (L-4) need to be chosen which *maximize the impact* of culture. This may refer to specific projects or initiatives, or the re-shaping, even re-defining, of the nature of various services or activities in the light of key ideas. There may be implications for the (re-)structuring or resourcing of operations, or the strengthening of particular disciplines.

Finally, culture must bed down in the assertion of certain values as priorities (L-3) *appropriately adapted* to the circumstances. In the case of Dr. Barnado's (Ex. 10.4), the handling of fund-raising appeals and community projects should alter in ways that reflect the influence of the new values. If a business wants more cooperative working and greater attention to overseas clients, then decision-making should take place with this in mind — but not every decision should be joint, nor should overseas clients always be favoured.

A culture is not about the pre-specification of priorities (much less expected outcomes) by the leadership. It is about every decision anywhere in the organization being directly affected by generally agreed values. The functioning of this domain and its contribution to achievement stands or falls on whether needed cultural values are being realized everywhere by everyone at all times in a quasi-automatic, unforced, constructive and appropriate way. If activities are not widely and routinely influenced by needed values in this way, then the old culture and identity will persist in practice and all that has happened is the creation of a false image.

Social Process. A culture contains values which define 'what we have to be'. People do not hold and use values just because a higher authority wishes it; and they cannot readily be made to alter their beliefs and attitudes just because the organization's environment is apparently altering. Nevertheless, if it is brought home to them that the survival of their organization and their job is at stake unless they understand and apply certain new ideas and share certain values, then they will be disposed to alter what they think is important.

The *method* used when modifying the culture is one of deliberately defining new values as a pragmatic necessity. The introduction of these ideas is necessarily difficult. Whereas visionary work excites and liberates, cultural work channels and binds. The challenge is to ensure that what is at root an indoctrination process is sufficiently acceptable. Ideals, crusades, campaigns, initiatives and even directives all have a part to play in driving through the change.

Paradoxically, many people do not object to having values forced on them so long as the ideas have an unambiguous rationale and are not an irrational or tribal imposition. The *engagement* process is one of arduous and even painful self-indoctrination. So work on the culture must feel essential. When this effort is successful, the natural *response* is pride. Pride will never develop if the culture work feels like an exercise stimulated by the latest fad. Of course, if the new ideas are objectionable or truly alien, then people will not be able to pay attention. Either they will covertly sabotage changes, openly rebel and ridicule the ideas, or leave the organization.

Communication, vital in all domains of functioning, is primarily a matter of dissemination here. The new ideas which are the rationale for the change must be restated, re-affirmed and re-explained. Attention on them must be maintained by initiatives and demonstrations whose results are publicized and openly talked about. Culture is a communal property, so the content of communications must be suitable for everyone and the process handled in a way which respects and affirms the equality of all.

The initial work on culture involves teasing out the key ideas which provide the logic and rationale for the required attitudes. This may take place in various ways, most usually in a small top level working party perhaps assisted by external consultants. The values must be memorable, so it is advisable to have no more than 5-7 which together can be given a label.

Once these (L-6) values are identified, the next task is to gain top level commitment to them. Unless and until the chief executive sets an example and is backed by the board, all subsequent efforts are futile. Leaders

must deeply believe that a modified culture is absolutely essential — if it is only desired or hoped for, then the work involved will seem too difficult and distracting. Once conviction is present, then the organization can be mobilized and an evolutionary process of change via self-indoctrination can commence.

Failure is certain if culture-modification is turned over to a specialist department, like training or planning, or if it is assumed or hoped that external consultants will drive the change. Other warning signs are a refusal to allocate enough time or money, denial of the difficulty of change, and expecting results overnight.

People in groups have to appreciate why the new ideas are required, explore what the cultural values mean to them, examine what the obstacles to realizing them are, and suggest the sorts of things they must do to change the culture. Negative and cynical views need to be permitted and worked on forthrightly. Subsequently, breach of a cultural value should be deemed a crisis and managed as such.

In the nature of things, resistance to value change is great and so culture is generally poorly handled. If full-scale culture-change is required then top management should orchestrate an internal movement (see Box 12.1: Ch.12).

Specialized Work. The cultural domain floats above the realities of action and provides a context for strategic moves. Attitudes and values channel the spontaneous loyalty and automatic responses of staff. So leaders should be deeply and continuingly preoccupied with culture. However, because a dysfunctional culture does not present an immediate threat, the specialized work and skills to introduce, explain and support cultural values tend to be neglected.

Internal communications are central to maintaining awareness of the process and progress of value change. Staff are continually changing in large organizations, so values defining the desired culture must be explained in induction programmes and persistently communicated and discussed. Otherwise the values may be forgotten or fall into disuse and the culture degenerates.

Communication here differs sharply from inspirational explanations of the vision; and it is nothing like conventional management briefings oriented to getting people 'signed up' and 'on board' to do things. Here, communication must be carefully designed and crafted to give identical and easily understood messages to every member of staff. Top managers must decide what is to be said, but the skills of saying it are those of a journalist, not a manager. Such communications are best handled by the public relations function. The con-

tents of all their internal communications should be permeated by the needed cultural values.

Common sense says that staff should not be kept in the dark but should be receiving a flow of information and comment about anything and everything with organization-wide significance. But many boards and chief executives never imagine communicating identically with all their staff. The result is that the community spirit cannot be mobilized when the firm is under threat. At the time of the Australian Elders IXL bid for the UK giant Allied Lyons in the 1980's, the Allied Lyons board found it had no way to communicate its position to each member of staff.

Most activities within public relations — community relations, staff relations, government relations, media relations, investor relations, charity appeals, catastrophe management — cannot be handled sensibly without a sense of corporate identity which is genuine. Public relations specialists have emerged with increasing recognition of the importance of developing and communicating corporate identity and corporate values. It is a misfortune for everyone that PR is still expected to be peddling hype, gloss and positive stories.

Other departments like marketing and personnel also need to be involved in clarifying individuality and are concerned about culture. However, it is all too easy to confuse true individuality with false self-promotion, and staff loyalty with industrial relations management. Marketing is particularly restricted because its logic derives from attracting customers for the outputs of the operation. Personnel work is primarily about the efficient use of staff as employees, that is to say, its focus is on staff as the human resource, rather than on staff as a sub-community of the wider comunity. Neither marketing nor personnel has a natural responsibility for things like the philosophy of the organization, the beliefs staff hold about it, the handling of local community politics, or crises of confidence in the integrity of the firm — all of which are central to cultural management.

The cultural domain and public relations work are poorly recognized in most public agencies: perhaps because of bureaucratic insensitivity to users or consumers, and the inertia and arrogance of publicly-funded authorities. However, both central and local governments are increasingly using public relations consultants to help them relate to their own citizens and others.

Limitation. Work in the cultural domain may *fail* for a variety of reasons. The commonest mistake is treating it as an optional extra to be addressed in the

indefinite future and kept apart from immediate pressures. Culture must be understood as defining the way immediate pressures are or should be handled. Focussing on what the culture should be like often seems to pose great problems. A diffuse and incoherent list of values is counter-productive; and simplifying by focusing on just one value is equally confusing and unsatisfactory.

Culture must be continually developed to be strong, to be realistic, to remain abreast of competitors and to engage effectively with wider society. If new ideas are simply copied rather than discovered from within, then the identity asserted is likely to be unsuitable, if not plain false.

Often the whole process is not taken seriously enough: key ideas in the identity may be launched with a fanfare, but the values are subsequently poorly sustained and inadequately buttressed. The notion that glossy marketing can substitute for genuine individuation parallels the quip that 'sincerity is the most important thing, fake that and you've got it made'. Pride in the existing culture can reflect arrogance and insensitive or inappropriate self-satisfaction. If the firm's leaders regularly violate their own values, a mood of cynicism develops; and this occurs even if the better people can create islands of integrity.

Cultures distinguish enterprises and give a sense of pride and meaning to those involved as they go about their daily activities. Cultural incompatibility is the main reason that mergers fail and takeovers are the norm. Although a suitable culture is needed for survival, it is not sufficient. Alone, the culture does not guarantee that the organization will thrive in the face of competitors or resource shortage. Functioning requires an investment in the future, greater attention to social needs and the market, and the determination of worthwhile or profitable outcomes.

G-4^2: Growth

Nature. Growth aims to ensure continued successful functioning. It engages directly with the reality that the future is likely to be different from the present. For businesses, ensuring profitable growth is far harder than cutting costs. Costs are tangible and relate to current operations, while growth is about investing in an inevitably uncertain tomorrow.

Misconceptions about growth are many. Growth is often referred to as 'development', but many developments are about improving or altering the vision, modifying the culture and rejigging the operation. Growth is often assumed to be about becoming bigger, when it may involve shrinking, diversifying or modify-

ing the enterprise. Growth is often equated to increasing profits whereas it is really about sustaining profit (unless neglect of growth has led to falling profits). Growth is often referred to as 'strategy', but it is less confusing to regard strategy as the means to achieve challenging growth objectives. Growth is often defined as a meaningless numerical 'target' (e.g. increase sales by 10%), rather than given a workable substance (e.g. generate an extra 10%-20% in sales by introducing a service component to all products).

Growth, as understood here, demands clarity about what social values need to be pursued and beds down in strategic objectives which define specific worthwhile achievements. So growth requires attention to social forces and emerging needs — the direction of technology, trends in consumer preferences, movements of competitors and the industry as a whole, government pressures and regulations, and market evolution. If such things can be anticipated and responded to, the organization can substantially strengthen itself. At the same time, growth-based responses to society's needs and pressures potentially strengthen wider society too.

Because growth gains its logic from social values (rather than principal objects), it tends to cut across internal structures (e.g. divisions of the operation, headquarter departments, disciplines) even if these structures were originally designed to align with needs. Growth also ramifies across organizations within a society. Primary health care, for example, is about the need for people to have direct care for their health without depending on referral to hospital or other specialist services. A proper response to that need in the UK involves the cooperation of numerous bodies including family physicians, family health service authorities, district health authorities, hospital trusts, pharmaceutical and appliance firms, social services, voluntary bodies in health care and related fields — and even patients themselves. Similarly, community developments like urban renewal seek to create organizational networks including local government, private firms, churches, voluntary bodies and community action groups. Getting such networks to engage in joint planning and generate the needed development is never easy.

The same need for cross-structural cooperation to benefit society applies at the governmental level but here the difficulty increases: inter-sectoral developments which cross ministries are much talked about, rarely attempted, and almost impossible to implement.

In the business sphere, growth must start from an intense focus on the precise nature of customer needs. The importance of alliances and joint ventures with other firms in meeting these may then become evident. For example, the single market in Europe means that

bank customers in one European country are increasingly going to need sophisticated and related banking services in other countries where their home bank is weak. Without well-developed alliances between banks in different countries, the efficiency and quality of service will be low.

To summarize: the *function* of growth is to re-define endeavours to meet social needs and to bring benefit internally.

Growth should be generated in accord with the spirit desired by the vision, and in accord with the culture. So its relation to *identity* is supportive. Growth, however, must take full account of tangible realities if it is to strengthen the organization and sustain achievement. Whereas work on the culture and vision can occur more or less in its own time, the timing of growth is often crucial to success. Windows of opportunity must be seized. Moving too quickly or too slowly can negate months or years of effort.

It is impossible for everything to alter at once, so the *coverage* of growth proposals must be highly selective. The knack is to have a sense of precisely which area is crucial. Should licensing be arranged? should new markets be found? should the range of products be altered? should vertical integration be pursued? should a gap be filled by acquisition? To answer such questions requires careful thought. Such strategic thinking is holistic and intuitive, and must be based on a first-hand knowledge and feel for the realities.

Growth is about strengthening the whole organization while benefiting the wider community. Development programmes in third world countries, for example, are viewed as a good thing for the international community. Global benefits like political stability and trading opportunities are envisaged, as well as assistance for the local populace. The same is true in businesses where the wider community will find that their development leads to benefits like more reliable products, employment opportunities, a better trained work-force, or better use of derelict land. Exploitative growth can occur and may succeed for a time, but eventually there is a political back-lash or the environment is so despoiled that the firm must choose to move on. Sensible long-term growth puts certain core needs in the context of a range of relevant interconnected communal values and ensures harmful side-effects are kept to a minimum.

Growth initiatives being inherently cross-structural cannot be used as a basis for structuring the organization. A common mistake in large organizations is to attempt to do so. The hope is that this will expedite progress by focusing line-managers and avoiding the need for project management and multi-disciplinary working. However, line-management ought to be designed to align with operating requirements. It takes its logic from the need to control activities and expertise by dividing them up, not from growth of the whole organization. Only occasionally will activity control fully coincide with the growth focus. Anyone simultaneously in charge of coordinating cross-operational development and managing implementation within one of those operations is liable to favour the contribution and demands of his own operation, and misjudge or downplay the contribution and problems of divisions or agencies led by others. This stance reflects unavoidable unevenness in knowledge, self-interest and pragmatism.

(It is, of course, possible to talk of growth within divisions or departments — just as these may have their own local cultures and local visions. Indeed, if responsibility for values and objectives is not devolved in large organizations, there is sure to be over-centralization with paralysis and stagnation.)

Content. The *essential rationale* for growth is sought in social values (L-5) — often in one single emotionally-held goal. For example, a business development may be rooted in 'industry's need for capital'; a health service development may be rooted in 'the need to be more responsive to patients'; and a community development may be based in 'the need for sporting opportunities'. Values like these are placed in the context of generally recognized social trends and communal values. As a result, growth starts from a consensual and unarguable basis that is positively desired by insiders and outsiders.

Political support for growth depends primarily on winning over insiders from the various agencies or departments involved in delivering the development. It is obtained through defining types of activity, i.e. principal objects (L-4), which are politically acceptable to the stakeholders. Using the above examples again, the principal objects might be 'to create a venture capital division', 'to introduce a hospital-at-home service', and 'to provide sports-training for the disabled'. Alternatives are possible in all cases and the objects chosen, including decisions on structures, staffing and funding, typically become foci of controversy.

Maximizing the impact of a growth proposal depends on its internal priorities (L-3). Choices about the type of new ventures supported, the amount of capital to be provided, the degree of risk tolerated and similar matters will determine the outcome of any venture capital endeavour. In the sports-training development, priorities like the choice of disabilities, the choice of sports, the choice of venues and so on will determine its impact.

Finally, growth must produce something which is *appropriately adapted* to the situation through its selection of strategic objectives (L-2). Specification here beds the development down in the actual realities, indicating what achievements are aimed for over a period of time, at what approximate cost, with what financial return or benefit, and by which agencies or sections of the organization. Some adaptation to circumstances and different perspectives of the various divisions or agencies is invariably required. These objectives must be seen to be feasible in order to gain the cooperation of those involved in implementation. In the case of the hospital-at-home programme, the objectives might state numbers of cases to be treated, training for staff to be instituted and specific cost savings.

Social Process. Growth stems from values and objectives which define 'what we could be'. It is about investing in the future. Explaining the process surrounding its handling is a mainstay of much management education. But too often its essence is omitted or downplayed amidst a mass of detailed techniques and principles.

As in all the domains, the leader's role is crucial. Here it concerns the strategic thinking that should precede and infuse the planning process. This thinking must guide and monitor explorations and investigations which put flesh onto the specification of purposes. Finally it ensures adoption of a particular course of action. Whereas a detailed grasp of the realities is unnecessary in the higher domains, and is inescapable and straightforward in programming operations, appreciation of reality is essential and yet difficult here.

Interpretation of information is paramount. Need-driven inquiry is the core *method*. The leader's strategic thinking must be stimulated, assisted and checked using information and analysis in an iterative process. It is worth re-emphasizing that, although good information and research-based principles are invaluable, there can never be a simple procedure or theory which will automatically generate the correct information or logically ensure successful growth. In exploring growth, disciplinary analyses come to the fore: the financial implications, the personnel implications, the marketing implications, the legal implications etc. must all be considered. Suitable *engagement* of key players and their analyses of organizational realities should be based on their own self-interest and on their willing and full cooperation. Otherwise the process is mechanical and dead. Growth clearly depends on a sense of shared values and a capability for considering and delivering on organization-wide objectives.

Communication here is essentially a process of exploration: of views, of hunches, of situations, of alternatives, of implications. It occurs in one-to-one meetings, small teams, project groups and participative time-outs. The *response* to this process, if the proposed development seems worthwhile, is a growing sense of determination to flesh it out and see it through. People become disappointed and disaffected if growth appears to ignore their interests, concerns and perceptions of reality.

The present popular recommendation of management experts that companies should start from customer needs or be market-driven (rather than being technology- or product-driven) is equivalent to a reassertion of the importance of social values as a rationale for development. The present analysis supports and explains this emphasis and reaffirms the importance of cooperation to deliver on social values. It also clarifies that the nature of products or services (principal objects) is inherently controversial quite apart from the specific outcomes decided upon. Managing that controversy requires the use of planning skills.

Specialized Work. A desirable and feasible direction for growth can always be devised for a business if it looks carefully and purposefully at the company itself (its vision, culture and strengths), its customers, its costs and its competitors. Nevertheless, companies often use management consultants to do such quintessentially internal work for them. Work on growth is often called planning, and the output called a strategy: growth is indeed the realm of strategic planning as distinct from project or operations planning. As already noted, expert knowledge and competence come into their own here.

Leaders require disciplinary specialists to complement their own understanding and to assist in the various analyses. The logic of work in relation to growth affirms that any person with relevant expertise within the organization may be involved in or may take a lead in a particular development. Housing improvement requires experts from construction, architecture, town planning, loan finance and other disciplines. Tourist developments demand inputs from people experienced and knowledgeable in the leisure, conference, hotel, entertainment and travel trades.

Because growth crosses structures and involves a wide range of people in a somewhat messy way, it is a risky and complex matter. As a result, an organizational discipline has emerged based on the need to stimulate strategic thinking, to organize the inquiry process, to ensure proposals are realistic and acceptable, and to assist with and monitor their implementation. This is the planning function. Planners, sited at headquarters, typically emphasize the inter-dependence of parts of the organization or network. They seek consensus and

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resolve conflicts by using the four levels of purpose which define growth (but, of course, not necessarily using my labels). Where the focus is on facilitating cooperation among community agencies, the specialist role is sometimes referred to as a policy-maker or social planner.

Planners need to have personalities which are participative and rational, with just a hint of idealism. They must have an eye firmly fixed on the future without ignoring the present. Good planners seek to balance individual and organizational aspirations. It is essential that they reconcile the enthusiasm of experts in the development with the problems of management and the realities presented by those responsible for operations. If possible, they should find some way of gaining direct contact with the customer or consumer.

Planners in centralized departments all too easily generate forecasts and strategies which are utterly unrelated to the main operations and disconnected from a holistic view of the enterprise and its social environment. Producing planning documents then becomes an end in itself. The leader remains aloof while planners and line-managers denigrate each other and compete for power.[24]

Limitation. Success here determines the medium to long-term health of the organization. So *failure* can coexist with high levels of current profitability. Risk is inherent in growth and proposals may fail even though sensibly developed and pursued. Failure which flows from misunderstanding or blatant mishandling of the nature of growth is less excusable.

Developmental failures are commonly based on a misperception of the realities which leads to an inadequate definition of the problem, insufficient funding, weak analyses or omission of key groups in the planning process. The need for fairness amongst those involved in planning a development is a paramount consideration: both government-sponsored joint developments and joint business ventures still tend to fail on this account.

The boldness which needs to accompany the selectivity required for growth may be frightening. Multiple small changes which are little more than disruptions or 'add-ons' are safe but do not strengthen.

Growth must be an organic and evolutionary process not an intrusion. It seems reasonable to suggest, for example, that proposals for dams which make hundreds of thousands of people homeless, without considering their views and needs, might reflect a failure of development whatever their technological and economic merits.

Growth is about determining what should be done

and by whom, but such proposals do not actually get things done or change anything. Existing operations must be systematically altered to produce new tangible outputs while maintaining ongoing activities. Society needs these outputs and depends on the operations of a multiplicity of organizations. Operations make functioning tangible because they are about the performance of activities. We must now move down to this final familiar domain.

G-4[1]: Operation

Nature. The operation is the common pathway for all functioning and reveals the true nature of the organization. Operations must not only embody the vision, express the culture and deliver developments, they must also sustain the enterprise. The income from operations (or allocated for operations in the public sector) must support work in the higher domains.

The *function* of an operation is to maintain performance which efficiently produces valued outputs.

Operations comprise the activities of front-line workers as organized by managers. Building on clarity and consensus about types of activity (principal objects) and important considerations (internal priorities), the operation reaches down to define numerous outcomes (strategic objectives) and tasks (tactical objectives). It surely goes without saying that all organizations need operations which are task-oriented, tightly specified, cost-focused and targeted at time deadlines: in short, programmed. This also applies to projects within the operation in which challenging objectives need to be taken seriously. ('Project management' is a technique or tool which emphasizes goal-directedness and programming.)

Operations need to be sharply time-based and carefully constrained financially because they bed down in tactical objectives and consume resources. They are usually programmed on an annual basis, with activity plans linked to budgets. In larger organizations, short-term operational programmes may be produced looking 1-2 years ahead; medium-term programmes incorporate developments taking 2-5 years to implement; and long-term programmes imply 5-10 years of continuing implementation. Sometimes the longer-term programmes are confusingly referred to as strategic, a term better left for growth proposals.

The operation confirms (or disconfirms), substantiates (or makes a mockery of), solidifies (or undermines) *identity* as expressed and **promoted** by work in the higher domains. The energy injected into any operation depends greatly on the quality of the visionary, cultural and growth domains. However, work in an

operation has its own potential to produce a deep sense of satisfaction for those involved. Doing things well can be profoundly gratifying and this is true whether or not anyone wants what we do. Outsiders who depend on the operation also feel satisfied if it is well run. Correspondingly, operational failures can generate the most intense frustration.

The *coverage* of an operation is comprehensive and its details are easily specified and quantified. Documents spelling out an operational programme tend to be rather full and require careful study to be absorbed. But programmes cannot be complete in every detail: a full account would be unreadable. It would assume an impossible degree of management control. Simplification is needed to ensure accounts, schedules and activity expectations are useful and comprehensible. However, too much summarizing prevents the programme being used for guiding the staff involved or for subsequent monitoring.

Content. The principal objects (L-4) of an operation serve as its *essential rationale*. For many organizations, the operation defines its basic nature. Producing goods and services is both the object of businesses and the essence of their operation. By contrast, operations within other types of organization are supportive rather than primary. For example, production of an annual atlas of environmental changes and pollution effects may be an operation which is just one supporting aspect of an international body's primary goal to design and disseminate a vision for planetary protection.

Political support for the operation depends on the specification of internal priorities (L-3). Prioritization leads to differential allocation of resources and changes in functioning. This must be managed to minimize arguments and discontent amongst staff. A firm introducing new computer technology, for example, must determine which departments will be computerized first. Refurbishment in a retail store will lead to disagreement about priorities in both sequence and amount allocated for the different sections. In marketing within a food processing firm, there is liable to be disagreement about how much should be spent on advertising each product line.

The suitable choice of strategic objectives (L-2) is vital to *maximize the impact* of an operation. These objectives are primarily driven by ongoing activities and local developments. But they must also be tailored to accord with growth objectives. When operational managers in firms define objectives, they do so with an eye to smooth trouble-free implementation. By contrast, membership-centred bodies often define impractical strategic objectives because they tend to distort realities under pressure from their members' concerns

about status and their feelings of self-importance. The Royal College of Nursing, for example, needed to respond to the introduction of general management into the NHS in 1983. The chosen option, to block implementation by devoting £1 million to advertising, was unrealistic and antagonized the very groups on which nurses depended — politicians and general managers. A far greater impact might have been achieved through promoting new powerful roles for nurses to complement general management.

Finally, operations need to be *appropriately adapted* to circumstances by specifying tactical objectives (L-1) which deal with contingencies and practical demands in precise detail. It is impossible to specify every tactical objective, but the essential steps or milestones towards realization of the strategic objectives must be clear, together with the time-scale and costs generated by these steps.

Social Process. The operation contains values and objectives which define 'what we will do'. It reveals how the organization becomes what it claims it intends to be. Most staff are primarily employed to manage or work in the operation. Work on operational objectives depends on the experience, competence and immediate knowledge of managers, supervisors and front-line workers. Managerial work involves getting things done, and the essential *method* is pragmatic. The operation can only continue to function if innumerable problems and crises are swiftly handled, and if political issues are skilfully worked around. Objects, priorities, strategies and tasks must be defined and re-defined to meet practical requirements.

Involvement of a person in setting purposes within the operation is determined largely by the level of responsibility assigned to a post. If the operation is viewed as a whole, then it is clear that most staff are expected to deliver against tactical objectives. The chief executive must determine all higher level values and determine strategic objectives together with a strategy to realize these. If the organization has a head-quarters above operational subsidiaries, then this headquarters should only orient, direct and resource the operation, setting strategic objectives but not getting involved with programming operations to meet these. However, if intentionality is to pervade the organization as indeed it should, then those at lower levels must be assumed to be capable of working with the higher levels of purpose in their own spheres of responsibility. This means that staff within operations must determine the vision, culture and developments for their section — within the wider picture.[25]

Work within the operation can be a mechanical affair in comparison to work in the higher domains because

the operation is essentially instrumental, a means to an end. So *engagement* with its values and objectives is at root a matter of conscientious performance. Managers usually feel relieved by an agreed programme because they then know what is expected of them and why. For many, the impersonalization (or depersonalization) seems to be natural, even a relief.[26] But it is probable that neglecting higher values and over-valuing instrumentality has long-term ill-effects for the person and society as well as for the organization.

The type of *communication* that characterizes operational work is a briefing. Briefing is a two-way process. Managers must be briefed about immediate realities and possible problems by subordinates, while subordinates must be briefed about key objectives, priorities and other values by managers. The briefing process informs and involves people in decisions, as well as getting them to do things. The *response* to an adequate briefing is a feeling of being in control. Unsatisfactory briefings, whether in content or quality or timing, generate a feeling of helplessness, frustration and irritation.

Specialized Work. It is one thing to programme operations for a coming year, and quite another to deliver the results. The specialized work here is management control. It may be unproblematic in small outfits with 30 or so staff, but it becomes far more difficult when hundreds or thousands are employed in the operation. Such large complex organizations have many disciplines and departments (or 'functions') plus several levels of management even if the hierarchy is kept flat.

Proper integration of the work of departments and disciplines requires a higher unifying function called general **management.**[27] In lower organizational tiers, however, direction-setting, teamwork and coordinative roles must be used to ensure that people in different disciplines work separately and together in an efficient and effective way.

The management control system must be wholly oriented to operational requirements. In relation to vision, culture and even growth, the limitations of information have been emphasized. But here at last information really comes into its own. Activities and events can be counted and analysed. Efficiency, productivity and quality can be calculated. Statistical process control means something. Computerization can streamline operations and alter their nature radically. Rapid access to information can increase adaptation to client requirements and can enable accurate evaluation and feedback. Information technology specialists typically view the operation as a vast information

system. Like general managers, they are preoccupied with the whole. Nevertheless, information alone does not resolve priorities.

In a large organization, programme preparation is a responsibility of senior and middle managers. Operations require an annual budget-and-planning cycle in which planning and finance directors collate information, provide guidelines for use by general managers, and coordinate the production and presentation of a programme to the governing board. The cycle is: programming–budgetting–operating–reporting leading to re-programming if necessary. However, much of the process is informal using memos, conversations, special meetings and ad hoc instructions.

Closure. *Failure* of an operation can have many causes. But it is always a bad sign because it is a prelude to collapse. The origins of failure may be external to the firm or found in higher domains. However, the operation itself can show a wide variety of problems. Failure to structure effectively, the absence of proper programmes or project management, confusion about objectives, and hurried ineffective briefings are all common. They cause delays and over-spends, or even total blockage.

Work on the operation is inherently challenging. So any absence of managerial dynamism and drive produces general chaos and loss of focus on what the operation must achieve to keep the organization functioning.

With the provision and implementation of a suitable operational plan, values are embedded and embodied in functioning. So identity is established within the organization and (simultaneously) within society. Tangible and intangible goods and services of every possible type are produced for society. If the other domains have been effectively handled, functioning is secure. Logically and intuitively there is no further domain to consider.

REVIEWING FUNCTIONING

We have now considered the four domains of functioning — with their core purpose derivatives: the vision, the culture, growth, and the operation. The four domains are linked through their relationship to identity — defining, maintaining, supporting and solidifying it respectively. The four domains are also linked through their function in the community within and without organizations — transforming, differentiating, strengthening and sustaining it respectively. Each domain has three levels in common with its adjacent domain, and all share principal objects. The objects of any endeavour or organization (which define its unique types of activity) emerge as the lynch-pin for functioning and for the maintenance of values and identity.

Practical Implications. All organizations must function. To do so successfully, leaders clearly need to have some concern with all domains. This means tackling the existential and personal dimension via a vision, grappling with the communal and attitudinal dimension via the culture, addressing the development and multi-disciplinary dimension via growth, and managerially gripping and programming the activity-based dimension defined by the operation.

Functioning is the motor of society, endlessly turning to deliver value for the individual and for the greater good. The enlightenment of society is revealed by work on visions with their potential to transform. Society's standards are revealed by the internal cultures of organizations. Society is strengthened by the vigorous growth of organizations and alliances between them. Finally, who we are and how we live is finally revealed and sustained by operations.

In a typical business, the vision can unite and energize the firm, creating a link between high ideals and the activities leading to its products or services. The firm then needs to create a viable culture, to chart a growth course, and to manage its operations. Culture ensures that the firm has a distinctive individuality that suits its environment. This involves its staff sharing certain beliefs and using certain values in devising and working systems and procedures affecting routine activity. Growth forces a focus on customers and their needs. To meet these, cooperation within the firm is required, and possibly alliances with other firms. Operations must be programmed in such a way that customers are found and the service or product is produced at the right cost and at the right time to match their needs.

Organizations of all sorts, not just businesses, must deal with all four domains to function and to thrive. Staff who progress up the career ladder to headquarter organizations often take their operational habits with them. The new ways of thinking and relating, required to institutionalize a vision or culture and to enable growth, are difficult to develop unless they are widely supported and understood. Many staff simply but mistakenly view the headquarters organization as another operation while revelling in their elevated status.

Considerable effort and resource may be required for an organization to work effectively in the higher domains, but increased energy and profits are released by success there. Leaders must ensure that visions, culture, growth and operations are integral to their own work and the work of the main line, and are not hived off or dumped elsewhere. Disconnection means energy and resources are dissipated, morale weakens and the quality of the output deteriorates.

There seems to be a particular affinity between the two odd domains and the two even domains. Visions must contain the seeds of growth possibilities and growth must forward the vision. In practice, the term 'vision' is often used confusingly to cover both domains. Operations are the prime locus for cultural values. The close linkage here is what makes culture change difficult: people feel that the new values stop them getting on with the job.

Leaders in business and politics who are insulated in their headquarters have a disturbing habit of becoming disconnected from the real work. They then expect all the supporting disciplines to deliver on their own. But a disconnected public relations or organization development department (or even external consultants) cannot deal with culture change without the leadership. Concerns for growth may lead to a large planning department but if ignored by the leadership its output is counter-productive. Concern to monitor operations and reduce risk may spin off a vast IT empire, but if the leader ignores the output, then there is waste and discontent. Such leaders then scapegoat their own departments, thereby reducing morale further.

Complacency and a denial of the need for improvement is the enemy of effective functioning. Yet many organizations — businesses, voluntary bodies, public sector agencies — only see the need for the operation and its rudimentary development. Part of the reason for this is a lack of awareness of the importance of self-conscious work on their own identity. People must learn to view the whole as well as focus on parts, develop a concern for the essence as well as take advantage of the obvious, and see all actions as inherently manifesting values.

It is evident that the highest levels of value, value systems and ultimate values, play no direct part in determining either growth or operations which are the main preoccupations of businesses. It is primarily up to organizations of other types to create a society in which higher values are properly recognized. We have said little about these, but they play a vital role in sensitizing businesses to values.

At present we are seeing an increased focus on such things as leadership, identity creation, customer-sensitivity, community relations, cross-functional working, and the management of pluralism. Correspondingly academic pundits and management consultants are speaking increasingly freely and dogmatically about work on the vision and the need for culture change.

Transition. If functioning is assured, then potential can be realized and identity consolidated. All organizations recognize that their identity implies and expresses

a social role. However, it is evident that the social role of most organizations is far more constrained than the domains might seem to suggest. This is because individualism and self-interest, often of the unenlightened variety, are the bed-rock of organizational survival.

A free society gets around this obstacle by allowing and expecting people to form organizations of many different kinds, each with its own limited and definable contribution to society. So, as well as firms which exist to create wealth for their owners, there are many other sorts of bodies. For example, some seek to influence the policies of businesses. Others work to benefit their members who are distributed within many organizations. Still others are concerned to develop worthwhile ideals, to set minimum standards authoritatively, to benefit minorities, or to improve society in some other way.

Before considering the remaining groupings of levels of purpose in Ch. 12, it is appropriate to turn to a classification of such organizations based on the social role implicit in their functioning.   ✴

Master-Table 34

Properties of the four domains of functioning.
Functioning ensures that values are enduringly expressed in activities. Each domain of functioning is formed by conjoining purposes from four adjacent levels. Adequate functioning sustains achievement and consolidates identity in organizations, while at the same time, affecting the communal identity.
See text for further details and explanation. See Master-Tables 35 and 36 for a related classification of organizations.

Tetrad No. (Levels)	Domain of Functioning	Function	Identity Relation and Communal Function	Social Process: Method Engagement	Special Work and Leadership	Communication and Desired Response	Failure is likely if:
4 (Ls 7-4)	Vision	To establish a framework of enduring values which inspire people and guide all work.	Defines identity and transforms the group because driven by ultimate values.	Personal: Reflective soul-searching which depends on: Spontaneous ownership.	Develop commitment, loyalty and enthusiasm in an open participative way, which requires: Transformative leadership.	Preaching the essence: *what we want to be!* leading to: Excitement.	Uninspiring Unintelligible Unfulfilling Dehumanized Woolly
3 (Ls 6-3)	Culture	To keep those values prominent which fit the social environment and maintain individuality.	Maintains identity and differentiates the group because driven by value systems.	Communal: Deliberate self-definition which depends on: Arduous self-indoctrination.	Use public relations to foster equal understanding and widespread adoption, which requires: Communicative leadership.	Coherent, correct current dissemination: *what we have to be!* leading to: Pride.	Incoherent Unenforced Superficial False Diffuse
2 (Ls 5-2)	Growth	To re-define endeavours so as to meet social needs and to bring benefits internally.	Supports identity and strengthens the group because driven by social values.	Disciplinary: Need-driven inquiry which depends on: Self-interested cooperation	Use planners to stimulate ideas, to coordinate inquiry, and to evaluate possibilities, which requires: Strategic leadership.	Selective exploration in a holistic way: *what we could be!* leading to: Determination.	Impossible Simplistic Intrusive Comprehensive Data-driven
1 (Ls 4-1)	Operation	To maintain performance which efficiently produces valued outputs.	Solidifies identity and sustains the group because driven by principal objects.	Managerial: Pragmatic handling which depends on: Conscientious performance.	Exert management control to cost, program and monitor activities, which requires: Accountable leadership.	Briefing — terse but comprehensive: *what we will do!* leading to: Feeling in control.	Inefficient Uncoordinated Under-resourced Chaotic Inflexible

NOTES

1. An extensive literature now exists attempting to describe ideas behind current society, using labels like modernity, modernism and post-modernism. See, for example: Hagan, E.E. *On the Theory of Social Change*. Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1962; Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. London: Polity Press, 1991. Crook, S., Pakulski, J. & Waters, M. *Post-modernization: Change in Advanced Society*. London: Sage, 1992. There are also a stream of popular books emphasizing the significance and rapidity of change, for example: Toffler, A. *Future Shock*. London: Bodley Head, 1970; Handy, C. *The Age of Unreason*. London: Business Books, 1989; and Harvey, D. *The Condition of Post-modernity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

2. The variety of planning definitions were noted in: Blum, H.L. *Planning for Health*. New York: Human Sciences Press, 1974. Definitional confusions are inevitable given that the ideas in this chapter have been used in many disconnected literatures including social planning and public policy, economics, international and development studies, the technological change literature, sociological and political theory, organization and management sciences, labour and industry studies, and the systems sciences. An academic aim of my work has been to aid comparisons of disciplinary concepts and help clarify conceptual conflicts and similarities. Such work supports disciplinary studies without devaluing or displacing them. Even within organizations, different departments come to use different terms for the same notion or the same term for different notions. The practical aim of this book is realized when organizations intelligently adapt my terms to create a common language which suits their particular culture and needs.

3. For an account of values in Czechoslovakia, see the writings of Vaclav Havel e.g. *Living in Truth*. (ed. J. Vladislav) London: Faber and Faber, 1987; *Summer Meditations*. (Transl. P. Wilson) London: Faber, 1992. For Zionism, see: Buber, M. *On Zion: The History of an Idea*. (Transl. S. Godman) T. & T. Clark, 1985; Rubinstein, A. *Zionist Dream Revisited: Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back*. New York: Schocken, 1989.

4. Moliere. *Tartuffe*. In: *Tartuffe and Sisterhood*. (Transl. R.R. Bolt) London: Absolute Press, 1991.

5. For example, see case illustrations in: Nash, L. *Good Intentions Aside*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990.

6. Most TQM projects seem to grind to a halt within a year or so leaving a more or less beneficial residue. For an account of TQM, see: Deming, W.E. *Out of the Crisis: Quality, Productivity and Competitive Position*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986; Juran, J.M. & Gryna, F.M. *Juran's Quality Control Handbook, 4th ed.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988; Oakland, J. *Total Quality Management. 2nd Ed.* London: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991. For a brief explanation of the limitations of TQM, see: Kinston, W. *Working with Values for Results: Beyond Quality to Total Ethical Management*. London: The SIGMA Centre, 1992.

7. For three utterly different but complementary approaches to organizational success, see: Kinston, W. op.cit. [6]. For seven different approaches to decision-making, all of which are needed in a large organization, see Master-Table 8 and: Kinston, W. & Algie, J. Seven distinctive paths of decision

and action. *Systems Research*, 6: 117-132, 1989. Strategies for culture-change depend on the nature of the new values being installed, as illustrated in: Kinston, W. *Strengthening the Management Culture: Phasing the Transformation of Organizations*. London: The SIGMA Centre, 1994.

8. Documents of this sort are sometimes referred to as policy or policy guidance. They are indeed guidance but they are not policy (as defined here) because they give no direction as to how immediate issues like resource shortage, community prejudices or inter-professional disagreements are to be handled.

9. The role that a person or organization has in society is not this sort of role, but a communal role ($G''-3^2$) *because society is not an endeavour*. Such roles are fulfilled on the basis of accepting certain conventions, holding certain beliefs, and recognizing certain duties (see Ch. 9). They are also part of a whole: the social structure. Here our concern is the definition of roles by endeavours and the need to adapt work activity to ensure joint achievement. We might speak of 'work roles' or 'organizational roles'. In particular endeavours, roles may be temporary and people may be viewed as instruments, preferably willing instruments, in the service of the work to be done. Communal roles are internalized because they must enduringly orient people, but work roles need not be.

10. Policies referred to here are service or business policies which determine results, not social policies. Social policies are not primarily about outcomes but about installing social policy principles. These are constituted by tenets and conventions which shape attitudes and activities so that personal needs are met (see Ch. 9: $G''-2^2$). For example racial equality policies are about dealing with the need for people — staff, customers, suppliers — to be dealt with fairly irrespective of race. Ordinary policies are relatively straightforward because their strategic objectives are not values at all but only a means for realizing the existing or given values emphasized by prioritization. Such policies can be left to managers to develop and governing bodies to instigate, check and sanction. But ethical principles are value systems which cannot be introduced directly into an organization in this way. If attempted, the values are quietly ignored as soon as the pressure is off. Introducing a social policy is a complex matter which requires using drives and creating new convictions and approaches.

11. For culture change which is primarily issue resolution, see: Hampden-Turner, C. *Corporate Culture: From Vicious to Virtuous Circles*. London: Hutchinsons, 1990. For culture change which is about the installation of new values, see: Kinston, W. 1994, op.cit. [7]. For more on culture-change, see Box 12.1 in Ch. 12.

12. Mintzberg, H. Patterns in strategy formation. *Management Science*, 24: 934-948, 1978.

13. Kennedy, P. Decisive action. *Health Services Journal*, 11 June 1992, pp.24-25.

14. See, for example: Schein, E.H. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1985; Kilman, R.H., Saxton, M.J. & Serpa, R. (eds.) *Gaining Control of Corporate Culture*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1986; Kotter, J.P. & Heskett, J.L. *Corporate Culture and Performance*. New York: Free Press, 1992.

15. Utopias may still be useful philosophical tools. Most of the values in Thomas More's Utopia, except for the abolition of war, are now realized: H. Goitein (ed.) *Utopia*. (Transl. R. Robinson) London: Routledge (undated).

16. Disability Manifesto Group. *An Agenda for the 1990s: Disability Manifesto*. London, 1990.

17. Suspicion of the power of rhetoric to influence people's actions has a long history, dating back at least to Plato's dislike of the Sophists. Aristotle studied their methods in: *The Art of Rhetoric*; (Transl. J.H. Freese) Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991. Also see: Burke, K. *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Managers, like most people, are more influenced by tricks of oratory than the substance of the message.

18. UK Prime Minister. *The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standard*. Cmnd. 1599, London: HMSO, 1991.

19. See, for example: Bass, B.M. *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*. New York: Free Press, 1985; Tichy, N.M. & DeVanna, M.A. *The Transformational Leader*. New York: Wiley, 1986.

20. See TQM references in Note [6]; For an explanation of management cultures, see: Kinston, W. op. cit. [7].

21. This example and many others describing the development and communication of identity by public relations experts can be found in case-books like Moss, D. (ed.) *Public Relations in Practice: A Casebook*. London: Routledge, 1990.

22. The collusion between managers, academics and management consultants in re-packaging old ideas and avoiding the real work of dealing with ideas in group settings is documented in: Huczynski, A.A. *Management Gurus: What Makes Them and How to Become One*. London: Routledge, 1993.

23. Traverso, M. & White, J. The launch of the Prudential's corporate identity: A case study. In: Moss, D. op. cit. [21]

24. The disconnection of planning function in relation to growth strategies is documented and discussed in: Mintzberg, H. *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. New York: Free Press and Prentice Hall International, 1994.

25. This assumption is inherent in the modification and elaboration of levels of work theory as I have developed it (Kinston, W. & Rowbottom R. I: Levels of work: New applications to management in large organizations. II: A new model of managing based on levels of work. *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis*, 16: 19-34, 1989 & 17: 89-113, 1990; and *Discussion Papers*, 1992). Because it derived from work on fair pay and a total preoccupation with structures and line-management, the original theory developed by W. Brown and E. Jaques heavily emphasizes the limitations of each individual's capacity to work beyond a certain level (Jaques, E. *A General Theory of Bureaucracy*. London: Heinemann, 1976). Their account does not formally link to values and objectives.

26. Creativity is linked to using values and the self. For most managers, their response to needs is instrumental and value-neutral revealing an undifferentiated self; or they extrapolate and analyse using a self that can be driven, manifests loyalty and social sense. Use of a theoretical framework (e.g. of purpose) requires a more integrated self or higher level of consciousness (cf. Ainsworth-Land, V. Imaging and creativity: An integrating perspective. *Journal of Creative Behaviour*. 16(1): 5-28).

27. For a classification of types of function which explains general management, see: Kinston, W. & Rowbottom, R. 1990 op.cit. [25]. In the 7 levels of responsibility defined by this model, general management is required at levels four to seven inclusive.

Chapter 11

Classifying Organizations

Most academics and management consultants have put their energies into understanding and improving firms and public services (usually welfare agencies). Other social bodies, if they are even mentioned, are generally regarded as atypical or special and lumped together in miscellaneous categories like 'not-for-profit' or 'quangos'. Efforts to understand their structures, management and leadership have been minimal beyond a scandal-driven newspaper exposé, the occasional case-study for a doctorate, or a one-off investigation instigated by those responsible at a time of change or crisis.

In these unusual bodies, being business-like — that is to say running an efficient, responsive and effective operation — is important, but pursuing such values by imitating business structures and methods is usually grotesquely inappropriate. Performance appraisal, for example, needs rather sensitive adaptation to be effectively used by a church, a complaints authority, a political party, a self-help group or a think-tank — and the notion is almost without meaning in a social movement organization.

A useful typology should not merely pigeonhole unusual social bodies, it should penetrate to their nature and assist in their design and operation. It should also give some indication of how the different types relate to each other. The typology offered here seeks to do just that.

INTRODUCING THE TYPOLOGY

This typology is based on recognizing the core role of an organization in society (i.e. its communal function). It operates on the self-evident notion that the part that any organized body plays in society must be an expression of its *functioning* (as explained in G-4: Ch. 10). In the nature of things, intrinsic functioning expresses identity and is determined by stable values which are evident in activities and achievements.

Because the domains of functioning establish social identity and each has a communal aspect, they offer a society-oriented way to classify organizations. Here the label 'organization' is not to be restricted to business

enterprises but used to refer to deliberately constituted and publicly recognizable social bodies of every conceivable sort.[1]

Core Role: Communal Function

Organizations of all sorts should explicitly and continually work on their functioning via all four domains (G-4: Ch. 10): i.e. installing a vision, developing a viable culture, determining growth possibilities, and running the operation. We have seen that these four domains are (respectively) needed to define, maintain, support and solidify the identity of the organization. We noted that functioning simultaneously serves both the organization and the wider community, and discovered that each domain simultaneously looks inward and outward (cf. Master-Table 34). Because our concern now is with the societal role of any organization, our focus is on the effect of functioning on wider society rather than on the internal community — but remember that one is part of the other, so these are essentially identical.

To recap in this context: the vision defines organizational identity by keying into ethical and personal issues — and it has the potential simultaneously to contribute to the *transformation* of society; the culture maintains and expresses organizational identity by highlighting and affirming certain essential values — and it simultaneously contributes to the *differentiation* of society; growth supports and evolves organizational identity by meeting social needs — and it simultaneously contributes to the *strengthening* of society; and the operation solidifies and confirms organizational identity by ensuring the efficient production of valued outputs — and it simultaneously contributes to the *sustenance* of society.

In practice, it is evident that all organizations do not focus equally on all domains of functioning. Because the achievements they seek differ in fundamental ways, they function differently and require different forms of management and leadership. All domains of functioning require some attention. Although an organization may take them all very seriously, they do not treat each equally. The Body Shop (UK), for example, may include global transformation in its vision, but society

views it primarily as a manufacturer and purveyor of soaps and cosmetics. It must do likewise because it stands or falls as a business according to its success in selling those products — whether or not the world is transformed. The vision in this case supports the operation, not the other way around.

Any social body must accord primacy to the domain(s) which provide the rationale for its existence and on which its inflow of resources and continuing survival depends. A political party, for example, does not persist and receive financial support according to the efficiency or quality of its operations (important though these may be for success). It stands or falls on ideological criteria and the vision of society it espouses.

An organization's core role in society, the communal function which it willingly accepts and urgently protects, is determined by what counts as achievement and hence by the domain of functioning with which it identifies or accords primacy. Organizations do, of course, serve many communal functions — providing employment, training staff, fostering patriotism &c — and so they seem to have further social roles. But these other functions are best thought of as side-effects. If it is imagined, say, that a business primarily exists to provide employment then inefficient businesses should be supported. This makes no sense (except perhaps as a short-term measure). It would be far more useful to support the launching of new more efficient businesses. However significant an organization's side-effects are from the community's point of view, they must remain subsidiary for the organization itself. For example, the UK's Automobile Association lobbies on behalf of motorists, but few members would remain if roadside services were withdrawn and few would withdraw if this lobbying ceased. In other words, the core social role of this body is essentially one of servicing break-downs not promoting motoring.

The core role of an organization in society can usually be recognized from the way its principal objects are defined. As people are intuitively aware, these objects are explicitly designed to identify the precise nature of an endeavour. You will find that the objects are usually carefully formulated to support one or more of the upper four types (levels) of values. The core role then emerges from the domain and communal function which that value dominates.

Principal objects can be defined: (a) in an enlightened way as activities which primarily support the pursuit of certain ultimate values; (b) in a clannish way as activities which primarily support the pursuit of certain value systems; (c) in a benevolent way as activities which primarily support the pursuit of certain social values; (d) in an economic way as activities which

are primarily pursued for their tangible or monetary value. Some combination of these is also possible.

The four types of principal object lead to four main core roles (or communal functions) in society aligned with the domains i.e. the core role may be to transform, to differentiate, to strengthen or to sustain society. Because purposes are hierarchically related, possible combinations are restricted to adjacent domains. There are three combinations of two core roles, two combinations of three core roles, and one set of all four core roles. Taken together, this results in the ten-fold typology of organization based on social role (function or identity) which will be presented and briefly explored in this chapter. The classification is laid out and the types numbered with examples in Master-Table 36.

Recognizing the Types

The names used for social bodies and organizations are extraordinarily numerous. Usage is conventional or haphazard with a vague logic. Terms indicating an organization or social body include: institution, association, company, guild, fraternity, syndicate, society, group, centre, agency, trust, club, partnership, movement, institute, commission, authority, **consortium**, federation, tribunal, exchange, collective, foundation, league, party, union. Typically, any social body can choose from amongst a variety of synonyms: e.g. a business may also refer to itself as a firm, a company, a corporation, an enterprise, or simply as an organization. So the typology will not depend on such nouns, but will instead be labelled using adjectives which catch the flavour of that type of endeavour followed by a suitable noun. (I try to avoid over-using the nouns 'organization' and 'body'.)

The full classification contains 10 distinct types. There are four mono-functional types — visionary bodies, membership associations, promotional groups, and service organizations; three di-functional types — ethical bodies, evangelical organizations, and reforming agencies; two tri-functional types — ideological and sectional associations; and one tetra-functional type — universal institutions.

Most of the chapter is devoted to examining the four mono-functional types. The essential properties of these four mono-functional types are summarized in Master-Table 35 with an indication of what more complex types must encompass. These other types must synthesize the imperatives of two, three or all of the four mono-functional types in an appropriate fashion. So it is reasonable to speak of all types or bodies with a transforming function as 'vision-generating', all types or bodies with a differentiating function as 'member-

ship-centred', all types or bodies with a strengthening function as 'reform-generating', and all types or bodies with a sustaining function as 'customer-centred'.

The four mono-functional types are each summarized briefly below noting their role in society, their source value and programme, their defining function and main output, and an illustrative example. Other more complex types with that function are listed: they are more fully explained with examples at the end of the chapter. (The numbering is based on that provided in Master-Tables 35 and 36.)

Visionary bodies (#7) foster the transformation of society and need to be built around the importance of the vision. Their principal objects refer to the direct application of ultimate values to social life. They apply given or developed ideals to particular domains in order to identify values for widespread use within and across existing societies. The prime outputs are missions to be adopted and implemented by others, usually governments and organizations. *Example:* The Center for Human Understanding was set up, initially within the University of Chicago, to allow 'a few persons from many parts of the world and from realms of both thought and action [to] learn from one another in an atmosphere where the search for truth is the paramount concern'.[2]

More complex types of vision-generating body include universal institutions (#1), ideological associations (#2) and ethical bodies (#4).

Membership associations (#8) provide for the differentiation of society and need to be built around the importance of specific cultures (or, from the societal perspective, specific sub-cultures). Their principal objects refer to the protection and promotion of specific value systems in society. They promote the value to society of the distinctive roles and interests of their members, and seek to produce benefits for members with the view that this will indirectly or directly benefit society. *Example:* The British Medical Association (BMA) is set up to pursue and promote the interests and values of registered medical doctors. It is the prime body defending the income and social status of doctors. Although the BMA seeks to improve the community's health, these concerns are naturally pursued from a medical perspective.

More complex types of membership-centred body include: universal institutions (#1), ideological (#2) and sectional (#3) associations, ethical (#4) and evangelical (#5) organizations.

Promotional groups (#9) enable the strengthening of society and need to be built around the impor-

tance of growth and development. Their principal objects refer to the pursuit of social values, and their function is to focus and shape some aspect of social life in terms of these needs. They work through the general public and government as well as by directly addressing relevant organizations. So their prime outputs are priorities or policies or proposals, often for or against change, for adoption by others in a particular society. *Example:* The UK's Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) was founded 'to embolden enterprise, enlarge science, refine art, improve our manufactures and extend our commerce'. What the RSA actually does is to mount lectures, inquiries and publications which provide a forum for people of all walks of life to come together and think about the future. The hope is that such activity will shape new ideas and stimulate action on a wide front. This has been recently attempted in the areas of education, the environment, and the company.

More complex types of reform-generating body include: universal institutions (#1), ideological (#2) and sectional (#3) associations, evangelical (#5) organizations and reforming agencies (#6).

Service organizations (#10) provide for the sustenance of society and need to be built around the importance of their operations. Their principal objects specify tangible worthwhile endeavours only: i.e. they define types of activity which are distinctive and good in themselves. The function of these enterprises is to do or produce something of immediate value to society, as cheaply as possible. So the outputs are desirable goods or services. Customers must be found and kept, and the principal objects must be pursued efficiently and economically if the enterprise is to survive. Such considerations have little or no significance for the survival of organizations within the other nine types. *Examples:* a bakery may be set up to produce bread and cakes — baking is good in itself; or a school may be set up to provide teaching for handicapped children — teaching is good in itself.

More complex types of customer-centred bodies include: universal institutions (#1), sectional associations (#3), reforming agencies (#6).

Properties. Because the logic and feel of the types of organization stem from a different communal function and concern with a distinct type of value in society, a variety of distinctive features are noticeable. The different roles and outputs of the organizations as noted above are the most evident features. Also influenced are certain common needs in all organizations like: what motivates participants or insiders, how resources are provided, where leadership comes from, and how rela-

tionships with the wider community are handled. The identity of the organization is dependent principally on the upper two levels of the associated core domain of work: the top (fourth) level offering an *essential rationale* and an internal identity, and the third level ensuring *political support* and an external identity. Leadership and effectiveness in the organization depend on the lower two levels of the associated core domains of work: the second level ensuring *maximum impact* and the lowest level ensuring that interaction with society is *appropriately adapted*.

We will now consider each of the mono-functional types of organization in these terms.

VISIONARY BODIES (#7) & VISION-GENERATION

Nature. Visions steer all progress by creating a conception of the most beneficial identity imaginable and possible. So it is not surprising that organizations have emerged which are dedicated to articulating and preaching visions. It may be that Plato and Aristotle ran their academies primarily to produce and disseminate a vision of a good society. Today's specialized visionary bodies also tend to be relatively small and oriented to inquiry.

The *function* of a visionary body (and any more complex type of vision-generating organization) is to apply ideals to particular domains and identify values for widespread use within and across societies. Their core role is to transform society. In other words, the visionary work serves the wider community rather than the organization itself. To do this work, the visionary organization must be an inquiring body dedicating itself to mankind rather than to a particular nation. Its outputs are reports identifying and explaining the need for certain endeavours (principal objects) in particular realms of concern. The hope is that societies, essentially their governments, public bodies and significant organizations, will identify with the report and foster or pursue the suggested endeavours. The more complex types of vision-generating organization have to combine such requirements with assistance to members, pressure for social reform, and provision of services.

A variety of influences appear to be fuelling the desire for visionary work: the growth of self-reflective awareness and dialogue amongst people; the predominating modern value of social improvement; the movement of advanced countries from a goods-based to a knowledge-based economy; transport linkages interconnecting all parts of the world; global electronic communication making instant reporting and influence

possible; the potential to destroy the world quickly via nuclear bombs or slowly through pollution and environmental destruction; the inter-linkages of economies via trading and financial flows; and the increasing potential for technological solutions to deal with problems of extraordinary difficulty and complexity.

The United Nations Organization (UNO) is a quasi-governmental body generated by a vision of international relations based on peace, security and justice as stated in the preamble to its founding charter. As well as fostering cultural developments and performing various practical functions, the UNO is expected to be vision-generating in specific areas. It does so by setting up visionary bodies to deal with topics like the environment where the need for international cooperation on a global scale is now widely recognized (see Ex. 11.1).

The Earth Summit: A World Commission on the Environment and Development was set up in 1983 by UNO with Mrs Brundtland (subsequently Prime Minister of Norway) as Chairman. The first outcome, a Report in 1987, Our Common Future, called for 'sustainable development' to ensure progress over the entire planet into the distant future. The Commission led to many working groups and national reports and a meeting in 1992 in Brazil dubbed 'The Earth Summit'. The aim of the meeting was to produce an 'Earth Charter' to embody basic principles which should govern the economic and environmental behaviour of people and nations. Its 'Agenda 21' was to be a blueprint for action in all major areas to the end of this century and into the next. The means to carry out the agenda and agreement on the necessary strengthening of certain institutions was also specified, and various conventions on climate change, forestry &c were signed.   Ex. 11.1

The aim of a visionary body is to produce ideals and visions that others will spontaneously recognize, pursue, adopt, resource and implement. It is inappropriate to criticize them for being toothless, or to belittle their output as airy theories and good intentions. The visionary body may engage in a certain degree of promotion of its visions or even devise developments to demonstrate the practicability of the vision. But it cannot and should not seek to impose or coerce.

Participation. These bodies require sponsorship or a source of income that enables independent functioning. However, the production of ideas is not a costly labour-intensive or materials-intensive activity, so visionary organizations may be small and exclusive. Entry or involvement tends to be based on commitment to the ideals of the organization as evidenced by the person's past record. Members are commonly expected to give voluntarily of their money, time and energy, often assisted by the generosity of their employers in government, universities or large firms. A

small core of full time staff may be funded, but full-time commitment from others may be unnecessary. Small visionary-bodies may exist under the umbrella of more complex types of vision-generating organization e.g. within a large university (#1) or major political party (#2).

Identity. Visionary bodies are distinctive because they seek to benefit everyone everywhere. This is possible because their *essential rationale* is to be found in ultimate values. In other words, the principal object, the formal raison d'être of the organization, actually specifies or implies ultimate values. This is what draws people to participate and contribute.

> Pursuing Truth: The World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS) was established in 1960 'for distinguished scientists and scholars to discuss the vital problems of mankind, independent of political boundaries or limits, whether spiritual or physical; a forum where these problems will be discussed objectively, scientifically, globally and free from vested interests or regional attachments. It will function as an informal 'world university' at the highest scientific and ethical level, in which deep human understanding and the fullest sense of responsibility will meet'. WAAS has worked on issues like conflict resolution and world education.
>
> Ex. 11.2[3]

The visible identity of a visionary body is based in the value system which must be selected to ensure *political support* for the organization. These ideas should be recognizable in the output. For example, the group charged with the production of the UNO charter of human rights embodied the value-system of western liberalism because of the influence of the founding members. Without such an identity for UNO, it is unlikely that they would have agreed to its formation. In relation to UNO's environmental concern, Robertson notes that there are two opposing visions on offer. In the best tradition of someone whose loyalties are already committed, he describes one as hyper-expansionist ('HE') and calling for further economic growth much as in the Brundtland Report, and the other as sane, humane and ecological ('SHE').[4]

Leadership. Visionary bodies specify social values to *maximize their impact* on people. So their leadership must be viewed as a form of communal leadership. The leader ought to feel like a natural servant of mankind and be recognized as such. Community leadership may be based on holding political or governmental offices as in the case of UNO; or it may be drawn from those with recognized achievements who are eminent in their fields, as in the case of the WAAS.

Alternatively, leadership may be self-proclaimed, flowing from a disinterested inner drive on behalf of humanity. The founders of the great religions emerged from amongst the people, gathered a small band of disciples or followers, and launched a spiritual programme for their society and beyond. Indeed, anyone in the community may take up the challenge, be anointed as leader by a few like-minded people, and form a visionary body. All that is required is an exquisite sensitivity to ultimate values, and a down-to-earth appreciation of realities.

The organization's social values govern how wider society evaluates the output and so need to be chosen to ensure that the vision is regarded as realistic and worthwhile by those who are expected to take action. Most would regard the output as beneficial if it addressed such things as the need for monetary stability, the need for peaceful resolution of ethnic differences, the need for full employment, and the need for ethical management of large corporations.

Once the social value is chosen, the output must specify principal objects in the form of projects, enterprises and activities for people, other organizations, and governments to pursue: like Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit (Ex. 11.1). These must be *appropriately adapted* to the situation without betraying the cause. This is why all religious founders, like Jesus or Buddha, who address omnipresent and universal spiritual needs are so historically embedded, and why they must take so much from existing tradition in the process of overthrowing it.

Limitation. Visionary bodies alone are insufficient in society. Vision-generation can devise an identity capable of maintaining new values, but adherents dedicated to those values are essential. So now we turn to consider membership associations which differentiate society by devoting themselves to sustaining and promoting their members' identity.

MEMBERSHIP ASSOCIATIONS (#8) & MEMBERSHIP-CENTREDNESS

Nature. In Ch. 5, we emphasized that an association was the product of people with a common interest who joined together to promote certain objects. Now it is necessary to recognize that there is one special type of association in which the interest being shared and promoted is the social status and role of those in the association. In other words, the common interest is self-interest.

An organization based primarily around promoting its members' self-interest is called here a membership association. Any organization, whatever its social function, which at root believes in or is dedicated to the

importance of a particular group in society must be viewed as membership-centred. Membership-centred bodies may push for legislation or other developments, and may even offer society a vision: associations of medical doctors regularly do such things in the area of health and health care. Nevertheless their concern remains unerringly directed at their members' interests and values. The National Union of Teachers works primarily for the interests of teachers which it assumes will benefit education and so society. Likewise, the British Nuclear Forum works primarily for the interests of the nuclear power industry, and the Tobacco Advisory Council works primarily for the interests of tobacco companies — although the degree to which the good of society is considered by such bodies seems to be of a lower order.

The point is that the *function* of a membership association (and any more complex type of membership-centred organization) is to promote the value in society of the distinctive roles, activities, needs, beliefs, interests and preferences of its members. Note that these are all individuating values. So their role is to differentiate society.

The distinctiveness, character and richness of any society arises in large part from the range of interests of its citizens as evidenced in numerous membership associations. These bodies provide self-affirmation internally and self-promotion externally. Members look to them partly for mutual support, but mainly to enhance their social standing, to increase their security, and to persuade governments and other bodies to put resources at their disposal. Should these efforts succeed, ever more people and ever more capable people will wish to be members and the future of their value system will be assured.

Those membership associations with which people are immediately familiar include professional and occupational associations and trades unions. Other examples are umbrella organizations like trade associations (e.g. British Menswear Guild), employer bodies (e.g. the Confederation of British Industry) and coordinating groups in the voluntary sector (e.g. Federation of Astronomical Societies, National Council for Voluntary Organizations). Community associations probably fit into this category as well.

It is possible for umbrella membership associations to have member organizations which are also membership associations. In the UK, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Association of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences (ALSISS) are examples. ALSISS describes its aim as promoting social science research in society — but this is equivalent to promoting social science researchers. In so far as it is successful, prestige

and finance will flow to members of its members because they control and define what counts as social science research. As in all such organizations, it is assumed that society will benefit, but this is usually difficult to quantify and the opportunity costs are never considered.

Consortia which form to campaign and lobby for vested interests in a particular sector seem to be a variant of membership association e.g. The Campaign to End Housing Shortages in the UK, is a body supported by the House Builders' Federation, the New Homes Marketing Board, the Building Employers Confederation, the National House Building Council, the Federation of Master Builders, the National Council of Building Material Producers and certain Building Societies.

Most people feel the need to belong to at least one membership association. Membership bolsters both our sense of belonging and our sense of being special within the diffuse anonymous complexity of modern society. New membership-centred organizations emerge when a new role develops in society. When planning, for example, is recognized as something of social value: various groups supporting planning and planners spontaneously emerge. First, perhaps a society of strategic or long-term planners is formed and then associations for different applications of planning: city planning, health service planning, transport planning, social planning and so on. Not surprisingly, this type of organization is mushrooming as society becomes more complex: in the US there were under 5000 trade associations in 1956, almost 13000 in 1975, and over 23000 in 1989.

Participation. If a person has the required qualification, entry to a membership association is usually easy, even automatic. Entry is nearly impossible without that qualification. In the early stages, entry criteria may not be sharply defined, sometimes to encourage membership to reach a critical size, and sometimes because the new value system is not evident. Sooner or later, however, strict membership criteria need to develop. The family therapy movement, for example, spawned numerous associations of family therapists. These were little more than cells, essential to promote the new ideals of family therapy and eager to help people act on its therapeutic ideology. However, as the movement thrived, the organizations became more significant and the visionary urge to transform society diminished to be replaced by a more selfish urge to protect hard-won prestige. As a result, a pressure grew to regulate membership by accrediting family therapy training.

Typically, the membership association's work in wider society benefits potential-but-not-paid-up

members as well as the actual membership. The organization wishes to be recognized as large and powerful, but it is assessed by the number of its paid-up members and depends on them for financial support. It needs to trade off the cost of membership against the numbers of members. Compulsory or automatic membership may be introduced to strengthen the association. For example, 'closed shop' arrangements block workers from holding certain jobs unless they are members of certain unions. Less forceful encouragement to join may be provided by a variety of fringe benefits from vintage wine offers to cheaper insurance. But this obscures the fact that resources in a membership-centred organization stem primarily from the membership itself. Members are expected to contribute through voluntary purchases (ties, mementoes, journals &c) and gifts (donations, endowments, bequests &c) as well as compulsory annual dues.

Identity. The *essential rationale* of a membership association is its value system, which consists mainly of tenets and conventions defining the tribal identity of members. The principal objects are defined to enable the organization to do whatever is required to strengthen and defend this value system. Members share a consensus on the importance of their value system. They see that an organization is needed to differentiate themselves and to debate with those who think differently and therefore 'wrongly'. Beliefs of great moment to doctors, for example, are regularly challenged by nurses, psychologists, managers, policy analysts, politicians and others. Similarly, trade unions and employer organizations rarely see completely eye to eye.

Coexistence of membership associations with near-identical value systems does not make much sense. It leads, for example, to various trade unions claiming to represent the same sort of worker. This may generate an unseemly competition for members, and splits the power base in negotiations. Amalgamation is the treatment of choice for needless multiplicity.

The reverse arrangement, which is apparent in the UK's National Health Service and its universities, is also not wholly satisfactory. Here a single union includes a range of workers with a variety of distinct value systems. Unless a single dominant approach can be found, fragmentation is preferable.

However, the identity of the association that is visible to the public, and so ensures its *political support*, is to be found in the espoused or highlighted social values. Doctors emphasize their concern to prevent and cure illness, rather than the particular beliefs which maintain what is sometimes an unjustifiably over-dominant position in health care. Trade unions are similarly eager

to present themselves as concerned about the state of the economy and unemployment whatever the effects of picketing, strikes and restrictive practices.

Leadership. Leadership in a membership association flows from members and their identification with the principal objects. These objects determine the support of the membership and hence must be chosen to *maximize the impact* of the organization. Because no identified leader, whether of the governing body or of a paid or unpaid executive, can instruct or override the wider membership, he or she needs to function more like a delegate. Outside bodies are always aware that the members hold the power and that agreements or decisions taken by formal leaders can be rejected or reversed by the membership. So those in formal leadership positions speak of the 'honour' of their position and walk the tightrope between being a mouthpiece and exerting real influence.

The work here demands sensitivity, self-restraint and loyalty. Leaders must be found from amongst those active members who are prepared to devote much spare time to their tribe. Elaborate governing bodies with many committees and working parties are common in all large membership associations. Often a commitment to serving on these over several years is expected of members as a matter of routine because the paid executive body is so small. Many quite large organizations, like the International Psychoanalytical Association with over 5000 members, have no more than a few paid administrative and secretarial staff.

Large and more socially significant membership associations (e.g. of doctors) and more complex types of membership-centred organizations (e.g. the Roman Catholic church) need an executive hierarchy of full-time employees headed up by an appointed top official or chief executive, as well as their governing council and various governing committees which are filled by election. Commonly there is an attempt to ensure that employees, or at least senior executives, are also members because outsiders cannot possibly identify sufficiently with the value system. So top management in the British Medical Association (BMA) is made up of non-practising doctors; and senior managers in trade unions are also members of that union.

Membership associations have a stake in many societal issues and exert their influence through asserting their preferences (i.e. internal priorities: L-3) with the hope that these values will be accommodated by governments and organizations. The effectiveness of such assertions depends upon their being *appropriately adapted* to the situation. The Confederation of British Industry, for example, is expected to take up a stance on diverse current issues, including (at the time of

writing) European integration, job-training schemes and interest rates. Exactly what value the executive promotes at any instant depends on many things including the mood of the country, an analysis of the issues, and the views of the members. The BMA sharply moved its position on UK health service reforms after the Conservative victory in the 1992 election. This tactical approach to priorities usually disturbs some members to whom it appears to reflect a betrayal of principles. In fact it reflects the reality that times change, that society is bigger than any single sub-group and that the only enduring principle is to benefit members. Adaptation is self-evidently essential.

A successful membership-centred organization is one that can keep wider society focused positively on its own values. Ideally, whatever the decision being faced, the membership-centred organization hopes that the choice will be swayed in its favour. Groups like the farmers and doctors are viewed as powerful because it seems that their membership associations so often get governments to make decisions in their favour.

Limitation. To highlight a unique identity, membership associations bring together people who are often otherwise dispersed and distributed in a wide variety of settings. These organizations are vehicles for pride and self-assertion. However, if society is to develop, then membership-centredness is not enough. Bodies specifically geared to strengthening society are needed.

PROMOTIONAL GROUPS (#9) & REFORM-GENERATION

Nature. The next distinctive type of social body finds its origin in the importance to society of its growth and development. Such organizations exist to promote particular social values and foster specific changes held to be generally beneficial. They are dedicated to influencing public opinion, pressuring governments to modify policy, and shaping organizational decisions directly or indirectly. Hence the general label of reform-generation. These bodies focus on a specific issue or domain of importance (other than that defined by a sub-group's self-interest) and they seek to stimulate or shape improvements. Naturally, this may sometimes mean opposition to current proposals or to recent changes.

A variety of labels have emerged for promotional groups according to which form of activity is most prominent: Among the groups are: 'political lobbies' oriented primarily to parliamentarians (e.g. the US National Rifle Association); independent 'think-tanks' dedicated to producing useful knowledge (e.g. the

Policy Studies Institute); 'campaigning organizations' seeking to influence the whole of society (e.g. Opportunity 2000 promoting work equality for women); 'regulatory authorities' protecting social values in a specialized area (e.g. a statutory gaming board); 'voluntary watchdogs' trying to influence a monopoly (e.g. a body formed by users of a state-controlled railway); 'citizen action groups' which emerge in response to an issue (e.g. a group seeking to overturn a court conviction); and 'funding agencies' (e.g. the Mental Health Foundation).

Such organizations are all about exerting social pressure through promotional activities. (An alternative label might have been 'pressure group', except that membership associations are so evidently masters of pressure while many promotional groups are not.) The amount and diversity of promotional activities, which are the operations of the body, depend on its size and strength (i.e. its resources). Typical operational activities include: convening meetings, seminars and conferences; commissioning and producing reports; publishing newsletters, pamphlets and periodicals; supplying speakers; lobbying and briefing politicians; coordinating letter-writing campaigns and petitions; advertising and exhibiting; maintaining a library; providing information and giving advice; helping local cells get organized; funding relevant research and projects. What makes each promotional group unique is not the way it operates which is rather uniform, but the social value which is being promoted.

> Low Pressure Tactics: New Consumer is a public-interest research organization which (disingenuously) describes itself as an information-provider and not as a campaigning body or pressure group. It describes its goal as 'enabling the individual to bring social and ethical values to bear on everyday purchasing or management decisions': these principal objects are social values. It carries out and publishes surveys of businesses: these principal objects are its essential activities. The organization has an explicit aim of encouraging, or rather subtly pressuring, businesses to alter their policies in the direction of greater social responsibility. The dimensions of corporate policy surveyed seem to reflect public concern and foci of crusades about armaments, tobacco, pollution, equal opportunities &c. The desire to foster reform is unmistakable.   Ex. 11.3[5]

The *function* of promotional groups (and more complex types of reform-generating organization) is to focus and shape some aspect of social life. Their role is to strengthen society. At a minimum they affirm an uncontroversial social need and aid its use as a priority by decision-makers. When they go further and seek to develop a better direction for government or relevant enterprises, their output consists of specific proposals

or policies for adoption and adaptation. Acceptance of a group's values or proposals within government or an organization is typically influenced by public opinion. So any output is supported by information, analyses, publicity and campaigns to mobilize public opinion.

In any particular domain there is likely to be a number of promotional groups each with its own slightly different orientation. For example, many groups in the UK seek to promote the social value of peace but the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament does so by campaigning and focuses on weapons of mass destruction, the Conflict Research Society does so by promoting an understanding of the causes and solutions to conflict, while the Council for Arms Control does so by promoting research and focusing on the need for arms control and disarmament. There are also other reform-generating groups in the same area: some evangelical (e.g. the Peace Pledge Union which is pacifist and emphasizes non-violent methods), some ideological (a Peace Party), some universal (e.g. the peace studies discipline within Universities).

Participation. Promotional groups vary greatly. In many, any interested person can become a member and offer support either through subscriptions (like Friends of the Earth), or through voluntary work (like citizen action groups). In the larger bodies, it may be possible to obtain paid employment. Employed staff tend to be identified with the cause and not just a particular issue or campaign. So, just as supporters may be workers, workers are often supporters. Some community leaders are rather generally involved and identified with reform and good causes. They seem to move round the campaigning circuit, or take their turn on different government-instigated inquiries and commissions.

For some organizations, like users groups or environmental campaigners, a large public membership is positively desirable. However, even when membership is large, its control may be minimal: ordinary members of the World Wildlife Fund (which funds and promotes conservation), for example, have no voting powers. Other bodies, like independent think-tanks or research foundations may have a limited and exclusive membership and so can support an idiosyncratic view of what is desirable. Public bodies, like the UK National Consumers' Council, which exists solely to promote the consumer viewpoint, are different again in that they are constituted by statute to work on behalf of the public and they lack members altogether.

Identity. The *essential rationale* behind any promotional group is to be found in a social value which usually appears in its title. The Prison Reform Trust in the UK presses for improvements in the prison system.

Greenpeace seeks to ensure we live in peace with our environment. Such organizations, even when their particular crusades or campaigns are irritating, tend to be regarded as relevant and worthwhile by the community generally. Everyone who is part of the organization sees its espoused social values as the main motivation for joining.

Financing comes from grants, donations and gifts from government, corporations and members of the public. Ensuring such *political support* for the organization depends on the principal objects because these determine the visible identity and membership of the body. Public support may be far more forthcoming, for example, for undoing injustice in one criminal conviction rather than in another. Similarly, in the health field, it may be easier to raise money for research than to gain support for a lobby to change legislation — even though the latter might be of more certain benefit to the community.

Objects may generate conflict between organizations in the same sector if the underlying social value differs. For example, citizen groups which campaign for the rights of people with 'learning difficulties' may clash with parent-led pressure groups seeking the overall well-being of the same people, but now described as suffering 'mental handicap'. The former term is based on the values of assimilation and normalization, while the latter term is based on the values of differentiation and specialized extra care.

Leadership. Leadership of a promotional group is based in the choice of priorities for change within the domain. These emphases and issues become the internal priorities for efforts by the organization and should be chosen to *maximize impact*. No promotional group is ever neutral, not even research funding bodies: the type of work funded and the assumptions built into funding criteria mean that values permeate choices implicitly if not explicitly. The leadership here lies primarily with the governing body (and its various subcommittees) which must set priorities and decide assumptions, and secondarily with the top officers. Top executive positions naturally go to those who are sympathetic to the governing board's approach to the domain, and who are identified with its values in regard to necessary improvement.

For example: a charitable trust which funds policy-relevant housing research must decide whether to direct its efforts to quality of housing, quantity of housing, location of housing need, financing of housing, interaction of housing needs with other social needs or some other theme. Top officers need to provide background to the trustees on feasibility and relevance, but the choice should be made by the trustees. Once the

theme is set, officers arrange for applications, assess them and indicate to the trustees which seem most worthy. Trustees will (properly) want to make the final decisions on funding.

Reform-generating organizations which seek to have a more direct impact recognize that social change is not a simple rational matter. They know that the prestige and enthusiasm of those holding governance positions have a great deal of influence. Energetic respected governors, usually unpaid, are therefore sought. Top executives, usually poorly paid, may have an independent profile in some reforming bodies but never to the degree found in businesses and other customer-centred organizations.

The vast majority of promotional groups are small. They can do little more than highlight a particular social need by fostering communication amongst their members and interested or relevant outsiders. These bodies lack paid executives and do little strategic work. Slightly larger bodies may use press releases, conferences and other means to affirm values and develop proposals. However, if an organization is to monitor the society and suggest possible developments, it needs senior full-time executives with considerable understanding of the problems and issues. For example, most people wish to see better care for schizophrenia sufferers, but it is not clear what can be done given the complex nature of the illness, the importance of family life in relapse, the diversity of views of the various professional groups, the range of possible therapies, and the changing socio-political climate. Charting a way through a maze of controversy to produce ideas and proposals that are both broadly workable and could command general support is no mean feat.

Impact does not depend solely on the quality of the proposals, but also on whether or not people listen. So strategic objectives must be *appropriately adapted* and timed to current exigencies. Success can be measured by the influence that priorities and proposals have on strategic objectives set by relevant organizations or by government. For example, an anti-war campaigning body (but not necessarily an evangelical or ideological body) might tactically move from proposing unilateral disarmament as a desirable strategy to multilateral disarmament depending on the actual global situation, the social mood, and the ideology of the government in power.

Limitation. Promotional groups look to produce a general benefit or result in society, but are disconnected from and not responsible for the detailed means whereby results are achieved. Actually running things and producing goods and services which others judge to

be worthwhile demands a different type of outlook and organization altogether. Without such bodies communal life could not be sustained, and visionary, membership and promotional bodies would have no substrate or support.

SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS (#10) & CUSTOMER-CENTREDNESS

Nature. The enterprises that we are most familiar with are the organizations that society requires to ensure that we receive our essential and desirable goods and services. Their orientation is or should be unambiguously focused on getting things done. (The introductory account of purposes in Ch. 3 was based primarily on such organizations.) We can call these enterprises customer-centred because getting customers is the basis of their success.

None of the previous types of body had proper customers or clients, people (activists or action groups) simply took it on themselves to launch the enterprise on the community. In some cases, governments or organizations founded and funded the bodies for their own ends. Service organizations, by contrast, typically depend on customers or clients seeking what they have to offer and, generally, paying for it. The activist here is the entrepreneur. Where a need is evident but the customer cannot pay, a third party may pay. However, such indirect payment weakens accountability to the customer and so potentially reduces efficiency and impairs effectiveness.

The *function* of a service organization (and more complex types of customer-centred organization) is to do or produce specific things of tangible value to society as cheaply as possible. (Even if products or services are very expensive or selling at prices unrelated to costs as in fashion-wear, the organization should still aim to keep its costs down. Note that lowering quality to reduce costs means providing a different product/service.) The role of such organizations is to sustain society. The existence and well-being of the other three main types of organization, like society itself, is dependent on the useful outputs of vast numbers of this type of body.

Whereas activities of the other types of organization were almost stereotyped, activities here are distinctive, multitudinous and highly specialized corresponding to the diverse requirements of people and society. Distinctive activities defined by the principal objects are now the basis for survival, organizational competence and success. Continuing innovation and specialization of activity and product lead to ever-increasing numbers of ways to meet needs and produce wealth.

These organizations are at the sharp end of value: their activities must be immediately and directly seen as beneficial without further mediation. So the other types of social body often seek to influence them. Visionary bodies try to alter the value context and legislation within which service organizations operate. Membership associations try to influence how they treat members. Promotional groups try to influence their policies or their regulation by social authorities. Service organizations are typically categorized as private, public or voluntary (non-profit) — see Ex. 11.4.

Some Service Organizations:

1. In the private sector are agricultural, manufacturing and service businesses of every conceivable type. Companies or corporations are the paradigm for service organizations, but sole proprietorships, professional practices and partnerships are also included.

2. In the public sector are governmental agencies whose nature varies from country to country. Because political considerations deflect the focus from customers and costs, governments are poor at running service organizations. So the number of these should be kept to a minimum. Nevertheless sovereign nations seem to need some hundreds of small and large service agencies. These are generally best set-up as independently governed bodies (quangos) rather than left within ministerially-controlled government departments. The police and taxation authorities are invariably public agencies, and so are some welfare services like income support and primary education. Some governments still keep basic utilities like electricity generation and water supplies in the public sector.

3. In the voluntary sector are many diverse organizations providing social, educational, religious and community services which are either traditionally voluntary (e.g. Royal National Lifeboat Institution, National Adoption Society, any local tennis club) or commercially unattractive (e.g. The Salvation Army; Homes for Homeless People). Funds come from public donations, government grants and commercial activities. Such bodies do campaign, but only to raise funds for their services or to lobby self-interestedly — not for reforming purposes. Ex. 11.4

Participation. Customer-centred organizations generate the employment on which the social and economic well-being of modern society depends. The decision to participate in a service organization is about being directly involved in producing desirable goods/services and profiting through being paid. Most employees and the self-employed earn their living from being productive and sustaining society as it is.

Private sector firms are supported by their investors, shareholders, who expect a financial return and in return participate minimally. In the public and voluntary sector, the payoff for those who constitute the organization is rooted in higher values and they may maintain their support despite inefficiency.

Each service organization should be a monument to the capacity of ordinary people to value things and demonstrate that value by paying personally. Ideally, service organizations operate within a market. Markets contribute to the creation of value when entry and exit is easy. A large number of customers and a large number of organizations maximize choice and increase diversity. An effective market enables customers and employees to feel independent and become valued by an organization. Where organizations have a monopoly or a captive clientele, which is common in the public monopolies and voluntary bodies, it is easier for those working in them to become inward looking and to seek to reward and perpetuate themselves much as if they were membership-centred.

Identity. The *essential rationale* of any service organization is primarily provided by the endeavour specified in its principal objects. These objects are the source of consensus for all those inside the organization. They are the basis of distinctive competence and financial viability. A firm's top management needs to be concerned with a wide variety of things including investments, technology, currency fluctuations, and even social problems — but if this concern replaces a focus on what the business is really about then direction is lost, costs are likely to grow and customers will suffer.

The social acceptability of a service organization and its image in the minds of staff derives from its internal priorities — the social values actually applied to its decisions in particular situations. By carefully selecting and balancing the various emphases, *political support* from relevant stakeholders can be assured. To make these delicate and far-reaching decisions, management must be guided and monitored by a governing body whose overview can cover all stakeholders. In businesses, boards largely consist of top managers together with a number of non-executive directors. By contrast, governing bodies of voluntary agencies and public services may have no executive members at all. In all cases, governing bodies need to take a more considered view of the balance of legitimate value pressures than executives do. When this does not happen, things go wrong. A leading charity for the deaf set up a commercial operation which tried to sell hearing aids which were available cheaper or free from other sources. Not surprisingly there was a public protest and some staff left in disgust.

Leadership. The long-term survival of any service organization in a market or managed environment depends on the quality of its strategic objectives and strategies. These need to be designed to *maximize impact*. What should the geographical dispersion of service centres be? How should new technology be

employed? When should a new product be commissioned? Where is the gap in the market? How can client-satisfaction be improved? Asking and answering such questions, not to mention implementing the answers successfully, requires full immersion in the realities of the situation. This is only possible for full-time employees. So, the balance of influence in service organizations is decisively tilted towards top executives. Voluntary services often operate poorly because the management committee (i.e. governing body) of the enterprise is over-controlling or refuses to appoint (or pay for) high calibre top managers.

In developing and providing services or producing goods to order, those in the organization must meet deadlines and deal with a multiplicity of practical problems. This means setting tactical objectives and progressing tasks. Tactics and tasks must be *appropriately adapted* to the situation. If not appropriate, the strategic objective or higher values are not being recognized, if not adapted then failure is likely and time and money is being wasted. Poor task completion leads to a drop in quality, waste of money, dissatisfied customers, and low morale. In a market, competitors are liable to take advantage of the situation and will eventually drive the inefficient firm out of business. Voluntary bodies may not feel these effects and so tolerate inefficiency and poor quality much longer. In much of the public sector, too, market forces are virtually absent and management may be devalued or subordinated to political imperatives.

Closure. With the institution of service organizations, goods and services are produced for society. Society is sustained and prosperity is possible. We have covered the last of the mono-functional types, but said little about the more complex types. It is now time to examine these, but only very briefly.

THE REMAINING SIX TYPES OF ORGANIZATION

The aim in this section is to give a variety of unambiguous examples of each of the remaining types. Not a great deal of research or consultancy has been carried out in relation to such organizations, so nothing further will be said about their structure and management. We will commence with the di-functional types, and within these start from the highest level.

Di-functional Types

As indicated in Master-Tables 35 and 36, the di-functional types are as follows: *Type 4: Ethical* bodies which primarily seek to transform society in its entirety but

do so on the basis of a tribal membership of some sort, and therefore are differentiating; *Type 5: Evangelical* organizations which primarily differentiate people in society but also seek to strengthen society; *Type 6: Reforming* agencies which primarily seek to strengthen society but also carry out activities which sustain society.

Ethical Bodies (#4): These organizations primarily appeal to a tribal membership while seeking to transform society in an enlightened fashion. Such bodies are mainly international voluntary associations, often the product of a social movement, whose activities are confined to developing and disseminating ideas through organizing meetings, seminars, workshops and publications. The International Alliance of Women (IAW), for example, was set up in 1904 to secure all such reforms as are necessary to establish real equality of liberties, status and opportunities for women (the differentiating or membership element) but also to ensure that the status of every individual shall be based on respect for the human personality without distinction of sex, race or creed (the visionary or transforming element). Another variety are the visionary professional or disciplinary organizations, like the International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS), many of whose members join for just this reason. Its 1994 meeting is entitled 'New Systems Thinking and Action for a New Century' and its concern is with ethical action to transform the world (see Ex. 11.5).

International Society for the Systems Sciences: Systems scientists are often mocked for the grandiosity inherent in being visionary. The visionary element is evident from the seven inter-related imperatives identified for study in the 1994 Annual Meeting: "1) balancing our thinking better between the near...and far in both space and time; 2) achieving a better balance between individual and collective rights and responsibilities ...; 3) ridding ourselves of obsolete assumptions...that perpetuate the widespread bureaucratic arteriosclerosis in the corporate, governmental, educational, and scientific establishments; 4) recognizing that in the global village...we will often find that 'less is more' and 'more is less'; 5) learning to design coordination-intensive structures that will be the key to public and private sector operations...[to] foster simultaneous centralization and decentralization, globalization and localization; 6) reinvigorating technological innovation and focusing it on societal needs; 7) managing the increasingly powerful technologies in a manner both ethical and enriching in human terms."

Ex. 11.5[6]

Keeping such bodies going is difficult, partly because there is an inherent contradiction between being visionary and being membership-centred. Funds for world transformation are hard to come by and the membership, however committed, invariably find that their

specific interests and needs are not being effectively forwarded. This problem lessens for those international ethical bodies which are umbrella groups whose members are full-fledged and successful membership associations in the various countries. The World Medical Association (WMA), for example, consists of autonomous national medical associations and works mostly in medico-ethico-legal and medico-socio-economic affairs. Individual doctors gain no direct benefits from the WMA and have little or no contact with it.

Evangelical Organizations (#5): These organizations primarily differentiate society by their adherence to a particular set of ideas or the values of a sub-group of society, while simultaneously being dedicated to generating reforms which strengthen society. The conflict noted in sustaining ethical bodies is absent in evangelical organizations. Membership-centredness is easily compatible with reform, even spurring it on, because members are gratified if they can strengthen society in the context of benefiting their value system and personal identity.

This is particularly true of church-based groups. Quaker Social Responsibility and Education is for Quakers only and helps them develop insights to improve society and make representations to public bodies. The Inter-faith Network in the UK works to facilitate the fuller participation of the different religious communities in public life. Its members share a religious vision of society and include representative bodies of various religions, inter-faith organizations, and a variety of educational and academic bodies in the religious sphere.

Most think-tanks are independent and non-political in their search for a way forward. However some think-tanks are membership-centred because they expect their output to adhere to a single ideology e.g. the Institute for Public Policy Research is socialist, the Adam Smith Institute is free-market oriented. Despite their bias, such Institutes are committed to producing feasible useful proposals that any government might adopt.

National professional or discipline bodies which set exams and standards are evangelical. The Royal College of General Practitioners, for example, was set up to improve standards of practice, education and research. As well as promoting the distinctive value of its members, such bodies do contribute to improving society through producing balanced reports on issues of social significance within their domain of expertise.

Evangelical organizations may be set up by tribes of all sorts in response to a social threat. The fear of

nuclear war has generated many specialized campaigning organizations e.g. Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, Clergy Against Nuclear Arms, Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Pagans against Nukes. The significance of these bodies is related to the influence of the tribe in society. Scientists are clearly able to achieve more than psychoanalysts or pagans.

A final example are the issue-based or group-based political parties like a peace party or a farmers' party. Only those involved with the issue or group will join such a party, and if there are enough non-member supporters then candidates may be elected to the legislature. However, if they are to achieve anything in the legislature, the party must develop and promote useful ideas and feasible proposals to strengthen and benefit society generally.

Reforming Agencies (#6): Reforming agencies are primarily reform-generating, but also provide essential services. They include large campaigning welfare providers, research-based pressure groups, some self-help groups, some scientific interest bodies, some regulatory authorities, and some international public service bodies.

A charity needs to be reasonably large, well-resourced and structured in a sophisticated fashion to be able to handle more than one communal function with any degree of effectiveness. Typical reforming charities with multi-million pound budgets include: Age Concern, the Royal National Institute for the Blind, Save the Children Fund, Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Oxfam. These have the social backing to provide a range of services and also to gain the public's attention as they press for social changes in areas of interest to them.

By contrast, many smaller voluntary service bodies over-ambitiously attempt to define themselves as campaigning bodies until, under financial pressures, they revert to type. The Cats Protection League (CPL), founded in 1927, is a typical example. It runs over 150 local groups with 17,000 members and in 1986 provided a service to over 75,000 cats. Included in its constitution are promotional objects: to encourage the neutering of cats not required for breeding and to inform the public on the care of kittens and cats. However, they acknowledge being unable to do as much as they would wish on the promotional side.

Some regulatory authorities are reforming agencies e.g. the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality have promoting and campaigning work to do as well as providing a service by investigating and pursuing cases of alleged discrimination. International public service agencies like

WHO and UNESCO not only provide services but seek to produce and publicize ideas and policies to improve society in specific areas. Some scientific bodies do the same e.g. the Royal Geographical Society arranges its own expeditions and provides training as well as promoting geographical science through the usual range of activities. Self-help groups, like the Rambler's Association provide services for their members, people who like walking, including maps, itineraries, publications and organized walks; and also actively lobby government on related matters like protecting public paths, maintaining access to open country and preventing damage to areas of natural beauty.

Tri-functional Types

The tri-functional types are as follows: *Type 2: Ideological* associations which primarily seek to transform society, but can only do so by both differentiating their members and supporters, and by strengthening society; *Type 3: Sectional* associations which primarily seek to differentiate their members in society, but can only do so by strengthening society and by providing services.

Ideological Associations (#2): Ideology-based political parties — in the UK: the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrat Party, the Conservative Party — exist to develop a vision to transform society in accord with a particular ideology. Membership of the party is usually relatively small. The party seeks to see society transformed or at least move in the right direction by forming a government. To win an election, it must appeal to the general population for support and votes, and this will only be forthcoming if the party is evidently working to strengthen society. If a party lacks any higher vision, then it is liable to have difficulty attracting capable members. This seems to be the case in recent times in regard to ideological parties in the US where disillusionment with politicians is high. However, if a political party is excessively visionary, then it is liable to lose its roots in the current preoccupations of society. In the UK, this seems to have happened to the Maharishi's Natural Law Party and the Green Party in the 1992 election.

Social movement bodies may also be of this type. Non-political social movements have their own set of valued ideas, beliefs and principles (i.e. ideology) which give them form and strength. The movement spawns cells and networks as part of its attempt to transform society through spontaneous collective action rather than through formal channels. Joining a social movement is an act of differentiation. The networks typically promote values and offer suggestions in an effort to reform society. The Communitarian Network

in the USA, for example, has emerged as part of a movement away from excessive individualist tendencies which many people see as damaging society generally.

Ideological associations tend to be far more enduring and effective than ethical associations. The direct concern to generate reforms and strengthen society in specific recognizable and realistic ways apparently provides for greater focus, cohesion and solidity. In the case of some social movement organizations the visionary elements may be abandoned resulting in a shift of type to an evangelical organization. This seems to have been the case with the early family therapy groups and networks whose members initially imagined that they might change not just therapy and psychiatry, but science and society. Subsequently, the associations of family therapists became vehicles for professional self-promotion.

Sectional Associations (#3): These bodies are built on membership, seek improvements in society which are of general benefit, and provide members and sometimes others with essential and relevant services. Essentially, they may be thought of as reforming agencies dedicated to a particular sub-group in society.

This sub-group may be an ethnic minority. For example, the Greek Cypriot Brotherhood was founded in 1934 to look after the needs of the Cypriot community in Britain. It could not do so by having a narrow membership focus alone. It furthered its aims by organizing political and material support for Cyprus amongst the UK Cypriot community, and by promoting Cyprus and its culture in the host community. It offered services in the form of social, cultural and educational events.

Distinctive self-help groups tend to form around illnesses, often encouraged or even founded by dedicated professionals. Sufferers of rather common conditions (like epilepsy, asthma, migraine) and also of rare conditions (like tracheo-oesophageal fistulas, Prader-Willi syndrome, haemophilia) can and do benefit from such groups. The illness is the differentiating focus, and members are sufferers, relatives, professionals and researchers. The organization is based on a recognition that both promotional and reforming activities as well as direct services are needed by members. The British Diabetic Association is a good example. It was set up in 1934 and has over 300 branches throughout the UK. Its objects are to benefit diabetics and others interested in diabetes. It wishes to increase public awareness and understanding of the disorder and promote research into the condition, as well as providing services. Services include advice, information and support for sufferers and their families. It currently finances over 60 research groups and projects and publishes several

newsletters and pamphlets. The 1991 Annual Report reveals that of a total budget of approximately £6.5 million, about 35% was spent on services directly for members, and about 50% on promoting social change including research.

Not all groups connected with illness or disability are sectional as described above. The British Diabetes Association is categorized as sectional (#3), whereas the National Diabetes Foundation is promotional (#9) because it is primarily a funding body to deal with diabetic sufferers receiving human insulin. The British Deaf Association is categorized as sectional (#3) because its members are those who are profoundly deaf and use sign language. It provides services for its members and campaigns nationally. The Royal National Institute for the Deaf, however, is categorized as reforming (#6) because it provides services and campaigns on behalf of all types of deaf people, and its membership is completely open to any concerned person.

Training-cum-regulatory professional associations also fall into this category. Whereas the medical profession has a separate regulatory authority (the General Medical Council), standard-setting bodies (the Royal Colleges), and membership associations (the British Medical Association); less developed professions do not. The Institute of Chartered Accountants, for example, is above all a membership-centred body which must promote the interests of its members. However, it also has a statutory function as a regulatory authority. In this guise, it is service-centred because it regulates accountants in relation to auditing and other matters; and it is reform-generating because it puts forward proposals for improving accounting conventions and practices.

The Tetra-functional Type

Tetra-functional organizations are universal institutions which seek to serve all communal functions. Organizations of the tetra-functional type seek to affect everyone in society and exert an influence beyond national boundaries. The two obvious examples are churches and universities. (Note that many of the smaller churches and smaller universities are better categorized as sectional (#3) because they lack the resources to develop a transforming vision which can encompass and transcend present society.)

Universal Institutions (#1): The United Nations Organization, the universal churches and great universities are organizations which can genuinely claim to be able to pursue the full range of social functions while simultaneous realizing their own identity. Directly or indirectly, they spawn numerous tri-, di- and mono-functional organizations.

The United Nations Organization is expected to do visionary work (cf. Ex.11.1), is based on membership governments who financially support it, presses for reforms in a wide variety of areas (e.g. trade, communications, refugees, rights), and provides services of many sorts (e.g. health-care, agriculture, peace-keeping).

Universal churches need to offer a transformative vision for societies, provide a social identity for their members, press for social reforms, and provide services internally for worshippers and both internally and externally for the needy. Universal creeds, like the Roman Catholic and Buddhist churches, affirm a universal faith and offer redemption and salvation for all.

A great university, like Oxford or Cambridge in the UK or Harvard in the USA, has an inescapable responsibility to be vision-generating. It must also serve the international community of scholars as a home for the various academic disciplines and therefore must be membership-centred. It expects to strengthen society by generating new ideas, discoveries, inventions and proposals of all sorts to be used by government and business. Finally, it exists to provide undergraduate and post-graduate teaching services which sustain society either through their vocational or cultural content.

Organizing such large and complex institutions is never a straightforward matter. Unlike other bodies, they cannot simplify themselves without internal and external accusations of self-betrayal. Although they contain people of the highest intellectual and moral calibre, this is not always evident in their operation. This is partly because the requirements of the different domains of functioning conflict wildly. Too much structure would interfere with the visionary work. Too little structure impedes the service work. Too much focus on social needs disintegrates the disciplines (whose logic has nothing to do with society). Too little focus on social needs makes for social irrelevance and ivory-towerdom. Leadership is fragmented and as much persuasive as authorized. These organizations, however hard they try, cannot really speak with a single voice.

REVIEWING THE TYPOLOGY

We have now considered the ten types of enterprise and their relation to society: transforming, differentiating, improving, and sustaining — or some combination of these functions. The main focus has been on the mono-functional types, whose structure and operation has been considered in some detail. However, the richness and vitality of a modern society depends on a full panoply of organizations of all types.

Customer-centred organizations whether universal, sectional, reforming or service are the engines of society. Their operations endlessly buzz to deliver tangible value. The standard of living in society depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of customer-centred organizations and the markets within which they operate. At the other extreme, the vitality, flexibility and potential of society is revealed by its tolerance of new visions. These often stem from movements which seek to transform society. A strong society can respond constructively to the output of vision-generating bodies — whether universal, ideological or ethical.

Improvements in society are based on vigorous growth within many types of organization — universal, ideological, sectional, evangelical, and reforming. The involvement of people can be ensured in society by encouraging every sort of membership-centred organization: universal, ideological, sectional, ethical and evangelical. This means expecting and supporting the self-affirmation of distinctive sub-cultures.

The Role of Business. The typology throws light on perennial debates about the role of business in society.

Businesses, like other customer-centred organizations, sustain society. That, in short, is the role of business. A business primarily sustains society by doing its business well, not by philanthropic acts, nor by the side-effects of its activities. Businesses must identify principally with their operations. Work on the vision, culture and growth must all be oriented to their operation. Such work does have a social function for the internal community, and inevitably has wider social effects. But a business does not exist to transform, differentiate or strengthen wider society except as a by-product.

A business must remain true to its own nature and pursue its own interests within the constraints of the ethical order and social forces. Swimming against the tide is exhausting and foolish. So successful businesses respond to social forces positively and, in this way, endorse them and contribute to the evolution of society. Here there are no special sectors — steel factories, publishing houses, banks, health care agencies, hotel chains, law firms — all must adapt to society's values or fail.

A particular business sector may or may not be something to be proud of. Communal standards, 'what everybody does', may be low, even squalid. However, any particular business can only adopt higher individual standards commensurate with its commercial and financial strength. Businesses must be pragmatic, and whatever their ideals, must always do what is appro-

priate at the time and respond to society as it is, not as they might wish it to be. Businesses are built on actual social values, not on fancy value systems or elevated moral theories. No business should respond automatically to moral exhortations of management gurus seeking respectability or politicians seeking an easy target.

Despite this, something must be done if people want a more enlightened society. It is up to people as individuals, *primarily within vision-generating, membership-centred and reform-generating organizations*, to respond to lapses in particular businesses or business sectors, and to take appropriate action. A person may also seek to use his or her leverage, either as a member of staff or director within a firm or as a supplier or as a customer. Firms, singly and together, will automatically respond to diffuse but consistent pressure from the public, the media, other organizations, the government and the law. The point to be emphasized is that no single business can or should be expected to lead social change, though many will properly seek to influence it.

Businesses in particular domains can and should group together in membership-centred umbrella organizations to support each other and to develop standards and publicize rudimentary self-regulation. Although such bodies cannot produce social change, they can reduce scandals. If a sector operates disreputably, governments eventually feel forced to introduce complex legal controls or to set up statutory authorities to regulate firms — which creates more costs for businesses and for society generally.

Transition. If all types of organization are functioning successfully, and if all are actively pursuing the values that establish their identity, then things will change in society. But if bodies function effectively, if they realize their potential, then the result could turn out to be disruptive. More seriously for the organization, if the values that support its rationale are not widely supported, then it will be impossible to obtain resources or gain what has been called the (informal) 'licence' to function in society.

Functioning (G-4) generates work and work requires people to participate willingly in an endeavour. To pursue effectively any endeavour (excepting the simplest one-man efforts), people must be organized within autonomous social bodies of the sorts described in this chapter. In addition, autonomy must be regulated to ensure that society is not deliberately or inadvertently subverted. This takes us to the subject-matter of Ch.12, the controlling conceptions of social life mentioned in the introduction to Ch.10. We now need to continue grouping levels of purpose where we left off at the end of that chapter.   ❖

A ten-fold typology of organizations based on social role.
The more complicated organizations (shaded on the right) show combinations of the properties of the four mono-functional organizations.
Each type of body finds its essence in one or more of the four domains of functioning and fulfils those communal identity functions (cf. Master-Table 34)
Typing is performed by examining principal objects, and then confirmed by checking these against actual activities of the organization.
The type numbers follow the lay-out in Master-Table 36. See text for further details and examples.

Type No.	Type of Organization	Role (Function) in Society	Output	Leadership Focus	Insiders	Source of Resources	Other Types [combined types/roles]
7	Visionary (and other vision-generating types)	To transform — to apply ideals to domains and identify values for use within and across societies.	Universally needed missions.	Appointed or anointed leader.	Idealists whose ideals are promoted.	Time, money and energy from wider society.	No. 4 Ethical / No. 2 Ideological
8	Membership (and other membership-centred types)	To differentiate — to promote the value in society of distinctive roles and interests of members.	Benefits for members and, through them, society.	Active members and the wider membership.	Members whose status and security is bostered.	Membership via dues, sales, gifts, bequests &c.	No. 5 Evangelical / No. 1 Universal
9	Promotional (and other reform-generating types)	To strengthen — to focus and shape some aspect of social life within a society.	Priorities and policies for adoption and adaptation.	Governing body (including its sub-committees).	Workers/supporters (paid and unpaid) whose interests are furthered.	Grants, gifts, donations from public and/or private sources	
10	Service (and other customer-centred types)	To sustain — to do or produce specific things of tangible value to society as cheaply as possible.	Essential and desirable goods and services.	Competent top executives	Employees and the self-employed who are paid to produce.	People who get the goods or services (or others on their behalf).	No. 6 Reforming / No. 3 Sectional

Master-Table 36

Examples of organizations in each of the ten types.

Each type is labelled adjectivally only. The role(s) beneath the label link to the core domain(s) of functioning. Although other domains in the organizations are useful for society, they are not the essence of the organization. Note that the categorical examples are illustrative, not comprehensive. Specific examples come from the UK except where noted or self-evident.
See text for further details and explanation.

No.	Type of Organization & Role(s) in Society	Core Domain(s) & Communal Function(s)	Categorical Examples	Specific Examples
	Tetra-functional Type			
1	**Universal** Vision-generating, membership-centred, reform-generating, and customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{4\text{-}1}$ Transforming, differentiating, strengthening, sustaining	Universal churches Great universities World-governing organizations	Roman Catholic, Buddhist Oxford, Harvard United Nations Organisation
	Tri-functional Types			
2	**Ideological** Vision-generating, membership-centred, and reform-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{4\text{-}2}$ Transforming differentiating strengthening	Ideology-based political parties Some social movement bodies	Labour Party Communitarian network USA
3	**Sectional** Membership-centred, reform-generating, and customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{3\text{-}1}$ Differentiating, strengthening, sustaining	Identity-based self-help groups Minor churches Ethnic support groups Training & regulating membership bodies	British Epilepsy Association Methodist church Greek-Cypriot Brotherhood Institute of Chartered Accountants
	Di-functional Types			
4	**Ethical** Vision-generating, and membership-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{4\text{-}3}$ Transforming, differentiating	Some social movement bodies Some international umbrella organizations Visionary discipline-based bodies	International Alliance of Women World Medical Association Internat'l Society for Systems Sciences
5	**Evangelical** Membership-centred, and reform-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{3\text{-}2}$ Differentiating, strengthening	Ideology-based think-tanks Issue-based political parties Some religious bodies Standard-setting professional bodies Specialized campaigning groups	Institute for Public Policy Research Farmers' Party Inter-faith Network Royal College of Psychiatrists Scientists Against Nuclear Arms
6	**Reforming** Reform-generating, and customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{2\text{-}1}$ Strengthening, sustaining	Campaigning welfare charities Self-help groups International public services Some scientific bodies Some regulatory authorities	Age Concern Rambler's Association World Health Organization Royal Geographical Society Commission for Racial Equality
	Mono-functional Types			
7	**Visionary** Vision-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{4}$ Transforming	Trans-disciplinary academic bodies Some United Nations bodies	World Academy of Art and Science World Commission on the Environment and Development
8	**Membership** Membership-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{3}$ Differentiating	Umbrella organizations Trade unions Professional associations Trade associations Community associations	Federation of Astronomical Societies National Union of Mineworkers British Medical Association British Menswear Guild Netherhall Neighbourhood Association
9	**Promotional** Reform-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{2}$ Strengthening	Campaigning organizations Official pressure group Most regulatory authorities Citizen action groups Political lobbies Independent think-tanks Grant-giving bodies	Friends of the Earth National Consumers' Council Gaming Board 'Free the Birmingham Six' group National Rifle Association USA Policy Studies Institute Mental Health Foundation
10	**Service** Customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{1}$ Sustaining	Businesses Professional practices Voluntary welfare services Activity-based interest groups Public agencies Some regulatory authorities Governmental executive bodies	British Petroleum An architectural practice National Adoption Society Cumberland Tennis Club National Health Service Industrial relations tribunal Inland Revenue

NOTES

1. Most of the organizations referred to are UK-based. Readers from most other societies should find comparable local examples without difficulty. Basic details of UK examples in the voluntary sector can be found in: National Council for Voluntary Organizations. *Voluntary Agencies: The 1988 Directory.* London, Bedford Square Press, 1987. Examples in the public sector are published in: Cabinet Office: Office of the Minister for the Civil Service. *Public Bodies, 1991.* London: HMSO, 1991; and *Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps Agencies Review 1991.* Cmnd 1760. London: HMSO, 1991. Where possible, the organizations described in this chapter have been contacted about their objects and activities to check that the accounts extracted from Reports and Directories were indeed correct at the time of writing.

2. Nef, J. (ed.) *Towards World Community.* The Hague: Dr. W. Junk, 1968.

3. Mudd, S. (ed.) *Conflict Resolution and World Education.* The Hague: Dr. W. Junk, 1966.

4. Robertson, J. *The Sane Alternative: A Choice of Futures. (Rev. Ed.)* London: M. Boyars, 1983.

5. Adams, R., Carruthers, J. & Hamil, S. *Changing Corporate Values: A Guide to Social and Environmental Policy and Practice in Britain's Top Companies.* London: Kogan Page, 1991.

6. Extracted from: *General Systems Bulletin,* Autumn, 1992, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 39-40.

Chapter 12

Realizing Values: The Controlling Conceptions

Values permeate all activity. But values cannot be developed or pursued by the activities of animals or computers. Values can only be realized by entities which have a distinct social existence. Because social existence is itself, at root, defined by values, realizing values expresses identity (cf. Ch.s 4, 5 & 7).

The simplest entity which realizes values is a person as a social being.

However a person acting alone cannot achieve very much. So any significant endeavour is joint, involving many people and requiring the formation of an artificial social being. Such entities, the drivers of value realization in modern societies, are referred to variously as bodies, organizations, legal individuals or collective actors. Like a person, they need a degree of autonomy.

Autonomous functioning of a joint endeavour is not straightforward. The people and the work to be done need to be organized. So artificial social beings must be created and maintained in a way which enables such organization.

The organization of work and the definition of autonomous artificial entities and their endeavours demand both freedom and control. Without freedom, nothing of value will develop. Without control, the results could well be chaotic and harmful. So the four lower level groupings — purposes, directions, drives and functioning described as 'building blocks' in Ch. 10 — must be operated by more complex purpose derivatives that can both control them and be controlled.

In this chapter, we shall first consider the three types of endeavour-based entity which require and manifest autonomy: these are defined by the pentads. Then we shall briefly note the nature of the two distinct types of societal guardian which regulate the exercise of autonomous power and express sovereignty: these are determined by the hexads. Finally, we shall consider the social order within which membership occurs: this is the heptad. The social order enables sovereignty and autonomy because it alone enables a person to exist as a social being, exercising universal human capacities for freedom, participation and responsibility.

G-5: AUTONOMY

Nature. Work ensures functioning (G-4) and sustains an endeavour (G-5). Put another way: functioning exists because of endeavours. Given the social implications of endeavours, an identifiable entity must be established which can be held responsible for this functioning. The social entity which embodies the endeavour must be capable of developing and owning its own functioning, including its drives, directions and purposes.

To organize all the work and people involved in an effective way, an endeavour requires autonomy. It can be imagined as a complex artificial person created to involve and organize people to do something of value. Such an entity can endure beyond changes in the people initially involved.

In other words, endeavours can take on a life of their own by being set up to exist as independent agents with their own distinct identity. Autonomous endeavours, like the people who constitute them, are expected to operate responsibly.

We took for granted earlier that the building blocks did not exist in isolation, but were found within organizations or other social bodies like regulatory authorities or popular movements. The issue is how such things can be allowed autonomy given the diversity and conflict which is generated by values, and the need for some form of social control over their impact.

The effort to organize an endeavour demands recognition that people are both unique individuals who want to do things which accord with their own particular values (loyalties, aspirations, needs, interests &c), and also participants in a society which must evolve and maintain common values. The inherent potential for conflict can only be removed by finding a *general consensus*. In a general consensus, each person finds that they individually endorse what others individually endorse, and therefore what society as a whole values. So a consensus allows the individual and the group to be reconciled without obliterating the identity of either.

In precisely the same way, the justification for organizations pursuing their own ends in their own

way must be that they serve society in some way and are, at the highest level at least, in accord with its values.

The requirement for enduring endeavours to be built on consensus is met by integrating an additional (fifth) level of purpose to create pentads. Three pentads are possible, and they correspond to the three ways that autonomy is manifested and embodied in distinctive types of endeavour. Dominating each pentad are the three forms of value which can be described as quintessentially social: social values, value systems, ultimate values (cf. Master-Table 31: Ch. 10). The three embodiments of autonomy support the three fundamental dimensions of realizing values: their development, their preservation, and their pursuit. In this way, the ineradicable social tension between continuity and change can be managed.

Autonomy is needed for successful endeavours. Endeavours must be self-sufficient, self-developing and purpose-based. Above all, it must be possible for the endeavour to fail or collapse — otherwise it is dependent rather than autonomous. The *function* of autonomy is, perhaps paradoxically, to ensure that work serves the values of both society and individual people.

Because of a consensus, defined endeavours can harness both personal and social energies effectively, can organize work and the people doing it, and can be under their own control. To do this, they necessarily develop, order and implement the building blocks in a way that is appropriate to their nature. In turn, as we shall see, autonomy must operate within the bounds of

sovereignty and must be in accord with membership of the social order in that society.

Types. There are three pentads and therefore three distinct types of autonomy and autonomous endeavour. In descending order, these are: *movements* ($G\text{-}5^3$); *authorities* ($G\text{-}5^2$); and *enterprises* ($G\text{-}5^1$). Executive-led enterprises manifest autonomy in relation to activities and their tangible results. These have been discussed a great deal throughout this book and are what is generally thought of when the term 'organization' is used. Authorities have been referred to mainly in relation to the design of ethical arrangements (Ch.s 8 & 9). They are relatively small bodies set up to preserve values by establishing the significance of certain values or rules in particular situations independent of vested interests or governmental pressures. Popular movements, mentioned previously in passing (mainly in Ch. 10) are large, minimally organized collections of people who seek to introduce new values into society.

In examining these manifestations of autonomy, the aim once again is not to be comprehensive, but rather to show how their nature is allied to the process of realizing values, and illuminated by the present framework of purpose. This is not just a theoretical conceit: an understanding of these endeavours in terms of levels of purpose seems to be essential for their responsible and effective structuring, operation and integration in society.

The autonomy pentads are represented diagrammatically in Fig. 12.1 and their properties are summarized in Master-Table 37. To provide a quick

Figure 12.1: The pentadic grouping which defines endeavours.
Three embodiments of autonomy enabling endeavours to be consensually organized.

overview before a more detailed examination, the three embodiments are now defined and introduced.

G-5³: Movements are autonomous endeavours which seek to transform all or part of society through voluntary collective action. Their function is to develop and establish new values of fundamental importance to society. Examples include: the workers' movement, the women's movement, anti-war movements, the psychoanalytic movement, revolutionary and millenarian movements. Such entities operate in the cultural arena, engaging with political, religious, economic and other issues of the day. They tend to spread across societies. Movements command the emotional power of ideas whose time has come, and promise fulfilment of personal ideals and identity. People constituting the movement's grass roots are consciously committed to the new values and freely put time and effort into supporting these. Participation requires a minimum of formality, but to spread the word and generate spontaneous collective action, the movement does require some structure. The basic organizational element is an informal but highly purposeful group of people who could be said to constitute a cell. Cells operate largely autonomously within loose networks, and have an egalitarian ethos. Sometimes a movement organization will form in an attempt to define a cell structure and provide rudimentary coordination, but there is great difficulty keeping track of cells. The movement's membership and the proliferation of its cells tends to increase and diminish in an unpredictable and relatively uncontrollable fashion. Cell activities are oriented to embedding and spreading the movement and its values. Movements achieve their ends by influencing authorities and government, and by spawning and shaping a wide variety of organizations. If the movement is successful, culture itself is altered and the movement's ideas and values come to be taken for granted by most people in society.

G-5²: Authorities are autonomous endeavours which seek to stabilize society by clarifying, modulating and asserting its values. Their function is to preserve social values and authorize their application to particular situations. To do this, they must recognize value pressures from many sources including new values emerging from popular movements. Authorities are commonly set up by statute: e.g. the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Radio Authority, and the Parole Board in the UK. Non-statutory authorities like the Advertising Standards Authority or Press Complaints Commission in the UK may be set up by a profession or an industry. (These are sometimes called 'self-regulatory organizations' or SRO's). As the examples illustrate, authorities operate with specific functions in specific areas, employing the procedural and regulatory power that goes with officially representing, protecting and asserting society's values. Many do nothing until a matter or complaint within their remit is brought before them; while others may be authorized to supervise or review in order to pre-empt deviations from acceptable standards. In all cases, the authority decides, adjudicates, reviews, and/or advises in terms of a particular situation. The authority is structured as a council (sometimes operating via smaller sub-committees) which is supported by a relatively small or even minimal secretariat. Work within the authority tends to be specialized or technical, and so it requires capable and socially concerned people with sound judgement, whose own gain is primarily further prestige and respect. If an authority is effective, it keeps government from becoming inappropriately involved in decisions taken in specific situations. This prevents cluttering of the political arena and diffusion of political debate. Independent authorities also benefit individuals by lessening the likelihood of petty tyranny by self-important bureaucrats, and by keeping disputes out of the courts. Authorities must seek to balance the power of individuals and organizations: on the one hand protecting people against unbridled arrogance or officiousness of private and public bodies; and on the other hand protecting organizations against malicious, misguided or pedantic personal complaints.

G-5¹: Enterprises are autonomous endeavours, typical organizations, which efficiently meet evolving needs in society. The function of an enterprise is to pursue social values through activities which generate tangible benefits for itself. The over-riding concern is to ensure its activities are appropriate, effective and efficient. Such organizations can be established by any person or association. They may seek to generate a vision for society, to benefit members of the association, to develop ideas for reform, or to produce goods or provide services, or some combination of these (cf. Master-Tables 35 & 36: Ch. 11). The right to associate and launch an enterprise is a most tangible expression of freedom in society. Enterprises, if constituted formally, are legal individuals fully entitled to pursue their own interests. They are capable of mounting large scale operations and need to use their own judgements and values in making decisions. Their management requires the joint efforts of a governing body, top officers, and many staff. The number of staff in an enterprise may extend from a handful to over a hundred thousand. Despite being predicated on autonomy, the basic feature of their internal structure (when numbers are large) is the hierarchical control provided by accountability relationships between sharply defined roles. This must be designed to meet

the apparently contradictory demands for both per-
sonal expertise and initiative and corporate com-
petence and performance. The type of work and
domain of endeavour is (or ought to be) the personal
choice of a participant, but money and perquisites
provide an inescapable incentive to accept a role within
a particular organization in that domain. Although
other factors also affect joining (e.g. future prospects,
trusted colleagues &c.), participation can be pragmatic.
If the surrounding culture permits, a person can rather
easily switch commitment to another enterprise, often
a competitor. An enterprise must generate sufficient
achievement in its own terms to thrive. Its success
depends on harnessing people to its vision and obtain-
ing social resources for its mission.

Properties

The three autonomous types of endeavour seem
rather different because of the way that their common
properties are handled. Even from the brief overview,
it is evident that each operates in its own social arena, is
organized differently, affects participants differently,
views people in a characteristic way, handles authority
and leadership differently, and generates a distinct type
of output. Each tends to be subject to a characteristic
form of criticism. Above all, each organization needs to
handle its autonomy and dependence on society
differently.

Autonomy implies a degree of privacy: so these
endeavours exclude unauthorized outsiders from their
deliberations and decision-processes. However, they
must also link into society to harness people, to obtain
resources and to be permitted to exist. In order to
reconcile these opposing demands, *each form of endea-
vour manifests a compartmentalization of special duties and
roles — with five compartments in each case*. It turns out
that these five compartments are appropriately defined
in terms of the inherent five levels of purpose. In each
case, wider society occupies the topmost or contextual
compartment. However, each is then constituted dis-
tinctively by its lower four compartments, each of
which is assigned characteristic forms of authority.

Compartmentalization. The notion of designing
organization, even business enterprises, is relatively
new. Such design essentially revolves around clarity
about work (roles and duties) within certain distinct
parts or compartments of the entity (e.g. shareholders
or the board in a firm). Research has revealed that this
compartmentalization is based on the (internal) levels
of purpose which constitute the endeavour. As usual,
the qualities of corresponding internal levels are
similar, so the compartments show certain similarities
across the three types of endeavour. Without the

present framework, the notion of design is hardly
credible because neither the necessity for compart-
ments nor their unique work is immediately apparent.

Each type of autonomous endeavour must include a
contextual level of purpose in which its own highest
aims and society's values coincide — because this is the
basis of the 'license to function' within wider society.
So the *fifth* (top) level of purpose in any organization
must be designed to achieve a *general consensus*.
Everyone inside and out must explicitly recognize that
the endeavour's autonomy is provided in return for
serving a real social need. Only the universally valid and
revered ultimate values (L-7) can provide a license for
movements which aim to transform society. Authorities
are mandated by distinctive principles or theories
(value systems) widely held in society (L-6); and enter-
prises can only vigorously pursue their ends if they
recognizably embody and further social values (L-5). To
reiterate: in each case, these highest values must be
alive and held both by those specifically associated with
the endeavour and by wider society generally. Because
insiders of all endeavours are also part of wider society,
the compartment here is *wider society* in all three cases.

Moving down now to the next two internal levels:
The *fourth* level in each case is concerned with pro-
viding the relatively unchanging *essential rationale* for the
endeavour. This rationale is used to define and to
structure the work, and also to sustain and maintain
consensus amongst participants. By contrast, the *third*
level in each case requires a choice to be made from
among a range of equally valid alternative values.
Selection here is sensitive and controversial because it is
driven by the need to reconcile different views and
ensure necessary *political support* for the work. Ideas and
'isms' (L-6) define movements, and social values (L-5)
steer them politically. Authorities are defined and
structured in accord with recognized social needs
(L-5), and politically steered by their terms of refer-
ence i.e. principal objects (L-4). Principal objects (L-4)
provide the rationale for enterprises, while their inter-
nal priorities (L-3) recognize stakeholder interests and
so provide political steering.

Finally, moving to the lowest two internal levels and
compartments: The *second* level in each case is con-
cerned with providing a direction and *maximizing the
impact* of the endeavour, while the *first* (lowest) level in
each case is concerned to ensure that it *appropriately
adapts* to the immediate situation and handles obstacles
and opportunities. Movements depend for their impact
on activities defined by principal objects (L-4); while
internal priorities (L-3) need to be chosen to ensure the
movement is appropriately responding to current issues
in society. Authorities are effective through their

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internal priorities (L-3) which broadly endorse (or oppose) values and value pressures of different groups or bodies in society. However they must determine their decision, judgement or proposal, i.e. strategic objectives (L-2), in a way that is appropriate to the immediate situation. Enterprises choose strategic objectives (L-2) with the aim of maximizing their impact; and they define tactical objectives (L-1) to handle all exigencies and produce the desired result with the available resources.

With or without conscious design, decisions about purposes at each level are of great significance. In practice, such decisions demand specialized and complex work. This is why distinct work compartments are needed. Very specific attitudes and capabilities are required if the work of each compartment is to be done well. This is why different people are attracted to the different types of endeavour and the different compartments within them. It is also the source of tensions between compartments.

The five compartments in any autonomous endeavour can be divided into the two upper ones ('the brain of the entity') which provide its rationale, enable internal and external consensus, and establish it as an enduring endeavour; and the three lower levels ('the heart of the entity') which produce results by dealing with evolving realities politically, strategically and adaptively.[1]

Specifying Duties. In each type of autonomous endeavour, a degree of separateness exists between the compartments — because the type of purpose and work in dealing with that purpose is so distinctive. Many instances of dysfunction are due to a failure to recognize or to manage this separation. The consequence is then an undesirable disconnection or an intrusive over-involvement between compartments. A means for integrating or inter-connecting the contributions of the compartments is evidently necessary.

Business enterprises are most accessible to external consultant advisors and investigators, and sympathetic to a redefinition of duties and new arrangements which seem to be more appropriate, effective and efficient. Participants in movements, by contrast, are inherently resistant to any outsider exerting such influence. Authorities are so politically sensitive and bound by custom and procedure that it is difficult to test out new ideas and assess their effect.

Inter-connection of the five discrete compartments and integration of their output can be fostered by clarifying the unique work of each compartment and ensuring that the principal duties in the different compartments (i.e. the social roles) interlock synergis-

tically. In defining the duties or work role of compartments, it is natural to start from the origin of each in a particular level of purpose. Each compartment necessarily has a unique core responsibility or duty in regard to purposes at that level; but if the compartments are to function as a synergistic system, each must also have rights (i.e. influence or authority) as well as duties in regard to purposes handled primarily by compartments defined by the other four levels. All these duties must mesh together coherently. So the levels framework can be used as a scaffold to specify duties in a systematic way and to clarify the kind and degree of authority or influence each compartment exerts on the various types of purposes which constitute the endeavour.

The main focus of the present account is a clarification of the work to be done in terms of duties, influences and an indication of the sort of tasks that flow from these.

A logical matrix pattern of influence emerged for each form of endeavour. In each case, the rows are the levels of purpose themselves which together characterize the autonomous endeavour; and the columns are the compartments corresponding to those levels, each of which defines a key body and its required role. Each cell of the matrix contains a term which attempts to capture the essence of the influence to be exerted by that compartment over purposes at that level. A diagonal pattern results which is the basis for developing synergy, resolving value conflicts, and ensuring choices are ethical. The three matrices are laid out in Master-Table 38 to enable the types of endeavour to be compared.

Insiders and Outsiders. We have already distinguished the external compartment, wider society, from the four internal compartments. A division is also needed within the internal compartments. In principle, immediate issues and situations can only be handled by decisions on internal priorities and below (i.e. L-3 to L-1). So the compartments associated with these levels contain the insiders of the organization. (Hairlines are used to mark off the insider compartments in Master-Table 38.) The insider compartments may be termed the *endeavour proper* because people generally view these compartments as *being* the endeavour. However this is inaccurate: these compartments only *run* the endeavour.

A movement, for example, is dependent on a single compartment, the grass roots. For an authority, insiders cover two compartments, corresponding to the council and its secretariat. An enterprise requires three insider compartments which are occupied by the governing, top officer and executant bodies.

Wider society is inevitably involved with autonomous endeavours without being committed to any of

them. Between wider society and the fully committed insiders, there are higher level compartments which are committed within limits. These intermediary compartments decide the need for the endeavour and determine its definition. They support the endeavour and its continuing existence but remain somewhat distant from its immediate day-to-day concerns and activities. As might be expected, tensions develop in all types between the insiders and these higher compartments.

G-5³: A Movement

Nature. Movements, often referred to as social or popular movements, highlight the significance of ultimate values by taking their influence one stage beyond convictions, ideals and visions to define the manifestation of a collective will. Movements swirl through societies fostering nothing short of rebellion to the status quo, and seeking to mobilize people *en masse*. Groups and networks of people with similar intense convictions appear spontaneously and all are agreed about the need for social transformation. Movements emerge from and merge with existing culture. Even if they seem to run contrary to popular values, they could not exist if they did not find a natural resonance within most people.

So this type of endeavour seeks to transform society, even if it appears to originate from a delimited domain. Although popular movements inevitably have a political dimension, the stakes played for are far higher. Their *function* is to develop and establish certain new values which are felt to be of fundamental importance for the well-being of society and everyone within it.

A movement is not simply spontaneous large scale action like demonstrations, though such things may accompany one. Nor is a movement to be equated with organizations which forward it, though these invariably spring up. Nor yet are they political structures embodying an ideology, though these are a common consequence. Movements are rather a form of collective organization, a body of distinct individuals, spontaneous yet unified in its purpose, and capable of altering a society radically. Social movements are a paradox: the collective-as-actor or community-as-individual.[1]

Religious movements and, in recent times, political movements typically hope to refashion man and society virtually in their entirety. But even relatively focused movements, like the psychoanalytic movement and the systems movement, at some stage imagine or imply that everyone and all society must change. Over time, movements may in fact succeed in producing such a transformation. The Solidarity movement, which spread far beyond the confines of Poland, was central to the political and civil regeneration of that country and

its spirit contributed to the collapse of the larger Soviet empire. The depth psychology movement has spread far beyond the confines of psychoanalytic therapy to alter for ever the way people understand inner motivation and personal relationships whatever the social setting.

Movements are diffusely defined and can overlap each other. For example, the self-help movement overlaps the new-age movement which overlaps the green movement which overlaps the feminist movement. Put another way, a movement may have many shades of emphasis: the Solidarity movement, for example, has been viewed as a worker's movement, a nationalist movement, and a democratic movement .

Development. New movements emerge when a vacuum in values is felt. Revolutionary movements thrive on poverty, oppression and alienation. In such conditions, people will naturally strive for something better. Religious movements spontaneously emerge when the organized or official religion is losing its hold on people, and a process of invigorating spiritual regeneration and renewal is needed. Similarly, the emergence and flowering of dynamic psychotherapies this century was a reaction to the failure of old modes of relating under changing social and political conditions. In this last case, what used to be regarded as sensible conventions in regard to sexuality and the expression of feelings came to be generally perceived as rank hypocrisy.

Movements are constantly in flux, growing and developing or subsiding and disappearing for complex reasons. Often they proceed in jerks. Some event or person captures the general imagination and leads people to become acutely aware of the gap between the myth that ultimate values are active in society and the reality of their neglect. This triggers a bout of intense mobilization of people and a contagious exhilarating atmosphere. The birth of Solidarity, for example, took place in a few short weeks during the strikes of August 1981. As more and more people join, the movement comes to the attention of public authorities and the news media, if permitted, begin reporting spontaneously the latest manifestations.

If the values of successful movements eventually enter the mainstream of cultural life, the movement may dissipate or become assimilated into a wider movement. The statistics movement (see Ex. 12.1) became part of empirical science. Other movements, like millennial movements, may rapidly peak, attempt revolution, perhaps repeatedly, and then become marginalized leaving a small sect or community as a residue. Other movements, after a brief burst of fierce

idealism, continue with a low profile for many years: for example, the modern systems movement.

> The Statistics Movement: Nowadays, we take censuses, social research, epidemiological and demographic studies, and opinion polls for granted. They seem essential to inform us about ourselves. However, prior to the 17th century, the systematic collection and analysis of facts about social life was not valued. The transition took place through the endeavours of a statistics movement. This movement drew on current values and trends within individualism, utilitarianism, Puritanism, empirical science, and the importance of mathematics, and was stimulated by political, military, economic and social needs. Public health, education and crime came to be of particular significance as statistics linked itself to an ideology of improvement. Statistics became a buzzword in the 1820s, with an etymology related to statist (= politician, statesman) and a vague meaning. Zealots, like Babbage, described and counted the most meaningless things and set up statistical societies whose principal objects were: 'to collect, arrange, and publish, facts...with a view to the improvement of mankind'. Slowly values like brevity, objectivity, relevance and quantification became dominant; and these and others have permeated society far more widely than we might think. For example, our notion of 'normal' has changed. Originally normal meant the opposite of pathological, but after the 1820's it came to mean typical or average. Human nature was less studied to clarify virtue and excellence, and more viewed as an exercise in empirical inquiry. Current factual accounts were given precedence, even seemed more real, than ideas and ideals which alone have the power to shape the way reality evolves.   Ex. 12.1[2]

The Brain of the Movement. The *general consensus* for any movement is to be found in characteristic ultimate values which are recognized in society generally. However, its *essential rationale* is provided by certain specific beliefs or ideologies. Together, these two levels form the convictions which provide a stable foundation for the movement. The ultimate values engender union and foster attempts to spread the word across societies. For example, some in the women's movement have made attempts, not always welcome, to breach tribal barriers and engage women in societies where apparently inferior and brutal treatment is part of the custom.

The independence movement generated by Gandhi in India was based on a philosophy of peaceful persuasion and non-violence; whereas independence movements elsewhere have been built around a philosophy of Marxism and militancy. Movements easily generate distinctive ideological splits or internal condensations: worker or labour movements, for example, have developed communist, socialist, or social democrat tendencies in different countries. When such splits occur within one country the base of the movement is weakened, and it becomes less effective.

Existing convictions in society naturally affect movements. Anti-war movements, for example, tend to be rejected or proscribed where war is glorified. Similarly, the feminist movement which depends on convictions about justice and equality does not catch fire in societies where egalitarianism is alien.

Movements tap into a latent utopianism in people. The core convictions are associated with the feeling that no change is beyond the bounds of possibility. As a result, people become active within the movement with no appreciation of what the realities of success are or how their desired values might be worked through in practice. A recent account of the handling of money and monetary transactions in a text of New Age economics seemed to assume that greed, fraud and fear will be things of the past.[3]

The Heart of the Movement. All movements tap into current social values — the need for personal security, the need for food, the need for work &c — because these play a large part in inducing people to notice it and join. For *political support* to be spontaneously forthcoming, the movement must target everyday ordinary personal and communal needs. Convictions within the movement can only become real when understood in terms of such social needs. Exploration and discussion of the ideas can then occur unselfconsciously in arguments and gossip about everyday life. Social values ensure that movements are part of the society that is to be transformed, and not alien or external to it.

Movements *maximize impact* by generating activities and organizations whose principal objects are dedicated to forwarding or embodying the new ideals. As a general rule, as long as the ideology is adhered to, movement activists tend to feel free to ignore social rules and are liable to do anything that furthers the movement. The wish to retain general support restrains excesses. Usually the most urgent object is to increase the popular base, but this may be difficult to achieve if social values have not been effectively evoked or if judicial and other authorities are opposed to the new ideas.

Movement activities, whether based on increasing membership or promoting the values, demand a degree of organization. Management is too strong a term to apply to a movement, because any organizing of activities must take account of the fact that all participation is voluntary and spontaneous. The activities serving a movement vary somewhat according to its nature. Millenarian movements which reject the present society as evil may take an active or even revolutionary approach by organizing demonstrations, rallies, marches, sit-ins, petitions, civil disobedience or violent confrontations. By contrast, millenarian movements

which are messianic may organize people to gather passively, note signs of impending doom, perform rituals, withdraw from daily life, engage in fasts, and await social transformation through divine intervention.

The success of any movement in terms of wider society can be assessed by the incorporation of its values in the climate of thought: which means things like new attitudes, new beliefs, new interests, new preferences, and new activities. In this process, the values must become incorporated within society's guardian institutions: which means things like new laws, new social policies, new political parties, new magazines, new religious sects, and new academic disciplines.

In addition, successful movements generate interests and attitudes that support a multiplicity of organizations. These are not necessarily part of the movement, but they are evidence of its hold on people. Modern political movements tend to generate organizations of all types, especially ideological, sectional, evangelical and reforming bodies. Many movements spawn customer-centred organizations as well. The new-age movement, for example, has generated tens of thousands of businesses: health groups, training organizations, therapy institutes, martial arts teaching, fitness centres, dance events, arts organizations, publishing houses, book-shops, festivals, clothes firms, health food shops, whole-food restaurants, alternative technology projects, ethical investment societies, and so on.

The pressures and opportunities of the moment must be tactically handled by the movement. In other words, its priorities are not chosen primarily to reconcile different interest groups or to accord with the rationale of the movement. Instead, they must be *appropriately adapted* to the immediate pressures and opportunities. In determining foci for action, expedience is essential. For example, if a government is about to decide on a major arms purchase, those in a peace movement may feel it the right time to mount rallies to provoke media coverage and to stimulate people to reconsider their values and bring pressure on the government. Sometimes it may be preferable to do nothing. For example, the peace movement was prominent in its opposition to intervention in the gulf war with Iraq, but was conspicuously silent in relation to interventions in the civil war in Bosnia and Somalia.

Priorities, being values, need to conform to the movement's higher values as well. So those in a non-violent movement prefer to be overcome by force rather than use violent tactics. In this way, they paradoxically affirm the value of the movement in their moment of defeat. Similarly, the women's movement may employ women for an activity even if available men

are better suited to the task. Such choices would be inappropriate in conventional enterprises. The urge to place principle over practicality is why movement activists on governing bodies or in executive posts can be so irritating.

> **The Politics of Being Green:** The green movement ideology abhors the factionalism, procedural regulation, **personal** leadership and compromise essential to success in modern day party politics. So Greens in the UK, Germany and elsewhere have had difficulty in allowing a party machine to develop and function properly. The German Greens were split between the 'Realos' who recognized the need for party politics, and the 'Fundis' who saw any compromise as fatally corrupting. The point is that a political party may emerge from the ideology of a movement and attract many of its members, but the two are not the same. The movement, if it is to succeed, must stay true to the nature of movements — ideally leaderless, spontaneous and egalitarian. By the same logic, a political party, if it is to succeed, must be true to the nature of political parties — ideally charismatically led and well-disciplined. The Green movement has successfully changed the way the world thinks, and has certainly influenced the policies of mainstream political parties although not to the degree desired by its participants.
>
> Ex. 12.2

The practicalities of social life during or following the successful remodelling of society by the movement are not the proper responsibility of the movement. Strategic and tactical objectives lie outside the realm of value choices which define its work. So the success or failure of any particular social policy or political party or any other enterprise spawned by the movement is not in itself a reflection on the movement.

People are irreversibly changed by participation in a movement, even if it collapses and society itself does not change significantly. So movements foster tribalism and the formation of sub-cultures which control language, dress, manners, friendships, and activities. People deeply committed to a movement may wish to live together within a neighbourhood, often form associations, and may segregate into factions within existing organizations.

Organizing the Movement. Values are intangible possessions which only come into existence when people freely and unself-consciously own them. Ultimate values which are the source of consensus are purely experiential and imaginative, and value systems (ideology, beliefs, principles) which provide distinctiveness are in this situation a personal matter. So movements lack sharp, socially controlled boundaries and they readily absorb all who instinctively feel part of them. Such people are known as the 'grass roots'. As more and more people are inspired by the movement,

it slowly gathers force and becomes a diffuse but recognizable social body capable of generating change.

Any movement is first and last a grass roots phenomenon. So it must be built on the equality of all members. Nevertheless, unless there is a certain degree of differentiation and a minimum amount of organization, the movement cannot get started, cannot spread, and cannot produce change. Movements which attempt to avoid all organization usually have an anarchist or mystical ideology and invariably fail. The Spanish peasant revolts in the early 20th Century showed a wildfire contagion of ideas, even among the illiterate, an effortless and apparently spontaneous unanimity of action and the deep conviction that an apocalyptic utopian change was inevitable — yet they collapsed under routine police control.[4]

Resistance movements in occupied countries clearly reveal the use of informal organization, because participation is proscribed and members are hunted down and punished, often by death. Too much organization makes such movements vulnerable. Separate cells, informal networks of communication, spontaneous support, and deep convictions are essential for the spread of resistance activities and the survival of its members.

It is essential to recognize that the conventional disciplined organization suited to a political party, pressure group or business is quite inappropriate to a movement. A movement develops a characteristic form of organization which requires its own distinctive style of management. Its basic entity is the cell, preferably of between 5-30 people.

Cells operate in an intensely personal, idiosyncratic and participatory way. As a result, they may form, fuse and dissolve in a bewildering fashion. Coordination between and within cells is rudimentary because peer pressure and force of personality provide most of the control. The main aim of the cell is to affirm the movement's values. Only consciousness-raising and rather simple activities are necessary to do this. The setting of strategic and tactical objectives is alien to movements, so ideas of efficiency and expertise are unnecessary. Attempts to introduce systems and procedural control are rejected because they generate undesirable inequality and feel oppressive and wrong. Cells may develop within existing institutions — in the church, in the professions, in the civil service — but when cells become formalized as associations, they are in danger of becoming inward-looking and losing their focus on wider society. Each cell links, at least loosely, with other cells in the hope of achieving territorial coverage. Such groups may have labels like: chapter, division, sector. However, cells can and do emerge independently of these, overlapping territorially and operating without links to others.

So movement activists who try to use executive-led enterprises as their model are likely to cause aggravation and waste their own and others' time and energy. It is probably natural that the more reflective participants become distressed at the seemingly inevitable disarray and factionalism, and the time and effort that goes into managing intense emotions and group processes. Elite activists tend to feel that they can and should control the movement. They are liable to act as if the central organization they create and sustain is synonymous with the movement as a whole. Despite their talk of equality and autonomy, they coerce and denigrate others. These and other misunderstandings are illustrated in Ex. 12.3 which describes an active phase of the women's movement in the USA as reported by a woman academic and sympathizer.

NOW: The National Organization for Women (NOW) was the largest and most prominent organization within the women's liberation movement in the USA. When created in 1966, it was conceived as a national action body. Although the activists wanted to organize a movement, they found themselves initially creating a pressure group to change federal policy. They neglected the need for widespread local membership groups. Slowly their focus changed and with it came disagreements. In 1968, the radical New York Chapter split off to become The Feminists, because it felt that elitists had taken over. At the same time, the conservatives formed the Women's Equity Action League; and key lawyers split off to form Human Rights for Women. NOW moved offices and its first employee was recruited. (By 1973 there were still only about 15 paid staff.) In 1969 several conferences were held. These were fraught with dissension, back-biting and name-calling, and were adjudged failures. Only at this stage, did the inherent diversity of the movement become apparent to the leading figures. Agreement to disagree opened the way for anyone to feel part of the organization. However, the reality still remained that NOW doubted the existence of grass roots support. Its leaders feared that the only outcome of a proposed strike of women on 26th August 1970 would be ridicule. In fact, the strike succeeded — not because of NOW, but because ordinary people were ready. As a result, NOW was flooded with new members. Many were non-political and sought to use membership to explore what being a woman in society meant. The old-timers, still seemingly unaware of the nature of movements, viewed the desire for personal awareness as a diversion from political efforts, and dismissed it as 'a crutch for less developed minds'. In fact, the rap groups which were introduced proved to be a great success for the movement.

Ex. 12.3[5]

The spontaneous character and informality of organization mean that the evolution of movements cannot be determined or even predicted by its leading

figures. There is no real leader. Only outsiders speak of leaders. thereby showing their misunderstanding of the nature of movement bodies. (Sometimes threatened political authorities refer to ring-leaders with its pejorative connotations and the implication that followers are docile.) Insiders are typically insistently egalitarian. Any attempt to dominate a movement demands capture of the official authorities, and the introduction of elitist and repressive measures to control ordinary people. Lenin, for example, made no secret of his intention to ensure that the revolutionary organization (the Party) was distinct from and superior to the revolutionary movement.[6] His Party members were to be exclusive, disciplined, professional, absolutely loyal and totally obedient to their centralized leadership. In this way, Marxist-Leninist ideology and Party officials, not ultimate values, became the final arbiter; and the masses that supported the revolutionary movement were betrayed and oppressed.

Because each level of value within a movement is so different in nature, each tends to be handled by people in different social roles. Ideally, all should appear to be exerting leadership because leadership of a movement is diffuse and can never be properly assigned or defined. Even when a movement identifies one person as its originator or central and inspiring figure - Lenin for the Russian revolution, Freud for the psychoanalytic movement, Martin Luther King in the civil rights movement — it is not true to say that this person leads the movement. No one person or group can claim full responsibility for the movement's direction and success. Nor can any one person or small group control the movement to any substantial degree. This is one of the key ways that a movement body differs from an enterprise organization

Organizing a movement requires a great deal of voluntary effort. The two prime tasks are building popular support and influencing the authorities. To pursue these, work needs to be done articulating, explaining, promoting, popularizing and documenting the significance of the movement. Activities that epitomize and spread the movement must be generated, and movement values must be brought into everyday life wherever possible.

Five distinct compartments, corresponding to five social roles or types of participation, can be identified in regard to this work: one (as usual) is outside the movement and four are within. Each is based in one of the five constituent levels of value. The external role is that of *wider society* which generally recognizes and affirms those ultimate values on which the movement is based and where consensus is possible. The internal roles are the elites — the intellectuals and the advocates; and the activists — the organizers and the grass-roots. The *intellectuals* are ideologues who systematize and affirm the ideas and ideology of the movement. The *advocates* manage the interface between the movement and wider society by linking movement values to present social needs. The *organizers* stimulate and manage movement activities to swell, strengthen and further the movement. Finally, the *grass roots* constitute and resource the movement and so shape its priorities. Above all, they give it a priority in their own life. Although no-one in a movement is superior to those at the grass roots, those in roles in the higher compartments have the potential to make a greater impact.

Table 12.1: The necessary inter-relation of compartmental duties in a movement. The role of each compartment is defined by its column with the core duty in bold type. This matrix is the basis for synergy and effectiveness. Note that wider society, though a contextual compartment, plays a significant role in any movement. Only the grass roots are true insiders.

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Intellectuals	Advocates	Organizers	Grass Roots
7: Ultimate Values	*Affirm*	Support	Promote	Reflect on	Assume
6: Value Systems	*Endorse*	Affirm	Support	Promote	Reflect on
5: Social Values	*Debate*	Endorse	Affirm	Support	Promote
4: Principal Objects	*Challenge*	Debate	Endorse	Affirm	Support
3: Internal Priorities	—	Challenge	Debate	Endorse	Affirm

Each of the compartmental roles develops and sustains values at all levels. Each role's core responsibility — core in the sense that without it the movement is fatally weakened — lies in its defining level. This duty is to *affirm* the value in each case. But certain responsibilities at higher or lower levels are also important. To maximize synergy, lower level compartments must in turn *support, promote, reflect on* and *assume* these affirmed values; and higher level compartments must in turn *endorse, debate* and *challenge* the value. A matrix in which the rows are the levels of value and the columns are the compartments or social roles clarifies and orders these duties: see Table 12.1 (and cf. Master-Table 38). The core duties form the main diagonal, and the subsidiary duties form parallel diagonals.

The matrix suggests greater discipline and order than a movement often seems to show. Because the duties of members of movements feel essential and natural to those involved, there seems to be little distinction between describing what people actually do and what they should do. In practice, these duties are largely operated (or distorted or neglected) spontaneously. Nevertheless, it is likely that greater self-awareness could prevent or limit gross mistakes such as those made by NOW in the women's movement (Ex. 12.3). Awareness would surely help prevent the intrusion of approaches designed to enable the lobbying of politicians or the running of a profitable business.

The matrix does not imply that movement roles are hierarchically-ordered in terms of power and control. If anything, the compartments form a reverse hierarchy. A movement arises in the grass roots and succeeds or fails in terms of its captivation of the imagination of ordinary people and the efforts of its organizers. People to fill all higher level roles can be found from amongst these. So we will start the account of movement duties at the base level and work upwards.

Grass roots participants must have a conscious commitment to certain values and beliefs within the movement and be prepared to participate actively within it. This is not to say they must be committed full-time, but they must join a cell or group identified with the movement and they must willingly participate in movement activities. A movement is not a vague spirit but a definitive endeavour: its success depends on active members who offer more than simply benign approval of the movement's ideals.

The grass roots are not a mass to be referred to contemptuously as rank-and-file, mob, lumpen-proletariat or fodder. Each is a distinctive individual: concerned, excited, involved, proud, interested, and committed to the movement. Each participant is an independent force in society pressing hard for social

change. Each looks for appropriate opportunities to *affirm* and apply the movement's values in their decisions. Such decisions determine the emphasis and focus of the movement at any moment in time. There is a recognition that change requires individual wills to coalesce as a collective will. This demands unity. So each participant is expected to *support* the efforts of organizers to set up cooperative efforts and to bring the movement and its values to wider public attention. This is unproblematic because everyone involved in a movement is convinced of its exceptional importance and feels the eyes of others upon them. So each gives freely of their time and energy to activities which forward the movement.

Each participant naturally *promotes* the need for new social values because, once these are widely and freely adopted, they powerfully influence priorities used in organizations and institutions which are not part of the movement. Each participant spontaneously *reflects on* the ideas of the movement, reading relevant literature, keeping up with developments, and discussing and debating progress in ideological terms. As a result, each participant talks about the movement in the same language of principles, ideas and needs as organizers or elites. However small the contribution that each person makes to the movement, it is recognized as exemplary, a model for others and a message to society.

Movements may not succeed, but when, like Solidarity, they do, it becomes evident that ordinary men and women are not subject to material necessity, driven by selfishness only, or constrained by historical laws. Ordinary people, it seems, *assume* the existence of a realm of ultimate values — of truth, justice, peace and other forms of absolute goodness — and each person possesses the capability to tap into these values to shape their own history and to redefine their own society. By keeping in mind inspiring and exhilarating ultimate values, people can avoid being overwhelmed by frustration and being demoralized by repeated setbacks.

Organizers are the main activists or militants of the movement. They emerge from the grass roots and are driven partly by a deep dedication to the ideals of the movement, and partly by a rage at the way that social reality reveals that espoused ultimate values are flouted. In most chapters of NOW (Ex. 12.3), for example, the number engaged in recruiting people to join the movement or in organizing relevant activities was about 40-50 out of 400.

The work to be done here is to organize a cell or network of cells and manage their activities. Organizers emerge on the basis of background, personality and the availability of time, rather than as a result of any expertise. Their most important qualities are social skills and

enthusiasm. Organizers use their voluntary groups to do a wide variety of things without any of the usual management tools and with minimum financial support.

A great deal of organizing work is needed, but it is unremunerated and unrecognized. So maintaining cell cohesion, momentum, and activity is exhausting. Organizers in NOW tended to burn out after a few years.

The organizer's over-riding task is mobilization: the principal objects are to spread the movement and to bring its values to the forefront of popular consciousness. The organizer must *affirm* these objects, and the grass roots must rally around. On this joint effort, the impact of the whole movement depends. Spreading and furthering the movement involves subsidiary objects like: forming ever more cells of grass roots members, linking cells with each other, arranging rallies, convening meetings and conferences, organizing relevant services, and writing and publishing news-sheets. Anything may be done which is consistent with the movement's ideology. Ideally, organizers recognize that they have no power to start anything that grass roots members are not prepared to accept as natural and appropriate. Within movement organizations, the greater the spontaneity, the more successful the activity. This means that organizers should *endorse* spontaneous preferences and situational priorities of the grass roots comprising the cell.

Bringing the movement to wider society means that organizers must *support* the new social values and oppose existing unjust values through devising and arranging things like protests, press releases, street marches, public debates, campaigns, or symbolic activities (like draft card burning or local strikes). If social values are not sensitively handled, such political activities may not be acceptable to the grass roots and may be condemned or blocked by the authorities. Organizers must reconcile the aspirations of the movement with the actual possibilities for action in society as it exists. If certain bounds are over-stepped, members will drift away, social support will be lost, and the authorities will turn against the movement rather than tracking it more or less sympathetically.

Organizers unfailingly *promote* the movement's ideas and, if these have been welded into an ideology, may allow themselves to be systematically indoctrinated. In turn, they help the grass roots learn about the movement and reflect on its underpinning ideas. However, to use the ideology effectively and ensure that society's sanction is not lost, organizers need to make an effort to *reflect on* the underlying ultimate values. Only in this way, can they keep working within the spirit of their movement and harness energies released by related movements.

Advocates for the movement seek to manage the political interface between grass roots activities and wider society. To those not involved, a movement, being a form of rebellion, seems initially puzzling and unnatural, even threatening. So it is essential that some people take on the task of explaining, in an easily understandable way, why the movement has emerged, what it means for people and society, and why the old order must be replaced. Advocates are primarily concerned to explain the historical roots of the movement, to publicize its achievements and to *affirm* that it addresses real social needs. They seek to persuade people to reject the old order by arguing that the proposed social changes will bring benefits to all. Some movement activities may be particularly distressing or confusing to outsiders. Advocates must explain these and *endorse* the need for activism in general. Advocates must also *support* the movement's ideology positively, explaining these beliefs persuasively to the general public in addresses, magazine articles and televised debates. Advocates also speak to the grass roots, interpreting wider social reactions and communicating the achievements and problems of the movement.

Advocates *promote* the ultimate values of the movement, perceiving that the public is always open to hearing about the way these are failing to operate in society. Those people who can communicate the ideals and visionary aspects of the movement most clearly and inspiringly are charismatic and are liable to be treated as celebrities or gurus. Advocates, in their writings and public lectures, *debate* the shifting priorities of the movement as set by the grass roots. Heavily committed and involved as they are, charismatic advocates tend to want to push the movement in a particular direction. As a result, advocates tend to fight amongst themselves and form factions.

The better advocates encourage many to flock to the movement and come to gain the respect of the authorities. In political movements, such advocates gravitate to political leadership positions or find themselves in negotiating roles. Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel eventually became Presidents of their countries. Petra Kelly was the big international star of the German greens, winning sympathy even from Germans who found her ideas silly or dangerous. However, such prominence is not egalitarian and tends to be viewed with suspicion by the grass roots. In their eyes, the advocate's task remains to popularize and support the movement faithfully as it evolves, and not to seek to direct, control or negotiate. Petra Kelly, for example, was voted off the Party executive for 1983-84 despite what she had achieved in getting Greens elected to the Bundestag in 1983.

Intellectuals in the movement have a duty to develop and systematize the ideas, beliefs and themes of the movement so as to form a coherent ideology. Such a doctrine can be elaborated, improved, studied and taught. Alternatively intellectuals may introduce and adapt a pre-existing ideology for the movement. Intellectuals emerge from the general public as well as from more likely sources which include academics, churchmen, lawyers and politicians.

The prime duty of intellectuals is to *affirm* a value system for the movement. Without this contribution from intellectuals, the convictions on which the movement depends tend to lack solidity and shape. A dearth of clear ideas and understandable principles gives the grass roots great difficulty in becoming self-aware and leads to the movement becoming amorphous and ill-defined in the public view. If such a situation develops, organizers lack a clear justification for their activities; and advocates sound less compelling. In other words, the more coherently, consistently and clearly a set of beliefs or theoretical framework is expressed, the greater the potential force of the movement.

Naturally, intellectuals *support* the ultimate values. Mannheim emphasized the significance of the 'socially unattached intelligentsia' like novelists, dramatists and actors, who are not tied into secure positions and incomes which induce conformity to the status quo.[7] Such people can often contribute artistic creations which capture and evoke the spirit of the movement. Intellectuals are also the only group that can effectively *endorse* the new social values. They are not only capable of developing new approaches to social issues using the movement's ideology as the basis, but they also have the knowledge and skills to penetrate the authorities and government, exposing their weaknesses and influencing their output in favour of the movement. They may also contribute in a practical way by *debating* movement activities in their lectures, pamphlets and books, and reflecting on the likelihood of successful social change. Because they take a cerebral perspective and tend to be disconnected from mass action, intellectuals alone have the capacity to *challenge* the shifting priorities of the movement as determined by the grass roots.

Intellectuals frequently trace the origin and evolution of movement ideas and put them in historical perspective. In this process, intellectuals sometimes seem to over-value their own role. Governments and authorities are eventually compelled to deal with a thriving movement, and they do so in part by putting its intellectuals in positions of power. In other words, the establishment treats them as able to speak for the movement and they collude out of hope, pride, ignorance or self-interest. Sharp-eyed academic observers have

recognized how intellectuals (much like themselves) betray their principles and integrity. Slowly they become a professional oligarchy, lose contact with the grass roots, use power for their own ends, and abandon their commitment.[8] Minor reforms may occur, but institutionalization and bureaucratization dissipate popular pressures for transformation.

Wider society forms the context for the movement and is its explicit target. Support and tolerance from people outside the movement are essential for any success. Existing authorities and organizations judge the strength and significance of the movement and decide how to respond in the light of their own vision. The essential duty of society is to recognize and *affirm* (or repudiate and reject) the ultimate values which are the essential justification of the movement. Above all, evil must be prevented. The appalling Catholic Inquisition, for example, developed in part to deal with a religious movement which was at its root anti-life.[9]

The next requirement is that the beliefs and ideologies used to structure and sustain the movement are not just tolerated but positively *endorsed*. Rejection of key ideas or the ideology as a whole means that the movement is unlikely to thrive. For example, neo-fascist movements and communist movements are often intensely detested or even banned in countries just liberated from repressive regimes underpinned by these ideologies, just as democratic movements were previously suppressed by those regimes.

Elites may work to get bills introduced in the legislature not because they expect them to pass into law, but because this forces discussion and conditions people to the values of the movement. Court cases may be instituted or reports commissioned for similar reasons. Such activities only work if they are reported in the media. So it seems that wider society has a duty to *debate* the social needs or problems which sparked the movement. After all, perhaps the movement does have a contribution to make to the community. Debate should occur within the political arena where the pros and cons and implications and consequences can be freely argued. If movements are to flourish, society requires arrangements allowing free association, free communication and free publication.

As for the activities of a movement, wider society usually *challenges* them. The activities are not so much viewed as unacceptable as unnecessary or extreme. Demonstrations and rallies do, inevitably, cause disruption. The challenge is expressed both publicly in the media and in parliament, and privately in everyday conversations at home and at work. In this way, all members of the public can engage with the movement and can assess its strength and significance. However,

CULTURE-CHANGE
Organizing a Movement in an Organization

•Culture-change is best handled via a movement with a well-defined ideology which is installed by willing self-indoctrination. The aim is for the alien to become natural and the necessary to become beneficial. The movement usually needs to be instigated and facilitated by the official leadership.

•Staff must become the *grass roots*. this means that they must have a sense that the present situation is intolerable or dangerous and personally self-damaging. They are helped to change if they can see that a new beginning is needed based on more enlightened values. It should be evident to all that everyone has to change, including the people at the top.

•Staff cannot be trained in values. Self-indoctrination depends on genuine participation. Staff must be engaged by allowing them to examine the new ideas and leaving them free to make sense of them from their perspective and in their situation. Each person must consider what issues new values raise, what changes they imply, what obstacles exist and what sorts of things need to be done to pursue them. Argument and debate should be encouraged and constructive opposition openly welcomed. Unless the ideas are struggled with personally, the needed internalization will never occur.

•In the very act of exploring participatively, the movement develops and new ideas start to become internalized. The rather full documents that often emerge from participative reflection must be summarized, disseminated and discussed widely, rather than being classified, filed and forgotten. A multiplicity of new initiatives must be launched and tracked. Demonstrations of success must be enabled and trumpeted.

•Everyone must be viewed as able to amplify the new ideas by affirming necessary social values, defining principal objects and setting priorities in their own area of responsibility. What should not be generated by discussions is a simple 'to do' list. If staff just define outcomes or tasks, they will be completed and forgotten. The aim of group events is to activate personal aspirations and duties as a way of engaging with the new ideas. People can then consider and reshape whatever it is they are intending to do in an indefinite future.

•Champions emerge at all levels during such transitions. These *organizers* should be fostered and rewarded. A small organization development team should learn about the new ideology and become comfortable with its language and principles so they can act as *advocates*. An *intellectual* is also required: possibly an outside consultant.

•When obstacles emerge, they must be directly confronted in a positive non-critical way. The aim is not so much to trouble-shoot or bang heads together as to use the situation to learn, to develop staff and to symbolize the necessity of the new ideas. There is nothing like ignoring overt failure or expediently rejecting values to bring culture-change into disrepute.

•Consistency is particularly important because it is an indicator of whether the change is genuine. During the early intense phase of value installation, any other new ideas, policies or projects should be developed to fit with the new culture. As always, expediency and opportunism remain essential — but only within and through the new values.

•Senior managers with their control over pay and promotion have an influence which cannot be ignored. Ideally, each should be engaged in a personal development process.

•Even if there is personal benefit from adopting the new values, people find it a struggle. They view the new ideas through the prism of existing values and subtly misunderstand what is being attempted. They feel disconcerted and awkward in applying the values and cannot envisage success. Without assistance, they act in ways which confirm the uselessness of the entire effort. Inevitably some will be unable to adapt. These few need to be replaced by new managers whose record and attitude show that they are positively disposed to the new ideas. Existing induction and training programmes must be reviewed and re-standardized in the light of the new ideas.

•Continuity is also important, so a regular open and honest review of progress is necessary. At least 2 years is required for the benefits of a movement to show. People can only sustain interest and involvement disconnected from immediate tasks over such a long period if they are kept in touch with developments. So internal communications about changes which give the same message to all must be developed and kept quite distinct from management briefings.

Box 12.1[10]

the priorities of the movement, the choices of particular cells and the choices made by grass roots members in their personal lives, remain wholly internal to the movement and are not a matter for wider society.

In successful movements, the emergence of new social values generates widespread sympathy which encourages people to join and leads the authorities to take the movement's concerns seriously. Success of the movement hinges on this process because if new ideas become **popular**, then we may say that society itself is changed. It is then only a matter of time before institutions, policies and organizations change to take account of that popularity.

Movements in Organizations. Because organizations and associations contain (secondary) communities, it is quite possible to have a movement within an organization. In the Anglican church, for example, there are distinct movements for and against the ordination of women, evangelical movements, and fundamentalist movements. These have all the qualities of the popular movements just described and are stimulated by related movements in wider society.

Large businesses which want to transform their cultures need to recognize that this can only be fully achieved through an internal movement. This proposition has several important implications. Above all, it means that all culture change must be based in unambiguous and convincing visions and ideals. People will only change values and own new values on behalf of the organization if these transcend all divisions and are unarguably rooted in what is good — i.e. in ultimate values. The use of a movement also puts a sharp limit on the amount of top-down instruction and education that is possible or necessary. The movement in an organization must spread spontaneously among the grass roots of an organization, just as it does within wider society. Otherwise there is no movement. And if there is no movement, then there can be no fundamental change. Unlike movements in society, where the government is almost wholly reactive, a movement within an organization needs to be supported and facilitated by top management.

Top management can facilitate movements as long as two apparently contrasting principles are accepted. The first involves recognizing that movements assume people have a dignity, a sense of responsibility, and an enthusiasm for what is good irrespective of their formal position. The second point is that systematic work on the culture is essential; otherwise the movement will not be properly linked to an organization's vision and immediate circumstances. Any management event or process must simultaneously be based in what the organization is about and must value and respect staff.

In much training and management consultancy, one or both of these requirements are absent.

To progress the internal movement, the importance of personal initiative must be kept paramount. This depends largely on rapid communication and easy discussion throughout the organization. In our project work, we help orchestrate small and large events with a maximum degree of reflective participation. Senior managers are encouraged to permit free expression of anxieties, disagreements and confusions which are intrinsic to genuine value change. We encourage development of large numbers of internal champions who spread the word and act as facilitators. As champions emerge, crusades and campaigns develop, and awareness grows. Slowly the spirit and atmosphere of the organization change. Worthwhile business activity can then be suggested, supported and evaluated by shop-floor staff and middle managers, not simply driven coercively by the board and its top management. (See Box 12.1 for more details.)

Limitation. A movement is potentially the most powerful independent force in society, but it is also the least manageable. So it tends to frighten people. Nevertheless, despite their rebellious quality, movements are not necessarily quirky or sensational. Despite their utopianism, they are not necessarily unrealistic. An effective movement needs to be handled in a serious, creative and responsible way with its grass roots being patient, dedicated and diligent. However, even a successful and thoughtful movement cannot itself carry out the detailed modifications to society which its values demand.

While society changes, social stability must be maintained. So the extent and pace of the movement's influence on social institutions needs to be sensitively tempered. The claims of people in the thrall of a movement need to be responded to, interpreted, even curtailed as its significance is digested. These claims, essentially, affirmations of the priority of the movement's values or complaints about decisions which conflict with those values, need to be authoritatively handled. Recourse to courts or parliament is too expensive, complicated and time-consuming. It is necessary to set up independent authorities to preserve, clarify and modulate society's current values; and it is to these that we now turn.

G-5²: An Authority

Nature. In modern complex societies, special bodies need to be established and assigned autonomy specifically to protect current and evolving values. The community and its individual members find their values

under threat from two directions: from movements which propose new untried values, and from individuals or organizations (including government departments) which seek to ignore customs, ethics or sensitivities. Without breaking the law, some people, perhaps ahead or behind the times, may do things which most others feel undesirable or out of keeping. More seriously, businesses may engage in potentially exploitative, victimizing, offensive or otherwise harmful practices while still apparently within the law.

In any case, it is neither desirable nor possible to have recourse to the law to determine all rights and wrongs (cf. Ch. 9). Many value-based disputes need to be settled by use of custom and current practice and kept firmly outside the judicial sphere. Similarly, when the way forward for a government is not clear, independent guidance from a specially constituted public body is often helpful. Independent authorities are social bodies designed to meet these needs. Sometimes they are called regulators, supervisors or tribunals.[11]

The *function* of an authority is to preserve existing values and to apply them authoritatively to particular situations. Their essential output is a decision or recommendation. The workings of authorities stabilize society because these bodies not only articulate and clarify current values in the course of their work, but also modulate them in response to social pressure.

Authorities can never be set up through a personal initiative. They are all dependent for their existence on instituting bodies which are representative in some way. This body is usually either the government, a membership association or the main organizations in an industry. All are legitimated to act by their concern for the public interest. The instituting body should ensure that the authority is adequately funded, sensibly staffed, and properly functioning. To serve the public interest, authorities must be seen to be independent in relation both to government and to private enterprises. Independence refers here to freedom from interference in their daily work - - their policies and activities — not to who sets them up or how their output is handled. Not surprisingly, non-representative totalitarian and authoritarian regimes ensure all authority is *de facto* an extension of government. In democratic societies, conflicts of interest or any appearance of such conflicts in the membership of authorities should be studiously avoided to maximize confidence in their performance.

All authorities are themselves specialized representative bodies: 'specialized' because they are focused on specific domains or activities; 'representative' because they are expected to be devoted to the public interest. So they require a combination of technical expertise or practical experience together with an acknowledged feel for the relevant social values. Expertise expected in the Charity Commission differs sharply from that required of the Royal Fine Arts Commission which differs again from that of the Securities and Investments Board. (These and subsequent examples are from the UK, but counterparts exist in other developed countries in many cases, although the labels are highly variable.)

Development. In the absence of specifically designed authorities, many disputes enter the political arena dragging government ministers and civil servants inappropriately and inefficiently into things which are better left to experienced people to handle. The effect is to clutter political debate and slow down organizational decision-making. So where there are regular and repeated instances of value-based disputes over routine decisions or strategies, a distinctive authority needs to be set up. Almost any area of social life may demand regulation in this way. The only criterion is whether an individual's or an organization's judgements or actions touches deeply on the public interest. The public interest may be activated by the effect of a decision for a single person (e.g. about parole or a tax appeal) or on a community matter (e.g. the removal of a public monument or the monopolistic power of a company).

Of course, it is not necessary or desirable to create authorities at every possible opportunity. Authorities should only be set up in response to (or in expectation of) a flow of socially problematic and politically disruptive situations. They often mark the emergence of a new value or new social demands or severe communal stresses. Authorities do not evolve easily because they are either a product of statute or a complex compromise of interests. Some authorities have a natural lifespan. The New Towns Staff Commission, for example, was set up in 1976 to safeguard the interests of staff affected by the transfer of housing and related assets from development corporations to District Councils. These transfers, which began in 1978, were completed by 1986 and the authority was subsequently wound up. Other authorities have a far more turbulent history (cf. Ex. 12.4). If their functioning fails to keep pace with social changes, they become unable to prevent issues entering the political arena and seem outdated or out of step. This is manifested by the government or private organizations persistently refusing to accept their advice. Eventually they are wound up and new authorities are constituted.

Regulating Racial Discrimination: To advise on racial discrimination, the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI) was set up in 1966 as a non-statutory body chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury and using

a variety of Advisory Panels staffed by experts. In 1968, the Government hurriedly passed an Act designed to deal with Asians fleeing to the UK from Idi Amin's Kenya. The NCCI clashed strongly with the government over the contents of that Act. This led to the Race Relations Act (1968) replacing the NCCI by two statutory bodies: the Race Relations Board (RRB) and the Community Relations Commission (CRC). The RRB represented the law enforcement and compliance aspects of the legislation; and the CRC was expected to promote good community relations by a variety of means and advise the government on request and at will. Racial problems continued and it was evident that new powers of formal investigation of individual complaints and indirect discrimination were required. As a result, a new Race Relations Act (1976) was passed which, among other things, replaced these two bodies with a single Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).   Ex. 12.4[12]

Coverage. The typical issue to be addressed by any authority is whether a particular decision of a person or firm, or a particular social outcome (flowing from independent decisions of many people) accords with current social values. If it does so, it is right. If it does not, then at the very least this must be noted and publicized. It is, of course, utterly impossible, and it would be grossly intrusive for an independent body to monitor any or every decision or outcome in social life. This would make a mockery of autonomy in enterprises. Instead, authorities examine particular matters which self-evidently need to be handled publicly. Then relevant bodies in the area note the result and (ideally) modify their behaviour and attitudes accordingly.

Some authorities may initiate their own investigations in response to general public concern as expressed in the media or parliament (e.g. The Royal Fine Arts Commission, Commission for Racial Equality). Others must wait for a referral from a private individual, a government minister, another agency, or some combination of these (e.g. tribunals and most complaints authorities).

Commonly, the judgement of the authority does not lead to automatic compliance by either government or private firms. For example, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recently recommended dismantling the anti-competitive practices in the brewery business which disadvantaged publicans and customers. However the minister bowed to the industry lobby and refused to implement it fully.[13] Newspapers commonly comply in a half-hearted way to rulings by press complaints authorities. A gross violation on the front page of a newspaper may lead to a perfunctory small paragraph of apology published on an inner page several months after the event. Naturally, the persistence of such evasive responses leads to a general dissatisfaction with the authority (or at least its powers).

Authorities are often involved in balancing the views of an individual and an organization. They may authoritatively uphold an organization's perspective on practical grounds. For example, almost two-thirds of the 1,118 complaints in the Press Complaints Commission Annual Report of May 1991 related to the accuracy of reporting, and many of these were (in the Commission's view) 'an inescapable consequence of the speed at which newspapers have to be produced'. On the other hand, where authorities are expected to raise communal standards (e.g. anti-discrimination bodies currently), they may be able to act vigorously on behalf of individuals e.g. carrying the costs of taking organizations to court.

The work of an authority may be performed primarily by investigating and reporting (e.g. anti-cartel authorities), by judging customary handling of cases (e.g. appeals tribunals), by proposing community changes (e.g. commissions for aesthetic development), by granting individual applications (e.g. licensing authorities), by advising governmental authorities (e.g. parole boards), by inspecting socially sensitive businesses (e.g. bank supervisors), by assessing complaints (e.g. press councils), by proposing policy or legislation (e.g. equality boards), by evaluating public communications (e.g. censorship authorities), by controlling a legal status (e.g. registration commissions), by determining remuneration in the absence of a workable market (e.g. pay review boards for special groups like judges), by deciding payments for personal disruption (e.g. compensation boards). In most cases, authorities are required to perform a mix of these activities: variously adjudicating, inspecting, reviewing, protecting, advising and proposing according to their remit and the particular situation they need to handle.

The Brain of the Authority. Each authority gets its mandate and legitimacy from certain beliefs, usually ethical rules and principles, that are widely held in society. Here lies the source of the *general consensus* which permits its independent operation. Neither ordinary people nor governments can sensibly turn to or respect an authority if they do not take these underlying ideas for granted. For example, regulation of financial practices requires more than a sense that honesty and truthfulness are good things. It demands consensus on an ethically-based theory of market operation, contractual obligation and so on. In many industries, the needed philosophy is summed up in an explicit code — a statement of good practice, minimum standards, or code of ethics. Such documents then provide the regulatory authority with a definitive frame of reference. For example, the Press Complaints Commission is charged with enforcing a code of practice framed by the newspaper and periodical industry.

Governments cannot establish an authority unless its philosophical base or ethical code is publicly welcomed. These ideas appear in consultative papers and commission reports, and are eventually codified in the legislation which sets up the statutory authority. So the ideas as written into law become the prime source of legitimacy. In its work, the authority contributes to the propagation of the beliefs or code while upholding the law.

The Possibility of Parole: Parole for prisoners was unthinkable in the early 19th century when the aim was to reduce crime through terror. Nor was it possible in the late 19th century when the main idea was to ensure that the punishment fitted the crime. Parole only became practicable in the 20th century when a theory of training and rehabilitation became acceptable. According to this philosophy, many offenders are unstable and immature (rather than inherently bad) and are harmed by long imprisonment which makes them even less capable of contributing to society at release. Such a theory calls for a means to respond to the individual needs and circumstances of each offender. This in turn demands a sensitive judgement based on maintaining public safety, recognizing degrees of crime severity, assessing evidence of remission, and so on. Hence the requirement for an authority.   Ex. 12.5

The *essential rationale* for each authority and hence its structuring flows from current social values. If the media in a democratic society is to act in the public interest, then authorities need to be instituted which recognize social needs like censorship, accuracy of reporting, respect for public decency, responsible advertising, control of privacy invasion, and so on. Unlike the underlying philosophy, the relevant values change over time. The decision to create an authority is a serious matter for society. They impose direct and indirect costs, are only weakly accountable to the public, and potentially reduce autonomy.

Consider, for example, the value of locally published newspapers and their contribution to the character of small communities. In the USA, many of these have been taken over by national conglomerates which seek to increase profits by simplifying and economizing through use of uniform newspaper formats, centralized reporting and standardized procedures. In principle, an authority could be set up to investigate such developments and pronounce upon them, with the view to ensuring a degree of local responsiveness and community character. Alternatively, if communities really value newspapers with local involvement and content (as opposed to self-appointed spokesman claiming they do), then there will be a market for such newspapers. There is no reason why private business enterprises cannot be set up to exploit it. Their success might even drive out the conglomerates or force them to rethink.

Such a solution enhances autonomy. In short: the market can be an efficient regulator of social values, and authorities set up to tell people what is good for them reduces their freedom.

The social need to ensure fairness and equality of treatment without recourse to the courts leads to the formation of tribunals to resolve disputes. Because distinct social values and technicalities are inherent in any domain, separate tribunal authorities are required for things like employer decisions, rents, compulsory mental health care, taxation decisions, use of data, immigration permits, pensions and social security allowances. There is also an umbrella authority in the UK, the Council of Tribunals, which checks that all tribunal procedures are fair and appropriate.

Finally, it should be noted that authorities, both statutory and self-regulatory, can be usefully bolstered by carefully framed supportive legislation so that recourse to the courts or the political arena is lessened. Such laws encourage people to respect authorities and to abide by their decisions despite their limited powers. For example: The 1968 Medicine Act and subsequent legislation buttress The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry's Prescription Medicine Code of Practice Authority which deals with complaints about promotional campaigns by member firms.

The Heart of the Authority. Authorities need precisely defined principal objects to meet social needs according to the agreed theory or ethical code. However, the idea of an authority is already a political statement, because it is about regulating people. The establishment of a gaming board, for instance, makes it clear that gambling is a sensitive public matter and that the community cannot allow a casino to be set up on the initiative of any individual. It is relatively easy to agree the need for an authority, but it is highly controversial to determine precisely its functions, duties and powers. For some the control is never enough, while for others regulations seem to entangle personal initiative in red-tape.

Because authorities attempt to move decisions out of the political arena, their objects must be defined so as to ensure sufficient *political support* for the body from the various stakeholders. Two interested parties usually stand out: powerful well-financed organizations in the relevant domain and the diffuse general public. Principal objects must be carefully defined following open debate and consultative advice. Poor design can lead to sustained factionalization or an imbalance of emphasis within an authority. For example the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) was responsible for licensing and regulating television and radio but, in practice, gave radio little attention. The solution was to

set up a separate body for radio in 1991: The Radio Authority.

If the objects are not sensitively and wisely defined in terms of duties and powers, then the authority will be viewed with hostility. Continuing denigration and opposition to its judgements and recommendations eventually renders it ineffective because every issue ends up back in the political or judicial arena. In the case of self-regulatory authorities, the commitment of the industry or profession to its own code of practice is the key requirement.

The authority *maximizes its impact* on society by its choice of internal priorities i.e. the values it emphasizes in coming to its conclusions. Everyone in the area needs to know what the relevant values are and whether new values are gaining ground. So pronouncements are given legitimacy and are studied by organizations that are or may potentially be affected.

Finally, authorities must produce strategic objectives which are *appropriately adapted* to the circumstances. Strategic objectives are the means whereby the authorities handle the reality of a particular situation. They are the essence of the proposals or recommendations.

Pollution Control: The rationale in 1970 for setting up the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution was to provide advice, to overview the research position, and to anticipate dangers. The Commission interpreted this remit in terms of reducing damage by 'attending to problems of long-term importance which may not be receiving adequate consideration by other official bodies including Government departments'. By its own account, 'in reaching its conclusions [i.e. strategic recommendations] the committee seeks to make a balanced assessment taking account of the wider implications for society of any control or preventative measures proposed.' The various Reports relate to preoccupations and problems as they have emerged in society. The early Reports dealt with gross air and water pollution while later ones deal with nuclear waste and the release of genetically modified organisms. To be accepted, proposals must be timely: the 5th Report (1976) suggested setting up a unified pollution inspectorate but it was not until 1987 after a repeat recommendation in the 11th Report (1985) that the government acted upon this proposal. Ex. 12.6[14]

Note that the exact details or mechanisms involved in producing the strategic objectives within the authority are irrelevant to its nature. Tactical objectives are to be found of course or nothing would get done, but they are not identified with the authority and do not determine its output as in enterprises. In other words, enterprises have all their work yet to do after strategic objectives are set, whereas once an authority says what should be done, that piece of work is complete.

Members of authorities do not fail in the same way as employees in enterprises. An authority may have difficulty if the requirements on it exceed the resources allocated, but this is not the responsibility of insiders. Authority members may make an occasional misjudgement, but incompetence of particular individuals does not lead to sacking. As in many prestige-based bodies, there is a denial of personal failure. Acknowledgement would bring disrepute all round. So unsatisfactory performers continue in post, but may be replaced when appointments come round for renewal.

Organizing the Authority. Public authorities are set up by statute, and depend on government for their existence. The legislature decides their remit, structure and procedures. Non-statutory authorities, sometimes known as self-regulatory organizations (SRO's), are set up by umbrella bodies or membership organizations within an industry or profession to protect the general public and to uphold minimum standards. Most professional membership bodies engage in a degree of self-regulatory activity. Specific self-regulatory authorities, like the Advertising Standards Authority and the Personal Investment Authority aim to dispense with the need for a statutory authority.

Authorities are ethical in nature: created to protect society and people in accord with social values and ethical codes. Similar ethical issues generate similar bodies in different domains e.g. the need for fairness generates a disparate range of tribunals as noted above. In the same way, independent pay review boards have been set up separately for doctors, for nurses, for the armed services, and for top civil servants: one single all-encompassing board would not do. Domains which are inherently ethically significant, like the media, may require a number of regulatory bodies to meet a variety of social needs e.g. a censorship board, a decency commission, an advertising standards council, and a complaints authority. Sometimes related values or social domains may be grouped together. For example the Registry of Friendly Societies supervises building (savings) societies, credit unions, cooperative societies, benevolent societies, recreational bodies, working men's clubs, housing societies, sickness benefit societies and many others under 14 separate Acts of Parliament.

When organizing authorities, the assignation of powers is as sensitive as the definition of duties or functions. For example, authorities can either be permitted or restricted from prosecuting or from investigating on their own initiative. 'Lack of teeth' is one of the commonest criticisms of authorities, but, whatever crusaders may argue, effectiveness depends on possessing politically acceptable powers, not on wielding draconian power. Authorities can easily be given what-

ever powers are thought politically desirable — it just happens that these powers are often minimal. Licensing authorities, however, almost invariably have extensive powers. The Radio Authority, for example, can impose conditions on licensees, give a warning, impose a fine, shorten the license or refuse to renew the license.

Self-regulatory authorities, in contrast, rarely have or use such extensive powers because they would be in danger of losing the support of their own members, the people who directly or indirectly finance and supervise them. Conflicts of interest are denied by those in the industry or profession, but until each and all are more enlightened than at present, it is difficult to see how such conflicts can be avoided (cf. Ex. 12.7).

Press Self-Regulation: In recent years, complaints about press behaviour have grown. A formal inquiry in 1990 suggested self-regulation was the preferred option. However, in order to be acceptable to the newspaper industry, the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) deliberately rejected some of the recommendations of that inquiry: e.g. with regard to appointments to its Board and on employment of its staff. The industry specifically denied the PCC powers to initiate inquiries into press behaviour. Presumably at the behest of the industry, the PCC explicitly stated that it should 'promote ... press freedom' and provide a 'defence ... against improper pressure' As a result, there was a further government-sponsored inquiry in 1993 which concluded that the PCC was 'not...an effective regulator' because it is 'in essence... dominated by the industry...and...over-favourable to the industry.'

Ex. 12.7[15]

Any authority needs to see itself and be seen by others as serving and representing the community. Its own structure and operations are ordered by social values and become defined as part of a political process. To illustrate and sustain this identity, its structure must be relatively inflexible, and its operations must be handled with explicit and fair procedures. The composition of the authority needs to take account of the need for a range of experts from within or without to ensure technicalities and legalities are well handled. So internal authority is multi-focal or polyarchic. For example, reports from the Royal Commission on Environment Pollution draw on the independent judgements of engineers, biologists, doctors and others. Leadership is formalized and expressed through a chairman who is a recognized public figure or social leader in the area and *primus inter pares* within the council. Because, the output is no more than a report, an authority can be structured in a simple way: essentially as a council with a supporting secretariat. Calculation of inflation, for example, is based on a formula decided by a special independent statutory body, the Retail Price Index Advisory Committee which reports as needed, usually once every 3-4 years.

This body has 21 members on its council and draws on 20-30 civil service staff for the secretariat.

To deal with a large volume of work, the council may split itself into committees each authorized to produce the necessary recommendation. For example, to deal with around 10,000 cases per year, the Parole Board (in 1991) had 86 part-time members working in panels of 3 or 4, while the secretariat consisted of a dozen administrators headed by a Secretary. The full board met only twice yearly. Because authorities are not primarily service-providers, they usually require only a few administrative or executive staff to do things like arranging consultation, handling paperwork, developing technical standards, dealing with public or trade or press inquiries, and organizing publicity for reports and decisions. Leadership here is provided by someone with a title like secretary, controller, director, or director-general. However, some authorities may have to perform complex work in clarifying values or their application in a situation, and this may lead to a staff of a hundred or more. For example, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission needs to employ about 150 staff for its detailed investigations of particular industries.

Conflicts of Interest. The organization of any regulatory body must take conflicts of interest seriously. These can arise in a variety of ways and active preventive measures are essential. The independence of an authority must not be viewed as merely a formal matter or it will fail. The constitution of a statutory authority, for example, should ensure that no members of the government are on its council; and the secretariat must not be directly answerable to a minister. Such arrangements would self-evidently compromise its autonomy. It should be evident to the public that council members are worthy and not exposed to undue influences. Conflicts of interest or function and personal bias must be avoided. Although some authorities naturally call for leadership from among the best within the industry, it is usually unnecessary and unwise, for example, to appoint a chief executive of a television company as chairman of a statutory authority for broadcasting.

Service provision takes the focus off regulation and on to activities which themselves need to be regulated. So when service organizations act as regulators, the incompatibility in outlooks is severe. For example the administration of monetary policy (handling interest rates, currency management, fund-raising for the government, money supply monitoring &c) is a service provided by a central or reserve bank. In the UK, this function is combined with the supervision of the banking system which has led, perhaps coincidentally, to a range of mishaps, including the largest fraud in banking history.[16]

Authorities are occasionally used to promote certain values, but this may compromise objectivity in a body expected to be unbiased. The danger is that the authority confuses 'a statute' (L''-6) with 'the law' (G''-5²) and in pursuit of the statute forgets to take account of custom-based conventions, tenets, rights and maxims. Promotion of values is then liable to evolve into a moral crusade, and the authority takes on the profile of a campaigning organization. When this occurs, the authority becomes distanced from values actually held in society (i.e. L-5 social values) and works according to its own hypothetical standard (i.e. L-6 value system) for which general consensus is lacking. The Commission for Racial Equality, for example, has a promotional remit and yet its activities in this direction were severely criticized by a parliamentary select committee. The committee took the view (which makes sense in terms of the present analysis) that promotional work should stem from the CRE's legal and investigative remit and should not proceed quasi-independently. By being partisan, the authority was in danger of losing public confidence.[17] The Equal Opportunities Commission was similarly rebuked by a judge when it took the government to court for rejecting its advice. Leave to appeal was refused and the Commission was told to put more effort into pursuing individual cases of discrimination.

Governments may empower existing bodies to regulate by statute, e.g. the Institute of Chartered Accountants officially licenses its members in relation to handling investment, insolvency and company audit. However, membership associations depend on their members, so there is an inherent conflict of interest. The appearance of independence, even if not its reality, is poisoned. On balance, it is generally preferable that regulation of doctors should be in the hands of a medical council with lay members rather than left to a medical association, that a banking regulator not a fellow banker or association of bankers supervises banks, and that an auditing authority not their membership body regulates company auditors. The consequences of leaving Lloyds of London to regulate itself has been disastrous for Lloyds, for its investors (the names) and the British insurance industry (cf. Ex. 8.16: Ch.8).

Compartmentalization. As with the other types of autonomous endeavour, an authority has distinctive compartments which accord with its component levels of purpose. These five compartments generate social roles and duties. The highest compartment again contains wider society which forms the enabling context, while four compartments are dedicated to the authority.

A movement proper was defined by the lowest level alone, and consisted of the grass roots applying their values and arguing for their immediate use by others. An authority proper is defined by the lowest two compartments, and consists of the council (the board or governing body) and its secretariat (the officials or administrative staff). The other two compartments are filled by a formal inquiry which authoritatively establishes that society needs (or does not need) to create (or reform) the authority, and an instituting body which can legitimately set up, politically win support for, appropriately fund and willingly accept responsibility for performance of the authority.

The role of the body in each compartment must again be to work with values at all five levels. However each has a core responsibility based on its defining level which is about making a *recommendation*. If this work is not done, the authority malfunctions. *Wider society* must recommend the beliefs and ethical codes about which there can be a consensus. Without the general promotion of certain key ideas, there will be no urge to identify the need for an authority, to create it, or to take notice of it. The *formal inquiry* must recommend that certain social values have emerged as needing attention. These values or needs become the rationale for the inquiry's proposal that an authority should be instituted or re-constituted. The *instituting body* must recommend certain principal objects (including duties, powers, structures, resourcing and staffing) which determine the interface between the authority and wider society. This body is also responsible for appointments to the council. The *council* must recommend certain values in making its decisions. These internal priorities maximize the impact of the authority. Finally, the *secretariat* must recommend a detailed appropriate and feasible decision or way forward, i.e. strategic objectives. The secretariat also ensures that everything is done which must be done at the mechanical level.

The values recommended within one compartment need to mesh with the values used in other compartments. To ensure socially-sensitive and politically responsible functioning, bodies within progressively lower level compartments must *act within*, then *respond to*, then *uphold*, and finally *interpret* values recommended by bodies in higher compartments. Bodies within progressively higher level compartments must also in turn *debate*, then *examine* and finally *note* the values recommended by bodies in lower compartments. Once again a simplified matrix with the values as rows and the compartments (bodies or roles) as columns clarifies and orders the necessary arrangement: see Table 12.2 (and cf. Master-Table 38). The core duties form the main diagonal, and the subsidiary duties form parallel diagonals.

Wider society has the primary duty to *recommend* the ethical ideas and socially acceptable theories which enable the formation and proper operation of an authority. This recommendation emerges from a public arena where politicians, academics, the judiciary, journalists and others discuss a topic until a consensus emerges about what is right. No formal recommendation is provided, of course, but without this general consensus on ideas nothing can be done. For example, a censorship authority, like the British Board of Film Censors, may be seen as essential to protect adults and children from immoral or seditious material. The body can only be tolerated and its decisions treated with respect if the ideas and ethical rules used are widely commended.

Change in a dominant political or economic ideology naturally demands a complete overhaul of society's independent authorities. However, people fully identified with the new ideas may simply not be available in society. Russia, for example, wishes to introduce a market economy, but this requires a range of regulatory authorities with considerable expertise and financial understanding to prevent the fraud and exploitation which could bring the whole idea of private enterprise into disrepute.

Wider society is also the source of the social values which are used to construct or reconstruct an authority. Its duty here is to *debate* whether certain social values need official recognition and protection. It is never clear whether there really is a need for the authority identified by the formal inquiry. For example, the development of the ombudsman office in various commercial areas like banking and insurance reflected the

awareness of a need for users to be able to protest against mal-administration. Previously, people were simply expected to tolerate bureaucratic inefficiency and manipulation. However, new bodies like the ombudsmen are expensive, potentially bureaucratic, and often disliked and opposed by the vested interests who were responsible for the abuse which called them into existence. As a result, their creation and continuing existence generates active public debate.

Principal objects which define a new authority are inherently controversial — far more so than agreeing the need for the authority. Any authority seeks to minimize turmoil in the political arena by working privately and independently on value disputes. So only those active within the domain fully understand the possibilities and limitations. Although the public is in no position to query or assess what the experts and existing authorities decide, they can expect some action by the media and by their pressure groups or membership bodies. So concerned citizens and those within the guardian institutions of society (e.g. journalists, politicians, academics, clergy) should assume a duty to *examine* its duties, powers, structures and procedures carefully. This is particularly needed prior to their creation or when they seem to be functioning poorly.

Regulatory authorities report to wider society, often annually. Interested people and relevant organizations ought to *note* the values in use, but the specific decisions or recommendations are not usually of general interest. In any case, outsiders are not given the detailed evidence by which they can judge the particular choices or proposals.

Table 12.2: The necessary inter-relation of compartmental duties in an authority. The role of each compartment is defined by its column with the core duty in bold type. This matrix is the basis for synergy and effectiveness. Note that wider society is the contextual compartment of the authority again, but that the insider section (on the right) now includes two compartments.

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Formal Inquiry	Instituting Body	Council	Secretariat
6: Value Systems	Recommend	Act within	Respond to	Uphold	Interpret
5: Social Values	Debate	Recommend	Act within	Respond to	Uphold
4: Principal Objects	Examine	Debate	Recommend	Act within	Respond to
3: Internal Priorities	Note	Examine	Debate	Recommend	Act within
2: Strategic Objectives	—	Note	Examine	Debate	Recommend

A formal inquiry is a transient body created by representative groups in a particular domain to deal with an emerging social problem or to handle an existing authority which seems to be failing. Failure may be evidenced by a scandal in which social values have been flagrantly violated or by a ground swell of popular discontent.

The Securities and Investments Board was set up in 1988 following an inquiry by Prof. Gower. This was initiated by the government in 1981, and his Reports were published in 1984 and 1985. The inquiry was provoked by widespread public alarm at the rise of large-scale fraud, insider trading, routine malpractice and lack of proper financial controls leading to business collapses. The Council of the Stock Exchange and existing self-regulatory authorities were widely perceived to have failed.[18]

Establishment of a specific authority, which means vesting controlling powers in a body outside the political arena and independent of government, is a major social commitment. So an authority proper cannot evaluate itself and is not assigned the power to reform itself. The inquiry has the duty to explore and to assess whether or not certain social needs are currently being adequately protected.

The core duty here is to *recommend* social values which form the rationale for instituting and sustaining any authority. These inquiries may be set up as a committee or commission (e.g. the Royal Commission on the National Health Service), or as a quasi-judicial body if criminality is an issue (e.g. the Scarman Inquiry into the Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981; the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland, 1987). It may be constituted with a board and secretariat or as a sole investigator getting help as required. The inquiry may be generated by a profession or industry where there are widespread public allegations of wrong-doing e.g. the internal inquiry into the Lloyds of London multi-billion pound insurance debacle (The Walker Report: An Inquiry into Lloyd's Syndicate Participations and the LMX Spiral, 1992).

People selected for an inquiry must be capable of an overview of society as a whole, should appreciate the particular domain, be respected publicly within the domain, understand how social control can work, and be sensitive to the political and value dimension of social life. Inquiries restate and *act on* the beliefs and principles which legitimate social control. In sensing and recommending emerging social needs, the inquiry places them in the context of other established social values. In Ex. 12.7, the 1993 Inquiry which recommended statutory regulation of the press 'to ensure that privacy which all agree should be respected, is pro-

tected from unjustifiable intrusion', also wished to contribute to the highest standards of journalism, to enable the press to operate freely, to protect children and victims of sexual crime and so on.

Movements spark off and sustain pressure groups, crusading organizations, political parties and other reform-generating organizations which attempt to influence these inquiries. The inquiry is therefore a key agent for recognizing emerging personal and social needs and giving them legitimacy. For example, the Equal Opportunities Commission (set up in 1974) was a product of the women's movement which had influenced all political parties. Although it was finally set up by a Labour government drawing on their policy study group Report 'Discrimination against Women' (1972), it also gained legitimacy from the Conservative government's consultative document Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (1973) and the Finer Committee Report on One Parent Families (1974).

The detailed determination of the duties and powers of an authority is quite distinct from the process whereby the need for one is recognized. Nevertheless inquiries require the duty to *debate* these details. They need to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of the present situation, and analyse the existing regulatory duties and powers. They commonly put forward different options and possibilities, and suggest new mechanisms, laws or structures without necessarily recommending any particular one.

Formal inquiries are usually set up because of a view that it is necessary to alter or reinforce values (priorities) currently used in practice (if there is no existing authority) or priorities currently recommended by the council (if there is an authority in existence). If there is no authority, formal inquiries seek to compare what society needs and values with what its relevant organizations are doing (cf. Ex. 12.8). If there is an authority, then the inquiry considers whether what the authority's council is affirming as important is socially fitting. So inquiries have a duty to *examine* the priorities being applied and comparing these with emerging social needs and views. In doing so they must *note* specific decisions, but they do not re-work or re-assess these.

Health Care Complaints: The Secretary of State for Health set up a review to examine complaints procedures within the National Health Service (NHS) following widespread public dissatisfaction. The committee was chaired by Prof. Alan Wilson, a university vice chancellor, and it included NHS and lay members. Its report, *Being Heard* (May 1994) identified 9 key principles (social values) such as responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, accessibility and impartiality. Through examining evidence from many sources, it was evident that these were not given priority in practice. It proposed a variety of improvements to be

taken up spontaneously by NHS organizations, using central guidance and management oversight, greater involvement of other auditing bodies like the Health Services Ombudsman and legislative changes to contracts for family health services. There was no mention of a possible 'NHS complaints authority'. Ex. 12.8

Instituting bodies must provide the political interface with society and be prepared to respond to value controversies and scandals. They must engage when social events seem to demand an alteration in the basic working of the authority.

For statutory authorities or when there is statutory assignation of powers to membership associations like the Chartered Institute of Accountants, the instituting body is the government. For non-statutory authorities, the most satisfactory instituting body is an umbrella organization consisting of relevant membership associations.

Regulating Advertising: In 1993, the Advertising Association consisted of 27 member bodies covering firms in advertising, marketing, television, mail-order, the press, cinema &c. In 1962, this Association, then much smaller, set up the Advertising Standards Authority to handle public complaints in terms of a code devised by the Code of Advertising Practice Committee. The danger in any such arrangement is that the instituting body becomes too captured by its members' interests and unduly limits the self-regulatory powers or the finances of the authority. To handle an increase in the scope and activity of self-regulation and to minimize conflicts of interest, a formal inquiry was commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading. As a result, in 1975, the Advertising Association and the Committee for Advertising Practice (for commercial complaints) handed over instituting responsibilities to the newly created and properly independent Advertising Standards Board of Finance (ASBOF). Ex. 12.9[19]

The formation of an authority to supervise the press has been problematic in the UK due to the lack of a proper instituting body: see Ex. 12.7. The Press Complaints Commission was set up by a loose working together of the five main press trade associations, referred to in most documents as 'the industry'. Following the critical report of the government-sponsored inquiry in 1993, the industry accepted the need for an instituting body and handed over financing and the control of Commission appointments to Pressbof (modelled on ASBOF in Ex. 12.8).

The fact that an authority is a product of an instituting body is the primary source of its power and legitimacy. The core duty of the instituting body is to *recommend* principal objects for the authority. This means indicating its terms of reference, its powers, its activities, the boundaries of its concerns, the way it is to

be structured and staffed, key procedures, and its resourcing. The authority's creation is highly political and these recommendations get a detailed examination by all interested parties. After any modifications in response to pressures, the final recommendation is put for endorsement to parliament or to the governing body of the umbrella organization.

In working out exactly what the authority is to do, the instituting body *responds to* the relevant value system in society by drawing up a an ethical code and promoting its significance. For example, a committee of editors drew up a Code of Practice in which important ideas like accuracy, privacy, misrepresentation, harassment, payment for articles and the handling of vulnerable groups were addressed.

The instituting body, being representative of the community, must *act within* its social values. This means responding to established changes in the relevant social environment, not pressing for innovation. The UK government had to move to form a Securities and Investment Board (SIB) to regulate other self-regulatory bodies because its own deregulation sparked off upheavals and developments within the financial services community which led to a corresponding need for enhanced investor protection. The government was *responding to* ideas assumed and explained in the formal inquiry (Gower Report, 1984). These stated that investor protection depended upon a high degree of efficiency in financial markets and that this, in turn, depended on common standards of honesty, competence and solvency amongst financial firms.

Instituting bodies remain somewhat distant from specific problems and possible solutions or choices, leaving it to the council and officials of the authority to propose and explain them. However, they do have a duty to *debate* the values being used in particular choices. If these priorities get too far out of line with the social values and needs as expressed in public opinion and perceived by the instituting body, then it is liable to view the authority as failing. Self-regulatory bodies will be concerned that this may mean government intervention. Governments will be concerned about political embarrassment and public criticism.

Finally, the instituting body needs to *examine* the detailed strategic objectives which are the essence of the authority's output. Tribunal decisions, for example, are typically gathered together in an annual report and submitted to the originating government department for scrutiny.

The council, the board of the authority, is the leading compartment. Its members come to be seen as part of 'the great and the good' in society. They tend to

be distinguished individuals, notable achievers, leaders and opinion-formers from within particular domains rather than generalists like politicians or clergy. To the wider public they may be obscure, but their honours, careers and achievements mark them out as trustworthy and deserving of respect. Some council members are chosen as representatives of relevant organizations. For example, the membership of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission consists of a Chairman and 31 members who are leading businessmen, members of professions, academics, and trade union officials. It has special panels (e.g. on telecommunications) with extra individuals who have appropriate expertise. The Equal Opportunities Commission draws from people who are noted in the field and have become distinguished, for example, by their work on industrial tribunals, in trade unions, and in the law. The Securities and Investments Board consists of Chairmen, Chief Executives and Directors of major firms in the world of finance (banking, insurance, broking, big business).

The council carries prime responsibility because it makes and defends decisions or proposals which are applicable to particular situations. These proposals consist of applicable values (i.e. internal priorities) and a desirable outcome (i.e. strategic objectives). The primary duty of the council is to *recommend* internal priorities and to be sure that the strategic objectives as recommended by the secretariat are appropriate. The actual decision will vary according to the circumstances. But in each case, the council has a responsibility *to debate* possible decisions in value terms and to bring their priorities to bear.

The Advertising Standards Authority, for example, has had to deal with complaints of sexism in advertisements. In adjudicating, they are aware they must balance the value of 'promoting equality between women and men against the public interest in safeguarding freedom of expression...[while recognizing that]...freedom of expression is the higher value'. (Case Report 150, 1987). Prioritizing values like this is more significant than the result in any particular case.

The council is the guardian of the ethics and ideals behind their authority, so it must *uphold* these in the handling of people and situations. For example, the council of the Press Complaints Commission specifically ratified the Code of Practice as its primary source of guidance in dealing with complaints. Any council must nevertheless *respond to* social values relevant to the issue under consideration. For example, parole of a rapist might be handled differently if a spate of recent similar parolees had re-offended and generated a public view that longer internments were desirable.

The council has the self-evident and strict duty to *act within* the authority's terms of reference irrespective of members' personal views of what should be done. In statutory authorities, this means detailed knowledge of the Act of Parliament which defines the objects, duties, powers and procedures.

The secretariat are administrative and technical staff who understand the value system justifying the authority and so are able to *interpret* its meaning and relevance in particular situations. Such understanding is based on education and previous socialization. At the time of writing, the two top staff in the Royal Fine Arts Commission, for example, have a background in architecture; and the London Regional Passengers Committee senior secretariat consists of two former officers of a similar predecessor body, a voluntary member of its council who became so interested that he applied to work for it, a former senior operations manager with London Buses, a trade unionist, an ex-customer relations manager from the Post Office, and an ex-education officer.

The core duty of the secretariat is to *recommend* appropriate responses to any immediate social challenge within the remit of the authority. To do this, they ensure that there is an investigation, analysis of evidence, draft recommendations and so on for the council to consider. The council imposes its priorities and sense of social values, and debates their papers in terms of whether these are adequately and appropriately expressed. All officials must *act within* the priorities or criteria set by council in its general proceedings. They simply *respond to* the principal objects, ensuring that the council is addressing itself to those tasks for which it was instituted and is acting within the law. Authority staff must be sensitive to social values, especially those identified by any formal inquiry, and they have a duty to *uphold* these in their proceedings.

Limitation. Regulatory authorities act as a buffer between the people and their government. They ensure values are sustained within society, but they are not designed to produce specific achievements. Neither movements nor authorities are vehicles by which people may express themselves in productive activities. They are insufficiently organized, insufficiently concerned with practical details, and overly dependent on general agreement to produce a sustained and tangible impact. Whether in the design of ideas for changing society or in the production of goods and services, a focused commitment is required which is driven by the notion of meeting felt needs. If individual people are to thrive, they must be able to pursue their own relatively private path within society. If society is to thrive, it

needs to release such expressions of autonomy. Enterprises exist for just this purpose.

G-5[1]: An Enterprise

Nature. The term 'organization' most immediately conjures up the image of a formally-constituted executive-led enterprise. Organizations which embody movements or authorities seem arcane, evanescent and other-worldly beside enterprises whose rationale depends on the expert management and performance of activities. Such organizations have become the environment in which we work and live. Our daily desires to eat, sleep, play, and strive in health and happiness are not so much affected now by the weather or wild animals as by innumerable enterprises. We look less to ourselves or to our fellows for products and services and more to private or public organizations: the construction company that built our house, the retail firms that sell us food and clothing, the business that employs us, the school that educates our children, the government agency that warns of the impending weather, the charity that provides our community theatre, the campaigning organization that voices our concerns, upon all these and many more we depend.

Although we depend on enterprises and they depend on us, enterprises are essentially self-interested. The *function* of an enterprise is to pursue values through activities which generate tangible benefits for itself. In other words, this type of autonomous endeavour regards values as a means to an end, its own end. Society, however, views enterprises as the means for incorporating and realizing wider values. This is why both movements and authorities seek to influence enterprises. They can do so rather easily because the presence of social values within the enterprise pentad forces them to be responsive.

An enterprise must be set up formally, i.e. constituted as an organization, when a needed task is beyond the resources of a single person or a small band of partners. A task of any significant complexity requires explicit and public statements of its purpose and value, and demands explicit differentiation of the work into different kinds and levels of responsibility. The resulting body can endure beyond changes in the people initially involved. So society views it as a legal individual: an autonomous social being with its own distinct identity and life.

Unlike movements, enterprises need clearly defined boundaries and must respect existing social values. However, like movements, the insiders need to be viewed as independent responsible individuals and not simply as agents — even though they enter into a contract of employment. A side-effect of this paradox is that a person or sub-group within an organization can use it to pursue or cloak their own intentions which may differ or run counter to stated objects.

So, whether the organization proper consists of just a few people (like some voluntary agencies) or over a million (like some armies or the UK's National Health Service), there is a need to weld them together into a distinctive purposeful unity while allowing each person an appropriate degree of autonomy to pursue and own activities. It is evident that large enterprises will only function successfully if everyone cooperates and accepts a great deal of responsibility.

Enterprises are activity-based organizations in which personal benefit is a central value. The person may be an insider or an outsider. Societies depend on autonomous enterprises, and these enterprises depend on autonomous people, you and I, working within them or dealing with them as customers, suppliers etc. So we must all learn to create, operate and modify enterprises to meet social needs — which includes using them for personal gain and to advantage those groups we support.

Although many organizations are reasonably managed internally, their linkage with the values and needs of people, with other organizations and with wider society generally is often problematic. Firms become unresponsive to their shareholders. Shareholders regard ownership as financial speculation. Boards provide no check on chief executives. Headquarters expand bureaucratically. Managers lose the confidence of their colleagues and subordinates. Suppliers are exploited. Governing committees proliferate uncontrollably. Customer views are ignored in decisions. Communities are neglected.

Such organizational problems, often said to be caused by character failings or climates of distrust or pressures of work, may be better explained by ignorance and confusion. Society promotes the use of formal organization for business, for example, but the precise role of firms in realizing social values is not properly appreciated. Indeed, many see businesses as inherently monstrous: financially-driven beasts which depersonalize people and engage in squalid dealings.

The analytic approach and basic principles of compartmentalization to be offered here apply equally to all types of organization. However, in modelling how enterprises can and should be operated, the principal focus will be on service organizations differentiated into three broad groups: voluntary or non-profit associations, commercial firms or companies, and governmental or public agencies.

Development. New enterprises are formed whenever a social need becomes evident. They are constituted as an organization if the activities and resources required to meet that need are inherently beyond what a sole trader or small partnership can handle. The enterprise then harnesses people in its service and, almost as a by-product, in the service of communal values related to that need.

Social values and personal needs can never be completely fulfilled, and so opportunities to set up enterprises are limitless. The social constraints to enterprises are defined by authorities and the law. Ethical restraints beyond these are an expression of the standards of the individuals involved. Within these limits, there are practical constraints determined by the interests of people in the activity and the availability of essential resources (such as trained people, credit, space, customers &c).

Enterprises are born and die with few surviving longer than 30-40 years. During their lifetime, they thrive or stagnate. Success or failure is partly a factor of the efforts and abilities of those responsible for them, and partly a matter of external largely uncontrollable realities. Schumpeter referred to the 'creative destruction' of capitalism to explain the way that competition and innovation operated in the business sector. In non-competitive or non-profit arenas, organizations follow different life trajectories and may survive for many decades or even centuries.

The Brain of the Enterprise. The *consensual* mandate for any enterprise is provided once again by *wider society*. To gain support from wider society for the pursuit of activities, social values must be identified. Social values are inclusive and integrative in nature, less controlling than ultimate values and value systems, and directly oriented to what people in the community feel they need. These values arise spontaneously or within movements and are legitimated or confirmed by authorities if necessary. An organization's survival depends crucially upon seeking accommodation with existing social values and on being free to seek resources from the societal environment by appeal to these values. As emphasized many times before, everyone inside an organization is simultaneously part of the wider community. The relevant personal capability here is awareness and acceptance of the communal net of values, and particularly its emerging needs.

The *rationale* for creating an enterprise is provided by the principal objects. The work of defining these and setting up and maintaining any organization is performed by a *constituting body*. This body consists of people or organizations who associate and commit themselves jointly to seeing that certain activities are carried out. Because this body can also close down or sell the enterprise, it might be said to be the owner or proprietor. *Constitutive duties* refer to the requirement to secure a continuing existence and identity for the organization, including a specific responsibility to resource any executive work or structures created by it. To be successful, the constituting body must contain people who are imbued with the drive to promote certain values actively and systematically, and who benefit directly from the existence of the enterprise. Constituting bodies are of various types: for example, the *membership* of voluntary associations, the *shareholders* of commercial firms, and the *government and legislature* in regard to statutory public agencies.

The Heart of the Enterprise. Decisions on internal priorities control the focus of activities and determine *political support*, so here is where the organization has its political interface with society. The work to be done is known as *governance*, and the social form is the *governing body*. Often referred to as a *board* (or council or authority or committee), it is the small group of *governors* (or trustees or councillors or directors) which must act corporately. Governors are often drawn from the constituting body, and may include top officers or outsiders with relevant credentials. Governance mediates, interprets, and promotes the wishes of the constituting body. In order to enable realization of the principal objects within the resources available, it must recognize practical constraints and pressures from the social environment. Setting priorities means gripping controversial political issues and so the skills involved are primarily political. Here, missionary or ideological zeal requires to be tempered pragmatically in the light of irremovable environmental factors and conflicting demands from the various stakeholders.

The choice of strategic objectives by an enterprise is about *maximizing its impact*. Choices must take into account both the complexity and uncertainty of the outer world and the value preferences of the governing body. This is the work of *top officers*. *Top officer bodies* include two roles. The first, often termed the *secretary* (e.g. company secretary, permanent secretary) is designed to assist the governing body in performing governance. In business, this role is commonly taken by the top finance officer. The other role, that of *chief executive* (also called general manager, managing director or director-general), is designed to control executive work and head up the executants within the enterprise. Sometimes a few key senior staff are specifically designated top officers by the governing body and formed into a *top management team*. Top officers need a degree of political sensitivity, an ability to weigh up and synthesize multiple factors intuitively, and the

capacity to mobilize and direct the full range of human financial and physical resources within the organization

Tactical objectives defining particular projects and tasks must enable the organization to *adapt appropriately*. This work of deciding and successfully pursuing tasks and projects may be described as *executant work*. It results in the use of resources to produce concrete changes in the external world by a given deadline. The *executant body* includes all staff working within the organization, executives or managers, and work-force. Top officers are also executants, and so those people invariably have two roles (or three if they are also on the governing body, or four if they are also shareholders or members of the constituting body). Executants, like top officers, need to be individually, not corporately, accountable even though corporate working is needed to manage large organizations. Executants typically have specialized skills, expert knowledge and practical experience which form the basis of their employment contract. According to their capability, they can cope with tasks of lesser or greater complexity.

Recapitulation. The above arrangements are similar in principle to those for movements and authorities. But they are designed to provide control over activities and to ensure that something tangible and socially worthwhile is produced. As before, there is an external level of purpose ensuring the organization can thrive within its social environment. However, there is just one level of purpose controlling the enterprise proper. The enterprise proper itself now covers three levels of purpose. The highest of these orients operations and shapes principal objects by using internal priorities. The remaining two levels of objectives enable detailed and directed implementation.

In terms of compartments: the governing body can be viewed as the specialized leading part of the constituting body, while the top officer body can be viewed as the specialized leading part of the executant body. Proper interaction of the two leading compartments, each driving and focusing in its own way, is inevitably of the greatest importance for organizational integrity and effectiveness. In businesses, it means that leadership can be sharply focused and the enterprise can speak with a single voice.

Irrespective of how or even whether the enterprise compartments are designed, it is evident that the work of each compartment is essential. If not explicitly provided for, such work will be carried out somewhere — otherwise the enterprise collapses. Despite a considerable amount of research, not just the responsibilities but even the number and rationale of compartments are not generally **appreciated.**[20]

Rational design of duties and authority is preferable to chance or a free-for-all, but this requires that a framework for thinking about these is sufficiently detailed and meaningful to be applied and used by the people involved. A satisfactory framework must promote synergistic interaction between compartments, aid the translation of values into action, and handle conflicts inherent in any social activity.

Organizing the Enterprise. The source of power in any enterprise is to be found in how well it is organized and managed. Unlike the higher endeavours, failure of organization here spells failure of the enterprise. Spontaneity, the essence of successful movements, now threatens chaos. Enterprise success depends instead on everyone knowing what is to be achieved and how. In that context, everyone involved must show initiative and cooperation. Cooperation means that choices and actions by all compartments must somehow mesh. But this is impossible without adequate accountability relations between and within compartments. So control is now hierarchical.

The modern fashion for denying the need for hierarchy amongst managers and minimizing the importance of clear responsibility and authority is just that: a fashion and a denial. Hierarchy can degenerate into rigid rules, status preoccupations and the mindless proliferation of levels. However hierarchy itself is unavoidable and, if used properly, helps ensure the efficient and effective running of the enterprise. Accountability is a form of control which enables people to be maximally independent and responsible. In a large organization, hierarchy and accountability do not oppose freedom of action, but rather complement it. They are not optional.[21]

Our main concern here is with relations between compartments. Certain aspects of compartment accountability may be laid down in legislation, but much is at the discretion of those in the enterprise and can be relatively easily altered in the service of its mission. Most observers agree that society urgently requires a better understanding of the duties of the compartments, and of the requisite relations between them. The present account has been tested to ensure it can be understood and acted upon by responsible people.

In clarifying the authority of the compartments, it is natural to start from the origin of each in a particular level. As originally suggested, each compartment has the unique responsibility in relation to purposes at that level. In this case the requirement is more definitive than to affirm (as in movements) or to recommend (as in authorities). Instead, it is *to set* the purpose. This

Table 12.3: The necessary inter-relation of compartmental duties in an enterprise. The role of each compartment is defined by its column with the core duty in bold type. This matrix is the basis for synergy and effectiveness. Note that this is the only form of endeavour which can 'set' purposes, but that this power does not include the highest level of social value. Top officers and executants are held individually accountable, whereas constituting and governing bodies are corporately accountable.

Compartment. Level	Wider Society	Constituting Body*	Governing Body	Top Officer Body	Executant Body
5: Social Values	*Set*	Pursue	Observe	Identify with	Act on
4: Principal Objects	Sanction	*Set*	Pursue	Observe	Identify with
3: Internal Priorities	Own	Sanction	*Set*	Pursue	Observe
2: Strategic Objectives	React to	Own	Sanction	*Set*	Pursue
1: Tactical Objectives	—	React to	Own	Sanction	*Set*

*Constituting bodies in commercial firms, voluntary associations and public agencies show great variation in their influence and duties in regard to lower level purposes. See text for further details.

means resolutely sticking to that purpose, checking on its pursuit or effects, and, if need be, changing it. Enterprise compartments need this positive power because their output and survival flow from forthright and timely action.

There is pressure on the three compartments in the enterprise proper to be well organized and managed. The public exposure of failure also fosters the natural urge for people in the various compartments to work together in an integrated way. This means that purposes set at every level of the hierarchy need to mesh. This will only occur if each compartment has some duties and corresponding influence or authority over higher and lower forms of purpose set by other compartments. But this influence is invariably less definitive than *to set* the purpose.

A progressive pattern emerged clearly in our research, and a summary of these findings is presented in matrix form in Table 12.3 (cf. Master-Table 38).

Moving down the compartments: the purpose which has been *set* by the key compartment should be *pursued* by the compartment below, then *observed* by the compartment below that, then *identified with* by the compartment below that, and finally *acted on* by the most distant compartment. Moving up the compartments, the purpose which has been *set* by the key compartment, should be scrutinized and *sanctioned* (i.e. approved or rejected) by the compartment above, then *owned* and supported (or disowned and vetoed) by the

compartment above that, and then *reacted to* by the most distant compartment. This rather simple terminology seems to catch the flavour of the requisite influence and rights due to each compartment in respect of any particular type of purpose. When each responsibility, stated in this way, is elaborated further in a few key tasks of immediate relevance, the formulations have proved readily understandable and useable by the people involved.

The principal characteristics and general duties of each compartment can now be examined. Although it is conjectured that compartments in all enterprises are fundamentally similar, variation in the details have been found according to the type of organization, particularly in the constituting body.[22]

Wider society needs to develop and *set* the social values which people may freely pursue via their enterprises. In business, these social values include consumer needs and define the market. Setting is perhaps too definite a term, because what the social values are, is not always clear from the variety of shifting and conflicting opinions, assertions, complaints, activities and pronouncements. Nevertheless, it is usually very clear whether or not the enterprise fits with the current range of social values. When something very new is being attempted, firms usually engage in market research, approach relevant authorities or government departments for advice or conduct pilot trials to clarify the value position. If a basic value of the wider society

is violated by an enterprise, people spontaneously object and either the enterprise fails or the government or an authority may intervene.

The second duty of wider society is to *sanction* the principal objects of any enterprise. The requirement of all companies in the UK to register their aims and objects and to submit names of directors and audited accounts annually is a form of oversight and legitimation of the principal objects. Indirect and implicit sanction is expressed in acts of recognition (such as acceptance of advertisements by the news media) or disapproval (such as boycotts), and by people who transact with or join the organization.

Different elements of wider society vary in their relevance for any particular enterprise. For example, as well as being most responsive to the values of potential members or those who deal with their members, a trade union will also be concerned with the values of other trade unions and any political parties or campaigning organizations which are broadly supportive.

Wider society knows relatively little of what goes on inside most organizations, and has little direct access to the setting of internal priorities, strategic or tactical objectives because these are largely private matters. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, society must *own* the values (priorities) being used for decisions within the organizations because those organizations and all within them are members of society. So society has certain rights and duties which are exercised via its regulatory authorities and law-enforcement agencies.

Strategic decisions of large organizations impact on society, and the choices of even small organizations may affect local communities. Naturally, people *react to* these. Elected representatives regularly support or criticize decisions of private sector bodies on their behalf, but anyone can communicate their views to a business. Sometimes, as in the case of the Coca Cola Corporation's decision to alter the recipe of its famous fizzy drink, the extent of public protest leads to a reconsideration and reversal of the decision. In a small community, where an organization is finding its activities unprofitable, local people may mobilize active support for the firm to help it stay in business. Tactical objectives are not a concern of wider society, except in so far as they reveal a neglect of certain social values or point to a socially undesirable strategic objective.

Constitutive duties show marked differences between the main groups of service organizations, but still within the pattern in Table 12.3. The membership of voluntary associations is characterized by maximum personal involvement of each member who may be expected to contribute to purposes at all levels.

Commercial firms lie at the other extreme with the vast majority of shareholders having a minimum involvement and concerned with just one thing — profit. This lack of concern with the organization itself seems wrong in principle. For public service agencies, the citizenry uses elected representatives in the legislature to serve as the constituting body. Because the constituting body is then accountable to the community, citizens ought to make a contribution to constitutive work. However, citizen duties, like shareholder duties, are often neglected.

The focus of constitutive work in all cases is, as the title implies, to *set* principal objects which both bring the organization into existence and ensure its continuance. There is a particular requirement to provide or obtain a resource base. Implicit, however, is a further duty to clarify and *pursue* the social values which gave rise to those principal objects. In relation to lower-level purposes, the constituting body is expected to *sanction* internal priorities, to *own* the strategic objectives and to *react to* tactical objectives.

To explain these duties, the three varieties of enterprise require separate consideration:

a) In **government agencies**, the situation is most complex because of the involvement of the public. The legislature clarifies the dominant values held by the public in order to *pursue* them by constituting the agency. The principal objects are set within legislation which defines the central activities, main structures and mode of resourcing. In this regard, the public contributes crucially, if rather indirectly, by voting in the legislators and paying the taxes and charges which resource the service. Appointment to governing bodies is determined according to statute and may be by appointment, nomination or election. Where nomination is controlled by government, there may be places reserved for people assigned on a representative basis (e.g. from unions, professions, or universities). The government minister, or sometimes a committee of the legislature, must *sanction* internal priorities, and the main strategic objectives must be primarily *owned* by the government. In the UK National Health Service, for example, new priorities and strategic plans are scrutinized by a select committee of Members of Parliament, whose report is debated and may be voted on in parliament. However, citizens should also be involved in overseeing and legitimizing such decisions and should participate constructively in consultative procedures. The public needs to keep itself aware, and therefore requires right of access to governing body meetings or to records of the debates. To help the public, the news media need to take on an informing and campaigning role. People should discuss developments within local

interest or pressure groups so they may effectively lobby to support or criticize strategies. Tactical objectives frequently generate intense *reactions*: for example the local community may protest and so lead its Member of Parliament to query closure of a small obsolete hospital, although this is within an agreed strategy to improve quality and reduce costs.

b) In **voluntary associations**, members are strongly invested in certain ideals and set objects in the constitution to *pursue* these values in a particular way. Members are also actively encouraged to accept governance duties. Under the guidance of the governing body, all members are expected to become involved in exploring controversial issues, and in scrutinizing and *sanctioning* internal priorities. Typically, members have a strong sense of *ownership* of strategic objectives, and may exert a veto on governing body decisions or insist on a referendum. In addition, members often deliberately involve themselves in executant work, inquiring about and *reacting to* tactical objectives with great intensity.

c) In **commercial firms**, control is more firmly in the hands of the governing board of directors, partly because the shareholders' concern lies with the production of profit. Proprietors and partnerships feel very responsible for their businesses, but many shareholders in large firms do not experience themselves as owning anything except the financial worth of their investment. Not surprisingly, they feel virtually no responsibility for the enterprise. The growth of stock exchanges and the emergence of large institutional investors (pension funds, unit trusts) has accelerated this neglect of ownership responsibilities. A speculative or purely financial mentality is in danger of producing an inappropriate short-term perspective. This may lead to excessive fluctuations in share price which can weaken a firm's financial position.

The annual general meeting is the focus for exerting constitutive rights and duties. However, shareholders have a weak grip in practice even on such matters as who the directors should be and what remuneration is appropriate for them. In the US, federal and state laws have tended to disenfranchise shareholders. It would seem positively helpful if shareholders sanctioned major political decisions in relation to things like environmental pollution given that firms so often claim that they decide things in the shareholders' interests. Owner failure is a prime cause of board failure which has led to the emergence of the corporate raider as a mechanism for shaking out incompetent and self-aggrandizing boards. Inevitably, 'shareholder associations' have emerged to remedy shareholder weakness. The present approach suggests that boards of directors

should not seek to block or weaken shareholders' proper control (i.e. to limit their compartment-based rights and duties). The present framework could be used to devise a way to help define constructive involvement from shareholders, especially institutional investors.[23]

Governance duties are poorly discharged in business, non-profit and governmental organizations alike.[24] On the one hand, parliaments and judicial authorities seem to be acutely aware of the need for governance. On the other hand, in no other compartment are ordinary people either so confused about what is expected of them, or so unable to adhere to their role. Squabbling and rubber-stamping, absence of executive supervision and neglect of duties, uninformed members and avoided policy issues, these and many other problems appear almost identically in the smallest voluntary agency and in the most lofty international body, like the World Bank.

Careful study reveals that *governance duties* are basically similar across all varieties of enterprise. Governing bodies are primarily there to *set* internal priorities. They must handle crucial controversies consequent on their central role in the authoritative allocation of resources. The pressures from the multiplicity of stakeholders — the constituting body, customers or clients, staff, creditors, government, the community, suppliers and others — must be balanced and a way forward found in the face of uncertainty. This demands judgement and sensitivity, not simply facts and analysis. In such work, group discussion and group resolution within the convention of collective responsibility appear desirable. Governing bodies depend ultimately on voting for decision, although they frequently operate most satisfactorily by consensus or (less satisfactorily) by deferring to the chair. Occasionally they refer decisions to a larger representative group of members, but referenda should only be sought on constitutional issues. The duty to set priorities includes decisions to introduce codes of practice, ethical policies, organizational standards and other controversial rules and values.

As well as gripping its prime task, that of setting internal priorities, the governing body must consider purposes at other levels. It must *observe* the social values of the various stakeholders by proclaiming these in public and by ensuring that any excessive, that is to say potentially scandalous or unwise, breach of such values (the communal standards) is promptly remedied. The governing body must also *pursue* the principal objects by clarifying and interpreting their nature, appointing the most senior officers, agreeing the main executive structures, reviewing top officer performance and resources overall, and proposing changes in the mission for deci-

sion by the constituting body. The governing body should *sanction* strategic objectives and scrutinize detailed strategies developed in the light of its main priorities or substantive internal priorities. This is often problematic in public agencies and voluntary associations because it requires joint work with one or more top officers who are frequently excluded from membership of the governing body. Detailed involvement of governors in executant matters, though frequent in practice, is neither logical (according to this model), nor in practice particularly effective in terms of time expended and results achieved. Nevertheless, the governing body must *own* all tactical objectives set by the staff and accept responsibility for their consequences. On occasion this may lead to the governing body vetoing a tactical objective on the grounds that it is socially unacceptable.

The amount of work involved in governance is considerable. Unless it is appropriately and effectively structured, prioritized, programmed and monitored, governors rapidly become overwhelmed and ineffective. A potential drain on time and energy stems from conflict with the constituting body. Shareholder revolts are not unknown. Where the governing body is a lower tier of government, conflict based on ideological politicization of issues may occur. In the UK in the 1980's, for example, many left-wing local councils acted as if they were the opposition to the right-wing national government rather than bodies whose activities and structure are defined by parliamentary statute.

Although governance *duties* are similar in all organizations, governance *structures and procedures* — such as hierarchical tiers, member composition, duration of office, powers of delegation, committee structures and standing orders — are not. Legislation, which varies somewhat from country to country, commonly specifies baseline structural and procedural requirements for governing bodies on the basis of local experience and conventional wisdom. These laws are usually different for charities, public limited companies, private businesses, and so on. However, in all cases, the constituting body typically needs to determine certain crucial matters for itself, and then the governing body needs to elaborate further, detailing arrangements as far as is required for its own effective operation. Such non-legal arrangements for governance need to be designed to support the particular mission of the organization and the preferences and views of those involved.

Careful organizational analysis is needed: to clarify suitable structural forms; to assign various governance duties within the structure appropriately; to determine a suitable composition of members and (often) non-members with relevant interests or expertise or influ-

ence; and to devise essential procedures and conventions. Because organizations vary greatly, much variation in the detail of governance is to be found. In general, the more extensive the social role of the organization, the more complex its governance. Universal institutions like the major universities or churches obviously need sophisticated arrangements. However, rather small membership-centred or charity-based associations may also develop rather complicated governing structures in order to involve as many members as deeply as possible.

Top officer duties show no essential difference between any of the three varieties of organization. In each variety, the location of such work is commonly disputed or not clear. In many firms, it may be difficult to determine whether top officer work is expected of the chairman of the board or of the so-called chief executive officer (or both). Attempts to avoid the problem by having the one person fill both roles is still common. In some voluntary associations, the chairman of the governing body almost completely takes over the top officer role. In other cases, the most senior executives, having become more identified with the founding ideals than the governors and members who constitute the association, seek to usurp constitutional and governing rights. In public agencies, where top officers are typically excluded from membership of the governing body, boards and top officers frequently come into conflict over their respective roles. In the NHS, ministers of state have taken on the top officer role from time to time. Whatever the difficulties and inherent conflicts in the governing-executing interface, and they are many and various, their resolution must start from a clear, feasible and distinctive specification for top officer work that meshes with that for governance.

Top officers, aided and sanctioned by their governing board, should, above all, be expected to *set* strategic objectives and work out detailed feasible strategies which they and other executants can implement. The aim here is for the enterprise to move in an unambiguous direction and in a way which makes the maximum of impact. On behalf of the governing body, top officers (directly and via delegation to subordinate managers) should scrutinize and *sanction* the tactical objectives which flow from strategies and keep the governors in touch with progress and costs. Looking upwards, top officers must put time and effort into *pursuing* the internal priorities set by the governing body. They should help governors both by ensuring that strategies align with the governing body's wishes, and also by raising and clarifying possible controversial issues and new potential priorities or foci for strategy development.

Top officers have a duty to *observe* the principal objects as set by the constituting body and interpreted by the governing body. Proclamation of the mission is generally recognized as an important aspect of executive leadership. In addition, top officers enable the governing body to pursue the principal objects by checking that resources are being fully mobilized to this end, and ensuring that all required activities are being pursued and no *ultra vires* activities allowed. Importantly, top officers should accept the constituting body's ideals without question. They need to *identify with* the social values as upheld by the governing body in order to develop a suitable culture among the executant body, and to ensure that wider society is handled naturally and appropriately. If such identification is not possible for personal reasons, resignation or dismissal is necessary.

Top officer duties, as noted earlier, are always associated with the duties of a senior executant. Failure to distinguish and accept both these sets of responsibilities in full is common. For example, our project work in local government revealed many top officers who largely ignored their senior executant role, and consultancy in the National Health Service revealed many chief executives who positively denied their top officer role.

Executant duties centre on task creation and completion. This is only one step, albeit the final step, in the conversion of social values into action. Yet people employed to carry out or execute specific tasks to specific deadlines, here called the executants, have become mistakenly synonymous with enterprises. In fact, task activities cannot logically exist on their own. They must derive their immediate rationale from the priorities (L-3) and strategies (L-2) which specify what the organization actually hopes to achieve in the world. But it is the executants, and only they, who can *set* sensible tactical objectives with realistic time-targets.

The proper duties of executants have been extensively investigated by many, so comment here can be kept to the **minimum**.[25] However, it is useful to recognize that the present model highlights their responsibilities in a distinctive way. As well as handling assigned tasks, executants should *set* tactical objectives as generally required by their post and the situation without requiring specific instruction. Because any post or functional role is a direct expression of the principal objects of the organization, an executant must *identify with* these to be effective. If identification is not possible, the executant should resign or be dismissed. The performance of tasks should be oriented by the need to *pursue* strategic objectives and strategies as developed by top management groups. Executants should also be expected to *observe* the priorities of their governing body, applying them as opportunity allows. Most

importantly, the concrete results produced by executants should ultimately embody or concretize the social values which generated the enterprise. Although a spontaneous conscious focus by executants on values is characteristically weak, executants may be expected, wherever possible, to *act on* social values as genuinely affirmed by top officers. For example, when community- or client-participation in planning a service is genuinely valued, staff should arrange the planning process to involve them. Even if such outsiders participate in planning, they are not held formally responsible for the results: i.e. executants remain accountable for decisions.

The emphasis in executant work is about producing results efficiently while adapting as well as possible to the exigencies of time and circumstance. This means a mixture or synthesis of systematic and responsive approaches to work are required. Organizational efforts need to be put into progressively reducing ambiguity, conflict and uncertainty by systematic analysis, information-gathering, definition of roles and accountability relationships, specification of methods and directions &c. These systematic frameworks then provide the context for spontaneous, fluid and dynamic responsiveness whose success is a function of personal aptitude and attitude.

Closure. The criticism that is usually hurled at formally organized enterprises, whether voluntary, commercial or public, is that they are too self-centred and fail to recognize the needs of other bodies and the community. But their values are not far off those of the society within which they operate. Their prime responsibility is to the mission as defined by the constituting body. Their standards are largely communal standards: they do what everybody else does. If these standards are undesirable, then authorities and laws can be introduced. But demanding perfection in an imperfect world is not advisable. Enterprises are needed to keep society going, and they perforce use the values, good and bad, that are prevalent in society.

With enterprises we have come to the final and most tangible way that autonomy can be embodied. We now briefly put joint endeavour in a historical perspective and indicate some implications of the analysis.

REVIEWING AUTONOMY

Autonomy is about the capacity to realize what you think is important i.e. your values. We have noted the three fundamental embodiments of autonomy. Because these embodiments of endeavour exist within society, their autonomous existence requires a consensus on certain values.

All autonomy depends on an openness in social relationships, a belief in the importance of values in society, the possibility of social change, and the exercise of freedom. So traditional and repressive societies show a diminution of all associations and joint endeavours, while democratic and progressive societies show a multiplicity. One reason why present efforts do not always work very well is that large scale autonomous endeavours are so recent — as the following ultra-brief historical review clarifies.

The Historical Perspective. Endeavours based on a group of people forming an independent entity with a life of its own are not new. But their extent and the implications for the individual in society have increased dramatically over mankind's social evolution, especially recently. The emergence and dominance of autonomy in general, and large executive-run organizations in particular, is the feature that overwhelmingly marks Western cultural evolution in the last 100 years.[26] In this rapid review, I will emphasise the emergence of compartmentalization because this is the practical notion emphasized by the present framework.

For over 2,000,000 years until about 10,000 BC, people operated as nomads in small family bands and could depend on informal arrangements. Even today, distinct and enduring social bodies, aside from kinship and political arrangements, are not to be found in subsistence societies preserved by their religion and traditions. Around 10,000 BC, the development of farming and villages led to surpluses and trading, and encouraged the systematic division of labour. When towns and cities emerged around 5,000 BC together with the development of writing and money, movements were facilitated, authorities gained importance and labour-intensive organizations became essential. Effective organization of civil administration, the military and religious functions, together with improvements in materials technology, enabled the creation of empires around 3,000 BC.

Rulers in these ancient civilizations operated on the basis of divine authority and were bound by traditions, so the acceptability of their endeavours within society was never an issue. They could therefore merge decisions about values with those of action in a way that would now seem tyrannical. Reversion to popular wishes would have to await their death. Pharaoh Akhenaten's monotheism, for example, was imposed during his reign and rejected immediately afterwards. Nevertheless precursors of movements — popular moods, demonstrations, fashions — had an influence on society however absolutist the ruler. Until a few hundred years ago, popular movements seem to have been largely religious or revolutionary in character.

Rulers viewed movements with suspicion and authorities were limited in scope and given little true independence. Until the invention of printing and the improvement of transport and communications (16th century), it was extremely difficult for a movement to spread very far or for a large-scale enterprise to operate very effectively.

The earliest joint enterprises were partnerships where all were expected to orient the endeavour and to share in both the work and profits. In England from early times, corporate bodies could be set up by Royal Charter and later by Parliamentary Act, and given the power to do anything an individual might do. The East Indian Company, for example, was chartered. However, once formed, the scope of a chartered company's activities was unlimited, and this put creditors and members at risk. The large trading companies which developed in the 17th and 18th centuries were not incorporated, and were run by large fluctuating numbers of loosely associated people owning transferable shares. Such bodies were also unsatisfactory because any person dealing with them could not know with whom he was contracting or whom to sue.

The disparate needs for effective legal control, for concentration of capital, and for managing a large complex work-force became fully apparent with the industrial era in the mid-19th century. As a result, incorporation of an enterprise became generally available in the form of a limited liability company. Incorporation resulted in a *de facto* immortal entity with the legal capacity to act as a person quite distinct from the actual people who provided the capital. In other words, the disparate needs led to the emergence of full compartmentalization and formalization of organizations with an internal differentiation of duties as appropriate to each compartment. Various legal reforms followed, and formally constituted organizations proliferated in the 20th century as governments in the West fostered the establishment of myriads of small and large firms, public agencies and voluntary bodies. All these were required by law to be compartmentalized: e.g. although details varied amongst nations, the process and structures for governing the organization were invariably sharply distinguished from its daily operation.

The increasing power of executive organizations over the past 150 years, with their need for an educated enterprising staff, led to the emancipation of men and women in a wide variety of areas. The age of enlightenment, flowering in the 18th century, had led people to became more confident in their own judgements; and the idea slowly took hold that monarchs and governments had limitations, and that a great deal of social life, as much as possible really, could and should operate

autonomously. (This process has not yet run its course, and is still at work today.) The worker's movement became a major force for political change; the depth psychology generated psychological change; and science altered the nature of work and the role of religion. These three great movements have now achieved their objectives. But a plethora of other cultural movements are emerging or re-emerging including the ecology movement, the women's movement, the communitarian movement, the rights movement, the New Age movement.

Increasing democratisation, globalization of communications, technological innovation, and societal complexity has fostered the spread of both movements and businesses — often across national and cultural boundaries. As a result, sophisticated independent regulatory authorities have become ever more necessary. Movements are inherently amateurish and can, to a degree, look after themselves. However, authorities need to engage with business technicalities. It seems that their development is lagging behind the proliferation of highly active global organizations naturally dedicated to their own self-interest. For example, at the time of writing there still seems to be only the most patchy and rudimentary appreciation of the need for effective international regulation of banking, currency operations and financial flows. World-wide destabilization is a real danger. Yet no authority acting alone can determine or police the system, and no government has the required legitimacy. Possibly the UN might create a commission, or a self-regulatory organization sponsored by the industry could link with governments.

Looking Forward. The historical review ended with the recognition that present endeavours are global and their power threatens social stability. Multinational organizations dominate business and are richer than many nations. Movements flow across continents with potentially frightening ease. Authorities are increasingly required to operate beyond the bounds of the nation-state but struggle to do so.

In this difficult situation, the present analysis re-affirms the significance of agreed duties, the need for general consensus, and the central requirement to work with values. In order to bring clarity into the design and operation of endeavours, it is essential to understand where responsibility and authority lie for choices of value and purpose. This means appreciating that there are three distinct types of joint endeavour, each defined and structured by a set of five adjacent levels of purpose.

The main message of the analysis is that logical and precise specifications of work (i.e. duties) are possible in the discrete compartments generated by the levels of

purpose. However, these duties involve working with values: something which most people still find difficult to imagine let alone do reflectively. Even movements, which seem virtually unamenable to design because they are solely about values, could be strengthened and more intelligently handled if all understood the work involved.

In seeking improvements by clarifying the work to be done, it is worth singling out the governing bodies of enterprises whose notorious malfunction seems to be primarily based on a mixture of ignorance and confusion.

Most research effort has gone into the design of enterprises, and within this effort most of the focus has been on executant structures and systems. Organization, for many writers, refers only to the organizing of executants and executive work. However, there is an equal necessity to attend to the work and organization needed by movements and authorities, and within enterprises much more thought could go into improving the functioning of constituting bodies, governing bodies, and chief executives (or top officer bodies). Without such attention, ethical and value considerations will not receive due attention and social progress will be disorderly or hindered.

It is proposed that the framework of duties presented and epitomized in Master-Table 38 is broadly valid as an approach or set of principles. This means that the suggested duties, structures and processes suggested need to be adapted to be appropriate to each social body, according to the ethical order of the society and within universal standards of the world order. Within any particular body or endeavour, the compartments require to be designed and re-designed in accord with circumstances. Globalization, the information revolution, environmental change, altered activities, growth in scope, new legislation, different people, and cultural shifts may all influence precisely what tasks are performed. A governing body at the top of a multinational, for example, ought to operate somewhat differently from the governing body of one of its national subsidiaries, even though the principles remain the same.

The analysis also indicates a way forward in assessing that elusive variable, effectiveness. If effectiveness is the successful achievement of goals, then no less than five levels of effectiveness must be considered. Enterprises, for example, need to be judged in the light of their social values, **principal** objects, internal priorities, and strategic objectives, as well as tactical objectives. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that *each compartment requires its own evaluation* in the light of its own distinctive duties. Compartments differ sharply, so

effectiveness of one may contribute to ineffectiveness of another. For example, participation in executant work by a member of a voluntary association may be judged unequivocally worthwhile by the constituting body, even if achievement is inefficient by executant criteria.

Education for Life. No society, much less the global order, will operate properly unless the individuals involved understand what is required and permitted. It is amazing that secondary school students and even university students are given no proper understanding of endeavours which they can join, within which they will spend so much time and with which they must interact. Cells in movements operate amateurishly and emotionally, almost by definition. Yet awareness of the nature of movements could ameliorate some of the strains by making the expectations that people have of themselves and each other more realistic.

Authorities have been little studied and little understood, even by academics. Yet they have a significant contribution to make. People need to appreciate the extent and limits of the powers of such authorities in order to use them properly. This may foster a greater sense of responsibility in industries and professions and lead to more enlightened self-regulatory authorities, so lessening the need for expensive and complicated statutory bodies. But professions and industries are often reluctant to expose themselves. Far too often, the association representing the members imagines it can serve as an independent authority irrespective of the conflict of interest.

Finally, in regard to enterprises, education is highly focused on executant work. Education for the other compartments is rudimentary or non-existent, if not positively misleading. Not one person in a thousand seems to understand the rationale for governing bodies. Yet in the UK alone, over a million people sit on governing boards in organizations of every conceivable type.

Transition. A person who is an insider of a movement is a unique and equal member of a community with a responsibility for it in common with all. A person who is an insider of an enterprise is an independent actor with a precise and distinctive accountability. A person who is an insider of an authority is expected to represent others in the community. This last mediating role seems to be the least individualized.

The authority is a bridge to cross the gulf between the necessary separateness of people as actors and the necessary unity of people as members of a community. Such mediation is required as the shifting realities of inner and often irrational feelings which power movements confront the hard realities of custom and self-interested intention in the outer world.

Autonomy is the prime channel for focusing and amplifying personal and social power. Movements unleash the most potent and diffuse combination of personal energies and social forces. Enterprises multiply the power of a single person to achieve something practical to an extraordinary degree. Authorities have defined and assigned rights and duties, sometimes of the most powerful kind, to intervene in sharply delimited areas. Between them, movements, authorities and enterprises can alter our personal, social and physical world beyond recognition.

Consensus-based autonomy serves society in so far as it permits each person to participate fully in the community while protecting their own values. But autonomy and a supportive consensus do not in themselves guarantee that results will be beneficial for society overall. Remember: it is not appropriate or practical for any single person or body to be fully responsible for the whole of society or for the social order in general. Each endeavour must energetically and wholeheartedly pursue its own inevitably limited mission or failure will result and no one will benefit. This paradox of self-interest failing to serve society fully cannot be avoided by central planning. Its resolution must be based on the idea that society has to function as an evolving self-consciously self-regulating system. But the dimension of societal (self-)control has not yet been addressed. It forces itself on our attention once we recognize the extraordinary power that can be released through committed endeavours.

The release of such awesome power demands a degree of regulation. All in society wish to ensure that order and stability are maintained, and that there is a degree of fairness in the rules being applied. This means that autonomy needs to operate within a common framework of ethical rules. Provision of that framework, the maintenance of order, and responsibility for the exercise of supreme power in society, implies sovereignty. It is to sovereignty with its potential to permit and regulate the realization of values that we must now turn.

Master-Table 37

Properties of the three embodiments of autonomy.
These are needed to ensure that endeavours can be organized so that work within them serves wider society as well as the individual people involved. Autonomy is based on pentads formed by conjoining five adjacent types of purpose. See text for details and explanation.

Pentad No. (Levels)	3 (Ls 7-3)	2 (Ls 6-2)	1 (Ls 5-1)
Types of Endeavour	A Movement	An Authority	An Enterprise
Function	To develop and establish new values of fundamental importance to society.	To preserve values and apply them authoritatively to particular situations.	To pursue values through activities which generate tangible benefits for itself.
Effect of Success	Society transforms itself by voluntary collective action.	Society stabilizes itself by clarifying, modulating and asserting its values.	Society functions by meeting its evolving social needs effectively.
Main Criticism	Too utopian.	Too remote.	Too self-centred.
Responsible for:	Determining a way of thinking for major social issues: cultural, political, economic &c	Handling complaints, adjudications, advice, supervision, review, protection &c.	Producing goods, services, ideas for reform, benefits for members &c.
Power Source	An idea whose time has come.	Society and its current values.	Systematic and responsive management.
Key Element	Autonomous cell.	Authorized committee.	Accountable role.
Authority	Egalitarian.	Polyarchic.	Hierarchic.
Leadership	Diffused.	Formalized.	Meritocratic.
Structures	Multiple, diverse, transient.	Simple, procedural, inflexible.	Complex, functional, flexible.
Insiders	Grass roots.	The council and its secretariat.	Governing, top officer & executant bodies.
Role of Insiders in Society	Heralds of the future who are united in the service of values.	Distinguished representatives who are legitimated to serve society as it is.	Independent agents who are harnessed in the service of a task.
Incentive to Join	Fulfilment of personal values i.e. insiders can do what they want to.	Prestige and respect i.e. insiders should do what they ought to.	Money and goods i.e. insiders must do what they have to.
Performance	Spontaneous and ideological.	Professional and sound.	Efficient and dynamic.

Master-Table 38

Designing duties to provide synergy in endeavours.

Each type of autonomous endeavour has different characteristic compartments/roles which must discharge responsibilities in relation to each relevant level of purpose. Synergy depends on achieving a necessary inter-relation of duties and authority or influence. The primary responsibility is in bold in the matrices. Note the diagonal arrangement. The two dotted lines differentiate wider society on the left, and the entity proper on the right. The centre sections mediate between wider society and the entity proper. See text for further details

Row 5/Col.1	Row 4/Col.2	Row 3/Col.3	Row 2/Col.4	Row 1/Col.5
Provides social consensus on need.	Provides the rationale to structure & sustain	Provides political steering and a societal interface	Provides a direction to maximize impact	Provides the appropriately adapted means

G-5³: A Popular Movement

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Intellectuals	Advocates	Organizers	Grass Roots
7: Ultimate Values	Affirm	Support	Promote	Reflect on	Assume
6: Value Systems	Endorse	Affirm	Support	Promote	Reflect on
5: Social Values	Debate	Endorse	Affirm	Support	Promote
4: Principal Objects	Challenge	Debate	Endorse	Affirm	Support
3: Internal Priorities	—	Challenge	Debate	Endorse	Affirm

G-5²: A Regulatory Authority

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Formal Inquiry	Instituting Body	Council	Secretariat
6: Value Systems	Recommend	Act within	Respond to	Uphold	Interpret
5: Social Values	Debate	Recommend	Act within	Respond to	Uphold
4: Principal Objects	Examine	Debate	Recommend	Act within	Respond to
3: Internal Priorities	Note	Examine	Debate	Recommend	Act within
2: Strategic Objectives	—	Note	Examine	Debate	Recommend

G-5¹: An Achieving Enterprise

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Constituting Body*	Governing Body	Top Officer Body	Executant Body
5: Social Values	Set	Pursue	Observe	Identify with	Act on
4: Principal Objects	Sanction	Set	Pursue	Observe	Identify with
3: Internal Priorities	Own	Sanction	Set	Pursue	Observe
2: Strategic Objectives	React to	Own	Sanction	Set	Pursue
1: Tactical Objectives	—	React to	Own	Sanction	Set

* Lower levels show variation in different types of organization

G-6: SOVEREIGNTY

Nature. The power that flows from the autonomy of a single person is indeed limited. However the power that flows from that same autonomy embedded and embodied in a group is a function of the number of people, the type of endeavour they launch, and the resources they can mobilize. Such power has the potential to achieve great things and to benefit individuals — but there are always ethical costs and potential dangers. The chief concern of any society is that it may become vulnerable to subversion from within or invasion from without. If society is over-turned then individual autonomy may be lost. It therefore becomes essential to subordinate autonomy to societal integrity.

The ethical cost of autonomy is our main concern. It derives from the deep reality that nothing that is done is wholly good, and nothing happens without some harmful consequences or unexpected side-effects. Ethical threat is also rooted in the individualist and partial concerns of autonomous endeavours, even movements. In the push for achievement, the well-being of the whole of society has perforce to be a secondary consideration. This too poses ethical problems.

Ethical damage can feed on itself until the fabric of society on which all depend is damaged and even destroyed. So, the autonomy of powerful 'legal individuals' must be capped by a supreme collective power: the **sovereignty** of society. Sovereignty, if accepted, implies that all movements, authorities and enterprises should properly exist and function within laws and other ethical rules of a particular territorial society or state. At the same time, sovereignty also protects autonomy by using power to define its limits, to assign personal rights, to keep internal or external disruptive forces at bay and to ensure a sufficiently stable value context. In other words, the exercise and control of autonomous power demands the exercise of a supreme or sovereign power.

Without autonomy and individual power, it is impossible to realize values. Without sovereignty and social power it is impossible to protect and maintain that process. All exercise of power, individual and social, private and public, must recognize the pre-eminent need for sustenance of the ethical order $(G''-7^1)$.

As we saw in the analysis of ethical authorities (Ch. 9), laws alone are by no means sufficient to sustain a social order. Other types of ethical rule are essential as well as rule derivatives culminating in the ethical order which is the source and summation of authority. Sovereignty deals with the entire social order, both its concrete, purposive aspects and its abstract, ethical aspects. Then we said that the ethical order should be embraced willingly. Now we must consider how such a willing embrace can come about. We must also move beyond (or descend from) the ethical order, to consider the pursuit of the common good which must deal with tangible and messy realities.

The ethical order was formed by rules of all seven types. Rules (within L-6) are the ethical tool for understanding and justifying social values and all activities in their service. Harnessing rules to support the realization of values is not a straightforward matter nor something that can be solely and individualistically determined by each endeavour or organization. The result would be endless disputes, discord and ultimately violence. The notion of rule by rules requires conceptualization of a society which possesses sovereignty in the sense of a unified and supreme will for all to live together in a particular way. Such a mysterious entity in turn needs to be concretized and given guardians. These guardians (within G-6) can then legitimately exercise and control supreme power. Note that the notion of guardian here has nothing to do with a virtuous and wise elite ruling class as conceived, for example, by Plato in *The Republic*. I use the term solely to emphasize that sovereignty needs to be viewed primarily as a custodial matter, and only secondarily as executive. It exists to protect and enable autonomy, human development, and the advancement of shared interests — not to mobilize and direct people to some pre-specified ideological end.[27]

Rules are of two distinct types, constitutive and regulative. Constitutive rules define a field, while regulative rules determine what is permitted within the field. In a similar fashion there are two guardians (or rulers). People who officially make up the society, citizens, are the constituting guardian — without them there can be no social order; and the government is the regulative or executive guardian — without some form of government laws could not be defined and the social order could not be maintained.

The existence of **sovereignty** is made possible by integrating an additional sixth level of purpose to create hexadic groupings which enable *ethical imposition* of values. The sixth level properly legitimates sovereignty and enables the coercive power that sovereignty unavoidably entails. In a sovereign society, it is essential that everyone and all endeavours are integrated into society according to certain ideals and conceptions of what society is and should be. In other words, sovereignty assumes ethical rules and value systems to which all adhere. At the heart of ethics lie rights and tenets, which together determine ideologies. So the additional level, like the ethical order, provides a quality which to

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its adherents is unambiguously ethical and to its detractors is unequivocally ideological.

Types. Each hexad defines a distinct requirement of sovereignty corresponding to the two guardians in society. In descending order, these are: *the citizenry* (G-6^2) and *the government* (G-6^1). As the French Declaration of the Rights of Man declared: 'Sovereignty resides with the people'. The hexadic arrangement accords, therefore, with what is generally called 'popular sovereignty'.[28]

The nature of sovereignty, government and democracy is too vast a topic to be examined here. My limited aim is to let the levels of purpose perspective throw some light on this controversial subject. My focus will be mainly on representative democracy with its free and fair elections of politicians, and a citizenry supported by freedoms of association, information and expression (as argued for in G"-3: Ch. 9).

A guardian may be defined as that societal entity which takes responsibility for the social order, both concrete/practical and abstract/ethical. Note that the guardian cannot be responsible for society: the reverse would seem to be closer to the truth. Any society evolves on the basis of individual actions and external influences. These are largely beyond the guardians' control. Society, via its deep ethical order and existing social order, lies beyond and above its manifest guardians however impressive and powerful they may seem. Each society, via its membership, needs to evolve appropriate guardian arrangements and suitable ex-

pressions of sovereignty. (The ultimate supremacy of membership is the essence of the heptad as described in the next section.)

The *function* of sovereignty is to ensure that a society, its people and their activities are regulated by values. The guardians of sovereignty use valued rules to control the exercise of power. They are concerned that values in the social order should permeate society by influencing the values and objectives chosen by individuals. Each guardian, however, operates this responsibility in a distinctive fashion.

The usual political formulation of 'the ruler' and 'the ruled' does not fit the levels of purpose framework very well. It misleadingly places the government above the people.[29] There is always a possibility, however slim, that the citizenry will remove or redesign the government, and never a possibility that the government will remove or redesign the people. If we ask: who is ruled? The answer is that both guardians are themselves ruled. Any government must operate in accord with the constitution, accepted procedures and laws of the land as laid down by the citizenry, previous governments and itself. The people, both the citizenry and others, are similarly ruled: by the law and by the ethical order generally.

Placing the citizenry above the government means that all power rules are open to revision by public debate in which all can share equally. It provides the potential for the general interest to prevail over special interests which have captured the government. Finally, in the case of a failure of performance, the government

Figure 12.2: The hexadic grouping which defines power.
Two guardians of sovereignty enabling power to be regulated ethically

L-7 Ultimate Value			
L-6 Value System			
L-5 Social Value		G-6^2	
L-4 Principal Object			
L-3 Internal Priority	G-6^1		
L-2 Strategic Obj.		← *The Citizenry*	
L-1 Tactical Obj.		← *The Government*	

can be peacefully removed and a new one installed without a crisis in the system.

We will now consider each guardian in turn from the present perspective without going deeply into political theory or examples. The hexads are represented diagrammatically in Figure 12.2. Differences between the guardians are summarized in Master-Table 39. The differences between the two guardians will be clarified by examining the different way that each handles purposes in the five common levels. These five levels of overlap can be viewed as defining the *political arena*. Apart from its ruling guardians, society has other *guardian institutions* which need to operate freely in this arena; and these will be briefly considered.

G-6²: The Citizenry

The citizenry, or citizen-body, constitutes society. This is why society's constitution which defines its form of government is usually decided and altered by referendum (or revolution). The citizenry, a term which has become synonymous with democracy, is defined here to include all those who can vote and hold public office.

The *function* of the citizenry is to assert the common good. So the actual situation in society, the concrete social order, must be scrutinized from a value perspective. If the enfranchised citizenry is to be a meaningful guardian, each citizen must be able to hold, check, reflect on, discuss, affirm and debate values and objectives of all sorts. This is what the political process is about. People who are judged to be unable to participate responsibly in this way (e.g. young children) may be deprived of all or part of their citizenship rights and duties. But being able to be a responsible citizen does not mean automatically having citizen status.

Citizenship is a political qualification. The citizenry, sometimes known as 'the people', is not synonymous with all people, or all who feel they are members of the society. In classical Athens, the proportion of citizens was tiny. Reasons are invariably found to exclude children and certain special classes from citizenship. Such special classes usually seem obvious to those in the society, if possibly unjust to outsiders. History reveals, for example, that slaves, women, prisoners, the mentally ill, resident foreigners and adherents to particular religions have been so classified. Even adults outside these classes usually need to have additional qualifications, typically birth or permanent residence in modern times, and usually wealth or property in the recent past. Any alteration of these arrangements reflects a fundamental change in the nature of society, and modifies the constitution of government. In the UK, for instance, a series of reform acts over 100 years

in the 19th and early 20th centuries dramatically widened citizenship by removing the need to own land, altering the age of majority, emancipating women, and abolishing religious restrictions on voting and officeholding.

The citizenry see themselves as the essence of the society. They are the sovereign power. It is their good and their interests which are at stake and liable to be disrupted by remote regulatory authorities, movements instigated by non-enfranchised classes, or exploitative firms. The citizenry is too numerous and amorphous to handle all the practical work of ruling. The best that they can do is express their values and indicate a desirable outcome. Governments are allowed to guard sovereignty and rule on the basis that they will respect these values and pursue such outcomes on behalf of the citizenry. The citizenry expects the government to handle all the details and mechanisms essential for societal regulation. Because the citizenry is the higher ruler, it must accept responsibility for its government — even if it is ruthless and tyrannical.

Power within the citizenry usually appears unbalanced. But the citizenry needs to be thought of as a whole, whose inner states and outer manifestations shift according to the times. Whatever the extent of the inequalities in practice, the citizenry is deeply preoccupied with issues of equality. The matter of how far citizenship should extend has already been noted. But a stream of other equality issues demand attention: how far should justice mean identical portions, treatments, rights or duties? and how far should inequalities based on merit, birth, need, position, or wealth be tolerated?

In practice, the citizenry seems to view its own conventions and will as superior to law and logic. It reacts with intensity when its perspectives are challenged. If need be, the law is changed and logic is ignored.

The citizenry recognizes the importance of absolutes and ultimate values. It expects these to be proclaimed and affirmed, despite the inevitable pragmatism of any government. To lead the citizenry in this way, a symbolic head is required. This can be a non-factional head-of-state, a figure-head monarch or church leader. The task here is to represent a deep sense of unity of society, to reaffirm the ethical teaching or unifying religion of society, and to uphold each and every citizen's desire for good rule.

When unity is a fiction, as in African countries like Zaire and Nigeria where warring tribes were forced together after colonisation, then a citizenry does not truly exist. As a result, unifying non-governmental leadership is weak, power is not effectively or ethically controlled, and civil disorder erupts.

The commonest criticism of the citizenry is that they do not take civic virtue and their guardianship duties seriously enough: people are uninformed, uninterested and uninvolved. They only leap into action when something affects their own enterprises and personal interests. The opposite view is that the neglect of politics is entirely appropriate, even beneficial, for most people, because this enables prosperity. Notable support for both views can be easily found: Thomas Carlyle regarded choice of government as the 'soul of all social business among men'; while William Blake held that 'if men were wise, the most arbitrary Princes could not hurt them. If they are not wise, the freest government is compelled to be a tyranny.'

When governments cease acting lawfully and responsibly and the citizenry takes no action, then society is in danger of breaking down and mob rule is likely. Demagogues emerge. By whipping up base emotions, inflaming people with half-truths, populist leaders may coerce government in an unbridled, unethical exercise of power which is rarely beneficial for society. At the time of writing, rule in Yugoslavia moved along this catastrophic path. Subsequently the nation disintegrated and civil war erupted.

G-6[1]: The Government

The government regulates society. Any government rules primarily by legally releasing and constraining the exercise of power by individual people and their associations. Any form of government is a set of political institutions whose *function* is solely to serve the common good as asserted explicitly by the citizenry. As an absolute minimum, a government must concentrate on two things: the security of the community (external and internal) and the well-being or prosperity of its members.

The work of government rule involves the performance of complex legislative, executive and judicial functions. The government must take all detailed actions, debate and pass laws, set up independent statutory authorities, create and manage needed public agencies: all with the over-riding aim of guarding sovereignty and protecting and promoting the common good. Governments who fail to maintain order and foster prosperity are liable to be rejected by the citizenry at the earliest opportunity.

Much political theory concerns the precise details of governance systems and methods for exercising control. For example, it considers the various forms that government may take e.g. autocracy and monarchy, aristocracy and oligarchy, various forms of democracy. Democratic government is expected to reconcile the common good with the needs and values of each person. Another dimension concerns the different approaches — such as communism, liberalism or conservatism — to handling the balance between the requirements of the individual and the group. Examination of these various political systems and ideologies lies beyond the scope of this book.[30]

The political institutions which define government require people to operate them. The people are selected from the citizenry and so are in some sense representative. Selection needs to take place in an acceptable way. For example, by election, by lot (a favourite in Aristotle's day), by coup (a long-time favourite in South America), by nomination, by appointment. Because government is a representative entity, everyone holding government positions (including officials and the judiciary) needs to see themselves as servants of society.

A dangerous but common confusion in much writing lies in using the term 'the state' as synonymous with 'the government'. This usage blurs the distinction between the government (the part) and society (the whole). This is wrong logically. It also tends to emphasize the need for the citizenry to give their government not just a monopoly of physical force but a superiority of judgement and the primary responsibility for society. This is wrong ethically. Nevertheless, an equivalence between state and the people can be (and is) upheld in the case of 'mobilization regimes'. These regimes are single party states unified by a religious or ideological doctrine, legitimated by mass action and supported by the repression of dissent.

The government, whether elected or not, must maintain a monopoly on force because it has to organize the protection of society from internal and external subversion. Too often, this force is used to protect itself. A representative government needs to be preoccupied with determining what the citizenry want and how to assist in its provision or production. So governments should seek to deal with unofficial leaders in the community: opinion-formers, religious leaders, influential academics, popular advocates in movements. Such contacts must be distinguished from pressure groups and vested interests. Without input from people genuinely concerned with society as a whole, governments are in danger of losing touch with what the citizenry needs and wants.

Finding a way forward, however, remains problematic. The liberal-democratic system tends to pander to well-organized minority lobbies. In any case, it is often very difficult to know what can be done. So governments often find that they are driven more by events and circumstances than by their values and visions.

Governments inevitably become pre-occupied with prosperity. Once poverty and hardship engulf members of society, then demoralization and social disorder threaten. Governments use wealth, together with honours, as the prime tools both to remove and to create inequalities.

The government views law-making as the highest expression of its powers. To decide on the need for a law, to develop a viable law, and to institute it procedurally requires a great deal of detailed and practical work. So governments need a pragmatic leader, a prime minister or premier, who can seek consent, handle necessary compromises and adapt to situations.

Governments are typically criticised for being unresponsive and self-serving. This is commonly because members of a sub-group of citizens habitually fills the top positions within the government. This sub-group is de facto the ruling class — also known as the establishment, power elites, or the political class. Any ruling class will tend, either deliberately or unconsciously, to perpetuate the social order which created it.[31]

Governments which are absolutist tend to rule by decree rather than law. Fascism which sees action as superior to thought — and values are essentially thought — produces rule by instinct. Such governing ideologies are evil in so far as they devalue values and produce governments which are weakly legitimated by the citizenry. This issue of legitimation is so fundamental to the ethical exercise of power that we must now consider what light the present levels of purpose analysis can throw on it.

Legitimation

It is obvious that the two guardians need to interact effectively if a sovereign society is to thrive. The relation between the citizenry and their government is *the* issue of political theory and not one which can be addressed and resolved in a few pages. However, we can gain a useful conceptual perspective on how the two guardians interlock and some indication of how they might reinforce each other in practice.

When linkage between the government and the citizenry is poor, social discontent and tension rises and the regime is described as non-accountable, non-representative or remote. Effective interaction is most likely to occur if the citizenry is virtually co-extensive with the resident population and the government operates democratically.[32] Democracy seems to be the conception that best expresses the assertion that the citizenry should regulate the government and not vice versa.

When the link between government and citizens is tight and positive, the two guardians can depend on each other. When the link is loose or negative, government tends to be autocratic or corrupt and the citizenry is weakened. People find security in their own efforts, their families and in small communities rather than attending to society. But if people disenfranchise or alienate themselves in a democracy, then the social order can break down. Collapse is particularly likely if poverty becomes wide-spread or if sub-populations with sharply different customs are forced to co-exist. The re-establishment of order invites the imposition of less-representative government: usually military or oligarchic.

The issue here is one of legitimation. How can government be genuinely said to enjoy the support and confidence of the people? How can its powers of detailed regulation and social (i.e. public sector) enterprise be deemed acceptable? A practical answer emerging from the approaches to ethical choice. It reveals that the legitimacy of any exercise of government (or citizen) power is based primarily on the need for consensus via legal validity, moral justifiability and effectiveness.[33] Such a line of analysis is concerned with the quality of rules, values and objectives being proposed. The answer to be given here is concerned with the relation of the government and citizenry to the various types of value and objective. Focus on the extensive overlap of levels of purpose between the two guardians reveals important and inescapable differences for governing to be satisfactory. In short, legitimacy derives from the two guardians sharing and accepting certain value systems, social values, principal objects, internal priorities, and strategic objectives.

These common purposes function in different ways for each guardian. I will explain this further with simple examples below. But at first sight, it is surely obvious that the government must accept that only the citizenry can provide ultimate values to regulate sovereignty, and that the citizenry must accept that only the government can provide tactical objectives to regulate sovereignty. It is also evident that some commonality of purposes and values at the other levels is essential if the government is to act on behalf of the citizenry and if the citizenry is to support its government.

Using Values. When the two guardians define themselves with the same type of purpose or value, they do so in overtly different ways. These differences are captured by the qualities of the internal levels that we have been regularly considering in previous groupings. We will take each type of purpose in turn indicating the distinctive perspective generated by each of the guardians.

Ultimate values are the source of supreme and irresistible power and they are *imposed ethically* by the

citizenry on themselves and on any government. To describe an ultimate value as ethical is almost tautological. To see particular ultimate values as central to society is more problematic. It implies that the citizenry deeply believe that these are fundamental to the humane or divine regulation of their society. The government has no significant involvement in determining which ultimate values are chosen. So when US President John F. Kennedy said that his country would 'pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to secure the survival and success of liberty', he was merely echoing and affirming the preference of the American people for liberty as the primary regulating ultimate value. Other societies are different: the ideological ultimate value in Japan seems to be harmony; in pre-Chinese Tibet it was compassion.

Value systems are a matter of *general consensus* within the citizenry and permit it to exert power. By contrast, ideas are *ethically imposed* by the government. Ethical rules and theories of social life (e.g. principles of education) are only followed and supported on the basis of a substantial consensus. The reader will recall that the ethical order must be embraced willingly by people. Once it is, then the citizenry expects the government to operate and regulate in accord with its component rules: that is to say, to impose them. Ideas are far more serious for governments than for its citizens, because a government can only function if it is adheres explicitly to the ethical order and is prepared to enforce it. Elections to form a government need to be fought on the basis of ideological commitments which can be translated into fair laws and implementable social policies. Different parties stand for different ideas and the citizenry uses majority voting in order to determine which of these sustains a sufficient consensus. Even if the election is fought on a pragmatic or personality basis, any government in power finds itself forced to impose an ethical orientation via its legislative programme or drift helplessly on a sea of events, vested interests and changeable public moods.

Social values are the *essential rationale* for the exertion of power by the citizenry and the source of their drive for sovereignty. These values enable the government to rule by *general consensus*. Ordinary people view social values, their needs and sense of belonging, as the logical bases for all communal activities including ruling. So these communal need-based values are the rationale for tolerating governments at all — especially paying taxes to cover its enormous cost. The government, for its part, uses shared values as a way of gaining the necessary consensus for its choices, social policies and legislation. It must ensure that people appreciate that these activities aim to meet their real needs.

Principal objects underlie the *political support* of the citizenry, and define the *essential rationale* of the government. The government exists to institute a wide range of on-going activities which should be carefully and sensibly designed to meet identified social needs. The government must organize the workings of the legislature, administration and judiciary; create independent authorities to enforce minimum standards and handle value disputes; and set up and run a variety of organizations like the civil service, the armed forces, public agencies and taxation authorities. The ever-present danger is the self-perpetuating growth of a regulatory bureaucracy and public sector which unavoidably stifle autonomy and impoverish the citizens. A wise citizenry sees this clearly, and views every governmental endeavour as a political issue in terms of its cost, its constraint on freedom, its impact on inequalities and its effect on private enterprise.

Internal priorities enable the citizenry to *maximize its impact*, but are used by the government to gain *political support*. For example, the public presses for better education or wider access to health care, because it wants to see the social order actually alter in that direction. The government, by contrast, pushes priorities for education or health care as a way of garnering support for itself and for its whole programme of spending, taxation, and social change. In other words, the citizenry is preoccupied with the effect of its values, whereas the government is preoccupied with developing and balancing the interests of the various stakeholders. Governments are well aware that many will oppose a priority because of their beliefs or vested interests. If the government fails to use priorities to find a compromise, it becomes wholly ineffective and may even be brought down. Even the judiciary must consider carefully the likely social response to values implicit in particular judgements.

Strategic objectives are viewed by the citizenry in terms of whether they are *appropriately adapted*, while they are used by the government to *maximize impact*. The citizenry wants social needs translated into results which fit the existing situation — emergency assistance for a flooded community, more choice of cheaper air flights, more flexible housing, employment opportunities in recession-hit areas. The details of how these outcomes are achieved (i.e. tactical objectives) are not their concern. By contrast, the government selects strategic objectives in order to have the greatest effect and do the best possible with the funds available for the community as a whole. This requires considerable systemic analysis and skilled intervention. If housing is a concern, for example, the government must consider whether this should be addressed by one or more of: re-zoning land, providing home loans, altering building regulations,

changing taxation on rented properties, and other diverse possibilities. Poor choice of strategic objectives can very easily make matters worse.

Tactical objectives set by the government must be *appropriately adapted* to circumstances. Precise deadlines and specific tasks are handled by governmental bodies. Much is pragmatically decided by officials, rather than by legislators or judges. The citizenry has no significant involvement and little awareness of the processes and details of official business. When something goes very wrong, an inquiry may indicate exactly what happened. More often, the precise details are obscured because they cannot be appreciated in context — or for less worthy reasons when documents are shredded to prevent embarrassment or to hide corrupt practices.

The Political Arena. The legitimation of government and the interaction between government and citizens takes place in a conceptual space, the political arena. The political arena may be precisely recognized as the overlap of levels defining the two guardians: L-6 through L-2. It is surely no coincidence that this corresponds precisely to the levels defining independent regulatory authorities (G-5^2). Recall that these authorities were viewed as a way to prevent cluttering of the political arena.

The government, guided by its citizenry, must serve as the guardian of social freedoms in general, especially freedom from fear, while recognizing that freedom must be restricted.

Indeed, individual freedom and its deliberate restriction for the common good is the deepest issue in politics. The final compromise in each case needs to be determined by debate within the political arena.

It is possible to discern specific domains of freedom-related decision-making. Consider, for example, radio and television broadcasting. The influence on society is great and the potential for misuse by either individuals or the government is high. So protection is required. In such a domain there are a variety of bodies which see themselves as protecting society's values. These bodies include private firms, public agencies, regulatory authorities, professional associations and listener or viewer groups. Together these can be thought of as comprising a 'guardian institution'. Should there be a need to delimit or extend free communication or expression via broadcasting, any or all of such bodies may well enter the debate. A loose network usually exists which, in the face of threat from the government or external forces, may lead to the setting up of a formalized or ad hoc association. Nevertheless, the guardian institution is not a specific, autonomous or bounded organization or endeavour which speaks with

one voice. Indeed, dissension within it is the norm and, because it reflects the plurality of interests and attitudes in society, this can be politically beneficial.

We may similarly suggest that freedom of worship is guarded not just by churches but by numerous public institutions, religious bodies and voluntary groups; freedom under the law is the concern of a wide variety of bodies associated with the legal system; freedom of thought is guarded by academia, learned bodies and otherwise competing membership organizations; and so on.

The guardian institution seeks to lead the citizenry in debate in its domain and to evolve the necessary values and objectives. However, distinctions between freedoms and between guardian institutions are somewhat artificial. The freedoms are highly inter-related and the political arena shows a high degree of inter-penetration of social bodies and processes. Churchmen not only speak in churches but on television, pronouncing on the behaviour of the government in any domain. Some churchmen are in government; and others are in universities. Academics may contribute regularly to popular newspapers and work for particular political parties. The press may oppose or support decisions of the churches, universities, or monetary authorities; even openly challenge court judgements. A high court judge may declare certain religious rituals illegal or advise governments to legislate.

People and organizations active within the political arena are acutely sensitive to the ebb and flow of values. They debate and argue the preferences and needs of society from the distinctive perspective of their institution. In doing so, they engage in a political process and become enmeshed in political conflict. When the media examines the ordination of women or the pay of top executives or the demands of striking workers, it ends up taking an attitude that is favourable or unfavourable to one or other side of the case. The rejected side can be presented as unreasonable or illogical by a skilful juxtaposition of images and selection of facts. The truly balanced assessment does not exist from the viewpoint of those involved. Each stakeholder tends to feel that the other's case has been too favourably handled. As we saw earlier in relation to authorities (G-5^2), official inquiries may be used by government when the debate becomes heated; but their recommendations are also subject to the vicissitudes of political debate.

The political arena is a battlefield for competing value systems. The stability of any community depends ultimately on the preservation and sensitive modification of values. So debate needs to be respected and developed if the arena is to serve society well. It is

possible to identify a variety of roles specific to levels of purpose in the political arena. These operate across domains, challenging guardian institutions on their own territory.

L-6: There are thinkers in universities, think-tanks and politics who seek to defend, challenge and elaborate theories, beliefs, or principles in use. L-5: Journalists, policy-analysts and jurists often act as evaluators seeking to determine what the social values are and whether they are being pursued in action. L-4: Promoters or sponsors seeking to gain consensus on the value of an endeavour or organization are to be found in the press and among civic-minded foundations. L-3: The media often acts as a factionalizer through providing fora and coalescing groups both for and against particular values. Such debates raise public awareness. Opinion pollsters contribute at this level also. L-2: Finally, would-be policy-makers and strategists, often in membership associations or reform-generating organizations, publicize and promote their own proposals for action.

Clearly, both the citizenry and the government benefit from work in the political arena. So both need to protect its existence and operation.

REVIEWING SOVEREIGNTY

Any guardian's proper concern is to provide a framework of rules within which individual people and their enterprises can function freely without harming the society on which everyone depends. Establishing this order does not inhibit progress but positively facilitates it by providing a bedrock of stability and a degree of justice. We have identified the two guardians as the citizenry, a sub-set of the people, and the government, a set of political institutions accepted by the citizenry and filled from among their members. The empirical complexities of sovereignty in practice have hardly been touched upon.

An idealized fantasy has often wished to fuse these two guardians. In versions of direct democracy, the citizenry's responsibilities are extended to incorporate that of the government using the mechanism of the sovereign assembly. If this ever worked in simple tiny city-states, which is doubtful, it is certainly impractical in modern complex societies. Citizens may well participate more fully in governmental decisions in the future using interactive television and computer-based methods for handling referenda and debates. But this is likely to enhance the responsibility and differentiation of the two guardians rather than lead to any confusion between them.

For progress, ethical rules are not enough. The citizenry requires that actual conditions should be altered. The internal structure of the guardians of sovereignty clarifies the fact that the citizenry can foster popular movements and actively support regulatory authorities, but cannot handle executive-run enterprises (cf. Master-Fig. 28). Executive work is too detailed, practical and reality-based for such a diffuse entity. The government, by contrast, can set up independent authorities and executive agencies, but it cannot generate popular movements. Movements require too much inspiration and imply too much transformation to be led or even fostered by a government.

The quality of the particular persons in positions of power naturally limits the quality of governments and their policies. Governments print money and engage in wars. Vast sums are raised in taxes and spent. Decisions affecting whole populations are made. Yet equality means that anyone may enter politics. Virtually no training in political processes, no knowledge of legal requirements, no understanding of finance and management, no qualification is required — nothing but citizenship. Social selection for political office operates in poorly understood ways, but clearly some people succeed because they have a vocation for public life. In some democratic societies, great wealth has become the road to high political office. In non-democratic societies, a few tanks and much determination may suffice. In all governments, those who achieve power tend to take advantage of it unconsciously or corruptly. The ethical authorities that keep such power in check are the citizenry's hope and responsibility.

Transition. Sovereignty protects the order and stability on which society depends by regulating power and by exercising supreme power. The mindless or harmful handling of power is a continuing problem. Control by the citizenry of the government should be enlightened or control by the government of the citizenry will be abysmal. This means that the control of power and the upholding of the social order must be under the influence of ultimate values. Not ultimate values as words on pieces of paper, but as living forces in the hearts of everyone to guide awareness, reflection and action.

Ultimate values imply an equality which recognizes distinctions. Hence the continuing preoccupation of political theory with the meaning and extent of equality. Power needs to be wielded ethically by the guardians, but neither the government nor the citizenry is ethical at heart — only individual persons and the ethical order and authorities which they embrace.

Sovereignty permits and generates freedoms. If it did not, the political arena could not work and social life

would be intolerable. But sovereignty involves control and, to varying degrees, coercion. If the government is oppressive, there may be redress. But if the citizenry is oppressive through narrow-mindedness, redress is more difficult.

Society, say some, is a conspiracy against the individual. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs. It distrusts and harms free spirits. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche teach that between the individual and the multitude, between individual integrity and social requirements, between what is inner and what is outer, between the realm of inner experience and the world of social commitment, there is an opposition as deep as can be imagined. The only hope is that each individual person may recognize this apparent opposition and synthesize the dialectic by recognizing the inevitability of social existence and the need for membership of society. In this way, a person can perhaps influence a sovereign society, including its current constitution and custodians, for its own good.

With this conclusion, we can move to the final heptadic group which defines membership.

Master-Table 39

Properties of the two guardians of sovereignty.

These are required to ensure that society, its members and its activities, are regulated by values
Each guardian is a hexad formed by combining six adjacent levels of purpose.
See text for details and explanation.

Hexad No. (Levels)	2 (Ls 7-2)	1 (Ls 6-1)
Type of Guardian	The Citizenry	The Government
Nature	To constitute a society. (i.e. the constitutive guardian/ruler.)	To regulate society. (i.e. the executive guardian/ruler.)
Function	To assert the common good: hence responsible for its government.	To serve the common good: hence responsible for collective decisions.
Members	People meeting agreed qualifications e.g. birth, property, residence; but excluding certain classes e.g. minors, prisoners, slaves.	Representative(s) obtained from the citizenry in an accepted way e.g. by election, lot, coup, nomination.
Authority	Derives from convention and the common will.	Derives from a constitution and legislation as supported by the citizenry.
Ideal	Civic virtue	Statesmanship
Type of Head	Symbolic e.g. monarch, head of state, religious leader.	Practical e.g. prime minister, supreme court judges.
Preoccupation	Ends i.e. ultimately emotional issues especially equality.	Means i.e. ultimately practical issues especially security and prosperity
Dysfunction	Demagoguery (mob rule).	Despotism (rule by decree rather than law)
Criticisms	Uninformed, uninterested, uninvolved.	Out-of-touch, self-serving, incompetent.

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G-7: MEMBERSHIP

Nature. Power must be controlled and a sovereign society must be established for one reason above all: that people, individually, may be free within its limits. The realization of values, the driving force of this structural hierarchy, is at root an expression of freedom. But freedom without rules or responsibilities is chaotic in practice and unethical in principle.

By integrating the final, seventh level, and creating a heptad, it is possible to construct a purposive entity whose survival depends on the notion of exercising freedom within rules. This is an enduring natural social group: typically a society with a particular social order.

Society needs the social order to be governed by ultimate values if freedom is to be responsible. The purposive entity defined by unifying all the levels of purpose including ultimate values is active **membership** of that society and willing acceptance of its order. Membership, like ultimate values on which it is based, is at root a *state of being*. In other words, the membership state is basic to social existence and societal integrity. Membership is the pre-condition for developing both personal and communal identity. It is just not possible for an individual to participate in social life and assume social roles and responsibilities without an experience of membership. The reverse is also true: society and the social order cannot persist, let alone thrive, without genuine members. The unifying heptad is diagrammatically represented in Fig. 12.3.

Social being is not identical with personhood. To be human involves other modalities of identity (cf. Master-Tables 11 and 12: Ch. 7). However, membership of a society and working or functioning within its order is the basis for developing and handling purposes and values — which is what fulfilment for social being is about. There is only one heptad and only one state of membership which enables the exercise of freedom. On the basis of genuine membership, society can develop sovereignty and authorize its guardians. They, in turn, enable autonomy with its association-based endeavours.

When we speak of membership of *the social order* (G-7¹), the emphasis is on ownership of values and objectives in a community. The usual focus, as in the previous section, is on the nation-state: the territorially-defined sovereign society. However, the smallest natural community, a household, and the largest, the world community, also have their order.

Membership of a well-to-do modern sovereign society is far more problematic than membership of a small subsistence community with its ties of kinship, neighbourliness and joint efforts to survive. The anonymity and impersonalization of modernity generates two requirements. The first (emerging from L-6) is the existence of a sphere of personal rights that cannot be abrogated or removed by sovereign power and political compromise — hence their label 'inalienable'. Certain inalienable rights must be freely available for all members of society, not just citizens e.g. the right to a measure of privacy applies even to children. Without such rights, it is rather difficult to work with values in

Figure 12.3: The heptadic grouping which defines freedom.
One state of membership enabling freedom to be exercised imaginatively.

L-7 Ultimate Value			
L-6 Value System			
L-5 Social Value			
L-4 Principal Object		G-7¹	
L-3 Internal Priority			
L-2 Strategic Obj.			
L-1 Tactical Obj.		← The Social Order	

society. So these rights, are not simply about sovereignty and, not surprisingly, many rulers feel threatened by them.

The second feature, paradoxically more difficult to comprehend in the secularism of modernity, is the ready activation of ultimate values (L-7). Ultimate values, alone, enable each person to recognize themselves in strangers. So they are the basis for bridging differences and overcoming envy, hostility and other inner destructive forces whose release is so easy. Ultimate values permit the extension of inalienable rights beyond the membership of society e.g. the right to a fair trial should apply to aliens. Because they embody and release spirituality, ultimate values limit the potential for destructiveness, the obsession with power, and the intrinsic immorality that goes hand in hand with sovereignty.

Ultimate values being personal, experiential, utterly open and unconditioned are the source of freedom and a reservoir of hope. As well as enabling individuality and binding diverse groups in society, they offer the resources of the imagination and will to combat existing ills and injustices. Freedom in this context is the imaginative ability within each person to create and realize new values, an ability on which every culture and society depends. Only an imaginative and free social being can recognize that ultimate values have created illusory and oppressive structures of belief and custom. Only an imaginative and free social being can willingly participate while refusing to be a slave to ideology or community pressures. Such a reflective attitude to society depends on inner integrity because it potentially questions the foundations of personal and social identity. We may say that the *function* of membership is to ensure that each person uses and evaluates their values.

Qualities. From the analysis so far, we can predict the contribution of each level to the social order and membership of it. As in the hexadic grouping, membership of the social order must be: exercised via tactical objectives so as to be *appropriately adapted* to actual circumstances; exercised via strategic objectives in a way which *maximizes impact*; exercised via internal priorities in order to win *political support* from key people or sub-groups; exercised via principal objects to provide an *essential rationale* for being in society; exercised via *social values* in order to function within the *general consensus* of the community; and exercised via value systems in order to enable intelligible *ethical imposition* on others. The additional inclusion of ultimate values enables membership to be exercised *imaginatively*. Including all levels, especially this highest level, enables enlightened functioning. It encourages the

generation and pursuit of truly inspired ideas which have the potential to remedy imperfections in society without violating it.

Put another way, purposes at each level provide each member with levers of power and influence over himself or herself and over others who are also members of that society. This is why their choice in practice entails responsibility. Tactical objectives (L-1) enable the control of work processes. Strategic objectives (L-2) enable the control of outcomes. Internal priorities (L-3) enable control of resource allocation and foci for effort. Principal objects (L-4) enable control over the identity of endeavours. Social values (L-5) enable influence on community needs. Value systems enable influence on ideas in society (L-6), and ultimate values (L-7) enable influence on the ethical order. All these purposes and modes of influence, including their limitations and potentials for dysfunction, should by now be familiar.

The idea of exercising freedom by choosing and focusing on ultimate values is not commonly appreciated. But the inspirational and spiritual forces associated with ultimate values are essential to overcome the thought control and dysfunctional habits produced by socialization. In all religions it is believed that man has a degree of power over God. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is unable to resist true repentance. In Hindu traditions, a person can force God's hand by fasting, sacrifice, prayers and other meditative rituals. In everyday life, it seems true to say that a deep focus on one or other ultimate value will produce results attuned to it. For this reason, great scientists are likely to dedicate themselves to truth rather than liberty, great artists to beauty rather than compassion, great statesmen to justice or freedom rather than truth or beauty. Through such dedication, each in their own way is helping create the future social order.

Civic Virtue. Society, whether people are aware of it or not, is held together by spiritual forces whose manifestation is most likely to emerge when each person deeply reflects on the meaning of their membership. Membership provides the root of sovereignty, the source of the common will, and the possibility of freedom. But to be effective, it depends on the existence and cultivation of civic virtue.

Civic virtue means taking the notion of a common good seriously. It means supporting with good grace the necessary compromises amongst sub-groups. It means being a responsible part of the citizenry and owning the government. It means supporting authority while rejecting its abuse. It means being prepared to take up suitable roles in society. It means seeing the need for achievements by others. It means tolerating

individual differences and acting with civility to others. It means opposing violence and terror as a solution. It means contemplating and expressing the essential ultimate values of any ethical order: peace, fraternity, equality, liberty, justice, truth, and harmony. It means having a private life and becoming a rounded person.

Within the maxims of civic virtue lies the secret of a desirable social order. In the civic ideal, we see the penetration of spirituality into the mundane realms of social life.

Whether a person is a citizen or not is a matter of meeting certain formal qualifications. Whether a person is a member or not is a matter of inner attitude. Citizens who do not manifest civic virtue probably contribute less to society than non-citizens who do. Statesmanship is the additional membership quality desirable in citizens who hold the highest public offices and to whom the citizenry and others turn for leadership.

These qualities of civic virtue and statesmanship do not necessarily preclude their presence within authoritarian, nationalist or elitist societies. They do suggest, however, that civic virtue cannot flourish in absolutist or tyrannical societies in which hatred and contempt permeate the relation between the governing regime and the populace. In such societies, freedom cannot be easily exercised and inalienable rights cannot be claimed. As a result membership is poorly established and cohesion is weak. Many people willingly flee such countries to seek membership in other more congenial social orders.

Closure. With the principles for specifying a social order and its membership we have come to the end of our exploration of the realization of values — an end which is also a beginning, because membership entails the assumption of certain responsibilities.

Freedom can only be exercised within a society if each person recognizes and accepts responsibility flowing from their own purposes and values. In order to assign and assume these responsibilities in an appropriate way, membership (and the experience of intentionality itself) must be divided up. This takes us back to the seven types of purpose (G-1) and the differentiation of the membership state into the seven primal roles.

Because all levels are now combined within the one single grouping, there are no internal groups to link. Instead, we need to understand how the internal levels are inter-connected. This is because freedom and power require intentionality to flow from one level to another in particular ways. In other words, our exploration now needs to move on in the following chapters to explore how we can and do use purpose and value to be free and powerful, and how we can and do participate in organizations and society.

Before doing so, we need to make a brief over-view of the whole process of realizing values drawing on the findings presented in Ch. 10 as well as the account in this chapter. In particular, I wish to clarify some of the emergent properties and patterns of the purpose derivatives, especially the perennial dualities which are associated with each group.

REVIEWING THE REALIZATION OF VALUES

We have now concluded an account of the essential purpose-based structures and processes. Starting from the root building block of value realization — specific responsibility for a particular purpose — we have progressed to the most abstract conception — a social being defined by membership of a particular social order within which values can be realized. Between these we have discovered and examined three more building blocks and two more controlling conceptions.

The four building blocks are: purpose–the elements of intentionality; direction–the practical guidance of our activity; drive–the impetus to promote change and overcome opposition to it; and functioning–the sustenance of achievement through continual work.

People use and control these building blocks on the basis of three essential conceptions: autonomy, sovereignty, and membership. Only by accepting membership of a social order, can a person influence it. To do so safely and ethically, they need sovereignty. This means constituting themselves as a citizenry and installing a government as the day-to-day custodian. By giving autonomy to enduring identifiable endeavours (i.e. movements, authorities, enterprises), the citizenry and its government can let people achieve things for themselves and for others.

The distinction between building blocks and controlling conceptions reflects the difference between the part and the whole. The building blocks are properties of parts. In other words, a part (of an organization, say) can function, can push a drive, can take a direction, and can hold a purpose. However, only a whole can have autonomy, sovereignty and membership. The whole associated with autonomy is a joint endeavour, the whole associated with sovereignty is a society, and the whole associated with membership is a person.

The seven purpose derivatives have been created by grouping adjacent levels of purpose. In this process, a new structural hierarchy has emerged and has been labelled G-1 through to G-7. Levels (groupings) in this derived hierarchy are very different from each other, reflecting the variety of structures and processes required to realize values. The way each grouping contributes to the whole process has been progressively clarified. Now it can be reviewed briefly. A summary is provided in Master-Table 40.

The Hierarchy. *Membership* of the social order is the starting point for realizing values (G-7). People must function responsibly and this requires the definition of....

•*Purposes* which must be *held* consciously (G-1). People must mean what they say and this means that they have to respond to their own inclinations and capabilities. Those who neglect or ignore values become agents. The responsibility implicit in holding a purpose generates activity which needs constraint. This is provided by....

•*Directions* which must be *stated* explicitly (G-2). People must propose them, agree to them, and know what they entail. Each person must tolerate restrictions on activities forwarding their own values in order to cooperate with others and so maximize achievement. Directions generate change which is frequently opposed. Making headway requires.....

•*Drives* which must be *pushed* intensively (G-3). People must recognize that achievement often requires change in habits and customary values. Each person must expect to modify their own values and is in turn permitted to press others to modify theirs. Drives generate achievement whose sustenance requires....

•*Functioning* to be *worked at* continuously (G-4). People must not become complacent or mechanical in their work. Each person must work meaningfully and productively in the present and invest for the future. Functioning is based on work which requires people to commit themselves. Organizing a worthwhile endeavour so it will endure is essential, but this requires.....

•*Autonomy* to be properly *established* (G-5). People must see themselves as participating in three distinct roles: as independent (and unequal) actors in relation to enterprises, as representatives of others in relation to regulatory authorities, and as equal members of society in relation to movements. Many people must associate to form and manage any substantial endeavour. So autonomy generates power and the need for its ethical control. This in turn requires.....

•*Sovereignty* to be *constituted* legally (G-6). People must ensure that supreme power is wielded ethically at all times. Each person must be active as a citizen while accepting the existence of government and its limitations. Sovereignty demands and generates freedom, but its operation depends on....

•*Membership* which must be *claimed* self-consciously (G-7). People exercise membership by activating ultimate values and imaginatively reflecting on the social order. Each person must voluntarily make the society their own, participating within it despite its many imperfections.

Progress and The Dualities. Progress offers a captivating, or perhaps tantalising, hope for the eradication or reduction of the present sufferings in

societies. So realizing values is often about getting progress and each of the groupings is oriented towards this in a distinctive way.

On the basis of the accounts of the groupings, it seems that membership represents the spirit of progress and sovereignty reveals the forces behind progress. Moving to the base of the hierarchy, purposes provide the means for progress and directions its specifications. Between potentiality and actuality, we find autonomy which enables the organization of progress and functioning which is the embodiment or realization of progress. Finally, drives are a pivot which enable the modification of progress.

But these are very general statements. Whether any of the purpose derivatives will actually deliver viable progress is another matter entirely. Perhaps it would be more accurate to affirm the converse: that each grouping offers a unique capability to impede progress and cause positive disruption.

Progress is easier wished for or expected from others or advised about, than produced. Progress is risky. So anyone in the hot seat very sensibly aims for progress which is compatible with personal survival and survival of the endeavour.

When realizing values, there is an unavoidable tension between the urge for *survival* and the desire for *progress*. Each structural level embodies a well-recognized and distinctive version of that progress-survival duality as experienced by those involved in the endeavour. Survival is an ethical imperative, both a stabilizing core and constraint in value realization. So its representations in the duality feel essential and unavoidable. Progress is merely desirable, a potential for growth and an aspiration. So its representations in the duality demand positive generation and their value must be repetitively re-affirmed and re-explained. The various progress-survival dualities reflect perennial dilemmas and arguments, and not just amongst social scientists and philosophers, but also amongst managers and politicians.

Below is a brief account of the evolution of the progress-survival duality (with the key terms italicized). I will build upwards on this occasion to show the progressive resolution of the dialectics much as was done for ethical systems in Ch. 6 (cf. Master-Fig 7) and identity systems in Ch. 7 (cf. Master-Fig. 13).

•Holding purposes (G-1) reveals the tension between the survival need to adapt to urgent pressures in the situation by being *pragmatic*, and the demand of progress which requires that people generate values and objectives as necessary guiding *principles*. Failure to resolve the tension leads to unreliable and patchy

development or collapse of the endeavour through disconnection, rigidity or utopianism. This duality, resolved satisfactorily by each person in their own way, expresses their *individuality*.

•Stating directions (G-2) reveals the tension between *individuality* on which creative efforts and personal initiative absolutely depend, and *cooperation* which must be evoked to sustain the group and generate the desired progress. Failure to resolve the tension leads to incoherence which threatens breakdown of the endeavour, or acrimonious conflict which threatens disruption of the group. Alternatively, failure results from herd-like behaviour, endless talk, hesitancy and weak decisions. Resolution of the duality leads to a habitual modus operandi and *stability* for the endeavour and group.

•Pushing drives (G-3) reveals the tension between the need for *stability* to handle external turbulence and shifting values (which is the very meaning and essence of survival), and the need to generate a vibrant *dynamism* based in a positive commitment to the new or modified values inherent in progress. Failure to resolve the tension leads to stagnation or disruption, both of which threaten the endeavour and the group. The resolution of this duality leads to *evolution* of the group and the endeavour.

•Working at functioning (G-4) reveals the tension between handling the *evolution* of any endeavour which is unavoidable as people, work and situations alter, and generating the *transformation* required for more substantial progress which involves a degree of discontinuity with the past. Failure to resolve the tension leads to over-ambitious changes or becoming trapped in a blind alley. The resolution of the duality leads to *consensus* on the endeavour within the group.

•Establishing autonomy (G-5) reveals the tension between *consensus*, the survival factor for all associating and organizing, and *conflicts* which result from striving for progress and generating argument about which values and actions are required. Failure to resolve the tension leads to the endeavour tearing itself apart with internal disagreements, or to the suppression of discussion and avoidance of risks with stagnation and eventual ossification. Resolution of the duality leads to endeavours and groups becoming the *means* for the maintenance of society.

•Constituting sovereignty (G-6) reveals the tension between surviving by tolerating the necessary *means* for ruling and implementing collective decisions (even though these rest ultimately on coercion), and generating those *ends* which all desire and which are the rationale for progress. Failure to resolve the tension leads to

citizens and governments failing to provide or tolerate the means to achieve the ends they claim to want. Or they pursue ends irrespective of the ethical quality or practical implications of the means. Resolution of the duality enables genuine *participation* in the political arena.

•Claiming membership (G-7) reveals the tension between *participation* in the social order despite its imperfections, without which there would be no society or survival; and generating a *dissociation* from the order, or at least its worst aspects, in order to conceive of genuine improvements. To support while criticizing and to criticize while supporting is the essential requirement. Failure to resolve the tension leads to fanaticism or uncritical support of the status quo. Societal development cannot be systematically planned or formally organized, so the resolution of this duality is resolved by *pragmatism* — which takes us back to purpose (G-1).

The Personal vs The Communal. Whether the goal is progress or maintenance of the status quo, realizing values is about doing things. This means taking action oneself and organizing the activities of others. Realizing values is the basis of a person's participation in their community or society. Whatever a person's place or perspective in society, it is impossible to escape some minimum involvement in each of the groupings in the hierarchy.

This immediately raises the issue of balance between *individual* wishes, interests or concerns and *communal* needs, interests or concerns. In handling any particular value, the question that invariably arises is whether the matter can be left to entrepreneurs, organizations or professional groups or whether some collective or governmental action is required. We want to allow and foster uniqueness, privacy, initiative and personal identity. Yet we recognize the need for order, protection of the public interest, and common aims.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the various purposive entities formed by combining the levels of the purpose interact with this individual-communal duality in distinctive ways. Purpose, direction, functioning and membership all demand a simultaneous consideration of the individual and the collective dimensions. That is to say, purpose, direction, functioning and membership cannot exist in society independent of their existence within a person or organization

Drives, autonomy and sovereignty are different. Two distinct (but linked and mutually influenced) forms are found: one essentially individual and the other essentially communal. Drives can either take the form of external community-oriented pressures which aim to change others and the social context or internal drives for self-development (which may leave others untouched). Some links between these two forms of drive are natural, but the distinction is unavoidable. Autonomy too can lead either to associations and networks whose formation is personally driven, or to public and official bodies whose formation is driven by the public interest. Finally, sovereignty is expressed by socially responsible citizens for whom genuineness is intrinsic, and political leaders who get paid to operate the levers of power on behalf of the community.

Transition. Social beings, natural and artificial, define purposes and generate the energy for the realization of values using all derivatives. But the reverse is also true. Purposes and their derivatives also define and energize social beings. Purpose enables the realization of values; and the existence of values generates efforts at realization by defining purposes. Social beings cannot exist without value and purpose; and value and purpose cannot exist without social beings.

But does the realization of value really produce progress? We can say that the realization of values leads to the evolution of society and its values. Whether or not this evolution reflects progress objectively-speaking may be disputed. Ideally, society should become progressively more humane and enlightened, but the values chosen for realization are absolutely dependent on the community and reflect its maturity. Evaluation of society over the long term is itself a matter of values used to conduct that evaluation. No neutral reply can therefore be given.

A great deal has now been said about purpose and value in organizations and social life. Now something more must be said about how people develop and use purpose in everyday life and at work. The account of the structures of intentionality (teleostatics) that has just been completed needs to be complemented by an account of the forces generated by the use of purposes and values (teleodynamics). In the next chapter, the nature and interplay of these forces will be explored and a striking pattern revealed. ✸

Properties revealing the coherence of the seven groupings of purposes.
The evolution of dualities is similar to that shown in Master-Figures 7 and 13. See Master-Figure 28 for a diagrammatic overview of the groups in the groupings. See Master-Table 29 for a summary of implications for society and for organizations. See text for further details and explanation.

L (Nos of Groups)	Grouping Focus	Function	The Process of Realizing Values	Personal Commitments	Progress	Inherent Duality Progress vs Survival
						G-1: Pragmatism
G-7 [1]	Membership needed for *Freedom*	To ensure that each person uses and evaluates their values	*The Society:* The starting point for realizing values – an existing social order	Each person must participate in a society despite its many imperfections.	Spirit of progress	Dissociation vs Participation
G-6 [2]	Sovereignty needed for *Power*	To ensure that society, its members and their activities, are regulated by values.	*The Guardians:* Sustaining an ethical order as a framework for realizing values	Each person must be active as a citizen while accepting a government with its limitations.	Forces of progress	Ends vs Means
G-5 [3]	Autonomy needed for *Endeavours*	To ensure that endeavours serve the values of both society and individuals.	*Organizations:* Organizing independent people for large-scale efforts.	Each person must see themself as an independent actor, representative and member.	Organization of progress	Conflict vs Consensus
G-4 [4]	Functioning needed for *Achievement*	To ensure that values are expressed coherently and enduringly in activities.	*Social Productivity:* Using purpose, direction and drive coherently and effectively.	Each person must work meaningfully and productively, never mechanically.	Embodiment of progress	Transformation vs Evolution
G-3 [5]	Drive needed for *Change*	To ensure that desired values are installed despite resistances.	*Political Manoeuvres:* Overcoming the inevitable opposition to change.	Each person must expect to modify their own values and press others to modify theirs.	Modification of progress	Dynamism vs Stability
G-2 [6]	Direction needed for *Activity*	To ensure that chosen values focus minds and shape outcomes.	*Group Requirements:* Ensuring group values guide individual decisions.	Each person must accept restrictions on their activities to enable cooperation.	Specification of progress	Cooperation vs Individuality
G-1 [7]	Purpose needed for *Responsibility*	To ensure that values can be affirmed, chosen and pursued in a social context.	*Primal Roles:* Developing the personal tools for participating in society.	Each person must respond to their own inclinations and capabilities in social life.	Means of progress	Principles vs Pragmatism

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NOTES

1. Sociologists have been deeply interested in social movements, partly because they so often participate in them. Yet the literature does not always distinguish movements clearly. Either it veers towards studying movements as totally unstructured and merged with social trends, social patterns or large scale activities like mobs, fads and panics (Turner, R.H. & Lewis, M.K. *Collective Behaviour.* Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1957; Smelser, N.J. *Theory of Collective Behaviour.* Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1963), or as structured in the form of pressure groups, political parties, new churches, regulatory programmes or social policies (Heberle, R. *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951; Cameron, W.B. *Modern Social Movements.* New York: Random House, 1966; Barker, Q., *New Religious Movements.* London: HMSO, 1989), or as an opportunity to understand political change (Oberschall, A. *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, Identities.* New York: Transaction Publ., 1992), political ideologies (Mackenzie, W.J.M. *Politics and Social Sciences.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967; Scott, A. *Ideology and New Social Movements.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) and cultural processes in general (Cohn, N. *The Pursuit of the Millennium.* London: Secker & Warburg, 1957; Killian, L.M. Social Movements. In: *Handbook of Modern Sociology.* (Ed. R.E.L. Faris), Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964). The two related movements most popular with sociologists have been the labour or workers' movement and the socialist movement — within which and for which many have worked as intellectuals. More disinterested studies of movements are relatively rare, but they seem to be aligned to the concept as presented here (Wilkinson, P. *Social Movement.* London: Pall Mall Press, 1971; Touraine, A., Dubet, F., Wieviorka, M., Strzelecki, J. et al. *Solidarity. The Analysis of a Social Movement: Poland, 1980-1981.* (Transl. D. Denby). London: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme and Cambridge University Press, 1983). Whereas sociologists have been preoccupied with revolutionary political movements, this book seeks to help anyone contribute to any sort of movement. So the emphasis here is on ordinary modern movements like the women's, green or New Age movements in which the reader might well participate or might have to handle in a work context.

2. For an account of developments of the movement in the UK, see: Cullen, M.J. *The Statistical Movement in Early Victorian Britain: The Foundations of Empirical Social Research.* New York: Harvester Press, 1975. For a more general account of the emergence of the use of facts, probability and the concept of 'normal', see: Hacking, I. *The Taming of Chance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

3. Robertson, J. *Future Wealth: New Economics for the 21st Century.* London: Cassell, 1989.

4. With regard to the need for an organization, see: Zald, M.N. & Ash, R. Social movement organizations: Growth, decay and change. *Social Forces.* 44: 327-340, 1966. For an account of the Spanish peasant revolts, see: Hobsbawm, E.J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959.

5. Details of the women's movement in the US are taken from: Freeman, J. *The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and its Relation to the Policy Process.* New York: Longman, 1975.

6. Lenin, V.I. What is to be done? In: *Selected Works.* Vol. 1, Part 1, Moscow, 1950. (Transl. from Russian. London: Lawrence & W., 1964.)

7. Mannheim, K. *Ideology and Utopia.* London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1936.

8. See: Michels, R. *Political Parties.* Glencoe Ill.: Free Press, 1949; Gerth, H.H. & Mills, C.W. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

9. This example is taken from Section 294 of Eliade, M. *A History of Religious Ideas. Vol. 2.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Bogomil missionaries fostered the formation of the Cathar Church whose "ideal was the disappearance of humanity, by suicide and by the refusal to have children" (p.185). In relation to the Inquisition, Eliade notes that "the manner in which [these heretics] were annihilated constitutes one of the blackest pages in the history of the Roman Church. But the Catholic reaction was justified." (p.188).

10. See the discussion of culture (G-4³: Ch.10); and cf. Kinston, W. *Strengthening the Management Culture: Phasing the Transformation of Organizations.* London: The SIGMA Centre, 1994.

11. Note that an authority may be referred to by a wide variety of names: as a commission, a committee, a board, a council, an office &c. The title does not clarify whether or not the authority is statutory or self-regulatory. No title in itself makes it clear that the authority is regulatory rather than an department of government (e.g. the status of regulators of privatized monopolies like Oftel or Ofgas is not obvious) or a public agency (Q: is the grant-maintained National Consumer Council an authority or a campaigning body? A: The latter.). Scrutiny of the principal objects and the associated structures and powers, especially appointments to the board, is essential to clarify the nature of the body.

12. This account is extracted from a series of three papers in *New Community,* Vol. 14, Parts 1/2 1987: Peppard, N. The Community Relations Commission 1968-1976: A note on its formation and role. pp.9-11; Lane, D. The Commission for Racial Equality: the first five years. pp.12-16 Newsam, P. The Commission for Racial Equality: 1982-1987. pp.17-20.

13. A key recommendation of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission's Report involved reducing the number of brewery-owned public houses (*The Supply of Beer.* London: HMSO, Cmnd. 651, 1989). Tied ownership restricts consumer choice of beers and inhibits competitor entry into the market. The Brewers' Society, representing the industry, lobbied vigorously against the MMC recommendations (*Report of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on "The Supply of Beer": A Critique.* London, 1989). In its Beer Orders laid before Parliament in subsequent years, the government imposed some restrictions on ownership but significantly less than the MMC recommendation. To reassure public opinion, it required a subsequent review of competition by its own Office of Fair Trading. This review was expected to occur in 1994, but it was cancelled in 1993. The relevant documents are: House of Commons Paper #402. *Effects of the Beer Orders on the Brewing Industry and Consumer.* 4th Report of the Proceedings of the Agricultural Committee.

Session 1992-1993; House of Commons Paper #870. *Third Special Report: Response by the Government to the 4th Report of the Agricultural Committee. Session 1992-1993.*

14. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. *A Guide to the Commission and Its Activities.* November, 1992.

15. The initial inquiry advocated disbanding the existing Press Council and replacing it by a more satisfactory and responsive body 'to give [the industry] one final chance to prove that voluntary self-regulation can be made to work': Home Office. *Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters* (Chairman: David Calcutt QC) London: HMSO Cmnd. 1102, 1990. *The Press Complaints Commission First Annual Report, 1991* summarized its own origins and performance in a self-complimenting way. A further review then took place in 1993 as planned and in the wake of further scandals: Department of National Heritage. *Review of Press Self-Regulation.* (Sir David Calcutt QC). London: HMSO Cmnd. 2135, 1993.

16. A special Report on the role and lapses of the Bank of England is provided in: House of Commons Paper #198. *Inquiry into the Supervision of BCCI: The Bingham Report.* October. 1992.

17. *First Report from the Home Affairs Select Committee on the Operation and Effectiveness of the Commission for Racial Equality, 1980-1981.* London: HMSO, 1981.

18. Gower, L.C.B. *Review of Investor Protection. Part 1. The Gower Report.* London: HMSO Cmnd 9125, 1984; and Non-Parliamentary Report of the Department of Trade and Industry. *Review of Investor Protection. Part 2.* 1985. These reports drew on the recommendations of two other working parties set up by the Bank of England and the Government respectively to examine similar issues.

19. The relevant documents are: Committee of Advertising Practice. *The British Code of Advertising Practice. 8th Ed.* London, 1988; the account by the Chairman in the *Annual Report of ASBOF, 1975-1976*; and *The Advertising Association's Annual Review, 1992-1993.* Details were also obtained by personal communication with the Advertising Standards Authority and the Advertising Association.

20. Although legal, economic, political and, especially, sociological study of organizations has been sustained since the 1930s, practical research has been comparatively meagre. Policy studies in business and government, for example, did not become a serious object of study until the 1960s. Practical organization within the voluntary sector has been relatively rarely examined (cf. Harris. M. & Billis, D. *Organising Voluntary Agencies: A Guide Through the Literature.* London: Bedford Square Press, 1986). Many organizational studies geared to the practicalities of managing operate by raising awareness among those involved (e.g. Morgan, G., *Images of Organization.* London: Sage, 1986). Relatively few are deliberately design-oriented and these focus almost exclusively on just one compartment, the executive structure (e.g. Jaques, E. *A General Theory of Bureaucracy.* London: Heinemann, 1976; Galbraith, J.R. *Organization Design.* New York: Addison-Wesley, 1977; Mintzberg, H. *The Structuring of Organizations.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979).

Relevant reflections on organizational design are to be found in some governmental commissions of inquiry. Such commissions are stimulated by periodic needs to review legislation by re-examining the purpose of organizations of different types and the comparative rights and obligations of relevant groups and the community. The resulting reports facilitate comparisons of design principles for organizations between different countries (cf. Hoghton, C. de (ed.) *The Company: Law, Structure and Reform in Eleven Countries.* London: Allen & Unwin, 1970). Such accounts generally confirm the overall picture as one of theoretical confusion.

Current organizational theory tends to treat organizations as essentially unitary executive things — like 'hierarchies', 'cooperatives' or 'matrix organizations' - and it is true that it is executive work that most needs organizing because this is where the operation is located. One or more of the other compartments are sometimes noted, but (to my knowledge) little effort outside the present research has gone into developing an unambiguous and effective model of the integrated working of the whole.

As a result, there is no widely agreed framework which shapes or indicates what, in principle, to expect of enterprises, nothing which aids clarification of the duties people (insiders or outsiders) should perform, nor how the main socially-recognized compartments should interact. In practice, designing compartments other than the executant body and developing inter-relations among compartments are based almost wholly on a mixture of expediency, intuition, custom and fashion. Self-control by those involved depends largely on obeying the law, current conventions and personal preference rather than any real sense of what is required.

21. The limited but important role of hierarchy and accountability in the total picture is provided in: Kinston, W. op. cit. [10]. A framework for participation in organizations has been developed which recognizes the claims of the individual and the institution. It derives from an ethically designed hierarchical framework for specifying work and structuring organizations: Kinston, W. *Management Processes and Participation in the Ethical Organization.* Unpublished Discussion Documents, The SIGMA Centre, 1992.

22. For more specific details of duties and tasks, see the Appendix in: Kinston, W. Designing the four compartments of organisations: Constituting, governing, top officer and executant bodies. *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis.* 18: 3-24, 1991. Note that the labelling, analysis and understanding here has moved on slightly from that publication.

23. For a short general essay on the issue of shareholder duties, see: Pennant-Rea, R. *Capitalism: Punters or Proprietors.* The Economist, May 5th 1990. The situation in the USA is analysed in: Jacobs, M.T. *Short-term America: The Causes of Business Myopia.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

24. Numerous texts testify to the malfunctioning of boards. Board failure is the commonest cause of business failure according to G. Mills in his *On the Board.* (London: Gower, 1981). This clear account by an experienced consultant accords well with the basic principles provided here. Businessmen regularly complain about boards, saying things like: 'The fact is that we haven't got in this country enough people to man our boards with the type of people whom we would love to have, ideally' (Brown, C.C. & Smith, E.E. *The Director Looks at His Job.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, p.123). For a brief trenchant view on boards in

academic bodies, see: Anthony, R.N. & Herzlinger, R.E. *Management Control in Non-profit Organizations. (Rev'd Ed.).* Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, 1980, pp.47-48. For the position in public agencies. see: Nachmias, D. & Greer, A. (eds.) Self-governance in the interpenetrated society. *Policy Sciences Special Issue.* Vol.14, Part 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1982.

25. See, for example: Mintzberg, H., *The Nature of Managerial Work.* New York: Harper & Row, 1973; and Jaques, E. op. cit. [20].

26. For some classic accounts of the emergence of powerful executive-run organizations, see: Russell, B. *Freedom and Organization. 1814-1914.* London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934; Berle, A.A. Jr. & Means, G.C. *The Modern Corporation and Private Property.* London: Macmillan, 1932; Boulding, K.E. *The Organizational Revolution.* New York: Harper & Row, 1953.

27. Sovereignty, government and citizenship are essential concepts within judicial and political studies and their intricacies and historical evolution will not be deeply explored here. The tendency of societies to move irreversibly to the condition of popular sovereignty (which is assumed as requisite by my analysis) is well argued by David Beetham (*The Legitimation of Power.* London: Macmillan, 1991) despite his reluctance to take an ethical perspective. Beetham points out that regimes based on mobilizing people, are rather vulnerable to policy failure and difficult circumstances. For an explanation of how a modern liberal-democratic nation-state can be sustained and changed, see: Kinston, W. *Creating a Strong Society: A Guide for Social Reformers.* London: The SIGMA Centre, due for publication 1996. The argument of that book uses the framework of approaches to ethical choice. For a summary of standard ideas oriented to the importance of the citizenry, see: Heater, D. *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education.* London: Longman, 1990. For a readable account of the value of representative democracy in relation to alternatives, see: Dahl, R.A. *Democracy and its Critics.* London: Yale University Press, 1989.

28. Quote from the 1793 version. See: Stewart, J.H. *A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution.* New York: Macmillan, 1951.

29. Note that the present analysis takes for granted a well-developed, thriving civil society which exists apart from government and its bureaucracy — in short, the realm of autonomy (G-5). The absence of this condition in most Third World countries is one of the main reasons for economic disarray and the replacement of popular sovereignty by authoritarian regimes. The government in these cases, for good reasons and bad, becomes the source of power and wealth and distances itself from (and exploits) the mass of the people.

30. Elsewhere, using a framework of change, I have begun to clarify relationships between the various political ideologies and forms of government, trying to show how these two aspects of ruling are linked: Kinston, W. *The Hierarchy of Change.* Unpublished Discussion Document, The SIGMA Centre, London, 1988.

31. Marx, Lenin, Pareto, Gramsci, Mosca, Michels and others seem to have taken the rather mundane observation that a minority comes to dominate civic life and social opportunities and used it to generate a conspiracy theory.

32. A wide variety of democratic arrangements are possible: cf. Held, D. *Models of Democracy.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. For a robust defence and explanation of representative democracy, see: Dahl, R.A. op.cit. [27].

33. Cf. Beetham, D. op.cit. [27]; and Kinston, W. op.cit. [27].

Chapter 13

Being Intentional

To be intentional is to be powerful. The ability to hold values and pursue purposes we can call our own is the very essence of freedom. We now move to a systematic account of how to manage that innate power.

Few of us manage values and use purposes in our personal and public lives as well as we would wish. When endeavours go awry, things often seem to spiral utterly out of control. Our higher values become disconnected from what we do. The urgent drives out the important. Direction is lost or not properly communicated. Sensitivity in handling others seems to disappear. It is as if we forget that social life and organizations are constructed out of our purposes and values, that they are our creation and our responsibility.

Social order and complex enterprises are fragile. Their constituent values and purposes are not created once and for all. Rather, they need to be repeatedly affirmed, clarified and sensitively modified if they are to mean anything.

Being intentional is so obviously a daily experience and a management need. Yet creating and managing ourselves and social reality in a positive way seems such a difficult and even awesome task. Intentionality, the disposition and capability to have purposes and act purposefully, and intentional processes, like exhortation and decision, are so natural that we take them for granted. Yet few (excepting, of course, the reader!) recognize just how weakly most people appreciate purposes and values.

We continue here with the premise with which we started: anyone whose decisions affect others not only needs to be intentional but also needs to be aware of being intentional. We can and must take this expectation of awareness further by examining how intention operates in our minds, organizations and social life. The result is a beautiful and immensely significant image.

INTRODUCING INTENTIONALITY

We know intuitively that at one moment or in one situation 'a contract' or 'diagnosis' or 'building houses'

is used as an idea (L-6), at another as a need (L-5), at another as an endeavour (L-4), at another as a priority (L-3) and so on — often with only the slightest modification in formulation or context to signify the change. Because the function of a particular purpose changes so easily and so spontaneously to suit our needs in a situation, people sometimes find it difficult to get a grip on the unchanging functions — the universal types or levels of purpose — that underlie any actual case.

The fluidity of intentional processes in the mind and in society needs temporarily to be frozen to understand how to master them. Having identified a variety of useful purposive structures (in Ch.s 10 and 12), we can focus now on how intentional processes create and manipulate those structures. An additional aim of this chapter is to reveal how, in principle, an enlightened society can or might or must emerge.

In pursuing these tasks, I shall first clarify the contrasting and potentially conflicting roles of emotion and logic in being intentional. Only then can I identify and label channels of influence between the levels. These channels lie at the heart of intentional social processes.

Familiarity with the various levels of purpose is assumed (see: Ch.s 3-5, 10 & 12), and so only the briefest of accounts and a minimum of examples will be offered. My aim here is to create an image and reveal a pattern, not to elaborate on every social process, each of which could be the subject of an entire book.

Certain channels of influence which can exist between levels invariably impede, confuse or disrupt social endeavours. Such pseudo-channels are positively counter-productive and need to be noted only so as to be avoided.

Properties of the Image

To describe the channels between levels, it is necessary to identify distinct *centres* for purpose formation within each level. This is required in order to clarify the *effect* that specifications of purpose at one level have on the specifications of purpose within another level. The influences between centres are invariably *reciprocal* — that is to say the channels operate in both directions.

All values are bipolar and contain their negative. So the *positive* form in which all effects exerted by a centre are primarily described should be taken to contain and imply a *negative* or devaluing form. In practice, as might be expected, there are many unsatisfactory influences in the channels. The positive effect may be absent, or too weak, or too strong, or distorted, or inappropriately replaced. So precision in regard to negative effects is not really possible. The text and Master-Table 44 provide examples of negative effects, mainly to assist in an appreciation of the channels. Of course, whether a negative influence is undesirable or beneficial is often controversial. It all depends on the particular values at stake and the perspective taken by the assessor in the situation.

The handling of the reciprocal positive influences is carried out by a characteristic social process which the channel primarily represents. All these *intentional processes* will be immediately familiar to the reader. They lie at the heart of all social organization and, of course, involve far more than just specifying purposes. The limited aim here is to reveal the pattern of which these processes are a part, not to explore the processes in detail.

In selecting terms to capture the various effects and intentional processes in social life, I have sought to be as precise and distinctive as possible and have tried to avoid labels that are common to all or many channels. For example, all higher level values and purposes broadly infuse, imply, contextualize, influence, justify, require, guide and orient lower level values and purposes; and all lower level purposes broadly underpin, support, conform to, fulfil, complete, imply and require higher level purposes. More precise descriptions of the effects than these are possible. Such precision is essential to master intentionality and communicate with clarity. Nevertheless, a variety of synonyms often seem perfectly suitable in practice, and the best term often depends on the situation being addressed.

The material in this chapter is summarized in three figures and three tables. Master-Table 41 is a simple listing of all the processes in order of their explanation. Master-Figure 42 shows how an image of inter-level channels is built up as the argument unfolds. Master-Figure 43 is a complete picture of the influences that the different purposes have on each other. Master-Figure 45 is the same image labelled with the intentional processes. In Master-Table 44, the channels are ordered in terms of power, and positive and negative effects are listed. Master-Table 46 is a complete summary of the various channels, also in order of their power, and with an indication of their proper use and examples of the consequences of disuse and misuse.

Creating an Image. Part of the task of this chapter is to develop a dynamic image which clarifies how to be intentional. This image is proving an extremely useful tool for reflectively working with values in organizations and society. Subsequent research (not included in this book) has revealed that the same image is applicable to all of the other seven level hierarchies in this framework, elemental and structural. The pattern seems to be fundamental because it has also been discovered in other domains e.g. in organizations where it clarifies management processes, and in academic disciplines where it clarifies scientific processes.

Purposes at each of the seven levels, as found within each of us, within organizations, and within a society or state, are diagrammed in Master-Fig. 42a without any connections or channels of influence — much as in previous Master-Matrices. The absence of channels means that this image offers little guide as to what effect a purpose or value at one level has or should seek to have on a purpose or value at a higher or lower level. The disconnected image does not yet represent a viable social existence: which, as we have discovered, implies the unification of all seven levels (G-7: Ch. 12).

In this inquiry, the seven levels, represented in Master-Figure 42a, will be re-drawn progressively as 42b, 42c, and 42d until a final image emerges as 42e. This final image is a theoretical structure which represents intentionality. Master-Figures 43 and 45 show and label all the channels along which intentionality can flow in an appropriate and constructive way. This image captures the extent and limits of our freedom and power.

Before proceeding, an outline of the ideas based on Master-Matrices 41 and 42 is provided to give an overview.

Explaining the Structure

Being Social (cf. Master-Fig. 42b): Being social is based in participation and responsibility. As we saw in Ch. 10 (G-1), this requires a separate focus on each of the levels of purpose. Developing any specific purpose or value immediately activates a duality. On the one hand, there is an approach which is emotional, pragmatic, responsive and evolutionary; and on the other hand there is a countervailing approach which is rational, structured, comprehensive and designed. On the basis of this duality, three modes of purpose formation can be identified, each of which can be represented as a 'centre' within a level. Modes fully identified with one or other side of the duality result in two complementary centres within certain levels — value systems, social values and internal priorities. Only one centre is found in the remaining levels — ultimate

values, principal objects, strategic and tactical objectives. In these levels, a third mode applies which resolves, integrates, synthesizes, combines or balances the duality.

The four single-centre levels are straightforward in their functioning. However, the three levels with two centres require a specific intentional process to ensure their effective and balanced operation. The L-6 responsibility for affirming ideas depends on *idealization*. The L-5 responsibility for recognizing community needs depends on *assimilation*. The L-3 responsibility for applying a preference depends on *assertion*. These processes are essential for acceptance and participation in a social group.

Encountering Reality (cf. Master-Fig. 42c):

Social groups require a common recognizable reality within which members can participate. Such a social reality must be formed and handled using values and purposes. Starting from a purely experiential state of good intention (ultimate values), it is necessary to link adjacent levels in order to enable and channel action. The first step is the *revelation* of reality (L-7→L-6) as a mix of illusion and illumination. Once reality is known (correctly or incorrectly), *socialization* of people into that reality (L-6→L-5) is needed using instruction and exhortation. Action then becomes possible through the *embodiment* of value within reality via social entities and endeavours (L-5→L-4). This step depends on enthusiastic instigation and proper institution. Once created, social bodies and endeavours need *orientation* to reality (L-4→L-3), which means clarification of what is currently important and accommodation to immediate urgent pressures. *Decisions* about reality (L-3→L-2) are then possible based on forecasting the desired end result and resolution of unavoidable pressures. Finally, *implementation* in reality (L-2→L-1) is required to complete the process.

Changing Reality (cf. Master-Fig. 42d):

Existing social reality is never entirely satisfactory and so change is desired. Changing reality depends on overcoming resistance from current values or purposes within the various centres. To do this, channels of influence which bypass a level are required. Ultimate values are the source of all intentionality and the desire for change, but they are too abstract, timeless and experiential to influence social values directly without the mediation of current value systems. So the process of change starts with the *dissemination* of new ideas (L-6→L-4). This requires practical demonstration of their worth and vigorous propagation. Communities permit the *evolution* of values applied in practice (L-5→L-3) by fostering a mix of innovation and con-

servation. But as evolution proceeds, the desired course can be lost. So active *maintenance* of new values is required (L-4→L-2). Finally, to make certain that things are actually happening in a way that accords with the overall endeavour and society generally, *re-assertion* of values (L-3→L-1) is required. This is performed by the evaluation of activities and the imposition of certain tasks.

Maintaining Humanity (cf. Master-Fig. 42e):

The main danger in the system of channels so far is the power of tribal and communal forces. Fortunately, ultimate values can by-pass these two levels and directly influence principal objects and, hence, each person and all endeavours. This is *enlightenment* (L-7→L-4).

There are seventeen other hypothetically possible channels and influences, but on close examination it is evident that their use disrupts the integrity of the community, organizations or activities.

After this skim through the ideas, we will now systematically examine the centres, influences and social processes in more detail.

DEVELOPING PURPOSES AND VALUES

As repeatedly emphasized, being social starts from participation and depends on accepting responsibility. Each of the levels of purpose plays its part in this process. To have or to set a purpose (or value) is to be part of a social group and to assume a specific responsibility in relation to that purpose. Now we need to consider how purposes in each level can be developed and used.

The descriptions of purposes and values up to now has revealed one of two patterns as levels are passed through: either progression (e.g. in scope and social significance) or alternation (e.g. of the inclusive-integrative/exclusive-divisive quality). A third pattern was also present but not then focused upon. It emerges when we consider the way reality is perceived and worked with, and hence the way specifications of each type of purpose are developed and used. This perspective generates a cognitive or psycho-social duality which explains many of the characteristics of purposive structures described in earlier chapters. The duality consists of two modes of functioning which are typically recognized as contrasting or opposing. They are described variously as:

Rational	vs	Irrational
Intellectual	vs	Pragmatic
Theoretical	vs	Practical

Inner-oriented	vs	Outer-oriented
Regulatory	vs	Responsive
Pro-active	vs	Reactive
Shaping	vs	Sensitive
Comprehensive	vs	Partial
Systematic	vs	Ad hoc
Structured	vs	Fluid
Static	vs	Dynamic
Designed	vs	Evolutionary

The broad coherence of each column is unmistakable, but labelling the columns poses difficulties. Different descriptors seemed more fitting in different situations or at different levels. I have chosen to identify the list on the left-hand side with a subscript L for logical or logic-based, and that on the right-hand side with a subscript E for emotional or emotion-based. (Clearly all values might be called 'logico-emotive' in that they need to be conceptualized and have a root in feeling. But that is beside the point. Here we are considering contrasting ways of working with these logico-emotive entities in a social arena.)

If we apply the above logical-emotional duality systematically to each level of purpose, it readily becomes apparent that some operate in a bi-modal form — either one mode or the other is used but never both simultaneously; while other levels are uni-modal and require both modes to shape the choice and use of a purpose or value. I refer to the latter approach with a subscript B, for balanced — balanced in the sense of tempering extremes, not in the meaning of equilibrium or equal amounts of each mode. Each mode can be thought of as a 'centre' for developing purposes. This means we must now recognize two complementary centres in some levels — and give them distinctive and immediately recognizable labels. Each of these centres will require separate consideration when we explore influences across levels.

Each mode generates opposing mental processes, different social orientations, and distinctive results. Even the form of specification varies: emotion-based centres typically generate a single sharply distinguished value; logic-based centres typically produce a coherent structure of inter-connected values; balanced centres typically produce one or perhaps two purposes in the foreground with a number of associated purposes in the background.

Intuitively, there is a need for balance to ensure that inner emotional energies, wider social forces and external realities are properly taken into account. In practice, habitual overuse of one mode is liable to disrupt others, reduce power and limit effectiveness.

One consequence of the need for balance is the finding that there are horizontal channels connecting the two centres of each bi-modal level. Intentions developed by each of these two centres naturally vie for dominance in this channel. As a matter of convention, I have placed the inherently dominating centre on the right-hand side in the diagrams, and the other on the left. Balanced centres are correspondingly placed in a midway position between emotion-based and logic-based centres.

We will now consider centres for the development of purpose at each level in turn, commencing with the lowest. The discussion will concentrate on the bi-modal levels and their horizontal channels. The two centres in these levels will be handled separately in subsequent sections, so the differences between them must be absolutely clear.

Centres at Each Level

Tactical objectives (L-1) are steps towards a desired outcome. They stimulate action to meet deadlines. So these purposes must be set with one eye on the immediate situation and its demands, and with the other eye on the required outcome or agreed strategy and broad time-scale. So dynamic or emotional inputs (i.e. pressures and emerging obstacles in the situation) and logical inputs (i.e. given systems, plans and methods) both need to be considered when setting an objective. Tactical objectives are often part of a plan. But even if they are not, any tactical objective is devised in the context of others: those leading up to it, those following it and those pursued in parallel; and each tends to generate subsidiary tactical objectives. In other words, tactical objectives are devised within a single balanced centre (L-1_B or TO_B).

Strategic objectives (L-2) envisage a desired concrete outcome and resemble tactical objectives in their formation. These objectives must have a responsive and evolutionary component because they are based on recognizing and responding to a variety of social forces and situational complexities. They deal with matters where hard facts are scarce and where an intuitive appreciation is essential: like the risk of a new challenge, or the attitudes of staff, or the reliability of allies. Failure in business is regularly caused through the neglect of intangibles and misjudgement of feelings. To reiterate the message for the cloistered civil servant or rational business planner: pragmatic considerations, evolutionary adaptation and an intelligent sensitivity to social realities are essential to strategic thinking.

Although a strategic objective based on nothing but data and logic is fatal, choosing a goal by pragmatic

reflex to a window of opportunity is equally unsatisfactory. Many managers and most politicians are prone to accept quick-fix solutions focused on painful symptoms, even though this neglects underlying problems and the side-effects worsen matters. A strategic objective cannot be purely responsive, and strategies cannot just be left to evolve and adapt in response to pressures. To maximize impact, it is essential to gain a degree of control over the situation. Strategic choices need to be based on an over-view which takes account of relevant facts and considers alternatives. A sufficiently complete and realistic scenario that will result from their adoption should be envisaged.

So strategic objectives must be developed using both modes within a balanced centre ($L-2_B$ or SO_B). As with other balanced centres, there is commonly a central objective with supporting objectives or sub-objectives — in this case to deal effectively with controversial issues and the situations and perspectives of different protagonists.

Internal priorities (L-3) are about applying preferences in a situation demanding choice, and so allocating available resources. They readily reveal two distinctively different modes of specification, both of which produce a goal which lays down emphases in handling a situation within the overall endeavour. But the social process — the production of the goal, the experience of deciding, the handling of the situation, the orientation to consequences — is dramatically different in the two cases.

On the one hand, a priority may be specified as a comprehensive structure (e.g. the allocation of a total budget to a variety of activities), or a pre-assigned set of the most important objectives (e.g. criteria used to select amongst applicants for a post), or as a weighting of importance assigned to each option in a list. These are examples of an output driven by a need or wish for systematization and comprehensiveness. They also reflect attempts to use the internal values of the endeavour to control a situation. So, the logic-based internal priority centre ($L-3_L$ or IP_L: labelled 'structured set of priorities' in the Master diagrams) is used to ensure that the distinctiveness and inner logic of an endeavour will prevail in handling situations.

On the other hand, and often apparently in conflict with such an approach, the internal priority may be an ad hoc assertion of value as a reaction or response to powerful external or internal demands in a situation. A priority of this type might determine an emergency allocation of funds for a particular item irrespective of the total picture or even an overspend; or cause acquiescence to staff demands for alteration of a work-

ing practice; or lead to appointing the sole internal male candidate rather than a female outsider despite her superior expertise and capability. The internal priority centre which is emotion-based ($L-3_E$ or IP_E: labelled 'over-riding priority' in the Master diagrams) enables a sensitive response to social pressures and personal feelings. Such priorities feel urgent, essential, dominating, and inescapable. Once such a value is acceded to, the endeavour and its milieu are both somewhat modified and the political pressures change. Almost immediately new pressures come into play and a different focus of conflicting values emerges calling for another socially sensitive choice to be made one way or the other. As a result of this cycle, the endeavour (or organization) and the psycho-social milieu evolve together.

It is possible (and usual) to operate the two internal priority centres consecutively to get the best of both worlds. For example, a proposed prioritization of funds based on comprehensive coverage and logical criteria is often preceded or followed by fixing one or two key allocations in response to external pressures (e.g. from suppliers) or to meet internal political pressures (e.g. the feelings of a new department). Similarly, a short-list of candidates for a post may be created using rational criteria, but the final selection in the rather artificial setting of an interview tends to be clinched by personal hopes, fears, wishes, preconceptions and impressions.

Urgent priorities naturally seek to over-ride the demands of logic and comprehensiveness. Although over-riding cannot be complete, turning the spotlight on certain values which cannot be ignored has the *effect* of usefully *focusing* the structured set of priorities. If this goes too far, then the effect is to skew decisions. The logic-based centre is solid, static and comprehensive in nature. From its perspective, pragmatic responses to shifting social influences seem irrational and potentially destabilizing. So the *reciprocal effect* is to *restrain* the development of urgent priorities. Taken too far, rational requirements may rigidly block the necessary fluid and adaptive handling of pressures.

The *intentional process* within this channel, $IP_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$, is assertion. The ever-present danger in organizations is that decisions are taken simply because they can be implemented and not with any concern for values. Values are perceived by many managers as messy, difficult, emotional, complicated, time-consuming, and better put to one side while the real work gets done. Assertion of values demands that both types of situational value are recognized. The preferences of stakeholders or urgent demands must be reconciled with pro-actively ordered or pre-defined aspirations and logical requirements of the endeavour. Assertion

which does not resolve this important and creative tension is indeed destructive.

In an out-and-out conflict between the two centres, the overwhelming evidence suggests that the emotional mode dominates. It is relatively safe for passion, even apparent irrationality, to dominate here because internal priorities do not alter the enduring values of a person, organization or society. Neither higher ideals, nor the mission and identity of any endeavour, nor the general values of a person or wider society are at risk. The reverse is the case: failure to respond to social-emotional pressures can put an endeavour at risk.

As we shall soon see, the emotion-based centres do not, cannot, and probably ought not dominate the logic-based centres at higher levels. Dominance of emotion here seems to serve as a safety valve. Just as tactical objectives need to adapt to brute physical reality if the strategic objectives are to be fulfilled, so internal priorities need to adapt to crude emotional forces if the principal objects are to be sustained. So 'over-riding priority: $L\text{-}3_E$' is placed on the right-hand side in Master-Figs. 42b, 43 & 45.

Principal objects (L-4) enable people to own their activities. They are the essential type of activity-defining endeavours which have a recognizable social identity — like an association, organization, division, department, post, team, project, collaboration, meeting, piece of work &c. These purposes must be specified so as to fit into the wider social context and to be realistically achievable. This calls for a hard-headed systematic analysis of the situation. Failure is common when endeavours are commenced on purely emotional grounds, for example, following social fashion or personal whim or as part of a speculative bubble. So a rational approach to the design of principal objects is needed.

At the same time activities defined by principal objects need to respond to a general feeling that something important is missing. Otherwise, the objects will not be infused with the necessary consensus, enthusiasm and commitment. Failure occurs when rational arguments alone are heeded and a market focus is neglected. There may be a logical need, for example, for a children's newspaper, or for a new centrist political party, or for socio-linguistic studies in academia, or for harnessing tidal energy, or for a small energy-efficient car: but without passionate proponents, sensitive timing and a degree of external social support such endeavours cannot thrive.

In other words, principal objects must, simultaneously, be rationally designed and be sensitive to social and emotional needs and pressures. This means

that objects are generated within a single balanced centre ($L\text{-}4_B$ or PO_B). Again, it is usual for specification to reveal just one object together with other loosely related subsidiary objects.

Social values (L-5) are essential to recognize personal and social needs. They define the most open-ended type of widely accepted purpose, and are the way that communities justify endeavours and influence the values used in choices. Social values, like internal priorities, reveal two distinctive and potentially conflicting modes of definition.

On the one hand there are social values accepted and recognized by all as part of the established collection or system of values ($L\text{-}5_L$ or SV_L: labelled 'communal net of values' in the Master diagrams). The communal net of values shapes, stabilizes and coheres any community and its members. It enables individuals to cooperate easily and naturally on an everyday basis by serving as an uncontroversial point of reference. So it characterizes a community, provides for its cohesion and is a comprehensive guide for people and organizations of all sorts.

Within any particular organization or endeavour, the values in its logic-based centre are a relevant sub-set of the established net of values of the community (communities) within which it is located. The relevant sub-set within a person, project or organization silently controls and shapes its activities and the priorities used to pursue these. People and organizations naturally tend to develop values within themselves which broadly accord with values in the relevant communities without.

People do not always recognize that they (i.e. their values) are in a community, and that the community (i.e. its set of values) is in them. Organizations forget that their stability and sense of control over their destiny rests largely on the congruence between internal and external social values. As a result, when values in the social environment change, managers erroneously imagine that superficial adaptation or compliance will do. Adequate social functioning absolutely depends on a genuinely held inner net of social values that mirrors the environment. So, when values in the banking environment changed in the 1980's, the result was a wave of scandals and convulsions in the early 1990's. Across the world — in the USA, in Scandinavia, in Japan, in Australia — banks failed to make the necessary internal alterations and generated huge losses or collapsed completely and needed rescue, often at the tax-payers expense.

Although people and organizations automatically direct their efforts and energies towards preserving and upholding existing values, whatever the disadvantages, change is still possible. However, change cannot be total

(even following revolutions) because this would violate the deep need for continuity. Change emerges piece-meal from the passionate promotion of a particular social value. Such social values are experienced and developed as an emergent, urgent, radical, distinctive, neglected or special need (L-5_E or SV_E: labelled 'high-lighted social need' in the Master diagrams).

Values in the emotion-based centre are like urgent priorities but they operate at the community level rather than within an endeavour. Such values play a crucial part in ideals, crusades and campaigns. Their use promotes awareness and engenders community pressure. In this way, they facilitate incremental changes in the inner workings and output of people or organizations, as well as change in the community generally. The highlighted social need may be a social development (like the opening of a foreign market, or alteration in a law), or a new personal need (like coun-selling for AIDs sufferers, or a teapot that does not stew tea), or an idea which is accepted in principle but diffidently upheld in practice (like equal opportunities for women, or pollution control).

Although the highlighted social need may appear self-evident or banal to detached observers, if it means inner change it is viewed as radical by the people affected. Seemingly good things like ethics in banking, truthfulness in politics, management in universities, customer-care in businesses or transparency in accounting often seem like contradictions in terms to cynical insiders and long-suffering outsiders. We see the same thing at a personal level: humility may be alien for one person, humour for another, diligence for another, courtesy for yet another — and yet circum-stances may demand the regular use of these personally uncongenial values. In other words, social values which are communally accepted as necessary and beneficial can seem extreme and challenging for particular people or organizations. As a result, promotion and pursuit of such mundane values become a source of communal tension, personal stress and inter-group strife.

Communal strains may emerge from this emotion-based centre in a different way. Some social needs must be selected from the communal value net to distinguish endeavours and to express diversity. Hospitals appeal to the need for health care, the construction industry to the need for houses, the coal industry to the need for energy self-sufficiency, the teaching profession to the need for education, farmers to the need for assured food supplies, and so on. These single needs are then selectively promoted to gain social support and acquire communal resources. They serve as the basis for the vigorous pursuit of sectional interests in society and claims for special provision; again generating tensions.

The communal net of values must enable or support particular values within it. Any highlighted value becomes reinforced and its necessity given credence when it is implied by all or part of the existing net of values. In return, these highlighted values reinforce and give life to the communal net. In other words, the two centres interact to enable both stability and dynamism, continuity and change. The *effect* of the established net of values is to *recognize* the highlighted value as a common need. However, once the need is given that special recognition, the communal net is altered some-what. So the *reciprocal effect* of the highlighted need is to *modify* the communal net of values. In an out-and-out conflict between a highlighted social need and the com-munal net of values, the latter invariably wins. (So 'communal net of values: L-5_L' is placed on the right-hand side in Master-Figs. 42b, 43 & 45.) This con-clusion is a restatement of the finding that continuity and stability are extremely important to people (cf. conventionalism in Ch. 6; and custom in Ch. 9).

The *intentional process* that occurs in the channel linking these two centres, $SV_L \leftrightarrow SV_E$, is one of assim-ilation. Assimilation is needed to ensure both differ-entiation within the community and belonging to it. Without assimilation, there would be social disinteg-ration. Those who represent the existing net of values seek to ensure that any highlighted value is part of it. Those upholding the specific value seek to ensure that it is more firmly or prominently established within the existing communal net. Specific needs must be assimi-lated by those people (or that part of oneself) repre-senting the communal net of values and the communal net must be assimilated by those people (or that part of oneself) promoting specific needs. Put another way: each member or organization with its distinctive needs must be assimilated by the community and the com-munity values must be assimilated by each member or organization.

Assimilation goes wrong in society in various ways: e.g. when the distinctive values of a sub-group, say a ruling class or the business sector, are regarded as synonymous with the full range of social values; or when concern for certain social needs, like current injustices, leads people to reject many values in the communal net to the point of embracing the violent overthrow of the social system.

Value systems (L-6) are about preserving ideas, and they too reveal a bi-modal form. Value systems can be defined in a precise logical and structured way — and then they might be said to specify a systematic doc-trine, ideology, validated theory, logical framework or school of thought (L-6_I or VS_I: labelled 'theoretical framework' in the Master diagrams). Although well-

established theoretical frameworks are strongly defended against external attacks, their logical construction does allow for rational criticism and logical development from within; and their stability and overt structure permit a degree of testing in practice and enable refinement over time. Logic is essential when the aim is to cover an entire domain; and structure and stability are needed for ideas to be effectively and enduringly inculcated in people so that they are regularly used.

Scientific progress and all formal schooling and professional trainings depend on the use of rational theories and frameworks. We simply cannot do without them. Many people, pointing to the destructive effects of political and religious dogmas, are nervous of the power and influence of any comprehensive theory in the social sphere. That theories are powerful is incontrovertible; but theorizing cannot be switched off just because some doctrines are false, perverse or handled foolishly.

Where coherent systematic theories or doctrines are lacking, value systems emerge spontaneously. (If not, the domain seems meaningless or irrelevant.) New ideas tend to form as beliefs or principles in an evolving, haphazard and pragmatic process. Eventually, the ideas become deeply-held, passionately affirmed, intensely defended and blindly-followed. This emotion-based centre, $L-6_L$ or VS_E, is labelled 'dominant belief' in the Master diagrams.

These beliefs serve as explanatory frameworks of a sort despite having no rational base: recall the unprovidable 'right to health' or the irrational idea of 'Aryan superiority' or the self-contradicting assertion that 'property is theft'. Dominant beliefs are not only strongly defended against external attack, they are also resistant to alteration from within. Even though beliefs may be inconsistent, incoherent and ill-defined, there seems to be an instinct to defend them at all costs rather than put them to a critical test and modify them. To the distress of those carrying the banner for science, beliefs seem to be impervious to logical criticism or empirical testing. However, scientists are no different: Priestley, the discoverer of oxygen, died believing in phlogiston; and Einstein never accepted quantum theory, the most successful physical theory ever.[1]

Personal beliefs and impersonal theories are easily linked. Theoretical frameworks become embedded in any person who uses them regularly and then slowly give rise to passionately held beliefs. Dominant beliefs, for their part, invite rationalization and theoretical refinement. Without some logical base, it is difficult to defend a belief and impossible to explain or teach it. Systematic theology, for example, is devised in part to buttress religious beliefs against common-sense criticism of inconsistency and incoherence. The *intentional process* in this channel, $VS_L \leftrightarrow VS_E$, is **idealization**.

Communal ideals are one of the natural moral institutions in society (L'-III: Ch. 7); and all enduring social groups demand that their defining ideas are idealized. Organized doctrines expect and allow adherents to construct their lives and worlds around them and to fight unceasingly for them. A dispassionate acceptance of ideas is not sufficient. The loyalty of a person whose endorsement is solely logical and who maintains the virtue of a dispassionate stance, let alone a sceptical or tentative one, cannot be trusted by the group. Deep emotional belief is unequivocally demanded. So group members with the intellectual capability and strength of character to question and analyse the ideals of their group may find themselves marginalized and forced to join a more cosmopolitan band whose beliefs include reflective inquiry.

So the two value system centres interact strongly and show a mutual interdependence and interest in each other. The difference between them can be captured by distinguishing between believing something (VS_L) — without which nobody could sensibly understand, predict or control anything; and believing in something (VS_E) — without which we would feel utterly isolated, helpless and confused.

The *effect* of established theoretical frameworks is to *legitimate* certain beliefs, even to demand them. The extraordinary power and effectiveness of scientific theories, for instance, has encouraged the public to put its faith in science. In most Western countries, it seems perfectly proper for children to be taught and disciplined from a very young age to believe in scientific methods and findings. The untested and untestable assumptions underlying such beliefs, especially in regard to knowledge and human nature, are not explained to children, while the opportunity or motivation to delve further is minimal for most adults.

The channel positively encourages people to hold certain beliefs and theories, while denouncing others as false, bad or questionable. People commonly simplify and adapt dominant beliefs in one area to fit beliefs used in other contexts. So the fusion of magical beliefs with scientific indoctrination leads people to expect miracles of science. Fusion of beliefs is particularly noticeable in the dynamic evolution of religions. In Asian and African cultures, theologically-ordered Christian beliefs interacted with existing primal or tribal religious beliefs and were inevitably modified. Such syncretism may be positively desired when it is controlled by the guardians of the teachings. Otherwise it is viewed with apprehension. Scientists, for example, are generally unhappy about the way that theories of quantum physics are used

to legitimate psychic phenomena like telepathy and clairvoyance which are widely believed in by the public. Guardians of the theoretical frameworks attempt to tolerate popular beliefs, but any which are too variant with the teaching are branded as deviations to be expunged. Reshaping deviant beliefs tends to be difficult, so suppression of their expression is generally preferred.

The assertion and defence of any logical framework of ideas, whether a mathematical theorem or a religious doctrine, occurs precisely because it comes to be believed in. The system seems to be true, and seems to penetrate beneath mundane reality. This process needs to be recognized for what it is: idol worship. So the *reciprocal effect* of the dominant belief is to *idolize* the theoretical framework. The danger is that the theoretical framework with its relative, partial, and temporal quality becomes the tangible idol replacing the intangible ultimate value which is whole, reconciling, integrative, eternal, and an expression of the spirit. Competing frameworks characterize most domains and, as we get taken over by one, others become less and less attractive. Theories or doctrines that fall foul of our beliefs are despised and treated with contempt and neglect.[2]

As noted above, if there is an out-and-out conflict between the two centres, the theoretical framework dominates. Beliefs must look to the teaching for their justification, not the other way around; and any worthwhile teaching needs to influence the human capacity to believe so as to generate beliefs which are in principle defensible. So 'theoretical framework: L-6$_L$' is placed on the right-hand side in Master-Figs. 42b, 43 & 45.

Ultimate values (L-7) define pure experiential states of being which enable the distinction between good and evil. The choice of an ultimate value must always feel emotionally right, and its proclamation should reflect a sensitivity to cultural influences and social pressures. In addition, there is a logical requirement for the value to penetrate and regulate the social being and its social environment appropriately, comprehensively and enduringly. No single ultimate value can be chosen to the neglect of all others, nor can ultimate values be developed as a complete logical structure. Instead one or two are affirmed with the others remaining more or less evident and relevant in the background. So ultimate values are clearly developed in a balanced mode.

Which ultimate value is chosen has already been recognized as significant for shaping and guiding convictions, ideals, visions, movements, the citizenry, and the social order. Now it is important to recognize that ultimate values — the well-spring of intentionality, the key to transcendence, the potential for radical transfor-

mation, the source of inspiration — require both emotional and intellectual effort. This means we have completed our examination of specification in each of the seven levels with the finding of a single balanced centre at the top (L-7$_B$: UV$_B$).

Completing the Image: Stage 1

We have now converted Master-Fig. 42a to 42b. The seven types of purpose have become ten centres of purpose formation, still within seven levels. Each centre is capable of mobilizing intentionality through using and releasing emotional and/or intellectual power. In the three levels containing two centres, the more dominant has been placed on the right hand side and distinguishing labels have been proposed (see Master-Figs. 43 & 45). Three horizontal channels, i.e. intentional processes, are required to reflect the fact that it is inevitable and appropriate that complementary centres in the same level, or rather purposes in such centres, need to influence each other.

The intentional processes here have been identified as idealization (in L-6), assimilation (in L-5), and assertion (in L-3). These are crucial processes which permeate social life. Without idealization, a group cannot develop loyalty and trust in its members (and vice versa). Without assimilation, personal and social needs will not coalesce and a person will not belong comfortably in a community. Without assertion, a person or group could not use preferences in handling situations, and distinctions between people and groups would make no difference.

The L-centres dominate in the two higher channels, whereas the E-centre dominates in the lowest channel. The dominance of logic and system (or emotion and responsiveness for that matter) is not to be taken as a suggestion that the result of its use is invariably good. We know from history (and each of us from innumerable experiences) that the reverse is often the case. Unsatisfactory specifications and harmful purposes can be easily generated in either mode. The point is that both sides of the duality are manifestations of power, and both forms of power should be used wisely at every level.

In any case, the main flow of power is downward, not horizontally, and this takes our analysis to the next stage, the influences which cross adjacent levels.

ENCOUNTERING REALITY

Although we may not think about it in these terms, the central task in social life is to determine and deal with reality for our benefit. The links between adjacent levels appear to be about this encounter with reality.

We start from appreciating what reality is (*revelation*), coming to accept reality (*socialization*), existing enduringly in reality (*embodiment*), engaging with reality (*orientation*), determining how to intervene in reality (*decision*), and operating on reality (*implementation*).

The hierarchy was originally defined on the basis of influences between adjacent levels (cf. Master-Table 2: Ch. 4). Purposes at one level were insufficient for action without purposes set at the level below — and conversely these purposes needed the higher level to be justified. A cross-level influence was also noted in analysing the various directions needed to constrain activity (G-2: Ch. 10).

Now we must examine the precise nature of the influence between adjacent levels in terms of developing and defining purposes and values. To describe influences and effects of one purpose on another more precisely, we must be clear about the mode of operation of the centre within which the purpose is developed, be it in the higher or the lower level.

We will commence the analysis from the top, giving particular attention to revelation because this is the process that is most taken for granted and most misunderstood.

L-7 ↔ L-6: Revelation

It is apparent that ultimate values can, should and do influence both modes in which value systems are formed. If no channels existed, far-reaching theories and dominating beliefs would develop without any concern either for related domains or for the greater good. The ideas would be cut off from any universal or spiritual root. For their part, ultimate values need both of these channels to be made socially meaningful and manageable. Taken together, the two channels constitute *revelation*. Revelation creates social reality via logical and emotional components labelled here *illumination* and *illusion*, respectively.

Illumination leads to a designed theoretical structure which produces useful understanding, while illusion leads to a useful, even if irrational, belief which makes life meaningful and bearable. The channels can co-operate to generate, sustain and promulgate ideas and ideals which seem true.

We tend to think of revelation as religious rather than as philosophical, scientific or political. Perhaps because ultimate values are spiritual in nature. Or possibly because religious founders openly appeal to revelation whereas others are disinclined or embarrassed to do so. In informal settings, modern scientists like Penrose, Hoyle, Gödel and others unashamedly refer to the experience of revelation and an associated euphoria,

although their papers scrupulously avoid any hint of such transpersonal influence.[3] Between the insight and the detailed publication of any great scientist, there is a long and careful effort to tease out and remove illusion leaving a relatively pure expression of illumination.

We are also inclined to assume that revelations must serve the good rather than the bad. But revelations have created barbaric political codes like Nazism which eventually led to its own destruction; and have produced perverse religious cults like The People's Temple whose members died by suicide or murder on the orders of their leader, the Reverend Jim Jones.

Illumination. The mystery of creativity in relation to ideas is as profound as the mystery of the creation of the physical universe. New theoretical frameworks — new religions, new scientific paradigms, new political ideologies — seem to be born through dissatisfaction with an existing conception of reality and intense contemplation within the domain while under the influence of particular ultimate values. The channel of influence, $UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_L$, represents an *intentional process* which is both social and transpersonal, and which may be labelled **illumination**.

The *effect* of the ultimate value on the theoretical framework is simply to *reveal* it. So a concern with justice in society will produce a quite different theory of society or religious doctrine than a concern for truth or beauty or freedom or compassion. As a result, if a social scientist (say) is preoccupied with justice rather than truth, then his perspective on a practical matter may be obscured. The *reciprocal effect* of the theoretical framework should be to *testify to* the ultimate value. If a doctrine or theory is developed under the influence of a malign passion like hatred or envy, then it *travesties* ultimate values.

The interaction between ultimate values and the logical development of ideas illuminates a domain, highlights the importance of both the ultimate value and the value system, demonstrates the possibility of using the ultimate value, and offers a potential contribution for the benefit of mankind.

Both the theoretician who is developing a new paradigm and the theologian who is systematizing doctrine ought to be actively concerned to ensure that the result is produced under the influence of ultimate values. Creating a coherent and valid theory which systematically embodies ultimate values is an ability given to only a very few. But openness to ultimate values is in any person's power. The infusion of ultimate values allows the scales to fall from the eyes of a receptive person, and then the qualities of the teaching can be perceived. In the absence of this experience, a

theoretical framework remains meaningless, abstruse and socially disconnected.

Illumination encourages intellectual work on the value system to make it as consistent, coherent and relevant as possible. This is the 90% perspiration complementing the 10% inspiration. The end result is a set of unshakeable yet modifiable convictions. Where the theoretical framework is useful, progressively improving, and lacking in serious competition — as in mathematics, physical sciences, evolutionary biology — people inexorably come to believe that they have a description of reality.

Theoretical frameworks are complex: their systematic coverage conveys an impersonal even arid flavour, while their precise logical construction veers on the artificial, even the inhuman. They seem impenetrable to the untutored and make few concessions to the layman's or novice's preconceptions or previous experiences. As the noted physicist Richard Feynman pointed out, 'you don't understand a new theory, you get used to it.' After experts become used to it, their scepticism diminishes and dissemination of the new ideas and principles is encouraged. Most people eventually come to accept the framework. But even scientists, once out of their field of expertise, cannot grasp the logic or fully appreciate the evidence for it.

Illusion. Ultimate values exert an influence on the development and sustenance of ideas independently of any logical justification or empirical validation. Ultimate values alone are inspiring, but these inspirational meta-values are not shareable or practical until they convert ideas to beliefs. In this process, a person experiences a welcome relief from feelings of confusion, futility, helplessness and isolation. Justice, for example, is meaningless until it is epitomized in a dominant belief. For one person, justice comes alive in the uniqueness of each individual, for another in an independent judiciary, for another in equal opportunities, for another in income security. In each case the ineffable impersonality and awesome generality of the ultimate value is distinctively keyed in to a person's particular social and emotional world.

Everyone develops and comes to hold dominant beliefs based on their personal experiences. Childhood and significant life events or social contacts leave their residues partly in this form. Social maturation involves purging oneself of socially dysfunctional beliefs generated by an idiosyncratic upbringing. However the main check on beliefs is in terms of inner emotional compatibility. Dominant beliefs (e.g. the inferiority of women), however irrational, may be modified under intense reality pressure: but then usually into other irrational beliefs (e.g. the equality of the sexes).

The *effect* of the ultimate value is to *magnify* or amplify the belief so that it is indeed dominant. This is the force that strengthens and rigidifies convictions, and permits sacrifices for an idea. Too often, the ultimate value is used to shield the belief from further scrutiny. The *reciprocal effect* of a dominant belief on the ultimate value is to epitomize it and, above all, to *glorify* it. Of course, when we consider how often in history horrific beliefs have emerged from ultimate values (e.g. torture from compassion), the effect is often the reverse: to discredit ultimate values and their perfectionist tendencies.

The use of this channel is evident in religious services in which believers exalt, praise, and honour ultimate values via their deity who is described as the embodiment of mercy, strength, compassion, wisdom, patience, love, hope, trust, faithfulness etc. Such worship, which is at the heart of prayer, enables the devotees' core beliefs to be enhanced and strengthened, and their ultimate values to be glorified, revered and celebrated.

The *intentional process* in the channel, $UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_E$, is one of illusion. Despite the intensity of their beliefs, ordinary people are unable to explain beliefs based on upbringing other than to say that these are what feel right and true to them. People hardly notice that they adopt and use illusory beliefs as and when it feels right and without bothering to analyse, structure, order or test them. Consider everyday things like democracy or self-esteem or arithmetic or evolution or economic growth: most people cannot sensibly explain what these ideas mean, and cannot defend them and their implications in a sophisticated debate other than by using ad hoc emotive arguments and appeals to authority. So the result of the influence of ultimate values in this channel is that each person feels safe and cocooned. Such a state is best exemplified by the committed scientist who dogmatically attacks dogmas — and is then puzzled when this behaviour is labelled self-deception. All of us hold a mixture of beliefs, some scientific, some psychological, some religious, some political, some practical and so on — each infused with a sense of truth (and other ultimate values). These unshakeable, disparate convictions can be shown to be false or too imprecise by rigorous impersonal rational analysis — but we usually have neither the time nor inclination to subject our thoughts to such meticulous scrutiny.

Illusion seems much more suspect than illumination. But man cannot live without illusory convictions. If illusions were not the norm, we might label them delusions. The delusion of personal invulnerability, for example, seems to be essential for human life. Once the delusion is destroyed, say in a soldier by the death of

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many comrades in war, then the result is a mental break down and an inability to fight. Similarly, without the illusory belief that 'it will all come right at the end' we could not persist in the struggle with adversity; and given sufficient set-backs and failures we do not. The Jews entering the gas chambers in Auschwitz, for example, did not resist because they were already psychically dead.[4]

L-6 → L-5: Socialization

An account of reality is not enough, it must be accepted and used by all in the social group. This takes us to *socialization*, a process which depends on abstract ideas (value systems) influencing the definition and recognition of social values and particular needs. The analysis here is more complex because there are two centres in each level, and so four possible channels: from VS_L to SV_L, from VS_L to SV_E, from VS_E to SV_E, and from VS_E to SV_L. In the event, analysis reveals that only two channels are viable, reflecting the processes of *instruction* and *exhortation*. Instruction works best when it is rational, comprehensive and structured, whereas exhortation works best when it is passionate, focused and opportunistic. The two processes are potentially synergistic and complementary.

Instruction. Any theory or doctrine is created to meet a range of social needs and exists to regulate the definition of those needs. Conversely, each theoretical framework, almost by definition, seeks to be embodied or reflected in the communal net of values. So an in-fluence between these two logic-based centres is appropriate and necessary. The final goal is for people to regard the theory as necessary rather than as contents of dusty books in the basement of a library. The channel, $VS_L \leftrightarrow SV_L$, represents an *intentional process* of *instruction*; or, if we disapprove or disagree with the ideas, or if they are forced on unwilling people, indoc-trination. Indoctrination conjures up images of totali-tarianism and thought police, but both terms describe the process of inculcating and perpetuating a system of ideas regarded, rightly or wrongly, as necessary for the group and better than existing alternatives.

Instruction seeks to ensure that a common under-standing develops about what values need to be observed and pursued in a community. It allows people to contribute in the right way in a wide variety of com-munal settings. So the *effect* of the theory is to *reinforce* parallel or related social values; and the *reciprocal effect* of the communal net of values is to *perpetuate* the theoretical frameworks. For example: an Islamic society and a Catholic community differ because the doctrine of each leads to a distinctive net of values to meet similar communal needs. Such religions seek and

may achieve tight control over the educational process so that all are instructed in their central doctrines.

In the absence of systematic and on-going instruc-tion, people neglect theories and slowly the ideas lose meaning and eventually become of historical interest only. Where a theoretical framework runs counter to the community net of values — market economics in a communist state, atheism in an Islamic republic, astro-logy in a scientific community, computerization in a traditional business — then the ideas question, subvert, or fragment the existing values and potentially foment unrest. This is the basis for censorship and the pheno-menon of closed minds.

Instruction is necessary in organizations when new ideas must be introduced. However, most in-service training is about providing additional skills and new information, not about inculcating important new ideas or altering existing values. It is disconcerting to recog-nize that introducing new ideas potentially means cul-ture change and demands personal growth. In moving forward, the current beliefs and net of social values of the employee community must be the starting point in determining what instruction is required. Instruction must be provided in a way that makes the new ideas seem necessary and that reinforces most of what is currently valued.

Impossibility #1. The rationality and order required by any theoretical framework offers no place for a newly emerging or distinctive social need whose definition is emotionally-driven. Conversely, the immediacy of a social need — increased safety at work following an accident, or better protection for investors following yet another financial scandal — cannot be appropriately referred back to some timeless doctrine. Attempting to do so feels dogmatic, dictatorial, and disconnected. So the diagonal channel from VS_L to SV_E, is neither needed nor desirable. The natural reference point for a highlighted social need is the communal net of values — to gain due recognition of the need and to support action. Alternatively, the need may appeal to a dominant belief for support.

Exhortation. Dominant beliefs naturally influence highlighted social needs, even though both are defined in an emotive, fluid and even pragmatic way. Indeed, the reason or justification for affirming a particular social goal — like safety at work or truth in lending — is generally sought in a link to an idea, often a maxim, which is passionately believed in — like care for others, helpfulness, or honesty. Both the belief and need in these examples are spontaneously identified and pro-claimed in response to an accident or scandal. The *intentional process*, $VS_E \leftrightarrow SV_E$, is one of **exhortation**.

In the absence of exhortation, sustaining beliefs are liable to be neglected and awkward social needs fail to be addressed.

The aim of exhortation is to ensure that equal opportunities for women (say) moves from being a good idea to being accepted as socially essential. Indeed the belief in equal opportunities often seems to be equivalent to the need for equal opportunities. Those who hold the belief point to the waste and harm stemming from not employing and involving women in work as equals. Without necessarily analysing all the implications and consequences, they proclaim the existence of a need. To the adherent, the social need seems to confirm the deeply held belief. In other words, the *effect* of a dominant belief is to *evoke* a specific social need, while the *reciprocal effect* of the highlighted social need is to *substantiate* the dominant belief.

The distinction between these two centres defining belief (VS_E) and need (SV_E) is most evident when a belief is expressed within a society where it is alien. The belief is still recognizable as an idea, but the equivalent need cannot be easily evoked. Existing social needs for discriminative treatment of women in that society (to continue with the same example) are now used to negate the idea of equal opportunities. Needs used in the home society to support the belief are rejected as socially disruptive, unsuitable and unnecessary. Facts or quantitative data in support of the alien need are ridiculed, judged irrelevant or shamelessly suppressed.

Impossibility #2. The net of communal values is too solid and established to be modified by a specific passionate belief until one of two conditions are met. Either the belief evokes a specific and recognizable need or it is incorporated within a coherent teachable doctrine. Of course, if the belief is idiosyncratic, it will not be allowed to distort the message of those accepted theoretical frameworks which are the prime controllers of communal values. So new beliefs, however worthy, take time to gain acceptance. The reverse is also true: no passionate belief lets itself be affected by what society as a whole values. So reference between these two centres carries no weight. Looked at in another way, the communal net of values is something that members of a society idealize and believe in without intellectual scrutiny, so these two centres are virtually identical and there is no need for any channel between them. In short, the second diagonal channel of influence, from VS_E to SV_L, is undesirable and unnecessary.

L-5 ⇝ L-4: Embodiment

Reality has been revealed and people have been socialized into it. The time has come to work within

reality. The first step is *embodiment*: the incorporation of values through creating bounded and relatively self-contained social entities which endure through time. Embodiment means defining and organizing endeavours which partition an otherwise undefined expanse of possibilities. This process depends on *instigation* by certain specific values, together with *institution* of relevant communal values. Embodying specific values is a dynamic and responsive requirement, so it emerges from the emotion-based centre. Embodying relevant communal values is a static, rational and comprehensive requirement, so it emerges from the logic-based centre.

Both processes often need to operate conjointly as the following example illustrates. A television documentary highlighted the plight of sexually abused children. Recognition of the need for society to offer more help directly to the children instigated the formation of a new charity, called Childline. Its main object was to enable children to phone anonymously to talk and get advice. However, successfully setting up such a charity depended on ensuring its detailed objects were socially acceptable e.g. by defining and ensuring staff competencies and limiting care activities. The objects needed to incorporate established values as manifest in existing welfare services, relevant laws and codes of practice, welfare professions, and public attitudes.

Instigation. Highlighted social needs positively demand the creation of social entities which are worthwhile in part because they seek to realize those values. When a sense of need — for an electrical car, for strong coffee, for worker safety, for educational holidays, for truth in lending, for equal opportunities — emerges in a community, people who hold that value strongly are predisposed to see something done about it. So the *intentional process* in the channel, SV_E ⟷ PO_B, may be labelled: **instigation**.

The *effect* of a highlighted social need is to *stimulate* the setting of a related principal object. Once the body or endeavour is created, the need continues to inject energy and enthusiasm in it. For example, a growing need for housing stimulates a building firm to be set up or a new type of mortgage to be offered; and the sense of a need for fair dealing by insurance brokers stimulates the creation of a new regulatory body or another course on business ethics. The channel may be misused: e.g. a faction focused on a particular social need uses it to hijack an initiative by re-defining its objects.

The *reciprocal effect* of the principal objects and resulting activities is to *promote* that particular social value. So building firms and mortgagors by their existence and everyday activities promote the need for housing; and regulatory bodies and business ethics courses bring the need for fair dealing to people's attention.

In the absence of instigation, nothing is developed at all, or existing endeavours are pursued without enthusiasm and lose their focus. Campaigning or other promotional organizations may be set up to ensure that this does not happen. Sometimes campaigning bodies are set up to counter the growing support for a specific social value. The implicit object of the tobacco lobby, for example, is to counter the value of reducing smoking.

Institution. However, more than instigation is required to set something up successfully and keep it running. Principal objects must also be determined in a way that accords with and helps realize community values generally. If due adaptation to current values is missing, the new objects will fail to gain much social support, and their pursuit may even be prevented or blocked. The communal net of values uses principal objects to get embedded in an enduring and practical way. The *intentional process* in the channel, $SV_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$, is the relatively formal one of **institution**.

The *effect* of the communal net of values is to *stipulate* certain features of the principal objects and to prohibit others. The *reciprocal effect* of the principal objects is to *incorporate* relevant values in the communal net within the endeavour. Institution reinforces existing values in society by ensuring they become central to a myriad of organizations and endeavours that interact and impinge on each other. Enterprises serve the general good in this way, although that is not their main purpose. When enterprises are seen as primarily serving society rather than themselves, the urge to institutionalize has gone too far and over-control suffocates initiative. At the other extreme, revolutionary organizations defined in terms of their own ideology oppose communal values and positively refuse to incorporate them.

L-4 → L-3: Orientation

Revelation and socialization are taken for granted by now, and it is necessary for the social embodiment of those values — organizations or endeavours — to orient themselves to approach and engage with actual situations sensibly and effectively. *Orientation* is based on the influence of principal objects on the working of the two internal priority centres. It depends on an *accommodation* to reality which is responsive, evolutionary and pragmatic; and a *clarification* of reality which is designed, comprehensive and structured. The two processes naturally complement each other. Without clarification, it is not clear what degree of accommodation is tolerable; and without accommodation, clarification is an other-worldly exercise.

Accommodation. Whatever the desire to deny or resist irrational feelings and pressures in a situation, any

endeavour is put at risk if inescapable or urgent priorities are not recognized. The *intentional process* in this channel, $PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_E$, is therefore one of **accommodation** to political pressures. All values rouse emotions and are potentially controversial, but a priority which is set purely to handle pressures is liable to be particularly contested. Principal objects need to be able to contain such conflicts.

The *effect* of the principal object on an over-riding priority is to *tolerate* it. Tolerating irrational but powerful priorities protects the endeavour or entity and all the resources and effort invested in it. However, the consequence of accommodation is that the outlook of the endeavour is altered. In other words, the *reciprocal effect* of an over-riding priority is to adjust or *reorient* the principal objects. Subsidies and tax incentives, for example, may put certain firms under intense pressure to change their main outputs. Pragmatic opportunists welcome and may even provoke crises (which are automatically top priority) even if this means that the overall aims are distorted or neglected.

Two further examples of accommodation: The legal system frequently does not deliver what it seems to promise because of the values and powerful position of lawyers. To confront lawyers and ignore their preferences would threaten a breakdown in services without any possible replacement. Better a distorted, inefficient, expensive and insensitive system than none at all. But continuing to surrender to powerful factions is self-destructive. In organizations, it may eventually undermine their rationale and effective working. Accommodation to the increasingly irrational demands of print unions failed to prevent (and even seemed to encourage) repeated disruption of production of *The Times* of London in the 1970's. Eventually the management decided to stand firm and it shut down publication. When the paper reappeared a year later, it was staffed by an entirely new work-force with different values more in accord with that of the business.

Clarification. The influence between principal objects and structured or comprehensive sets of priorities is quite different. The concern here is to ensure that priorities (whether specified as rational criteria, important activities, or resource allocations) cover the entire endeavour and are determined by its nature. From a rational perspective, it is essential that everything of relevance and importance should be addressed. Even relatively minor matters must not be overlooked. This demands a degree of analysis and systematization of the endeavour's internal and external reality, and a determination of preferences. The *intentional process* in the channel, $PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_L$, is one of **clarification**.

Because objects are defined in such a global and simple way — often reduced to a single phrase or sentence ('to sort out recruitment', 'to sell clothes', 'to study values'), it is not really clear what the principal objects are about until this channel is activated. So the *effect* of the principal objects on logic-based priorities is to *demand* and generate them; and the *reciprocal effect* of a structured set of priorities is to *elucidate*, elaborate, explain or refine the objects.

A systematic and analytical approach to priorities helps in the development and progression of the endeavour by providing a degree of discipline and design that single urgent priorities wilfully neglect. The simplest example is resource allocation where there is a limited total (100%) and where this total must be accounted for. Covert or haphazard budget allocations not only create irritation and feelings of unfairness, they also make financial control difficult. By contrast, discriminating and classifying spending in a comprehensive and structured way enables debate, reduces conflict, and provides control.

Of course the quality of analysed priorities depends on the quantity and quality of intellectual and intuitive effort expended. This effort may be considerable and it leads to a common danger. Once a structured set of priorities has been developed (e.g. for budgetary allocation or for syllabus development), it is liable to become rigidified, resistant to revision and applied even though times have changed. Rather than refining the objects, such priorities suborn or substitute for them.

L-3 ⇥ L-2: Decision

With perplexing issues of the nature of reality now fully dealt with, a social and institutional context provided for, and an orientation set, the moment of commitment is reached. *Decision* is the application of value to action, and this is precisely what occurs in linking internal priorities with strategic objectives. The latter lays down what is to be done, and the former explains why it is to be done. Internal priorities in both centres need to influence the strategic objective centre to ensure that an optimal decision is made. So decision involves two processes: *resolution*, which is dynamically pursued and socially introduced; and *forecasting*, which must be systematically pursued and logically developed.

If an over-riding priority leads to the selection of a course of action, the logic-based priority centre should seek to ensure that this course takes into account other valid values or that it is chosen to assist a more comprehensive strategy. When a structured set of priorities generates a future scenario, the emotion-based priority centre should ensure that action is rapidly and sensitively taken on urgent or anxiety-generating matters.

Resolution. In all decision situations, it is necessary to force a choice of a particular outcome in the face of conflicting views about what could and should be done. (If there is no real choice, then action follows mechanically without any decision being made.) The *intentional process* in this channel, $IP_E \leftrightarrow SO_B$, is one of **resolution**. It involves gaining acceptance that something must be done, recognizing the pressures, surveying the possibilities and grasping the nettle. The psychological process is one of commitment and dynamism. As people say: 'choices must be made'. In this channel, irrational or factional pressures evoke images of one or more ways to reduce or remove these pressures. In considering strategic objectives, a degree of rationality can be brought to bear. However, the decider is aware of an intense urge to ensure that one of the various possible options is rapidly selected whatever the arguments against it. In other words, the effect of an over-riding priority is to *select* a particular strategic objective. The *reciprocal effect* of that strategic objective is to *suit* the urgent priority and so remove the pressure and anxiety.

Anxieties and pressures are liable to lower the quality of decisions, to foster a short-term perspective, and to unbalance the specification of strategic objectives. If management by crisis is unchecked, sustained progress becomes difficult and substantial change cannot be introduced. The strategic objective may worsen the priority which it is solving: e.g. increasing borrowing to pay urgent interest on debts increases the pressure to service debts. To the stressed manager or politician, however, reasonable objections to a pragmatic response feel like obstruction rather than assistance. Solutions are wanted now, not criticisms or lengthy analyses. And being pragmatic — doing something, anything — is essential sometimes. Because over-riding priorities are so emotion-filled, ignoring them tempts a political explosion or serious damage to the endeavour.

Forecasting. There are, however, rational or planned approaches to making decisions. These are based on using values in the endeavour and information about the situation to direct and coordinate people in a systematic and coherent way. Only a structured set of priorities can provide a comprehensive context of what strategic objectives are needed. The *intentional process* in the channel, $IP_L \leftrightarrow SO_B$, is **forecasting**. The forecast for an endeavour or organization is an achievable picture of the short-, medium- or long-term future based on its nature and the present situation. (Sometimes such a forecast is called a vision: but cf. G-4[+]: Ch. 10.)

The use of forecasting enables greater self-control and greater control over the social environment. The forecast is sometimes called a plan: but do not confuse a forecast with a real plan which says exactly what has to

be done (cf. G-2[1]: Ch.10). Also distinguish a mathematics-generated, theory-driven forecast of external conditions from a reality-based forecast of what an endeavour might achieve. Forecasting is as much an imaginative as a mechanical process. Different hypothetical scenarios ('what ifs') should be developed, complete in all significant details and not omitting ill-understood or unpredictable factors. The aim is to anticipate challenges, reveal opportunities, and guide pragmatic responses.

The *effect* of the rationally-developed priority set is to *order* or organize strategic objectives. If rationality and completeness are taken too far, the result is to complicate the specification of the desired outcome. The *reciprocal effect* of strategic objectives is to *depict* the likely actual effect of pursuing rationally developed priorities in the present situation. Strategic objectives which have been solely devised to suit urgent priorities or to grasp an opportunity simply ignore the relevant rational set of priorities.

L-2 → L-1: Implementation

Once a decision is made, the stage of intervention in physical reality is reached. Intervention assumes a mutual influence between strategic objectives and tactical objectives. Because both centres are balanced, there is only one possible channel through which value transformations finally produce tangible results. This channel, $SO_B \leftrightarrow TO_B$, enables the *intentional process* of **implementation**. Tactical objectives are pure means and have no significance other than their contribution to the realization of the strategic objective and all higher values. Nevertheless this channel is not trivial: there will be no desired outcomes without detailed objectives and deadlines.

The *effect* of any strategic objective is to *initiate* the specification of tactical objectives. These objectives prompt and propel people into action and trigger the use of resources for performance of tasks. The *reciprocal effect* of tactical objectives is to *ground* the strategic objective in the immediate realities, indicating precisely what is involved in producing the desired outcome. Implementation is always difficult and the strategic objective should be experienced as a challenging but worthwhile beacon. If values and objectives carry little weight, or pressure of circumstances and self-interest is intense, tactical objectives may be set which by-pass or even pervert strategic objectives. Everyone is kept busy, but results are not delivered. In such cases the strategic objective is an excuse for action (or corruption) rather than a beneficial driving and shaping force.

The activities which the tactical objectives define produce the desired outcomes in a progressive fashion.

Implementation of plans and production of outcomes in the social sphere are broadly equivalent to the notion of causality in physical science. Social events are not so much caused as produced or implemented: an election campaign is not caused, it is implemented; tactical objectives do not cause the building of a car, their fulfilment produces a car.

Unless intentionality in its downward flow reaches this channel, all will have been in vain. The potential and promise generated by the higher centres will not be fulfilled. The trouble is that we may know precisely what we want to achieve, but things may still go wrong. A myriad of extraneous factors, including other people's intentions and physical or social forces, lead to detours and adaptations. The strategic objective may still be produced, but at the cost of ignoring or violating higher values.

Completing the Image: Stage 2

The result of defining the primary cross-level flows of influence is to convert Master-Fig. 42b to 42c. Eleven more channels have been found necessary and defined, and two theoretically possible channels have been ruled out as inappropriate and undesirable. The upper two channels — illumination, illusion — lie in a purely abstract realm where thinking and feeling hold complete sway. The lower seven channels — institution, instigation, accommodation, clarification, resolution, forecasting, implementation — are directly concerned with doing things in the everyday world.

Joining these groups are two channels — instruction and exhortation — which seek to bridge the abyss between the ideal and the real, between potentiality and actuality, between theory and practice, between mind and society. In an attempt to make this leap, these channels link centres in the same mode — whereas all others have some degree of balance. These two utterly unbalanced channels, bound together above by idealization and below by assimilation, together provide balance of a sort to liberate the tremendous force needed to make the difficult transition from abstract thought to concrete need.

Because all the centres are now connected, social reality and the basis of a society with social beings now exist. But endeavours lack any independent links to the realm of abstraction and imagination. Without such channels, a society and its members would be somewhat unsophisticated and probably stagnant. Principal objects which define activities would be wholly under the influence of tribal guardians, like priests or scientists. Alternative accounts of reality could not develop and spread easily, so the result would be a uniformity of thinking with the potential to deteriorate into fanaticism.

There is a further limitation of the image. Since actions based in tactical objectives may produce side-effects which violate higher values, some means for preventing this is needed. In other words, channels of influence which by-pass levels must be defined.

CHANGING REALITY

The concern now moves to changing reality, and for a social being this means changing social reality. Change is difficult because of the natural inertia of all centres, from the eternal ultimate values downwards. But even ultimate values may need to change and the others certainly do. The channels drawn so far do enable a different or changed value in one centre to exert influence on what happens in another, but this influence never goes so far as exerting complete control over the receiving centre. So the receiving centre is liable to ignore or distort that influence in the normal course of its operation. To ensure the triumph of higher values, it is therefore essential to have channels which allow a flow of influence between centres two levels apart. In this way, any distorting or obstructing effect of the centre at the by-passed level can be mitigated or overcome. (This is consistent with our earlier finding that overcoming opposition in people required drives defined by three adjacent levels of purpose: G-3 in Ch. 10).

Changing reality starts from the *dissemination* of new ideas, invariably radical and unexpected at first but thought to be worthwhile. These ideas foster a gradual but inexorable *evolution* of the community, whose old and new values are expressed in endeavours. *Maintenance* of current endeavours and their incorporated values is then required in the face of derailing forces. Finally, *re-assertion* of values is necessary in the context of implementation.

We will examine these processes in more detail and see where and how by-passing of levels is possible and necessary. However, before doing so, I must explain why change starts from ideas (value systems: L-6) and not from ultimate values (states of being: L-7).

L-7 → L-5: It might be imagined that ultimate values could or should directly influence social values in either or both centres. In reality, however, ultimate values are *always* channelled through the existing value systems of a social group.

The highest ideals, it will be recalled, are an amalgam of ultimate values, value systems and social values (G-3⁵). In other words, social needs must either be justified by a recognized school of thought or by popular beliefs. No appeal beyond these makes sense to people. Any proposed social value lying outside accepted ideas is utterly rejected as irrelevant, incomprehensible, alien or abhorrent — even if its origins are claimed to be in ultimate values. For example, justice and freedom alone do not determine a woman's need for education and for equality in employment and social dealings. If the societal dogma denies that women have such needs and affirms the virtue of wifely compliance and a domestic role, then its upholders will wholly reject the so-called claims of justice and freedom, and go on vociferously to deny that women have an unjust or oppressed position in society. In short: any proposed need must be introduced and valued as an idea before people will consider whether it might be communally necessary.

Another way to look at this phenomenon is to recognize that resistance has no meaning within the abstract experiential and potential realm in which ultimate values and value systems reside. Value systems are the means whereby self-sufficient, eternal and immutable ultimate values are revealed. So value systems are never viewed as a resistance to ultimate values by adherents, even if an outsider judges the lived revelation to be barbaric or deluded. The reverse is the case: resistance to change actually means resistance to new and supposedly worthwhile ideas by lower levels in their efforts to handle social pressures, keep necessary activities going, and overcome practical obstacles. So channels from UV$_B$ to SV$_E$ and from UV$_B$ to SV$_L$ are neither necessary nor desirable.

L-6 → L-4: Dissemination

The first step in changing reality is to spread ideas, often new ideas, in a process known as *dissemination*. Dissemination requires that ideas, beliefs and theories directly influence the definition of principal objects, without being unduly modified or rejected by existing social values. The aim here is to develop endeavours which exert an influence on surrounding values.

As social values evolve to meet the practical needs of community life, already accepted identity-defining ideas can be submerged or lost. So a mechanism for reaffirming and renewing established value systems is necessary. In other cases, value systems are recent creations seeking to reorient the community, even if this means opposing some current social values. This is the basis for all *crusades* for social reform (G-3⁴). So dissemination is needed both to reform and to renew social values in line with emerging beliefs and theories. Effective dissemination takes place through *propagation* of the valued ideas, which needs to be as systematic and comprehensive as possible; and *demonstration* of their use and worth, which needs to be as practical and convincing as possible.

The two channels clearly complement each other. Firms, for example, need both channels to handle culture change. Culture change is about introducing a new set of beliefs in the teeth of existing social values. Many varied initiatives are called for in order to explain and explore what the change is all about, to prevent the neutralizing and adaptive effects of current social values, and to demonstrate the virtues and widespread benefits of the new order. In this way, a new value consensus gradually forms and the new ideas slowly become a reality.

Propagation. Any school of thought absolutely requires that those who accept and idealize it should endeavour to alter the current communal net of values to accord more with its teachings. If adherents did not do so, they would be betraying what had been revealed to them. In other words, the established net of social values is viewed as a potential or actual resistance to be overcome by ideology-based activities of all sorts, especially educative and communicative efforts. So this channel, $VS_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$, represents the *intentional process* of **propagation**.

In the everyday case of a professional, propagation is automatic and unstoppable. Each professional uses the identification enforced during socialization by their group to generate on-going endeavours which systematically support and further the doctrines of the group. The professional's personal efforts are validated by the doctrines, and those efforts also establish the doctrines in wider society. We find it natural that professionals set up associations, training establishments, journals and so on even though these things spread a particular professional ideology. In the same way, we accept and expect sympathizers of a political ideology to form dedicated political parties, produce newspapers, create pressure groups, launch campaigns, commission research and so on — always with an orientation consonant with their ideology.

Any new theory or ideology cannot be effectively transmitted and pursued via mainstream education. Education must endorse whatever is conventionally accepted. At best, students are given an impartial account while adherents want total acceptance of certain premises. Within the rarefied atmosphere of the scientific community, scientists are no different. New disciplines and theories have a hard time getting noticed and accepted. So their loyal adherents establish dedicated conferences, research projects, teaching programmes, new journals, specialized centres, communication networks, sub-departments of faculties and so on, all to forward their ideas systematically.

As the above examples illustrate, the *effect* of a theoretical framework is to *validate* certain principal

objects, making endeavours worthwhile and ensuring organizations further the ideas. The *reciprocal effect* of the principal objects is to *establish* the theoretical framework as a real social force. The endeavour affirms the existence of the ideas in the social group and ensures its continuing development and communal application. The reverse effects are also possible and commonplace: an established theoretical framework may invalidate certain objects. For example parapsychological research programmes and systems science departments are sparse on the ground because (correctly or incorrectly) both are widely viewed as contravening scientific conventions or tenets. If endeavours which contravene a doctrine could not be invalidated, the hold of those ideas on society would be threatened — adherents start fearing that anything might be permitted.

Demonstration. Propagation alone is insufficient for dissemination. People must be touched and their beliefs altered if they are to change their views. Dominant beliefs seek to create and shape the objects of endeavours and enterprises in an *intentional process* which is represented by the channel $VS_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$, and called **demonstration**.

Demonstration is partial and opportunistic, but it gets people's attention. Adherents who wish to show others the value of their ideas use it all the time. When top management or government ministers, for example, wish to assert strongly held beliefs which buck the existing social consensus, they launch special initiatives and pump in effort and money well beyond what would be realistic for a routine development. By this means they not only demonstrate their commitment, they maximize the likelihood of a resounding success which convinces others. In the case of a new religion, doctrine is not enough and the standard demonstration used to convert people is a miracle. All religious founders perform miracles, even though the doctrine may play down their significance.

When ordinary people want to do something to show their commitment to an idea, they demonstrate: by marching, attending rallies, joining pickets, distributing pamphlets, signing petitions. These endeavours sustain the belief among the demonstrators and inform wider society. Endeavours are regularly defined to express, reflect and support personal beliefs, especially those weakly held in the community or at variance with a defining ideology. For example: a medical epidemiologist may allow his studies to be shaped by his radical concern for social inequality as well as by his disciplinary methods and theories. If a person's principal objects do not openly confirm and demonstrate a respect for their beliefs in this way, it means that the person is compartmentalizing social life

or acting hypocritically. The common tendency for people to divorce values in their work and their personal life can be said to reflect a breakdown in the use of this channel.

Defining activities in terms of passionate beliefs shows yourself and others where you stand. So the *effect* of dominant beliefs on principal objects is to *sustain* them. The *reciprocal effect* of principal objects is to *confirm* the beliefs. Many devout Christians choose to earn a living doing public sector or voluntary agency work because of their beliefs about the corrupting influence of wealth. While a job in manufacturing might be acceptable, work in financial services would be almost a betrayal of their beliefs. In any case, success is unlikely because their beliefs undermine the necessary commitment to making money out of money.

L-5 → L-3: Evolution

Dissemination seeks to change social reality, but actual change requires and implies the *evolution* of values in use. New social values become effective within endeavours and organizations in the form of preferences or criteria used in deciding. But moving values from outside an organization or person to the inside takes time. It is a form of growth and occurs in a gradual and piecemeal and organic way. Social values and internal priorities are both bi-modal, so there are four channels possible in theory (cf. L-6→L-5). As it turns out, once again only two of the channels are viable.

The need to bypass a level here is about ensuring that what is important within an endeavour mirrors what is viewed as important by the wider community. Without some direct influence of social values on internal priorities, endeavours and organizations (once set up) could let themselves follow their own technological and self-centred imperatives to everyone else's detriment. Campaigning groups often emerge spontaneously as part of an effort to stop this tendency (cf. G-3³).

The evolution of values depends on a mix of the new and the old as circumstances unfold. The introduction of the new, *innovation*, must be designed and systematically driven; while maintenance of the status quo, *conservation*, needs to be a quasi-automatic and responsive reaction.

Conservation. The communal net of social values reflects widely shared personal and social needs and is, accordingly, the source of a diverse range of social demands and pressures which impinge on any endeavour. The importance of social continuity and stability makes these values a matter of deep concern to all. So the *intentional process* in the channel, $SV_L \leftrightarrow IP_L$, is one of **conservation**. It is appropriate for a centre, which

is both within and external to an enterprise, to have a direct influence on the setting of urgent priorities. The *effect* of the net of established communal values is to *condition* the choice of an over-riding priority within an endeavour. The *reciprocal effect* of such a priority is to *preserve* the communal net of values and the community itself.

Conservation enables the community to be maintained, social life to be orderly, and the enterprise to be safeguarded and supported. The channel needs to be used to a greater or lesser degree in any decision. The alternative would be disruptive social upheaval.

Social values may of course be counter-productive for the endeavour. For example, some societies have evolved social values like refusing to communicate bad news, using bribes to supplement pay, respecting seniority more than merit, fierce independence, and rejection of authority. All these values impose burdensome priorities which are liable to impede efficiency and productivity. Efforts may be made to eradicate such a culture within an organization, especially if the project is financed from another country or by an international institution with conventional managerial values. However, success is extraordinarily difficult because more useful emotion-based priorities would challenge communal cohesion on which everything and everyone depends.

Impossibility #1. Conservation of social values complements their institution, so principal objects can be by-passed without undue anxiety. By contrast, the communal net of values (or a relevant sub-set) cannot by-pass principal objects to influence the rational analysis and comprehensive structuring of priorities. Such by-passing would imply that an organization or project should consider and pursue a full range of social values in a systematic way. This is neither feasible nor sensible. The only comprehensive influence on the structuring of priorities must be the nature of the endeavour, as encapsulated in its principal objects. So a direct channel of influence from SV_L to IP_L is neither necessary nor desirable.

Innovation. Not all communal values can be pursued by a single endeavour. But if particular social needs are relevant, then these can and should inform a rationally-developed set of priorities. The *intentional process* in the channel, $SV_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$, is one of **innovation** or practical change. Note that innovation does not flow directly from a new radical idea (VS_E) which has not yet been converted into a social need.

Competitive advantage for firms depends on their recognizing emerging needs (i.e. markets) — for different products or services, for specific features like

convenience or reliability, for more environmental protection, for more individualized services, indeed for whatever is in the forefront of public attention — and then innovating. Firms must accept that what will be important in the future may not be the same as what was valued in the past. They should gear themselves to accept periodic changes to their forecasts and planned developments.

The fear of instability and the wish to avoid an over-reaction to social fashion is common and natural in firms, probably because it is imagined that the new need should be endorsed as an over-riding priority. However, by taking a structured and comprehensive approach to the organization's current aims, new needs can be sensibly considered and incorporated without excessive danger. The *effect* of a highlighted social need on a structured set of priorities is to *re-order* those priorities. The result is often a significant transformation of activity which demands new arrangements and careful planning to be implemented successfully. The *reciprocal effect* of the re-structured set of priorities is to *introduce* the particular value into the endeavour or enterprise.

Poorly handled innovations disrupt existing rational priorities and end up harming the endeavour and failing to bring about the desired change. If the innovation channel did not exist, organizations could only respond to a specific need by altering their mission or waiting for the social environment to change. The result would be stagnation. This is evident in some organizations, where a set of rigidified priorities actively excludes noticing or responding to new needs.

Impossibility #2. Highlighted social needs are too partial, too tinged with irrationality and too riddled with *communal tensions* to by-pass principal objects and influence over-riding priorities directly. Any such need potentially challenges the status quo and must be tamed and incorporated by analysing it in the context of existing values of the endeavour. Insisting that a particular need should be made an urgent priority just because it is good or fashionable is naive and impractical. Businessmen can usually resist politicians and academics telling them what the country needs. By contrast, well-meaning lay-governors of public agencies may damage their organization and demoralize their managers by successfully insisting on the priority of a particular community value without considering how it locks into management needs. So a channel of influence from SV_E to IP_F is neither appropriate nor beneficial.

L-4 → L-2: Maintenance

Dissemination and evolution have now brought about changes in the values circulating in the community. So they enable new and existing bodies to pursue new values. However, values can be so easily lost if endeavours start drifting or managers become distracted. Internal priorities with their tendency to be dominated by factions and external pressures are particularly liable to distort newly agreed values and push endeavours off course. The only safeguard is a direct channel of influence between principal objects and strategic objectives. The *intentional process* in the channel, $PO_B \leftrightarrow SO_B$, is one of **maintenance**. The link to initiatives (G-3^2) which cover the same three levels is apparent.

The *effect* of the principal object is to *re-direct* or realign specification of strategic objectives. However, where principal objects generate strategic objectives directly (as is common when managers take an opportunist or pragmatic approach), there is a tendency to mis-direct specification because the clarification, emphases and checks provided by internal priorities are absent.

Each strategic objective that is fulfilled should contribute to achieving the objects of the endeavour. So the *reciprocal effect* of any strategic objective is to *further* the principal object and the values it represents. Put another way, all futuristic forecasts, strategies and main outcomes should be checked against what is to be achieved overall — the principal objects. In this way, a person or organization never loses sight of the rationale for daily activities. This channel is the basis for any general over-sight or supervision of activities. At a personal level, it embodies the virtue of perseverance.

A person's life usually drifts and their energies dissipate if this channel is not used: e.g. the person may move from one problematic situation to another with each defining a new short-term way of living. A single person can choose such a life, but in a family the children would probably suffer. The equivalent dysfunction in business would be strategic objectives which side-track the principal object: e.g. mindless diversification simply to become larger or international; or concentration on foreign exchange speculation rather than on the core business. In public agencies, such dysfunction may emerge as directionless pragmatism: e.g. government bureaucracies in developing countries frequently seem to exist to provide salaried posts, a feeling of participation and a core group committed to supporting the government — while the social needs for which they were created are ignored.

L-3 → L-1: Re-assertion

Efforts to change reality in line with values regularly founder at the last hurdle. So often what is actually done fails to express higher values or produces side-effects

which violate agreed values. Strategic or operational plans may claim to realize priorities, but all too often these orienting values and criteria are distorted or neglected in the hurly-burly of action and pragmatic efforts to overcome obstacles quickly. To deal with this tendency it is essential that internal priorities, the lowest level of purpose which is also a value, enable *re-assertion* of those values which are relevant to particular activities.

There are two possible channels of direct influence to the lowest level of implementation. Reassertion can occur through the straightforward *imposition* of values in a process driven by emotion and urgency; while *evaluation* permits a check of tactical objectives, tasks and their consequences in terms of a comprehensive range of relevant values. Evaluation and imposition can operate independently of each other. This engenders a characteristic tension, especially in public agencies, between providing services (i.e. using resources to produce value) and evaluating services (i.e. using resources to check that value has been produced).

Imposition. Values that seem urgent or inescapable in the board room or the senior manager's office are not necessarily judged to be over-riding in the heat of the action. Although tactical objectives need to recognize such values, the setting of tactical objectives is primarily driven by the agreed strategic objective. In any case, disagreement with given priorities or failure to understand their relevance is common during implementation. If this happens, passions rise in whoever set the priorities, and an urge develops for direct control over the precise details of implementation. So the *intentional process* in this channel, $IP_E \leftrightarrow TO_B$, is one of **imposition**.

Checking all tactical objectives is unwise and impractical. Problems with the overuse of directives have already been discussed (G-3[1]: Ch.10). Nevertheless, imposition remains an essential tool in any endeavour. For example, a manager should not determine exactly how a subordinate achieves an agreed outcome — say a nurse attending a patient, or a manager closing a factory. However, if certain specific value controls and constraints are not insisted upon — say providing information for self-help in the case of the nursing treatment, or consulting with the community in the case of the factory closure — then the results may well be produced in unsatisfactory or unacceptable ways.

The *effect* of an over-riding priority on the tactical objective is to *prescribe* it. Alternatively, the effect may be to proscribe or veto a proposed objective. If tactical objectives violate emotion-based priorities, a veto may be needed even though the tactic would expeditiously

forward a desired strategic objective. For example, enlarging airports near London, though important for economic development, is virtually impossible to implement because of public objections. The *reciprocal effect* of the tactical objective is to *satisfy* the priority.

Evaluation. The logic-based internal priority centre with its structured analysis of relevant values enables innovation and fosters the unique range of concerns of an enterprise. These values are essential for the endeavour and need re-assertion. However, it is not rational to apply or impose a full range of values when tactical objectives are being set. It would hopelessly complicate and interfere with handling the already complex realities of implementation. Furthermore, almost any value may become a survival issue during implementation and turn into an urgent priority which takes momentary precedence. So the structured set of priorities must remain above the implementation fray. In this position, however, it is ideally suited to assess the appropriateness of proposed plans and resource use, and to monitor subsequent performance. So the *intentional process* in the channel, $IP_L \leftrightarrow TO_B$, is one of evaluation.

The *effect* of the structured set of priorities is to *inform* the specification of tactical objectives. The *reciprocal effect* of well-specified tactical objectives is to *note* or take account of the various relevant values. Innovations can then be **progressed** and the endeavour as a whole is safe-guarded even while urgent priorities are being implemented.

If evaluation reveals that things are going wrong, for example overspending or missing deadlines or victimization, then the significance of these problems can be assessed. If need be, correctives may be instituted through devising new strategic objectives or asserting new priorities. There may be a temptation during evaluation or monitoring to propose better tactical objectives. Senior managers, management consultants and social scientists, for example, are habitually in danger of making this mistake in association with their evaluations. But the choice of tactical objectives is about overcoming obstacles and properly requires immersion in the situation with responsibility for completing the tasks. It is just too easy for outsiders to fire off instructions without having to consider the work involved.

All too often evaluation is absent or minimal, partly because the structured set of priorities is neglected or rigidified. Then tactical objectives (responding directly to over-riding priorities) start to drive policies and outcomes rather than the other way around. In the absence of evaluation, resources tend to be poorly used and there is uncertainty about whether or not real progress is being made.

Completing the Image: Stage 3

The result of defining these flows of influence is to add seven further channels and convert Master-Fig. 42c to 42d. Two additional links from the abstract realm to the everyday world have been recognized — propagation and demonstration; and society and its members have developed considerable additional powers for sustaining and pursuing their values — conservation, innovation, maintenance, imposition and evaluation.

But all values are still based on the communal revelation. So the structure is still not fully satisfactory. The ordinary member of society is still dominated by the values of others, however unconvincing or repugnant. Even if social values are congenial, 'when I live on what they say, and fill my life with it, I have replaced the I which I myself am in solitude with the mass 'I'....Instead of living my life, I am de-living it.'[5] Furthermore, the potential for externally-directed fanaticism noted in Master-Fig 42c is now realized internally, because a plurality of true believers has become possible. Each sect is dedicated to altering community perspectives and needs; and each seeks the exclusive allegiance of members of the community.

Harmony and progress depend on each person participating in communal life while rejecting both sectional fanaticism and excessive conformity. This depends on a conviction of personal autonomy, a deep humanity, and the possibility of individual integrity — all of which can have only one source: ultimate values.

MAINTAINING HUMANITY

An ethical society should be an enlightened society. An enlightened society requires humane members: this means people who recognize social obligations and yet refuse to be slaves to communal pressures, conventions and doctrines — however well-established and widely upheld. The openness, inner freedom and essential rightness that characterize enlightenment can only be developed in one centre: ultimate values. And, if individuals are to be held responsible, their influence can have only one receptor: principal objects.

L-7 → L-4: Enlightenment

If we are to be truly creative, to be able to discriminate well amongst ideals, needs, and emphases — in a word: to be enlightened — it is necessary that we consciously open ourselves to the influence of ultimate values. This means using ultimate values to reflect on those purposes, principal objects, which define the identity of those endeavours which we must own as ours. The *effect* of ultimate values is to *humanize* principal objects. The effect here is to fill endeavours with goodness. The negative effect, to diabolize objects, means filling endeavours with badness (hence 'the work of the devil'). The *reciprocal effect* of good principal objects is to *manifest* the ultimate value. The social and also transpersonal *intentional process* in the channel, $UV_B \leftrightarrow PO_B$, is enlightenment. This channel determines good deeds and enables enlightened self-interest.

Ultimate value is pure value. It is the significance of any value. It defines the meaning of existence. In spiritual terms, ultimate values represent the closest we can come to directly imaging, and socially using, God. The channel is evident in the Old Testament priestly benediction: 'May the countenance of Eternal Being shine upon you' which is sometimes translated as 'May the Lord enlighten you'.

A direct influence of ultimate values upon principal objects provides the will and inspiration to achieve something which is personally felt to be unambiguously worthwhile. It is the way that a person keeps faith with himself and with society. It unambiguously asserts the possibility of humane activities — of just works, of peaceful negotiations, of faithful service, of honest counsel, of caring treatment.

In determining principal objects, people not only define their activities, but also reveal most clearly who they are and what moves them: by their deeds do ye know them. Deliberately evil deeds are those that are developed by repudiating positive ultimate values. This channel permits and requires self-determination, and establishes the freedom of human beings to create and maintain a worthwhile social existence. According to Confucius, humanity (*jen*), is the supreme virtue.

Intuitively, we know that the self-aware person is the only vehicle through which ultimate values can be channelled. And we discovered earlier (Ch. 5), that people take full control of their own identity only at the principal object level. This means that an enlightened society must be one which enables freedom of association and enterprise while fostering autonomous reflection on ultimate values. Organizations and governments, even churches, can be influenced directly by ultimate values only through the attitudes and activities of their participants.

Organized churches, despite their vested interest in controlling the access of people to God, do recognize this channel. The moral community and the just social order that they seek do promote an autonomous relation to God, but one invariably hedged around with doctrinal complexity and organizational conditions. In the past, and perhaps even today in some places, churches have preferred the majority of people to be ignorant and indoctrinated, and have dealt with the

intelligent by co-opting them into their own ranks to control the masses. As Campbell notes, church persecution has never been about lack of faith in God, but about lack of faith in the doctrine of the church: by the 12th century in Europe Christian beliefs no longer universally held were universally enforced.[6] The New Age movement, widely condemned by the churches as pagan, lies at the other extreme and encourages people to have faith in ultimate values and to seek and be guided directly in everyday life by spirituality, wisdom and compassion rather than via religious institutions.

Completion of the Image: Stage 4. The result of defining this last channel of influence is to convert Master-Fig. 42d to 42e. The single extra channel in fact completes the structure. Other channels linking centres which are three or more levels apart may look like tempting short-cuts to implement higher values, but they are impractical and liable to be harmful. So they must be positively avoided, as explained below.

17 Dysfunctional Channels

Ultimate values influence value systems directly and by-pass social values to infuse principal objects directly. They do not penetrate any further because purposes set in the lower levels are too evanescent and practical for eternal considerations to have any meaning. Evoking ultimate values when deciding what outcome to seek or what immediate steps to take is distinctly dubious. It appears mysterious and mystical when attempted.

Value systems do have a direct influence on social values and principal objects. But they must not be allowed direct influence on priorities or still lower levels of implementation. The problem is that valued ideas are too abstract to be directly applied in particular decisions. When evoked, they are liable to blind people to the messiness and practicalities of action in social situations. When disciplinary researchers imagine that their painstakingly developed knowledge and theories should determine organizational or governmental policy, they are usually working on the mistaken assumption that a direct influence is beneficial.

Managers and politicians typically ignore or downplay academic ideas, and even doctors are resistant to incorporating the latest findings of medical research. The present model suggests that this makes sense. Only when the relevant wider community has come to view the new findings or ideas as social needs (L-5_E) is it safe to act on them. (Whether the community is right or wrong in its assessment is neither here nor there.) If new ideas are to be recognized as needs and applied to decisions, then a variety of channels must be properly

used. Ideas must be spread about (propagation), shown to be beneficial (demonstration), properly understood (instruction), and recognized widely as necessary (assimilation). Only then can they be systematically introduced (innovation). It takes time, unless scandals or dramatic results hasten the process.

We have previously seen how the unmodified unmediated application of doctrine to specific situations produces unmanageable and destructive discord within, irrationality and extremism in external relations, and ultimately catastrophic collapse. When governing bodies become over-politicized, for example, the well-being of the organization and the views of the general community take second place to propagation of an ideology. In the early 1980's, UK local government councils with socialist ideals symbolically declared their tiny boroughs to be 'nuclear-free zones' and spent money on prominent publicity and futile sign-posting at a time of financial stringency. The councils were widely ridiculed as loony, and the episode contributed to the overwhelming defeat of the Labour Party in the 1984 general election.

Social values ought not extend their direct influence further than principal objects and internal priorities. They must not seek direct influence on the implementation centres because their open-ended and communal nature gives no indication of what, precisely, should be aimed for. The result of creating direct channels to lower levels, as do-gooders regularly attempt, is to support options because they are generally good, rather than because they are possible, appropriate and necessary to deal with the immediate realities.

Principal objects affect priorities and strategic objectives, but a direct influence on tactical objectives is not sensible. Principal objects define the identity of any endeavour while tactical objectives are pure means and epitomize adaptation to external realities as far as is necessary. So the higher centre cannot possibly serve as the immediate reference or criterion for the lower centre. Of course, people do attempt to use this channel at times. For example bureaucracies in developing countries — providing for, say, public health care or agricultural development — often lack strategic objectives. Instead, there are expectations on staff to perform tasks and keep busy. In such organizations, posts and salaries are often linked to purely tactical activities, like completion of reports or attendance at meetings. Performance of these tasks is then accepted as the way that staff fulfil the mission.

We have now completed our examination of all possible direct influences.

REVIEWING INTENTIONALITY

A full range of intentional processes have been identified and defined in terms of inter-connections between different types (centres) of purpose and value. As a result, an image has been created as promised in the introduction. Explaining this image has been kept brief deliberately to help the reader get a full view uncluttered by too much detail or too many examples. An even briefer summary is provided in Master-Table 46. The reader is encouraged to review Ch.s 3-5 and Ch.s 10-12 with intentional processes explicitly in mind.

The structure represents social life as operated by social beings driven by emotion and logic and capable of achievement via enlightened functioning. Reality is created, values are infused, organization is allowed for, humanity is provided. and situational pressures are recognized. The structure has 10 centres of purpose and energy development, and 22 channels along which intentional forces flow. A further 23 theoretically possible channels of direct influence have been identified as unusable, inappropriate or positively disruptive.

Intentional processes, like values and purposes, make most sense to rationalists. Accordingly, the exposition and labels have been provided in accord with their preferences. Dedicated adherents to other approaches to choice, action and inquiry may not view the pattern with the same sense of satisfaction (cf. Master-Table 8: Ch. 6: see Box 13.1). Different world outlooks affect the use of purpose and may alter the labelling.

Some Reactions: Systemicists are likely to be sympathetic but possibly disturbed by the image's incompleteness i.e. its omission of associated factors. Individualist and dialecticists, by contrast, are likely to be suspicious of a completeness which seems to restrict their freedom, and they suspect subjection to logical or transcendental forces outside their control. Empiricists find such an edifice of complex ideas with an absence of data and facts extremely disturbing, if not incredible. Like conventionalists, they tend to see the pattern as just too new, different and mysterious. Most modern philosophers (dialogic inquirers) are also likely to be suspicious of grand simplifying theories. Imaginists and transcendentalists, despite their affinity for the experiential aspects of values, hate the inherent categorization and also distrust the dominance of logic. Pragmatic-opportunists would say: 'real life's not like that', and complain that the pattern is far too complicated for ordinary people to assimilate.

Box 13.1

Elegant conceptual simplicity underpinning real world complexity, an ideal of science, is epitomized by the structure.

The framework of purpose had not previously been identified by investigators, in part because the different modes of purpose formation blur the picture, in part because of the fluid transformation of purposes, and in part because it is far easier to be aware of the flow of intentionality through the channels, than from their static origins. This flow, as we now see, is potentially complex, permits of tremendous variation, and produces strikingly different end results in the social world.

Empirical complexity is increased by the fact that the whole structure exists endlessly within itself. As the context, perspective or frame of reference changes, a purpose or value is subtly altered and takes on a new function for a different body using a different centre (see Box 13.2).

Fluid Transformations Again: The structure of purpose captures and conceptualizes experiences. And it shows the characteristic fluidity of the inner experiential world. What is a principal object for a working party, may be a strategic objective for an organization. What is a strategic objective of an organization may be an over-riding priority for a pressure group. What is a priority for one pressure group may be a need in wider society. What is a need in society may be a structured priority in a firm. What is a structured priority of a firm may be viewed as a theoretical framework by an academic. What is a theory for an academic may be a belief held by a government. What is a belief in government may be an ultimate value for a person. And so on.

Box 13.2

In reviewing intentionality, we will examine the image or pattern that has emerged: and then briefly demonstrate its application by showing how it reveals differences in personal work-style and various ways of achieving the same thing.

The Image of Freedom and Power

So Master-Figure 45 is the necessary image referred to in the introduction. The pattern which has been revealed is almost, but not quite, symmetrical. Although the 7 levels are highly interconnected, more than half of all possible channels are not viable.

The Navel. The navel of the structure is the principal objects centre in the fourth level. This has all the higher centres directly influencing it, and it directly influences all lower centres, except tactical objectives.

It links to 5 of the other 6 levels, whereas the other centres are linked only to 4 other levels. In all, 8 channels out of the 22 connect to principal objects. Other centres have only 3, 4 or 5 connecting channels. Principal objects not only control the passions of transient priorities and the efforts of implementation but also receive and contain higher cohesive forces and social energies. They can tap the spirituality and inspiration of ultimate values, the loyalty and solidarity generated by value systems, and the belonging and mutuality enabled by social values, as well as the enthusiasm and commitment inherent in their own nature.

Principal objects are where personal identity pressures are paramount (cf. Master-Table 31). By focused commitment to these, people can master the structure and become heroes — electrifying those with whom they come in contact, achieving the seemingly impossible, and (for better or worse) driving the evolution of history itself.

Power and Balance. Each centre can be ranked in terms of its inherent power. Above ultimate values lies a creative source which is beyond being and is inconceivable except as a divine influx. From ultimate values, the line of power zig-zags downwards, always moving horizontally from right to left in bi-modal levels (which means jumping the gap between dominant beliefs and the communal net of values) until it reaches tactical objectives. Below tactical objectives, we can imagine the non-human world with its physical energies harnessed and transformed by human power and intention. The channels can also be ranked in terms of power, and this is the basis for their numeration in Master-Tables 44 and 46.

The descending decatonic scale of power does not mean that a more powerful centre or channel is more fitted for any particular matter. The whole effort of the book, and particularly this chapter, has been to show that a variety of different forms of purpose and channels are required in combination according to the particular concern being addressed. However, to some degree all are operative all the time because the structure defines our social existence.

The image reveals the dynamics of power and makes it obvious that such power is not omnipotent. The vagaries of physical reality and the state of the community, as well as the limitation of existing knowledge, constrain what can be achieved. Using the appropriate centre(s) and the appropriate channel(s) in accord with the nature of the situation is the secret of success — not brute power.

The channels exhibit all possible relationships

> **Balance Details:** There are five symmetrical channels (all of which run vertically): one L→L link: instruction; one E→E link: exhortation; and three B→B links: enlightenment, maintenance and implementation. There are four channels with balanced centres dominating: two B→L links: illumination and clarification; and two B→E links: illusion and accommodation. There are three L→E links: idealization, assimilation and conservation; but only two E→L links: assertion and innovation. There are four L→B links: propagation, institution, forecasting, and evaluation; and four E→B links: demonstration, instigation, resolution and imposition.   **Box 13.3**

between the three modes of functioning. Of the 22 channels, 14 involve balanced (B) centres, 12 involve logic-based (L) centres, and 12 involve emotion-based (E) centres (see Box 13.3). At the higher levels where identity is determined, it is evident that logic-based modes of cognitive and psycho-social functioning dominate. However, in particular situations emotional forces are irresistible. Overall, there is a one-channel majority in favour of the logic-based mode.

The Endless Journey

We endlessly travel the identified channels. A sensible person uses all channels and avoids counter-productive channels (absent from the image for good reasons). The power of any social being is determined by the clarity, quality and strength of their purposes and values, and the skill with which the channels are navigated. Awareness of the total pattern offers an opportunity to be more enlightened in our values and more effective in their implementation.

Alternative Itineraries. The variety of channels means that there are alternative ways of moving between centres, or producing a purpose in a centre. Figure 13.1 illustrates this variety in two cases: defining a new endeavour, and handling a decision issue. More complex patterns than those shown become evident when the influence of other centres is taken into account. The potential to use different channels and centres is one of the sources of the varieties of plausible 'theories' about organization and management. It probably also explains different work styles.

Personal Profiles. Most people find that they are inclined to some channels and averse to others. In discussing the image with people, they often identified itineraries which they regularly used. It became evident that these had contributed to their work style and social identity. Figure 13.2 depicts and explains the profiles of people in different social roles as found in our projects.

Figure 13.1: Alternative Itineraries.

(1) Defining a new endeavour. Only the key centres are shown. The labels are self-explanatory.

(2) Reaching a decision. It is possible to start from a particular overall aim or decision issue (the principal object) and define strategic objectives in a variety of ways.

A: Pragmatic achievement. The overall aim frequently suggests a set of options which are worth pursuing. No link to internal priorities is activated because the decider assumes that the chosen outcomes are self-evidently worthwhile and uncontroversial. The outcomes can only be achieved, of course, if they are not too ambitious, if the views of the people affected by the decision can be over-ridden, and if organizational constraints like budgetary or ethical policies can be ignored.

B: Criteria development and application. After selecting a set of options pragmatically, it is possible to prioritize these and then ask why one option was preferred to another. This exercise will clarify the criteria that were used in deciding priorities. Criteria developed in this way can then be applied to guide future decisions in the same area. The principal objects have not been clarified but some systematic application of values has been introduced and a general outcome can be forecast.

C: Political choice. Decisions in organizations are frequently made in order to respond to pressure or to resolve conflicts. Such political or dialectical choice is based on considering the views of different pressure groups. Such groups give over-riding importance to their own values in any project or endeavour. By finding a compromise and ensuring that each stakeholder gets a payoff, a decision that is sure to be implemented can be reached. However, its outcome may not be fully in line with what the principal objects require.

D: Crisis management. In a crisis, it is necessary to choose an expedient course of action. In such situations, control by the overall aim may be neglected, but some attempt must be made to ensure that key values in the endeavour are not neglected. This is provided by input from the structured set of priorities e.g. by budgetary analysis of the choice, or by checking that the choice is generally within policy.

E: Blue-sky planning. Sometimes practical pressures and political realities are too intrusive. It may be desirable to put these to one side and analyse the principal objects carefully to create a new vision. The imaginative elaboration of this vision may lose touch with the overall aim and ignore the social needs supporting the work. Alternatively, the analyses may deal with the possibility that the overall aim was inappropriate in the first place.

F: Zero-based planning. Putting aside pressures while maintaining contact with the principal object is characteristic of zero-based planning, a form of deciding recently re-discovered as 'business process re-engineering'. This provides the most radical overhaul of any endeavour. However, avoiding channels dealing with political and practical realities means that zero-basing runs into stiff opposition. Plans and costings may look good on paper, but implementation may not be possible.

G: Rational planning. Systematic analysis of the decision issue is more likely to be productive if there is a continuing input from interested parties in a rational process. As an elaborate strategic vision is developed to meet the endeavour comprehensively, its elements are continuously modified by recognizing urgent priorities and pressures. Most planning departments in organizations work in this fashion.

H: Systemic policy-making. Decisions can be made in a systemic participative way. Such policy-making requires clarification of the endeavour, involvement of everyone with an interest, bringing to the forefront issues and potential controversies, and seeking suggestions about what might be done. These are then analysed and debated, agreement gained and objections handled. Eventually a way forward is found that is not only on course with the overall object, but also meets pressures, produces an acceptable desirable and feasible vision, and gains people's commitment.

Figure 13.1: Alternative itineraries.

(1) Different ways in which new endeavours may come about.

A. A new need stimulates creation of a new department.

B. Innovation in a firm leads to a new division.

C. Public finance for a need leads to new initiatives.

D. An organization set up to demonstrate a new need.

(2) Reaching a decision: see opposite for explanations.

A. Pragmatic achievement.

B. Criteria development and application.

C. Political choice.

D. Crisis management.

E. Blue-sky planning.

F. Zero-based planning.

G. Rational planning.

H. Systemic policy-making

DETAILS OF PROFILES in Figure 13.2:

A: The social work director. This charismatic leader had strong beliefs which were used to manage and innovate. She took an interest in theories of all sorts but did not use or pursue them systematically. She particularly enjoyed setting up demonstration projects which could show what her ideas could do for the community. She enjoyed the systematic work required to develop detailed proposals and make successful applications for funds. She was concerned with the details of the implementation of her projects, but regarded formal evaluation as unnecessary and a waste of resources.

B: The pragmatic general manager. This manager of a large hospital was concerned to accommodate the values of the various professional groups which he saw as the driving forces and sources of ideas in health services. He was concerned to be seen as a supporter of these groups, and would organize meetings of professionals to gain consensus before making significant decisions. He was deeply involved in setting tasks, often issuing directives to others if he felt that the tasks were not moving forward rapidly enough. He had no vision for the development of the hospital as a whole, and had difficulty implementing new ideas proposed by his superiors which were not supported by the professions.

C: The eclectic psychotherapist. This therapist prided himself on not being taken over by any particular psychological theory. He viewed therapy as essentially about empathy and attunement to the client. He worked with feelings but sought to say or, at times, do things that he intuited would be helpful. He was particularly concerned with the wording of his comments, with his tone of voice, with the layout and furnishing of the room, and with timing of sessions.

D: The member of parliament. This politician was a committed socialist and used his seat in parliament to promote a variety of beliefs linked to socialism. He had worked for the party organization for many years prior to winning his seat and regularly joined in demonstrations. Once in parliament he selected various issues to speak on, proposing outcomes based on a very limited understanding of the topic. He always emphasized that politics was a matter of asserting values through gut-feel and that politicians had to depend on experts.

E: The theological college lecturer. This priest was conflicted about ultimate values which seemed too abstract to be credible. Nevertheless, he held strong beliefs and taught systematic doctrine. He was opposed to proselytizing, and believed that he (and others) should demonstrate their faith in their everyday activities. He had an analytic mind and often volunteered to help in the development of new projects. However, he preferred to supervise or steer, disliked getting into details, and tended to leave things uncompleted.

F: The social scientist consultant. This social scientist taught social policy in a university setting and worked as a consultant to public sector organizations. She offered rigorous evaluations of organizational developments and used these to develop recommendations for improvement which were always complex and comprehensive. A range of social theories would be regularly brought to bear in a dispassionate way. She had a strong feel for history and emphasized the need for evolutionary change.

Figure 13.2: Profiles of intentionality. These diagrams show in bold the channels habitually and self-consciously used by particular people. The other channels were used with greater or lesser awareness and enthusiasm.

A: The social
work director

B: The pragmatic
general manager

C: The eclectic
psychotherapist

D: The member
of parliament

E: The theological
college lecturer

F: The social scientist
consultant

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
Facing Reality. In our everyday life, all of us, even philosophers, assume that external reality exists in some independent way. We take it for granted that if we are sufficiently interested, educated and competent we could penetrate and perceive reality without too much trouble. Many great philosophers, modern and classical, many religious teachers, Eastern and Western, and a variety of modern scientific disciplines — including mathematics, theoretical physics, sociology and psychoanalysis — have shown that this common-sense way of thinking is a misunderstanding, even though it seems to work.

The present study confirms this finding. It seems that we must be content with only a limited perception of the truth. Either we achieve illumination via theories that seem true, or rest on illusion via ideas that feel true. It seems that we need both to live: even though we cannot understand the theories, and our beliefs are little more than self-delusion. The endless journey is the human condition.

However, the present analysis offers hope. It reveals that between illumination and illusion lies enlightenment, and with it the possibility for good deeds to replace good intentions. Enlightened action can by-pass abstruse debates about truth and reality. Modern surgery, travel by air, disaster relief, exploration of other planets — nothing would have happened if we had waited until we had certainty about it all. Even while we believe in the possibility of knowledge of an external reality, we know that we must move ahead in the absence of certainty. The issue, therefore, rests not on objective truth but on the value of what we do. And what we do can be, must be, influenced by ultimate values as well as by observable realities and scientific findings.

Whether we are open to ultimate values and whether we use them to create something good or evil is primarily a matter for each and every person. Individual people, being the repository of ultimate values, will always be capable of higher ethical standards than their organizations, social groups and governments.

It is necessary to end with a caution. Although enlightened activities do influence the life of the community, such influence does not equate with an ability or right to impose new ideals upon others. The essential mutuality of social life, respect for existing ethical authorities, and the requirement for continuity combine to force the conclusion that progress to a truly enlightened society, even if aided by the occasional painful convulsion, must perforce be slow.

Closure and Transition

We have reached the end of our adventure in ideas. The account here has clarified further what it is, in principle, to exist as a social being and what being intentional and responsible entails.

The code of the mental software that our ancestors (or divine providence) implicitly developed and silently handed on as an inner guide has, I suspect, been cracked. At any rate, by engaging with the ideas in this book, we can become far more aware of our purposes, ideas and obligations. Academic interests aside, there is only one reason for awareness. That is to enable us to pursue what we each need and want as individuals and as members of groups ever more effectively and more fairly. I have emphasized over and over again the importance of the self and personal freedom in social life, counter-balancing this at every turn with the importance of responsibility and the requirements of authority. But this is only the first stage.

The next stage in this account entails an appreciation of what is required to design social life so as to maximize good (cohesion and well-being) and minimize harm (fragmentation and suffering). This perspective, although it starts from an unequivocal view of ourselves as social beings, requires that we foster individual endeavour and diminish communal interference, that we enhance personal autonomy and reduce social coercion, and that we support communal diversity and oppose oppressive homogenization. All of which is easier said than arranged.

Although we now have a clearer idea of what being intentional entails, we have not clarified the practical principles underpinning the running of society from the perspectives just described. In regard to handling good and harm in society, we do know that ethical obligations (H^2) are the key. In regard to individual endeavours, we know that the framework for realizing values is a guide ($_SH^1$). In exercising personal power so as to reduce coercive measures which protect others, we know that we need a framework of ethical rules (H^3). Finally, in handling sub-cultural diversity, we now know that the hierarchy of ethical authority provides an essential perspective ($_SH^3$).

The further exploration of these hierarchies takes us into the realms of participation and order within society, the effects of history, the processes of politics, the activities of governments, and the behaviour of organizations. We now know that all these matters are constructed out of values and that they must be appreciated and handled using values. However, this takes us, to continue my computer analogy, to the hardware side of working with values. As such, it must await another volume. ❉

Master-Table 41   **Intentional processes in social life.**
All balanced processes are in italics. Note that balance is usually achieved by using two complementary channels. Direct influence across more than one level is not always possible; and direct influence across more than three levels is never appropriate. See text and the following Master Matrices for further details.

Being social: intra-level responsibility for participation

UV	By distinguishing good and evil.		
VS	By preserving ideas — which depends on:	*Idealization*	L → E
SV	By recognizing needs — which depends on:	*Assimilation*	L → E
PO	By owning endeavours.		
IP	By allocating resources — which depends on:	*Assertion*	E → L
SO	By determining an outcome.		
TO	By setting tasks with deadlines.		

Encountering reality: cross-level influences

UV → VS	*Revelation* of reality via:	Illusion B → E	Illumination B → L
VS → SV	*Socialization* into reality via:	Exhortation E → E	Instruction L → L
SV → PO	*Embodiment* within reality via:	Instigation E → B	Institution L → B
PO → IP	*Orientation* to reality via:	Accommodation B → E	Clarification B → L
IP → SO	*Decision* about reality via:	Resolution E → B	Forecasting L → B
SO → TO	*Implementation* in reality:	B → B	

Changing reality: using values to by-pass resistances

UV → SV	*N/A because influence must be mediated via value systems.*		
VS → PO	*Dissemination* of values via:	Demonstration E → B	Propagation L → B
SV → IP	*Evolution* of values via:	Innovation E → L	Conservation L → E
PO → SO	*Maintenance* of values:	B → B	
IP → TO	*Re-assertion* of values via:	Imposition E → B	Evaluation L → B

Maintaining humanity: by-passing group pressures

UV → PO	*Enlightenment*	B → B
VS → IP	*N/A because value systems cannot be situational and priorities must be.*	
SV → SO	*N/A because social values are too open-ended to guide useful results.*	
PO → TO	*N/A because objects are too general to guide time-targeted means.*	

Master-Figure 42

Developing the channels needed to be intentional.

Interconnections between centres of purpose formation are developed in stages: (a) shows the elemental unconnected levels which define responsibilities; (b) shows division into balanced (B), emotion-based (E), and logic-based (L) centres needed for responsible participation; (c) shows inter-level linkage with covering italicized terms where there are two channels; (d) shows by-passing of a level to change reality by overcoming inertia and resistance, again italicized terms describe a joint process involving two channels between levels; (e) shows by-passing of group pressures to maintain integrity and humanity. See text for explanations as to why other channels are inappropriate.

UV = ultimate value; VS = value system; SV = social value; PO = principal object; IP = internal priority; SO = strategic objective; TO = tactical objective; B = balanced; E = emotion-based; L = logic-based.

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Effects of the various types of purpose and value on each other.
Positive form only: for negative terms see Master-Table 44.
For further details see text.

Ultimate
Values
L-7:UV(B)

← magnifies
glorifies →

reveals →
testifies to →

← legitimates
idolizes →

Dominant
Belief
L-6:VS(E)

Theoretical
Framework
L-6:VS(L)

evokes ↑ substantiates

↓ humanizes
manifests ↑

perpetuates   reinforces ↓

Highlighted
Social Need
L-5:SV(E)

← sustains
← confirms

← recognizes
modifies →

validates →
establishes ↗

Communal
Net of
Values
L-5:SV(L)

stimulates →
← promotes

← stipulates
incorporates →

re-orders ↓   introduces ↑

Principal
Objects
L-4:PO(B)

preserves ↑   conditions ↓

← demands
elucidates →

tolerates →
← re-orients

re-directs ↓   furthers ↑

Structured
Set of
Priorities
L-3:IP(L)

← focuses
restrains →

Over-riding
Priority
L-3:IP(E)

← depicts
orders →

suits →
← selects

← notes
informs →

Strategic
Objectives
L-2:SO(B)

satisfies ↗
prescribes ↘

initiates ↑
↓ elaborates

| UV = ultimate value; VS = value system; |
| SV = social value; PO = principal object; |
| IP = internal priority; SO = strategic objective; |
| TO = tactical objective; B = balanced; |
| E = emotion-based; L = logic-based. |

Tactical
Objectives
L-1:TO(B)

Positive and negative effects in being intentional. Channels are ordered in terms of power (cf. Master-Table 46). The effect refers to what a specification in one centre does to specifications and their use in another. Negative effects are not necessarily harmful or undesirable; and they are less precise. See text for further details

No.	Channel	Positive Effects	Negative Effects	Social Process
1	$UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_L$	UV_B reveals VS_L VS_L testifies to UV_B	UV_B obscures VS_L VS_L travesties UV_B	Illumination
2	$UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_E$	UV_B magnifies VS_E VS_E glorifies UV_B	UV_B shields VS_E VS_E discredits UV_B	Illusion
3	$UV_B \leftrightarrow PO_B$	UV_B humanizes PO_B PO_B manifests UV_B	UV_B diabolizes PO_B PO_B repudiates UV_B	Enlightenment
4	$VS_L \leftrightarrow VS_E$	VS_L legitimates VS_E VS_E idolizes VS_L	VS_L denounces VS_E VS_E despises VS_L	Idealization
5	$VS_L \leftrightarrow SV_L$	VS_L reinforces SV_L SV_L perpetuates VS_L	VS_L fragments SV_L SV_L neglects VS_L	Instruction
6	$VS_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	VS_L validates PO_B PO_B establishes VS_L	VS_L invalidates PO_B PO_B contravenes VS_L	Propagation
7	$VS_E \leftrightarrow SV_E$	VS_E evokes SV_E SV_E substantiates VS_E	VS_E suppresses SV_E SV_E negates VS_E	Exhortation
8	$VS_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	VS_E sustains PO_B PO_B confirms VS_E	VS_E undermines PO_B PO_B betrays VS_E	Demonstration
9	$SV_L \leftrightarrow SV_E$	SV_L recognizes SV_E SV_E modifies SV_L	SV_L denies SV_E SV_E rejects SV_L	Assimilation
10	$SV_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	SV_L stipulates PO_B PO_B incorporates SV_L	SV_L prohibits PO_B PO_B opposes SV_L	Institution
11	$SV_L \leftrightarrow IP_E$	SV_L conditions IP_E IP_E preserves SV_L	SV_L imposes IP_E IP_E challenges SV_L	Conservation
12	$SV_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	SV_E stimulates PO_B PO_B promotes SV_E	SV_E re-defines PO_B PO_B counters SV_E	Instigation
13	$SV_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	SV_E re-orders IP_L IP_L introduces SV_E	SV_E disrupts IP_L IP_L excludes SV_E	Innovation
14	$PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_E$	PO_B tolerates IP_E IP_E re-orients PO_B	PO_B welcomes IP_E IP_E distorts PO_B	Accommodation
15	$PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_L$	PO_B demands IP_L IP_L refines PO_B	PO_B rigidifies IP_L IP_L suborns PO_B	Clarification
16	$PO_B \leftrightarrow SO_B$	PO_B re-directs SO_B SO_B furthers PO_B	PO_B misdirects SO_B SO_B side-tracks PO_B	Maintenance
17	$IP_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	IP_E focuses IP_L IP_L restrains IP_E	IP_E skews IP_L IP_L blocks IP_E	Assertion
18	$IP_E \leftrightarrow SO_B$	IP_E selects SO_B SO_B suits IP_E	IP_E unbalances SO_B SO_B worsens IP_E	Resolution
19	$IP_E \leftrightarrow TO_B$	IP_E prescribes TO_B TO_B satisfies IP_E	IP_E proscribes TO_B TO_B violates IP_E	Imposition
20	$IP_L \leftrightarrow SO_B$	IP_L orders SO_B SO_B depicts IP_L	IP_L complicates SO_B SO_B ignores IP_L	Vision
21	$IP_L \leftrightarrow TO_B$	IP_L informs TO_B TO_B notes IP_L	IP_L proposes TO_B TO_B drives IP_L	Evaluation
22	$SO_B \leftrightarrow TO_L$	SO_B initiates TO_B TO_B grounds SO_B	SO_B excuses TO_B TO_B perverts SO_B	Implementation

The image of intentionality:
purposes and intentional processes in social life.

UV = ultimate value; VS = value system;
SV = social value; PO = principal object;
IP = internal priority; SO = strategic objective;
TO = tactical objective; B = balanced;
E = emotion-based; L = logic-based.

Master-Table 46

Using the twenty-two channels of intentionality.

A summary with examples of their beneficial use, the consequence of their insufficient use and an example of their misuse. A chart like this cannot be complete, especially in regard to doing things wrongly, but it can give a feel for the channels. The channels are ordered in terms of power: higher levels first and, for those levels with two centres, the dominating centre first. Where an endeavour is referred to, related terms — like organization, social body, project, initiative or ongoing activities — also apply.

No.	Social Process	Use	Disuse	Misuse
1	Illumination $UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_L$	To produce a theory or doctrine which is inspired and beneficial.	Leads to meaningless and abstruse theories and doctrines.	Developing a theory or doctrine under the influence of hatred, envy or other malign passion.
2	Illusion $UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_E$	To create beliefs which counter feelings of helplessness, confusion, futility and isolation.	Leads to physical, mental and social deterioration and eventually death.	Knowingly fostering beliefs that are harmful to a person or society.
3	Enlightenment $UV_B \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To do the humane thing despite doctrinal beliefs and social pressures	Leads to fanatical or mechanical functioning.	Using ends (ultimate values) to justify the means (principal objects) without reference to communal values.
4	Idealization $VS_L \leftrightarrow VS_E$	To enable critically refined ideas and personal energies to reinforce each other and increase group cohesion.	Leads to inconstancy or disloyalty	Using theories or doctrines to suppress incompatible beliefs and vice versa.
5	Instruction $VS_L \leftrightarrow SV_L$	To ensure people know the right way to contribute to communal life and activities.	Leads to society eventually losing knowledge.	Forcing the theory or doctrine on people irrespective of their willingness to receive it
6	Propagation $VS_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To develop and strengthen a theoretical framework systematically within wider society.	Leads to an inability to produce any significant change in attitudes.	Infiltrating ideas into endeavours without agreement.
7	Exhortation $VS_E \leftrightarrow SV_E$	To affirm and communicate deeply-held beliefs for everyday use.	Leads to the neglect of urgent social needs.	Pestering and hectoring people who deny or reject the ideas or the supposed social problems.
8	Demonstration $VS_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To generate endeavours that express and prove beliefs, so encouraging their acceptance in the wider community.	Leads to cynical or hypocritical compartmentalization of activities	Pursuing beliefs regardless of the cost or consequences.
9	Assimilation $SV_L \leftrightarrow SV_E$	To enable both differentiation and belonging within a community.	Leads to social disintegration	Substituting values of a sub-group (e.g. ruling elite, business) for the net of community values.
10	Institution $SV_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To establish social values publicly within a myriad of communally necessary endeavours.	Leads to activities being disconnected from the communal net of values.	Forcing organizations to serve the general good.
11	Conservation $SV_L \leftrightarrow IP_E$	To give due weight to values which support the community on which the endeavour depends.	Leads to radical or self-centred decisions causing social disruption	Doing more of the same in response to a challenge.

No.	Social Process	Use	Disuse	Misuse
12	Instigation $SV_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To generate and support an endeavour or social body which responds to a social need.	Leads to a lack of new endeavours; or loss of enthusiasm and focus in a current endeavour.	Taking over an endeavour and using it for factional purposes.
13	Innovation $SV_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	To enable a particular social need to be incorporated sensibly and effectively within an on-going endeavour.	Leads to an inability to meet new needs and stagnation.	Destabilizing an endeavour by introducing an irrelevant value.
14	Accommodation $PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_E$	To respond positively to uncontrollable pressures in a situation and so protect an endeavour.	Leads to collapse of the endeavour through direct attack or loss of essential support.	Surrendering to powerful factions who have little concern for the rationale of the endeavour.
15	Clarification $PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_L$	To explicate and differentially value all relevant aspects of an endeavour so it can move forward on a broad front.	Leads to neglect of minor but essential parts of the endeavour.	Developing a set of criteria and preferences to be used in all situations.
16	Maintenance $PO_B \leftrightarrow SO_B$	To keep an endeavour on course by checking all proposed outcomes against its rationale.	Leads to loss of direction and drift	Ignoring values and political considerations and acting in an unfocused opportunistic way.
17	Assertion $IP_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	To enable both urgent priorities in a situation and the full range of valid concerns to receive due attention.	Leads to a poor focus on what really matters in any decision.	Giving excessive weight either to rationality or to social pressures.
18	Resolution $IP_E \leftrightarrow SO_B$	To force a choice of a particular outcome in the face of conflicting views about what should be done.	Leads to the neglect of inescapable pressures with explosive or devastating consequences.	Managing by crisis with cynical or expedient choices that harm the endeavour.
19	Imposition $IP_E \leftrightarrow TO_B$	To ensure that crucial values are acted upon and undesirable side-effects of achieving an outcome are avoided.	Leads to neglect of crucial values amidst the hurly-burly of action.	Handling problematic situations by habitually using directives.
20	Forecasting $IP_L \leftrightarrow SO_B$	To determine a rounded desirable and achievable outcome in the medium or long term in regard to a specific matter.	Leads to expedient short-termism	Producing excessively elaborate rational analyses based on dubious assumptions and unrelated to practical realities.
21	Evaluation $IP_L \leftrightarrow TO_B$	To assess the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of plan details and monitor their implementation	Leads to poor use of resources and uncertainty about progress.	Evaluating as a substitute for decision and action.
22	Implementation $SO_B \leftrightarrow TO_B$	To ensure that necessary tasks are set and resourced in a way that delivers the desired outcome within a time deadline.	Leads to failure to produce desired results.	Producing results at any cost and neglecting priorities, social needs, and higher values.

NOTES

1. Horror at the fact that irrationality is the norm is a recurrent feature of the scientific imagination. Many famous examples of irrational thinking and action are captured in Stuart Sutherland's *Irrationality: The Enemy Within.* (London: Constable, 1991). Although intuition is dismissed by him as 'that strange instinct that tells a person that he is right, whether he is or not', Sutherland speculates that irrationality may provide an evolutionary advantage. The present inquiry, which commenced with a weaker bias for rationality, revealed that rationality is indeed essential, but that it is simply insufficient to sustain human existence (see especially Ch. 6).

2. Ethical design research requires that beliefs which are successfully used in the social world and held with conviction should force a suspension of the investigator's subjective valuation. Without this impartiality, the secondary hierarchy of systems or approaches could never have been developed (cf. Ch.s 6 and 7). In this research, beliefs are identified and organized in a logical way, and then treated as information to be logically analysed, reformulated, elaborated, modelled, tested, re-constructed, compared and validated. The aim is to produce something sufficiently stable and rational to be capable of being improved, used and taught. Such a product allows people to understand the limitations of their own beliefs, to apply them more effectively, and to handle those colleagues who think differently with more understanding and respect.

3. See the accounts in: Davies, P. *The Mind of God.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Many popularizers of science highlight the moments of inspired insight and minimize the boring dogged details and blind alleys of research work (cf. Gleick, J. *Chaos: The Making of a Science.* New York: MacDonald, 1992).

4. We have noted that hope is essential to survival (Ch. 7). Key delusions are geared to providing hope. Studies of disasters, especially man-made, suggest that certain delusions are essential for survival. See: Kinston, W. & Rosser, R. Disaster: Effects on mental and physical state. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research,* 18: 437-456, 1974.

5. Ortega y Gassett. J. *Man and Crisis.* (Transl. M. Adams), New York: W.W. Norton, pp.92-93. Similar quotations could be taken from many authors — Nietzsche, Shaw, Emerson, Goethe - - that represent the modern spirit of man in which the sacred dispenses with all things social and depends on inner integrity.

6. See: Campbell, J. *The Masks of God: Creative Mythology.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, Ch. 1: Experience and Authority. It is not an accident that a collection of Catholic social teachings is entitled *Proclaiming Justice and Peace* (Walsh, M. & Davies B. (eds.) London: Harper Collins, 1991). Personal ultimate values like wisdom and compassion do not appear in the index. The text does of course acknowledge personal uniqueness and human freedom and so implicitly recognizes the channel from ultimate values to principal objects e.g. 'utilizing only his talent and will-power, each man can grow in humanity, enhance his personal worth, and perfect himself' (*Populorum Progressio* 26 March 1967 para. 15; op. cit.).

Chapter 14

Reflecting on the Framework

We have come to the end of our exploration of purpose, value and obligation.

The world today is not only more complex than in the past, it is more unified. We might fondly imagine a golden age long ago when a wise king or inspired prophet could cut the gordian knot for us. No matter how contentious or complex the matter, the decision would be right and good, and at once executive, legislative, judicial and doctrinal. But all this is wishful thinking.

It is just as wishful to imagine that social science disciplines can be unified. Inter-disciplinary work may be valuable, but it creates ever more refined and ever more specialized disciplines. The very notion of a discipline, with its professionalisation and specialist journals, implies partiality and divisiveness. I have sought in this book to move beyond disciplinary study to a transdisciplinary dimension with which everybody can engage. My purpose has been to help people directly and to foster humane social design.

If we must divide and dissect what we wish was whole and simple, if we must construct social arrangements of ever greater import, if we must dedicate ourselves to mighty organized achievements, then we are in the business of social design whether we like it or not. Design means awareness, and social design means self-awareness. Awareness requires frameworks of ideas with which to operate, and self-awareness requires these to be rooted in human experience and identity. Such design-oriented and identity-protecting frameworks are currently lacking in science as we know it. This book has sought to start filling that gap — even if it means working within a new paradigm of inquiry.

The framework provides ground rules for how society and people can, do and should operate in principle. It reflects a deep design that is not of my making but is, I assume, based in the biological and cultural evolution of human nature. The ideas are followed intuitively and unself-consciously by wise and successful people.

MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL

"While the faculty of large generalisation is perhaps the noblest of human capacities, the power of sound generalisation is perhaps the rarest."[1] Whether the generalisations provided by the framework are sound is for each reader to decide after deep reflection.

Academic readers will have their own critical tools and require no advice or help from me. If you are an academic, please remember that any useful framework must be simultaneously lucid, practical, predictive and ethical. I know this poses a dilemma. Any academic worth his salt worships at the temple of Reason. Incorrect conclusions, practical obstacles and ethical omissions are not nearly so worrying as failures of method or lapses of logic. In real life, the reverse holds true.

The present transdisciplinary approach is rooted in real life and bows before Truth. Not objective or certain truth, but truth as the ultimate value and experience that each of us seeks and invokes in order to live our lives from day to day despite our blindness and ignorance.

Many intellectuals follow Aristotle who thought that popular opinion could be ignored when considering questions like 'what is the good for man?'[2] Classical Chinese philosophy also seemed to believe that only a sage could or would consider such questions. Opposed to this elitist trend, there has always been a view of truth as something available to all of us, at least in regard to our own particular situation.

This book has been written on the assumption that each of us must achieve understanding for ourselves. Such understanding can only occur, ultimately, through imagining the world and realizing one's self. Scientific rationality and disciplinary boundaries do not determine this process. The reason is obvious: conventional science and its disciplines are the products of this deepest form of human understanding, and are themselves tools to aid it.

I encourage my clients to make up their own minds about the ideas I offer. In this spirit, the reader who is wondering what to make of these frameworks may benefit from the following advice attributed to Buddha: "Do not be led by reports or tradition or hearsay. Be not led by the authority of texts, nor by logic or inference,

nor by considering appearances, nor by the delight in speculative opinions, nor by seeming possibilities, nor by the idea: 'this is our teacher'. But when you know for yourselves that certain things are unwholesome and wrong, avoid them. And when you know for yourselves that certain things are wholesome and good, accept them and follow them."

THE GOOD LIFE

Ethics. I am struck by the fact that the book has said little new about being ethical. Acting ethically is the same paradox now as it was when it was first considered by early man. As Krishna pointed out in the *Bhagavad Gita*, controlling the results of our actions does not lie within our power.[3] When it comes to action, it is evident that we can never do nothing; and we can never do just one thing; nor can we ever know all the consequences that flow from our actions.

What is within our control are the values and objectives we hold or repudiate. These and these alone determine whether what we do is ethical.

But ethics has taken a radical turn in modern times. It has moved from viewing human identity and intentionality as rooted in society and its institutions, especially its organized religions, to recognizing the power and freedom of the imagination. The forces ranged against the imagination are still strong, but for centuries now they have been in retreat.

If that imagination has created the notion of inalienable rights, then it has also generated the sense of absolute responsibilities. So society has not disappeared. Responsibilities define our identity as social beings and are at the core of ethics in practice.

I find myself following many others in saying that living a good life is based on being intentional, using self-command, reflecting on experience, recognizing potential, and accepting responsibility. To this must be added a general concern for others and a duty to the community and its present ethical order, active opposition to wilful injustice and oppression, together with a myriad of virtues. What is perhaps new is my emphasis throughout on the significance of identity.

Identity. The significance of identity, personal identity and social identity, is central to the present framework. Identity is a self-evident but generally neglected phenomenon. It is not a mysterious concept but the way we live. Try to alter a language, tinker with human genes, or introduce a new form of government and uproar results — because these things touch on identity. The current attempt to preserve, protect and respect plants and animals reflects a wider and deeper

conception of human concerns beyond the person, in other words, it is an enhancement and not a diminution of the focus on human identity.

Although emphasizing personal or individual identity is controversial in some quarters, the importance of the unique individual human being remains a beacon in work with values. Economics takes the view of man as a 'rational interest-maximizer'. It does so because this notion is an expedient vehicle for certain theories — not because it accords with a conception that can be used safely and effectively by parents, politicians or managers. As part of my exploration, I have clarified a range of more sophisticated approaches to identity development. I hope that this particular contribution may go some way to alleviating the sometimes inhuman quality of social science.

For a maximally creative and effective life, a person must self-consciously and autonomously commit himself to participating in society in an organised fashion (i.e. must develop social being), and must do so in a harmonious and attuned way (i.e. must develop transpersonal being).

Failure in these domains generates disorganised mismanagement and compulsive-disruptive control. These seem to be the prime dysfunctional forces in social life. Disorganisation and mis-management lead to needs not being met and in certain cases threaten death — think of food distribution in a famine or running an ambulance service. Chaotic inefficiency is an easily recognized problem. In contrast, coercion is not. Coercion replaces firmness far too often. It is as if coercion is preferred as a way to manage things, feelings, individuals, relationships, organizations, social situations, and the demands of faith — whatever the deeper long-term costs to self, others or society.

The framework is itself an expression of the good life. It tries to organize and manage understanding while being attuned to people and their social context. It can orient people, open the imagination and focus attention on key responsibilities, while still leaving people largely free to decide for themselves what values or purposes to hold and pursue. These are the decisions which determine the sort of person we are, the sort of organizations we build, and the sort of society we shape.

Change. But the good life and the just society cannot be easily or suddenly achieved. Identity change is traumatizing and life threatening. In the esoteric tradition, death symbolizes change because change is equivalent to death of the old self. The most shocking and disturbing personal discovery for me during the exploration of these ideas was facing the value of continuity. It was painful because this meant recognizing

the need to tolerate inadequacies, injustices and imperfections of all sorts in social life. It meant the acceptance of history at the cost of the future.

Plato, in *Phaedrus*, when considering the nature of freedom, spoke of 'initiatory action' which could break the chains of necessity — essentially the forces of history and past choices and identifications — which bind a person. Although in theory this could produce a totally new condition of life, personal or group tragedy was the inevitable result.[4] The message is that the over-intense insight which leads to the urge for transformation proves, in the end, to be a form of madness.

Nevertheless transformation is possible if history and continuity are recognized and valued, if understanding is adequate, and if the transpersonal dimension is activated. Change, when it comes, does so through both individual and collective reflection which engages with the imagination and perceives potentials for genuine growth. This is the basis, as I see it, from which we must face the crisis which constitutes modern societies.

THEORY OR MYTH

Most readers of this book surely believe, like me, that knowledge is generally preferable to ignorance, that science offers the most effective way of developing knowledge, that such knowledge is tentative and never certain, and that the well-being of society depends on gaining more knowledge. This is, of course, a dogma.

Scientists are priest-equivalents proclaiming and guarding the dogma, and with sole rights to challenge or modify scientific doctrines. The scientific process is sacred to them and not subject to ordinary social control. Many openly see science and its methods as a universal creed and wish children to be socialized with its beliefs. Some argue that its approaches and values provide a basis for an ethical teaching. There has been little move amongst the scientific community to encourage children to become aware of science as a product of society, to understand its value system and limitations, to explore its orthodoxies and heresies, or to recognize the way that dissension is managed.[5]

Science, argues Popper, is akin to myth in that both attempt to explain the world and its mysteries.[6] Science is judged superior because it eradicates errors deliberately. Whereas myth is conservative and ritualistic, scientific knowledge encourages its own falsification. So science as a dogma is unique. The progress of science triumphantly reveals the overthrow of doctrinal prejudices and the shackles of myth.

It is true that science has given mankind what myth could never have given. But to heap hyperbole on science and denigration on myth is misconceived. Science is surely secure enough by now not to need to denigrate non-scientific modes of knowing and explaining.

Myths do indeed attempt to explain, but their explanations are of a different order because myths have other social functions. Myths must serve as models and exemplars for personal development, must provide a basis for social identity and cohesion, and must point to the tremendous mystery of existence and totality i.e. God.

Science demystifies and dissects, disintegrates and reduces, compartmentalizes and controls, homogenizes and de-identifies. As a result of this approach, scientists have come to regard themselves as if above or outside society. God is viewed at best as a quaint and now superfluous medieval idea, and at worst as a superstitious fatalistic trap. Some rare scientists, have deplored and even opposed these trends. Einstein is reputed to have said that science without religion is lame, while religion without science is blind. But most scientists stand by helplessly as the great programme of profanation and pre-eminence evolves.

Science has been weakest in the social sphere, partly because the Popperian programme of falsification breaks down in the face of value disputes and ideological pressures. Any supposed law of social life is handled by evaluating its practical effect and acceptability, not by proving it wrong or right.

Where in this context should the present account be placed? Is it a scientific object to be verified or falsified? Although it belongs to no discipline, I do indeed put forward the framework as a scientific object. In other words, the programme of profanation continues because the viewpoint here has been that neither our deepest values nor the process of valuation itself is too sacred to be exposed and dissected.

The framework is the product of careful observation and patient painstaking analysis and testing. Definitions, properties and relationships have been repeatedly proposed, altered, discarded, re-examined and critically refined until something solid and natural emerged. Much of the framework has been validated in practice. Attempts to falsify part of the framework through conventional empirical tests have already commenced.[7] In a scientific spirit, I have generally preferred to put forward unambiguous propositions (epitomized by the numerous matrices and extensive glossary) rather than woolly fudges. This should make the identification and correction of errors easier.

And yet the framework seems to be akin to myth too. It has been designed to have a practical effect and to be

acceptable to its users without dictating what they should actually do or choose. The framework is a model which people may use when they are struggling with value or ethical issues. Like myth, the framework enables and encourages the systematic construction of identity, and the pursuit of what is worthwhile. It offers principles for the inner cohesion of society and other groups. It seeks to foster diversity, multiplicity and universal coexistence. Above all, it points to God.

The framework exists in a void out of which good and evil precipitate. God is the void or beyond the void. However, to make the notion of God more manageable, God is frequently identified with goodness (i.e. ultimate values: L-7) and being. From ultimate values, as from God, all types of lower level values and purposes emanate and find their final justification.

"In the cosmologies of archaic man as in infancy, the main concern of the creator" says Campbell, "was in the weal and woe of man".[8] Human concerns have been my concern throughout. To develop formulations which would not only assist people with the project or problem in hand, but would be permanently useful and applicable to other situations was my constant aim. "Light was made so that we should see; night so that we might sleep", Campbell continues. In the same infantile, anti-scientific and quasi-mythical way, we can continue: principal objects were created so that we might identify endeavours, strategic objectives were created that we might define desirable outcomes. This is the basis for my use of functional definitions throughout.

Myth engages and releases cosmic energies: but not during their pedantic analysis, only in their deliberate and socially sanctioned use. The framework too releases energies when used properly.

Of course mythology is not invariant as apologists for science would have us believe. The most remarkable feature of mythology is its evolution. Myths evolve in order to adapt to social realities, with vestiges and relics from the past as evident as gills in the human embryo. The nuclear image of the son-god who dies and is resurrected as known in Christianity is a major advance on the same image in Greco-Roman mythology, which is more advanced again than that in the earlier Egyptian mythology.

As myths evolved they provided ever more sophisticated accounts of the divine, and opened up ever more beneficial possibilities for human nature. But the progress of knowledge incorporated in mythical form does not follow the same rules as the progress of scientific knowledge.

The spiritual development of Judaism and Christianity marked the invasion of the sacred into history. Previously, time was cyclical and there was no history. So learning from history was impossible. But once history became possible, reflection became possible and religious belief was itself threatened.

With the decline of Christian control over belief, science could replace theological and metaphysical speculation. Science commenced with studies of the external physical and biological world; and then, after the emergence of the novel, was led by Comte and others in the early 19th century to study society; and finally by Freud and others in the late 19th century to study the inner world of experience.

Spirituality has come increasingly under scrutiny. Despite being a subject of study by anthropologists and historians of religion, as well as some schools of modern psychology, the spiritual has yet remained a mysterious thing apart for most people. The present theoretical framework has a place for spirituality together with a formalized account of its contact with mundane activities. It prises away the notion of spirit from the exclusive clutch of churches and their dogmatic doctrines. Until modern times, few doubted that God provided the background for personal, social and political life. Perhaps a time will come when a more sophisticated recognition of spiritual needs and functions is acceptable again.

An Archetypal Structure. Mythology is characterized by archetypal images. A frequent query-criticism of the present framework asks why the number seven is so prominent. Of course, other numbers occur as well: there are the 6 dyads, the 5 triads, and so on. Nevertheless the prominence of 7, the number of levels in each of the various hierarchies, is undeniable.

One answer to the query simply argues that there are 7 levels for the same reason that we have 5 fingers or protons consist of 3 types of quark. 7 levels is what was empirically found and 7 levels is the number theoretically and intuitively needed to represent and explain an astonishing variety of phenomena.

Another answer, which invites deeper reflection, is that the seven levels represent an archetypal image. Mythological structures with seven levels abound. There are the seven chakras or centres of energy in Hinduism, the seven notes of the octave, the seven planetary spheres of antiquity, the seven heavens of Judaism and Islam, the seven deadly sins, the seven day week, and so on. Perhaps unknowingly the present analysis has fitted reality into that simple pre-existing unconscious image. However, if so, my research and clients have done far more than that: they have

elaborated many details of the shape and nature of the archetypal image itself.

Archetypal images are not strange to science. The primary and most popular image is undoubtedly the duality. It is evident in those numerous laws in which one variable is described as a function of another variable. The primary advantage of dualistic classifications seems to be a sense of simplicity and an opportunity to contain and control value polarities. But we saw in Ch.s 3 and 4 how commonly dualism is used to define purpose and value, and how utterly inadequate it is. In the social realm, it seems that the archetypal image of seven levels is superior. It allows a great deal of useful elaboration while always retaining a sense of simplicity.

Description by the use of opposites or quasi-opposites is a particular characteristic of science, especially the social sciences, and an absolute favourite of popular management texts. Subjective vs objective, stability vs change, complexity vs simplicity, social vs personal, person-centred vs task-centred, centralized vs decentralized, integrated vs differentiated, formal vs informal: the list is endless. Dualities are important of course. I invoked them repeatedly: to explain the evolution of the approaches to ethical choice (Ch. 6), to explain identity development (Ch. 7), to capture the intrinsic tension in social participation (Ch.s 8, 9 and 12), to define distinct forms of intention (Ch. 13), and elsewhere. But invariably, and unlike in most social science and management literatures, the notion of balancing or transcending the duality was added.

By taking two pairs of opposites and ignoring the need to overcome duality, a 2 x 2 table can be created from the Cartesian coordinate system (cf. Fig. 2.2 in Ch. 2). This four-celled box is a favourite image of classifiers at least since c. 450 BC when Empedocles used hot vs cold and dry vs moist to categorize the construction of the universe into four elements: fire, water, air, earth.[9]

Any image, whether the 2 x 2 table or the seven level hierarchy, cannot be disproved or falsified. It simply exists. At worst, its application generates an inadequate map of reality, and then analyses based on it have little or no practical use. A real danger is using the image to give the illusion of understanding.

The seven level hierarchy provides some protection against illusion, because not any seven-fold categorization or intuitive progression will do. The image requires that each level should have a distinctive quality. An essential quality of the sixth level, for example, is that it contains seven systems derived from a focus on each of the levels in turn. More dramatically, the qualities of the various levels must enable them to be

combined progressively to create recognizable derived social entities which form a second orthogonal seven-level structural hierarchy.

The dynamics of the image are also striking. They involve harnessing fundamental dualities which present as cognitive modes or social perspectives. Either both sides of the duality are separately represented within a level, or the duality is balanced in the level. The result is the creation of centres allowing flows of influence between them. A characteristic pattern is generated which is found in all seven level hierarchies, both elemental and structural — although the text only analyses the primary hierarchy in this way.

The fact that such an extraordinarily complex image not only fits purpose, value, rules and authority, but also usefully represents other areas of human functioning like experience, decision, change, work, inquiry, knowing, creativity, and communication, is surely evidence of its archetypal nature.[10]

Of great significance is the fact that the seven level image is reflexive: that is to say, it contains itself and subjects itself to its own principles. In regard to purpose, the framework of purpose is a logic-based value system. It is the product of an intense desire for truth that helps and heals.

Order. Logic-based value systems epitomize the provision of order. Some readers may feel over-constrained, sensing that I have taken categorization and definition to extremes.

Of course both myths and science are, indeed must be, extremist in their efforts to provide for order in their different ways. All myths and all sciences spring from a conception of universal order. The creator's effort is to bring the human-social-physical world into accord with higher philosophical or spiritual necessities. In whatever way this is done, the order comes to feel natural to people educated in it, and to feel alien to those new to it. Remember Feynman's quip about physics: "you don't understand new theories, you just get used to them."

Primitive tribes knew that harmony and well-being required people to be aligned with the nature of the cosmos of which they were a part. Modern man only seems to know that efforts in construction, transport, communications, pharmaceuticals and the like must align with physico-chemical laws. Somehow we have forgotten those laws of (and for) social life and human action which in past times were embodied in myths.

Science needs to provide for alignment in the human realm with the effortlessness of myth but without the coercion so natural in priest-dominated cultures. The

present account of purposes and values and all that flows from it seeks to do just that. However, it needs to be compared to a map of the world in the 17th century, very broadly correct perhaps but demanding much further careful exploration.

Two aspects of any myth or scientific law spring to mind. First the abstract, permanent, universal quality in its form ($y = f(x)$, the dead and resurrected son-god); and then the local specific applied and socially conditioned form (stress is proportional to strain within the elastic limit; Jesus as a crucified and resurrected incarnation of divinity). The myth expresses the ineffable in a local concrete meaningful form. But in doing so it divides and separates people. Science and scientific applications, by contrast, have become universal truths in a way that specific myths could never be.

Like myths, the present framework consists of universal ideas that spring from the nature of the human mind and social condition. Where else could it have come from? However the application of the framework — the determination of a principle, the selection of priorities, the adoption of a value system — seems liable to evoke just that intensity of difference and disagreement that so characterises mythical knowledge and generally distinguishes it from science.

Is the framework no more than myth then? Myths, while demanding personal absorption, do enable reflective distance. This framework also invites distinction and reflection. It enables people to have a distance from their own values and experiences, and encourages improvement of oneself and the social order. Myths, however, do not usually encourage change. They are rather part of a context which seeks to do the reverse. Myths socialize people in communities, developing intense and distinctive convictions and stabilizing the social order. Church leaders are in no more hurry today than in the past to say what every student of religious ideas and mythology knows — that all religions are ultimately one.

The control of pleasure, achievement and the ethical order are the primary social aims of myths. The framework accepts the validity of those aims, but does not itself control. Like other scientific products, it is empty without the operation of human judgement.

Scientists tend, by nature, to be sceptical and tough-minded. To produce this framework, tolerance and sympathy for different ways of thinking, feeling and doing were needed. Yet throughout I felt a conviction that man, scientific man as much as primitive man, needs order. Progress is nothing more than the replacement of chaos, the primal state of the universe according to so many mythologies, by order. Order,

not control. Human judgement and human responsibility remain.

SALVATION OR REVELATION

Money and Politics. The notion that prosperity suffices for human existence would be laughable in any age but ours. What economic benefit could possibly come from civil war or ethnic slaughter? Why do people return to live in sites regularly devastated by earthquakes, volcanoes and hurricanes? How does the frequency of divorce and re-marriage fit the economic thesis?

Money intervenes between values and action in society. Money, like survival, reflects necessity. Earning money is good. But life built around money, like life dominated by survival needs, is wretched. To focus solely on money is to lose sight of both ends and means. To make money the measure of esteem and status is to live in a world of the tangible and concrete rather than a world of ideas and feelings. It is to be seduced by the possibility of conscious control. It is a denial of ultimate values and weakens virtue. Yet money and the imperatives for survival in so many poor countries, harnessed to technology and self-interest, may yet be a force for international accord. We shall see.

Until recently, secular society not only invested its emotional capital in money but also in politicians permitted to exert control on the people's behalf. People believed in the power of governments to intervene and to use tax-payers money to relieve suffering and provide salvation. For some it was communist-authoritarian government which would show the way, for others it was democratic liberal-capitalist government. The downfall of communist regimes has, in an aesthetically pleasing way, coincided with a profound disillusionment with the redeeming power of liberal democracy. Despite an extraordinary increase in material prosperity, a mixture of moral disorientation and extremist fundamentalism has become rife.

Most people have contempt for their governments as they view the emergence of fragmented families, the drug abuse epidemic, escalating numbers of abortions, racial hatred, massive unemployment, and increased criminality. The USA, self-proclaimed epitome of liberal democracy, seems to show municipal government in decline. This is shown by over 30 million people in over 100,000 community associations where it is dues and restrictive byelaws that manage their communal relationships.

People, paradoxically, seem to demand more and more of government as their confidence in its effective-

ness sinks. They feel sick of the corruption, incompetence and arrogance of appointed officials and elected politicians. But even if a democratic government consisted of competent and humble public servants of the highest integrity, it would be unable to provide what people want and need deep down.

The rage and frustration at the unfairness and suffering in human existence cannot be assuaged or removed by money or political initiatives. No-one feels loved enough, secure enough, or appreciated enough. Problems are not removed but moved about — to be dumped on children, the disenfranchised or some other country. State solutions are activist, interventionist and populist: which so often means releasing hatred and making war. But global communications make political manipulation of hatred problematic and technologies of killing make war horrific.

Crisis. So modern society seems to be suffering an old-fashioned spiritual crisis. Fear and impotence combine in a desperate, raging, alienated lower class, a confused, struggling, insecure middle class, and well-to-do elites who feel uncomfortable and are disconnected. This crisis is upon us because of a crisis in belief: a crisis in what to believe, and a gap between what people actually believe and what they say or feel they ought to believe.

The churches seem unable to help. By 1200 AD, their opposition to freedom of thought, individual experience and scientific methods had probably sealed their fate. Their still half-hearted attempts to accommodate mean that while many people, most in some societies, recognize a divine realm and label themselves as adherents of a faith, relatively few leaders and thinkers see current churches as the basis for a new world order.

In my discussions with people, salvation rarely emerged as a preoccupation — the word seems to be unfashionable — but ways of handling destructiveness, dealing with suffering, and avoiding harm were ever-present concerns. Simple solutions, whether or not they are religious, tend to be counterproductive. I hope that emancipation by a liberal education will move people away from a single idea that suffering is always a matter of personal fault, or due to the malevolence of others, or a product of society, or an expression of the wrath of a Supreme Being, or an outcome of meaningless chance events. A preferable approach to destructiveness and suffering is one which promotes the attribution of meaning in order to pursue the good and do what is right.[11] But this moves the focus from salvation to revelation.

The Future. Science offers revelation not salvation.

My own speculation is that science, unknown to its practitioners, is a product of spirituality. Science is transpersonal, it transcends time and space, it allows for self-reflective awareness, it demands integrity in its performance, it is a basis for hope, it is fed by the imagination. But in its present form it seems to fail on one key quality: it is not preoccupied with the social order and the nature of human existence — and I include the social sciences here.

Paradoxically, when at last nothing is sacred, when science has stripped away the entitlement to mystery utterly, then perhaps everything can become sacred again. It may be that we are witnessing or rather living through the ultimate ordeal and temptation. If we are to emerge successfully, science must endorse a social and transcendental vision in order to embrace this last domain. This would be a new scientific paradigm, complementing, not replacing, the old. Can the present scientific community grasp the nettle of what is involved in work with values or must we await the inquirers of the future? With imagination, something is surely possible.

Perhaps the present analysis, with its base in the universal requirement for responsibility in social life, its assumptions of freedom and justice so characteristic of Western philosophies, its recognition of the spiritual so dominant in Eastern philosophies, and its origins in the urge to heal, may provide some pointers.   ❉

NOTES

1. Gray, J.C. *The Nature and Sources of the Law*. New York, 1921, p.276.

2. Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. (Transl. D. Ross, rev'd J. Ackrill & J. Urmson) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, p.4-7.

3. *The Bhagavad Gita* (transl. J. Mascaro, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962) is part of the great epic, *The Mahabharata*, compiled in 400-200 BC.

4. Plato. *Phaedrus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

5. See for example: Mitroff, I.I. *The Subjective Side of Science*. New York: Elsevier, 1974; Barber, B. Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery. *Science*, 134: 596-602, 1961; Maddison, D. Innovation, ideology and innocence. *Social Science and Medicine*, 16: 623-628, 1982; Zito, G.V. Toward a sociology of heresy. *Sociological Analysis*, 44: 123-130, 1983.

6. Karl Popper, the eminent philosopher of science, made this comment in a late essay which I have been unable to trace.

7. Research in the USA has given some confirmation to the existence of the seven approaches to ethical choice, and possibly to the three cognitive modes used in specification. See: Snow, R.M. & Bloom, A.J. Ethical decision making styles in the workplace: underlying dimensions and their implications. *Systems Research*, 9: 35-45, 1992.

8. Campbell, J. *Primitive Mythology*. Vol. 1, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p.86.

9. As explained in Campbell, J. op.cit. [8], p.452, Empedocles described it like this:

	Moist	Dry
Hot	Air	Fire
Cold	Water	Earth

10. Hierarchy and duality are fundamental notions of systems theory. However, the experiential approach to hierarchy and duality taken by me in this book and elsewhere is unusual.

Hierarchy has preoccupied religious thinkers (cf. A.O. Lovejoy *The Great Chain of Being*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), and hence emerges as a perennial philosophical theme — something I was reminded about as this book was going to press by: Kuntz, M.L. & Kuntz, P.G. (eds.) *Jacob's Ladder and the Tree of Life: Concepts of Hierarchy and the Great Chain of Being*. New York: Peter Lang, 1987. My approach, however, has been to pursue the deep intuition of hierarchy in a formal-systemic, transdisciplinary and non-philosophical way.

11. Max Weber suggested that the most complete and successful system for dealing with suffering was *karma* as developed in India (*The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*. Transl. and ed. Gerth, H.H. & Martindale, D., New York: The Free Press, 1958). The salvationist doctrine of karma gives suffering a cause, a meaning and a positive value. But it seems less satisfactory in dealing with evil; and it minimizes the personal capacity to attribute meaning.

AFTERWORD

"All this talk of goodness and duty, these perpetual pin-pricks, unnerve and irritate the hearer; nothing, indeed could be more destructive of his inner tranquillity." says Lao Tzu to Confucius in an imaginary dialogue created by Chuang Tzu. "All your lectures are concerned with things that are no better than footprints in the dust." ... "The last thing you should do is tamper with men's hearts. The first to tamper with men's hearts was the Yellow Ancestor when he taught goodness and duty. [Later] there arose the schools of Confucius and Tzu. Henceforward the pleased and the angry began to suspect one another, the foolish and the wise despise one another, the good and the bad to disappoint one another, charlatans and honest men to abuse one another. Decay set in on every hand. Men's natural powers no longer came into play; their inborn faculties were wholly corrupted."

From: Waley, A. *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China*. Doubleday: New York, 1939 p.71-74.

GLOSSARY

Meanings, Formulae
& Master-Matrix References

GLOSSARY

Contents. This Glossary is a quick reference to the main terms used in the book. It lists these with brief definitions and minimal elaboration or explanation. A term's conceptual place in the theoretical framework is indicated by a formula; and Master-Matrix numbers show where the term can be viewed in context. Use a formula with the Table of Contents to identify the relevant major section in the text. Further more detailed guidance with page references are available through the main Index.

Many terms, even key ones, have more than one role or meaning in the theoretical framework. Additional everyday meanings or extended meanings of terms which are tangential to the book's purpose are kept to the minimum necessary to avoid confusion. Words that are most often used synonymously with the terms chosen in the book are included with a reference to the preferred term. Very general terms with the potential to mystify are also included. The Glossary does not aim to be comprehensive. Many technical terms in management, politics and philosophy that are peripheral to the framework are excluded. This Glossary therefore complements specialized academic dictionaries and companions.

Columns. The first column lists the terms. The second column provides definitions or explanations of the terms or refers the reader to another term elsewhere in the Glossary. The third column indicates the place in the framework of purpose (Arabic numerals) or

experience (Roman numerals) where the term as defined is to be found. Finally, the fourth column identifies the Master-Matrix where the concept can be viewed concisely in its theoretical context. The last two columns are necessarily left blank in the case of general terms or general meanings of specific terms.

Formulae printed in bold indicate a precise correspondence to the Glossary term. These terms are key concepts used in the Table of Contents and found in the left-hand columns of Master-Matrices. Formulae in plain text refer to items, often present in the relevant Master-Matrices, which are properties, synonyms or entities closely related to the key concepts.

In the explanatory column, terms that are found elsewhere in the Glossary are italicized in case there is a need for further clarification. To avoid repetition, the adjectives 'ethical' and 'social' which qualify terms in the left-hand column are frequently left understood in the text when the meaning is clear.

Order. Alphabetization in the first column is based on the first word, and then the second, and so on e.g. 'civil liberty' comes before 'civility principle'. Hyphenated words like 'bi-modal' are treated as single words. Two and three word terms are listed according to the first word e.g. 'cardinal virtue' appears under C (not V); but there is a fair amount of cross-referencing e.g. under 'virtue', there is a suggestion to 'see: cardinal virtue'.

Term	Definition		
A movement	A *purpose-based autonomous endeavour* created through voluntary *collective* action to develop and establish new *values* of fundamental importance to *society*.	G-5^3	37,38
Absolute	1) An utterly abstract *rule* introduced to ensure that all in a *social group* know and aspire to the path of *duty*.	L"-7	16,17
	2) A *rule*, determined by *ultimate values*, which constrains people both in their sense of *freedom* by evoking *duty* and in their sense of duty by evoking freedom, and whose *effectiveness* depends on the personal control of personal control via *free will*.	G"-1^7	21
	3) The characteristic *rule* of an *organized religion*	L"-VII	14,15
	4) See: *God*.		
Absolute good	1) Unachievable by a *person*, so viewed as an attribute or equivalent of *God*.		
	2) See: *ultimate value*.	L-7	
	3) See: *good*.		
Absolute Reality	The unified totality of the universe including all that is and all that is not. Used synonymously with *God*.		

Term	Definition		
Absolutism	A *theory* and form of *government*, monarchical or tyrannical in practice, in which the *ruler* rather than *the citizenry* or *the law* is supreme.		
Acceptability	Likely to be well-received: the prime requirement in dealing with a *community* or any *social group* taken as a whole, hence required quality of *rules* in the second *internal level* of *ethical authorities*.	$_SH^3$	19,20
Acceptance	Form that satisfaction takes in *individual being*.	L'-IV	11
Accommodation	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *principal objects* and an *over-riding priority*.	$L\text{-}4_B \leftrightarrow L\text{-}3_E$	41–46
Accountability	A state of being answerable to or liable to be called to account i.e. *responsibility* to an authorized *person* or *social body*.		
Accountable leadership	*Leadership capability* required to manage an *operation* in *an organization*.	$G\text{-}4^1$	34
Achievement	1) Successful production of *results* in accord with a specified requirement.		
	2) If referring to a type of activity, see: *principal object*.	L-4	
	3) If referring to a desired result, see: *strategic objective*.	L-2	
	4) If referring to task completion, see: *tactical objective*.	L-1	
	5) If referring to continuing success, see: *functioning*.	G-4	
Action	1) A specific purposeful process with mental, physical and social components and consequences which cannot all be anticipated.		
	2) Any directed alteration of the social or physical world which involves the exercise of *power* and *judgement* as to feasibility (cf. *work*).		
	3) A civil case brought before a *court of justice*.		
Action plan	A linked set of *tactical objectives* and *sub-objectives* including their *time* targets.	L-1	
Activist	1) *Participant* in *society* who seeks to bring about some *change* in society's *values*.	$G\text{-}1^5$	31
	2) The *organizers* and *grass roots* who actively affirm and spread the *values* of a *movement*.	$G\text{-}5^3$	38
Activity	1) Related or organized *actions* generated by *purposes* which require constraining and channelling to be effective.	G-2	32
	2) In relation to *identity*, see: *principal object*.	L-4	1–3
	3) The *growth-promoting potential* and source of *hope* which develops receptivity within *sensory being*.	L'-I	11,13
	4) *Movement* requiring *concentration* and involving the whole *body* i.e. physical activity or sport.	L'-II	12
Adaptation	1) Changing to fit others: the dynamic form of *self-expression* in *individual being*.	L'-IV	12
	2) Changing to fit the *situation*: The prime requirement of *tactical objectives* and a required quality of any *purpose* in the base level of *purpose derivatives*.	L-1 $_SH^1$	30
Adherent	*Primal role* of any *person* based on a *responsibility* to their *value system* to preserve it. (Synonyms include: expert, disciple, devotee, ideologue, follower, believer.)	$G\text{-}1^6$	31
Advocate	1) One who speaks on behalf of a *person* or group aiming to forward their *interests*.		
	2) The *role* in a *movement* with the *duty* to provide a political interface between the movement and *wider society*.	$G\text{-}5^3$	38
	3) A legal term with various specialized meanings in different *legal systems*; broadly speaking, a legal professional.		

Agent	1) Loosely refers to a *person* or *social body* as an actor or doer in *society*. 2) *Primal role* of any *person* based on a *responsibility to* an *employer* for doing what has to be done now. (Synonyms include: functionary, operative.)	G-1[1]	31
Aims and objects	See: *principal object*	L-4	
Alienation	Signal of dysfunction in *social being*.	L'-VI	12
Alliance	The relationship which links otherwise competing or distinctive *associations* or *endeavours*.	L-4	3
Altruism	1) Devotion to the welfare of others: the *aspiration* in the *communalist* *approach* which is counter-balanced by the *constraint* of *egoism*. 2) An essential aspect of *cohesion* in small *communities*.	L'-5	5,7 16
An authority	1) A *purpose-based autonomous endeavour*, either *statutory* or *self-regulatory*, set up to preserve existing *social values* and apply them authoritatively to particular *situations*. (Synonyms include: board, commission, supervisor, regulator, committee, council). 2) See: *ethical authority*. 3) See: *authority*. 4) See: *established authority*.	G-5[2] sH[3]	37,38
An enterprise	1) A *purpose-based autonomous endeavour* created to pursue *values* through *activities* which generate tangible benefits for itself. 2) Loosely refers to any *organization* set up by *individuals* to produce goods or services which meet *social needs*.	G-5[1]	37,38
An organization	1) A temporary or enduring social *institution* which has a defined *membership*, explicit *aims* and some explicit internal *structure* of *posts* and/or *committees* based on assigning *work* of different kinds to different people. 2) Often refers to *an enterprise*, but a *movement* and an *authority* have characteristic organizations too. 3) Loosely used to refer to any *social body*. There are many synonyms in common use including: association, company, guild, fraternity, syndicate, society, group, centre, agency, trust, club, partnership, movement, institute, commission, order, authority, consortium, federation, tribunal, exchange, collective, foundation, league, party, union. 4) See: *organization*.	G-5	37,38
Approach	1) The *direction* which ensures *adherents'* correct *participation* within their wider *community* setting. 2) A *value system* devised to deal with certain *social needs*. 3) See: *system*. 4) See: *structure*.	G-2[5] L-6	32
Approach to deciding	See: *decision system*.		
Approach to ethical choice	A *value system* for *ethical choice* which is built upon a *core obligation* and deals with *conflicts* between *values*.	H[2]	5,6
Approach to identity development	An *identification system* based around the primacy of a particular form of *experience* used for the building and repair of *self*. The seven *approaches* enable systematic psychotherapeutic techniques and theories of the mind, as well as generating *dualities* which are perennial subjects of philosophical debate.	H[II]	11,12
Approach to inquiry	See: *inquiring system*.		

Term	Definition	Code	Pages
Appropriate	1) Meeting the need to adapt to *values* and *realities* in the immediate *situation*, hence the required quality of *purposes* in the first *internal level* of *purpose derivatives*.	$_SH^1$	30
	2) *Ethical injunction* in *pragmatist choice*.	L'-3	5
Arbitration	1) A method of deciding associated with *dialectical decision-making*.		
	2) Form of *judgement* to resolve disputes using *the custom*.	$G^*\text{-}5^1$	25
Arousal	The dynamic form of *self-expression* in *sensory being*.	L'-I	12
Arrogance	Aggressive conceit revealing a poor appreciation of one's strengths and weaknesses: the *cardinal vice* resulting from failing to resolve the *strength-vulnerabilities duality* when using the *individualist approach* to *ethical choice*.	L'-4	5
Aspiration	1) The expression of an *ideal*.	$G\text{-}3^5$	33
	2) See: *ethical aspiration*.	H^2	
	3) See: *vision*	$G\text{-}4^4$	
Assertion	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of an *over-riding priority* and a *structured set of priorities*.	$L\text{-}3_E \leftrightarrow L\text{-}3_L$	41–46
Assimilation	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of an established *communal net of values* and an emergent *highlighted social need*.	$L\text{-}5_L \leftrightarrow L\text{-}5_E$	41–46
Association	1) A *social group* which promotes an *interest* formally on the basis of *principal objects*.	L-4	3
	2) The *constituting body* of a *formal organization*.		4
Attachment	The *identity drive* in *emotional being*.	L'-III	11
Attention	1) Directing the *mind*.		
	2) See: *awareness*.	L-1	
	3) See: *concentration*	L'-II	
Attitude	An inner disposition which governs but does not determine *action*, and which is bounded by *conventions*.	L''-2	15,17 21
Attunement	The dynamic form of *self-expression* in *transpersonal being*.	L'-VII	12
Authority	A general term essential to *order* and *ethics* in social life, but used with a variety of different connotations.		
	1) The basis of any *ethical order* and fundamental to the regulation of *power* and *obedience*.	$G^*\text{-}1$ $_SH^3$	18–20 27
	2) In relation to *conformity* with the *ethical frames of reference*, qualified as: traditional, *rational* or religious.	$G^*\text{-}5$	25
	3) Any entity, abstract or constituted, which has *legitimate control* over the exercise of *power* in *society* i.e. which can command or decide or choose or provide *purposes* or *rules*, in a way that ought to influence the views and *conduct* of others.		27
	4) For abstract or rule-based authority, see: *ethical authority*.	$_SH^3$	18–20
	5) For constituted or official authority, see: *established authority*.		
	6) A form of *right* which provides the social legitimation to support the carrying out of *duties* and the exertion of *power*, either within an organization or in *wider society*.	L''-4	27
	7) For inner authority, see: *obligation*.	L-6	2,16
	8) An agency, regulatory or service-providing, controlled and funded by *government* with defined powers (e.g. Education Authority, Planning Authority, Gaming Board) including both its *governing body* and its *executants* or employees.	$G\text{-}5^1$ $G\text{-}5^2$	
	9) See: *an authority*.	$G\text{-}5^2$	
	10) See: *primal authority*.	$G^*\text{-}1$	
	11) See: *governing body*.		

Autonomous endeavour	*Purpose-based social body* with a definable *identity* which is responsible for its own *functioning* to thrive or collapse: either *an enterprise, an authority, or a movement.*	G-5	37,38
Autonomy	1) Personal *freedom* or freedom of the *will*.		
	2) See: *individual autonomy*.	L"-6	
	3) The *ethical disposition* which supports adherence to *absolutes*.	L"-7	16,17
	4) An example of an *ultimate value*.	L-7	
	5) The right of self-government, especially in regard to a *sovereign society* or *organization*.		
	6) The *pentadic purpose derivative* whose embodiments organize endeavours so as to ensure that *work* serves the *values* of both *society* and *individuals*. Joint endeavour is embodied in popular *movements*, regulatory *authorities* and executive-led *enterprises*.	G-5	28–30 37,40
Awareness	1) The sensory *motivation* which links *tactical objectives* in the *framework of purpose* with *sensation* in the *framework of experience*.	L-1 L-I	2,16
	2) Inner realization of *experience*.		
	3) The static form of *self-expression* in *sensory being*.	L'-I	12
Axiology	The phenomenological study of *values* within the academic *discipline* of *philosophy*.		
Bad(ness)	1) Negative *value*: the opposite value pole to *good(ness)* and with the same qualifiers in relation to the *levels of value*.	L-3 to L-7	3
	2) See: *evil*.	L-7	
Balanced mode	1) A way of functioning which incorporates or synthesises two opposing *modes*. It is indicated by a subscript B.		
	2) A way of setting *purposes* in which both *logic-based* and *emotional-based* factors and processes are involved.	H¹	41–46
Banner goal	See: *social value*.	L-5	
Basic right	See: *fundamental right*.	L"-4	
Behaviour	1) Activity or body movement which is involuntary, mindless, ritualistic or compelled i.e. distinct from action.		
	2) See: *action*.		
Being	1) Existing in *reality*.		
	2) Linked in the case of a *person* to development of a *human identity*, which includes seven distinct aspects.	H"	11,12
	3) Ground of *value* and *inner experience* from which *human identity* emerges and which makes *participation* in *humanity* or *union* possible.	L-7	3
	4) *God* or an aspect of God or an emanation of God.		
Belief	1) Mental acceptance of a fact or proposition as true; and hence the fact or proposition itself.		
	2) See: *tenet*.	L"-3	
	3) See: *dominant belief*.	L-6ₑ	
	4) See: *faith*.	L'-VII	
Belief system	1) See: *ideology*.	G"-2³	
	2) See: *value system*.	L-6	
Believer	See: *adherent*.	G-1⁶	
Belonging	The *personal energy* and *social force* released by the evocation of *social values* within a *community*.	L-5	3
Benevolence	The *cardinal virtue* which emerges from satisfactory handling of the *altruism-egoism duality* in the *communalist* approach to *ethical choice*.	L'-5	5

Bi-modal level	*Level* in a *hierarchy* whose contents are expressed and used in two sharply distinct *modes* linked by a *channel* of reciprocal influence.		
Board	The special body within an *enterprise* or an *authority* whose *membership* is made up of *governors* who corporately make authoritative *priority-based decisions.* (Synonyms in common use include: governing body, council, committee, authority, commission, steering group.)	G-1³ G-5¹ G-5²	4,31 38
Bodily existence	See: *vital being.*	L-II	
Body	1) In relation to *society:* a bounded structured entity which endures and can act. 2) See: *social body.* 3) In relation to a *person:* the premise of *reality* for *vital being.* 4) See: *body states.*	G-5 L-II L-III	35,36 11
Body states	A physiological condition of arousal: the *stabilizing core* of *identity* in *emotional being* which is developed through the use of *mental states.*	L-III	11
Boss	*Role* which depends on frequent use of *directives,* or the threat of directives, and can be contrasted with the role of *leader.*	G-3¹	
Brief	See: *principal object.*	L-4	
Briefing	Technique of managerial communication required for an *operation.*	G-4¹	34
Building blocks	Phrase used in the text to refer to the lower four *purpose derivatives* — *purpose, direction, drive, functioning* — which are available for realizing *values* within a whole *social body* or a part of it.	G-1 to G-4	28 31–34 40
Business	1) Profit-making sector of *society.* 2) *An enterprise* providing services or products of some kind to clients or customers for profit; typically taking the form of a *company, partnership* or sole trader and generally referred to as a *firm.*		
Business philosophy	A collection of *social values* used by a *firm* to motivate staff and integrate the firm within its *wider society.*	L-5	
Business plan	1) See: *development programme.* 2) See: *operational programme.*	G-4² G-4¹	
Campaign	The *drive* or component of a drive created to persuade people in a *constituency* to act on dormant *values* which they hold in common.	G-3³	33
Campaigner	*Social role* of those who emerge from a *constituency* to run a *campaign* to activate *members* of that constituency.	G-3³	33
Campaigning organization	A *reform-generating organization* whose *principal object* is to mount *campaigns* on behalf of a particular reform.		35,36
Capability	The personal or internal aspect of *achievement.* Together with socially assigned *authority,* it makes successful pursuit of *goals* or discharge of *responsibility* possible.		
Cardinal vices	The seven *vices* which result from and are expressed by failure to handle the *aspiration-constraint* tension in the various *approaches to ethical choice.*	H²	5
Cardinal virtues	The seven *virtues* which result from and are expressed by proper handling of the *aspiration-constraint* tension in the various *approaches to ethical choice.*	H²	5
Categorical imperative	See: *ethical imperative.*	G"-6	
Cause	A topic or area of *legitimate* social concern, either *good* or *defensive* in nature, leading to the creation of a *crusade.*	G-3⁴	33

Cell	The organizational *element* of a *movement*, typically consisting of 5-30 equal *members*.	G-5³	37
Centre	1) A locus (e.g. for *purposes*) lying within a *level* in a *hierarchy* and determined by the *mode* of formation and functioning. 2) See: *social body*.		
Ceremonial respect	*Survival* need in society met by people identifying with the *rules* of *formal etiquette*.	L″-I	15
Ceremony	1) A coherent set of formalized and often solemn *rituals*, *symbolic* in nature and serving some social *function*. 2) See: *formal etiquette*.	L″-I	
Champion	1) *Social role* that is required for a successful *crusade* on behalf of a *cause*. 2) *Participant* in an *organization* who enthusiastically supports and leads a particular *change*.	G-3⁴	33
Change	1) Alterations in the present state, especially those which touch on *values*. 2) The *constraint* in the *conventionalist* approach to *choice* which balances the *aspiration* to maintain *continuity*. 3) See: *drive*.	L′-2 G-3	5.7
Channel	Any connection indicating a form of mutual influence between *modes* or *centres* in a *hierarchy*.		
Charisma	1) Grace and power associated with *ultimate values* and hence seen as bestowed by *God* on *leaders*. 2) Form of *legitimation* and *authority* associated with the *ethical frames* of *reference*. 3) Capacity to inspire *enthusiasm* and devotion associated with the *leadership* of enterprises and *popular movements*.	L-7 G″-5³ G-5	3
Charter	1) An organized set of *rights* (and *duties*) which regulate the exercise of *power* within relationships. 2) A public document containing *human rights principles*. 3) Statement of a *universal standard*. 4) Document which defines and sets up an *endeavour*.	L″-4 G″-2⁴ G′-4⁴	17
Chief executive officer	The *role* in an *enterprise* which is accountable for all *executive work* and heads up the *executant body* or *top management team*.	G-5¹	
Church	1) Chief *legal individual* in *theology* with *responsibility* for preserving and celebrating a *religion*. 2) All *believers* in a particular *religion* who share a *morality* and should therefore form a *moral community*. 3) See: *organized religion*.	 L′-VII	
Citizen	Possessor of *citizenship* and *member* of *the citizenry*.	G-6²	39
Citizen body	See: *the citizenry*.	G-6²	
Citizenship	1) Qualification of a *person* living in a *society*, classically associated with the *idea* of *political rights* (e.g. to vote) and the *legal right* to hold public office (i.e. to rule or govern) and hence contrasted with being a *subject* or *slave*. In modern times, extended to include social and economic rights (e.g. to welfare and public services). . 2) See: *membership*.	G-6² G-7¹	39
Civic virtue	The form of *virtue* associated with active *membership* of society and required of a *good citizen*.	G-7¹ G-6²	39
Civil liberty	An essential *moral right* which applies specifically to *political* aspects of *citizenship* and *membership*.	G-5³	

Civility	1) Ceremonially respectful handling of non-specific aspects of social interaction which demands sensitivity and *self-control*. 2) The basis for *peaceful coexistence* of people in a *community*.	G"-2^1	22
Civility principle	A *principle* which shapes *behaviour* so that due *respect* for other *community members* can be manifest during inter-personal interactions.	G"-2^1	22
Clarification	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *principal objects* and a *structured set of priorities*.	L-4$_B$ ↔ L-3$_L$	41-46
Class	1) A category. 2) See: *social class*		
Class organization	An *organization* set up to represent a *social class* without requiring the assent of all or even most *members* of the class.		
Class power	*Primal authority* for *rights* in *society*.	G"-1^4	21
Coalition	1) The relationship which links *factions* which usually have opposing views of *internal priorities*. 2) Form of *government* in which representatives from different *political parties* share office and cooperate.	L-3	3
Code	An organized *system* of *rules*.	H^3	17
Code of conduct	A phrase used with a variety of meanings. 1) See: *code of ethics*. 2) See: *code of practice*. 3) See: *code of good practice*. 4) See: *minimum standard*. 5) See: *the ethical order*. 6) See: *the morality*. 7) See: *individual standard*.	 L"-5 L"-1 G"-3^1 G"-4 G"-7^1 G"-5^3 G"-4^2	
Code of ethics	A more or less organised set of *maxims* devised to suit the requirements of a particular *organization* or professional *group*.	L"-5	17
Code of good practice	An aspirational set of related *tenets*, *conventions* and *prescriptions* which promote certain *social values* in a particular setting, and which are produced to re-orient people and foster their *conformity*.	G"-3^1	23
Code of practice	A more or less organized set of *prescriptions* which specify precisely what is to be done by whom in given circumstances.	L"-1	17
Coercion	*Power* based ultimately on *physical force* which may be used to ensure compliance with *rules*.	H^3	17,21
Coexistence	The relationship linking distinct *tribes* or *adherents* in the same *domain* despite their differing *value systems*.	L-6	3
Coherence	The necessary internal order of a *structure*: an essential requirement to stabilize *identity*.		
Cohesion	The holding together of *members* of a *social group*, hence the intangible force which maintains the group's existence.		3
Collective	1) See: *community*. 2) See: *social group*.		
Collective enterprise	1) Referring to *an enterprise* providing public services, see: *public agency*. 2) Referring to efforts to change society's *values*, see: *a movement*.	G-5^1 G-5^3	37 37
Collective good	See: *common good*.		

Commandment	See: *ethical imperative*.	G"-6	
Commission	1) See: *an authority*.	G-5²	
	2) See: *board*.	G-1³	
Commitment	1) The basis of entry and *participation* within an *association* or other group generated by shared *principal objects*.	L-4	3
	2) Inner experiential state at the moment of *decision*.		
	3) Essential requirement for pursuing *drives*.		
Committee	1) Social body whose *members* are authorized to make *decisions* as a group.		
	2) See: *an authority*.	G-5²	
	3) See: *board*.	G-1³	
Common good	1) Those *values* which all in a *social group* share, the most significant and enduring of which is the continuing existence of the social group.		
	2) The *aspiration* of the *legitimist approach* which is counter-balanced by the *constraint* of *individual autonomy*.	L-6	5,7 16
Common morality	See: *universal standard*.	G"-4⁴	
Commonality	Property of a *value* which underpins the formation of *natural social groups*.		
Commons	A reservoir of concrete *goods* or *bads* affecting or accessible to all in a *community* and with an inherent tendency to be exploited by each *member*; hence related to *distributive justice*.	G"-3⁵	
Communal ideals	The *natural moral institution* which maintains a *consensus* in *society* on its principal *values*.	L"-III	10 14-16
Communal identity	The core enduring *values* of a *community* manifested in its *structures* and *functioning* and maintained by its *natural moral institutions*.		10
Communal identity functions	The essential requirements on any *community* or *society* to transform itself, to differentiate itself, to strengthen itself, and to sustain itself.	G-4	34,35 36
Communal net of values	1) *Social values* defined in the *logical mode*.	L-5ₗ	41-46
	2) *Values* defining a *culture* within an *organization*.	G-4³	34
Communal role	A *position* which orients individuals to relating to others in a way that affirms mutual *rights* and *duties*.	G"-3²	23
Communal standard	*Minimum standard* which seeks to protect an evolving undefined *community* and which is expressed in public *activities*.	G"-4¹	24
Communalist approach	A *teleological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* to balance all anticipated consequences in relation to the *needs* and *interests* of all concerned including the chooser. The *injunction* is to choose what is beneficial overall.	L'-5	5-9
Commune	1) A territorial *community*, usually small enough for all *members* to recognize each other, and deliberately established with a specific *ideology*.	L-6	
	2) See: *utopia* (2).		
Communion	The basis of *cohesion* within a *union* or amongst *humanity*.	L-7	3
Communitarianism	A sophisticated version of the *communalist approach* emphasizing the *obligation* of each to uphold their own and others' *rights* and *social responsibilities*.	L'-5	

Community	1) A *social group* within which people actually interact regularly in order to meet their personal *needs*, and which depends on the use of shared *social values*. Such groups are primarily defined territorially.	L-5	3,4
	2) *Primal authority* for *conventions* in society.	G*-1²	21
	3) See: *secondary community.*		
	4) See: *wider society.*	G-5	
Community association	A territorial *community* which ensures *order* by organizing its *members* into a *membership association* — as distinct from depending on *political organization* i.e. *government*.		
Community identity	See: *communal identity.*		
Community leaders	*Primal authority* for *prescriptions* in society.	G*-1¹	21
Company	A *social body* which is incorporated so that it becomes a *legal individual* or artificial personality in which *shareholders* are distinct from *executives*. (Synonym: corporation.)		
Compartment	The five socially recognised *structures* required for any *autonomous endeavour* to function ethically and effectively. Each compartment demands characteristic *work* and skills to discharge distinct *duties*. These duties must be designed to interact so as to produce synergy and coherence.	G-5	38
Compartmentalization	The structuring of all *autonomous endeavours* into *compartments.*	G-5	38
Competition	1) The relation between separate *associations* or *endeavours* with the same (or very similar) *principal objects*.	L-4	3
	2) An aspect of *individualism* because of similarity of *interests* and *endeavours*.		
	3) Factor in biological evolution (cf. competitive exclusion principle) and also in social life.		
Component	1) See: *compartment.*		
	2) See: *element.*		
Concentration	The *essential supplies* to support *vital being.*	L'-II	11
Conduct	*Action* in a social context which is open to *judgement* in *ethical* terms by oneself and others.		
Conflict	1) Forceful disagreement between individuals and groups which is intrinsic to *value* debate and *political* life.		
	2) Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and establishing *autonomy* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *consensus*.	G-5	40
Conformity	1) Automatic or forced compliance with *rules* which is a basic requirement in any *social order*.	sH³	27
	2) *Survival* need of *society* met by *individuals* identifying with *popular morality*.	L'-II	15
	3) The *ethical disposition* which ensures that *conventions* are followed.	L"-2	17
Conscience	1) The inner *moral authority* formed by *socialization*, chiefly during childhood upbringing but also in subsequent *education*, which is both the source and enforcer of *ideals* and *obligations*.	L"-3	
	2) *Primal authority* for *tenets* in society.	G*-1³	21
Conscientious objector	One who rejects certain *legal responsibilities* on *ethical* grounds.	G*-3⁴	23
Conscientiousness	The *ethical disposition* which ensures that *tenets* are followed.	L"-3	17

Consensus	1) Freely given agreement on a particular *value* by each *individual* in a *social group*.		
	2) The characteristic quality of *social values*, and hence a required quality of *purposes* in the fifth *internal level* of *purpose derivatives*.	$_sH^1$	30
	3) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and establishing *autonomy* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is *conflict*.	G-5	40
Consequentialist	A variety of *communalist approach to ethical choice* which emphasizes the *obligation* to take account of the effects of our choices on others, usually within a rather limited circle.	L-5	
Conservation	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence between an established *communal net of values* and *overriding priorities*.	$L-5_L \leftrightarrow L-3_E$	41–46
Constituency	1) A sub-group of people in a *community* who share certain *values* and so can be the focus of a *campaign*.	$G-3^3$	33
	2) *Citizens* in a territorial *community* whose elected *representative* is in parliament.	$G-6^1$	
Constituting body	The *compartment* of an *enterprise* responsible for determining its rationale and creating and sustaining it e.g. *association members* for a *voluntary body*, *shareholders* in a *company*, and the *legislature* for *public agencies*.	$G-5^1$	4,38
Constitution	1) A statement of the *governance system* of a *society*: the fundamental *political* and *legal* structures of *government* and the *legal rights* of *citizens*, whether written or unwritten.	L*-VI	
	2) Document specifying *rights*, usually as an expression of *human rights principles*.	G^*-2^4	
	3) Document specifying the *mission* of an *organization*.	$G-2^4$	
	4) See: *principal object*.	L-4	
Constitutive duties	The *duties* of a *constituting body*.	$G-5^1$	38
Constraint	See: *ethical constraint*.	H^2	
Containment	The form of *satisfaction* in *emotional being*.	L*-III	11
Contemplative inquiry	An *inquiring system* using unconscious *awareness* and intensity of *focus* to create imaginative possibilities.		8
Continuity	1) The persistence of *values* in a *social being* or *social group*: an essential requirement for *identity*.		
	2) The *aspiration* in the *conventionalist approach* to *choice* which is counter-balanced by the *constraint* of *change*.	L*-2	5,7 16
Control	1) To exercise restraint or to limit free *action*; hence to exercise *power* or *authority* in order to limit the power of oneself or another.		
	2) Source of dysfunction within *transpersonal being* which may affect all other *identity systems*.	L*-VII	
	3) Essential requirement for social *stability* and *order*, even if it involves *coercion*.	G-6	
Controlling conceptions	Phrase used in the text to refer to the upper three *purpose derivatives* — *autonomy, sovereignty, membership* — which only apply to whole *social bodies*.	G-5 to G-7	28 37–39 40
Controls	See: *ethical authority*.	$_sH^3$	

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Convention	1) A *rule* introduced to ensure that all in a *social group* know and apply certain *attitudes* generally in their *conduct*.	L"-2	16,17
	2) A *rule*, determined by the *community* mainstream, which constrains people to hold and act on certain *attitudes* through the application of *social pressure* and *public opinion* i.e. emerging from general consent and implicit in repetitive action.	G"-1²	21
	3) The characteristic *rule of popular morality*.	L"-II	14,15
	4) See: *charter.*		
Conventional morality	1) See: *popular morality.*	L"-II	
	2) See: *individualist approach.*	L'-4	
Conventionalist approach	A *deontological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* on the chooser to conform to widely held views of what is valued and proper within the chooser's relevant *social group*. The *injunction* is to choose what is acceptable.	L'-2	5–9
Conviction	1) The *direction* that stabilizes a person's *ethical* stance in changing circumstances.	G-2⁶	32
	2) Experiential state generating compliance with *tenets*.	G"-1³	21
Cooperation	1) The relationship which links *communities* or *individuals* that share *social values*.	L-5	3
	2) Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and stating *directions* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *individuality*.	G-2	40
Core	1) Of *identity*, see: *stabilizing core*.	H^II	
	2) Of an *ethical approach*, see: *core obligation*.	H²	
	3) In reference to *compartments*, see: *core duty*.	G-5	
Core duty	The requirement to affirm, to recommend or to set the *purpose* which defines a *compartment*.	G-5	38
Core obligation	The *maxims* and *social values* around which each *approach* to *ethical choice* is designed.	H²	5
Corporate credo	1) See: *business philosophy*.	L-5	
	2) See: *credo*.	L"-3	
Corporate responsibility	*Social responsibility* of a *company*.		
Corporation	See: *company.*		
Corruption	Perversion or spoiling of purity or integrity: the *cardinal vice* arising from failing to resolve the *spiritual-temporal duality* when using the *transcendentalist approach* to *ethical choice*.	L'-7	5
Council	1) The *board* of a statutory or non-statutory *authority* which is *responsible* for decisions and for recommending certain *values* as *priorities*.	G-5²	38
	2) See: *an authority*.	G-5²	
	3) See: *local government*.		
Courage	Facing and enduring danger, difficulty or hardship: the *cardinal virtue* resulting from successfully resolving the *strength-vulnerabilities duality* when using the *individualist approach* to *ethical choice*.	L'-4	5
Court of justice	Place where *judges* determine *the law*.	G"-5²	25
Credo	1) A more or less organized set of *tenets* which specify *values* to be held and affirmed without question.	L"-3	17
	2) See: *ideology*.		
Creed	1) See: *credo*.	L"-3	
	2) See: *religion*.		

Criterion	1) An *internal priority* specifying a particular *value* to be applied when deciding a course of *action*. 2) *Value* used in an assessment.	L-3	
Crusade	1) The *drive* or component of a drive created to convert people to *ideas* of potential social benefit. 2) See: *cause*.	G-3[4]	33
Cultural ethic	A *position* which orients *individuals* to participating in *society* in a way that demonstrates *virtue*.	G"-3[3]	23
Cultural force	1) The *power* provided by *ethical authorities* and based on mass *obedience*. 2) See: *social force*.	sH[3]	
Cultural institutions	1) See: *guardian institutions*. 2) See: *culture*.	G-6	
Culture	1) The character of a *social group* determined by the pattern of relations of people, sub-groups, *governance* and *organizations*, and their products. Culture is embodied in the group's artefacts, *actions*, *values*, *institutions*, and knowledge. 2) The domain of *functioning* requiring continuing *work* to keep those *values* prominent which fit the social environment and maintain *individuality*. 3) See: *value system*.	 G-4[3] L-6	 34
Culture change	1) Non-specific term in the management literature used in relation to *organizations* to refer to: (a) alteration of internal *social values*, or (b) resolution of avoided *political issues*. 2) *Work* to alter the *values* used routinely within an *organization*, typically requiring an internal *movement*.	 G-4[3]	
Custom	1) See: *the custom*. 2) See: *formal etiquette*. 3) See: *prescription*. 4) See: *convention*. 5) See: *good practice*. 6) See: *communal standard*.	G"-5[1] L"-1 L"-1 L"-2 G'-3[1] G'-4[1]	
Customary right	A *right* which exists by virtue of its acceptance in a *community* over a prolonged period of time.	G'-5[1]	
Customer-centred organization	A category of *social body* within which the simplest is a *service organization*, and whose more complex versions are *universal institutions*, *sectional associations* and *reforming agencies*.		35,36
Decision	1) The application of *value* to *action*. 2) The *social process* involving *forecasting* and *resolution* by which *internal priorities* generate *strategic objectives* or influence their definition.	 L-3 → L-2	 41,42
Decision system	A structured *approach* to taking *action*. There are seven varieties formally and practically related to the *approaches to ethical choice* and to *inquiring systems*.		8
Declaration	See: *charter*		
Decree	1) The expression of a *directive*, and hence compulsory. 2) A *rule* or *decision* of an *absolutist regime* which has the force of *law*. 3) An order of a *court of justice* made after consideration of a case.	G-3[1] L"-6	33
Dedication	The *ethical disposition* which supports adherence to *tenets*.	L"-3	16,17
Defensive cause	*Cause* based on reactively protecting the *vested interests* of an established *class* or *business* sector in *society*.	G-3[4]	

Deliberately	Chosen or performed with *purpose* and *awareness*: hence required quality of *rules* in the fourth internal *level* of *ethical authorities*.	$_sH^3$	19,20
Demagogue	Popular leader who appeals to passions and prejudices and is inclined to ignore *the law*.	$G-6^1$	39
Demonstration	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *dominant beliefs* and *principal objects*.	$L-6_E \cdot \cdot L-4_B$	
Deontological approach	An *approach to ethical choice* which appeals to *authority* and to what is *right*.	H^2	5
Deontology	A philosophical approach which sees *duty* and *rules*, rather than *purpose* or the search for the *good*, as the necessary and sufficient base on which to understand *ethics*.	H^2 H^3	
Derivative	1) Conceptual entities derived from or constructed out of adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy*. 2) For *levels of purpose*, see: *purpose derivative*. 3) For *levels of ethical rule*, see: *ethical authority*.	$_sH^1$ $_sH^3$	
Desire	The emotional *motivation* which links *internal priorities* in the *framework of purpose* with *emotion* in the *framework of experience*.	$L-3$ $L-III$	2,16
Development	1) An intended improvement in *functioning*: potentially applicable to the vision, the *culture*, and the *operation* as well as its usual connotation of *growth*. 2) See: *development programme*.	$G-4$ $G-4^2$	34
Development programme	A set of *purposes* defining *growth* together with approximate costs, time frame and other relevant information.	$G-4^2$	34
Deviant	One whose *conduct* is in accord with a devalued *communal role*.	$G''-3^2$	23
Devotee	See: *adherent*.	$G-1^6$	
Dialectic	1) Tension-generating conceptual entities made famous by Hegel as thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis. It assumes that opposing *ideas*, which may seem irreconcilable, actually define or require each other and can be synthesized within a higher order unity. 2) See: *dualism*. 3) See: *duality*.		
Dialectical decision-making	A *decision system* based on resolving disputes by enabling powerful *interest groups* to negotiate an acceptable compromise: it corresponds to the *individualist approach* to *ethical choice*.		8
Dialectical inquiry	An *approach* in which knowledge emerges from defining and synthesizing opposites.		8
Dialogic inquiry	An *inquiring system* using ratiocination and conceptual discussion to get a structured and authoritative theoretical base for inquiry of any sort.		8
Dialogue	1) Form of communication essential for *participation* in a *community*. 2) The dynamic form of *self-expression* within *relational being*. 3) Social process required to devise and use *directions*.	$L-5$ $L'-V$ $G-2$	3 12 32
Direction	1) The influence of *purposes* or *values* at higher levels on those at lower levels. 2) The *dyadic purpose derivative* which constrains *activity* by ensuring that *values*, chosen from those that are accepted, focus *minds* and shape outcomes. 3) See: *instruction*.	H^1 $G-2$	28-30 32,40

Directive	The *drive* or component of a drive created to produce specific action when there is intractable *value conflict*.	G-3[1]	33
Director	See: *governor*.	G-1[3]	
Disability	A form of *right* specifying an inability to act with impunity.	L″-4	
Disciple	See: *adherent*.	G-1[6]	
Discipline	1) A branch of inquiry and learning defined by a *value system*. It must be distinguished from a *domain* and from domain-based inquiry.	L-6	
	2) The source of expert knowledge in *organizations*, especially relevant when considering proposals for *growth*.	G-4[2]	34
	3) See: *function*.	L-4	
	4) See: *self-control*.		
Dissemination	The *social process* involving *demonstration* and *propagation* by which *value systems* generate *endeavours* and influence the definition of their *principal objects*.	L-6 → L-4	41,42
Dissident	One who views existing *society* as unfair and refuses to be bound by its *laws* and legal procedures while attempting to create a better society.	G″-3[5]	23
Dissociation	Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and claiming *membership* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *participation*.	G-7	40
Distinctive competence	The expertise, skills, experience and other *capabilities* uniquely possessed by an *organization* which enable it to pursue its *principal object* effectively.	L-4	
Distributive justice	A *position* defined to orient *individuals* to supporting *the ethical order* and tolerating actual inequalities: essentially about fair shares of social *goods* and *bads*.	G″-3[5]	23
Divine authority	1) The *authority* ascribed to *God*.		
	2) As ascribed to a person, see: *divine right*.		
Divine justice	An occurrence beyond *rules* or human understanding which produces the *right* end result.		
Divine right	An *authority* or *power* believed or assumed to be derived directly from *God* and which, accordingly, can override all *temporal authorities*.		
Doctrine	1) Systematized teaching or *theoretical framework*.	L-6₁	
	2) See: *the morality*.	G″-5[3]	
	3) See: *ethical teaching*.	L″-V	
	4) See: *moral doctrine*.		
Dogma	1) See: *dominant belief*.	L-6ₑ	
	2) See: *doctrine*.	L-6₁	
	3) See: *credo*.	L″-3	
	4) See: *ideology*.	G″-2[3]	
	5) See: *religion*.		
Dogmatic affirmation	1) Essential for *individuals* and *society* because it enables such things as: a sense of *freedom*, an *experience* of *truth*, the possibility of *conformity*, and full *membership* of a *tribe*.		
	2) Hence required quality of *rules* in the third *internal level* in the *ethical authorities*.	₅H[3]	19,20
Domain	Sphere of social *activity* — often contrasted with a *discipline* which is a sphere of *theory*-based study located within academia. Academia is itself a domain.		
Domain of work	1) See: *domain*.		
	2) See: *functioning*.	G-4	

Dominant belief	*Value system* defined in the *emotional mode*: something to believe in.	L-6$_E$	41–46
Dominant reality	*Reality* as recognized by an *identity system*.	H^{ii}	11,12
Drive	A *triadic purpose derivative* which promotes *change* by ensuring that desired *values* are installed despite resistances.	G-3	28–30 33,40
Dualism	A philosophical term referring to the need to develop explanations using one or other of two *ideas* which are usually viewed as opposites. If they can be fused within a higher synthesis, then they constitute a *dialectic*.		
Duality	1) A *dialectic* which enables or forces progression through different *levels* or *systems* to overcome its limitations. The central dialectic characterizing any particular level in a *hierarchy* should be managed at that level, but may need to be resolved by moving to a higher level or avoided by moving to a lower level.		
	a) The *aspiration–constraint* duality in each *approach to ethical choice* which when transcended leads to a new constraint in a higher level approach where a new aspiration emerges.	H^2	7
	b) The *stabilizing core–growth-promoting potential* duality in each *approach to identity development* which when transcended leads to a new stabilizing core of a higher level *identity system* where a new potential for growth emerges.	H^{ii}	13
	c) The *survival–progress* duality in each level within the realizing *values* hierarchy which when transcended leads to a new survival need and a new requirement for progress.	$_S$H^1	40
	2) A *dialectic* applicable to all *levels* in a *hierarchy* but handled at the first, second, fourth and seventh levels by fusion or synthesis and at the third, fifth and sixth levels by polarization with simultaneous attraction and opposition: e.g. the emotional-logical dialectic in the primary *hierarchy of purpose*, and the individual-collective dialectic in the *hierarchies of rules, ethical authorities* and realizing *values*.	H^1	42
Duties	1) The *work* and *responsibility* required of or assigned to or expected of some socially recognised job or *post*. 2) See: *duty*.	L-4 or L''-4	
Duty	1) The essence of *absolutes* which is equivalent to the *obligation* to do what is *right* and therefore *good*. 2) *Action* or conduct which is due to another or to the *social group* i.e. a form of *right*; hence the characteristic *rule* of a *social structure*. 3) See: *obligation*. 4) See: *duties*.	L''-7 L''-4	
Dyad	A group of two adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy*. A seven level hierarchy contains six dyads.	$_S$H^1 $_S$H^3	18,28
Dynamism	Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and pushing *drives* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *stability*.	G-3	40
Edict	See: *law*.	L''-6	
Education	1) *Self-development* through the acquisition and internalization of relevant and necessary *ideas* and facts. 2) *Activity* needed in an *organization* to handle objections to a new *approach*.	G-2^5	32
Effectiveness	The essential and most elusive of the three requirements of organized *action* (effectiveness, efficiency, economy) because it is based in *purpose* i.e. achieving *objectives* and realizing *values*.		
Egoism	Concern for one's self: the *constraint* in the *communalist approach* which balances the *aspiration* of *altruism*.	L'-5	5,7

Element	Fundamental entity of any *system*. In *systems thinking*, an element is itself a system, and systems are the elements of larger systems.		
Elemental hierarchy	The *hierarchy* of basic entities from which a *structural hierarchy* may be created by combining adjacent *levels* in all possible ways.	H[1], H[1] H[3], H[III]	0
Elites	1) People of high status who dominate the working of *government*.	G-6[1]	
	2) *Intellectuals* and *advocates* who theorise, document, promote and interpret popular *movements*.	G-5[3]	38
Embodiment	1) The *social process*, involving *instigation* and *institution*, by which *social values* generate the *principal objects* (i.e. specific endeavours) of bodies or influence their definition.	L-5 → L-4	41, 42
	2) See: *autonomy*.		
Emotion	The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* of *desire* and enables pursuit of *internal priorities*.	L-III	2, 10
Emotional being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *emotion*, is driven by *attachment* and requires provision of *value*.	L'-III	10-13 16
Emotional mode	A way of setting *purposes* in which mental processes are irrational and pragmatic, the social orientation is reactive and evolutionary, and the output is fluid and partial. It is indicated by a subscript E.	H[1]	41-46
Emotional role	The experiential (or *identity*) state resulting from containing certain feelings and fantasies which complement feelings and fantasies held by another.	L'-III	11, 12
Emotion-based value	A *value* developed in the *emotional* mode.		
Empirical inquiry	An *inquiring system* based on using general agreement as to the facts to discern regularities (called 'laws' in natural science).		8
Empiricist decision-making	A *decision system* based on using detailed valid and reliable information to solve problems. It corresponds to the *conventionalist approach to ethical choice*.		8
Employer	1) A social entity capable of holding an *agent* to account.	G-1[1]	31
	2) See: *company*.		
End	1) A *purpose* which is the 'why' for another purpose which is its *means*.	H[1]	
	2) See: *purpose*.		
Endeavour	1) An enduring *activity* or specific project whose *identity* is defined by *principal objects*.	L-4	1-3
	2) See: *autonomous endeavour*.	G-5	
Ends	Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and constituting *sovereignty* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *means*.	G-6	40
Energy	1) *Survival* need of *society* met by people identifying with *communal ideals*	L"-III	15
	2) The *physical* requirement for *action* or *work*.		
	3) The mental or psychic (i.e. non-physical) requirement for *action* or *work*. See: *personal energy*.		
Enlightened self-interest	1) The pursuit of *activities* which directly or self-evidently benefit others while also benefiting oneself.		
	2) See: *enlightenment*.		

Enlightenment	1) The humanisation of everyday activity: an *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *ultimate values* and *principal objects* .	L-7$_B$↔L-4$_B$	41–46
	2) Attainment of a sustained ultimate experience of oneness of all things, non-dual cognition, clear light, utter awareness, and dissolution of the individuated personality into the universal mind, God or Absolute Reality. (Synonyms include: moksha, wu, satori, zazen, nirvana.)		
	3) A *philosophical approach* emerging in the 18th century which is associated with an elevation of the *individual, reason* and *science* above *community,* tradition and religious *edicts*. Noted thinkers in this tradition included: Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Mill.		
Enterprise	1) See: *an enterprise.* 2) See: *an organization.* 3) See: *endeavour.*	G-5^1	
Enthusiasm	The *personal energy* and *social force* released by the presence of *principal objects* within an *association*.	L-4	3
Entitlement	1) Experiential correlate of a *right*.	L'-4	21
	2) See: *right.*	L'-4	
	3) The static form of *self-expression* in *individual being.*	L'-IV	12
Equality	1) Status of people in a *union* where it is associated with uniqueness rather than uniformity.	L-7	3
	2) *Ultimate value* implicitly sought in all *social groups* where *values* are shared; hence a preoccupation of the *citizenry.*	G-6^2	39
	3) *Ultimate value* linked to the design, maintenance and use of ethical *positions.*	G'-3	27
	4) An actual state in which all *group members* have the same amount of some tangible or intangible *good.*		
Equilibrium	The *identity drive* in *sensory being.*	L'-I	11
Equivalence	Status of people in a *faction* because strength of numbers (e.g. for voting) is so important.	L-3	3
Essential core	See: *stabilizing core.*	H''	
Essential supplies	What must be provided to meet the *identity drive* if emotional and physical harm (and eventually illness and death) are to be avoided.	H''	11
Established authority	A body created and supported by one or more *primal authorities* and given *powers* and *duties*, typically in relation to preserving *social values*, maintaining minimum *societal standards*, offering definitive *judgements* of *right* and *wrong*, and ensuring *community* viability generally.	H^3	27
Established religion	See: *official religion.*	G''-5^3	
Eternal verities	A set of *absolutes* which indicate the path of *duty* which all should follow.	L''-7	17
Ethic	See: *cultural ethic.*	G''-3^3	
Ethical	1) Relating to the distinctions *right/wrong* and *good/bad* in regard to character, choices, *actions*, or *institutions.*		
	2) Being or acting in accordance with a defined valued *obligation*. The supreme obligation is to develop and protect *human identity*, especially in its *communal* aspect.		
	3) Appeal to *values* which are understood to be *right* and *good*: hence a required quality of *purposes* in the sixth *internal level* of *purpose derivatives*.	$_S$H^1	30
Ethical aspiration	The obligatory *motivation* in each *approach* to *ethical choice* which is part of a *duality* whose other part is a practical *constraint*.	H^2	5,7 16

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Term	Definition	Code	Pages
Ethical authority	An abstract *institution* constituted by one or more types of *ethical rule* which puts socially valid and acceptable limits on the exercise of *power in society*.	$_sH^3$	18–20 27
Ethical body	1) Term used in the text for a *social body* which primarily seeks to transform *society*, but does so from a *membership-centred* base.	Type #4	35,36
	2) See: *an authority*.	$G-5^2$	
Ethical challenge	A call for the justification of a choice, act or social *institution* either in terms of what is important (i.e. *values*) or in terms of *obligations* (i.e. *rules*).		
Ethical choice	To choose in accord with a defined *obligation*: universally valid obligations define distinct *approaches to choice*.	H^2	5-8
Ethical constraint	What limits realization of the *aspiration* in each *approach to ethical choice* and thereby creates a tension which must be resolved.	H^2	5,7
Ethical design	The creation of a social entity based on considering what is *right* and *good*.		
Ethical design approach	Assisting beneficial change by designing practical arrangements using assumptions within a *theoretical framework*, like *levels of purpose*, which has itself been constructed using *ethical design*.		
Ethical disposition	The inner motivational *capacity* which inclines a *person* to adhere to *ethical rules*, with each type of rule requiring its own characteristic capacity.	H^3	16,17
Ethical doctrine	1) A *system of tenets* within *the morality* of a *community*.	$G^{\cdot}-5^3$	
	2) A *theoretical framework* usually associated with a *religion*		
	3) See: *ethical teaching*.	$L^{\cdot}$-V	
	4) See: *moral doctrine*.		
Ethical frame of reference	A *pentadic ethical authority* which ensures that differing views of *right conduct* can be definitively resolved by an authoritative *judgement*.	$G^{\prime\prime}$-5	18–20 25,27
Ethical identity	*Social identity* defined in terms of *ethical standards*.	$G^{\cdot}$-4	24
Ethical imperative	A *hexadic ethical authority* which ensures that categorical *obedience* can persist authoritatively in *society* through time.	$G^{\prime\prime}$-6	18–20 26,27
Ethical inquiry	1) Investigation demanded when an *ethical choice* must be made.	H^2	6
	2) Inquiry conducted in such a way that it generates benefit for the *individuals* involved and *wider society* (cf. *ethical design*).		
Ethical order	See: *the ethical order*.	$G^{\cdot}$-7^1	
Ethical position	A *triadic ethical authority* which ensures that *members* can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and *change*.	$G^{\prime\prime}$-3	18–20 23,27
Ethical principle	A *dyadic ethical authority* which ensures that choices affecting the *community* and its viability can be authoritatively guided.	$G^{\prime\prime}$-2	18–20 22,27
Ethical rule	1) A formal statement of *duty* that seeks to govern the social *conduct* of individual *members* of a *community*. To be used widely, it must be determined by a *primal authority*.	H^2	16,17
	2) The *monadic ethical authority* which ensures that constraints defined by recognizable *authorities* can become binding *obligations* on all.	$G^{\prime\prime}$-1	18–20 21,27
	3) The characteristic feature of *natural moral institutions*.	H^{III}	14,15
	4) *Ethical authorities*, being *rule derivatives*, are often referred to loosely as rules: cf. *ethical principles*, *ethical positions*, *ethical standards* and *ethical imperatives*.	$_sH^3$	18–20 27
	5) See: *legitimist approach*.	$L^{\cdot}$-6	
Ethical standard	A *tetradic ethical authority* which ensures that *conformity* can be sustained above an authoritative and self-chosen minimum.	$G^{\prime\prime}$-4	18–20 24,27

Ethical system	1) A philosophical term applied to any *theory* built on ethical *rules* and *principles*.		
	2) See: *the morality.*	G"-5[3]	
	3) See: *ethical teaching.*	L"-V	
	4) See: *code of ethics.*	L"-5	
	5) See: *approach to ethical choice.*	H[2]	
	6) See: *the ethical order.*	G"-7[1]	
Ethical teaching	1) The *natural moral institution* which maintains *consensus* in *society* on what constitutes proper or *virtuous* communal *functioning.*	L"-V	10 14-16
	2) *Primal authority* for *maxims* in a *society.*	G"-1[5]	21
Ethics	1) The orientation of human *activity* — mental, physical and social — in accord with what is *right* and *good.*		
	2) The universally felt *obligation* to sustain and protect *human identity* in a community.		
	3) See: *ethical system.*		
	4) See: *moral philosophy.*		
Ethos	A set of *conventions*, typically evolving and poorly organized, which determine the *attitudes* and so govern the general *conduct* of *members* of a *social group.*	L"-2	17
Etiquette	1) See: *formal etiquette.*	L"-1	
	2) See: *civility.*	G"-2[2]	
Evaluation	1) Assessment of the worth or benefit of something.		
	2) An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *structured set of priorities* and *tactical objectives.*	L-3₁ • •L-1ʙ	41-46
Evangelical organization	A *social body* which is primarily *membership-centred* but also seeks to be *reform-generating.*	Type #5	35,36
Evil	**1) The ultimate *bad*, hence the negative pole of *ultimate value.***	L-7	
	2) The urge to abolish or deny or invert *value* and value distinctions altogether.		
Evolution	1) Form of continuous change without major discontinuity.		
	2) Hence, the *social process* involving *innovation* and *conservation* by which *social values* generate *internal priorities* or influence their definition.	L-5 → L-3	41,42
	3) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and working at *functioning* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is *transformation.*	G-4	40
Exclusive choice	Choice of *purpose* which omits or devalues alternatives and is therefore socially divisive; applies to even levels in the *hierarchy of purpose.*	H[1]	2
Executant	1) One who puts a *purpose* into effect.		
	2) See: *agent.*	G-1[1]	
	3) See: *executant body.*	G-5[1]	
Executant body	The *compartment* of an *enterprise* responsible for setting and pursuing *tactical objectives* which are adapted appropriately to the *situation.*	G-5[1]	4,28
Executive	1) One who manages *implementation* in an *organization* i.e. includes members of both the *top officer body* and the *executant body.*	G-5[1]	38
	2) That one of the three branches of *government* which is responsible for implementing *laws* and for initiating and pursuing *policies* for *society.*		
	3) See: *manager.*		
	4) See: *agent.*	G-1[1]	

Exhortation	1) An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *dominant belief* and a *highlighted social need*.	L·6$_E$ ← ·L·5$_E$	41–46
	2) Basis of *compliance* with *maxims*.	G'·1^5	21
	3) Required to gain agreement to an *approach*.	G·2^5	32
Existence	See: *being*.	H^{ll}	
Expectation	A way of bringing *social pressure* to bear on people and so guiding their *activity*.		
	either 1) in relation to *rules*, see: *ethical authorities*	$_s$H^3	
	or 2) in relation to *purpose*, see: *purpose derivatives*.	$_s$H^1	
Experience	1) See: *inner experience*.	H^l	
	2) An external happening which generates *inner experience*		
	3) *Self-development* which results from varied practical applications of *capability* and expertise over time.		
Experiential primacy	The *element* of *inner experience* which is central to the deliberate use of an *approach* to identity development.	H^{ll}	11
Expert	Possessor of specialized knowledge and hence an *adherent* to certain associated *conventions* and *theories*.	G·1^6	31
Extreme circumstance	Situations where the sense that choice is *ethical* is unavoidable and painful: used in the text to illustrate resolution of the *aspiration-constraint duality*.	H^2	6
Extremism	The *cardinal vice* that emerges from failing to resolve the *continuity-change duality* when using the *conventionalist approach* to ethical choice.	L'·2	5
Faction	1) A *social group* formed to ensure a particular view prevails when *internal priorities* are being set.	L·3	3,4
	2) Hence, crucial source of *pressure* when making *policy*.	G·2^2	32
Fairness	See: *justice*.		
Faith	1) **Trust in God** or in a realm of divine providence.		
	2) The *essential supplies* to support *transpersonal being*.	L'·VII	
	3) See: *dominant belief*.	L"·6$_E$	
	4) See: *conviction*.	G·2^6	
	5) See: *organized religion*.	L'·VII	
Fellowship	The basis of *cohesion* within a *community*.	L·5	3
Firm	A profit-making *enterprise*.		
Followers	Those who hold *leaders* to account.	G·1^2	31
Folly	The *cardinal vice* that emerges from failing to resolve the *solutions-realities duality* when using the *rationalist approach* to ethical choice.	L'·1	5
Forecasting	1) An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *structured set of priorities* and *strategic objectives*.	L·3$_L$ ↔ L·2$_B$	41–46
	2) See: *planning*.		
Formal etiquette	The *natural moral institution* which maintains *consensus* in *society* on what constitutes correct *behaviour* in public interactions.	L"·1	10 14–16
Formal inquiry	*Compartment* of an *authority* dealing with its *rationale*: a transient body created by *the government* or other representative group to consider the need for an *authority* as a way to deal with repeated violations of *social values* or to handle the apparent failure of an existing authority to act within current social values.	G·5^2	38
Formal justice	*Justice* which is reached through due legal procedure.	G'·5^2	25

Formal organization	*An organization* which is explicitly or legally constituted.		
Fortitude	See: *courage.*	L'-4	
Frame of reference	1) The social context within which and for which a specific *purpose* (or *derivative*) or *rule* (or derivative) is being used. 2) See: *ethical frame of reference.* 3) See: *framework.*	G⁻-5	
Framework	1) An organized *system* of concepts which constrain and channel a variety of understandings (or models) possible in any problematic *situation* or *mess.* 2) See: *theoretical framework.*	L-6ₗ	
Fraternity	An *ultimate value* essential for designing, maintaining and adhering to *ethical principles* in society.	G'-2	27
Free rider	One who benefits from *collective goods* and generally available benefits without making the proper contribution.		
Free will	1) Essential assumption about the human condition if *ethics* is to have any meaning. 2) Basis of compliance with *absolutes.* 3) Associated with adherence to *the ethical order:* hence required quality of *rules* in the seventh *internal level* of that *ethical authority.*	L''-7 sH³	21 19,20
Freedom	1) A state of *being* and *ultimate value* which is essential for communal life to be tolerable. 2) Essential for any *member* of any *social order* because it enables *values* which are not yet incorporated in *society* to be considered. 3) See: *liberty.* 4) See: *autonomy.*	L-7 G-7	40
Function	1) The useful contribution to personal or social life provided by a particular *institution*, and hence the reason for its existence and persistence. (Most of the concepts in the framework are defined in terms of their function.) 2) Source of *pressure* stemming from *principal objects* which influences definition of a *role* in *organizations* or in any *network*-based *endeavour.* 3) An area of systematized expertise, in time becoming a *discipline* and serving as a base for a career. 4) See: *principal object.*	G-2³ L-4	32
Functioning	A *tetradic purpose derivative* which sustains *achievement* by ensuring that *values* are expressed coherently and enduringly in *activities.*	G-4	28–30 34,40
Fundamental right	A *membership right* which is or ought to be held in common by all (or all *citizens*) within a *society.*	L''-4	
General management	A specific integrating and coordinating *function* which can effectively control a wide range of diverse specialised functions required for any complex *operation.*	G-4¹	
Goal	See: *purpose.*	H¹	
God	1) The attempt to name *Absolute Reality.* 2) The void: an inconceivable permeating environment which gives rise in a completely mysterious way to any *person*, thing, *idea* or imaginable entity (including more concrete conceptions of God). 3) The source and end of *spirituality*, accessible to some degree via *ultimate values.* 4) The *growth-promoting potential* and source of *hope* required to develop the *soul* in transpersonal being. 5) Postulated entity holding every *human being* to account.	L-7 L'-VII G-1⁷	3 11,13 31

Godhead	See: *God* (2)		
Good(ness)	1) Positive *value* which may be absolute, theoretical, potential, achievable or tangible and quantifiable according to *level*.	L3 – L7	3
	2) The *teleological imperative* defining the abstract focus of *ethics*.		
Good cause	*Cause* based on the *interests* of all in society, typically aiming to help worthy *individuals* or *classes* or *activities*.	G-3[4]	
Good practice	1) A *position* which orients *individuals* to acting in a way which meets the needs of others in specific contexts.	G″-3[1]	23
	2) See: *code of good practice*.	G″-3[1]	
Goods	Tangible *good*, usually referring to products rather than *services*.		
Governance	1) In an *organization*: the work performed by a *board* or *governing body* on behalf of the *constituting body*.	G-5[1]	38
	2) In a *society*: the work performed by the *government* on behalf of the *citizenry*.	G-6	
Governance structures	1) The various *posts*, *committees*, working parties and other bodies which are necessary to carry out the *work* of a *governing body*.	G-5[1]	
	2) See: *government*.	G-6[1]	
Governance system	The *natural moral institution* which maintains *consensus* in *society* about the way that *ethical rules* are formally determined and enforced as *laws*.	L″-VI	10 14–16
Governing body	1) The *compartmental* body formed as a *board* which is responsible for performing the work of *governance* in *organizations*, especially setting *internal priorities*.	G-5[1]	4, 37 38
	2) The *leadership* body in an *association*.	L-4	3
Government	1) The *ruler* or *leadership body* of the *state* as defined by the *governance system*. In modern times, government consists of three distinct branches: a *legislature*, a *judiciary* and an *executive* (or administration). See: *the government*.	G-6[1]	39
	2) The *body* responsible for selecting and using *social policy principles* within *society*.	G″-2[2]	22
	3) When applied to an *organization*, see: *governance* (1).	G-5[1]	
	4) When applied to oneself, see: *self-control*.		
Governor	1) *Member* of a *governing body* or *board*. (Synonyms include: director, trustee, commissioner, councillor.)	G-5[1]	38
	2) *Primal role* available to any *person* based on taking *responsibility* for allocating *value* in concrete terms now.	G-1	31
Grass roots	The large numbers of *voluntary participants* in a *movement* that determine its success by upholding its *values* spontaneously in any appropriate *situation*.	G-5[3]	37, 38
Gratification	The form which *satisfaction* takes in *relational being*.	L′-V	11
Group	1) The *stabilizing core of identity* in *relational being* which is developed through the expression of *individuality*.	L′-V	11, 13
	2) See: *social group*.		
	3) See: *social class*.		
	4) A set of adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy* which, when taken together, define a new conceptual entity.		
	5) See: *grouping*.		
Group ethos	See: *ethos*.	L′-2	
Group standard	See: *communal standard*.	G′-4[1]	

Grouping	1) Combination of a certain number of adjacent *levels* in a particular *hierarchy* which defines and illuminates a distinctive human and social phenomenon. 2) The *elements* of a *structural hierarchy*.		
Growth	1)The *evolution* of *identity*. 2) The domain of *functioning* of a *social body* requiring continuing *work* to re-define *endeavours* so as to meet *social needs* and to bring benefits internally.	G-4^2	34
Growth-promoting potential	Source of *hope* which can be specifically activated and used in each of the *approaches to identity development*.	H^8	11,13
Guardian	1) The embodiment of *sovereignty* which takes *responsibility for* protecting and forwarding *the social order* both concrete/practical and abstract/ethical. The two guardians are *the citizenry* and *the government*. 2) An elite group with the function to *rule society*, as proposed classically by Plato in *The Republic*.	G-6	39,40
Guardian institution	A way of grouping an undefined range of *social bodies* within a particular *domain* who seek to defend *freedoms* of *the citizenry* in the *political arena*.	G-6	
Guidance	1) A statement of *values*, usually from a higher *authority*, that is expected to influence locally defined *rules*, *purposes* or *decisions*. 2) See: *approach*.	G-2^5	
Guideline	1) See: *guidance*. 2) See: *policy*. 3) See: *convention*.	G-2^2 L$^-$-2	
Hard case	See: *extreme circumstance*.	H^2	
Harmony	1) The relationship between separate *social groups* following *reconciliation* of differences and creation of a state of *union* based on activating *ultimate values*. 2) The static form of *self-expression* in *transpersonal being*. 3) The *ultimate value* intrinsic to developing and maintaining *the ethical order*.	L-7 L$^-$-VII G$^-$-7	3 12 27
Heptad	The entity formed by grouping together all seven *levels* in a seven-level *hierarchy*.	$_s$H^1 $_s$H^3	18,28
Hexad	A group of six adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy*. A seven level hierarchy contains two hexads.	$_s$H^1 $_s$H^3	18,28
Hierarchy	1) A *system* whose *elements* are *levels*. The principal *elemental* and *structural hierarchies* in the *frameworks* in the text all contain seven levels. Each level implies and requires the existence of the other higher and lower levels. Higher levels are usually more complex in nature and wider in scope and implications. 2) Form of social organization used by *tribes* in a fluid and symbolic way to enable *order* and *continuity*. 3) Form of social organization used by *social bodies* in a formal and practical way to differentiate *duties* and *authority* in *posts*.	 L-6	 3
Hierarchy of approaches to ethical choice	The secondary *hierarchy* which is nested within the *value system* level of the primary hierarchy and which contains the seven distinct ways of choosing *ethically*.	H^2	7,9,16
Hierarchy of community	The seven encompassing natural *territorial communities*, each of which requires a distinctive form of *political organization* and *governance*.		
Hierarchy of ethical rules	The tertiary *hierarchy* which is nested within the *legitimist approach* in the secondary hierarchy and which contains the seven distinct types of *ethical rule*.	H^3	9,16 17,21

Term	Definition		
Hierarchy of experience	The primary *hierarchy* from which hierarchies of *approaches to identity development* and *natural moral institutions* are derived. It contains the seven distinct types of *inner experience*.	H^{i}	10,16
Hierarchy of purpose	The primary *hierarchy* from which hierarchies of *ethical choice approaches* and *ethical rules* are derived. It contains the seven distinct types of *purpose* — the upper five are *values* and the lower two are *objectives*.	H^{i}	2,9 16
Highlighted social need	*Social value* defined in the *emotional mode*.	L-5$_E$	41–46
Holistic	See: *systemic*.		
Holistic inquiry	An *inquiring system* based on using modelling to represent the *situation* as completely as possible.		8
Hope	1) A mixture of *desire* and *expectation* in the face of uncertainty which is essential for *survival* and which can be activated by use of the *growth promoting potentials* inherent in *human identity*.	H^{ii}	11,13
	2) An example of an *ultimate value*.	L-7	
Human being	*Primal role* of any *person* based on a *responsibility* to *humanity* or to *God* to distinguish *good* and *evil*.	G-1^{7}	31
Human energy	1) See: *personal energy*.		
	2) See: *social force*.		
Human existence	Having and operating a *human identity*.		
Human identity	An organized set of persistent interacting *identifications* which define a *person*. There are seven different *approaches to identity development* each of which must be adopted to some degree.	H^{ii}	
Human right	A *right* which is in accord with a *human right principle* or emerges from its application.	G"-2^{4}	22
Human right principle	A *principle* which shapes social constraints on *members* so as to protect their *freedom* as *individuals*. It is essential to guide *collective action* seeking to benefit the *community* or to prevent harm to it by individuals.	G"-2^{4}	22
Humanity	1) The *social group* which includes all people in all cultures at any one time (and even all times) and which can only be united through *ultimate values*.	L-7	3,4
	2) An example of an *ultimate value*.	L-7	
	3) A *virtue* expressing compassion and benevolence.	L"-5	
Hypothetical imperative	1) A term associated with Immanuel Kant which refers to a non-ethical *rule* based on instrumental or *rational achievement*, i.e. pure *means*, and which is contrasted with a *categorical imperative* based on *duty* which is truly *ethical*.		
	2) See: *prescription*.	L"-1	
Iconoclast	One who is prepared to break with customary and cherished *rights*, *tenets* and *conventions* or *institutions* based on these; hence a generator of new *communal roles*.	G"-3^{2}	23
Idea	1) The content of any *value system*.	L-6	
	2) The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* of *interest* and enables pursuit of *principal objects*.	L-IV	2,10 16
Ideal	1) A valued *idea* or *belief*.	L-6	
	2) A standard or state of perfection or unattainable excellence: the *aspiration* in the *pragmatist approach* to *choice* which is counter-balanced by the *constraint* of *potential*.	L'-3	5,7 16
	3) The *drive* or component of drive created to commit people to desired *values* despite their differences.	G-3^{5}	33

Idealization	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *theoretical framework* and a *dominant belief*.	$L\text{-}6_I \leftrightarrow L\text{-}6_E$	41–46
Identification	1) The internal process essential for developing a *human identity*.	H^{II}	
	2) The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* of *obligation* and enables adherence to a *value system*.	L-VI	2, 10 16
	3) The *experience* assigned primacy in *social being*.	L'-VI	11
Identity	1) The unvarying quality of an entity which gives it uniqueness and sameness in the eyes of an observer. Any identity is based in *coherence, continuity* and *value*.		
	2) The property of a *system* which is determined by its *structure* and/or *functioning*.		
	3) Property of a *value* which underpins the notion of *social being*.	L-6 & L'-VI	3
	4) In relation to *endeavours*, see: *principal object*.	L-4	
	5) See: *human identity*.	H^{II}	
	6) See: *ethical identity*.	G'-4	
	7) See: *organizational identity*.	G-4	
	8) See: *communal identity*.		
	9) See: *identification*.	L'-VI	
Identity boundary	*Experience* of the extent and location of *the self* or parts of the self, which may be either external and diffuse (odd *levels* in the *approaches to identity development*) or internal and distinct (even levels).	H^{II}	11
Identity development	The growth and repair of *human identity* which may be handled via distinct *approaches*.	H^{II}	10–13
Identity disorder	Psycho-social disturbance linked specifically to one of the *approaches to identity development*.	H^{II}	12
Identity drive	The inner inescapable urge in each *approach to identity development* which must be met by certain *essential supplies*.	H^{II}	11
Identity realm	See: *approach to identity development*.	H^{II}	
Identity supplies	See: *essential supplies*.	H^{II}	
Identity system	See: *approach to identity development*.	H^{II}	
Ideological association	A *social body* which primarily seeks to transform *society* according to a *vision*, and tries to do so by also being *membership-centred* and *reform-generating*.	Type #2	35, 36
Ideological belief	A *tenet* defined within an *ideological principle* or *ideology*.	$G'\text{-}2^3$	22
Ideological principle	A *principle* which shapes societal *institutions* so that personal *entitlements* may be met.	$G''\text{-}2^3$	22
Ideological right	A *right* defined to affirm or alter the status of a *class* within a *community* and part of an *ideological principle* or *ideology*.	$G''\text{-}2^3$	22
Ideologue	*Adherent* and exponent of an *ideology*, typically part of the intellectual elite of a popular *movement*.	$G\text{-}5^3$	38
Ideology	1) A *system of ideas* and *ideological principles* which imply relations of power in *society* and are used to justify social *institutions* and *structures* or modifications of these.	$G'\text{-}2^3$	22
	2) The essential rationale of a *movement*.	$G\text{-}5^3$	
	3) See: *value system*.	L-6	
Illumination	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *ultimate values* and a *theoretical framework*.	$L\text{-}7_B \leftrightarrow L\text{-}6_I$	41–46

Illusion	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *ultimate values* and a *dominant belief*.	$L\text{-}7_B \leftrightarrow L\text{-}6_E$	41–46
Image	The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* of *intention* and enables pursuit of *strategic objectives*.	L-II	2,10 16
Imagination	1) The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* of *inspiration* and enables pursuit of *ultimate values*.	L-VII	2,10 16
	2) The enabler of *freedom* and the design of a better future for a *social order*: hence the required quality of *society's membership* and of *purposes* in the top *internal level* of the *heptadic purpose derivative*.	$_SH^1$	30
Imaginist	An *approach to decision-making* which emphasizes intuition, inspiration and deep personal commitment. It corresponds to the *transcendentalist approach to ethical choice*.		8
Immunity	A *right* to act with impunity.	L'-4	
Imperative	See: *ethical imperative*.	G"-6	
Implementation	A *social process* which results from the mutual influence of *strategic objectives* and *tactical objectives*.	$L\text{-}2_B \leftrightarrow L\text{-}1_B$	41–46
Imposition	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of an *overriding priority* and *tactical objectives*.	$L\text{-}3_E \leftrightarrow L\text{-}1_B$	41–46
Inclusive choice	Choice of *purpose* which includes and values alternatives and is therefore socially integrative; applies to odd *levels* in the *hierarchy of purpose*.	H^1	2
Indifference	Lack of interest, concern or feeling: the *cardinal vice* resulting from failing to resolve the *altruism-egoism duality* when using the *communalist approach to ethical choice*.	L'-5	5
Individual	1) An indivisible *element* or *member* of a *social group*.		
	2) Any social entity that has a 'legal personality' assigned: particularly a *person, organisation, church* or *government*.		
	3) *Primal role* of any *person* based on a *responsibility* to themselves for owning what is to be achieved overall.	$G\text{-}1^4$	31
Individual autonomy	The *constraint* of the *legitimist approach to ethical choice* which balances the *aspiration* to realize the *common good*.	L'-6	5,7
Individual being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *ideas*, is driven by *self-esteem*, and requires provision of *respect* from others.	L'-IV	10–13
Individual standard	*Minimum standard* which seeks to protect the self-defined *identity* of an individual (*person* or *organization*).	$G''\text{-}4^2$	24
Individualism	1) A philosophical *doctrine* whose *ideas* broadly underpin the *individualist approach to ethical choice*.	L'-4	
	2) An example of a *cultural ethic*.	$G^*\text{-}3^3$	
Individualist approach	A *deontological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* of the chooser to ensure his security and *interests* in the light of existing *power relations*. The *injunction* is to choose what is self-advantageous.	L'-4	5–9
Individuality	1) The *growth-promoting potential* and source of *hope* in *relational being* which enables development of the *group*.	L'-V	11,13
	2) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and stating *directions* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is *cooperation*.	G-2	40
Individuation	1) Personal or organizational growth in relation to *identity development* within *individual being*.	L'-IV	
	2) See: *culture-change*.	$G\text{-}4^3$	

Indoctrination	1) See: *education*. 2) See: *instruction*.		
Inequality	Inevitable status arrangement in *the social order* of actual *communities*: probably essential to meet both *individual* and collective *needs* despite the *ultimate value* of *equality*.	L-5	3
Initiative	The *drive* or component of a drive created to generate *activities* which forward given but neglected *values*.	G-3^2	33
Injunction	The authoritative direction given within the *approaches to ethical choice* which captures what is *good* and/or *right*.	H^2	5
Injustice	1) Unfairness. For varieties of injustice, cf. *justice*. 2) The *cardinal vice* arising from failing to resolve the *common good* — *individual autonomy* duality when using the *legitimist approach to ethical choice*.	L'-6	5
Inner authority	1) See: *obligation (2)*. 2) See: *conscience*.	L-6 G''-1^3	
Inner experience	A continuous largely unconscious internal mental (psychic) process of *human beings* which, when conscious, may be referred to as feeling or sense. It can be usefully differentiated into a *hierarchy* of seven *levels*.	H^I	2,10
Inner obligation	Form of motivation, see: *obligation*.	L-6	2,16
Innovation	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *highlighted social need* and a *structured set of priorities*.	L-5$_E$ ↔ L-3$_L$	41–46
Innovator	One who introduces new *good practice rules*.	G''-3^1	23
Inquiring system	A structured *approach* to gaining knowledge which embodies a guarantee of *truth*. The inquiring systems parallel the *approaches to ethical choice* and *decision systems*.		8
Insiders	People working in those *compartments* which define the *endeavour* proper.	G-5	38
Inspiration	The *transpersonal motivation* which links *ultimate values* in the *framework of purpose* with *imagination* in the *framework of experience*.	L-7 L-VII	2,16
Instigation	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *highlighted social need* and *principal objects*.	L-5$_E$ ↔ L-4$_B$	41–46
Instinct	See: *instinctual activity*.	L'-II	
Instinctual function	Innately-driven bodily activities: the *stabilizing core* of *identity* in vital being which is developed through *symbolic function*.	L'-II	11,13
Instituting bodies	Permanent bodies which provide the *political* interface for an *authority* by determining its *principal objects* including *terms of reference*, *duties*, *powers*, *structure*, resourcing and staffing.	G-5^2	38
Institution	1) A set of interactions within *society* which endure beyond changes in individual *participation* e.g. language, ritual greetings, patterns of family living, *rules* in use, established arrangements, *organisations*. 2) Installation of *values*: an *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *communal net of values* and *principal objects*. 3) See: *natural moral institution*.	L-5$_L$ ↔ L-4$_B$ H^{III}	41–46
Institutional morality	See: *societal standard*.	G''-4^3	
Institutional standard	See: *societal standard*.	G''-4^3	
Institutionalization	Installing an *institution* in a *social group*.		

Instruction	1) Specification of a *purpose* in a form requiring compliance		
	2) An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *theoretical framework* and the *communal net of values*.	$l \cdot 6_l \cdots l \cdot 5_l$	41–46
	3) The expression of a *directive*.	$G \cdot 3^1$	33
	4) See: *prescription*.	$l \cdot 1$	
Integrity	1) Wholeness, purity, authenticity, incorruptibility: the *cardinal virtue* resulting from successfully resolving the *spiritual-temporal duality* when using the *transcendentalist approach to choice*.	$l \cdot 7$	5
	2) Acting in conformance with *conviction*.	$G \cdot 2^6$	32
Intellectual	1) A *member* of *society* who participates through developing and expounding *ideas*.		
	2) The *role* in a *movement* with the duty to elucidate and systematize its *ideas* and so develop a new or existing *ideology* which provides the movement with *structure* and *identity*.	$G \cdot 5^3$	38
Intention	1) The vital *motivation* which links *strategic objectives* in the *framework of purpose* with *image* in the *framework of experience*.	$l \cdot 2$	2, 16
	2) See: *purpose*.		
Intentional process	Universally required purpose-based *social process* represented by a *channel* connecting *centres* of *purpose-formation*.	H^1	41–46
Intentionality	1) The experiential capacity for having and acting on *values* and *purposes* which characterizes social life and generates *the social order*.	$G \cdot 7$	28
	2) Form of *satisfaction* in *social being*.	$l \cdot VI$	11
Interdiction	The authoritative prohibition given within the *approaches to ethical choice* which captures what is *bad* and/or *wrong*.	H^2	5
Interest	1) The *individual-based motivation* which links *principal object* in the *framework of purpose* with *idea* in the *framework of experience*.	$l \cdot 4$ $l \cdot IV$	2, 16
	2) See: *self-interest*.		
Interest group	See: *vested interests*.		
Internal level	A *level* within a *group* (or *grouping*) in a *structural hierarchy* which has its own distinct quality depending on its position.	sH^1 sH^3	20, 30
Internal movement	A *movement* occurring wholly within an *organization*.	$G \cdot 5^3$	
Internal priority	1) A *purpose* specifying a degree of emphasis among valid *values* or *actions* for immediate use. (Synonyms in common use include: focus, criterion, political aim, reason, policy, important objectives.)	$l \cdot 3$	1–4
	2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for allocating value in concrete terms now.	$G \cdot 1^3$	31
	3) Hence: precise quantitative amount of emphasis, *value* or *resource* to be assigned to a certain *activity*.	$l \cdot 3$	
Internalized position	See: *ethical position*.	$G^* \cdot 3$	
Intuition	The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* of *need* and enables appreciation of a *social value*.	$l \cdot V$	2, 10 16
Intuitionist	1) See: *imaginist*.		
	2) See: *pragmatist*.		
Issue	A matter requiring *decision* because it excites controversy.		
Judgement	1) The exercise of wisdom and understanding as a basis for *action*; an evaluation or opinion of a *situation* using the *mind*.		
	2) Assessing *conduct* to determine what is *right* or *wrong*, *just* or *unjust*, using either a *minimum standard* or an *ethical frame of reference*.	$G^* \cdot 4$ $G^* \cdot 5$	24 25

Judiciary	The whole body of professional judges in any *legal system*: one of the three branches of *government* with the *responsibility* to decide what *the law* is in *courts of justice*.		
Justice	1) Fairness; being in accord with what is rightly due: a notion used in a wide variety of ways as indicated below.		
	2) The *ultimate value* underpinning adherence to the *ethical frames of reference*.	G⁻-5	27
	3) Fairness in a *person*: the *cardinal virtue* arising from the resolution of the *common good — individual autonomy* duality when using the *legitimist* approach to ethical choice.	L⁻-6	5
	4) Fair play in decisions, see: *natural justice principle*.	G⁻-2⁶	22
	5) Fair shares of social goods, see: *distributive justice*.	G⁻-3⁵	23
	6) Fair judging procedures, see: *formal justice*.	G⁻-5²	25
	7) Fair judgements, see: *substantive justice*.	G⁻-5¹	25
	8) An outcome in which *good* triumphs over *evil*, see: *divine justice*		
Law	1) A *rule* introduced to ensure that all in a *social group* know and obey those rules which are essential to maintain a stable *social order*. (Synonyms in use include: regulation, edict, statute, canon, ordinance.)	L″-6	16,17
	2) A *rule*, determined by *the law*, which constrains the enforcement of rules and which assumes the need for the social control of social control via legalized *coercion*.	G″-1⁶	21
	3) The characteristic rule of a *governance system*.	L⁻-VI	14,15
	4) See: *the law*.	G⁻-5²	
	5) Academic *discipline*, body of knowledge and profession dealing primarily with laws and the working of *courts of justice*.		
	6) In science: regularities in nature revealed by *empirical inquiry*.		
Leader	*Primal role* of any *person* based on a *responsibility to followers* for deciding what is to be achieved now.	G-1²	31
Leadership	1) *Work* required in all organized and natural groups. This work is handled distinctively in the *natural social groups* emerging from the *levels of value*.	L-3 to L-7	3
	2) Abstract and usually collective term for the *leader role* and the *person* or small *group* occupying it.		
Legal framework	1) See: *legal system*.	L⁻-6	
	2) See: *the law*.	G⁻-5²	
Legal imperative	See: *pragmatic imperative*.	G⁻-6¹	
Legal individual	See: *individual (2)*.		
Legal obligation	See: *legal responsibility*.	G⁻-3⁴	
Legal positivism	1) An *approach* to thinking about *law* based on observation, i.e. statutes and court judgements, rather than depending on speculation or reasoning, i.e. the laws which ought to be set. Pursuit of this approach divorces *the law* utterly from *the morality*.		
	2) The theoretical and/or *ideological* basis for *pragmatic imperatives*.	G⁻-6¹	39
	3) See: *positive law*.		
Legal principle	A *principle* which shapes legal decisions so as to protect social *institutions* on which the *community* depends, essentially applied to disputes brought before *courts of justice*.	G″-2⁵	22
Legal responsibility	A *position* which orients *individuals* to fulfilling their legal *obligations* to others and to the *community*.	G″-3⁴	23
Legal right	A *right* which is embodied in *the law*.	G⁻-5²	

Legal standard	1) See: *law*.	L"-6	
	2) See: *legal principle*.	G"-2⁵	
Legal system	1) The *laws* and legal institutions in a *society*, including the means for deciding what *rules* are to be enforced and how.	L"-6	17
	2) See: *governance system*.	L"-VI	
Legislation	*Laws* and law-making by *the government*.		
Legislature	That one of the three branches of *government* which is *responsible for* passing *laws*.		
Legitimate	1) Socially valid in the view of an *authority* which is generally accepted.		
	2) In accord with an accepted *rule* or *principle*.		
	3) Required quality of *rules* in the sixth *internal level* of *ethical authorities*.		19,20
Legitimate power	1) An accepted *right* essential if an *individual* is to act within a *social group*.	L"-4	
	2) *Power* exercised by *the government*, *citizens* or their *social bodies* which builds on or emerges from the general *consensus* and is buttressed at least by *legal validity* and preferably also by *moral* justifiability and likely *effectiveness*.	G-6	
Legitimist approach	A *deontological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* to set a *rule* accepted by the chooser and all others in the *social group*.	L'-6	5–9
Level	A tier in a *hierarchy*. In the hierarchies in the text, levels correspond to qualitatively distinct types of the same thing.		
Levels of rule	See: *hierarchy of ethical rules*.	H³	
Levels of experience	See: *hierarchy of experience*.	H¹	
Levels of purpose	See: *hierarchy of purpose*.	H¹	
Levels of value	The upper five *levels* of the *hierarchy of purpose*.	L-7 to L-3	3
Liability	A form of *right* specifying a requirement to accept the exercise of *power* by another.	L"-4	
Liberty	1) The *ultimate value* essential for designing, maintaining and adhering to *ethical standards* in society.	G"-4	27
	2) As a form of *right*, see: *privilege*.	L"-4	
	3) See: *freedom*		
Limitations	1) The bounds to what can realistically be expected of any conceptual tool: used in the text to move on to the next type at a higher or lower *level* in a *hierarchy*.		
	2) See: *vulnerabilities*.	L'-4	
Local government	*Government* of a town or rural district which is primarily focussed on enabling or ensuring needed *services*.		
Logic-based value	A *value* developed in the *logical mode*.		
Logical mode	A way of setting *purposes* in which mental processes are *rational* and theoretical, the social orientation is pro-active and regulatory, and the output is structured and static. It is indicated by a subscript L.	H¹	41–46
Loyalty	The *personal energy* and *social force* released by the *value system* of a tribe.	L-6	3
Maintenance	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of *principal objects* and *strategic objectives*.	L-4₈ ⤍ L-2₈	41–46

Management	1) The handling and *control* of things, *activities* and *persons* to get necessary performance in an *endeavour* or *an organization*.		
	2) The dynamic mode of *self-expression* in *social being*.	L'-VI	12
	3) See: *general management*.	G-4¹	
Management control	Specialized work required for the *functioning* of an *operation*.	G-4¹	34
Manager	Key *role* in the *hierarchy of accountability* within *organizations*. The manager is expected to be both a *leader* of subordinates and to be an *agent* and *follower* of higher managers.	G-5¹	
Mandate	See: *principal object*.	L-4	
Manifesto	1) Program which a *political party* claims it will implement following election to office.		
	2) See: *reform agenda*.	G-3⁴	
Manners	See: *civility*.		
Market	1) A supply-and-demand buying-and-selling arena in which *competition* between *individuals* occurs leading to an allocation of *goods* capable of being individually owned (cf. *commons*); hence an issue of *distributive justice*.	G'-3⁵	
	2) A *social group* defined by the *needs* of actual and potential clients or customers.	L-5	
Maxim	1) A *rule* introduced to ensure that all in a *social group* know and meet the general requirements for *virtuous functioning*. (Synonyms include: precept, adage, motto, proverb, saying, truism.)	L"-5	16,17
	2) A *rule*, determined by an *ethical teaching*, which constrains people in their *functioning* and depends on social pressure for personal *control* via *moral exhortation*.	G"-1⁵	21
	3) The characteristic *rule* of an *ethical teaching*.	L"-V	14,15
	4) See: *virtue*.		
Meaning	1) In general: the significance or sense of something, often referring to an underlying intent.		
	2) Symbolized *experience* i.e. formed through the interaction of experiencing and anything that can function as a *symbol*. Meaning operates in both the *emotional mode* (felt meaning) and the *logical mode* (logical meaning).		
	3) *Survival* need of *society* met by people identifying with *organized religion*.	L"-VII	15
Meaninglessness	Signal of dysfunction in *transpersonal being*.	L'-VII	12
Means	1) A *purpose* which is the 'how' of another purpose which is its *end*.		
	2) Hence, may refer to any or all of the lower six *levels* of *purpose*. The *government* is therefore the means for *the citizenry* to exert *sovereignty*.	G-6¹	
	3) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and constituting *sovereignty* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is ends.	G-6	40
	4) See: *tactical objective*.	L-1	
Meditation	1) Method to contact *ultimate values* and *spiritual forces*.	L-7	3
	2) Inner experiential process by which a *person* may develop *convictions* and hence hold *ideals* and determine a *vision*.	G'-2⁶	32
Member	An *individual* bound to participate with others in a particular *social group*.		
Membership	1) The collectivity of *members* in a *social group*.		
	2) The *collective* in an *association* in distinction to employed staff; especially used to refer to the *constituting body* of voluntary *organizations*.	G-5¹	38
	3) The *heptadic purpose derivative* which requires the exercise of *freedom* by each *person* to enable the use and evaluation of *values*.	G-7	28-30 40

Membership association	The type of *social body* which helps differentiate *society* because it is set up to promote the distinctive *roles, activities* and *interests* of its *members*.	Type #8	35,36
Membership right	A *right* which is possessed as a matter of fact by a *member* of a particular *society* and which is, therefore, part of the *social structure*.	L"-IV	14,15
Membership-centred body	A category of *social body* within which the simplest is a *membership association*, and whose more complex versions are *universal institutions*, *ideological* and *sectional associations*, *ethical* and *evangelical bodies*.		
Mental state	1) A person's felt condition based on *inner experiences*, especially *ideas* and *emotions*. 2) The *growth-promoting potential* and source of *hope* in *emotional being* which enables development of an *identity* based on *bodily states*.	L'-III	11,13
Mentality	1) Mind-set: a quasi-automatic way of thinking, valuing and acting. It is an effect of *socialization* based on *education, exhortation* and *activities* requiring *conformity*. 2) The inner correlate of an *approach*. 3) The inner correlate of a *cultural ethic*.	G-2⁵ G'-3³	32 23
Mess	1) A *system* of interacting problems. 2) Social *reality* as perceived without a theoretical filter.		
Meta-ethical design	*Ethical design* of a *framework* which can be used to develop *models*, particularly in the sphere of personal *conduct* and social organization.		
Meta-ethics	Theoretical branch of *moral philosophy* which focuses on the *meaning* of terms and nature of assumptions used in discourse about *ethical* matters.		
Meta-model	See: *framework*.		
Meticulousness	Scrupulousness, careful precision: the *ethical disposition* which supports adherence to *prescriptions*.	L"-1	16,17
Militant	1) An aggressive *activist*. 2) See: *organizer*.		
Mind	1) Used in a many ways, but generally refers to a non-material entity which contains consciousness (thoughts, feelings, meanings wishes &c) and which is not reducible to the brain or physiological processes. 2) See: *mental state*.	L'-III	
Mind-set	See: *mentality*.		
Minimum standard	A baseline below which a *social identity* is violated, see: *ethical standard*.	G'-4	24
Mission	The *direction* which unifies *participants'* wholehearted efforts in an *endeavour*.	G-2⁴	32
Mob rule	An inflamed populace which violates *the law* and ignores *the government*.	G-6	39
Mobilization regime	*Government* in a single party *state* unified by a religious or *ideological doctrine*, legitimated by mass action and supported by repression of dissent.		
Mode	1) A state of being or manner of use of a thing that does not belong to its essence and so may be changed without destroying it. Some types of *purpose, rules* and *authorities* exist in distinct modes. 2) Hence, a way of selecting, setting and using a *purpose* involving the mental process, social orientation and form of specification.	H¹	42–45
Model	1) An understanding, often of a *mess*. 2) A map or *systemic* account of an entity, event or *situation*.		

Moderation	Avoidance of extremes: the *cardinal virtue* resulting from successfully resolving the *change-continuity* duality in the *conventionalist approach* to *ethical choice*.	L'-2	15
Monad	A *group* equivalent to a single *level* in a *hierarchy*. A seven level hierarchy contains seven monads. Monads generate distinctions essential for defining *responsibility* and *authority*.	$_sH^1$ $_sH^3$	18,28
Monarch	1) One who is the sole *ruler* in *the state*: sometimes contrasted with a *tyrant*		
	2) In earlier times, a divine representative and epitome of *the morality*.	G''-5³	25
	3) Symbolic head of a *society* capable of unifying its *members* despite differences based on genes, personalities, practicalities, politics or legalities.	G-6²	39
Monarchy	Form of *government* in which a single *person*, usually titled King or Queen, is supreme.		
Motivation	An inner self-conscious tendency to *action*. It can be hierarchically analysed to correspond to and provide a link between the hierarchies of *experience* and *purpose*. *Secondary* and *tertiary hierarchies* correspond to *ethical aspirations* and *ethical dispositions* respectively.	H¹ H² H³	2,16
Moral	1) See: *ethical*.		
	2) See: *morality*.		
	3) See: *morals*.		
Moral code	1) See: *popular morality*.	L''-II	
	2) See: *the morality*.	G''-5³	
Moral community	1) A *community*, not necessarily or usually territorial, which is defined by adherence to a *code of ethics*, an *ethical teaching*, or *the morality*.	L''-5, G''-1⁵ G''-5³	15,17 21,25
	2) The willing recipient of *moral imperatives*.	G''-6²	26
Moral doctrine	A set or *system* of *ethical rules* needed to teach and underpin *the morality* of a society and invariably found in a *religion*.	G''-5³	25
Moral imperative	An *ethical imperative* which regulates demands for *obedience* generated by a *member* of a group, and so maintains a *moral community*.	G''-6²	26
Moral institution	1) Any *institution* devised for an *ethical purpose*.		
	2) See: *natural moral institution*.	H^{III}	
Moral law	1) *Law* implied by *the morality* or followed by a *moral community*, and therefore a matter for each *person*.	G''-5³	
	2) See: *natural law*.		
Moral order	1) See: *the morality*.	G''-5³	
	2) See: *cultural ethic*.	G''-3³	
	3) See: *the ethical order*.	G''-7¹	
Moral philosophy	A sub-discipline within the academic *discipline* of *philosophy* which deals with *ethics*.		
Moral right	A *right* judged to be fair according to *the morality* or a *moral doctrine* within a particular *society*, and which may or may not be accepted according to *the law* or *the custom*.	G''-5³	
Moral value	1) An *ethical rule*, often a *maxim*, which may or may not be valued within a particular *society*.	H³	
	2) *Rules* within *the morality*.	G''-5³	25
	3) See: *popular morality*.	L''-II	

Morality	1) See: *ethics*.		
	2) See: **popular morality**.	L'-II	
	3) See: *minimum standard*.	G".4	
	4) See: *the morality*.	G".5³	
Morals	1) *Ethical* habits and manners, usually focused on *popular morality*.	L'-II	15
	2) See: *ethics*.		
Movement	1) The dynamic form of *self-expression* in *vital being*.	L'-II	12
	2) See: *a movement*.	G-5³	
Movement organization	A loosely structured *network* of *cells* with a coordinating headquarters enabling the *organizers* and *grass roots* to keep in touch with each other and so help spread the *values* of the *movement*.	G-5³	37
Mundane	See: *temporal*.		
Mutuality	1) The basis of entry and *participation* within a *community*.	L-5	3
	2) The static form of *self-expression* within *relational being*.	L'-V	12
Myth	*Theory*, usually within a *religion* and often in narrative form, incorporating *symbolic* truths which maintain personal *identity* and ensure *survival* of a *community*.		
Nation	1) A large *tribe* occupying a territory whose *members* share a common language, history, tradition, *religion* and *culture* — and hence common *communal ideals*.		
	2) See: *nation-state*.		
	3) See: *society*.		
Nation-state	A *state* which is simultaneously a *nation* i.e. a fusion of cultural and political structures which maximizes *loyalty* and *identity*.		
Natural justice	1) Fair play in decisions.	G".2⁶	22
	2) *Justice* whose origin and value is claimed to arise from the nature of *humanity* and *society*.		
Natural justice principle	A *principle* which shapes the expression of fair play in *society* and which is needed to guide the design and use of other sorts of principles.	G".2⁶	22
Natural law	A controversial but enduring notion that *natural justice principles* or *moral laws* exist which are valid independently of any *positive law* and which silently legitimate the binding force of positive law.		
Natural moral institution	A societal *institution* enabling *social being*, and associated with a characteristic *ethical rule*. A distinct form develops to support each of the seven *approaches* to *identity development*.	H"'	10 14-16
Natural right	1) A *right* held to exist as part of human nature.		
	2) Used in philosophy as a synonym of *moral right* or *human right principle*.		
Natural social group	A *social group* whose existence and nature is built around a *level of value*.	L-3 to L-7	3,4
Need	1) The relational *motivation* which links *social values* in the *framework of purpose* with *intuition* in the *framework of experience*.	L-5 L-V	2.16
	2) See: *identity drive*.	H'	
	3) See: *essential supplies*.	H'	
	4) See: *social value*.	L-5	
	5) See: *highlighted social need*.	L-5ᴱ	
Negativity	The relation between separate *tribes* or between *adherents* of distinct *ideologies* within a *domain*.	L-6	3

Nested hierarchy	A *hierarchy* which exists wholly within a *level* of another hierarchy. When nesting occurs in hierarchies in the text, it is typically within the sixth level. (Note that the lower six levels of a *structural hierarchy* also contain nested hierarchies.)		
Network	*Elements* loosely linked together without the need for a clear boundary. If tightly linked and bounded, then the network is equivalent to a *system*.		
Non-conformist	One who refuses to follow the *rules* of *good practice*.	G˙-3[1]	23
Norm	1) Refers loosely to *values*, *attitudes* and *rules* associated with *membership* of a *social group*.		
	2) See: *convention*.	L˙-2	
Obedience	1) The *ethical disposition* which supports adherence to *laws*.	L˙-6	16,17
	2) The essence and rationale for *ethical imperatives* and the basis of *continuity* for an *ethical order*.	G˙-6	26
Objective	1) A *purpose* at one of the lower two *levels* in the *hierarchy*, i.e. either *strategic* or *tactical*.	L-2 & L-1	
	2) Loosely used as synonymous with any form of *purpose*.	H[1]	
Obligation	1) In social terms: what one is bound to do, or what ought to be done.		
	2) In personal terms (i.e. *inner obligation*): the social *motivation* which links *value systems* in the *framework of purpose* with *identification* in the *framework of experience*.	L-6 L-VI	2,16
	3) See: *duty*.		
Official religion	1) *Religion* endorsed by *the state* and therefore seen as the source of *the morality* in that *society*.	G˙-5[3]	25
	2) See: *organized religion*.	L˙-VII	
Operation(s)	1) The domain of *functioning* of a *social body* requiring continuing *work* to maintain performance which efficiently produces valued outputs.	G-4[1]	34
	2) The subsidiary *business* or that part of a *firm* which actually produces the goods or services in contrast to the headquarters which raises finance, provides *guidance* and *plans* the future.		
Operational programme	A statement of what is intended by and expected of an *operation* in a coming period, usually a year, with given *resources*.	G-4[1]	34
Operational objective	1) A *purpose* defined within the *operation*.	G-4[1]	
	2) See: *tactical objective*.	L-1	
Operative	See: *agent*.	G-1[1]	
Opportunist decision-making	A *decision system*, often described as *pragmatic*, which emphasizes seizing opportunities and taking small incremental steps. It corresponds to the *pragmatist* approach to *ethical choice*.		8
Opposition	1) The relationship which links *factions* within an *association* or *endeavour*.	L-3	3
	2) The natural reaction to *change* or the assertion of new or alien *values* which can only be handled and overcome by gaining *political* support.	G-3	
Option	1) An alternative for choice.		
	2) See: *strategic objective*.	L-2	

Order	1) Reduction or removal of dispute or confusion through ranking: a characteristic property of *values*.		
	2) The absence of chaos and arbitrary interference in *society* due to *individuals* adhering to certain *rules* and *ethical authorities* and obeying *established authorities*.	G"-7	27
	3) See: *the ethical order.*	G"-7[1]	
	4) *Survival* need of *society* met by its members' *identification* with the *social structure* and by the provision of a *legal system* supporting that structure.	L"-IV	15
	5) A *system* of *rules*.		
	6) A *system* of *values* and *objectives*, see: *the social order.*	G-7[1]	
	7) See: *ethical frames of reference.*	G"-5	
	8) An *instruction* in an *organization*; or a *decision* in a *court of justice*.		
	9) A form of *social body.*		
Organization	1) The stable form of *self-expression* in *social being.*	L'-VI	12
	2) As in political organization, see: *the government.*	G-6[1]	
	3) As in social organization, see *institution.*		
	4) See: *an organization.*		
	5) See: *an enterprise.*	G-5[1]	
	6) See: *social body.*		
Organizational identity	The nature of an *organization* as expressed by its *functioning.*	G-4	34
Organizational morality	See: *organizational standard.*	G"-4[2]	
Organizational movement	See: *Internal movement*	G-5[3]	
Organizational role	1) In relation to a *post* or project within an *organization* or to an organization's part in a wider *network*, see: *role* (3).	G-2[3]	32
	2) See: *post.*	L-4	
Organizational standard	An *individual standard* held by an *organization.*	G"-4[2]	24
Organized religion	The *natural moral institution* which maintains a *consensus* in *society* on solutions to the great mysteries of *human existence.*	L"-VII	10 14–16
Organizer	The *role* in a *movement* with the *duty* to ensure its impact by arranging relevant *activities.*	G-5[3]	38
Orientation	1) Getting bearings on any thing, *situation* or *idea*: a characteristic property of *values.*		
	2) The *social process* involving *accommodation* and *clarification* by which *principal objects* generate *internal priorities* and influence their definition.	L-4 → L-3	41,42
Orthodoxy	1) Doctrine or *theoretical framework*, and hence its dedicated *adherents.*	L-6₁	3
	2) Source of *pressure* in designing an *approach.*	G-2[5]	32
Outcast	One who is rejected by *society* following transgression of an accepted *cultural ethic* or endorsement of a new ethic.	G"-3[3]	23
Outcome	See: *strategic objective.*	L-2	
Outlaw	One who rejects certain *legal responsibilities* and acts accordingly without *ethical* justification.	G"-3[4]	23
Outsider	1) One who does not accept the *rules* of the prevailing *ethic* but still participates.	G"-3[3]	23
	2) One who may have an interest in the workings of an *autonomous endeavour*, but is not directly involved on a daily basis. Hence, the notion of an outsider *compartment.*	G-5	38

Over-riding priority	*Internal priority* created in the *emotional mode*.	L-3$_E$	41–46
Owner	See: *proprietor*.		
Participant	*Primal role* of any *person* based on a *responsibility* to the *community* to recognize what each and all in the community need.	G-1^5	31
Participation	1) The *identity drive* in *social being*.	L'-VI	11
	2) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and claiming *membership* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is *dissociation*.	G-7	40
Partisanship	The basis of *cohesion* within a *faction*.	L-3	3
Partnership	1) The basis of *cohesion* within an *association*.	L-4	3
	2) An *association* of two or more persons to run a *business* in which they share expenses and profits/losses: hence a form of *enterprise* distinguished from a *company* or corporation.	G-5^1	
Passion	The *personal energy* and *social force* released by an *internal priority* and used by a *faction*.	L-3	3
Peace	The *ultimate value* linked to adherence to *ethical rules* and *respect* for *primal authorities*.	G'-1	27
Peaceful coexistence	1) Minimum requirement for social life within and between *states*		
	2) See: *coexistence*.		
Pentad	A group of five adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy*. A seven level hierarchy contains three pentads.	$_S$H^1 $_S$H^3	18,28
Person	1) A living entity with the capacity for self-definition. Used in the text with a focus on *social being*.		
	2) See: *individual*.		
	3) See: *human being*.	G-1^7	
Personal energy	A mental state released by *values* that enables any *person* and the *social groups* to which they belong to achieve things.		3
Personal identity	1) See: *human identity*.	H^{II}	
	2) See: *individual being*	L'-IV	
Personal morality	See: *personal standard*.	G'-4^2	
Personal pressure	1) A force felt within oneself which influences on *conduct*.		
	2) A force to be distinguished from personal control and *social pressure* which is the basis for compliance with *rights*.	L''-4	21
Personal responsibility	1) *Essential supplies* to maintain *social being*.	L'-VI	11
	2) Provision of *responsibility* in relation to each of the *levels of purpose*, and associated with a characteristic *primal role*.	G-1	31
Personal standard	An *individual standard* held by a *person*.	G'-4^2	24
Philosophical analysis	See: *dialogic inquiry*.		
Philosophy	1) Academic study of the nature of *reality* through the use of reasoning other than experiment.		
	2) See: *value system*.	L-6	
	3) See: *ethical teaching*.	L''-5	
	4) See: *the morality*.	G'-5^3	
	5) See: *business philosophy*.	L-5	
	6) See: *moral philosophy*.		

Physical environment	The material world of energy and information which gives rise to *sensation* and in which each *person* is inextricably embedded.	L'-I	11
Plan	1) The *direction* which organizes essential *tasks* and *resource* use in a time schedule. 2) See: *programme*. 3) See: *planning*.	G-2¹	32
Planning	1) Type of specialized *work* required to assist in *decisions* about *growth*. 2) A specialist *discipline* required to assist line-managers or general managers in large *organizations* by systematizing *operations*, proposing *developments* and enabling *implementation*. 3) Developing a *plan*.	G-4² G-4¹ G-2¹	34 34 32
Polarization	1) Creation of opposites: one of the characteristic properties of *values*. 2) Movement of a *person* or *social group* to an extreme or opposing position or view with respect to others.		
Policy	1) The *direction* developed to coordinate *leaders'* independent *decisions* in a problematic *situation*. 2) A term used loosely for almost any sort of *purpose* or *derivative*. 3) See: *social policy*. 4) See: *principle*.	G-2² G"-2² G"-2	32
Policy issue	An *issue* which calls for the formulation of a *policy* to resolve it.	G-2²	
Political	1) Any process in which there are equally valid alternative *values* and a need to win support in favour of one of these. Hence the required quality of *purposes* in the third *internal level* of *purpose derivatives* 2) Associated with governing a *state* or *territorial community*. 3) Used, often derogatively, to describe *decisions* or *situations* in which *partisanship* leads to *principles* being denied or ignored.	sH¹ G-6	30
Political aim	See: *internal priority*.	L-3	
Political arena	The conceptual social space which *the government* and *the citizenry* need so that *issues* affecting *society* such as *communal needs*, *public interest decisions*, *social responsibility* and *individual freedom* may be debated.	G-6	
Political class	See: *ruling class*.		
Political organization	See: *government*.	G-6¹	
Political party	*Ideological associations* which compete for *power* in *society* by formulating social *goals*, selecting and using *ideological principles*, articulating *interests*, recruiting *individuals* for political activity, and mobilizing people in support of their *values*.		
Popular morality	The *natural moral institution* which maintains a *consensus* in *society* on the right *attitudes* in regard to the use of a person's *body*.	L"-II	10 14–16
Popular movement	See: *a movement*.	G-5³	
Popular sovereignty	An arrangement where *the citizenry* is *responsible* for the *rules* used in *society* and for installing *the government*; usually opposed to an arrangement where the government is viewed as ruling *the people*.	G-6	
Position	1) Status in a *tribe*. 2) See: *post*. 3) See: *ethical position*.	L-6 G"-3	3

Positive law	1) *Law* which is laid down as a command by *the regime* in office and which is utterly distinct from *ethics* or *laws* defined by a *moral community*. Associated with the writings of John Austin and Hans Kelsen. 2) See: *legal positivism*.		
Positivity	A positive attitude: the relation between separate *communities* (including their *members*) who share similar *social values*.	L-5	3
Post	1) An office to be filled by a *person* and found in an *organization*. It is defined by its distinctive *duties* and *authority* which relate it to other posts. 2) See: *role*.		
Potentials	What may emerge from an entity or *situation*: the *constraint* in the *pragmatist approach* to *ethical choice* which is counter-balanced by the *aspiration* to pursue an *ideal*.	L'-3	5,7
Power	1) The ability of a *person, social body* or *group* to influence the *actions* of others in order to realize their own *purposes*. 2) A *right* indicating that one can act and implying that others must accept this. 3) See: *legitimate power*. 4) For different types, see *ethical frames of reference*.	L"-4 G'-5	25
Practice	1) Regular *activities*, or *rules* governing those activities. 2) See: *good practice*.	G'-3¹	
Pragmatic	1) Loosely used to imply the need to get *action* and rapid benefit without much concern for overarching *values, ethical* demands, long-term *objectives* or *rational inquiry*. 2) See: *pragmatism*		
Pragmatic decision-making	See: *opportunist decision-making*.		
Pragmatic imperative	*Categorical imperative* which regulates demands for *obedience* generated by the *rulers of a society*, and so maintains its *political* nature.	G"-6¹	26
Pragmatism	1) Philosophical doctrine associated with the work of certain American philosophers, especially William James, C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. 2) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and holding *purposes* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is *principles*.	G-1	40
Pragmatist	1) *Manager* who gets rapid action by using gut-feelings and spotting opportunities for incremental *progress*. 2) *Adherent* to the *pragmatist approach*.		
Pragmatist approach	A *teleological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* to pursue *values* which are preferred by the chooser, bring some general benefit, and can be easily applied. The *injunction* is to choose what is appropriate.	L'-3	5-9
Preaching	Technique required to communicate a *vision*.	G-4⁴	34
Preference	The influence of a *value* on a choice or *decision*		
Prescription	1) A *rule* used to ensure that all know and follow certain *behaviours* strictly as specified. (Synonyms in common use include: instruction, requirement, protocol, directive.) 2) A *rule*, determined by *community leaders*, which constrains people to act in certain ways and permits the application of direct social *control* or impersonal command. 3) The characteristic *rule* of *formal etiquette*.	L"-1 G"-1 L"-1	16,17 21 14,15
Pressure	See: *social pressure*.		

Primal authority	Universally found source of *authority* in *communities*; seven types in all, each associated with a particular type of *rule*.	G"-1	21
Primal role	Universally found *social role*; seven types in all, each associated with *responsibility* for setting a particular type of *purpose*.	G-1	31
Primary community	A territorially-defined *community*.	L-5	3
Primary task	See: *principal object*.	L-4	
Primitive society	A *society* characterized by the absence of: writing, *formal organizations*, a dedicated *judiciary*.		
Principal object	1) A *purpose* specifying an *activity* which defines the *identity* of an *endeavour*. (Synonyms in common use include: aims, objects, function, service, brief, terms of reference, mandate, task, primary task, mission.)	L-4	1–4
	2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for owning what is to be achieved overall.	G-1⁴	31
Principle	A commonly used term with a wide variety of meanings, many of which are given specific labels in the text.		
	1) A *value* used for guidance, as distinguished from *purposes* which are definitive or *rules* which are binding.		
	2) See: *ethical principle*.	G"-2	
	3) See: *dominant belief*.	L-6ᴇ	
	4) See: *rule*.	L'-6	
	5) See: *maxim*.	L"-5	
	6) See: *absolute*.	L"-7	
	7) See: *standard*.		
	8) See: *internal priority*.	L-3	
	9) See: *policy*.	G-2²	
Principles	Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and holding *purposes* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *pragmatism*.	G-1	40
Priority	1) A selected option i.e. a particular *task* or *activity* in an *endeavour* which is being given importance.	L-3	
	2) See: *internal priority*.	L-3	
Privilege	A *right* expressing a permission to act.	L"-4	
Programme	1) See: *operational programme*.	G-4¹	
	2) See: *development programme*.	G-4²	
	3) See: *plan*.	G-2¹	
Progress	Continuing improvement: *aspiration* and *potential* when realizing *values*, hence part of a *duality* whose other pole is *survival*.	ₛH¹	40
Project management	A method for organizing an *achievement* which requires the cooperation of numbers of people. It is based on clarifying and setting *purposes* and schedules and ensuring that these are adhered to.		
Promotional group	The type of *social body* which strengthens *society* because it is set up to focus and shape some aspect of its social life.	Type #9	35,36
Propagation	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of a *theoretical framework* and *principal objects*.	L-6ʟ ⇌ L-4ʙ	41–46
Proposal	1) The expression of an *initiative*, which should be costed.	G-3²	33
	2) See: *plan*.	G-2¹	
Proprietor	1) One who has the exclusive *right* to the use or disposal of a *business*.		
	2) See: *constituting body*.	G-5¹	

Protocol	1) A sequential set of *tactical objectives* or *tasks*.	L-1	
	2) An organized set of *prescriptions*.	L*-1	17
	3) Required ceremony or ritual, see: *formal etiquette*	L*-1	
Prudence	Ability to discern the surest and most politic course of *action*: the *cardinal virtue* resulting from successfully resolving the *ideals-potentials duality* when using the *pragmatist approach to ethical choice*.	L'-3	5
Public agency	*An organization* set up by the *government* to serve the *common good*. It takes one of two forms: either *an enterprise* which provides services (e.g. education) or products (e.g. coirage); or *an authority* which determines and preserves current *social values*.	G-5¹ G-5²	37
Public body	An *organization*, either governmental or private and *membership-centred*, which is created to serve the *common good*.		
Public figure	Elected or emergent communal *leaders* and opinion-formers	L-5 G-1⁵	3 31
Public interest	See: *common good*		
Public opinion	Basis for compliance with *conventions*.	G*-1²	21
Public policy	See: *social policy*.	G*-2²	
Public relations	Specialized work required to handle communications within and without an organization, whose effectiveness depends on clarity about its *identity* and *culture*.	G-4³	34
Public service	1) *Service* provided by a *governmental body*, hence may refer to a *public agency*. 2) *Service* provided by a *firm* for the *common good* and from which it does not profit directly.		
Purpose	1) A statement that specifies a future state of affairs and so helps bring it about. There are a vast variety of synonyms in common use, most of which have been given specialized definitions in this Glossary. General terms which remain include: aim, end, goal, intent.	H¹	1–3
	2) The *monadic elements* which define *responsibilities* when acting, so ensuring that *values* can be chosen, affirmed and pursued in a social context.	G-1	28–30 31,40
Purpose derivative	Purposive entities which are developed by conjoining two or more adjacent *levels of purpose* and which together form a *structural hierarchy*.	₅H¹	28–30 40
Purposiveness	See: *intentionality*.	L'-VI	
Quandary	The inevitable problem when implementing an *ethical choice* which is characteristically different in each of the seven *approaches*.	H²	6
Quango	Acronym for 'quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization' set up by *statute* to serve the *public interest* either as *an enterprise* or as *an authority*.	G-5¹ G-5²	
Radical	1) Touching on what is essential or fundamental and hence typically progressive, unorthodox or revolutionary. 2) One who views existing *society* as unjust and affirms a new *distributive justice position*.	G*-3⁵	23
Rank-and-file	See: *grass roots*.	G-5³	

Rational	1) In *ethical choice*: the *injunction* to be reasonable characterizes the *rationalist approach*.	L'-1	5–9
	2) Rational *decisions* are explainable in terms of *purpose* and *value*		8
	3) Rational inquiry is associated with the use of concepts and analysis.		8
	4) Rational *judgement* or *authority* is associated with *the law*.	G"-5[2]	25
	5) A characteristic quality of *principal objects*, and hence the required quality of *purposes* in the fourth *internal level* of *purpose derivatives*.	sH[1]	30
Rationalist approach	1) A *teleological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* to meet practical objectives which are self-evidently sensible and worthwhile to the chooser. The *injunction* is to choose what is reasonable.	L'-1	5-9
	2) An *approach* to *decision-making* based on using *values*, setting *priorities* and devising *strategies* and *plans*.		8
	3) An *inquiring system* based on stating assumptions, developing concepts, and performing logical analyses.		8
Realities	1) The *constraint* in the *rationalist approach* to *ethical choice* which is counter-balanced by the *aspiration* to find *solutions*.	L'-1	5,7
	2) The context of *ethical choice* and social *action*, which may be construed in either *temporal* or *spiritual* terms or a synthesis of these.	L'-7	7
	3) See: *reality*.		
Reality	1) What exists: which is defined differently according to assumptions within the various *approaches* to *identity development*.	H[II]	
	2) See: *realities*.		
	3) See: *Absolute Reality*.		
Reason	1) An *ultimate value* inspiring the philosopher, the 18th century age of enlightenment and modern science.	L-7	
	2) See: *political aim*.	L-3	
Re-assertion	The *social process* involving *evaluation* and *imposition* which results from *internal priorities* generating *tactical objectives* and influencing their definition.	L-3 → L-1	41,42
Receptivity	The *stabilizing core* of *identity* in *sensory being* which is developed by *activity*.	L'-I	11,13
Recklessness	Lack of care for consequences: the *cardinal vice* resulting from failing to resolve the *ideals-potentials duality* when using the *pragmatist approach* to *ethical choice*.	L'-3	5
Recognition	Noticing and affirming personal *capacities* and *potentials*: the *essential* supplies to support *relational being*.	L'-V	11
Reconciliation	The relationship which links differing *social groups* by recognizing their common *humanity* and appealing to *ultimate values*.	L-7	3
Reflection	Essential for working with *convictions*, especially dealing with objections to them.	G-2[6]	32
Reflective awareness	Essential requirement for *ethical design*.		
Reform agenda	A set of proposals for *change* which are the expression of a *crusade*.	G-3[4]	33
Reformers	*Participants*, often *activists* in *reform-generating organizations*, seeking changes within their *community*.		
Reform-generating organization	A category of *social body* within which the simplest is a *promotional group*, and whose more complex versions are *universal institutions*, *ideological* and *sectional associations*, *evangelical organizations* and *reforming agencies*.		35,36

Reforming agency	A *social body* which primarily seeks to strengthen *society*, but also provides *services*.	Type #6	35,36
Regulation	1) See: *rule*.	H³	
	2) See: *law*.	L″-6	
	3) See: *system of regulations*.	L″-6	
Regulator	See: *an authority*.	G-5²	
Regulatory authority	See: *an authority*.	G-5²	
Relational being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *intuition*, is driven by *self-actualization*, and requires provision of *recognition* within a relationship.	L′-V	10–13 16
Religion	1) A codification of the *spiritual* dimension of human existence which is institutionalized via *ethical, experiential, mythical, theoretical, ritual* and *organizational* components.		
	2) See: *organized religion*.	L″-VII	
	3) See: *official religion*.		
	4) See: *church*.		
Relocation of feelings	The dynamic form of *self-expression* in *emotional being*.	L′-III	12
Representative	An *individual* or *organization* which stands for or speaks on behalf of another individual or *social group*.		
Representative mechanisms	1) See: *guardian institutions*	G-6	
	2) See: *political arena*.		
Resolution	An *intentional process* in social life involving the mutual influence of an *over-riding priority* and *strategic objectives*.	L-3$_E$ ◂ ▸L-2$_B$	41–46
Resource	Concrete *value* allocated by *internal priorities*.	L-3	1
Respect	1) The *ethical disposition* which ensures that *rights* and *duties* are fulfilled.	L″-4	16,17
	2) The *essential supplies* to support *individual being*.	L′-IV	11
	3) Required attitude toward the *rules* in the first (bottom) *internal level* of the *ethical authorities*.	$_S$H³	19,20
	4) See: *ceremonial respect*.	L″-I	
Responsibility	A very general term essential to *ethics* and social life, but used with a variety of different connotations.		
	1) The requirement to fulfil an *obligation*.		
	2) As in 'responsible for': see *power*.	L″-4	
	3) As in 'responsible to': see *accountability*.		
	4) The *essential supplies* to support *social being*.	L′-VI	11
	5) As in 'sense of responsibility': see *obligation (2)*.	L-6	
	6) In a job or organization: see *duties*.		
	7) See: *duty*.		
	8) See: *legal responsibility*.	G′-3⁴	
	9) See: *personal responsibility*.	G-1	
	10) See: *social responsibility*.		
Results	1) *Changes* in the external world consequent on *activity*		
	2) See: *achievement*.		
Revelation	The highly personal *social process* involving *illumination* and *illusion* by which *ultimate values* generate *value systems* or influence their definition.	L-7 ⇢ L-6	41,42

Right	1) A *rule* introduced to ensure that all in a *social group* know and respect what is due to or from someone in a social setting; so the term embraces *duties* and related notions like *power, privilege, immunity, disability* and *liability*.	L"-4	16,17
	2) As (1) but restricted to what is due to someone or can be claimed by someone i.e. seen as the counterpart to *duty* or *responsibility*.	L"-4	
	3) A *rule*, determined by *class power*, which constrains people's sense of *entitlement* and which depends on recognizing *special interests* and personally applying *pressure*.	G"-1⁴	21
	4) The characteristic *rule* of the *social structure*.	L"-IV	14,15
	5) What is correct or proper (i.e. the opposite of *wrong*): the positive *deontological injunction* defining the abstract focus of *ethics*.		
Ritual	1) A prescribed act repeatedly performed for its *symbolic function* as part of a *ceremony*.		
	2) See: *prescription*.	L'-1	
Role	1) The part which one undertakes to play in a social relationship.		
	2) The *stabilizing core* of *identity* in *social being* which is developed through exposure to *situations*.	L'-VI	11,13
	3) The *direction* which identifies a part's contribution to the performance of a whole.	G-2³	32
	4) See: *communal role*.	G"-3²	
	5) See: *primal role*.	G-1	
	6) See: *social role*.		
	7) See: *emotional role*.	L'-III	
	8) See: *post*.		
Rule	1) Authoritative statements which govern *individual conduct*: rules may be divided into constitutive rules (which set up the social field) and regulative rules (which determine operation within it).		
	2) An *ethical* statement which governs *individual conduct* within a *community* — see: *ethical rule*.	H³	16,17
	3) The product of the *legitimist approach*.	L'-6	9,16
Rule derivative	An ethical arrangement which is developed by conjoining two or more adjacent *levels of ethical rule* — see: *ethical authority*.	sH³	
Rule-based authority	See: *ethical authority*.	sH³	
Ruler	1) The *person* or *social body* that can exert supreme *power* in society.		
	2) See: *the government*.	G-6¹	
	3) See: *guardian*.	G-6	
Ruling	1) Judicial *decision* or authoritative pronouncement.		
	2) Act of governing, presumably because its essence involves setting and enforcing *rules* and making authoritative pronouncements.	G-6¹	39
	3) See: *directive*.	G-3¹	
Ruling class	Sub-group of citizens whose members habitually fill top positions in *the government* and usually dominate economic life as well. (Synonyms in use include: power elites, the establishment, the political class.)	G-6¹	39
Sage	1) Visionary or prophetic *individual* capable of affirming and upholding *ultimate values*: cf. *spiritual leader*.	G-1⁷	31
	2) Spiritual interpreter and judge for *the morality*.	G"-5³	25
Secondary community	*Communities* formed when any set of people interact over time for a particular *purpose* other than in the course of their daily life e.g. within an *organization*.		

Secretariat	The administrative staff within an *authority* which serves the *council* in all practical aspects and must recommend detailed appropriate and feasible decisions.	G-5²	38
Secretary	1) Chief officer of a *secretariat*.	G-5²	
	2) One of the *top officers:* either in an *enterprise* (e.g. a company secretary assists the *governing body*), or in the executive wing of *government* (e.g. permanent/deputy/ under/assistant secretaries in the civil service assist ministers of state).	G-5¹	
Sectional association	A *social body* which primarily seeks to differentiate its *members* in order to provide *services* for them and to generate *reforms* on their behalf.	Type #3	35,36
Self	1) The experiential essence of a *person*.		
	2) Inner *experiential* entity holding each *person* to account as a *responsible individual* within *society*.	G-1⁴	31
	3) See: *human identity*.	H"	
	4) See: *the self*.	L'-IV	
Self-actualization	The *identity drive* in *relational being*.	L'-V	
Self-command	See: *self-control*.		
Self-control	1) Appropriate handling of one's feelings and wishes: the essential requirement for *ethical conduct*.		
	2) Requirement for engaging with *tactical objectives*.	L-1	31
Self-determination	1) See: *self-government*.		
	2) See: *enlightenment (3)*		
	3) See: *autonomy*.		
	4) See: *free-will*.		
Self-development	1) Growth of *the self* or development of a *human identity*.	H"	11-13
	2) In regard to *social being:* effect of engaging with *social values*.	G-1⁵	31
Self-esteem	The *identity drive* in *individual being*.	L'-IV	11
Self-expression	Property of *human identity* which manifests distinctively in each *approach* to *identity development*.	H"	12
Self-discipline	See: *self-control*		
Self-government	1) See: *autonomy*.		
	2) See: *government*.		
	3) See: *self-control*.		
Self-interest	1) The pursuit of one's own profit, benefit or advantage; so viewed as the key incentive in much economic theory. Often confused with selfishness or used pejoratively to suggest the exclusion of any concern for others.		
	2) Requirement for engaging with *principal objects*.	L-4	31
	3) See: *individualist approach*.	L'-4	
Selflessness	Effect of engaging with *ultimate values*.	L-7	31
Self-realization	See: *self-actualization*.	L'-V	
Self-regulation	1) *Responsible action* in a *community* involving adherence to the spirit of a relevant *code of ethics;* in *business*, often ensured by a *self-regulatory organization*.		
	2) Use of *maxims*.	L"-5	
Self-regulatory organization	An *authority* which is set up by an industry or profession to serve the *public interest*.	G-5²	

Sensation	The form of *experience* which underpins the *motivation* generated by awareness and enables pursuit of *tactical objectives*.	L-I	2,10 16
Sense of responsibility	1) See: *obligation (2)*. 2) See: *personal responsibility*. 3) See: *social responsibility*.	L-6 G-I	
Sensory being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *sensation* is based in maintaining *equilibrium*, and requires provision of *stimulation*.	L'-I	10-13 16
Sensory existence	See: *sensory being*.	L'-I	
Sensory reality	1) See: *physical environment*. 2) See: *sensory being*.	L'-I	
Service	1) Tangible *good*, usually contrasted with a product, based on doing something that helps or benefits or satisfies someone. 2) See: *principal object*. 3) See: *an organization*	L-4	
Service organization	The type of *social body* which sustains *society* because it is set up to do or produce specific things of tangible *value* as cheaply as possible.	Type #10	35,36
Shareholders	*Owners* and hence the *constituting body* of a company.	G-5[1]	38
Shareholder association	A *voluntary body* formed to enable *shareholders* in a *company* to exert their *constitutive duties* and *rights* in dealing with the *board*.	G-5[1]	
Side	See: *faction*.	L-3	
Siding	Taking sides: the basis of entry and *participation* within a *faction*.	L-3	3
Situation	1) All relevant aspects of the immediate, evolving and therefore transient circumstances: the context for *systemic decision-making*. 2) The *growth-promoting potential* and source of *hope* in *social being* which enables the development of *role*.	L'-VI	11,13
Slogan	The expression of a *campaign*, which should be memorable.	G-3[3]	33
Social	Relating to *members* of a *social group* or the group as a whole.		
Social being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *identification*, is driven by *participation* in *society*, and requires provision of *responsibility*.	L'-VI	10-13 16
Social body	1) An organized entity with a defined *identity* built around *principal objects*, existing independently in *society* and responsible for itself. 2) See: *an organization*.		35,36
Social class	1) Those *members* of *society* who fit within a particular category and exert greater or lesser influence as a consequence, but who do not constitute a *natural social group*. 2) Occupational and socio-economic categorization of people, given much significance in the social sciences.	G"-I	21
Social domain	See: *domain*.		
Social existence	See: *social being*.	L'-VI	
Social force	1) A non-physical force based in *personal energy* that operates at the level of the *social group* and generates consequences for all within it and even beyond. 2) See: *cultural force*. 3) See: *social pressure*.	H[1] sH[3]	3

Social group	1) A collection or categorization of people sharing certain *purposes* or characteristics.		
	2) See: *natural social group*.		
	3) See: *social class*.	G'-1⁴	
Social identity	1) *Identity* defined in terms of *social being*.	L'-VI	
	2) What *minimum standards* seek to protect.	G'-4	
Social imperative	See: *pragmatic imperative*.	G'-6¹	
Social institution	See: *institution*.		
Social justice	See: *distributive justice*.	G'-3⁵	
Social movement	See: *a movement*.	G-5³	
Social need	1) See: *social value*.	L-5	
	2) See: *highlighted social need*.	L-5ₑ	
Social order	1) See: *the social order*.	G-7¹	
	2) See: *order*.		
Social policy	Refers loosely to all or part of a *government* initiative to alter social conditions based on one or more *social policy principles* with or without *legislation*.	G'-2²	
Social policy principle	A *principle* which shapes *attitudes* and *organisations* so that *members'* *needs* are met and which is essential to guide the handling of *interactions* which mediate these personal and communal needs.	G''-2²	22
Social practice	See: *good practice*.	G'-3¹	
Social pressure	A force from or towards others in *society* generally which is aimed at altering an *individual's conduct*: essential for *compliance* with *ethical rules* which sustain society.		15,21
Social process	A functional regularity, repetitive activity or flow of events in social life.		
Social responsibility	1) An *experiential* state associated with one's *identity* as a *social being* which leads to responsible *participation* in *society* and acceptance of a wide variety of legal and non-legal *obligations*.	L'-VI	11
	2) A type of *cultural ethic*, voluntarist, philanthropic or humanitarian in nature, which is typically promoted as a countervailing force to a libertarian or *individualist* ethic.	G'-3³	
	3) See: *legal responsibility*.	G'-3⁴	
Social role	1) The part played by a *member* or *social body* in a particular *social group*.		
	2) See: *primal role*.	G-1	
	3) See: *communal role*.	G'-3²	
Social structure	The *natural moral institution* which maintains a *consensus* in society on its proper boundaries and internal differentiation.	L''-IV	10 14-16
Social value	1) A *purpose* specifying a freely shared *need-based value* serving a specific *community*. (Synonyms in common use include: value, need, social goal, basic value, banner goal, core value, ideal.)	L-5	1-4
	2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for recognizing what each and all in the *community* need.	G-1⁵	31
	3) A *potential good* in which possibilities for realization are left open.	L-5	

Socialization	1) The way that *members* acquire *behaviours* and *values* necessary for the *stability* and *continuity* of their *social group*.		
	2) The basis of entry and *participation* within a *tribe*.	L-6	3
	3) The *social process* involving *instruction* and *exhortation* by which *value systems* generate *social values* and influence their definition.	L-6 → L-5	41,42
	4) The requirement for an *ethical position* to be internalized.	G"-3	19
Societal	Relating to *society* as distinct from other *social groups*		
Societal standard	A *minimum standard* which seeks to protect a society's officially enacted *identity* as expressed in formal *institutions* like *laws, government policies* and *statutory authorities*.	G"-4³	24
Society	1) An artificial territory-based *community* including families and larger social and cultural groupings, together with its *organizations, customs,* and other *authorities* and *institutions* including *government* and whose integrity depends on *ultimate values*.		
	2) See: *nation*.		
	3) See: *the state*.		
	4) Loosely refers to the relevant *social group*, surrounding *community* or wider social context.		
	5) See: *wider society*.	G-5	
	6) A label used for a *membership-centred* or not-for-profit *social body*.		
Solidarity	The basis of *cohesion* within a *tribe*.	L-6	3
Solomonic justice	*Justice* reached through *revelation* and *inspiration* by a *sage*, and associated with a wise application of *the morality*.	G"-5³	25
Solutions	1) The *aspiration* in the *rationalist* approach to *ethical choice* which is counter-balanced by the *constraint* of surrounding *realities*.	L'-1	5,7 16
	2) See: *strategic objective*.	L-2	
Soul	The *stabilizing core* of *identity* in *transpersonal being* which is developed by *God*.	L'-VII	11,13
Sovereign society	A *social group* which has full control over its *law-making*.		
Sovereignty	The *hexadic purpose derivative* whose *guardians* control *power* by ensuring that *society*, its people and their *activities*, are regulated by *values*.	G-6	28–30 39,40
Spiritual leader	One who regularly evokes contact with *ultimate values*, the *transpersonal* and the *transcendental* on behalf of a *community*.	G-1⁷	31
Spirituality	1) Sphere of the *soul*, the *sacred*, and the *divine*.		
	2) The *aspiration* of the *transcendentalist* approach to *choice* which is counterbalanced by the *constraint* of *temporality*.	L'-7	5,7 16
	3) The *personal energy* and *social force* released by *union* and the experience of *ultimate values*.	L-7	3
	4) The *identity drive* in *transpersonal being*.	L'-VII	11
	5) The requirement for *cohesion* in a society.		
Spokesman	1) One who speaks on behalf of a *social group*, typically as specified and authorized by its *members*.		
	2) See: *advocate*.	G-5³	
Stability	1) *Survival* need of *society* met by people identifying with the *governance system*.	L"-VI	15
	2) Basis for ensuring *survival* when developing and pushing *drives* — to which the counterpart for *progress* is *dynamism*.	G-3	40
Stabilizing core	What is innately and automatically accessible in each of the *approaches to identity development*.	H"	11,13

Standard	An important term used with many different meanings:		
	1) A basis for comparison.		
	2) A desirable and achievable quality or quantity i.e. a *strategic objective*.	L-2	
	3) See: *prescription*.	L⁺-1	
	4) See: *code of practice*.	L⁺-1	
	3) See: *convention*.	L⁺-2	
	5) See: *principle*.	G⁺-2	
	6) See: *ethical standard*.	G⁺-4	
	7) See: *minimum standard*.	G⁺-4	
	8) See: *ideal*.	G-3⁵	
	9) See: *policy*.	G-2²	
Standard-setting authority	The *social body* that can determine *ethical standards*	G⁺-4	24
State	1) See: *the state*.		
	2) See: *nation-state*.		
	3) See: *society*.		
	4) See: *the government*.	G-6¹	
Statute	Act of Parliament or *law* contained within it.	L⁺-6	
Statutory authority	A *social body*, either a *regulatory authority* or *public service agency* set up by *the government* via *legislation*.	G-5¹ G-5²	
Steering group	A *body* with board-type powers to set *priorities* and control choices for a project within an *endeavour* or *organization*.	L-3	
Stimulation	The *essential supplies* to support *sensory being*.	L⁺-1	11
Strategic	Maximizing impact in a *situation*: hence the required quality of *purposes* in the second *internal level* of *purpose derivatives*.	$_sH^1$	30
Strategic leadership	*Leadership capability* required to generate and implement *growth* within an *organization*.	G-4²	34
Strategic objective	1) A *purpose* specifying a desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact. (Synonyms in common use include: direction, solution, vision, strategy, option, choice, outcome, achievement, deliverable.)	L-2	1,2,4
	2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for deciding what is to be achieved now.	G-1²	31
Strategic plan	See: *strategy*.	L-2	
Strategy	1) The set of subsidiary *strategic sub-objectives* which are a *means* to achieve a main *strategic objective*.	L-2	
	2) See: *strategic objective*.	L-2	
	3) See: *growth*.	G-4²	
Strength	The *aspiration* in the *individualist approach to ethical choice* which is counterbalanced by the *constraint* of *vulnerabilities*.	L⁺-4	5,7 16
Structural hierarchy	A *hierarchy* formed by combining all possible adjacent entities within an *elemental hierarchy*.	$_sH^1$ $_sH^3$	0
Structuralist approach	A *decision system* which emphasizes *structure*, *legitimate authority* and procedures for *control* and corresponds to the *legitimist approach to ethical choice*.		8
Structure	The most fundamental concrete *identity*-defining quality of any entity i.e. change in structure creates a new entity in practice, but without necessarily changing the abstract conception of the entity.		

Structured set of priorities	Internal priorities created in the *logical mode*.	L·3₁	41–46
Sub-culture	An enduring *natural social group* within a *society* based on what feel like fundamental cultural distinctions — ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, historical, geographical or ideological — which are embodied in *ethical authorities* respected by group *members*.		
Sub-objective	A *purpose* which is a *means* to pursuing a main purpose of the same type i.e. within the same *level*. Note that a purpose at a lower level is never a sub-objective of a purpose at a higher level.		
Substantive justice	*Justice* in which *judgement* is reached via *pragmatic* and evidential considerations: with the end result being more significant than the process or subsequent implications.	G*·5¹	25
Supervisor	1) Label sometimes used for *an authority* (e.g. a banking supervisor) 2) Low level managerial role usually indicating the person-in-charge or the line-manager.	G·5²	
Supreme good	*Ultimate value* which heightens awareness of the nature and importance of *values* and their deliberate use.	L·7	
Survival	Continuing existence through events which threaten to destroy that existence: constraining and stabilizing core when realizing *values*; part of a *duality* whose other pole is *progress*.	₅H¹	40
Symbol	Something that refers to and can represent something else; hence essential for relating to *God*.		
Symbolic function	1) The activation of *meaning* which is essential for personal and group *survival*. 2) The *growth-promoting* potential and source of *hope* within *vital being* which develops an *identity* based on *instinctual function*. 3) See: *symbolisation*.	L·II	11,13
Symbolisation	The production of *symbols*: the mental mechanism for the outer public expression of *inner experience* and *meaning*.	L·II	
System	1) Any set of inter-related and structured *elements*: as in *decision system*, *inquiring system*, *value system*, *identity system*, *legal system*. 2) A *logic-based framework*. 3) See: *code*.	L·6	
System of regulations	A more or less organized set of *law-like rules* instituted to maintain *order* within an *organization* or *social group*.	L"·6	17
Systematization	The structuring and ordering of concepts or *activities*. If coherence, consistency, comprehensiveness, boundaries and internal interactions are considered, the result is a *model* of a *system*.		
Systemic	Associated with attention to all *elements*, their structured interaction and the *identity* of the whole; to be distinguished from 'systematic' (cf. *systematization*)		
Systemic decision-making	A *decision system* which emphasizes developing a *model* to represent the *situation* and making *strategic* interventions to trigger *change*: it corresponds to the *communalist approach* to *ethical choice*.		8
Systemic inquiry	See: *holistic inquiry*		
Systemicist approach to choice	See: *communalist approach*.	L·5	
Systems thinking	The use of assumptions characteristic of *holistic inquiry*.		

Tactical objective	1) A *purpose* specifying a precise tangible time-targeted *result* which is a step to a desired outcome. (Synonyms in common use include: activity, task objective, operational objective, tactic, immediate result.)	L-1	1,2,4
	2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for doing what has to be done now.	G-1[1]	31
Task	1) *Activity* to be performed within a given time period to produce a specific result or output.	L-1	1
	2) See: *principal object*.	L-4	
Task objective	See: *tactical objective*.	L-1	
Teleodynamics	Neologism coined to refer to study of the interactions and forces between different *levels of purpose* which affect the operation of *intentionality*.		41–46
Teleological approach	An *approach to ethical choice* which appeals to *goodness* and supports *intentionality*.	H[2]	5
Teleology	A philosophical approach which sees *goodness* and *purpose* (rather than *duty* and *rules*) as the necessary and sufficient base on which to understand *ethics*.	H[2]	
Teleostatics	Neologism coined to refer to study of the structures of *intentionality* i.e. *levels of purpose* and *purpose derivatives*.	H[1] $_s$H[1]	
Temperance	See: *moderation*.	L-2	
Temporal	Worldly, transient, mundane and practical aspects of social life.		
Temporality	Sphere of mundane or temporal life: the *constraint* in the *transcendental approach to ethical choice* which balances the *aspiration* of *spirituality*.	L-7	5,7
Tenet	1) A *rule* introduced to ensure that all in a *social group* know and apply certain *values* in daily life. (Synonyms in common use include: dogma, belief, assumption, article of faith, conviction.)	L″-3	16,17
	2) A *rule*, determined by a person's *conscience*, which constrains people to hold and act on certain *beliefs* through the application of personal *control* and inner *conviction*.	G″-1[3]	21
	3) The characteristic *rule* of *communal ideals*.	L″-III	14,15
Tension	The static form of *self-expression* in *vital being*.	L-II	12
Terms of reference	1) The definition of the scope of *work* set for an *individual* or *group* in relation to deciding, reporting or implementing.		
	2) See: *principal object*.	L-4	
Territorial community	The primary form of *community* whose *political organization* can be usefully defined by seven encompassing territories ranging from the household through to the world.		
Tetrad	A group of four adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy*. A seven level hierarchy contains four tetrads.	$_s$H[1] $_s$H[3]	18,28
The Absolute	See: *God*.		
The citizenry	The *constitutive guardian* of society, *responsible for* conceiving and asserting its own *common good*, which includes installing and monitoring *the government*.	G-6[2]	39
The custom	The *ethical frame of reference* which enables *judgements of conduct* which define what has always been taken as *right* and should continue to be.	G″-5[1]	25
The establishment	See: *ruling class*.		

The ethical order	1) The *heptadic ethical authority* which ensures that each *member* of a *society* can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems *right*.	$G''\text{-}7^1$	18–20 27
	2) See: *the social order*.	$G\text{-}7^1$	
The government	The executive and regulative *guardian* of *society* responsible to *the citizenry* for discerning and fulfilling its *will*. Also see: *government*.	$G\text{-}6^1$	39
The law	1) The *ethical frame of reference* which enables *judgements* of *individual conduct* which define what must be taken as *right* now.	$G''\text{-}5^2$	25
	2) *Primal authority* for laws in a *society*.	$G'\text{-}1^6$	21
The moral law	1) See: *moral law*.		
	2) See: *the morality*.	$G'\text{-}5^3$	
The morality	The *ethical frame of reference* which enables *judgements* of *conduct* which define what ought to be taken as *right*.	$G''\text{-}5^3$	25
The other	The *growth-promoting potential* and source of *hope* in *individual being* which enables development of *the self*.	L'-IV	11,13
The people	1) The *membership* of a *society* which creates *the social order*.	$G\text{-}7^1$	
	2) The embodiment of *the custom*	$G'\text{-}5^1$	25
	3) See: *the citizenry*.	$G\text{-}6^2$	
The self	An inner conception of continuing coherent and valued existence which is the *stabilizing core* of *identity* in *individual being* and which is developed through other people.	L'-IV	11,13
The social order	1) The *heptadic purpose derivative* which enables willing, responsible and purposeful *participation* in *society*.	$G\text{-}7^1$	28
	2) The actual *situation* in *society* which flows from people pursuing *purposes* to realize *values* in accord with society's *ethical rules*. This concrete order is permitted by the underlying abstract *ethical order* but is not determined by it.		
	3) See: *the ethical order*.	$G'\text{-}7^1$	
The state	1) Territorial *community* together with its *sovereign government* with an emphasis on the latter's capacity to issue legal commands to serve what it deems to be the *common good* and its *duty* to use physical force to control internal and external fraud and violence.		
	2) See: *the government*.	$G\text{-}6^1$	
	3) See: *nation-state*.		
Theology	The study of *God's* nature, attributes and relation carried out within a particular *religion* by an adherent.		
Theoretical framework	*Value system* defined in the *logical mode*: something to believe.	$L\text{-}6_1$	41–46
Theory	1) An explanation of phenomena		
	2) A *system* of *ideas*.	$L\text{-}6_1$	
Top executive	1) Any *member* of the *top officer body* (e.g. the chief finance officer) or that body itself.	$G\text{-}5^1$	38
	2) See: *chief executive officer*.		
Top management team	1) Team of senior *executives* expected to run *an organization*.		
	2) See: *top officer body*.	$G\text{-}5^1$	
Top officer body	The *compartment* of an *enterprise* responsible for providing *direction* and maximizing its impact.	$G\text{-}5^1$	4,38
Traditional authority	The form of *authority* inherent in *the custom*.	$G''\text{-}5^1$	25

Transcendental being	1) See: *transpersonal being*. 2) See: *God*.	L'-VII	
Transcendentalist approach	A *teleological system* for *ethical choice* based on the *core obligation* on the chooser to respond to a deep inner sense of what is *right* and *good*, which stems ultimately from the divine. The *injunction* is to choose what is authentic.	L'-7	5–9
Transformation	Basis for ensuring *progress* when developing and working at *functioning* — to which the counterpart for *survival* is *evolution*.	G-4	40
Transformative leadership	*Leadership capability* required to generate and implement a *vision* for an organization.	G-4⁴	34
Transpersonal	Associated with personal *experiences* that transcend the *individual*.		
Transpersonal being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *imagination*, is driven by *spirituality*, and requires provision of *faith*.	L'-VII	10–13 16
Triad	A group of three adjacent *levels* in a *hierarchy*. A seven level hierarchy contains five triads.	₅H¹ ₅H³	18,28
Tribal society	See: *primitive society*.		
Tribe	1) A *social group* which preserves its distinctiveness via its *value system*. 2) See: *primitive society*.	L-6	3,4
Tribunal	1) A *board* with the *power* to investigate and adjudicate or determine claims or disputes, which works in accord with *the custom*. 2) A form of *statutory regulatory authority*.	G*-5¹ G-5²	25
Truth	1) Objective account of *reality*, the search for which drives all inquiry. 2) An *inner experience* used by everyone as a guide in daily life 3) The *ultimate value* essential for designing, maintaining and adhering to *ethical imperatives*.	G"-6	27
Ultimate value	1) A *purpose* specifying a universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being. (Synonyms in use include: meta-value, universal value, being value, absolute value, inspirational value, spiritual value, ideal.) 2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for distinguishing between *good* and *evil*.	L-7 G-1⁷	2-4 31
Umbrella organization	*Membership-centred organization* whose members, the *constituting body*, are other organizations.		
Unequivocal respect	Required quality of *rules* in the first internal *level* of all *ethical authorities*.	₅H³	19,20
Union	1) A state of relatedness in which *ultimate values* dominate and in which those involved are sensitively attuned to each other. 2) The form satisfaction takes within *transpersonal being*.	L-7 L'-VII	3 11
Universal institution	A *social body* which simultaneously seeks to transform *society*, to differentiate its *members*, to strengthen society by offering *ideas* for *change*, and to provide *services*. The prime examples are the great universities and major churches.	Type #1	35,36
Universal right	1) A *right* affirmed to be applicable to all across all *societies*, whether or not the right is legalised or available in fact; usually claimed to be inalienable. 2) See: *universal standard*. 3) See: *human right principle*.	L*-4 G*-4⁴ G*-2⁴	
Universal standard	A *minimum standard* which seeks to protect an internationally agreed conception of *human identity* in society as expressed in *rights* and *duties* accorded to all *individuals* in a *sovereign society*.	G"-4⁴	24

Utilitarianism	1) Philosophical notion, originally associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, whose nature is contested amongst academics but which is commonly understood to refer to the requirement to seek the greatest good for the greatest number.		
	2) See: *communalist approach*.	L'-5	
Utopia	1) In theory: a *community* in which what people have to do is what they want to do.		
	2) In practice: a *community* devised to meet certain religious, political economic, or psychological ideals.		
	3) See: *ideal*.		
Utopianism	1) Wish for a perfect society: the driving force in *popular movements*.		
	2) A pejorative term referring to efforts to achieve an impossible *ideal* of social life and the denial of realistic obstacles usually related to human nature.		
Value	1) The importance of something to someone in a social context, which is based on inner feelings. Many terms which refer to value are given special definitions.	L-7 to L-3	2–4
	2) The uniting and motivating force within *social groups*, hence usually refers to *social value* when unqualified.	L-5	1
	3) The *essential supplies* to support *emotional being*.	L'-III	11
Value derivative	See: *purpose derivative*.		
Value system	1) A *purpose* specifying a complex valued idea or a set of interlinked ideas ordering understanding within a social *domain*, and so justifying enduring *values* and *activities* within it. (Synonyms in common use include: ideology, school of thought, doctrine, theory, intellectual framework, paradigm, philosophy, idea, ideal, principle, belief.)	L-6	1–4
	2) The type of *purpose* or *value* which generates a *personal responsibility* for preserving *ideas* and holds *adherents* to account.	G-1⁶	31
Vested interest	1) *Persons* or *organizations* with a stake in the status quo and hence affected by any *drive* to produce *change*.	G-3	
	2) See: *faction*.	L-3	
Vice	1) A quality of a *person* which is wicked or *evil*, and which only develops through depravity and self-indulgence.		
	2) A form of moral or *ethical* flaw.		
	3) See: *cardinal vice*.	H²	
Virtue	1) A quality of a *person* which is of worth and benefit, and which only develops through application and self-discipline.		
	2) A form of moral or *ethical* excellence equivalent to an internalized *ethical maxim*.	L'-5	17
	3) The *ethical disposition* which supports adherence to *maxims*.	L'-5	16, 17
	4) *Survival* need of *society* met by people identifying with the *ethical teaching*.	L'-V	15
	5) See: *cardinal virtue*.	H²	
Virtuous	Pertaining to *virtue* or *ethical maxims*; hence required quality of *rules* in the fifth *internal level* of *ethical authorities*.	₅H³	19, 20
Virtuous conduct	Voluntary *conduct* which observes *the morality* of a society.	G'-5³	

Vision	1) A domain of *functioning* of a *social body* requiring continuing *work* to establish a *framework* of enduring *values* which inspire people and guide all work.	G-4[4]	34
	2) See: *strategic objective*.	L-2	
	3) See: *policy*.	G-2[2]	
	4) See: *forecasting*.		
	5) See: *image*.	L-II	
Visionary body	The type of *social body* which can transform *society* because it is set up to apply *ideals* to *domains* and to identify *values* for use within and across societies.	Type #8	35,36
Visionary leader	1) A *leader* who generates a following by operating persistently with *ultimate values*.	G-1[7]	31
	2) See: *transformative leadership*.	G-4[4]	
Visionary organization	1) *An organization* with a well-ceveloped and forward-looking or enlightened *vision*.		
	2) See: *vision-generating body*.	G-4[4]	
Vision-generating body	A category of *social body* within which the simplest is a *visionary body*; and whose more complex versions are *universal institutions, ideological associations* and *ethical bodies*.		35,36
Vital being	The *approach to identity development* which assigns primacy to *image*, is based in *vitality*, and requires provision of *concentration*.	L'-II	10–13 16
Vitality	The *identity drive* in *vital being*.	L'-II	11
Vocation	**Work** that stems from and supports a person's *identity*.	H[II]	11
Voluntary body	An *enterprise* set up to provide *services* or run a *campaign* on a non-profit basis and therefore heavily dependent on its *membership*.	G-5[1]	
Vulnerabilities	Weaknesses or limitations: the *constraint* in the *individualist approach* to *ethical choice* which is counter-balanced by the *aspiration* for *strength*.	L'-4	5,7
Wider society	The *outsider compartment* of *autonomous endeavours*: so providing the context for any organized *endeavour* and with the responsibility for ensuring *consensus* on the highest (fifth) *level of value* defining it.	G-5	4,38
Will	1) The capacity to resist temptation and master passions: essential to sustain an *ethical order*.	G'-7	18–20
	2) Source of creativity and *personal energy*.		
	3) In society, what *the citizenry* wants or is assumed to want.	G-6[2]	
Wisdom	1) Sound *judgement* of *means* and *ends*: the *cardinal virtue* resulting from successfully resolving the *solutions-realities duality* when using the *rationalist approach to ethical choice*.	L'-1	5
	2) An example of an *ultimate value*.	L-7	
Work	1) As a psycho-social process: exercising *judgement*, making *decisions* and acting in pursuit of an explicit goal to produce *change* in the external world; essential for personal, organizational and societal *functioning* and the expression of *autonomy*.		
	2) As a physical process: the expenditure of physical energy.		
	3) As a social entity: a valued job.		
	4) As a *purpose* (i.e. the work to be done): see *principal object*.	L-4	
	5) See: *functioning*.	G-4	
Work group	*Social group* specifically created to pursue a pre-defined *endeavour*.		4
Wrong	The negative *deontological injunction* defining the abstract focus of *ethics* (i.e. the opposite of *right*).		

MASTER MATRICES

The Complete Set

Master-Figure 0

The full framework. In this framework, every cell represents an easily recognizable entity in the social world, and can be precisely labelled and defined using ordinary languages. Each entity relates intuitively and logically with every other entity. Entities with similar formulae show formal similarities. The formulae can be interpreted using the Table of Contents.

ETHICAL RULES

$G''-2$ $G''-3$ $G''-4$ $G''-5$ $G''-6$ $G''-7$

etc etc

$L''-7$
$L''-6$
$L''-5$
$L''-4$
$L''-3$
$L''-2$
$L''-1$

ETHICAL APPROACHES

TERTIARY HIERARCHY

TERTIARY STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY
Ethical Rule Derivatives enabling Ethical Authority in Society.

$L'-7$
$L'-6$
$L'-5$
$L'-4$
$L'-3$
$L'-2$
$L'-1$

Value Systems enabling Responsible Choice in Specific Situations.

SECONDARY HIERARCHY

PURPOSES (& VALUES)

$L-7$
$L-6$
$L-5$
$L-4$
$L-3$
$L-2$
$L-1$

$G-2$ $G-3$ $G-4$ $G-5$ $G-6$ $G-7$

Associated Hierarchies

PRIMARY HIERARCHY*

PRIMARY STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY
Purpose and Value Derivatives enabling the Realization of Values in Society.

*The pattern of processes shown within the primary hierarchy can be found within the other hierarchies.

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Master-Table 1

The hierarchy of purposes used to translate values into action.
The Table summarizes properties of levels in the hierarchy which relate most directly to activity.
Note that the 'typical format' is illustrative only. See text and Master-Tables 2 and 3 for further details and explanations.

L	Type of Purpose	Definition	Typical Format	Experience and Activity	Value/Action Relation	Link to Resources	Temporal Perspective
5	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	'We all need and want ..X..' [X = the social value.]	Intuition of many varied possible and worthwhile activities.	*Value consensus* crossing endeavours social bodies and institutions.	Provides the social potential for obtaining resources.	Present and undefined future.
4	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	'..A.. is set up to ..X..' [A = organized entity: eg project, group, person; X = the principal object.]	Idea (i.e. type or category) of specific worthwhile activities.	*Value consensus* within a defined endeavour.	Indicates general level and type of resource base required.	Present and defined or undefined future.
3	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use.	'..X.. is more important than ...Y,Z... now' [The preference for X over Y,Z .. is the internal priority.]	Emotion surrounding likely activities (basis of politics)	*Value/value conflict* within an endeavour in general or in a particular situation.	Provides the rationale for allocating resource.	Present and immediate future.
2	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	'..X.. must be achieved over the next ..t..' [X = strategic objective; t = approx. time period.]	Image of the outcome of activities (basis of strategies).	*Value/action conflict* within an endeavour in a particular situation.	Leads to mobilization and deployment of resource.	Rate of progress in a defined future
1	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome	'..X.. is to be done by ..T. so as to achieve ..Y..' [X is tactical; Y is strategic; T is the time-deadline.]	Awareness of activity details (basis of tasks)	*Action/action conflict* within an endeavour in a particular situation.	Leads to resource being produced and consumed.	Precisely defined future.

Master-Table 2

The complete hierarchy of purpose.
Additional properties are specified in Master-Tables 1, 3, 4 and 31. See text for further explanation.
The columns headed 'Transition downwards' and 'Transition upwards' describe the logic for the evolution of the hierarchy through the limitations of each level in terms of producing results (the 'how') and in justifying choice (the 'why'). Read the columns top down and bottom up respectively.

L	Type of Purpose	Definition	Transition Downwards (The 'How?')	Transition Upwards (The 'Why?')	Nature of Choice	Motivation (Motivation Type) Core Experience	Some Typical Critisms
7	Ultimate value	A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.			Inclusive-integrative	Inspiration (Transpersonal) Imagination	Too vague; too ambiguous; too abstract.
6	Value system	Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain	Need to order social life and guide thinking.	Need for an absolute justification.	Exclusive-divisive	Obligation (Social) Identification	Too confusing; too simplistic; too extreme; too controlling
5	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Need for ideas to be accepted by people.	Need for an explanatory rationale.	Inclusive-integrative	Need (Relational) Intuition	Too impractical; too platitudinous; too vacuous; too obvious.
4	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	Need to pursue specific activities competently.	Need for community endorsement.	Exclusive-divisive	Interest (Individual) Idea	Too constrained; too limited.
3	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use.	Need to cope within available resources.	Need to limit possible choices.	Inclusive-integrative	Desire (Emotional) Emotion	Too situational; too pragmatic; too flexible; too inflexible.
2	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	Need to produce actual impact in the situation.	Need for action to be governed by preferences.	Exclusive-divisive	Intention (Vital) Image	Too imprecise; too subjective;
1	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome.	Need to adapt to circumstances in fine detail.	Need for a sense of what is to be achieved.	Inclusive-integrative	Awareness (Sensory) Sensation	Too demanding; too specific; too mechanical.

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Master-Table 3

The hierarchy of values and types of social group.

The left-hand section contains definitions of values (purposes). The right-hand section identifies the associated natural social groups and some of their properties. For further details and explanations see text.

L	Type of Value & Definition	Type of Good	Social Group & Function	Energy & Antithesis	Participation & Cohesion	Relations: Linked and Separated	Leadership & Status	Group and Personal Identity
7	Ultimate value A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.	Absolute good	Humanity To enable union.	Spirituality : Anti-sociality	Being : Communion	Reconciliation and Harmony	Free-floating charisma : Equality and uniqueness	Humanity is the ground of all group and personal identities.
6	Value system Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain.	Theoretical good	Tribe To preserve social distinctiveness.	Loyalty : Betrayal	Socialization : Solidarity	Coexistence and Negativity	Symbolic ritual positions : Informal hierarchy	Tribal identity defines personal identity.
5	Social value A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Potential good	Community To meet social needs	Belonging : Isolation	Mutuality : Fellowship	Cooperation and Positivity	Public figures – elected or emergent : Fluctuating inequalities	The person and the community shape each other's identity
4	Principal object An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	Achievable good	Association To promote an interest formally.	Enthusiasm : Apathy	Commitment : Partnership	Alliance and Competition	Governance structures : Designed differentials	People define the identity of the association.
3	Internal priority A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use	Quantifiable good	Faction To ensure a particular view prevails.	Passion : Fanaticism	Siding : Partisanship	Coalition and Opposition	Powerful individuals : Impersonal equivalence	Factions enable assertion of personal identity.

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Master-
Table 4

Natural groups and organizations.
Natural social groups are the way people share and develop values, while work groups (quintessentially organizations) are the way that acitivities are pursued. The diagram shows the role of social values and principal objects in linking natural and work groups.
Similar clustering of levels occurs in both cases, driven either by the value and social group, or purpose and responsible body.
For further explanation and details on the clustering, see text Tables 3.5 and 5.1.

NATURAL GROUPS

Relations		Formation		TYPE OF VALUE		SOCIAL GROUP
Values/groups controlling	L7	Values/groups controlling	L7	Ultimate values	define	Humanity contains
differences	L6	identity	L6	Value systems	define	Tribes living in
	L5		L5	Social values	define	**Communities** requiring
Values/groups reflecting	L4	Values/groups reflecting	L4	Principal objects	define	**Associations** which need
differences	L3	identity	L3	Internal priorities	define	Factions

WORK GROUPS

RESPONSIBLE BODY		TYPE OF PURPOSE	Formation		Relations	
Wider society enables	sets	Social values	L5	Goals/bodies providing stability	L5	Goals/bodies providing orientation
Constituting bodies who create	set	Principal objects	L4		L4	
Governing bodies who appoint	set	Internal priorities	L3		L3	
Top officers who appoint other	set	Strategic objectives	L2	Goals/bodies generating change	L2	Goals/bodies generating impact
Executants	set	Tactical objectives	L1		L1	

can be → **Wider society**
can be → **Constituting bodies**

Properties of the seven approaches to ethical choice.
The core obligation can be viewed as either a social value (L-5) or an ethical maxim (L''-5).
See text for further details and examples.

L	Type of Approach	Core Obligation	Classification	Injunction to choose: (Interdiction)	Aspiration and Constraint	Cardinal Virtue Cardinal Vice
1'	Rationalist	Meeting practical objectives which are self-evidently sensible and worthwhile to the chooser.	Teleological	Reasonably (Unreasonably)	Solutions and Realities	Wisdom : Folly
2'	Conventionalist	Conforming with widely held views on what is valued and proper within the chooser's relevant social group.	Deontological	Acceptably (Unacceptably)	Continuity and Change	Moderation : Extremism
3'	Pragmatist	Pursuing values which are preferred by the chooser, bring some general benefit, and are easily applied.	Teleological	Appropriately (Inappropriately)	Ideals and Potentials	Prudence : Recklessness
4'	Individualist	Ensuring the chooser's security and interests in the light of existing power relations.	Deontological	Self-advantageously (Self-disadvantageously)	Strengths and Vulnerabilities	Courage : Arrogance
5'	Communalist	Balancing all anticipated consequences in relation to the needs and interests of all concerned including the chooser.	Teleological	Beneficially overall (Harmfully overall)	Altruism and Egoism	Benevolence : Indifference
6'	Legitimist	Setting a rule which is accepted as right by the chooser and all others in the social group.	Deontological	Fairly (Unfairly)	Common good and Individual autonomy	Justice : Injustice
7'	Transcendentalist	Responding to the chooser's deep inner (and essentially divine) sense of what is right and good.	Teleological	Authentically (Hypocritically)	Spirituality and Temporality	Integrity : Corruption

Master-Table 6

Using the approaches to ethical choice.

Note that all or many of the instigating factors are usually present in any choice situation, so the option of which approach to use is open.
See text for an elaboration of these summaries and for examples.

L	Type of Approach Duality	Instigated when:	Topics of Inquiry and Debate	Extreme Circumstance	Quandary	Features of Implementation	Principal Criticism
1′	**Rationalist** Solving the problem while recognizing realities.	A serious problem must be tackled dispassionately.	Will worthwhile objectives be met? Are they really worthwhile? What side-effects will there be?	Intense emotional pressure.	How to achieve goals in the face of intense emotive resistance.	Set up reorientation and educational programs.	Too insensitive
2′	**Conventionalist** Maintaining continuity given the pressure for change.	Social change becomes overt and unavoidable.	What are the existing values? How inevitable is change? What will be the effect on current values?	Rapid widespread uncontrollable change.	How to enable change while supporting established values.	Consult and allow dissent, phase change, compensate, allow some to opt out, resocialize.	Too reactionary
3′	**Pragmatist** Pursuing ideals within the bounds of present potential.	The situation demands immediate action.	What ideals are relevant? What is desired & believed? What can be done easily to ensure some benefit?	Collapse of ideals	How to persuade everyone that the choice means an improvement.	Communicate well, move ahead rapidly, foster pluralism, create groups who will benefit.	Too expedient
4′	**Individualist** Developing strengths without neglecting vulnerabilities.	Competition for resources and dominance exists.	Where does advantage lie? What is the actual balance of power? How can losses be minimized?	Loss of an essential resource.	How to overcome or adapt to others.	Be professional, husband resources, balance returns against effort, be tough.	Too self-centred.
5′	**Communalist** Choosing altruism by virtue of egoism.	Others need due consideration.	What will the effects be? Who will be affected? Who can tolerate hardship? What else might help?	Need for a sacrifice.	How and where to draw the boundary of concern.	Use participative system modelling, develop a system of choices, build on relationships.	Too complicated.
6′	**Legitimist** Serving the common good and individual autonomy.	Individuals must each govern their behaviour in a group setting.	What is the best rule? Is it acceptable now? Will it suit in future? How will it be monitored and enforced?	The group is chaotic and riven with conflict.	How to handle the diminution of individual freedom.	Ensure that rule-setting is participative and authoritative.	Too indeterminate
7′	**Transcendentalist** Realizing spirituality in the midst of temporality.	Personal integrity must be asserted.	(Use of meditative and related techniques to enable openness to an inspired intuition.)	Extremity of any sort, especially an assault on integrity	How to communicate the nature of the choice.	Draw on inner strengths, tolerate social rejection if necessary.	Too open to self-delusion

Master-Figure 7

The hierarchical evolution of ethical aspirations and constraints.
These belong to the approaches to ethical choice. Clearly the highest aspiration is spirituality and the most basic constraint is the situational realities. The emergence of each level is based on resolving the duality of aspiration and constraint at the preceding level. This resolution serves as the constraint at the higher level, where a new higher ethical aspiration is invoked. (The term in bold is the ethical aspiration, and the term in italics is the constraint.)

Level / *Approach*	
7' *Transcendentalist*	**Spirituality** / *Temporality*
6' *Legitimist*	**Common good** / *Individual autonomy*
5' *Communalist*	**Altruism** / *Egoism*
4' *Individualist*	**Strengths** / *Vulnerabilities*
3' *Pragmatist*	**Ideals** / *Potentials*
2' *Conventionalist*	**Continuity** / *Change*
1' *Rationalist*	**Solutions** / *Realities*

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Master-Table 8

A comparison of approaches for ethical choice, decision-making and inquiry.
The approaches are all used by people in the imperative mode; and the research has developed principles or injunctions for use in design. The implicit outlook has been abstracted from these principles, but it is not offered as having an independent reality

L	Implicit Outlook	Ethical Choice	Decision-making	Inquiry
	Each outlook applies across the three domains.	Each approach offers a sense of conviction.	Each approach offers a promise of confidence.	Each approach offers a guarantee of certainty.
1'	Move forward logically.	**Rationalist** Use means which logically achieve ends which are self-evidently worthwhile.	**Rationalist** Use values, objectives, priorities and plans to move forward.	**Formal-analytic** Use self-evident ideas, assumptions and logic to develop analyses.
2'	Deal with things as everyone agrees they are.	**Conventionalist** Conform to values which are widely held in your social group.	**Empiricist** Use detailed, valid and reliable information to solve existing problems.	**Empirical** Use general agreement as to the facts to discern regularities.
3'	Take small, easy, desirable and obvious steps.	**Pragmatist** Pursue values you prefer which also bring some wider benefit and are easily applicable.	**Opportunist** Use opportunities for action where some achievement is certain and easy.	**Explanatory** Use hypotheses and comparisons of alternatives to get increments of knowledge.
4'	Reconcile diverse conflicting outlooks	**Individualist** Ensure your security and interests by recognizing and using power relationships.	**Dialectical** Use disputes between different parties to reach a compromise solution.	**Dialectic** Use conflicts between ideas to develop an encompassing synthesis
5'	Balance all relevant factors.	**Communalist** Produce the outcome which best takes account of the needs and interests of all.	**Systemic** Use a model including all factors to generate an optimal-feasible strategy.	**Holistic** Use modelling to represent the situation as completely as possible.
6'	Impose a structure.	**Legitimist** Set explicit general rules which you and others in the group accept as fair.	**Structuralist** Use structures and procedures to provide legitimate authority and order.	**Dialogic** Use ratiocination to get a structured and authoritative theoretical base for inquiry.
7'	Let the Spirit move you.	**Transcendentalist** Respond to your deep inner sense of what is right and good.	**Imaginist** Use intuition and inspiration to gain deep personal commitment.	**Contemplative** Use unconscious awareness to create imaginative possibilities.

Master Matrix 8

Master-Figure 9

Nested hierarchies in the framework of purpose.
Note that the hierarchy of approaches to ethical choice is based on the primary hierarchy of purpose and lies wholly within Level 6. Each approach is a system of values. The hierarchy of purpose and the hierarchy of ethical rules are in single boxes indicating their holistic nature; whereas each ethical approach (or system) is in a discrete box reflecting its distinctiveness.

ETHICAL RULES
(Tertiary Hierarchy)

Level	
Level 7″	Absolutes
Level 6″	Laws
Level 5″	Maxims
Level 4″	Rights/Duties
Level 3″	Tenets
Level 2″	Conventions
Level 1″	Prescriptions

APPROACHES to ETHICAL CHOICE
(Secondary Hierarchy)

Level	
Level 7′	Transcendentalist
Level 6′	Legitimist
Level 5′	Communalist
Level 4′	Individualist
Level 3′	Pragmatist
Level 2′	Conventionalist
Level 1′	Rationalist

FRAMEWORK of PURPOSE
(Primary Hierarchy)

Level	
Level 7	Ultimate Values
Level 6	Value Systems
Level 5	Social Values
Level 4	Principal Objects
Level 3	Internal Priorities
Level 2	Strategic Objectives
Level 1	Tactical Objectives

Master-Figure 10

The framework of experience with its nested hierarchies.
The framework of experience is in a single box indicating the holistic nature of personal experience. The secondary hierarchy of identity reflects the primary hierarchy and lies wholly within L-VI. These approaches are discrete systems of assumptions and properties and so are in distinct boxes.
The natural moral institutions are a hierarchy nested within the L'-VI system of the secondary hierarchy. These institutions, though discrete, interact strongly to define the identity of a community and its members.

NATURAL MORAL INSTITUTIONS
(Tertiary Hierarchy)

Level VII″	Organized Religion
Level VI″	Governance System
Level V″	Ethical Teaching
Level IV″	Social Structure
Level III″	Communal Ideals
Level II″	Popular Morality
Level I″	Formal Etiquette

APPROACHES to IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT
(Secondary Hierarchy)

Level VII′	Transpersonal
Level VI′	Social
Level V′	Relational
Level IV′	Individual
Level III′	Emotional
Level II′	Vital
Level I′	Sensory

FRAMEWORK of EXPERIENCE
(Primary Hierarchy)

Level VII	Imagination
Level VI	Identification
Level V	Intuition
Level IV	Idea
Level III	Emotion
Level II	Image
Level I	Sensation

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Master-Table 11

Properties of the seven approaches to identity development.

The matrix summarizes characteristic assumptions and properties of the seven approaches to developing an identity. Note that the type of identity is also the form of the dominant reality and descriptive of the nature of human existence. The lower term of the duality is the stabilizing core of identity and the upper term is the growth-promoting potential (or source of hope). See text for further details.

L	Type of Identity*	Embedded in:	Boundaries	Identity Needs: Drive & Supplies	Satisfaction (Lack)	Well-Poor Functioning	Inherent Duality	Example Vocations
I'	Sensory being	Physical environments	External and diffuse	Equilibrium met by providing stimulation.	Sensory contact (Neglect)	Integrated — Overwhelmed	Activity and Receptivity	Decorator Fashion model
II'	Vital being	Body structures and functioning	Internal and distinct	Vitality met by providing concentration.	Controlled activity (Fatigue)	Energetic — Debilitated	Symbolic function and Instinctual function	Sportsman Dancer
III'	Emotional being	Feelings and flows of feeling	External and diffuse	Attachment met by providing value.	Emotional containment (Feeling bad)	Constructive — Destructive	Mental states and Body states	Social worker Psychotherapist
IV'	Individual being	A world of people	Internal and distinct	Self-esteem met by providing respect.	Acceptance from others (Rejection)	Genuine — False	The other and The self	Author Actor
V'	Relational being	Relationships and networks	External and diffuse	Self-actualization met by providing recognition.	Gratification of wishes (Frustration)	Liberated — Inhibited	Individuality and Group	Entrepreneur Leader
VI'	Social being	Society at a point in history	Internal and distinct	Participation met by providing responsibility.	Intentional activities (Aimlessness)	Involved — Detached	Situation and Role	Official Campaigner
VII'	Transpersonal being	The All (Cosmos/Being)	External and diffuse	Spirituality met by providing faith.	Union with the other/Being (Meaninglessness)	Serene — Anguished	God and Soul	Priest Poet

*Terms like 'individual', 'self' and 'existence' are frequently applied instead of 'being' to several or all the identity descriptors.

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Master-Table 12

Psychotherapy and the approaches to identity development.
This matrix provides an analysis in relation to psychological development, disturbances, techniques and theories.

Notes:
Everyone uses all approaches implicitly. Self-expression has static and dynamic elements which are listed in that order.
Lack of satisfaction is invariably a threat. Threats at unrecognized levels generate dysfunction in the level habitually used
Freud's contribution is more complex than the Table suggests. See text for further details.

L	Identity (Reality)	Self-expression involves:	Identity Threats	Signal of Dysfunction	Identity Breakdown	Identity Disorder	Psychotherapies (Non-psychoanalytic)	Psychoanalytic Theorists
I'	Sensory being	Awareness and arousal	Boredom; overstimulation; neglect.	Pain	Disintegration	Psychosomatic personality	Aromatherapy; reflex zone therapy; shiatsu	Paris school
II'	Vital being	Tension and movement	Stress; inattention; fatigue.	Exhaustion	Illness	Psychopathic – hysterical personality	Alexander technique; behavioral conditioning; dance therapy.	(None)
III'	Emotional being	Modification and relocation	Separation; confusion; hardness.	Anxiety	Paranoia	Borderline personality	Transactional analysis.	Klein
IV'	Individual being	Entitlement and adaptation	Rejection; contempt; devaluation.	Shame	Collapse	Narcissistic personality	Client-centred therapy; cognitive therapy.	Winnicott Kohut
V'	Relational being	Mutuality and dialogue	Non-recognition; frustration; scapegoating.	Guilt	Paralysis	Neurotic personality	Humanistic therapies.	Freud
VI'	Social being	Organization and management	Aimlessness; loss of responsibility; social isolation.	Alienation	Vagrancy	Traumatized personality	Existential therapies; radical therapy.	Kinston & Cohen
VII'	Transpersonal being	Harmony and attunement	Despair; being over-whelmed; cynicism.	Doubt	Torment	(Sickness of the soul)	Psychosynthesis; transcendental meditation; analytical psychology.	(None)

The hierarchical evolution of dualities in identity development.
The term in bold is the growth-promoting potential of the duality and the term in italics is the stabilizing core of any identity within that reality. The stabilizing core and the growth-promoting potential are transcended and apparently synthesized to produce a new stabilizing core at the next higher level, where a new growth-promoting potential emerges. See text for further explanation.

Level Approach	
VII' Transpersonal	**God** / *Soul*
VI' Social	**Situation** / *Role*
V' Relational	**Individuality** / *Group*
IV' Individual	**The other** / *The self*
III' Emotional	**Mental states** / *Body states*
II' Vital	**Symbolic function** / *Instinctual function*
I' Sensory	**Activity** / *Receptivity*

Master-   **Rules in society's natural moral institutions.**
Figure 14   The natural moral institutions get their character from the highest type of rule (in bold) because these shape and influence rules of lower types.
                  As a result, the institutions become progressively more complex and powerful. See text for further details and explanation.
                  Note that the horizontal hierarchy of the institutions lies within social being (L'-VI) and the framework of experience, whereas the
                  vertical hierarchy lies within the legitimist approach to ethical choice (L'-6) and the framework of purpose and value. Cf. Master-Figure 16.

Levels	L"-I Formal Etiquette	L"-II Popular Morality	L"-III Communal Ideals	L"-IV Social Structure	L"-V Ethical Teaching	L"-VI Governance System	L"-VII Organized Religion
L"-7							**Absolutes**
L"-6						**Laws**	Laws
L"-5					**Maxims**	Maxims	Maxims
L"-4				**Rights**	Rights	Rights	Rights
L"-3			**Tenets**	Tenets	Tenets	Tenets	Tenets
L"-2		**Conventions**	Conventions	Conventions	Conventions	Conventions	Conventions
L"-1	**Prescriptions**	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions	Prescriptions

Master-Table 15

Properties of society's natural moral institutions.
These form spontaneously within any complex society to foster its survival and coherence. The various rules support social being by providing the basis for identification and responsible participation. The place of these institutions in the theoretical framework is shown in Master-Figures 10 and 16. Note that these institutions operate within social being and provide a foundation for both personal and communal identity. See text for further explanation and details.

L	Types of Moral Institution	Identity Realm Link and Typical Concerns	Society's Survival Need	Main Rule Type and Focus	Ensuring Compliance: Sanction & Inducement		Approach to Individual Differences	Common Criticisms
I″	Formal etiquette	Sensory: dress, appearance, dining, speech.	Ceremonial respect	Prescription deals with social behaviours	Direct social control of behaviour &	Certainty of doing what is right.	Ignored and irrelevant	Too artificial and mechanical.
II″	Popular morality	Vital: sex, aggression, work, alcohol, drugs, money.	Conformity	Convention deals with social attitudes	Social rejection &	Social acceptance	Suppressed and overcome	Too rigid or too lax; worsens personal problems.
III″	Communal ideals	Emotional: any property of a society which enables attachment.	Energy	Tenet deals with social values	Social opposition &	Social endorsement	Accepted and tolerated	Blocks learning from outsiders; creates taboos.
IV″	Social structure	Individual: claims, duties, powers, disabilities, privileges, immunities, liabilities.	Order	Right deals with social boundaries	Losing benefits of membership &	Gaining benefits of membership	Classified and institutionalized	Institutionalizes injustice.
V″	Ethical teaching	Relational: handling personal and social relationships.	Virtue	Maxim deals with social functioning	Social condemnation &	Social admiration	Recognized and valued	Too demanding and unrealistic in everyday life.
VI″	Governance system	Social: maintaining peace, order, justice, freedom and the common good.	Stability	Law deals with social enforcement	Public penalties &	Public support	Assumed and protected	Too overwhelming; too corruptible; too bureaucratic.
VII″	Organized religion	Transpersonal: mysteries of existence – especially evil, suffering, and God.	Meaning	Absolute deals with social existence	Being distrusted &	Being trusted	Sustained and transcended	Too pervasive; too controlling; too hypocritical

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Master-Figure 16

Linking the frameworks of experience and purpose via motivation.
Basic motivations link experience and purpose; ethical aspirations link approaches to ethical choice with approaches to identity development; and ethical dispositions link ethical rules and the natural moral institutions of society. See text for further details and explanation.

	TYPES of ETHICAL RULE	Ethical Dispositions	NATURAL MORAL INSTITUTIONS	
Level 7″	Absolute	Autonomy	Organized Religion	Level VII″
Level 6″	Law	Obedience	Governance System	Level VI″
Level 5″	Maxim	Virtue	Ethical Teaching	Level V″
Level 4″	Right	Respect	Social Structure	Level IV″
Level 3″	Tenet	Dedication	Communal Ideals	Level III″
Level 2″	Convention	Conformity	Popular Morality	Level II″
Level 1″	Prescription	Meticulousness	Formal Etiquette	Level I″

	APPROACHES to ETHICAL CHOICE	Ethical Aspirations	APPROACHES to IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT	
System 7′	Transcendentalist	Spirituality	Transpersonal	System VII′
System 6′	Legitimist	Common Good	Social	System VI′
System 5′	Systemicist	Altruism	Relational	System V′
System 4′	Individualist	Strength	Individual	System IV′
System 3′	Pragmatist	Ideals	Emotional	System III′
System 2′	Conventionalist	Continuity	Vital	System II′
System 1′	Rationalist	Solutions	Sensory	System I′

	FRAMEWORK of PURPOSE	Basic Motivations	FRAMEWORK of EXPERIENCE	
Level 7	Ultimate Value	Inspiration	Imagination	Level VII
Level 6	Value System	Obligation	Identification	Level VI
Level 5	Social Value	Need	Intuition	Level V
Level 4	Principal Object	Interest	Idea	Level IV
Level 3	Internal Priority	Desire	Emotion	Level III
Level 2	Strategic Objective	Intention	Image	Level II
Level 1	Tactical Objective	Awareness	Sensation	Level I

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Master-Table 17

Properties of the seven types of ethical rule and associated codes.
The rule types are those found in the natural moral institutions, but no longer linked to particular identity realms (cf. Master-Fig. 16).
Note that the immediate source of authority for a rule or code varies with the frame of reference (e.g. employee hierarchy, association, nation)
See text for further details and examples. For a more general account of the rules, see Master-Table 21.

L	Type of Rule & Code	Function	Application	Changing Rules	Advantages (over Laws)	Common Criticisms	Ethical Disposition
1"	Prescriptions may be organized as a Code of practice	To ensure all know and perform certain social actions strictly as specified.	When people need precise instructions on what to do to avoid harm.	Change is easy because it flows from rational inquiry.	Straightforward; unambiguous; easy to monitor.	Ignores feelings and preferences of the people affected.	Meticulousness
2"	Conventions may be organized as an Ethos	To ensure all know and apply certain attitudes generally in their conduct.	When discretionary action must be constrained in a widely accepted way.	Change emerges because the social group and its values evolve.	Adaptable; feels natural; enables graded adherence.	Too fuzzy and undefined; generates excessive conformity.	Conformity
3"	Tenets may be organized as a Credo	To ensure all know affirm and express certain values in daily life.	When a group needs to strengthen its culture by activating ideals.	Change is difficult because people must be re-socialized.	Powerful; preventative; personally owned.	Too distorting; too emotionally invested; too controlling; too difficult to install.	Dedication
4"	Rights may be organized as a Charter	To ensure all know and respect what is due to and from each individual in a class.	When conflicts due to power imbalances between classes need to be reduced.	Change is opposed because the balance of power is altered.	Less threatening; allows refining; enables gradual acceptance.	Generates conflict; worsens prejudices; fosters extremism.	Respect
5"	Maxims may be organized as a Code of ethics	To ensure all know and meet general requirements for virtuous functioning	When individuals in society need confidence in the self-control of others.	Change is superficial because the same maxims apply in new situations.	Based in trust; activates virtue; flexible and simple to operate.	Too vague; open to exploitation; too dependent on the individual.	Virtue
6"	Laws may be organized as a System	To ensure all know and obey those rules enforced to maintain a stable social order.	When differences of view on what rules are essential become socially intolerable.	Change is formalized because it must be agreed as a social necessity.	Carefully defined; comprehensive; backed by socially permissible force.	Too pedantic; too mechanical; too complicated; too rigid; too procedural.	Obedience
7"	Absolutes may be organized as The eternal verities	To ensure all know and aspire to the path of duty.	Applicable by any one anywhere at any time.	Change is absent because it is unnecessary.	Universal; immutable; eternal.	Too abstract; too contentless; too uncontrollable	Autonomy

Master Matrix 17

Master-Figure 18

The framework for accommodating ethical authority.
A diagram of the structural hierarchy formed by systematically defining all combinations of adjacent levels of ethical rule in the elemental hierarchy.
The processes above the groupings indicate what must be handled ethically in any society; and the resulting form of authority is described beneath the groupings
See text and Master-Tables 19, 20 and 27 for further details and explanation of the whole framework.

	G"-1 Recognizing Authority	G"-2 Maintaining Community	G"-3 Socializing Individuals	G"-4 Protecting Identity	G"-5 Judging Conduct	G"-6 Regulating Obedience	G"-7 Engendering Will
L"-7	Absolute	Natural Justice Principle	Distributive Justice	Universal Standard	The Morality	Moral Imperative	
L"-6	Law	Legal Principle	Legal Responsibility				
L"-5	Maxim			Societal Standard			
L"-4	Right	Human Right Principle		Individual Standard	The Law		The Ethical Order
L"-3	Tenet	Ideological Principle	Cultural Ethic				
L"-2	Convention	Social Policy Principle	Communal Role	Communal Standard			
L"-1	Prescription	Civility Principle	Good Practice		The Custom	Pragmatic Imperative	

| revealing 7 types of binding **RULE** supporting and constraining Community | revealing 6 types of guiding **PRINCIPLE** supporting and constraining Individuals | revealing 5 types of internalized **POSITION** supporting and constraining Identity | revealing 4 types of minimum **STANDARD** supporting and constraining Conduct | revealing 3 types of definitive **FRAMES OF REFERENCE** supporting and constraining Obedience | revealing 2 types of categorical **IMPERATIVE** supporting and constraining Will | revealing 1 type of sustainable **ORDER** supporting and constraining Authority |

Generic Labels:

| ELEMENTAL DIFFERENTIATION | CONSTRAINED DYNAMISM | SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT | SELF-CONTAINED OPERATION | PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION | STRUCTURED INTEGRATION | HOLISTIC UNIFICATION |

Master-Table 19

The groupings of levels of ethical rule generating ethical authority.

Abstract authorities, labelled in the content column, emerge from grouping the seven levels of ethical rules to form a structural hierarchy (G"-1 to G"-7).
Groups within these groupings define ethical authorities needed in any society. See Master-Table 27 for further properties and relationships of the groupings

G	Nature	Function in Society	Content (Group Structure)	Characteristic when Ascending the Groups	Implications for Social Design	Some Typical Errors
G"-1:	Recognizing authority unequivocally	To ensure that constraints defined by recognizable authorities can become binding obligations on all	Ethical Rules (7 monads)	Groups reflect progressively greater autonomy and weight of ethical responsibility in making choices.	Primal authorities of seven distinct types must be respected by all established authorities.	Confusion about what different types of rule can achieve; an excessive use prescriptions and laws to enable coercion.
G"-2:	Maintaining community acceptably	To ensure that choices affecting the community and its viability can be authoritatively guided.	Ethical Principles (6 dyads)	Groups reflect progressively greater demands for willing cooperation amongst members of a society.	Government is about using principles. Scholarship to develop and assess ethical principles is needed.	Treating principles as rules and failing to see that principles need to be weighed and balanced against each other.
G"-3:	Socializing individuals dogmatically	To ensure that members can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and change	Ethical Positions (5 triads)	Groups reflect progressively more powerful societal requirements for conformity with ethical rules.	Orchestrated public debate is needed for progress, so freedom of expression and association are essential.	Regarding positions as if they were unitary e.g. only one form of distributive justice, only one valid ethic.
G"-4:	Protecting identity deliberately	To ensure that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative and self-chosen minimum.	Ethical Standards (4 tetrads)	Groups reflect progressively profounder conceptions of social identity, each of which needs protection.	Progress depends on developing standards, and providing for monitoring and arbitration.	Confusing standards which define an ideal, an actual, a goal, or an expectation with standards which define a minimum and an identity.
G"-5:	Judging conduct virtuously	To ensure that differing views of right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement.	Ethical Frames of Reference (3 pentads)	Groups reflect a progressive move from respecting the past, through handling the present, to creating a better future.	There are three types of justice and social power. The law mediates between custom and morality.	Over-valuing or under-valuing one of the frames; trying to fuse distinct frames.
G"-6:	Regulating obedience legitimately	To ensure that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time.	Ethical Imperatives (2 hexads)	Groups reflect a shift from pragmatic and temporal considerations to spiritual and eternal considerations.	The ultimate personal and social sources of obedience are absolutes and laws respectively.	Attempting to unify temporal and spiritual powers in one authority to avoid intrinsic tensions; over-personalizing societal authority.
G"-7:	Engendering will freely	To ensure that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems right.	Ethical Order (1 heptad)	The group of all levels reflects the sustenance of a social order which unifies all inner-personal and outer-social obligations.	The need for all to create a society in which what each member ought to do is what each wants to do.	Denying the need for communal restraints on individuality; denying the need to maximize personal autonomy.

Master Matrix 19

Master-Table 20

Qualities of internal levels in each of the groupings of ethical rules.
These properties apply to each of the groups within a particular grouping. The Table shows how each grouping builds on the previous one. Note that the highest level (in shaded bold) gives the grouping its characteristic quality. In the formulae on both sides, 1°L refers to the first level in a group or grouping, 2°L to the second level &c. See text for further explanation and examples

	G"-1	G"-2	G"-3	G"-4	G"-5	G"-6	G"-7	
	Authority requires 7 types of **RULE** to be respected	**Community** requires 6 types of **PRINCIPLE** to be applied	**Individuals** require 5 types of **POSITION** to be affirmed	**Identity** requires 4 types of **STANDARD** to be adopted	**Conduct** requires 3 types of **FRAME OF REFERENCE** to be evolved	**Obedience** requires 2 types of **IMPERATIVE** to be imposed	**Will** requires 1 type of **ORDER** to be embraced	
7°L							**Freely**	7°L
6°L						**Legitimately**	Legitimately	6°L
5°L					**Virtuously**	Virtuously	Virtuously	5°L
4°L				**Deliberately**	Deliberately	Deliberately	Deliberately	4°L
3°L			**Dogmatically**	Dogmatically	Dogmatically	Dogmatically	Dogmatically	3°L
2°L		**Acceptably**	Acceptably	Acceptably	Acceptably	Acceptably	Acceptably	2°L
1°L	**Unequivocally**	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	Unequivocally	1°L

DEFINITIONS:

Unequivocally	:	In terms of what is clearly recognized as an obligation by all concerned.
Acceptably	:	In terms of what is expected and allowed by most in the community.
Dogmatically	:	In terms of what is to be believed without further proof or doubt.
Deliberately	:	In terms of what is self-consciously owned, claimed and conformed to.
Virtuously	:	In terms of what is required by ideals of virtue and justice.
Legitimately	:	In terms of what is formally specified and enforced.
Freely	:	In terms of what is necessary, desired, right and good for oneself and all.

Master-Table 21

Properties of the seven types of binding rule in society.

Respect for rules is based on recognizing the primal authorities in community life. All actual or instituted social authorities appeal to these. Rules must be unequivocally respected but each provides for a different degree of freedom in practice. See text for further details and explanation and cf. Master-Tables 16 & 17. Note that Master-Table 17 provides details of the function and application of rules, differences in changing rules, their particular advantages, common criticisms, and the related ethical disposition.

Monad (Level)	Type of Rule and Focus	To Whom the Rule Applies	Primal Authority	Basis of Compliance	Quality of Adherence	Personal Freedom & Weight of Responsibility
1 (L"-1)	Prescription constrains actions.	Members as elements of a community.	Community leaders	Social control via impersonal command	Certain-incontestable (because capable of precise specification and assignation)	Absolute minimum (because constraints are precisely specified).
2 (L"-2)	Convention constrains attitudes.	Members diffusely in the mainstream of a community.	Community as a whole	Social pressure via public opinion	Uncertain-contestable (because partial, fuzzy and evolving).	Minimum (because responsibility is shared with others).
3 (L"-3)	Tenet constrains beliefs.	Members of associations within a community.	Each person's conscience	Personal control via inner conviction	Certain-incontestable (because based directly on inner experiences).	Moderate (because internally controlled but partly unconscious).
4 (L"-4)	Right constrains entitlements.	Members of social classes in a community.	Class power	Personal pressure via special interest	Uncertain-contestable (because members challenge explicit rules).	Near maximum (because under direct conscious personal control)
5 (L"-5)	Maxim constrains functioning.	Members of a moral community.	An ethical teaching	Social pressure for personal control via moral exhortation	Certain-incontestable (because so obviously good and right).	Maximum (because rule-breaking may be personally advantageous).
6 (L"-6)	Law constrains enforcement	Members of an officially bounded community.	The law	Social control of social control via legalized coercion	Uncertain-contestable (because open to interpretation and revision).	Maximum* (because of freedom under the law).
7 (L"-7)	Absolute constrains freedom and duty.	Members of all communities at all times.	Ultimate values	Personal control of personal control via free will	Certain-incontestable (because so abstract and all-embracing).	Absolute maximum (because the meaning and use must be left up to each person).

*Laws may reduce freedom if they are used where other types of rule are required, if society is treated as an organization, or if the legal system does not operate by consent.

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Master-Table 22

Properties of the six types of guiding principle in society.
Ethical principles, which are needed to maintain a community, are dyadic authorities formed by conjoining two adjacent types of rule.
A variety of ethical principles must be applied when making choices which might affect community security and cohesion (i.e. viability)
Note that a wide variety of bodies may develop or promote principles of various sorts. See text for details and explanation.

Dyad No. (Levels)	Type of Principle	Function	Contribution to Community Viability	Type of Decision Requiring Ethical Guidance	Authority and Responsibility for Selection & Use	Theory/Discipline for Development & Analysis
1 (L"s 1 & 2)	Civility principle	To shape behaviour so that due respect for community members is always manifest.	Provides the basic mechanism for communal coexistence.	Handling informal aspects of inter-personal interactions.	Each person	Social psychology
2 (L"s 2 & 3)	Social policy principle	To shape attitudes and organisations so that members' needs are met in society.	Bolsters the rationale for member participation in a community.	Handling interactions mediating personal needs.	Government	Public administration Policy analysis
3 (L"s 3 & 4)	Ideological principle	To shape social institutions so that fair entitlements of classes of members are met	Assists re-structuring of the community when required.	Whenever the status or power of a class of individual is affected.	Political parties.	Economics Sociology Social theory
4 (L"s 4 & 5)	Human right principle	To shape social constraints on members so as to protect their freedom as individuals.	Minimizes coercive control of community members.	Collective action seeking to benefit all or prevent harm by individuals.	Legislators, jurists, regulatory authorities, courts of human rights.	Political theory
5 (L"s 5 & 6)	Legal principle	To shape legal decisions so as to protect social institutions on which the community depends.	Maintains confidence in the legal system.	Disputes within courts of justice.	Judges, lawyers.	Jurisprudence
6 (L"s 6 & 7)	Natural justice principle	To shape the expression of fair play in society.	Maintains community spirit by minimizing feelings of injustice.	Creation and use of any social arrangement.	All members of society, and especially official authorities.	Natural law theories

Master-Table 23

Properties of the five types of internalized position in society.

Ethical positions, which are needed to socialize individuals, are triadic authorities formed by conjoining three adjacent types of rule.
Positions express and reflect culture and enable ethical change. Note that both freedom and conformity are essential and valued in all societies
Ethical change is viewed as progress towards enlightenment by those advocating it. See text for details and explanation.

Triad No. (Levels)	Type of Position	Function	Expression	Nature of Multiplicity	Ethical Change	Relation to Freedom	Conformity For (or Against)	Change Agents (Devalued)
1 (L"s 1-3)	Good practice	To orient individuals to acting in a way which meets the needs of others in specific contexts.	Codes of good practice which define, promote and concretize social values.	Disconnected, with areas of connection.	Depends on rational inquiry, and grounds all ethical change.	Expresses freedom.	Overt and easy (or resisted)	Innovator (Non-conformist)
2 (L"s 2-4)	Communal role	To orient individuals to relating to others in a way that affirms mutual rights and duties.	Social relationships which maintain the social structure.	Distinct and connected.	Depends on communal change, and stabilizes ethical change.	Enables the exercise of freedom.	Feels natural (or unnatural)	Iconoclast (Deviant)
3 (L"s 3-5)	Cultural ethic	To orient individuals to participating in society in a way that demonstrates virtue.	Personal outlooks or spirit of the age.	Overlapping or dialectically inter-connected	Depends on personal change, and drives all ethical change.	Defines the nature of freedom.	Leads to personal identification (or deep rejection)	Outsider (Outcast)
4 (L"s 4-6)	Legal responsibility	To orient individuals to fulfilling their legal obligations to others and to the community.	Social institutions emerging from laws and government sanction.	Strongly inter-connected	Depends on legal enforcement, and consolidates ethical change.	Protects the exercise of freedom.	Self-conscious (or imposed from without)	Conscientious objector (Outlaw)
5 (L"s 5-7)	Distributive justice	To orient individuals to supporting the ethical order and tolerating actual inequalities.	A cultural conception of a fair way to deal with collective goods and bads.	Tends to unification.	Depends on cultural forces, and justifies ethical change.	Enhances freedom of each and all.	Assumed automatically (or profoundly problematic)	Radical (Dissident)

Master- Table 24	**Properties of the four types of minimum standard in society.** Ethical standards, which are needed to protect identity, are tetradic authorities formed by conjoining four adjacent types of rule Standards must be owned if they are to enable self-appraisal and self-control. See text for details and explanation.

Tetrad No. (Levels)	Type of Standard	Function	Focus of Conformity	Standard-setting Authority	How Standards Are Set	How Standards are Monitored	Who Judges Breaches
1 (L"s 1-4)	Communal standard	To protect an evolving undefined community identity.	Individual activity in public.	The community	Informally	Media investigation, public complaints, informal criticism.	Any member of the community.
2 (L"s 2-5)	Individual standard	To protect an individual's self-defined identity.	The individual's internal functioning (expressed explicitly or implicitly in actions).	Each person or organization.	Privately by deliberate choice.	Internal criticism and review, often in response to external comment.	The individual: i.e. governing body in an organisation.
3 (L"s 3-6)	Societal standard	To protect a society's officially enacted identity.	Formal institutions e.g. laws, regulations, government policies, public agencies &c.	Governing organs of a society.	Formal enactments like laws and statutory instruments	Statutory agencies and regulatory authorities.	Courts and tribunals within a society.
4 (L"s 4-7)	Universal standard	To protect an internationally agreed conception of human identity in society.	Individual rights and duties in a sovereign society.	Multi-national governmental bodies (e.g. UNO).	Unanimously adopted formal declarations to be ratified in law by national governments.	Campaigning bodies, world press, parliamentary fact-finding visits.	International judicial tribunals commissions and courts.

Master-Table 25

Properties of the three types of definitive frame of reference in society.
Ethical frames of reference, which are needed to judge whether conduct is just, are pentadic authorities formed by conjoining five adjacent types of rule. See text for details and explanation.

Pentad No. (Levels)	1 (L"s 1-5)	2 (L"s 2-6)	3 (L"s 3-7)
Types of Frame of Reference	The Custom	The Law	The Morality
Function	To enable judgements of conduct which define what has always been taken as right.	To enable judgements of conduct which define what must now be taken as right.	To enable judgements of conduct which define what ought to be taken as right.
Time Perspective **Social Reality**	Past Practical & communal	Present Institutional & societal	Future Aspirational & theoretical
Generator **Primal Authority**	Popular sympathies & emotions Community as a whole	Legal reasoning & the intellect The law itself	Moral imagination & intuitions Ethical teaching/ultimate values
Justice **Judging Body** **Judicial Style** **Proceedings** **Methods**	Substantive Adjudicator(s) forming a Tribunal Pragmatic & prudential Inquisitorial – investigative Negotiation & mediation	Formal Judge(s) in a Court of Justice Procedural & technical Accusatorial – adversarial Representation & advocacy	Solomonic Sage in a sacralized setting Dogmatic & educational Revelatory – experiential Inspiration & illumination
Focus **Control** **Authority** **Freedom** **Type of Power**	Situational & fuzzy Outer & informal Traditional Restricts Economic & physical	Objective & comprehensive Outer & formal Rational Protects Political & coercive	Subjective & symbolic Inner/outer & informal/formal Religious Defines Integrative & humanistic
Social Form **Societal Epitome**	The People Chief/Prime Minister	The Government Judge	The Official Religion Spiritual Head of State/Monarch
Main Advantage **Main Limitation** **Main Danger**	Practicality Ignores the individual Mob law or blood feuds	Values individuals Bound by precedent Expensive, lengthy, incomprehensible cases	Provides hope for a better world Impracticality Extremist utopianism

Master- | **Properties of the two types of categorical imperative in society.**
Table 26 | Ethical imperatives, which are needed to regulate obedience, are hexadic authorities formed by conjoining six adjacent types of rule. See text for details and explanation.

Hexad No. (Levels)	1 (L"s 1-6)	2 (L"s 2-7)
Types of Imperative *Example*	Pragmatic Imperative e.g. kill when necessary!	Moral Imperative e.g. do not murder!
Function	To regulate demands for obedience generated by the rulers of a society.	To regulate demands for obedience generated by a person as part of a group
Object of Control	Rulers, the citizenry and the government, and through them, society.	Each person and through them the community and thence the rulers.
Concern	Maintaining a political society.	Maintaining a moral community.
Legitimation	By laws: as formally introduced within a recognized legislature.	By absolutes: commandments defined in holy scriptures or in imaginative awareness.
Source of **Authority**	Human beings have a practical need for rules given their temporality and frailty.	Human beings have a spiritual and religious need for rules.
Ideological Base	Legal positivism.	Ecclesiastical absolutism.
Danger	Unprincipled laws and activities by governments.	Elevating rules better categorized as lower level types to the status of laws or absolutes.

Properties revealing the coherence of the hierarchy of ethical authority.
See Master-Tables 18 & 19 and text for further details and explanation.

G	Ethical Authority and Function	Ultimate Value Link	The Process of Ethical Design	Key Social Entities	Evolution of Authority	Conformity & its Effect	Unity and Multiplicity
7"	**The Order** ensures that each member can be authentic when authorizing and sustaining what everyone deems right	Harmony	*Moral imagination:* the starting point and hope for a better world	The person and the actual social order.	Spirit of authority	Desired so enables freedom	Unity.
6"	**Imperatives** ensures that categorical obedience can persist authoritatively in society through time.	Truth	*Ethical force:* what makes social life possible and worthwhile.	Ultimate values (God) and the sovereign society.	Force of authority	Demanded so requires restraint	Unity expressed as a duality.
5"	**Frames of Reference** ensures that differing views of right conduct can be definitively resolved by an authoritative judgement.	Justice	*Ethical context:* the evolving all-embracing context for personal conduct.	Communities; The government; Natural moral institutions	Systems of authority	Judged so enables freedom	Three unities seeking a greater unity.
4"	**Standards** ensures that conformity can be sustained above an authoritative and self-chosen minimum.	Liberty	*Ethical being:* self-consciously seeking ethical individuality and tolerating diversity.	Communities; each person and organization; the government; multi-national governmental bodies.	Realizing authority	Self-appraised so requires restraint	Multiple discrete connected unities.
3"	**Positions** ensures that members can be coherently and authoritatively oriented to ethical challenge and change.	Equality	*Open debate:* the mechanism of ethical stability and progress.	The media, campaigning and reforming bodies of many types; innovators, iconoclasts, outsiders, conscientious objectors, radicals.	Modifying authority	Debated so enables freedom	Connected multiplicity.
2"	**Principles** ensures that choices affecting the community and its viability can be authoritatively guided.	Fraternity	*Community governance:* what can and should be ethically designed.	Each person, the government, political parties, legislators, jurists, regulatory authorities — plus academic inquirers.	Establishing authority	Determined so requires restraint	Disconnected multiplicity.
1"	**Rules** ensures that constraints defined by recognizable authorities can become binding obligations on all.	Peace	*Primal authorities:* the means and limits of ethical design.	Communal leaders, community mainstream, consciences, class power, ethical teachings, the law, ultimate values.	Recognizing authority	Bounded so enables freedom	Multiplicity organizable in discrete areas.

Master-Figure 28

Purpose derivatives and processes for realizing values in society.
Diagrammatic representation of the structural hierarchy formed by systematically defining all combinations of adjacent levels of purpose in the elemental hierarchy. See text and Master-Tables 29 and 30 for further details and explanation.

	G-1 Defining Responsibility	G-2 Constraining Activity	G-3 Promoting Change	G-4 Sustaining Achievement	G-5 Organizing Endeavours	G-6 Regulating Power	G-7 Exercising Freedom
L-7	Ultimate value		Conviction		Vision	A Movement	The Citizenry
L-6	Value system	Approach	Ideal				
L-5	Social value	Mission	Crusade	Culture	An Authority		
L-4	Principal object	Role	Campaign	Growth			The Social Order
L-3	Internal priority	Policy	Initiative				
L-2	Strategic objective	Plan	Directive	Operation	An Enterprise	The Government	
L-1	Tactical objective						

revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing	revealing
7 levels of **PURPOSE**	6 types of **DIRECTION**	5 components of **DRIVE**	4 domains of **FUNCTIONING**	3 embodiments of **AUTONOMY**	2 guardians of **SOVEREIGNTY**	1 state of **MEMBERSHIP**
enabling and generating Activity	enabling and generating Change	enabling and generating Achievement	enabling and generating Endeavours	enabling and generating Power	enabling and generating Freedom	enabling and generating Responsibility

Generic Labels:

ELEMENTAL DIFFERENTIATION	CONSTRAINED DYNAMISM	SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT	SELF-CONTAINED OPERATION	PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION	STRUCTURED INTEGRATION	HOLISTIC UNIFICATION

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Master-Table 29 — **The groupings of levels of purpose used to realize values in society.**

Grouping the levels of purpose forms seven levels in a structural hierarchy. The G numeral indicates the number of adjacent levels grouped together. In all groupings (G), descending the groups reveals progression to more realizable, precise, tangible, or action-based entities.

G.	Nature	Function	Content (Structure)	Implications for Society	Implications for Organizations	Common Errors
G-1:	Defining responsibility appropriately	To ensure that values can be affirmed, chosen and pursued in a social context.	7 levels of **Purpose** (monadic)	Recognition that everyone has the need and ability to fill seven distinct primal roles in social life.	All seven levels need to be recognized as motivating and influencing staff.	•Poor balance between personal and group pressures. •Excessive neglect of one or more roles and levels.
G-2:	Constraining activity strategically	To ensure that chosen values focus minds and shape outcomes.	6 types of **Direction** (dyadic)	Communication between primal roles at adjacent levels is needed to deal with uncertainty about using values in practice.	Clear, realistic and acceptable directions are needed for cooperation, efficiency, effectiveness.	•Woolly specifications. •Mishandling the social process. •Ignoring value pressures
G-3:	Promoting change politically	To ensure that desired values are installed despite resistances.	5 components of **Drive** (triadic)	Values must be constantly revised, reasserted and (re-)installed, even in the most conservative society.	Organizations are quasi-communities and all staff should be engaged when introducing values.	•Failing to recognize the political dimension in change. •Not attempting to introduce any changes.
G-4:	Sustaining achievement rationally	To ensure that values are expressed coherently and enduringly in activities.	4 domains of **Functioning** (tetradic)	Society requires a wide variety of organizations dedicated to its transformation, differentiation, strengthening and sustenance.	Strong management involves the performance of four types of leadership work.	•Omitting work on mind-sets. •Excess focus on operations. •Absence of strategic thinking. •Poor linkage of the domains.
G-5:	Organizing endeavours consensually	To ensure that work serves the values of both society and individuals.	3 embodiments of **Autonomy** (pentadic)	Organizing involves compartmentalization and the duties of each compartment should be designed to be synergistic.	Movements, authorities and enterprises must be developed and handled in distinctive ways.	•Expecting efficient services from government, or self-regulation by individual firms. •Misunderstanding regulation
G-6:	Regulating power ethically	To ensure that a society, its people and their activities, are regulated by values.	2 guardians of **Sovereignty** (hexadic)	The people require guardian institutions and political debate to control the government that regulates their activities.	An organization should consider itself a society in microcosm and work on its framework of ethical rules.	•The government places itself above the citizenry. •Poor working of the political arena.
G-7:	Exercising freedom imaginatively	To ensure that each member of society uses and evaluates values.	1 state of **Membership** (heptadic)	Society requires its members to show civic virtue by participating willingly, being responsible and acting on what is important.	Values are constantly affirmed by all staff in their relationships, actions and communications.	•Taking society for granted. •Denying the omnipresence of values in all social phenomena. •Devaluing certain members.

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Master Matrix 29

Master-Table 30

Qualities of internal levels in each of the groupings of purposes.
These properties apply to each of the groups (purpose-derivatives) within a particular grouping. The Table shows how each grouping builds on the previous one. Note that the highest level (in shaded bold) gives the grouping its characteristic quality.
In formulae on both sides, 1°L refers to the first level in a group or grouping, 2°L to the second level &c. See text for further explanation

	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	G-6	G-7
	Each of the 7 levels of **PURPOSE** enables **Responsibility** to be defined	Each of the 6 types of **DIRECTION** enables **Activity** to be constrained	Each of the 5 components of **DRIVE** enables **Change** to be promoted	Each of the 4 domains of **FUNCTIONING** enables **Achievement** to be sustained	Each of the 3 embodiments of **AUTONOMY** enables **Endeavours** to be organized	Each of the 2 guardians of **SOVEREIGNTY** enables **Power** to be regulated	Each of the state of **MEMBERSHIP** enables **Freedom** to be exercised

	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	G-6	G-7	
7°L							**Imaginatively**	7°L
6°L						**Ethically**	Ethically	6°L
5°L					**Consensually**	Consensually	Consensually	5°L
4°L				**Rationally**	Rationally	Rationally	Rationally	4°L
3°L			**Politically**	Politically	Politically	Politically	Politically	3°L
2°L		**Strategically**	Strategically	Strategically	Strategically	Strategically	Strategically	2°L
1°L	**Appropriately**	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	Appropriately	1°L

DEFINITIONS:

Appropriately	:	To meet the need to adapt to the immediate situation.
Strategically	:	To meet the need to maximize the impact of values given in the situation.
Politically	:	To meet the need to win support when choosing from valid alternative values.
Rationally	:	By appeal to a value-based rationale for on-going activities.
Consensually	:	By appeal to a general and freely given agreement on values.
Ethically	:	By appeal to values which are understood to be right and good.
Imaginatively	:	By appeal to values which transcend present society.

Properties of the seven levels of purpose.

Purposes ensure that responsibility is appropriately defined. Each level is a monad: i.e. elemental and irreducible.
The seven levels of purpose are associated with specific roles, responsibilities and relationships.
See text and review Master-Tables 1-4 for further details and explanation.

Monad (Level)	Level of Purpose	Definition	Relation to Self	Personal Responsibility	Primal Role & Relationship	Pressures	Specialized Communal Roles
7 (L-7)	Ultimate value	A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.	Selflessness with the danger of self-denial	For: distinguishing good and evil.	Human being responsible to God	Theory- or society-based.	Visionaries, prophets, spiritual leaders.
6 (L-6)	Value system	Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain.	Self-definition with the danger of self-glorification	For: affirming ideas instilled during socialization.	Adherent responsible to the value system	Group pressures are paramount.	Disciplinary experts, political party supporters, social movement elites.
5 (L-5)	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Self-development with the danger of self-preoccupation	For: recognizing what each and all in the community need.	Participant responsible to the community		Public figures, journalists, voluntary campaigners, social movement activists.
4 (L-4)	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour	Self-interest with the danger of selfishness	For: owning what is to be achieved overall.	Individual responsible to oneself	Identity pressures are paramount.	Entrepreneurs (and everyone when acting autonomously)
3 (L-3)	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use.	Self-assertion with the danger of self-destructiveness	For: allocating value in concrete terms now.	Governor responsible to the board	Organization- or endeavour-based.	Members of commissions, governing bodies, councils, authorities, tribunals, committees.
2 (L-2)	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	Self-fulfilment with the danger of self-indulgence	For: deciding what is to be achieved now.	Leader responsible to followers	Reality pressures are paramount.	Managers, decision-makers, ministers of state.
1 (L-1)	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome.	Self-control with the danger of self-alienation	For: doing what has to be done now.	Agent responsible to the employer		Administrators unskilled labourers. functionaries

Master-Table 32

Properties of the six types of direction.
Directions ensure that activity is constrained by chosen values. Each type is a dyad formed by combining two adjacent types of purpose.
They assume certain values are held and mediate their pressures in practice as well as dealing with crucial uncertainties affecting activity.
See text for details and explanation.

Dyad No. (Levels)	Type of Direction	Function	Pressures determining Content	Uncertainty to be Resolved	Specification is especially Needed:	Social Process Gaining Agreement Handling Objections	Some Consequences of Mishandling
6 (Ls 7 & 6)	Conviction	To stabilize a person's ethical stance in changing circumstances.	From experience & For socialization	How can activities accord with one's deepest values?	When explicitly working with values.	Meditation & Reflection	•Personal demoralization •Organizations lose vitality •Corruption develops •Dogmatism thrives
5 (Ls 6 & 5)	Approach	To ensure adherents' correct participation in a community setting	From the orthodoxy & For social integration	How can activities promote the orthodox view?	When dealing with new or complex social issues.	Exhortation & Education	•Group loses cohesion •The domain malfunctions •Social debate is weakened •Zeal becomes disruptive
4 (Ls 5 & 4)	Mission	To unify participants' wholehearted efforts in an endeavour.	From popular demands & For a distinct identity	How can activities gain general social support?	When integrating a large complex organization.	Involvement & Inclusion or Exclusion	•Social antagonism grows •Efforts are diffused •Organization is hijacked •The enterprise splits
3 (Ls 4 & 3)	Role	To identify a part's current contribution to the performance of a whole.	From functions & For relationships	How can activities interact with synergy?	When expectations of individuals in a system are not clear.	Networking & Negotiation	•Conflict is institutionalised •Cooperation is neglected •People get confused •Work fails to get done
2 (Ls 3 & 2)	Policy	To coordinate leaders' independent decisions in a problematic situation.	From factions & For results	How can activities address the issues given the resources?	When controversy exists about what to aim for.	Debate & Consultation	•Controversy intensifies •Efforts are fragmented •Vicious circles develop •Issues are avoided
1 (Ls 2 & 1)	Plan	To organize essential tasks and resource use in a time schedule.	From circumstances & For logic	How can activities produce results efficiently?	When implementation is long and complicated.	Teamwork & Analysis	•Resources are wasted •Results are patchy •Delays and dissatisfaction •Disconnection from action

Master-Table 33

Properties of the five components of drive.
Drives promote change and overcome opposition to desired values. Each is a triad formed by combining three adjacent types of purpose
They are operated by individuals and organizations within communities and directed either inwardly to modify the self,
or outwardly to modify others. See text for further details and explanation.

Triad No. (Levels)	Component of Drive	Function	Desired Effect	Expression	Locus of Responsibility	Inherent Criticism	Consequence of Failure
5 (Ls 7-5)	Ideal	To commit people to desired values despite their differences.	People feel encouraged to persevere despite all obstacles.	Aspirational conception	Social movements explained by their elites.	Unrealistic	Cynicism and apathy weakens the social fabric.
4 (Ls 6-4)	Crusade	To convert people to ideas of potential social benefit.	People's energies and loyalty are enduringly harnessed	Reform agenda	Causes represented by their champions.	Extremist	People do not understand what the change is about
3 (Ls 5-3)	Campaign	To persuade people to act on dormant values which they hold in common.	People are temporarily activated to choose according to preferences	Memorable slogan	Constituencies activated by their campaigners.	Intrusive	People do not act on their values.
2 (Ls 4-2)	Initiative	To generate activities which forward given but neglected values.	People are engaged over a defined time to achieve results.	Costed proposals	Organizations advised by their experts.	Distorting	Disillusionment with management's ability to make progress.
1 (Ls 3-1)	Directive	To produce specific action when there is intractable value conflict.	People in the situation are immediately controlled.	Compulsory decree	Leaders sanctioned by the organization's crises.	Dictatorial	Deterioration in the situation due to an impasse.

Master Matrix 33

Master-Table 34

Properties of the four domains of functioning.
Functioning ensures that values are enduringly expressed in activities. Each domain of functioning is formed by conjoining purposes from four adjacent levels. Adequate functioning sustains achievement and consolidates identity in organizations, while at the same time, affecting the communal identity. See text for further details and explanation. See Master-Tables 35 and 36 for a related classification of organizations.

Tetrad No. (Levels)	Domain of Functioning	Function	Identity Relation and Communal Function	Social Process: Method Engagement	Special Work and Leadership	Communication and Desired Response	Failure is likely if:
4 (Ls 7-4)	Vision	To establish a framework of enduring values which inspire people and guide all work.	Defines identity and transforms the group because driven by ultimate values.	Personal: Reflective soul-searching which depends on: Spontaneous ownership.	Develop commitment, loyalty and enthusiasm in an open participative way, which requires: Transformative leadership.	Preaching the essence: *what we want to be!* leading to: Excitement.	Uninspiring Unintelligible Unfulfilling Dehumanized Woolly
3 (Ls 6-3)	Culture	To keep those values prominent which fit the social environment and maintain individuality.	Maintains identity and differentiates the group because driven by value systems.	Communal: Deliberate self-definition which depends on: Arduous self-indoctrination.	Use public relations to foster equal understanding and widespread adoption, which requires: Communicative leadership.	Coherent, correct current dissemination: *what we have to be!* leading to: Pride.	Incoherent Unenforced Superficial False Diffuse
2 (Ls 5-2)	Growth	To re-define endeavours so as to meet social needs and to bring benefits internally.	Supports identity and strengthens the group because driven by social values.	Disciplinary: Need-driven inquiry which depends on: Self-interested cooperation.	Use planners to stimulate ideas, to coordinate inquiry, and to evaluate possibilities, which requires: Strategic leadership.	Selective exploration in a holistic way: *what we could be!* leading to: Determination.	Impossible Simplistic Intrusive Comprehensive Data-driven
1 (Ls 4-1)	Operation	To maintain performance which efficiently produces valued outputs.	Solidifies identity and sustains the group because driven by principal objects.	Managerial: Pragmatic handling which depends on: Conscientious performance.	Exert management control to cost, program and monitor activities, which requires: Accountable leadership.	Briefing — terse but comprehensive: *what we will do!* leading to: Feeling in control.	Inefficient Uncoordinated Under-resourced Chaotic Inflexible

A ten-fold typology of organizations based on social role.
The more complicated organizations (shaded on the right) show combinations of the properties of the four mono-functional organizations.
Each type of body finds its essence in one or more of the four domains of functioning and fulfils those communal identity functions (cf. Master-Table 34).
Typing is performed by examining principal objects, and then confirmed by checking these against actual activities of the organization.
The type numbers follow the lay-out in Master-Table 36. See text for further details and examples.

Type No.	Type of Organization	Role (Function) in Society	Output	Leadership Focus	Insiders	Source of Resources	Other Types [combined types/roles]
7	Visionary (and other vision-generating types)	To transform — to apply ideals to domains and identify values for use within and across societies.	Universally needed missions.	Appointed or anointed leader.	Idealists whose ideals are promoted.	Time, money and energy from wider society.	No. 4 Ethical / No. 2 Ideological
8	Membership (and other membership-centred types)	To differentiate — to promote the value in society of distinctive roles and interests of members.	Benefits for members and, through them, society.	Active members and the wider membership.	Members whose status and security is bostered.	Membership via dues, sales, gifts, bequests &c.	No. 5 Evangelical / No. 1 Universal
9	Promotional (and other reform-generating types)	To strengthen — to focus and shape some aspect of social life within a society.	Priorities and policies for adoption and adaptation.	Governing body (including its sub-committees).	Workers/supporters (paid and unpaid) whose interests are furthered.	Grants, gifts, donations from public and/or private sources	
10	Service (and other customer-centred types)	To sustain — to do or produce specific things of tangible value to society as cheaply as possible.	Essential and desirable goods and services.	Competent top executives	Employees and the self-employed who are paid to produce.	People who get the goods or services (or others on their behalf).	No. 6 Reforming / No. 3 Sectional

Master-Table 36

Examples of organizations in each of the ten types.

Each type is labelled adjectivally only. The role(s) beneath the label link to the core domain(s) of functioning. Although other domains in the organizations are useful for society, they are not the essence of the organization. Note that the categorical examples are illustrative, not comprehensive. Specific examples come from the UK except where noted or self-evident.

See text for further details and explanation.

No.	Type of Organization & Role(s) in Society	Core Domain(s) & Communal Function(s)	Categorical Examples	Specific Examples
	Tetra-functional Type:			
1	**Universal** Vision-generating, membership-centred, reform-generating, and customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{4\cdot1}$ Transforming, differentiating, strengthening, sustaining	Universal churches Great universities World-governing organizations	Roman Catholic, Buddhist Oxford, Harvard United Nations Organisation
	Tri-functional Types:			
2	**Ideological** Vision-generating, membership-centred, and reform-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{4\cdot2}$ Transforming, differentiating, strengthening.	Ideology-based political parties Some social movement bodies	Labour Party Communitarian network USA
3	**Sectional** Membership-centred, reform-generating, and customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{3\cdot1}$ Differentiating, strengthening, sustaining.	Identity-based self-help groups Minor churches Ethnic support groups Training & regulating membership bodies	British Epilepsy Association Methodist church Greek-Cypriot Brotherhood Institute of Chartered Accountants
	Di-functional Types:			
4	**Ethical** Vision-generating, and membership-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{4\cdot3}$ Transforming, differentiating.	Some social movement bodies Some international umbrella organizations Visionary discipline-based bodies	International Alliance of Women World Medical Association Internat'l Society for Systems Sciences
5	**Evangelical** Membership-centred, and reform-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{3\cdot2}$ Differentiating, strengthening.	Ideology-based think-tanks Issue-based political parties Some religious bodies Standard-setting professional bodies Specialized campaigning groups	Institute for Public Policy Research Farmers' Party Inter-faith Network Royal College of Psychiatrists Scientists Against Nuclear Arms
6	**Reforming** Reform-generating, and customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{2\cdot1}$ Strengthening, sustaining.	Campaigning welfare charities Self-help groups International public services Some scientific bodies Some regulatory authorities	Age Concern Rambler's Association World Health Organization Royal Geographical Society Commission for Racial Equality
	Mono-functional Types:			
7	**Visionary** Vision-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{4}$ Transforming	Trans-disciplinary academic bodies Some United Nations bodies	World Academy of Art and Science World Commission on the Environment and Development
8	**Membership** Membership-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{3}$ Differentiating.	Umbrella organizations Trade unions Professional associations Trade associations Community associations	Federation of Astronomical Societies National Union of Mineworkers British Medical Association British Menswear Guild Netherhall Neighbourhood Association
9	**Promotional** Reform-generating.	$G\text{-}4^{2}$ Strengthening.	Campaigning organizations Official pressure group Most regulatory authorities Citizen action groups Political lobbies Independent think-tanks Grant-giving bodies	Friends of the Earth National Consumers' Council Gaming Board 'Free the Birmingham Six' group National Rifle Association USA Policy Studies Institute Mental Health Foundation
10	**Service** Customer-centred.	$G\text{-}4^{1}$ Sustaining.	Businesses Professional practices Voluntary welfare services Activity-based interest groups Public agencies Some regulatory authorities Governmental executive bodies	British Petroleum An architectural practice National Adoption Society Cumberland Tennis Club National Health Service Industrial relations tribunal Inland Revenue

Master-Table 37	**Properties of the three embodiments of autonomy.** These are needed to ensure that endeavours can be organized so that work within them serves wider society as well as the individual people involved. Autonomy is based on pentads formed by conjoining five adjacent types of purpose. See text for details and explanation.		
Pentad No. **(Levels)**	**3** **(Ls 7-3)**	**2** **(Ls 6-2)**	**1** **(Ls 5-1)**
Types of Endeavour	A Movement	An Authority	An Enterprise
Function	To develop and establish new values of fundamental importance to society.	To preserve values and apply them authoritatively to particular situations.	To pursue values through activities which generate tangible benefits for itself.
Effect of Success	Society transforms itself by voluntary collective action.	Society stabilizes itself by clarifying, modulating and asserting its values.	Society functions by meeting its evolving social needs effectively.
Main Criticism	Too utopian.	Too remote.	Too self-centred.
Responsible for:	Determining a way of thinking for major social issues: cultural, political, economic &c.	Handling complaints, adjudications, advice, supervision, review, protection &c.	Producing goods, services, ideas for reform, benefits for members &c.
Power Source	An idea whose time has come.	Society and its current values.	Systematic and responsive management.
Key Element	Autonomous cell.	Authorized committee.	Accountable role.
Authority	Egalitarian.	Polyarchic.	Hierarchic.
Leadership	Diffused.	Formalized.	Meritocratic.
Structures	Multiple, diverse, transient.	Simple, procedural, inflexible.	Complex, functional, flexible.
Insiders	Grass roots.	The council and its secretariat.	Governing, top officer & executant bodies.
Role of Insiders in Society	Heralds of the future who are united in the service of values.	Distinguished representatives who are legitimated to serve society as it is.	Independent agents who are harnessed in the service of a task.
Incentive to Join	Fulfilment of personal values i.e. insiders can do what they want to.	Prestige and respect i.e. insiders should do what they ought to.	Money and goods i.e. insiders must do what they have to.
Performance	Spontaneous and ideological.	Professional and sound.	Efficient and dynamic.

Master-Table 38

Designing duties to provide synergy in endeavours.

Each type of autonomous endeavour has different characteristic compartments/roles which must discharge responsibilities in relation to each relevant level of purpose. Synergy depends on achieving a necessary inter-relation of duties and authority or influence. The primary responsibility is in bold in the matrices. Note the diagonal arrangement. The two dotted lines differentiate wider society on the left, and the entity proper on the right. The centre sections mediate between wider society and the entity proper. See text for further details.

Row 5/Col.1	Row 4/Col.2	Row 3/Col.3	Row 2/Col.4	Row 1/Col.5
Provides social consensus on need	*Provides the rationale to structure & sustain*	*Provides political steering and a societal interface*	*Provides a direction to maximize impact*	*Provides the appropriately adapted means*

G-5³: A Popular Movement

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Intellectuals	Advocates	Organizers	Grass Roots
7: Ultimate Values	Affirm	Support	Promote	Reflect on	Assume
6: Value Systems	Endorse	Affirm	Support	Promote	Reflect on
5: Social Values	Debate	Endorse	Affirm	Support	Promote
4: Principal Objects	Challenge	Debate	Endorse	Affirm	Support
3: Internal Priorities	—	Challenge	Debate	Endorse	Affirm

G-5²: A Regulatory Authority

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Formal Inquiry	Instituting Body	Council	Secretariat
6: Value Systems	Recommend	Act within	Respond to	Uphold	Interpret
5: Social Values	Debate	Recommend	Act within	Respond to	Uphold
4: Principal Objects	Examine	Debate	Recommend	Act within	Respond to
3: Internal Priorities	Note	Examine	Debate	Recommend	Act within
2: Strategic Objectives	—	Note	Examine	Debate	Recommend

G-5¹: An Achieving Enterprise

Compartment Level	Wider Society	Constituting Body*	Governing Body	Top Officer Body	Executant Body
5: Social Values	Set	Pursue	Observe	Identify with	Act on
4: Principal Objects	Sanction	Set	Pursue	Observe	Identify with
3: Internal Priorities	Own	Sanction	Set	Pursue	Observe
2: Strategic Objectives	React to	Own	Sanction	Set	Pursue
1: Tactical Objectives	—	React to	Own	Sanction	Set

*Lower levels show variation in different types of organization.

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Master-Table 39

Properties of the two guardians of sovereignty.
These are required to ensure that society, its members and its activities, are regulated by values.
Each guardian is a hexad formed by combining six adjacent levels of purpose.
See text for details and explanation.

Hexad No. (Levels)	2 (Ls 7-2)	1 (Ls 6-1)
Type of Guardian	The Citizenry	The Government
Nature	To constitute a society. (i.e. the constitutive guardian/ruler.)	To regulate society. (i.e. the executive guardian/ruler.)
Function	To assert the common good: hence responsible for its government.	To serve the common good: hence responsible for collective decisions.
Members	People meeting agreed qualifications e.g. birth, property, residence; but excluding certain classes e.g. minors, prisoners, slaves.	Representative(s) obtained from the citizenry in an accepted way e.g. by election, lot, coup, nomination.
Authority	Derives from convention and the common will.	Derives from a constitution and legislation as supported by the citizenry.
Ideal	Civic virtue.	Statesmanship.
Type of Head	Symbolic e.g. monarch, head of state, religious leader.	Practical e.g. prime minister, supreme court judges.
Preoccupation	Ends i.e. ultimately emotional issues especially equality.	Means i.e. ultimately practical issues especially security and prosperity.
Dysfunction	Demagoguery (mob rule).	Despotism (rule by decree rather than law).
Criticisms	Uninformed, uninterested, uninvolved.	Out-of-touch, self-serving, incompetent.

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Master-Table 40

Properties revealing the coherence of the seven groupings of purposes.
The evolution of dualities is similar to that shown in Master-Figures 7 and 13. See Master-Figure 28 for a diagrammatic overview of the groups in the groupings. See Master-Table 29 for a summary of implications for society and for organizations. See text for further details and explanation.

L (Nos of Groups)	Grouping Focus	Function	The Process of Realizing Values	Personal Commitments	Progress	Inherent Duality Progress vs Survival
						G-1: Pragmatism
G-7 [1]	Membership needed for *Freedom*	To ensure that each person uses and evaluates their values.	*The Society:* The starting point for realizing values – an existing social order.	Each person must participate in a society despite its many imperfections.	Spirit of progress	Dissociation vs Participation
G-6 [2]	Sovereignty needed for *Power*	To ensure that society, its members and their activities, are regulated by values.	*The Guardians:* Sustaining an ethical order as a framework for realizing values.	Each person must be active as a citizen while accepting a government with its limitations.	Forces of progress	Ends vs Means
G-5 [3]	Autonomy needed for *Endeavours*	To ensure that endeavours serve the values of both society and individuals.	*Organizations:* Organizing independent people for large-scale efforts.	Each person must see themself as an independent actor, representative and member.	Organization of progress	Conflict vs Consensus
G-4 [4]	Functioning needed for *Achievement*	To ensure that values are expressed coherently and enduringly in activities.	*Social Productivity:* Using purpose, direction and drive coherently and effectively.	Each person must work meaningfully and productively, never mechanically.	Embodiment of progress	Transformation vs Evolution
G-3 [5]	Drive needed for *Change*	To ensure that desired values are installed despite resistances.	*Political Manoeuvres:* Overcoming the inevitable opposition to change.	Each person must expect to modify their own values and press others to modify theirs.	Modification of progress	Dynamism vs Stability
G-2 [6]	Direction needed for *Activity*	To ensure that chosen values focus minds and shape outcomes.	*Group Requirements:* Ensuring group values guide individual decisions.	Each person must accept restrictions on their activities to enable cooperation.	Specification of progress	Cooperation vs Individuality
G-1 [7]	Purpose needed for *Responsibility*	To ensure that values can be affirmed, chosen and pursued in a social context.	*Primal Roles:* Developing the personal tools for participating in society.	Each person must respond to their own inclinations and capabilities in social life.	Means of progress	Principles vs Pragmatism

Intentional processes in social life.
All balanced processes are in italics. Note that balance is usually achieved by using
two complementary channels. Direct influence across more than one level is not always
possible; and direct influence across more than three levels is never appropriate.
See text and the following Master Matrices for further details.

Being social: intra-level responsibility for participation

UV	By distinguishing good and evil.		
VS	By preserving ideas — which depends on:	*Idealization*	L → E
SV	By recognizing needs — which depends on:	*Assimilation*	L → E
PO	By owning endeavours.		
IP	By allocating resources — which depends on:	*Assertion*	E → L
SO	By determining an outcome.		
TO	By setting tasks with deadlines.		

Encountering reality: cross-level influences

UV → VS	*Revelation* of reality via:	Illusion B → E	Illumination B → L
VS → SV	*Socialization* into reality via:	Exhortation E → E	Instruction L → L
SV → PO	*Embodiment* within reality via:	Instigation E → B	Institution L → B
PO → IP	*Orientation* to reality via:	Accommodation B → E	Clarification B → L
IP → SO	*Decision* about reality via:	Resolution E → B	Forecasting L → B
SO → TO	*Implementation* in reality: B → B		

Changing reality: using values to by-pass resistances

UV → SV	*N/A because influence must be mediated via value systems.*		
VS → PO	*Dissemination* of values via:	Demonstration E → B	Propagation L → B
SV → IP	*Evolution* of values via:	Innovation E → L	Conservation L → E
PO → SO	*Maintenance* of values: B → B		
IP → TO	*Re-assertion* of values via:	Imposition E → B	Evaluation L → B

Maintaining humanity: by-passing group pressures

UV → PO	*Enlightenment*	B → B
VS → IP	*N/A because value systems cannot be situational and priorities must be.*	
SV → SO	*N/A because social values are too open-ended to guide useful results.*	
PO → TO	*N/A because objects are too general to guide time-targeted means.*	

Master-Figure 42

Developing the channels needed to be intentional.

Interconnections between centres of purpose formation are developed in stages: (a) shows the elemental unconnected levels which define responsibilities; (b) shows division into balanced (B), emotion-based (E), and logic-based (L) centres needed for responsible participation; (c) shows inter-level linkage with covering italicized terms where there are two channels; (d) shows by-passing of a level to change reality by overcoming inertia and resistance, again italicized terms describe a joint process involving two channels between levels; (e) shows by-passing of group pressures to maintain integrity and humanity. See text for explanations as to why other channels are inappropriate.

Responsible Participation depends on:

Encountering Reality depends on:

Changing Reality depends on:

Maintaining Humanity depends on:

L - 7 UV

L - 6 VS

L - 5 SV

L - 4 PO

L - 3 IP

L - 2 SO

L - 1 TO

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

UV = ultimate value; VS = value system; SV = social value; PO = principal object; IP = internal priority; SO = strategic objective; TO = tactical objective; B = balanced; E = emotion-based; L = logic-based.

Master-Figure 43

Effects of the various types of purpose and value on each other.
Positive form only: for negative terms see Master-Table 44.
For further details see text.

Ultimate
Values
L-7:UV(B)

← magnifies
glorifies →

reveals →
← testifies to

← legitimates
idolizes →

Dominant
Belief
L-6:VS(E)

Theoretical
Framework
L-6:VS(L)

evokes ↑
substantiates ↓

humanizes ↓
manifests ↑

perpetuates
reinforces ↓

Highlighted
Social Need
L-5:SV(E)

← sustains
confirms

← recognizes
modifies →

validates →
establishes →

Communal
Net of
Values
L-5:SV(L)

stimulates →
← promotes

← stipulates
incorporates →

re-orders ↑
introduces ↑

Principal
Objects
L-4:PO(B)

preserves ↑
conditions ↓

← demands
elucidates →

tolerates →
← re-orients

re-directs ↓
furthers ↑

Structured
Set of
Priorities
L-3:IP(L)

← focuses
restrains →

Over-riding
Priority
L-3:IP(E)

← depicts
orders →

suits →
← selects

← notes
informs →

Strategic
Objectives
L-2:SO(B)

satisfies ↑
prescribes →

initiates ↓
elaborates ↑

UV = ultimate value; VS = value system;
SV = social value; PO = principal object;
IP = internal priority; SO = strategic objective;
TO = tactical objective; B = balanced;
E = emotion-based; L = logic-based.

Tactical
Objectives
L-1:TO(B)

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Master Matrix 43

Master-Table 44

Positive and negative effects in being intentional. Channels are ordered in terms of power (cf. Master-Table 46). The effect refers to what a specification in one centre does to specifications and their use in another. Negative effects are not necessarily harmful or undesirable; and they are less precise. See text for further details.

No.	Channel	Positive Effects	Negative Effects	Social Process
1	$UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_L$	UV_B reveals VS_L / VS_L testifies to UV_B	UV_B obscures VS_L / VS_L travesties UV_B	Illumination
2	$UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_E$	UV_B magnifies VS_E / VS_E glorifies UV_B	UV_B shields VS_E / VS_E discredits UV_B	Illusion
3	$UV_B \leftrightarrow PO_B$	UV_B humanizes PO_B / PO_B manifests UV_B	UV_B diabolizes PO_B / PO_B repudiates UV_B	Enlightenment
4	$VS_L \leftrightarrow VS_E$	VS_L legitimates VS_E / VS_E idolizes VS_L	VS_L denounces VS_E / VS_E despises VS_L	Idealization
5	$VS_L \leftrightarrow SV_L$	VS_L reinforces SV_L / SV_L perpetuates VS_L	VS_L fragments SV_L / SV_L neglects VS_L	Instruction
6	$VS_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	VS_L validates PO_B / PO_B establishes VS_L	VS_L invalidates PO_B / PO_B contravenes VS_L	Propagation
7	$VS_E \leftrightarrow SV_E$	VS_E evokes SV_E / SV_E substantiates VS_E	VS_E suppresses SV_E / SV_E negates VS_E	Exhortation
8	$VS_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	VS_E sustains PO_B / PO_B confirms VS_E	VS_E undermines PO_B / PO_B betrays VS_E	Demonstration
9	$SV_L \leftrightarrow SV_E$	SV_L recognizes SV_E / SV_E modifies SV_L	SV_L denies SV_E / SV_E rejects SV_L	Assimilation
10	$SV_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	SV_L stipulates PO_B / PO_B incorporates SV_L	SV_L prohibits PO_B / PO_B opposes SV_L	Institution
11	$SV_L \leftrightarrow IP_E$	SV_L conditions IP_E / IP_E preserves SV_L	SV_L imposes IP_E / IP_E challenges SV_L	Conservation
12	$SV_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	SV_E stimulates PO_B / PO_B promotes SV_E	SV_E re-defines PO_B / PO_B counters SV_E	Instigation
13	$SV_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	SV_E re-orders IP_L / IP_L introduces SV_E	SV_E disrupts IP_L / IP_L excludes SV_E	Innovation
14	$PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_E$	PO_B tolerates IP_E / IP_E re-orients PO_B	PO_B welcomes IP_E / IP_E distorts PO_B	Accommodation
15	$PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_L$	PO_B demands IP_L / IP_L refines PO_B	PO_B rigidifies IP_L / IP_L suborns PO_B	Clarification
16	$PO_B \leftrightarrow SO_B$	PO_B re-directs SO_B / SO_B furthers PO_B	PO_B misdirects SO_B / SO_B side-tracks PO_B	Maintenance
17	$IP_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	IP_E focuses IP_L / IP_L restrains IP_E	IP_E skews IP_L / IP_L blocks IP_E	Assertion
18	$IP_E \leftrightarrow SO_B$	IP_E selects SO_B / SO_B suits IP_E	IP_E unbalances SO_B / SO_B worsens IP_E	Resolution
19	$IP_E \leftrightarrow TO_B$	IP_E prescribes TO_B / TO_B satisfies IP_E	IP_E proscribes TO_B / TO_B violates IP_E	Imposition
20	$IP_L \leftrightarrow SO_B$	IP_L orders SO_B / SO_B depicts IP_L	IP_L complicates SO_B / SO_B ignores IP_L	Vision
21	$IP_L \leftrightarrow TO_B$	IP_L informs TO_B / TO_B notes IP_L	IP_L proposes TO_B / TO_B drives IP_L	Evaluation
22	$SO_B \leftrightarrow TO_L$	SO_B initiates TO_B / TO_B grounds SO_B	SO_B excuses TO_B / TO_B perverts SO_B	Implementation

The image of intentionality:
purposes and intentional processes in social life.

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Master-Table 46

Using the twenty-two channels of intentionality.

A summary with examples of their beneficial use, the consequence of their insufficient use and an example of their misuse. A chart like this cannot be complete, especially in regard to doing things wrongly, but it can give a feel for the channels. The channels are ordered in terms of power: higher levels first and, for those levels with two centres, the dominating centre first. Where an endeavour is referred to, related terms — like organization, social body, project, initiative or ongoing activities — also apply.

No:	Social Process	Use	Disuse	Misuse
1	Illumination $UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_L$	To produce a theory or doctrine which is inspired and beneficial.	Leads to meaningless and abstruse theories and doctrines.	Developing a theory or doctrine under the influence of hatred, envy or other malign passion.
2	Illusion $UV_B \leftrightarrow VS_E$	To create beliefs which counter feelings of helplessness, confusion, futility and isolation.	Leads to physical, mental and social deterioration and eventually death.	Knowingly fostering beliefs that are harmful to a person or society.
3	Enlightenment $UV_B \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To do the humane thing despite doctrinal beliefs and social pressures	Leads to fanatical or mechanical functioning.	Using ends (ultimate values) to justify the means (principal objects) without reference to communal values.
4	Idealization $VS_L \leftrightarrow VS_E$	To enable critically refined ideas and personal energies to reinforce each other and increase group cohesion.	Leads to inconstancy or disloyalty.	Using theories or doctrines to suppress incompatible beliefs and vice versa.
5	Instruction $VS_L \leftrightarrow SV_L$	To ensure people know the right way to contribute to communal life and activities	Leads to society eventually losing knowledge.	Forcing the theory or doctrine on people irrespective of their willingness to receive it.
6	Propagation $VS_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To develop and strengthen a theoretical framework systematically within wider society.	Leads to an inability to produce any significant change in attitudes.	Infiltrating ideas into endeavours without agreement.
7	Exhortation $VS_E \leftrightarrow SV_E$	To affirm and communicate deeply-held beliefs for everyday use.	Leads to the neglect of urgent social needs.	Pestering and hectoring people who deny or reject the ideas or the supposed social problems.
8	Demonstration $VS_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To generate endeavours that express and prove beliefs, so encouraging their acceptance in the wider community.	Leads to cynical or hypocritical compartmentalization of activities.	Pursuing beliefs regardless of the cost or consequences.
9	Assimilation $SV_L \leftrightarrow SV_E$	To enable both differentiation and belonging within a community.	Leads to social disintegration	Substituting values of a sub-group (e.g. ruling elite, business) for the net of community values.
10	Institution $SV_L \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To establish social values publicly within a myriad of communally necessary endeavours.	Leads to activities being disconnected from the communal net of values.	Forcing organizations to serve the general good.
11	Conservation $SV_L \leftrightarrow IP_E$	To give due weight to values which **support** the community on which the endeavour depends.	Leads to radical or self-centred decisions causing social disruption.	Doing more of the same in response to a challenge.

Continued on next page

No.	Social Process	Use	Disuse	Misuse
12	Instigation $SV_E \leftrightarrow PO_B$	To generate and support an endeavour or social body which responds to a social need.	Leads to a lack of new endeavours; or loss of enthusiasm and focus in a current endeavour.	Taking over an endeavour and using it for factional purposes.
13	Innovation $SV_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	To enable a particular social need to be incorporated sensibly and effectively within an on-going endeavour.	Leads to an inability to meet new needs and stagnation.	Destabilizing an endeavour by introducing an irrelevant value.
14	Accommodation $PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_E$	To respond positively to uncontrollable pressures in a situation and so protect an endeavour.	Leads to collapse of the endeavour through direct attack or loss of essential support.	Surrendering to powerful factions who have little concern for the rationale of the endeavour.
15	Clarification $PO_B \leftrightarrow IP_L$	To explicate and differentially value all relevant aspects of an endeavour so it can move forward on a broad front.	Leads to neglect of minor but essential parts of the endeavour.	Developing a set of criteria and preferences to be used in all situations.
16	Maintenance $PO_B \leftrightarrow SO_B$	To keep an endeavour on course by checking all proposed outcomes against its rationale.	Leads to loss of direction and drift	Ignoring values and political considerations and acting in an unfocused opportunistic way.
17	Assertion $IP_E \leftrightarrow IP_L$	To enable both urgent priorities in a situation and the full range of valid concerns to receive due attention.	Leads to a poor focus on what really matters in any decision.	Giving excessive weight either to rationality or to social pressures.
18	Resolution $IP_E \leftrightarrow SO_B$	To force a choice of a particular outcome in the face of conflicting views about what should be done.	Leads to the neglect of inescapable pressures with explosive or devastating consequences.	Managing by crisis with cynical or expedient choices that harm the endeavour.
19	Imposition $IP_E \leftrightarrow TO_B$	To ensure that crucial values are acted upon and undesirable side-effects of achieving an outcome are avoided.	Leads to neglect of crucial values amidst the hurly-burly of action.	Handling problematic situations by habitually using directives.
20	Forecasting $IP_L \leftrightarrow SO_B$	To determine a rounded desirable and achievable outcome in the medium or long term in regard to a specific matter.	Leads to expedient short-termism	Producing excessively elaborate rational analyses based on dubious assumptions and unrelated to practical realities.
21	Evaluation $IP_L \leftrightarrow TO_B$	To assess the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of plan details and monitor their implementation.	Leads to poor use of resources and uncertainty about progress.	Evaluating as a substitute for decision and action.
22	Implementation $SO_B \leftrightarrow TO_B$	To ensure that necessary tasks are set and resourced in a way that delivers the desired outcome within a time deadline.	Leads to failure to produce desired results.	Producing results at any cost and neglecting priorities, social needs, and higher values.

INDEXES

Names
Subject

NAMES INDEX

This index includes all individuals named in the contents and chapter notes:
mythological, historical, contemporary and scientific.

SUBJECT INDEX

Key concepts and formulae are indicated in bold; (MM-#) followed by a number
identifies the page number of each numbered Master Matrix. Chapter-end notes are
indicated by *n* or *nn* after the page number e.g. 125(n3) or 125(nn3–5). The
Glossary, which can be found on pages 513 to 570, complements the index with
cross-references and synonyms. Users are also referred to the comprehensive
Names Index on pages 623 to 627.

The important thing is practice not theory.

The Talmud.